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This volume, the third and final of the ‘Documents’ series is, like its predecessors, complementary to the campaign and political volumes of the war history programme. It is based on documents held in the Prime Minister's Department and the Service departments, to which access, for the purpose of producing this collection, has always been entirely unrestricted. Their bulk is formidable, and publication in full quite impracticable; indeed, many of them are only of minor importance.
In order, therefore, to present a reasonable picture of the problems which confronted the Government of New Zealand in particular, and also those of her Allies, in the prosecution of the war in the
As with previous volumes, the documents are presented chronologically within various subject headings. The telegrams reproduced contain the errors and mutilations in transmission which exist in the originals. No effort was made at the time, except with gross errors, at any elucidation, and none has been attempted since. Most of the documents therefore appear in the form on which the Government acted: the chief exceptions are
The requirements as to the paraphrasing of messages, which applied to Volumes I and II, have now, because of effluxion of time, been waived. Where, however, multiple addresses were used, as is common practice between Commonwealth countries, only the New Zealand address is reproduced. Annotation, again for reasons of space, has been restricted.
The research for the three volumes in this series has been the work of Mr L. S. Hart and Mr C. R. McColl, formerly of the staff of the
Secretaries of State for Dominion Affairs in the United Kingdom Government during the war were:
On
Governors-General of New Zealand during the war were:
Circular telegram. Following for your Prime Minister: Prime Ministers of New Zealand during the war were:
1. His Majesty's Ambassador at Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Craigie, PC, GCMG, CB; Ambassador to
2. His Majesty's Ambassador has expressed his doubts whether the aim of preventing
3. Sir Robert Craigie considers that the issue by the United States Government of a declaration to the effect that they will not tolerate any change in the territorial status quo in the
Whether in the growing emergency in the
If so, whether it is possible to discover some common policy capable of dealing with the German drive to secure
4. He believes that if Great Britain and the
Joint assistance to
status quo of these territories is preserved.
The United States and the members of the British Commonwealth to give
The Allied Governments to receive full guarantees against reexport to enemy countries.
The question of the future status of settlements and concessions in
5. On the present procedure he thinks that such proposals should emanate from the Japanese themselves, and he has reason to believe that this might be quickest if Japanese intermediaries were to be definitely assured in advance that a settlement on these lines would
6. If, however, the
7. A telegram has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Lord Lothian, PC, KT, CH; British Ambassador at
To increase their pressure either to the extent of a full embargo or of the despatch of ships to
To seek to wean
8. The United Kingdom Government appreciate that if the
9. While there is no doubt an element of bluff in the Japanese attitude, and wiser elements in
10. In the meantime we are faced with the necessity of returning a reply to the Japanese demands which we understand have just been presented through the Ambassador:
To withdraw our garrison from
To close the
To close the Burmese frontier to supplies to Generalissimo
11. As to (1), we feel that as the b). It is questionable, however, whether we could delay our reply for very long.
12. As to the second demand, we may be able to satisfy
13. His Majesty's Ambassador has been asked to put these considerations before the United States Government at the earliest possible moment and to invite their observations.
His Majesty's Ambassador has been authorised to add that if there is war in the
Reference my Circular telegram of 26 June.
The following telegram has been received from His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of
‘The Commonwealth Government has given prolonged consideration to the questions in issue, and is in full agreement with the conclusion of the British Ambassador at
‘From reports and information from various quarters it seems to us that
‘To our mind it is imperative at the outset to have a clear indication of
‘We consider that the present three Japanese demands do not in themselves vitally affect the future or present security of the Empire. French acceptance of similar demands has further strengthened the Japanese position, and we can only arrive at the conclusion that if the
‘As to the suggestions of Craigie for a general settlement, the basis of negotiation so far as they visualise the complete independence and integrity of
‘We cannot believe that
‘At the same time, we see virtue in this proposal of mediation for the termination of the Sino-Japanese war, only if the specific object and result is a tripartite declaration regarding the status quo in the Western Pacific and guarantees as to respective territorial integrity in the designated spheres, to which the
‘This latter may in fact prove difficult to obtain but, failing it, the
‘Generally we agree with the view that it would be contrary to the successful prosecution of the war for the
The following reply has been sent:
‘
‘After full consideration the
To agree to the withdrawal of the
To make inquiry as to the precise grounds for complaint at
With regard to the On the recommendation of Sir Robert Craigie, who considered that ‘there would be a serious risk that a reply on these lines would lead to a state of war with
‘Finally, it is proposed to say that, far from being instrumental in prolonging hostilities, His Majesty's Government in the
‘In arriving at the above conclusion His Majesty's Government in the
‘As the Commonwealth Government are aware, the
‘We are inclined to agree with Sir Robert Craigie that a refusal to close the
‘In the light of the above, and in view of the very bad effect which the closing of the
‘We fully appreciate the considerations advanced by the Commonwealth Government from the point of view of
‘We are repeating your telegram and this reply to His Majesty's Governments in
We should be grateful if we could be informed as soon as possible whether His Majesty's Government in New Zealand concur in the terms of the reply which it is proposed to send to
With reference to your Circular telegram of 26 June [No. 1], my Ministers ask me to convey to you the text of a telegram which has today been despatched to the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth of
‘I thank you for your telegram of 28 June Repeated in No. 2.
The delicacy and danger of the situation.
The desirability of obtaining a clear indication of
The desirability, if circumstances allow, of retaining the United States Fleet in the
The extreme undesirability of any act or omission on our part which might have the effect of unnecessarily precipitating trouble with
The undesirability of any attempt to haggle with
The undesirability in the best interests of the British Commonwealth of the involvement of the
The probable futility of the suggestion that in the present circumstances
‘On the other hand we are most sceptical as to whether status quo in the
‘Again we cannot bring ourselves to believe that the offer of mediation that you propose, in the absence of
‘A copy of this telegram has today been despatched to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.’
My Ministers desire me to inform you that their general views on the Far Eastern situation and on your Circular telegram of 26 June are set out in a telegram sent this morning to the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of
My Ministers are in general agreement with the point of view expressed in your telegram of 2 July (Part 2 of which was received in a mutilated condition and was not deciphered or considered before the despatch of the above-mentioned telegrams). At the same time my Ministers feel that it would be preferable to await the result of the approach made to the United States Government before any reply is made to The New Zealand Government on 5 July telegraphed its concurrence with the terms of the reply to be sent to
A copy of this telegram is being sent to
Circular telegram. My Circular telegram of 10 July, D. 327. Not published. In this telegram the Dominions Secretary reported that the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr Hachiro Arita) had expressed disappointment at the British reply to the Japanese demands and requested an assurance that exports of war material from the
In view of the attitude of the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr Arita was Minister for Foreign Affairs from 16 January to 21 July 1940.
2. Sir Robert Craigie has pointed out that the possibility of the resumption of traffic in October would be a lever for ensuring adequate Japanese attention to any suggestions which we and the
3. After further consideration of the situation it has been decided to inform Sir Robert Craigie as follows:
4. The solution which we should prefer if it could be obtained would be that for a period of three months, and on the understanding referred to in the latter part of paragraph (1), the transit of the materials in question should be not banned, but limited to the quantities during the corresponding period last year.
5. If Sir Robert Craigie cannot obtain this solution or thinks it unwise to attempt it, he is being authorised at once to put forward the proposal in the form which he suggests. He has been informed that the more restricted the list of war materials is the better. He will be at
6. Sir Robert Craigie is being instructed to add that His Majesty's Government in the
7. The United States Government are being informed of our decision and of the reasons for reaching it.
Sir Harry Batterbee, GCMG, KCVO; High Commissioner for the
Your telegram of 12 July, No. 285. Not published. Sir Harry Batterbee reported a conversation with Mr Fraser in which the latter had expressed his concern that concessions to
We entirely sympathise with the general attitude of the Prime Minister of New Zealand; in particular, the importance of not taking any action which would antagonise
His Majesty's Ambassador at
Please speak to the Prime Minister in the above sense.
Circular telegram. The Prime Minister Prime Ministers of the
On 24 June the
From 17 July to 17 October 1940. Not published.
My Prime Minister asks me to convey to you the text of the following communication which has today been despatched to the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of
‘I am very much obliged to you for your telegram of 27 July Not published. In this telegram the Commonwealth Government expressed its views on the Far Eastern situation and requested the observations of the Viscount Bruce of Repeated in No. 3.
‘We have never understood why the policy set out in the Secretary of State's telegram to us of 2 July On 16 July the Japanese Cabinet resigned. Prince Konoye became Prime Minister and Mr Matsuoka Foreign Minister.
‘In short, while we neither understand nor sympathise with the policy that has been adopted vis-à-vis
‘We have no specific comments and no objections to make to the considerations set out in your telegram, except that we gravely question the possibility of enlisting
‘We warmly endorse your suggestion that His Majesty's Government in the
‘Finally, we attach the greatest importance to the fullest possible exchange of views in this matter between New Zealand and
‘In our opinion the position in the
Repeated to the Commonwealth of
Your telegram of 30 July repeating the message sent to the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of
We are sorry to learn from your telegram that the
We realised throughout that the
We do not regard our yielding to the Japanese demands in relation to the force majeure in accordance with general advice which, it will be remembered, was given to us by the United States Government.
It is our constant endeavour to consult and inform Dominion Governments as fully as possible on questions of major policy affecting the
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand much appreciate your most secret telegram of 3 August. They fully realise that in the existing circumstances there must arise occasions upon which action must be taken by His Majesty's Government in the No. 5.
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have now had an opportunity of perusing the telegram of 6 August from the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Not published. This telegram contained the Commonwealth Government's views on British proposals concerning retaliatory action for the recent arrest of British subjects in Not published. Reported a British decision to arrest certain Japanese nationals in British territory against whom there was a prima facie case on the grounds of espionage.
They fully agree as to the desirability of consultation.
They warmly support the policy of making every possible effort to avoid hostilities with
This telegram has been repeated to
Please communicate to the Prime Minister the following personal and most secret message from the Prime Minister:
The Combined Staffs are preparing a paper on the
2. Should Japan nevertheless declare war on us, her first objective outside the Yellow Sea would probably be the Dutch East Indies. Evidently the
3. We are about to reinforce with more first-class units the
4. A final question arises: whether
5. We hope, however, that events will take a different turn. By gaining time with Not published. In this message to all the Dominion Prime Ministers, Mr Churchill reviewed the position of the
6. The
7. The Navy increases in strength each month and we are now beginning to receive the immense programme started at the declaration of war. Between June and December 1940 over 500 vessels, large and small, but many most important, will join the Fleet. The German Navy is weaker than it has ever been. The ScharnhorstScharnhorst, battle-cruiser, 32,000 tons, nine 11-inch guns, speed 30 knots. Sunk in action Gneisenau, sister ship to
Bismarck, battleship, about 45,000 tons, eight 15-inch guns, speed 30 knots. Sunk in action
Tirpitz, sister ship to Bismarck. Attacked by midget submarines in
Heavy cruisers, about 15,000 tons, eight 8-inch guns, speed 30 knots. The first of the five ships of this class was named Admiral Hipper.
8. We therefore feel a sober and growing conviction of our power to persevere through the year or two that may be necessary to gain victory. In a message sent through the High Commissioner for the
My following message, Circular Z. 214, See Appendix IV.
2. The appreciation is based on the following important assumptions:
That the military situation in other theatres, i.e., in immediate future. For the present, therefore, we shall have to retain a fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean.
That the attitude of the
That we should go to war with
3. The third assumption above is arbitrary and, in fact, the question whether we should or should not go to war with Assumption 3 begins)’ and end with the words ‘(Assumption 3 ends)’.
4. We fully appreciate the strategic disadvantage of a failure to take up the Japanese challenge in such circumstances, and the main point for further examination is whether our limited resources in the
5. In the light of the third assumption above it would be logical that the appreciation should recommend immediate staff conversations with the Dutch in the
6. It will be seen from paragraph 34 of the appreciation that an attempt has been made to assess, on the basis of such information as is at the Chiefs of Staff's disposal, the scale of a possible Japanese attack on
7. As regards paragraph 34 of the appreciation, the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff, like the
8. In paragraph 50 of the appreciation certain conclusions are drawn as to the garrison required in
Circular telegram. Following for Prime Minister:
1. Thailand. Anglo-Thai non-aggression pact was ratified on 31 August.
2. Japan. There appears to be a danger of the broad issues involved in the
The spirit of the agreement is to forbid the transit of certain articles but to place no obstacle in the way of traffic in non-prohibited goods.
The agreement is temporary and does not therefore justify measures designed to forbid the accumulation of goods in
The Japanese are trying to expand the agreement in various ways incompatible with its general spirit and in particular with (1) and (2) above.
What are the Japanese doing for their part to fulfil their side of the bargain, i.e., special effort to reach a general settlement in the
Circular telegram. Following for your Prime Minister:
Burma Road. Less than two months remain before the
2. Nothing has happened to suggest that the
3. The United States Government have indicated willingness to discuss with us what measures of support the
4. Our decision will obviously have to depend on our war position at the end of the intervening period. Any setback would still further prejudice our position in the
5. On the other hand, the failure of
6. To do so without due preparation, however, would doubtless be the signal for a fresh anti-British agitation in
7. Preparatory action must (i) avoid allowing the Japanese to make it appear that, if we do not keep the
8. With these considerations in mind His Majesty's Ambassador at Mr Y. Matsuoka, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, 22 Jul 1940–16 Jul 1941.
9. We should be grateful for your views. A telegram on 5 September from the Dominions Secretary advised that paragraph 9 ‘should be read as referring to the general question of the
My Ministers have now had an opportunity of considering your most secret and personal telegrams to your High Commissioner [Nos. 11 and 12] and Circular Z. 214 of 12 August
In the first place my Ministers would like His Majesty's Government in the
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand offer the following immediate comments on those aspects of the matter upon which specific requests for their views have been made:
1. The main problem as it appears to them is not so much (as set out in your telegram [No. 12]) ‘whether our limited resources in the
2. They do not believe that this can be considered solely or even primarily as a military problem.
3. The political aspects seem to them to be of even greater importance than the military, and the problem involves also the question of honour and of that indefinable which for want of a better word might be referred to as prestige. Our honour, and our reputation for fair and generous dealing, they feel, are among the most valuable attributes of the British Commonwealth—so valuable that without them our cause might not prevail. We must bear in mind that, in the event of a Japanese attack on the
4. Turning now to the military aspects of the matter, they agree that for the time being there is little that the British Commonwealth, and particularly New Zealand, could do, other than by example and encouragement, to support the Dutch, and they agree also that the Dutch refusal up to the present to concert plans with us is an embarrassing factor that cannot be ignored. But, as they see it, Japanese control of the
5. It is their opinion, therefore, that the British Commonwealth cannot afford, on the material side, to allow a Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies, nor on the moral side remain neutral and inactive
6. It seems to His Majesty's Government in New Zealand therefore:
That we are bound, both by honour and interest, to act with what vigour we can in the case of Japanese aggression in the Dutch East Indies, which we should let it be known we would regard as a hostile act;
that we should accept, and as far as possible prepare against, the disadvantageous position (temporary they hope) in which we would be placed vis-à-vis
that the Dutch should at once be advised of our attitude to
that at the same time the Dutch should be informed of our difficulties in providing immediate powerful military, naval and air force assistance but that steps are already under way to overcome these limitations, and they should be informed also of our firm resolve to do all in our power to come to their assistance if attacked;
that the Dutch should be suitably warned of the obvious results, as so patently exemplified in
that the policy outlined above should be explained fully to the United States Government, whose sympathy would be valuable and whose collaboration in such a policy it might not be impossible to obtain.
This telegram has been repeated to
Repeated to the Governments of
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have now given careful consideration to your Circular telegram dated 4 September [No. 14] from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs concerning the closing of the
They hold this belief on the grounds that such a concession at the expense of
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand realise full well the difficulties now confronting the
In any case, the war position of the British Commonwealth is no worse than it was in July last and, indeed, prospects seem likely to be better in a few weeks' time than they are today. Should the Mr Cordell Hull, Secretary of State of the Not published. On 16 September His Majesty's Ambassador in
Since Japan has made no attempt whatever to comply with the understanding that the period of the agreement should be used to explore the terms of a general settlement, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand consider that the Governments of the British Commonwealth are justified in claiming that their concessions have met with no corresponding response. In actual fact, of course, the Japanese have taken, and are continuing to take, full advantage of British and French weakness to make further gains and thereby to prosecute the war against
The danger of adding to the numbers of our enemies at this critical time must obviously be taken into consideration, and it is of course more dangerous to open the road now than formerly it would have been to decline to close it, but His Majesty's Government in New Zealand feel that the risk of converting the enmity of
Circular telegram. Burma Road. Following for Prime Minister:
We greatly value the views which you have furnished in reply to my Circular telegram of 4 September [No. 14], and these have been most carefully considered. Since my telegram was despatched there have been two major developments, ( Japanese forces entered A 10-year pact between a) the Japanese entry into Indo-b) the German-Italian-Japanese pact;a) the United States Government hope that the road will not remain closed after 17 October; (b) cancellation of
c) in order to avoid a second crisis three weeks hence the best course would be to notify the
His Majesty's Ambassador at
The War Cabinet considered the matter today and came to the conclusion that in the present circumstances there was no alternative to the adoption of this course. We are confident that your Government will concur in this view. It is accordingly proposed that the decision would be announced by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons next Tuesday in the sense that the agreement was concluded for a [group mutilated–definite?] period and there has been no provision for renewal, and in any case, in view of recent developments, His Majesty's Government in the
Viscount Cranborne had succeeded Viscount Caldecote as Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs on 3 October.
Your Circular telegram of 3 October. My Prime Minister asks me to advise you that His Majesty's Government in New Zealand fully agree with the course that is being adopted regarding the
Circular telegram.
Please give the following message to the Prime Minister:
Recent reports from His Majesty's Ambassador at
In a recent conversation with His Majesty's Ambassador, Mr Cordell Hull threw out the idea of private staff talks between the
His Majesty's Ambassador has been informed that any other suggestions for co-ordinated reaction to the Japanese-Axis pact which the Not published. Paragraphs 2 and 3 read: ‘2. Netherlands East Indies. The Netherlands Government inform us that the Japanese are now asking for 3,150,000 tons of oil per annum over and above normal exports to
‘3. We have pointed out to Lord Lothian that we feel that the Japanese attack on the
The question of parallel declarations by the Lord Casey, PC, CH, DSO, MC (then Rt. Hon. R. G. Casey); Australian Minister to the
The question of a possible visit by a Not published. Mr Fraser replied on 9 October welcoming ‘the possibility of still closer relations between the British Commonwealth and the
Circular telegram. For the Prime Minister of New Zealand.
As will be seen from the message in my Circular telegram of today [No. 19] the question of further action in relation to
With reference to Circular telegram of 8 October addressed to the High Commissioner for the For several months after the reopening of the inter alia, in the sections Defence of New Zealand, Defence of the South Pacific and Fanning Island.
This telegram has been repeated to
Circular telegram.
1. We have been considering possible steps which we could take inter alia in the economic sphere as counter action in the event of further Japanese moves to the south. Two suggestions have been made which seem worth considering as possible reprisals. They are:
The placing of Mitsui, Mitsubishi, or Okura on the Black List, and
Denunciation of the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty. Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, signed
2. Our preliminary views on these two suggestions are as follows:
3. Black-listing of one or other of the above firms might bring home to Japanese industrialists the perils of bad leadership…. A brief comment on the priority for black-listing has been omitted.
4. The argument in favour of denouncing the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty is that, although a year must elapse before its expiry, a denunciation would have a considerable political effect in
5. We have asked His Majesty's Ambassador at
6. We should be grateful for any observations Dominion Governments may wish to offer on these two proposals.
Your Circular telegram of 5 April. The views of His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are in general as follows:
1. They are and always have been firmly opposed to any policy of appeasement with
2. At the same time His Majesty's Government in New Zealand realise that the circumstances are now exceedingly delicate and that any unnecessary irritation at the present juncture would be unwise. They feel, therefore, firstly, that action such as is now contemplated should be taken only in the event of the ‘Japanese move to the south’, which these measures are intended to follow, being sufficiently unequivocal and important, and, secondly, that the action is made in co-operation with or with the knowledge and sympathy of the
3. Of the two proposals set out in the Secretary of State's telegram, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand prefer the denunciation of the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty, leaving the question of placing Mitsui, Mitsubishi, or Okura on the Black List for subsequent consideration.
4. Should notice of termination of the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty be given, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand will undertake to take a similar step with reference to their trade arrangements with
Hon. W. Nash. Mr Fraser had left New Zealand on 3 May on a visit to the
This message was repeated to the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are in general agreement with the recommendations of the British– British and American staff talks began in Not published. The United States and British view was that the transfer of part of the
2. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are also in general agreement with the recommendations of the ADB and BD Meetings between American, Dutch and British service representatives, and between the British and Dutch, took place at
3. With reference to paragraph 42 Paragraph 42 defined the responsibility of the United States Pacific Fleet. Admiral Sir Edward Parry, KCB, RN (then Commodore Parry); Chief of New Zealand Naval Staff, May 1940–Jun 1942.
Circular telegram. My telegram of 25 June, Circular D. 373. Not published. In a brief comment on the likely attitude of the
Information from most secret … sources shows that the
2. His Majesty's Ambassador at Rt. Hon. the Earl of Mr Sumner Welles, Under-Secretary of State of
Circular telegram. My Circular telegram of 5 July.
We have now considered what action should be taken in the event of a further move south by
Restrictions on Japanese shipping facilities in
The possible denunciation of the Commercial Treaty.
2. We will telegraph separately in the near future in regard to (2). As regards (1), the Commanders-in-Chief in the Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, GCVO, KCB, CMG, DSO, AFC; C-in-C Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton, GBE, KCB, KCMG, DSO; C-in-C
3. We have hesitated hitherto to enforce measures of this kind since, though outwardly non-discriminatory, they will entail heavy loss and delay to Japanese mining companies. The Governor of the Straits Settlements Sir Shenton Thomas, GCMG, OBE; Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Straits Settlements and High Commissioner for the Malay States, 1934–46; interned by Japanese, Feb 1942 – Aug 1945. In the text omitted the Dominions Secretary discussed the likely effects of this measure on the Japanese iron and steel industry.
My Circular telegram of 9 July. Japan.
The possible denunciation of the Commercial Treaty in the event of a further southward move by
2. We have given most careful consideration to these views and suggestions re-examining the possible courses of action open to us. In deciding to recommend the denunciation of the Commercial Treaty, notwithstanding the doubts previously expressed, we have been influenced by the manner in which the situation has developed in recent months, and by the need for meeting any further Japanese move by a measure which could both be put into effect without delay and would at the same time afford unmistakable evidence of our reactions. We fully recognise that the practical importance of this step would be small, but do not consider that it could be regarded as provocative. On the other hand, we have reason to believe that the psychological effects in
3. We very much hope, therefore, that on reconsideration His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions will feel able to concur in our taking this step as soon as the moment is judged opportune. Although we should wish to proceed with the denunciation of the treaty at a very short interval after the Japanese move into Southern Indo-
4. A very early reply would be appreciated since the latest indications are that a Japanese move may be imminent. As to the general Not published. In the event of an ‘overt act’ by
Circular telegram. My Circular telegram of 12 July.
Following for Prime Minister:
Reliable information has now reached us indicating that the Japanese have demanded, or are about to demand, bases in South Indo-
With reference to your telegram of 15 July, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand agree with the proposal to denounce the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty in the event of steps being taken by See p. 38, note 1.
You will have seen from our telegram dated 16 July to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs that the Not published. Not published.
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
With reference to your Circular telegram of 15 July [No. 28] and my reply of 16 July [No. 29], His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have given further consideration to the implications of the proposed denunciation of the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty in the event of steps being taken by Not published.
Circular telegram. My Circular telegram of 12 July [No. 27].
All His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions have now concurred in our proposal to proceed at the appropriate moment with the denunciation of the Commercial Treaty. We are accordingly informing the United States Government that we propose to take this step immediately there is any overt act on the part of
2. The Commonwealth Government have stressed to us the importance of following up the above action with intensified economic restrictions. We fully agree with this view and hope to telegraph detailed proposals as soon as we have received a further indication of the United States Government's intentions; see my telegram M.158. Not published. This telegram reported the United States Government's intention to impose an immediate embargo on exports to
3. In the meantime certain further possible measures have also occurred to us. They are:
The closing of the Japanese Consulate-General at
The placing of Ishihara and Okura on the Statutory List.
4. As regards (1), we have ample evidence of improper activities of the Japanese Consul-General to justify this action and do not consider that it would lead to dangerous reactions in
5. As regards (2), Ishihara is connected specially with Japanese enterprises in Not published. On 19 July the acting Prime Minister replied: ‘His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have no objection to offer to the step now proposed by His Majesty's Government in the
My telegram of 17 July. Japan.
We are grateful for your telegram of 16 July [No. 29], and note that in the event of it becoming necessary to proceed with the denunciation of the Commercial Treaty His Majesty's Government in New Zealand would wish to take steps at the same time to terminate the trade agreement between New Zealand and
2. As regards procedure, notice of the termination of the Commercial Treaty would be given to [sic] His Majesty's Ambassador,
3. If desired by the
4. Alternatively, the Mr N. Nakafuji.
5. We should be grateful for a very early reply indicating which of the above courses the The New Zealand Government replied on 20 July that it would give notice of termination, ‘if and when the occasion arises’, through the Japanese Consulate-General in
Circular telegram. My Circular telegram of 15 July [No. 28]. Japan.
1. We learn from a most secret source that the new A new Cabinet was formed on 18 July. Prince Konoye remained Prime Minister, but Vice-Admiral Toyoda replaced Mr Matsuoka as Minister for Foreign Affairs. A security direction has been omitted.
3. The State Department have also informed us that they have learned that eleven Japanese troopships left ports in
Circular telegram. Japan. My telegram M. 166, paragraph 1 (
Not published. Paragraph 1 (a) reads: ‘In response to inquiries as to the economic action the United States Government contemplate in the event of a) the freezing of all Japanese and Chinese assets, the latter at the request of the Chinese Government.’
My immediately following telegram Not published. This telegram, M.173, despatched on 22 July, was delayed in transmission.
Our policy has hitherto been to do everything possible to avoid war with
Weighing these considerations, the conclusions we have reached are:
That we must on no account discourage action which the
That we must in the paramount interest of co-operation with the
That if we are called upon to go to lengths which involve a plain risk of war with
We hope that these conclusions will commend themselves to His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions.
In view of the expected imminent Japanese move south we are most anxious to make our [group mutilated – intentions?] known to the United States Government at once and should be grateful for the earliest possible expression of views by immediate telegram.
Circular telegram. My preceding telegram M. 173. See p. 43, note 6. Japan. Following for Prime Minister:
1. While detailed application of
The complete freezing of all Japanese assets, which thereafter would be immobilised except in so far as specific licences might be granted for particular transactions.
The subjection of all imports from
Further restrictions on exports of petroleum products to
2. As regards (1), the United States Government apparently anticipate that the immediate effect of the freezing order will be to bring to a standstill all trade between
3. In accordance with the general conclusions set out in my telegram [No. 35], we think it important that we and other British Commonwealth Governments should follow the Statutory Rules and Orders. Not published.
4. We should be glad to learn by immediate telegram if possible whether the Dominion Governments would be willing to take similar action simultaneously with us. It will be appreciated that the general conception underlying the
5. Application of the regulation to
6. A further telegram will be sent as regards paragraph 1 (2) as soon as we know in more detail the degree of restriction of imports contemplated by the United States Government.
Government and See p. 43, note 6.
Circular telegram. Japan.
We have considered our conclusions further in the light of views expressed by the Canadian, Commonwealth and New Zealand Governments. We fully appreciate the vital importance, to which all three Governments have called attention, of securing the clearest possible indication that the active armed support of the
2. Having regard to constitutional difficulties in the
3. We have considered whether it would be possible to inform the United States Government that we are prepared to take action parallel with theirs, and at the same time to make it clear that we are assuming that if, in consequence, an attack on the
4. In our view the United States Government will in fact be compelled to support us if the need arises. It is clear that if the Japanese are provoked to extreme measures it will be as a result of the drastic effect of action taken by the
5. With these considerations in mind we feel convinced that the proper course is to follow the
6. We earnestly trust that His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions will feel able to agree to our taking this line with the United States Government. We feel it essential to make known to the United States Government forthwith our willingness to take parallel action with them, and should be grateful, therefore, for a reply by most immediate telegram.
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
Your telegram of 25 July. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are fully in accord with the viewpoint that, should the
The following is the text of a statement made in Parliament today by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 23 Dec 1940–26 Jul 1945.
I ask the leave of the House to make a brief statement on recent
A pact granting
His Majesty's Government regard these developments as a potential threat to their own territories and interests in the Mr Sumner Welles.
I do not propose today to give an account of the measures which His Majesty's Government have prepared to meet these and other possible developments. I will give the House further information at an early date, but I can state at once that certain defence measures in
Circular telegram. My telegram of 17 July [No. 32], paragraph 1. Following for your Prime Minister:
Japan. Following on statements regarding the action of
My telegram [No. 41]. Japan.
It would be appreciated if we could be informed as soon as notice of termination of New Zealand's trade agreement with
We should also be glad to learn the
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
With reference to your telegram of 25 July [No. 42]. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are serving notice of denunciation of the New Zealand –
Circular telegram. My Circular telegram M.199. Not published. Reported a discussion between the British Minister at Thailand.
Indications have been accumulating that the Japanese may be contemplating an early move into
2. We are not satisfied that the above information concerning Japanese demands is necessarily reliable, but it is clear that Thai Government circles are seriously apprehensive and this apprehension is no doubt reinforced by the continued agitation about
3. Further telegrams from His Majesty's Minister report that both the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made earnest appeal to him to the effect that, if
4. On 30 July His Majesty's Minister reported that the Thai Prime Minister had not only approved and associated himself with this appeal, but had given him the following urgent and very secret message for the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:
‘It is to be expected that
5. We are consulting with the United States Government at once in regard to the
Circular telegram. My Circular telegram of 1 August. Japan.
1. The possibility that the Japanese may be contemplating early action in relation to Not published. Discussed the difficulty ‘in the present circumstances’ of securing a guarantee of armed support from the Not published. Contained details of the steps being taken by the United States Government to control imports from and exports to See p. 43, note 6.
2. My three immediately following telegrams Not published.
The question of an assurance from the
Warning to
The freezing of Japanese assets.
The nature of information reaching us about Mr J. G. Winant, United States Ambassador to Great Britain, 1941–46.b) and (c) is very urgent; (a) is equally pressing, but it is a particularly delicate question and informal discussions here with the United States Ambassadora) to await his observations before giving him definite instructions to take action.
Circular telegram. My Circular telegram M.207. Not published. Reported a further appeal by the Thai Prime Minister for support from the Thailand.
On 1 August His Majesty's Minister at Not published. The text of telegraphic instructions sent to the British Ambassador at
Rt. Hon. R. G. Menzies.
Repeated to the Prime Ministers of
Following for Prime Minister from Prime Minister:
My colleagues and I have given anxious consideration to the Far Eastern position. We have, as you know, always regarded
We have also assumed that in the event of war with
We also once more urge that, having regard to the grave tension at present existing, air and military reinforcements to
Should we, the British countries, be prepared to make it clear to casus belli?
Should we announce this to the countries concerned independently of
We are of the opinion, as the Government of one of the two British Dominions which are most directly affected, that the first question should be answered ‘Yes’, and that while every pressure should be maintained upon the
Having regard to reality in the
The attitude of the coup in Indo-
We feel that if we are prepared to fight,
Naturally in all this we are assuming that whatever we do will be done in the closest consultation and agreement with the
We express these views frankly and with the realisation of their implications so that you may see the supreme importance which we attach to them.
Repeated to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and the Prime Ministers of
Your telegram of 11 August.
1. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand share the anxiety of His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of
2. They concur in the viewpoint that
3. With the views of His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of
4. They have always assumed that, in the event of an outbreak of war, effect would be given to the assurances of His Majesty's Government in the
5. It is agreed that an early discussion concerning the British attitude See Vol. I, vis-à-vis casus belli. It seems to them unwise to take such action unless and until there is available a force sufficiently strong to ensure successful resistance to Outbreak of War and Declarations: Germany.
6. It appears to His Majesty's Government in New Zealand moreover that, having encouraged
7. The force of the arguments put forward by His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth for making a stand is fully admitted but the question of expediency cannot be overlooked. Before any clear definition of policy can be agreed upon, it seems necessary to ascertain what military resources are available in the
8. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand would therefore welcome a very early appreciation of the strategical position in regard to
9. The choice seems to be not so much one of abandoning
Circular telegram.
1. We have received from the United States Government information as to communications made by them on 17 August, i.e., since the President's return from his meeting with the Prime Minister, The meetings took place on 9–12 August on board HMS Admiral K. Nomura, Japanese Ambassador in Prince of Wales and the Augusta in Placentia Bay,
2. The first communication refers briefly to Japanese action in Indo-
3. The second communication indicates the readiness of the
4. We are considering what further action we ourselves should now enforce in relation to
Circular telegram. My telegram of 27 August.
We have now given further consideration to the question of the action which it would be appropriate for us to take in respect of
We should prefer to link our own warning specifically with that given by the Rt. Hon. Sir Ronald Campbell, PC, GCMG, CB; United Kingdom Minister in aide-memoire of what is said might be communicated to the Japanese authorities.
We are making it clear to the United States Government that our communication would be subject to the concurrence of His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions. We hope the Dominion Governments would agree in principle with the line which we propose to take, and would also be prepared to make similar communication to the
We will telegraph further as soon as we receive a reply from His Majesty's Minister at
Circular telegram. My immediately preceding telegram. The following are the terms of Formula 1:
‘His Majesty's Government in the
‘His Majesty's Government, therefore, who have for their part no aggressive intentions either against the countries bordering on British territories or against
The following are the terms of the second formula:
‘His Majesty's Government in the
‘His Majesty's Government, therefore, who have for their part no aggressive intentions either against these countries or against
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
Your telegrams of 28 August.
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand fully concur in the proposal of His Majesty's Government in the
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are, moreover, willing to authorise His Majesty's Government in the
Circular telegram. My Circular telegram of 28 August [No. 51].
His Majesty's Minister at
That (as had been our intention) our warning should be made confidentially to the
That our objection to Japanese encroachment should not relate to the ‘South-West Pacific area’ but be made more broadly and take the form of a warning against continuance of the war and expansion policy and the programme of conquest by force. The basis of this suggestion is the desire of the
That the express mention of the word ‘war’ be avoided on the grounds that public opinion in
2. As regards Konoye suggested a meeting between himself and President Roosevelt ‘to explore the possibility of saving the situation’.
3. Recent events such as the President's warning and the Prime Minister's broadcast, the United States Government's oil policy in respect of Under the leadership of Brigadier-General John Magruder, the mission arrived at Chungking in
4. Further consideration in the light of the above is being given to the question of the action to be taken by us.
Following is a most secret and personal message from the Prime Minister for the Prime Minister:
Events about
2. As soon as the President had made these declarations I made the statement in my broadcast which conformed to all we had agreed upon with you and the other Dominions beforehand and has since been endorsed by all. Encouraged by this,
3. Nevertheless, the growth of our battleship strength, the ravages made in the German Navy, which is now reduced, apart from the Tirpitz and the U-boats, to very [group mutilated – modest] proportions, and the measure we now have of the Italian Navy, will make it possible in the near future for us to place heavy ships in the
Mr Fraser arrived back in New Zealand on 13 September.
My telegram of 2 September [No. 53].
We have now given full consideration to the question whether it would be desirable to convey a formal warning to
It will be remembered that in his broadcast of 24 August the Prime Minister, referring to the menace created by
A subsequent discussion with the United States Secretary of State indicated that the The word revised in the draft formula was ‘war’. See No. 53, paragraph 1 (c).
We have ourselves reached the conclusion that in the present circumstances no useful purpose would now be served by the issue of a warning by us at once so wide and so relatively vague as that of the
We should propose, therefore, that the United States Government be informed accordingly. It is, however, important that the United States Government should be given no grounds for thinking that we had not taken action in this matter fully corresponding to their own. We propose, therefore, to word our communication so as to indicate that if they thought that we could usefully make any further statement we would do so, but that in our judgment it was undesirable to add anything at this stage to the Prime Minister's broadcast.
We should be glad to learn as soon as possible whether His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions concur in a communication being addressed to the United States Government on the above lines.
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand fully concur in the proposal of His Majesty's Government in the
Circular telegram. Japan.
The following is a repetition of a telegram sent to His Majesty's Ambassador,
‘Since your conversation with Mr Hull the In the new Japanese government formed on 17 October, General H. Tojo was Prime Minister and Mr S. Togo Minister for Foreign Affairs.a) the stimulus which the German advance on b) the effective pressure of our economic embargo on
‘2. It is possible that the direction which the Japanese will take is southward, e.g., into American, British, Chinese and Dutch. On 16 October it was announced that the Soviet Government was evacuating
‘3. Even though there is little effective action that we could take in this eventuality (and you should make it clear that we have taken no decision on the point) it is desirable that we should enter into consultation with the United States Government at once. So long as our Russian allies are resisting
‘4. Still more important is the question whether we can afford to allow
‘5. Indo- See p. 49, note 1.
‘6. We have been well content to leave the handling of the Japanese problem to the
‘7. Naturally we should still prefer if possible to keep
‘8. Please communicate the foregoing to Mr Hull and ask whether he can inform us of the action which the United States Government contemplates in the event of a Japanese attack on
See also my immediately following telegram.
Circular telegram. Japan. My immediately preceding telegram.
1. Lord Halifax has reported that he has raised the matter with Mr Hull and we are awaiting a definite and considered reply.
2. In the meantime we have been approached by the Soviet Ambassador M. Ivan Maisky, USSR Ambassador in Great Britain, 1932–43.
3. We have reason to believe that the United States Ambassador is also raising the matter with his Government.
Personal messages between Mr Churchill and Mr Fraser sometimes carried the distinguishing codenames WinchNo. 4.Winch and Pefra, derived from the christian name and surname of the sender of the message.
My telegram of 2 September [No. 54].
1. I am still inclined to think that
2. Admiralty dispositions had been to build up towards the end of the year with the HMS HMS Rodney,Rodney, 33,900 tons, nine 16–inch guns, 23½ knots. Nelson, 33,950 tons, nine 16–inch guns, 23½ knots.
Royal Sovereign class battleships: Royal Sovereign, Resolution, Ramillies and
3. In the interval, in order further to deter HMS HMS HMS Prince of Wales,Prince of Wales, 35,000 tons, ten 14–inch guns, 27 knots.RepulseRepulse, 30,755 tons, six 15–inch guns, 29 knots.Prince of Wales will be noticed at Repulse will be relieved by the Renown,Renown, 32,000 tons, six 15–inch guns, 29 knots.
4. In my view the Prince of Wales will be the best possible deterrent, and every effort will be made to spare her permanently. I must, however, make it clear that the movements of the Prince of Wales must be reviewed when she is at Tirpitz breaking out and other operational possibilities before the Duke of York
HMS Duke of York, 35,000 tons, ten 14–inch guns, 30 knots.
Mr Menzies resigned on
While His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are largely in agreement with the views expressed in your most secret telegram No. 444 of 31 October, Not published. The Prime Minister of démarche without the concurrence of the
Another serious factor of the existing situation which makes them hesitate to agree to the proposed declaration at the moment is our knowledge of the obviously limited scale of operations which, in fulfilment of the declaration, could be launched against Mr Nash was in
PefraNo. 4.
Following for Prime Minister from Prime Minister:
Very many thanks for your telegram Winch No. 4. I quite understand the position and warmly welcome the steps that you are taking.
Circular telegram. My telegram of today, Circular D.660. Not published. Reported a discussion on 29 October between His Majesty's Ambassador at Japan.
The following is the text of a further telegram received from His Majesty's Ambassador at
‘I had intended to confine my remarks about Indo-
The defence of the security of
The defence of
‘2. As regards (a), I said that the plea of a threat to Japanese security simply did not hold water, seeing that b), I could see no possible necessity for military occupation to secure economic advantages which, in any case, had subsequently been accorded to
‘3. I said that on this question of further southward expansion I thought it best to be perfectly frank and definite, while inviting His Excellency to take my observations in the same friendly spirit in which they were offered. The change in strategical equilibrium brought about by the Japanese occupation of Southern Indo-
‘4. The Minister for Foreign Affairs made no comment on these candid observations beyond acknowledging the friendly purpose of my remarks and repeating that they showed how vitally concerned was Great Britain in preventing any further aggravation of the present situation in South-Eastern Asia.’
WinchNo. 5.
Your Pefra No. 4. Nothing is so good as having something that can catch and kill anything. It keeps them bunched. Good wishes.
Circular telegram. Reference my telegram of 27 October, M.339. Not published. Reported proposals to supply assistance to
The United States reply observed that it had been the policy of the United States Government to give sympathetic consideration to priority of export applications from the Thai Government, and that the Thai Minister in
2. In view of urgent representations by the Thai Prime Minister we have felt it desirable not to delay the further offer of assistance, and
An attitude of resolute independence will do much to hamper Japanese plans and constitute the surest means of winning external support for
We are, however, fully alive to the Japanese menace and have a natural interest in frustrating it.
Military assistance to
Should it be necessary for us to meet the Japanese menace in the Kra Isthmus, it is important for us to be assured that we shall not meet with Thai opposition. We hope we may count on active co-operation, since only by our success can the final independence of
We are prepared to authorise the Commander-in-Chief Far East to send an expert adviser in aerodrome defence, and His Majesty's Minister is to offer twenty-four 4·5–inch howitzers and twelve field guns, with British instructors. If the offer is accepted, twelve howitzers with 1000 rounds of ammunition per gun would be released at once from
In view of the immense calls on our resources, we cannot offer aircraft at present and are doubtful whether a supply of fighter or bomber aircraft can be arranged from any other source, though we are making inquiries. We are also inquiring into the possibility of the supply of [group mutilated – similar?] training aircraft, and are prepared to supply limited quantities of aviation petrol—adequate for the current needs of the Thai Air Force.
If the reaction of the Thai Prime Minister is favourable we are prepared to consult the United States Government as to what further can be done.
3. Sir J. Crosby reports he is at once communicating with the Thai Prime Minister in the above sense.
4. The Thai Prime Minister has recently accepted our proposal to increase our staff of the Assistant Military Attaché in
Circular telegram. Japan.
Mr Hull sent for His Majesty's Minister on 18 November to inform him of the position of the conversations with the Japanese. The following is the text of a telegram from Sir R. Campbell reporting Mr Hull's remarks, which the latter asked should be treated with a special degree of secrecy and given the most limited circulation:
‘After recapitulating the history of these conversations, their interruption by Japanese action in Indo- Mr S. Kurusu, Japanese Minister in
‘2. Mr Hull said Mr Kurusu had been “in a great state” over the breakdown on all these three points and had asked whether there was not some way round the difficulty. Could not some means be found of giving the
‘3. The Japanese were now communicating with their Government. In the meantime the Secretary of State wished His Majesty's Government to be informed of the position reached in case they desired to make any comments.
‘4. The Chinese Ambassador Dr Hu Shih, Chinese Ambassador to the
We will telegraph further as soon as possible.
My telegram of 20 November. Japan.
1. In a further telegram His Majesty's Minister,
When the Secretary of State informed the Japanese representatives that the United States Government required the withdrawal of Japanese troops from
The Secretary of State said that as far as he was aware Kurusu had brought no message for the President and had no special instructions.’
2. Sir R. Campbell further understands that the Secretary of State gave the Australian Minister a similar account of the conversations with the Japanese and said that he had maintained a ‘take it or leave it’ attitude. He added that he had made it clear to the Japanese that no ‘arrangement’ that might be possible between
My telegram of 20 November [No. 65], paragraph 3. Japan.
The following is the text of a telegram giving our comments, which was sent yesterday to the Chargé d'Affaires at
‘We greatly appreciate the manner in which Mr Hull handled Mr Kurusu, and feel that his forthright statement of the principles on which any settlement acceptable to the
‘2. We find it difficult to believe that any prima facie evidence of a genuine desire to go some considerable way to meet our point of view. Our first reaction is, therefore, that unless the Japanese offer were accompanied by unacceptable conditions regarding the future position of
My telegram of 22 November. Japan.
His Majesty's Ambassador at Dr A. Loudon, Netherlands Minister to the
2. Hull recalled the past history of Japanese talks as reported in my telegram of 20 November [No. 65], and added that in the latest conversation with Kurusu and the Japanese Ambassador he had emphasised the
3. The two governing motives in his mind in regard to these conversations had been: (a) to strengthen the peace party in b) to gain vital time. As to the first, Kurusu had emphasised the urgent importance of giving the peace party some evidence of progress, however small, and as to the second, the United States Navy and Army were most anxious to gain time for further strengthening of the
4. On the night of 20 November the Japanese communicated to Hull a document, of which the text is contained in my immediately following telegram.
5. Hull said that when he saw the Japanese again his inclination was to make an alternative proposal to them on the following lines:
‘The United States Government, while maintaining their position on fundamental points, would be willing to consider the conclusion of some limited agreement which might give time for wider discussions, but which would probably not last more than two or three months unless progress could be made on the larger questions. The basis of such an agreement might be that
In return it might be possible by general agreement with the
6. Hull inquired what view other Governments would be likely to take of this kind of suggestion which, he thought at best, if the Japanese were really seeking for a way out [group mutilated – for the?] new policy, might lead to a wider settlement, and at worst would have the effect of gaining valuable time. He thought that, from the point of view of
7. His Majesty's Ambassador informed Hull in reply of the contents of my telegram of 22 November [No. 67]. The Dutch Minister emphasised the importance of any concession in the matter of oil, on which Hull observed that any oil supplied would need to be strictly limited and, in his opinion, should not include the highest grade. In any case, if the Japanese were allowed any oil from the
8. Subsequent to the foregoing conversation Hull suggested to His Majesty's Ambassador that representatives of the Governments concerned might be given authority to take decisions on the amount of economic relief which their Governments would be willing to concur in giving to the Japanese on the basis suggested. He felt the general situation to be critical, and one that might not permit the delay involved in reference to Governments on all points.
9. His Majesty's Ambassador considers that Hull has in mind a limited and probably temporary arrangement only designed to enable the position for conversations on a wider issue to proceed. These would include a general
10. The Chinese Ambassador expressed the fullest confidence in Hull, and admitted that it would be a great relief to have the Japanese menace from Indo-
under this plan,
the Chinese Government regard economic pressure on
His Majesty's Ambassador had the impression that Hull would be very careful of Chinese feelings.
11. Hull emphasised again his desire that this matter should be treated within as restricted a circle as possible in view of the paramount importance of secrecy.
12. We will telegraph further as soon as possible.
My immediately preceding telegram.
The following is the text of the document handed over to the United States Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador on 20 November:
‘1. Both the Governments of
‘2. The Japanese Government undertake to withdraw its troops now stationed in
‘3. The Governments of
‘4. The Governments of
‘5. The Government of the
The views of His Majesty's Government in New Zealand on the points raised in your telegrams [Nos. 68 and 69] and M.378 Not published. Contained Mr Hull's personal marginal comments on the Japanese document quoted in No. 69.
1. They are, in general, opposed to any steps that would be regarded by
2. In particular, they would deplore any step taken in this connection which might have the effect of increasing the Japanese pressure upon
3. While they would regard the terms of the document handed to the United States Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador on 20 November as entirely unacceptable, they are generally in sympathy with Mr Cordell Hull's comments as set out in Circular telegram M.378, and would favour an attempt being made to reach a temporary understanding on the basis of those comments.
4. They are particularly impressed by the desirability of working in the closest co-operation with the United States Government, and if that Government wish to proceed on these lines they are strongly of opinion that the Governments of the British Commonwealth should concur. If such an arrangement were ultimately found to be possible (as to which they must express some doubt) then the general effect on the world situation of a Japanese withdrawal from Indo-
Circular telegram. japan.
My immediately preceding telegram M.403, paragraph 2. Not published. Paragraph 2 read: ‘The Secretary of State told the Australian Minister that nothing of consequence happened at the meeting between the President and Japanese representatives on 27 November. Both sides restated their position. Kurusu had had no instructions from his Government to return.’
1. The [ This was a proposal by Mr Hull for an interim agreement with modus vivendi,modus vivendi in the face of strong Chinese opposition and that he had now dropped it entirely. The Australian Minister suggested that further discussion with the Chinese might save the position, but the Secretary of State thought it was now too late.
2. The Australian Minister later saw the Under-Secretary of State, who said it was apparent that the Japanese had started their military operations at least some days ago.
3. The Australian Minister tried to draw out both the Secretary of State and the Under-Secretary of State as to what action the
My immediately preceding telegram.
Lord Halifax saw the Under-Secretary of State yesterday and has telegraphed the following account of the conversations:
‘1. I asked Welles whether things had moved at all since the President's interview with the Japanese. Welles told me that nothing further had transpired since the President's talk and the handing over of the general note to the Japanese.
‘2. From intercepted telephonic conversations, the United States Government understood there was an internal crisis going on in
‘3. He showed me the record Hull had made of the President's conversation with the Japanese. The character of this had been quite general, the Japanese taking the line of regret that no temporary agreement had been found possible, and the President developing the argument that, anxious as the
‘4. I asked Welles whether he could give me any indication what would be the
‘5. He thought the Japanese were likely to move during the next few days rather than fill up Indo-
‘6. Your telegram M.402 just received. Not published. This telegram to the British Ambassador in modus vivendi as practical politics, contributory causes being the Chinese reaction, the suggestions of His Majesty's Government which did not appear to Hull capable of inclusion in the interim agreement and, I fancy, their own reconsiderations in the light of comments received.’
Circular telegram. My telegram of 29 November [No. 72].
1. There are important indications that
2. The Admiral T. C. Hart, USN; Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet, Jul 1939 – Jun 1942; commanded Allied Naval Forces, ABDA Area, Jan – Feb 1942
3. Our military advisers fear the operation might lead to a clash which might involve us in war, and they have always emphasised that, unless our vital interests were immediately threatened, this should be avoided so long as we have no certainty of
4. In these circumstances His Majesty's Ambassador at
5. Lord Halifax is to ask for an urgent expression of the United States Government's views and has been reminded of the importance of ensuring ourselves of
6. We should be grateful for your views by most immediate telegram.
My telegram [No. 73]. The following is the text of two telegrams received in reply from His Majesty's Ambassador at
First telegram begins:
‘Have seen Hull who left me in no doubt as to his own personal opinion, which would be to do immediately what we want. He is telephoning the President, who is in the country, and advised me to make our Naval Staff Mission at once see Stark, Admiral H. R. Stark, USN; Chief of Naval Operations, 1939–42; commanded US Naval Forces in
Second telegram begins:
‘1. After telephoning the President, Stark has told the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet to make the desired reconnaissance flights. Aircraft have been instructed not to approach Japanese ships in a manner to indicate offensive intention, but are authorised to defend themselves if attacked.
‘2. The Secretary of State has given the President the message in your telegram [No. 73] and the President will telephone the Secretary of State tomorrow (Sunday) morning. The President is expected to be back in
‘3. You cannot count on the President taking a decision on policy before his return, and he has so far given no indication whether he will feel able to take a decision in favour of supporting us, to which he will undoubtedly feel inclined. The Secretary of State will tell me anything he can after his telephone talk to the President tomorrow (Sunday) morning.’
This message was repeated to the Prime Minister of
Your most secret telegram of 30 November [No. 73]. The views of His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are as follows:
1. An immediate approach to the Thai Government would seem to them desirable, informing the Thais of the apprehensions of His Majesty's Government in the
2. With or without such a Thai invitation, the Not published.
3. In the contingency, which they feel is not unlikely, of a Thai refusal to receive assistance and a
4. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand do not feel that they are in a position to pass any considered judgment of real value on some of the considerations outlined in the last preceding paragraph, and while they assume, of course, that no action will be taken unless and until it is an established fact that Japanese ships are approaching the Isthmus or have, in fact, crossed the ADB line, As defined in the report of the American-Dutch-British conversations at
5. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand assume that the
My telegram of 30 November [No. 74].
The following is the text of a further telegram received last night from His Majesty's Ambassador at
‘1. Have seen Hull who tells me that the President will not decide anything in advance of discussions which he will have, it seems, on return to
‘2. Hull said it would, of course, be helpful if we could possibly get the Thais to invite us in, and also added that he scarcely supposed they would do this until it was too late.
‘3. Even if the President does not give an immediate affirmative answer to our questions and although prophecy is dangerous, I find it very difficult to believe that the United States Government would not support us in the event of hostilities; I know Hull, Stimson Mr Henry L. Stimson, United States Secretary of War, Jul 1940 – Sep 1945. Mr Frank Knox, United States Secretary of the Navy,
‘4. The real question to my mind is how quickly the
In a later telegram Lord Halifax reports that the Japanese are seeing the Secretary of State at their request at 10 a.m. today (Monday). Mr Hull does not know for what purpose.
My telegram of 1 December, last paragraph.
The following telegram has been received from Lord Halifax with reference to the meeting of Japanese representatives with the Secretary of State this morning (Monday):
‘1. Hull telephoned that he had seen the Japanese, who had not received any instructions from
‘2. He reminded them that [group mutilated – previously?] he had said the United States Government were unable to meet them on three important points of their proposals which covered—
the stopping of aid to
giving them some oil
the retention in Indo-
Lord Halifax added that, when he telephoned, Mr Hull had not yet seen the President, but expected a United States Cabinet meeting to be held later in the day.
My telegram M.412. Not published. In this telegram the Dominions Secretary repeated to the Prime Minister the text of a telegram from Lord Halifax reporting on his interview with the President.
After consideration of Lord Halifax's account of his discussion with the President, the following reply is being despatched to Lord Halifax this evening:
‘1. We entirely agree with President Roosevelt that we and the United States Government (and the Netherlands Government) should be clear as to what action we shall respectively take in the various situations likely to arise.
‘2. Of the hypotheses in paragraph 6 of your telegram, the first two seem to us for practical purposes indistinguishable. Paragraph 6 read: ‘He wished me accordingly to ask you what His Majesty's Government would do in the event of ( The reference to support in paragraph 8 read: ‘On the immediate question asked in your telegram [No. 73] he said we could certainly count on their support, though it might take a short time, he spoke of a few days, to get things into political shape here….’ See p. 91, note 1.a) the Japanese reply being unsatisfactory, reinforcements not yet having reached Indo-b) the reply being unsatisfactory, reinforcements having in the meantime reached Indo-c) a Japanese attack on c) the threat to
‘3. We have already been considering the possibility of some arrangement with the Thai Government under which our entry into the Kra Isthmus, at whatever stage it might take place, would be by their invitation. The difficulty at present is that we are not militarily in a position to give direct assistance to the Thai Government in the protection of the rest of their territory. The proposal to occupy a very small part of the Kra Isthmus is therefore unlikely to appeal to them, and we fear the same applies to an undertaking from us to guarantee their ultimate full sovereignty and independence. It would, we feel, be asking a good deal of them to expect them to accept the virtual certainty of partial extinction in order to ensure their ultimate independence.
‘4. The Thai Prime Minister has forcibly represented to us that the only way to save
‘5. We would propose to make it clear in any such communication or in any announcement which might accompany our [group mutilated – plan?] that we should restore in full to
My telegram M.412, paragraph 3. Not published. Paragraph 3 read: ‘He [President Roosevelt] then discussed at great length the Japanese reinforcement of Indo-
‘I have received reports during the past days of continuing Japanese troop movements to Southern Indo-
‘It was my clear understanding by the terms of the agreement, and there is no present need to discuss the nature of that agreement, between
‘Please be good enough to request the Japanese Ambassador and Ambassador Kurusu to inquire at once of the
My telegram [No. 78].
The following reply, dated 3 December, has been received today from His Majesty's Ambassador at
‘I saw the President with the Under-Secretary of State this evening and read to him your telegram. See No. 78.
‘1. Do you mean by the words, “If she uses Indo-
‘2. I said I read your telegram to mean the first, although it was plain that the building-up of a base would pro tanto diminish Japanese dependence on vulnerable supply lines. The President was much alive to this, but I think his own mind leant in favour of making a warning, if given, [group mutilated – conditional on?] actual jumping-off.
‘3. The point also arose in the discussion whether your wording, “as a base for further aggression”, was or was not intended to cover the hypothesis of intensified attack on the
‘4. The President assented to the interpretation of support as recorded in paragraph 8, my telegram M.412, See p. 86, note 2.
‘5. In the circumstances of hypothesis (c), the President indicated assent to our putting the Kra Isthmus plan into operation in this eventuality, and I have no doubt in this case you can count on the armed support of the
‘6. I read the President the last two sentences of paragraph 2 of your telegram, See No. 78.
‘7. He recognised the force of your paragraphs 4 and 5 concerning the proposed guarantee to
A further telegram will be sent as soon as possible.
Your telegram of 1 December [No. 75].
We were most grateful for your timely and valuable telegram and have had very fully in mind the considerations you mention.
You will since have seen from my telegrams M.412 Not published.
We have considered most carefully the suggestion made in paragraph 1 of your telegram, but have come to the conclusion that, for the reasons given in paragraphs 3 and 4 of my telegram [No. 78], any immediate approach to the Thai Government would involve serious risks. As however there indicated, we are explaining the position to His Majesty's Minister at
Circular telegram. My telegram of 4 December [No. 80].
The following telegram dated 5 December has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador,
‘1. Your telegram of 3 December (Action in the event of further Japanese aggression). See No. 80.
‘2. I should like you to express our very deep appreciation for the President's prompt and helpful response. We are particularly grateful for his confirmation of our interpretation of his assurance of support in the circumstances contemplated in my telegram of 30 November [No. 73].
‘3. As regards the scope of the warning, it would apply to an attack by
‘4. We are dealing with the
‘5. Our proposed action with regard to
Circular telegram. netherlands east indies.
In view of President Roosevelt's attitude as indicated in paragraph 7 of my telegram M.412 Not published. Reporting on his interview with President Roosevelt, Lord Halifax in paragraph 7 of his telegram of 2 December said Not published. This assurance, at first given orally and then supported by a Note on 5 September from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Netherlands Minister in inter alia that he thought that President Roosevelt would be disposed to support whatever action His Majesty's Government in the
My telegrams of 4 and 5 December [Nos. 80 and 82].
The position is that we have now received an assurance of armed support from the
If we find it necessary either to forestall a Japanese landing in the Kra Isthmus or to occupy part of the Isthmus as a counter to Japanese violation of any other part of
if the Japanese attack the
if the Japanese attack us.
2. We have accordingly instructed the Commander-in-Chief Far East that he should take action as he has suggested (see paragraph 2 of my telegram of 30 November [No. 73]) without reference to us if either:
He has good information that a Japanese expedition is advancing with the apparent intention of landing on the Kra Isthmus, or,
The Japanese violate any other part of
3. The Commander-in-Chief Far East has also been authorised, in the event of a Japanese attack on the
thailand.
My telegrams [Nos. 78], paragraphs 3–5, [No. 80], paragraph 7, and [No. 82].
1. We have explained to His Majesty's Minister at
It is important that, if and when the operation is carried out, it should not meet with Thai resistance. It is in our view our best first strategical move in the circumstances envisaged, not excluding further possibilities, and represents the best means of helping
We have it in mind, therefore, in order to prepare the way, to give
We hope this promise to assist might encourage
We understand the Thai position to be that no military arrangement of any kind is practicable without a definite warning to
2. A further telegram will be sent on receipt of Sir J. Crosby's reply. In the meantime we have informed His Majesty's Ambassador at
Circular telegram. My telegram of 5 December [No. 83]. netherlands east indies
The following is the text of the Note handed to the Netherlands Minister Jonkheer E. M. van Verduynen, Netherlands Minister to the
‘In my Note of 5 September See p. 91, note 2.
‘2. His Majesty's Government have again reviewed the position in the light of recent developments, and they feel it is of urgent importance to provide the firmest basis for effective co-operation in meeting the present Japanese threat. They are accordingly, for their part, prepared to enter at once into a mutual understanding with the Netherlands Government whereby each party will undertake to co-operate immediately with the other to the fullest extent of its available resources in the event of the other party being forced to take military action to repel an attack upon any of its territories in the
‘3. His Majesty's Government have reason to believe that their views are shared by His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of
‘4. The question of the form in which the understanding should be recorded and the further question of whether, and if so, at what moment, publicity should be [group omitted – given?] to it can be further discussed if the Netherlands Government accept the suggestion in principle.’
My telegram of 5 December [No. 82]. The following reply has been received from Lord Halifax this afternoon (Friday):
‘1. I had a long talk with the President this evening (Thursday) and gave him the message in your second paragraph.
‘2. On the question of warning in your third paragraph, he was very doubtful about the wisdom of including attack on the
‘3. Subject to the above and to paragraph 5 below, he agrees to the warning covering any attack by
‘4. He said, however, that he had received an indirect communication from Kurusu that matters were not yet hopeless and that a direct approach to the Emperor Emperor Hirohito.
‘5. In answer, I said in the question of the approach to the Emperor the main point seemed to be the danger of delay in putting in a warning on the assumption that Kurusu's approach was worthless. Could he make his communication to the Emperor if he made it serve as a definite warning? The President agreed and said he could, and would include such a warning, if he decided to do it, tomorrow morning after he has received the Japanese reply to his question two
‘6. He will decide whether he does or does not communicate with the Emperor tomorrow (Friday) morning, and meanwhile wishes us to suspend delivery of the warning while making all preparation for it with the Dutch. If he does approach the Emperor he would hope that the three-power warning might be deferred till he had the Emperor's reply, for which he would ask urgently.
‘7. Your paragraph 5. No. 82.
Circular telegram. My telegram [No. 87]. The following reply was sent to Lord Halifax last night:
‘1. I am greatly relieved to hear that the President agrees to the warning and I accept his procedure. I understand his difficulties about making the warning apply to the
‘2. We will at once concert with the Dutch the wording of our respective warnings and have them ready.
‘3. We shall be interested to hear whether the President decides to make a communication to the Emperor and the form it will take. I approve of what you said as reported in paragraph 5 of your telegram.
‘4. We shall wait for word from the President before communicating our warning to the Japanese.
‘5. We will also give an assurance to
Circular telegram. japan.
My telegram [No. 87], paragraph 7, and my telegram [No. 88], paragraph 5.
The following further telegram dated 5 December has now been received from Lord Halifax:
‘Welles has just telephoned to say that the President has changed his mind and wished to suspend decision about conveying assurances to
‘2. This is most annoying. Nevertheless, in view of the urgency of the situation revealed in recent Not published.
My telegram of 6 December [No. 89]. The following is the text of a further telegram from Lord Halifax dated 5 December:
‘I saw Hull this evening (Friday). He told me he had seen the Japanese this morning, who had given him a reply, which was brief, to the President's inquiry about troops in Indo- Text omitted reported
1. A report was received by the Admiralty from the Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet Admiral Sir Tom Phillips commanded the Eastern Fleet from 3 to 10 Dec 1941. He lost his life when his flagship, the The southernmost point of Prince of Wales, was sunk by Japanese air attack.
2. A later report from the Commander-in-Chief stated that the advance guard had altered course north-west.
3. A further telegram on this movement will be sent as soon as possible, but the information available is not yet sufficient to establish whether the Japanese are making for:
Kra Isthmus,
An anchorage in Indo-
The Admiralty advise that the last-mentioned possibility can by no means be excluded.
My immediately preceding telegram
1. Since the possibility remains open that the immediate destination of the Japanese convoys is another port in Indo-
2. We have not yet heard whether the President has decided to send a message to the Emperor or not. If he has not yet made up his mind, his decision may now be influenced by the news of the sailing of the Japanese convoys. We must assume in any event that he may wish to proceed with some form of warning at any moment, in which case warnings from ourselves and the Dutch may be required to follow almost immediately afterwards.
3. It would, we feel, add greatly to the impressiveness of the warning (if the President should wish us to proceed with it) if it could be delivered on behalf of all His Majesty's Governments jointly. We very much hope His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions will feel able to concur with this course and identify themselves in this manner with the warning proposed.
4. In view of the urgency of the matter, as explained in paragraph 2, we have thought it desirable to prepare and telegraph to His Majesty's Ambassador at
5. We should be grateful if we could be informed by most immediate telegram whether you concur in the terms of the draft note and in the procedure suggested. In the circumstances it would be helpful if you would cause your reply to be repeated to His Majesty's Ambassador at
6. It will be appreciated that in drafting the note we were presented with a special difficulty owing to the desire of the President that the
My immediately preceding telegram.
The following is the text draft of the note:
‘I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I have been instructed to make the following communication to the Imperial Japanese Government on behalf of His Majesty's Governments in the See No. 79. See No. 90.
‘There is no threat from any quarter against Indo-
‘The relations between the Governments of the British Commonwealth and the Netherlands Government are too well known for the
thailand.
My immediately preceding telegram.
1. The Prime Minister is proposing in accordance with President Roosevelt's suggestion (see my telegrams [No. 80] and [No. 87], paragraph 7) to send an immediate personal message to the Thai Prime Minister warning of imminent Japanese danger, urging him to fight if attacked, and saying we will come to his assistance to the utmost of our power. The text has been telegraphed to
2. In the meantime, His Majesty's Minister at
Repeated to the British Ambassador,
Your most secret telegrams of 7 December [Nos. 91–94]. On the assumption that the Government of the
Circular telegram. japan. My telegrams [Nos. 88 and 92].
The following telegram, dated 6 December, was received from Lord Halifax this morning:
‘1. I communicated your telegram [No. 88] to the President when I saw him this evening (Saturday). He is sending a message to the Emperor for delivery, by Japanese time, on Sunday morning. If no answer has been received by Monday evening,
‘2. He told me the best information the
‘3. He told me that he thought seriously of a possible Japanese threat to
Circular telegram. thailand. My telegram [No. 94].
1. Lord Halifax has reported that the President welcomes also the proposal to send a message to the Thai Prime Minister.
2. The President was himself sending a message to the Thai Prime Minister in confidence last night (Saturday), on the following lines:
That the
That when peace comes, no matter what happens meanwhile, unless the Thais aid the Japanese, the
japan. My telegram [No. 96].
The following is the text of the President's message to the Emperor:
‘Almost a century ago the President of the
‘Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our two countries need I address to Your Majesty messages on matters of state. I feel that I should now so address you because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation.
‘Developments are occurring in the
‘The people of the
‘I am certain that it will be clear to your Majesty, as it is to me, that in seeking these great objectives both
‘More than a year ago, Your Majesty's Government concluded an agreement with the Vichy Government by which 5000 or 6000 Japanese troops were permitted to enter Northern
‘For the past few weeks it has become clear to the world that Japanese military, naval and air forces have been sent to Southern Indo-
‘Because these continuing concentrations in Indo-
‘I am sure that Your Majesty will understand that the fear of all these peoples is a legitimate fear inasmuch as it involves their peace and their national existence. I am sure that Your Majesty will understand why the people of the
‘It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is unthinkable.
‘None of the peoples whom I have spoken of above can sit either indefinitely or permanently on a keg of dynamite.
‘There is absolutely no thought on the part of the
‘I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the Governments of the East Indies, the Governments of
‘I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought in this definite emergency to ways of dispelling the dark clouds. I am confident that both of us, for the sake of the peoples not only of our own great countries but for the sake of humanity in neighbouring territories, have a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and destruction in the world.’
japan.
Although hostilities have now broken out At 7.55 a.m. on 7 December Japanese carrier-borne aircraft launched a surprise attack on the United States Pacific Fleet in
We understand the United States Congress has been summoned to meet this morning, 8 December, when the President will recommend an immediate declaration of war by the
We contemplate that our own declaration should then follow at once, and the House of Commons is being summoned to meet at 3 p.m. In the meantime we are taking immediately all operational and security measures as if a formal state of war already existed.
Hostilities have now broken out with
His Majesty's Ambassador at
‘On the evening of 7 December His Majesty's Government in the
‘In view of these wanton acts of unprovoked aggression committed in flagrant violation of International Law, and particularly of Article 1 of the Third Hague Convention relative to the opening of hostilities, Article 1 of the Third Hague Convention ( ‘The contracting parties recognise that hostilities between themselves must not commence without a previous explicit warning in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war.’
The existence of a state of war with The text of the Proclamation, published in a New Zealand Gazette Extraordinary on
His Excellency the Governor-General has it in command from His Majesty the King to declare that a state of war exists between His Majesty and the Emperor of
Given at
thailand. My telegram of 7 December [No. 94].
The following is an extract from a telegram from His Majesty's Representative at
‘I have just come from the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He tells me that under duress the Thai Government reports an agreement with the Japanese Ambassador this morning allowing the passage of Japanese troops across
Circular telegram. thailand.
The situation in
2. Until the situation is clearer we are inclined to consider it premature to declare that a state of war exists with
Our forces should take no unprovoked action against the Thais; but
if the Thais attempt to obstruct the operations of our troops, or if in the opinion of local commanders the presence of Thai forces constitutes a threat to their security, they should be treated as enemies; and
that if any concentration of Thai forces indicates the possibility of a threat to the security of
3. For the time being we are treating
4. The Netherlands Government informed us on 15 December that they were proposing to break off diplomatic relations with
5. His Majesty's Ambassador at
Circular telegram. thailand.
My telegram of 19 December.
As stated in paragraph 5, His Majesty's Ambassador at
Reports, officially confirmed, of the entry of Thai troops into
Reports, not as yet officially confirmed, of the participation of Thai aircraft in attacks on British territory.
Reports from Japanese sources that in [group mutilated –
We are now considering what action we could suggest might be appropriately taken in consultation with other interested Governments and hope to telegraph our considered views to you shortly.
Circular telegram. thailand.
My telegram of 29 January. The Swiss Government state that the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified the Swiss Consulate that ‘by Royal Command declaration of war on Great Britain and the
Circular telegram. My Circular telegram of 4 February.
We announced in today's official Gazette that in view of this communication a state of war exists between the
This telegram was repeated to the Prime Ministers of
The existence of a state of war with
Repeated to the Prime Minister of New Zealand.
Your telegram of 8 December, No. 778. Not published. The Australian Government had asked for an up-to-date appreciation by the Chiefs of Staff on the situation in the
We fully understand your wish to have a general review of the new war situation which has now developed, but things are moving so fast that a telegram drafted in the morning is often out of date by the evening. We are hard at work examining the position and considering what re-disposition of our naval forces should now be made and what and how reinforcements can be sent to the
2. We are of course in for an anxious time in the Rt. Hon. Sir Earle Page, PC, GCMG, CH; Special Australian Envoy to British War Cabinet, 1941–42; Member of Australian War Cabinet, 1942–43.
3. It is not considered that there is any immediate large-scale threat to the territory of See Appendix IV.
4. The potential threat to our sea routes in the Far Eastern area has of course greatly increased and the situation is largely that set out in paragraphs 30 to 33 of telegram Z.214 already referred to. Admiralty instructions with regard to convoying and routing are contained in Admiralty telegram Not published.
5. As regards local Australian defence, until we know more of the Japanese intentions we do not recommend any changes in those dispositions decided on as a result of consideration given to the subject at the time of Mr Menzies' visit (see paragraphs 23 to 26 of our reply of 18 April). Not published.
6. A further telegram will be sent to you as soon as the new situation has been fully examined.
The following is a report prepared for our military advisers on the methods open to
‘1.
‘2.
‘3.
Denial to us and the Americans with a view to the easiest possible capture of:
The
Repetition of air attacks on
‘4. Other operations.
Operations which might be carried out simultaneously with or independently of the above:
Attack on the Dutch submarine base at
Attack on the Panama Canal by carrier-borne aircraft—difficult and risky, but prize very great;
Occupation of islands near the Equator on which air bases are being constructed, e.g., [group omitted–Christmas?] Island (
Raid by cruisers and minelaying of ports and their approaches in the
The acquisition of a refuelling base in Madagascar is a remote possibility.
Developing from the main operations,
Key points in
Air bases in the
Following from my Prime Minister to Prime Minister of New Zealand:
I send you subjoined the all-important agreement between the President and myself Mr Churchill conferred with President Roosevelt at Fd Mshl Earl Wavell, PC, GCB, GCSI, GCIE, CMG, MC (then General Sir Archibald Wavell); GOC-in-C
Text of the agreement is contained in my immediately following telegram.
My immediately preceding telegram. Text of agreement:
That unity of command shall be established in the South-West Pacific. Boundaries are not yet finally settled, but presume they would include the Malay Peninsula, including
That General Wavell should be appointed Commander-in-Chief, or if preferred, Supreme Commander, of all
General Wavell, whose headquarters should in the first instance be established at Lt-Gen George H. Brett; appointed Deputy Supreme Commander,
That American, British, Australian and Dutch naval forces in the ‘theatre’ should be placed under the command of an American Admiral, in accordance with the general principle set forth in paragraphs (a) and (b).
It is intended that General Wavell should have a staff in the South Pacific portion, as Foch's Marshal Foch was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in In the draft manuscript of the British official history, Grand Strategy, Vol. III, Chap. 16, this sentence reads: ‘It is intended that General Wavell should have a staff in the same sort of proportion as Foch's High Control Staff was to the great Staffs of the British and French armies in
Principal commanders comprised in General Wavell's sphere will be Commander-in-Chief Burma, Commander-in-Chief Singapore and
The United States Navy will remain responsible for the whole Pacific Ocean east of the Philippine Islands and Australasia, including Rapid changes in the Far Eastern situation during the next fortnight resulted in modifications in this proposed organisation. Headquarters of the Supreme Commander ABDA area were set up near
A letter of instruction is being drafted for the Supreme Commander safeguarding the necessary residuary interests of the various Governments involved and prescribing in major outline his tasks.
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
Your telegrams of 29 December [Nos. 111 and 112].
Following for your Prime Minister:
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are in cordial agreement with the proposal to appoint General Wavell, in whose capacity they have every confidence and for whose character and standing they have the highest regard, to the supreme command of that portion of the
2. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government in New Zealand the proposals do not go far enough. The defeat of
3. Until the above policy can be implemented, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are willing to concur with the proposals in general. At the same time, they are not without doubt on certain aspects on which they have made the assumptions set out below. They would be glad to have confirmation of these assumptions or further information.
It is assumed that General Pownall Lt-Gen Sir Henry Pownall, KCB, KBE, DSO, MC; Commander-in-Chief Far East, Dec 1941 – Jan 1942; Chief of Staff ABDA Command, Jan – Feb 1942; GOC d), who is to be subordinate to General Wavell.
It is noted that naval command in the area ‘east of the See p. 34, note 3.
It is assumed from paragraph (f) that General Wavell's authority is to include lines of communication from
No reference is made in paragraph (d) to New Zealand naval forces. It is presumed that they are intended to be included.
4. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have two further observavations to offer:
While they fully realise the necessity in time of war of making very urgent decisions, they feel that it will be realised in
If General Wavell's proposed command impinges directly or indirectly upon the defence of New Zealand or e), and they would also wish to be represented on the ‘appropriate joint body’ also referred to in paragraph (e), as to the constitution of which they would be glad of further information.
My telegram of 29 December [No. 112]. The following is the directive sent to General Wavell: Mutilations in the text of this telegram as received in New Zealand have been corrected from the version published in the British official history, The War Against Japan, Vol. I, Appendix 20.
‘By agreement among the Governments of
‘1. Area: A strategic area has been constituted, to comprise initially all land and sea areas including the general regions of
‘2. Forces: You have been designated as Supreme Commander of the ABDA area and of all armed forces, afloat, ashore and in the air, of the ABDA Governments, which are or will be:
stationed in the area;
located in Australian territory when such forces have been allotted by the respective Governments for service in or in support of the ABDA area.
You are not authorised to transfer from the territories of any ABDA Government land forces of that Government without the consent of the local Commander or his Government.
‘3. The Deputy Supreme Commander, and if required a Commander of the combined naval forces and Commander of the combined air forces, will be jointly designated by the ABDA Governments.
‘4. No Government will materially reduce its armed forces assigned to your area [group mutilated – nor] any commitment made by it for reinforcing its forces in your area except after giving to other Governments and to you timely information pertaining thereto.
‘5. Strategic Concept and Policy: The basic strategic concept of the ABDA Governments for the conduct of the war in your area is not only in the immediate future to maintain as many key positions as possible, but to take the offensive at the earliest opportunity and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against
‘6. General Strategic Policy will be therefore:
To hold the Malay barrier, defined as a line of the Malay Peninsula,
To hold
To re-establish communications through the Dutch East Indies with Luzon, and to support the Philippine Islands garrison.
To maintain essential communications within the area.
‘7. Duties, Responsibilities and Authorities of Supreme Commander: You will co-ordinate in the ABDA area the strategic operations of all armed forces of the ABDA Governments; where desirable, to arrange the formation of task forces, whether national or international,
‘8. While [group mutilated – you should therefore] have no responsibilities [group mutilated – in respect of the internal] administration of the respective forces under your command, you are authorised to direct and co-ordinate the creation and development of administrative facilities and the broad allocation of war materials.
‘9. You will dispose of reinforcements which from time to time may be despatched to the area by the ABDA Governments.
‘10. You are authorised to require from the Commanders of the armed forces under your command such reports as you deem necessary in discharging your responsibilities as Supreme Commander.
‘11. You are authorised to control the issue of all communiqués concerning the forces under your command.
‘12. Through the channels specified in paragraph 18, you may submit recommendations to the ABDA Governments on any matters pertaining to the furthering of your mission.
‘13. Limitations: Your authority [group mutilated – and control] with respect to the various positions of the ABDA area and to the forces assigned thereto will normally be exercised through the Commanders duly appointed by their respective Governments. Interference is to be avoided in the administrative processes of the armed forces of any of the ABDA Governments, including free communication between them and their respective Governments. No alteration or revision is to be made in the basic tactical organisations of such forces, and each national component of a task force will normally operate under its own Commander and will not be subdivided into small units for [group mutilated – attachment to] other national components of task forces, except in cases of urgent necessity. In general, your instructions and orders will be limited to those necessary for the effective co-ordination of forces in the execution of your mission.
‘14. Relations with ABDA Governments: The ABDA Governments will jointly and severally support you in the execution of duties and responsibilities as herein defined, and in the exercising of authority herein delegated and limited. The Commanders of all sea, land and air forces within your area will be immediately informed by their respective Governments that, from a date to be notified, all orders and instructions issued by you in conformity with the provisions of this directive will be considered by such Commanders as emanating from their respective Governments.
‘15. In the unlikely event that any of your immediate subordinates, after making due representation to you, still considers that obedience to your orders would jeopardise the national interests of his country to an extent unjustified by the general situation in the ABDA area, he has
‘16. Staff and Assumption of Command: Your staff will include officers of each of the ABDA Powers. You are empowered to communicate immediately with national Commanders in the area with a view to obtaining staff officers essential to your earliest possible assumption of command. Your additional staff requirements will be communicated as soon as possible to the ABDA Governments through the channels of communication described in paragraph 18.
‘17. You will report when you are in a position effectively to carry out the essential functions of the Supreme Command, so that your assumption of command may be promulgated to all concerned.
‘18. Superior Authority: As Supreme Commander of the ABDA area you will be directly responsible to the ABDA Governments through the agency defined in Annex 2.
‘The ABDA area is bounded as follows:
‘On the north: by the boundary between Note: Indo-
‘2. Forces assigned to ABDA and adjacent areas are authorised to extend their operations into other areas as may be required.
‘(1) On all important military matters not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Commander of the ABDA area, the United States Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in
Provision of reinforcements.
Major changes in policy.
Departures from the Supreme Commander's directive.
‘(2) This agency will function as follows:
Any proposals coming either from the Supreme Commander or from any of the ABDA Governments will be transmitted to the Chiefs of Staff Committee both in
The Chiefs of Staff Committee in
On the receipt of these opinions, the United States Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in
‘(3) Since London has the machinery for consulting Dominion Governments, and since the Dutch Government is in
‘(4) Agreement having been reached between the President and the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, the orders to the Supreme Commander will be despatched from
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have noted the directive sent to General Wavell as Supreme Commander of the ABDA area. They are, however, particularly concerned with the situation in that part of the South-Western Pacific which is not included in this area. In this connection they observe that General Wavell's command does not include the communications across the
They assume, therefore, that the larger question of unification of the whole Pacific Ocean with the ABDA area, particularly as regards the naval forces, raised in my telegram of 30 December [No. 113], and also that of the Prime Minister of Not published.
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand would be grateful if specific information could be given as soon as possible of the measures contemplated to ensure co-ordination of naval, military and air defence in the whole of the
Following from Prime Minister to Prime Minister of New Zealand:
Your telegram of 31 December to
We are trying our best in consultation with the
2. You will see that we have been able to make up a fairly good [group mutilated – instalment?] and will try and do more as soon as we can.
3. It was not possible to consult you more fully about the South-West Pacific Supreme Command as speed of execution was essential, but I hope the results are satisfactory to you.
4. I am trying hard to get the Americans to assume naval responsibility for the area south of the Equator and west of 180 degrees up to the east coast of
5. I am doing my utmost to build up and restore the Allied position in the
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
The following is from the Prime Minister for your Prime Minister:
We have been considering with the greatest of care the present position of the war, especially the situation that has arisen in the
1. General Observations:
(i) The New Zealand Government have, throughout the whole course of hostilities, endeavoured to consider the problems of the conflict from the widest point of view, and we have we think succeeded, generally speaking, in looking upon the situation as a whole. We have never deviated from a complete recognition of the fact that the critical theatre of war has, up to the present at any rate, been the European theatre, and we have never allowed our preoccupations and apprehensions for the safety of this Dominion to interfere with what we considered to be our primary duty of applying the greatest force that we could provide at the most useful point. We feel that our efforts in this direction have not been less than those of any other portion of the British Commonwealth.
(ii) We have never, however, allowed our attention to be entirely monopolised by the European theatre. Though we still accept the principle that the continued defence of the
(iii) While the remarkable successes of the Russians over the Germans and the comparatively encouraging results so far of the battle in the On the night 17–18 Nov 1941 the
(iv) The Battle of the
(v) By far the most serious development in recent months has been the outbreak of hostilities with
(vi) It is clear that this is recognised by yourself and your colleagues, and of course we greatly appreciated the attempt that was made to help us by the despatch to these waters of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse. But, to be completely frank, we have not always felt that the potential problems of the
2. The Pacific Area generally:
(i) We have noted with the greatest of interest your discussions on this matter with President Roosevelt, and I must at once say that, though we fully endorse the desirability, indeed the necessity, of the unity of command which was the principal objective of those talks, we have felt that there were many aspects of the arrangements proposed in
(ii) We did make in connection with these proposals, and conveyed to the Secretary of State in my telegram of 30 December [No. 113], certain assumptions on which we have had as yet no further information, but we are not without doubt, as the result of a subsequent communication on the subject, whether similar collaboration in other areas is intended or will be found to be possible.
(iii) On the actual proposals for the ABDA area as set out in the directive to General Wavell contained in the Secretary of State's telegram of 4 January [No. 114], we have the following comments to make:
As it seems to us, there is one main problem and one alone in the whole area of the
As we see it, any attempt, such as the ABDA proposal, to divide this area into smaller areas must have the effect of dissipating our efforts. General Wavell is to command in the ABDA area at sea, on land, and in the air. At the moment there is a general understanding that an American Admiral is to command in the remainder of the
We observe that New Zealand is not to be concerned in any way with the ABDA area, and I must say at once that we are not content to accept this position. It is a fact that we
The means proposed for consultation with the Dominions, namely through the Chiefs of Staff in
We note that as the result of the appointment of General Wavell the position of Resident Minister at Viscount Norwich, PC, GCMG, DSO (then Rt. Hon. Alfred Duff Cooper); Resident Minister for Far Eastern Affairs, Capt the Rt. Hon. Oliver Lyttelton, PC, DSO, MC; Minister of State in the
The problems of the ABDA area will spill over from that area into the
Our main criticism of the ABDA proposal is shortly this: that it professes to provide, and does provide, for only one portion of the problem, and by isolating that problem from the rest of the
I cannot too strongly express the strength of our view that the very first step to be taken to defeat
(iv) Finally, on this aspect of the matter I wish to say this, that during the period when the war, though world-wide, had its principal manifestations in
3. New Zealand's own Position:
(i) You are already aware in some detail of the deficiencies in the armaments necessary to defend this Dominion and also
(ii) Now, however, all this is changed. We have seen within a few short weeks the United States Pacific Fleet crippled. We have seen the The Japanese landed in the HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse were sunk off
(iii) I am sure you will agree with me that we have in the course of this war seen tragic instances in which the most competent opinion has been rapidly falsified by the event, and I am sure you will agree with me also that, as those responsible for the lives and safety of the people of this Dominion, we cannot wholly divest ourselves of this responsibility in favour of expert opinion, however authoritative, though of course we would wish to attach all due weight to such opinion.
(iv) In considering the military opinion so far as it affects ourselves, we have noted in the first place that in New Zealand itself we have been told by the highest military authority only a few months ago that New Zealand and
(v) We have noted also the opinion constantly expressed in the past by the Chiefs of Staff, both in the
4. To sum up, we have very little knowledge indeed of the intentions of the higher direction of the war, whatever be the authorities now responsible for it, either in
5. I do most earnestly apologise for adding this additional burden to your shoulders, which I know are very much strained with other and more immediate perplexities, but I am sure were you in our place here you would feel much as we do, and I do hope that you will find time at an early date to let us have your comments on this communication.
This message was also sent to the Prime Minister of
It is felt to be very important that Wavell should exercise supreme command without delay, as soon as he reports himself ready to do so. So far as See p. 114, note 1.
2. The United States Chiefs of Staff agree. A similar suggestion is being made to the Dutch.
3. We should be grateful for your earliest reply. Mr Fraser replied on 14 January that the
winch
No. 1
Following are proposals which have been agreed to by the
‘1. Definition of Area: A new naval area to be called Anzac area is to be established. The boundaries of this area will be as follows:
From longitude 141 degrees east eastward along the Equator to the longitude of 170 degrees east; thence south-eastward to latitude 020 degrees south, longitude 175 degrees west, thence south along meridian 175 degrees west.
From a point on the Equator southwards along meridian 141 degrees east to the south coast of
‘2. Designation: This area is designated as an adjunct of the Pacific Ocean area, and naval forces operating therein will be considered to be an adjunct of the United States Pacific Fleet.
‘3. Command Relations:
The command of naval forces of associated powers operating in the adjunct area will be vested in a United States Flag Officer directly responsible to the Commander-in-Chief United States Pacific Fleet, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN; Commander-in-Chief
The Commander-in-Chief United States Pacific Fleet will exercise general supervision over the operations in the adjunct area and will correlate them with operations when adjacent to the areas; but he may not change the allocation of the vessels assigned to the adjunct [area].
‘4. Allocation of the Forces within the Area:
Proposed initial assignments of forces located in the adjunct area:
by the British—one aircraft carrier;
by the
by
by New Zealand—two light cruisers, one armed merchant cruiser.
Note: (1) The remainder of
(2) All local defence armaments to remain at the disposal of
(3) The United States will undertake to furnish to the Australian and New Zealand Governments all practical assistance in ships, planes, munitions, etc., to be manned by
‘5. Assignment of Tasks:
The tasks assigned to the forces of the associated powers in the adjunct area are:
to cover the eastern and north-eastern approaches to
to safeguard by all practicable escorting and covering operations convoys in the adjunct area;
to support the defence of islands in the adjunct area, with particular emphasis on its key points; to attack adjacent enemy key points;
to correlate operations with the forces in the ABDA area and with the United States Pacific force.
‘6. Forces assigned to the adjunct and adjacent areas are authorised to extend their operations into other areas as may be required.’
You will realise that decisions had to be taken at once, and I hope you will agree that this is a valuable step forward to meeting the position which you have represented to us. I have communicated in the same sense to Mr Curtin.
The Prime Minister of the
In general, we consider that the proposals have the following advantages:
They indicate the importance attached by the British and the United States Governments to the problems of the area in question.
They make some provision for necessary co-operation with the adjacent areas.
They make some provision for reinforcements which are urgently required.
They provide some measure of direct American naval assistance.
From these points of view, therefore, the proposals are a distinct advance on any which have yet been put forward.
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand propose to reply at the earliest possible moment in the form set out below. Before doing so, however, they would be grateful to be advised without delay of the tenor of the reply to be sent in this connection by His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of On 22 January Mr Curtin sent to New Zealand a copy of his own reply to Mr Churchill. This telegram is not reproduced.
‘My colleagues and I have studied the proposals put forward in your telegram WINCH No. 1 of 14 January, which we welcome from the point of view of the closer association with the
‘We assume also that the present proposals are an interim measure to cover immediate requirements while Allied forces in this theatre of war necessarily remain on the defensive.
‘We feel that you are well aware that from the broadest aspect the present proposals leave untouched the main problem to which we have previously drawn attention. These proposals, with those for the ABDA area, divide the theatre of operations into individual and to some extent artificial areas. Unified command over all naval forces engaged in the war against
‘I take it that you will by now have seen my telegram of 12 January, No. 117.
Your telegram of 12 January [No. 117]. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister:
1. I am grateful to you for your telegram. I welcome, as always, the frank expression of your views, with which, in the main, I am much in sympathy, and the well-balanced reasoning with which you have presented them to me.
2. I fully endorse the remarks in your opening paragraphs. The Government and people of New Zealand have always adopted a helpful and realistic attitude to this war, which, beginning in the narrow confines of
3. If you have thought us unmindful of your necessities in the past, although indeed we have never been so, I can assure you that the vast distance in miles which separates
4. You will, I am sure, forgive me if in the time at my disposal I do not take up each of your points in detail. From the telegram which you have now received since sending your telegram to me, you will know of the army and air reinforcements which we and Not published.
5. Nevertheless, you would not expect me to make promises of support which cannot be fulfilled, or of the early redress of a situation in the
6. I sense your [reproach at our] The words in brackets are not included in the copy of this telegram on the Prime Minister's Department file but are included, in square brackets, in the version published in Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. IV, p. 12. See also No. 124.
7. Turning now to the strategic areas in the
8. As at present arranged, the United States Navy will have control in the
9. In establishing the ABDA area there was no intention to ignore or to starve the other
10. Our object, and in this I include all the ABDA powers, is to hold
11. I and my advisers have given much thought to the question of Dominion representation on our war councils, and in this connection I am not referring to the larger question of an
12. I have had a preliminary report from General Wavell, whom I expect to assume supreme command any day now. Whilst acknowledging the gravity of the present situation, he takes a robust view of the final outcome, and I am most anxious he should feel at the outset of his difficult task that he will receive our unstinted and united confidence.
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
Your telegram No. 28 of 14 January. Not published. This message contained General Wavell's plan for the organisation of ABDA headquarters. Australian and New Zealand agreement was asked for.
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have no observations to offer, other than that they consider an effective method of liaison should be established between them and General Wavell's headquarters and hope that this can be arranged.
Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister:
In amplification of my telegram [No. 121], following are proposals for the machinery in Rt. Hon. C. R. Attlee; Lord Privy Seal, May 1940 – Feb 1942. Rt. Hon. Sir William Jordan, PC, KCMG (at this date the Hon. W. J. Jordan); High Commissioner for New Zealand in the
From Prime Minister for your Prime Minister:
I am most grateful to you for your telegram in reply to mine of 12 January [No. 117]. I fully realise how impossible it is for you to traverse at once and in detail the points that we have thought it desirable in complete frankness to raise, but there are, we feel, matters of substance in our comments which we trust will be considered in
I should like at once to remove what appears to be a misconception as to our reaction to the military appreciations we have received from time to time as to probable developments in this part of the world. The fact is that we have never been ‘misled’ by these appreciations which have, generally speaking, seemed to us to be more optimistic than the situation as we saw it warranted.
We are fully appreciative of the measures that are now being taken to provide us from both See also Defence of New Zealand and Defence of the South Pacific.
I shall not in this telegram touch upon the division of this theatre of war into separate areas under separate commands or upon the vital necessity, as we see it, of concentrating our forces at the earliest possible moment to regain naval supremacy in the
We warmly welcome the object which the proposal is intended to serve, and particularly what we earnestly ask you to believe we regard
We assume (and would be glad of confirmation) that, as contemplated by you, the proposed body would have authority to deal not only with all major
I should make it clear that, even after the establishment of the proposed body, we could not feel that we would be sufficiently in touch with affairs in the ABDA area unless, as we have already suggested, we can be afforded some means of permanent liaison with General Wavell's headquarters.
Let me say finally how fully we realise the necessity for quick decisions and of avoiding any unnecessary restrictions on the powers and authorities of General Wavell and the Commanders of the other areas.
In view of the similarities of circumstances between this Dominion and the Commonwealth of
peeraNo. 1.
My colleagues and I have studied the proposals put forward in your telegram WINCH No. 1 of 14 January, No. 119.
We note that the proposals are purely naval, and we feel it desirable to point out that, in our opinion, the problem is not solely naval and that, as in the case of the ABDA area, some form of unified control—land, sea and air—in the Anzac area might well be established with American, British, Australian and New Zealand association.
We assume that the present proposals are an interim measure to cover immediate requirements while Allied forces in this theatre of war necessarily remain on the defensive. We feel that you are well aware that from the broadest aspect the present proposals leave untouched the main problem to which we have previously drawn attention. These proposals, with those for the ABDA area, divide the theatre of operations into individual and to some extent artificial areas. Unified command over all naval forces engaged in the war against
Following from Prime Minister for Prime Minister:
I have carefully studied your telegram of 20 January [No. 124]. Like you I will deal in this telegram only with the proposal for a Far Eastern Defence Council in
The President proposed to me the appointment of a British General as Supreme Commander in the ABDA area. As part of this arrangement the orders to the Supreme Commander on major strategy and policy will finally emanate from the President, acting on behalf of the ABDA Governments. The President will be advised by the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Fd Mshl Sir John Dill, GCB, CMG, DSO; Chief of the Imperial General Staff, May 1940 – Dec 1941; Head of the British Joint Staff Mission to
2. The arrangements for inter-working between the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in
Any proposals emanating either from the Supreme Commander or from any of the ABDA Governments will be forwarded simultaneously to the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in
3. In the event of disagreement between the United States Chiefs of Staff and the British Joint Staff Mission, which would imply disagreement between the United States Chiefs of Staff and the Council of the
4. As an essential part of the arrangement for the Far Eastern Council in
5. Such is the scheme in detail. It will be seen from it that the Far Eastern Council in
6. If the orders of the ABDA powers to the Supreme Commander were to be framed by a body in
7. The above is the plan to which the President was prepared to agree, and I feel that it is the one which offers the best opportunity to New Zealand to make her voice effectively heard in the Allied councils. It is not possible for the
8. I hope, therefore, that on studying this fuller explanation of the scheme New Zealand will agree to take part in the Far Eastern Council in The text of a telegram sent by Mr Churchill to Mr Curtin on the same subject has been omitted.
Your telegram of 18 January [No. 122]. We have telegraphed to General Wavell that it would be desirable to include one or two New Zealand officers on his staff and have requested him to get into touch with you direct on this point.
Repeated to the Australian Commonwealth and New Zealand Naval Boards.
… This message was sent in three parts. Parts 1 and 2 are not reproduced.
‘The Combined Chiefs of Staff recommend the immediate establishment of the Anzac area and corresponding
‘1. Boundaries. Beginning at longitude 141 degrees east at the Equator, eastwards along the Equator to longitude 170 degrees east, thence south-easterly to a point in latitude 20 degrees south, longitude 175 degrees west, thence due south; from point of beginning, south along meridian 141 degrees east to south coast of
‘2. Fleet Admiral E. J. King, USN; Commander-in-Chief US Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, 1942–45.
‘3. All practicable use will be made of naval supply, communications and repair facilities in
‘4. Initial assignments of ships to
‘5. Tasks to be assigned the
‘6. Naval forces assigned to Anzac and adjacent areas are authorised to extend operations into other areas as circumstances may require.
‘7. Effective date of the foregoing organisations, allocations, and appropriate control of operations, 1 February, or as soon thereafter as practicable. On receipt request remarks may reach British Admiralty Delegation,
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
Following for your Prime Minister:
Thank you for your telegram of 24 January [No. 126] which I am afraid, however, still leaves us perplexed and, to be candid, unconvinced. An immediate reflection, if you will allow me to say so, is that your telegram seems to have been drafted primarily, if not solely, with reference to the ABDA area. In particular:
Provision is made for representations to the proposed
You refer in paragraph 7 to the appointment of a British General to command the On 22 January Japanese forces landed at inter se, and also between each and both of them and the ABDA area.
On more fundamental aspects I must again express the unanimous opinion of my colleagues and myself that in view of the proposed assumption by the
The New Zealand Government notify their views to the New Zealand representative on the
the Council itself for discussion.
The Chairman conveys the result of the discussion to
the Joint Staff Mission in
the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee who, if agreed, finally transmit the conclusion to
the President or the
We cannot regard this as adequate for our purposes—it would surely be cumbersome and there could be no certainty that our representations on any particular subject would in this manner reach the American authorities either in time for appropriate action or in the form which we should wish.
I am bound to say that the proposals as presented are not attractive to us, and that if we were obliged to choose between a Council as contemplated in
Put shortly: We think it not only desirable but necessary that there should be one co-ordinating authority—land, sea and air—for the whole war against
It may well be that among the many possible solutions—all open to some, and possibly grave, objection—the best might perhaps be as follows:
Dominion membership of the United Kingdom War Cabinet. Indeed as this is, in effect, already accorded to
A Committee of that c) below; and
A
I am really very sorry to worry you like this, but try as we may we cannot see your proposal as a workable method of meeting the situation as we think it should, and hope it can, be met.
The Prime Minister desires me to transmit the following:
Your telegram of 26 January. I am sorry you still do not think that our proposal is a workable method of meeting the situation. In the circumstances I am putting your views and those of Curtin as to the formation of a
As regards the specific points raised at the beginning of your telegram, I confirmed that New Zealand would be perfectly entitled to put their views before the
May I add how much I appreciate the tone of the official statement which you have just issued on this subject.
Repeated to the Prime Ministers of
We have been thinking over the machinery for consultation between ourselves and other members of the British Commonwealth on matters of urgency connected with the war, in the light of the new position resulting from the
2. We are now informing the Commonwealth Government that we are prepared to agree to this request, and Sir Earle Page, who is at present in
3. We feel that New Zealand should know this in case they felt disposed to avail themselves of the new arrangements on a similar footing to
winchNo. 2.
1. We are most grateful for your full and ready acceptance of the proposed Anzac area and we are glad to learn you agree. [See]
2. We fully agree that command of a predominantly British fleet by a
3. The proposal in your second paragraph that there should be unified control—land, sea and air—in the Anzac area, as is the case in the ABDA area, is receiving urgent and most careful consideration and I will communicate again.
4. We are satisfied that the proposal for naval control over the Anzac area is the best that can be devised to meet the present situation, but agree that it may require modification later.
Following for Prime Minister from Prime Minister:
As stated in my telegram of 27 January [No. 130], I put your views and those of Curtin about the formation of a
‘The Staff have been giving consideration to the matter of including the Australians, the Dutch and the New Zealanders in the Joint Staff conferences. While they have not given me a final answer, I think I can say that their general feeling, with which I concur, is that all political and Government matters concerning New Zealand,
We have not yet considered the matter further here, and in the meantime I should be glad to know at your convenience whether the arrangement proposed by the President is satisfactory to you. I am making a similar inquiry of Curtin.
I am having repeated to you in the following telegrams the text of replies received from Not published. The Prime Ministers of both South Africa and
The delegation for the New Zealand Supply Mission arrived in
1. Churchill has informed us that President Roosevelt and his advisers are not in favour of the location of the
representation in
on the
on the
on the Staff plane; and also,
Strengthening of Staff representation in
The Washington Staff proposals are not without difficulty in view of the requirement laid down, which is, of course, not unreasonable, that decisions must be immediate and therefore reference to Governments for formal consent will not be possible, while at the same time stress is laid on the fact that the views of the respective representatives on the
2. With all the difficulties inherent in the proposals as now put forward, we feel that we can carry the matter no further and that we are bound to accept them. My immediately following telegram contains the text of a message sent to Churchill today.
3. I shall be very grateful for an urgent expression of your views generally and particularly on representation, both political and military, both in
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
Following from Prime Minister for Prime Minister:
I am very grateful to you for your message contained in the Secretary of State's telegrams of 2 February [No. 133] and Nos. 85 and 86, The last two telegrams are not published. See p. 146, note 1.
I am sure you will agree that it would serve no useful purpose for me to say that we agree with the view now expressed by President Roosevelt (which we appreciate concurs with your own) when in fact we do not agree. We have considered this matter at great length and with the most earnest desire to reconcile our views on a proposal which deeply concerns us with those which we know you to hold. In this we
At the same time, having expressed our views, we feel that we have taken the matter as far as we can. As you know, despite our doubts, we have never at any time declined your proposal for a Far Eastern Council established at
There are, however, two matters to which I feel I must call your attention:
It is noted that in your last communication, as in previous communications, the whole thought appears to be directed to the ABDA area, and I wonder if it is sufficiently appreciated by those responsible in the a) that no part of New Zealand territory is included in that area; (b) that, except through the proposed c) that while conditions in that area may well have a vital effect on this Dominion, nevertheless a direct attack on New Zealand or New Zealand outposts is unlikely to originate from or to pass through that area. Our main preoccupations therefore are in the Anzac area and the remainder of the
We wonder whether this is in any way connected with what we regard as the inaccurate and misleading title which is now given to the ABDA area. This portion of the
The appointment of Mr Nash as New Zealand Minister in
Personal for Prime Minister from Nash.
Your telegram No. 2. Not published. This telegram summarised for Mr Nash's information a number of the messages printed earlier in this section dealing with the setting-up of the ABDA area and the formation of a Far Eastern Council.
My views on Dominion representation in the
(1) The successful prosecution of the war demands unification of the higher direction of command and resources, and any suggestion of sectarian interest should be firmly put aside…. Text omitted contained a brief comment on the Netherlands Government's telegram (not published) on the formation of a ‘
(2) The proposals for an
(3) Politically, the proposal will lead to the formation of a British Commonwealth or sectarian point of view, which will then have to be reconciled from a considerable distance with another sectarian point of view in
(4) Strategically, because it encourages the conception, evidently still held in
(5) Geographically, because
(6) I consider the best solution for the higher direction of the war is for Churchill with the British War Cabinet to direct the war on the European,
(7) Representatives of
(8) It is desirable that command should be unified and should if possible be exercised by one person in
(9) I strongly feel that we should continue to insist on this, or some very similar arrangement, not only for our own sakes but for the sake of the common cause. Clinging to pre-war policies and exaggerating present loyalties will not help towards our objective—the winning of the war—and neither policies nor loyalties will matter much if we lose.
(10) Sir John Dill has just advised me over the telephone that Churchill has announced the setting-up of the Far Eastern Council in
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
Following from Prime Minister for Prime Minister:
Press and broadcast reports of the recent statement by you appear to indicate some doubt as to New Zealand's attitude with reference to representation on the
You may be interested to know also that in the secret session of Parliament held yesterday I outlined the point of view that we have
Following for Prime Minister from my Prime Minister:
Your telegram of 6 February [No. 135].
1. I am very glad to receive your assent to the proposed Far Eastern Council in
2. There has been no overlooking of the Anzac area, but distances are so great that it is necessary to establish a separate organisation from that of the ABDA area. We are proposing to
3. The whole affairs of the Anzac area will be dealt with from this combined command, and their relations with the ABDA area will, so far as they affect or overlap one another, be dealt with either directly between the two commands or, when necessary, by the
The following is the text of a memorandum handed to me yesterday by Sir John Dill:
‘Combined Chiefs of Staff. Representation of Ministers of the Dominions and Dutch.
‘Memorandum by Combined Chiefs of Staff.
‘1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have considered the President's outline of proposals for representation of the Dutch and of the British Dominions. In their view these proposals would work out as follows:
A separation will be made between political and strategic questions, borderline cases being treated as strategic.
All discussion on political questions will be conducted in
Strategic questions will be handled in
The Dominions and Dutch Staffs will be represented by Staff Missions in
Where questions affecting any Dominions or the Dutch are under discussion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the heads of the Staff Missions concerned will be invited to attend.
The interests of the Dominions and the Dutch are primarily confined to particular theatres of war. The British and United States Chiefs of Staff on the other hand have to consider the strategy of the war as a whole, the interests of their two nations being world-wide. The responsibility for making final recommendations to Governments will therefore remain with the Chiefs of Staff.
‘2. The whole question of Dominion and Dutch representation is at present under active discussion between His Majesty's Government in the
‘By direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.’
I have not seen the President's outline of the proposals referred to. Sir John stated:
That the Combined Chiefs of Staff were taking over a complete building in
That he would make a suitable room available in the building for New Zealand attachés.
That we might now consider appointments of higher ranking attachés to represent the Dominion.
That whilst he would see Casey or myself at any time, the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be confined to Staff Officers of fighting units.
The proposals appear to be in line with the arrangements detailed in your telegram [No. 135] and we are confined to representation which can only be supported at meetings by attachés—and attachés of our Staff will be allowed to take part in the discussions—on general questions which may affect us, when invited to do so by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
anzac AREA.
1. The following telegram has been addressed to the Joint Staff Mission,
‘(1) Following on a suggestion put forward by His Majesty's Government in New Zealand, the Chiefs of Staff have recommended, and the Prime Minister has approved in principle, that unified control—land, sea and air—should be established in the Anzac area.
‘(2) The arguments in favour of this arrangement may be summarised as follows:
The problem in the Anzac area is not exclusively a naval one, since there are the land and air forces in
It seems desirable that the Supreme Commander of the Anzac area should receive his instructions from the same authority as the Commander of the ABDA area, and that the machinery for ensuring that these instructions represent the views of the united nations concerned should be the same in both cases.
‘(3) The British Chiefs of Staff consider that the new arrangement should be on the following lines:
It would be necessary for the Anzac area as now agreed to be extended to include the whole of
Since the problem is predominantly a naval one, the Supreme Commander of the Anzac area would be a United States Flag Officer, who should establish his headquarters ashore, probably in
There would be subordinate Commanders—land, sea and air—on the analogy of the ABDA area.
The Supreme Commander would receive his general strategic instructions through the same channels as General Wavell.
‘(4) Please take up these proposals with the United States Chiefs of Staff as a matter of urgency.
‘(5) Meanwhile, this telegram has been repeated to His Majesty's Governments in the Commonwealth of
‘(6) Assuming that all are in agreement in principle, we request that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should obtain the President's approval. Thereafter the detailed arrangements will be the subject of consultation between the Governments concerned.’
2. We should be glad to have the views of the Commonwealth and New Zealand Governments on these proposals as soon as possible.
Your cable of 5 February [No. 134].
In the present perspective it is obvious that our views of the set-up necessary to efficiently carry on the war strategically, operationally and politically, particularly in the
We should increase our representation on the military, naval, or air side by appointing a competent senior officer capable of participating in discussions on strategy and planning operations with [group mutilated – a knowledge?] of the Maj-Gen O. H. Mead, CBE, DSO; Commander, Southern Military District (Brigadier), Oct 1940 – Feb 1942; GOC Pacific Section,
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
Your telegram of 8 February [No. 140]. ANZAC AREA.
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are fully in agreement with the proposal to establish unified control—land, sea and air—in the Anzac area, and generally with the suggested procedure set out in paragraph (3) for bringing this into force.
While they adhere to their views on the proposed procedure for general strategic instruction, they are prepared to accept it and to endeavour to make it effective.
At an interview with the President yesterday I stressed and he understood New Zealand's [group omitted – problems?], particularly the need for its defence and its value as a base if things went badly and
I stressed the need for anti-aircraft defences, with which he agreed. I shall continue to stress to the Chiefs of Staff for their attention our need for all equipment. He urged that our Staff officers should make immediate contact with the United States Chiefs of Staff, which they will do on Wednesday. He maintained he would send for me if questions affecting us required his consideration and also would see me when I wished to represent our case. I asked especially if I could contact personally the United States Chief of Staff, Marshall, General of the Army the Hon. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff United States Army, 1939–45.
I hope now to make some contacts with Hopkins, Mr Harry L. Hopkins, adviser and assistant to President Roosevelt, 1941–45; died
Taking into account the fact that Not published.
peeraNo. 4. pacific war council.
In order to make the best arrangements possible from the point of view of New Zealand to facilitate the work of the
Mr Nash informs me In a telegram dated 23 February, not published.
winchNo. 5.
I know nothing of any change of location to In the event, the
The Rt. Hon. C. R. Attlee had succeeded Viscount Cranborne as Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs on
It has now been decided that General Wavell's headquarters should be dissolved and that the command of the ABDA area should be transferred to the Dutch. See p. 114, note 1.
General Wavell has been instructed accordingly by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at
The above conclusion was endorsed by the
After consultations which have taken place between members of the Advisory War Council, the New Zealand was represented by Commodore W. E. Parry, Chief of the Naval Staff, and Air Commodore R. V. Goddard, Chief of the Air Staff. Maj-Gen Patrick J. Hurley; personal representative of United States Chief of Staff in
2. A drafting committee comprised of the Neither the draft cable sent to New Zealand on 1 March or the
3. I may add that those concerned in the formulation of the text regard the matter as one of overriding urgency.
Reference No. 75. Not published. Contained New Zealand's comments on the Australian draft.
The Advisory War Council considered your reply at
2. We have accepted all the points you have raised and have amended the draft accordingly.
3. In view of the overriding urgency of the matter as mentioned in [No. 149], and with which Messrs Sullivan and Coates were in full agreement, we are despatching the cable only to the Prime Minister of the
4. In regard to the Supreme Commander to be appointed by the Council, we have informed the Prime Minister, in view of General Brett's experience as Deputy Supreme Commander of the ABDA area, the knowledge he has gathered of Australian and New Zealand requirements, the contacts he established in Government and Service spheres, that for our part we would welcome his appointment.
5. The cable as revised is being repeated to you and copies passed to your representatives here.
6. We have also decided to accept your suggestion that the approach to the President should be through Mr Churchill. We hope that you will exert your powerful influence accordingly.
7. We consider that the immediate adoption of the plan is essential to the security of our two countries, and we look forward to a period of the very closest co-operation.
Repeated to the Prime Minister of New Zealand on 5 March.
Following for Prime Minister from Prime Minister:
Regarding cable [No. 140] relative to the extension of the Anzac area and the machinery for its control, we have now had an opportunity of discussing this with a special delegation of representatives of the
(a) Present Military Position:
Japanese successes place
The loss of
The basis of our planning must be not only to ensure the security of
The immediate problems which are of great urgency are to secure the lines of communication from the
(b) Definition of Anzac Area:
We are in agreement with the proposal of the Chiefs of Staff of the
the present Anzac area;
the whole of a);
an area to the west and north-west of
the sea area to the south of
This extension would involve a considerable increase in naval responsibility, and to meet this it would be necessary for additional naval forces to be provided to cover this additional commitment.
(c) Machinery for Higher Direction of Policy and Operations in Anzac Area:
The United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff stated that it is desirable ‘that the Supreme Commander of the Anzac area should receive his instructions from the same authority as the Commander of the ABDA area, and that the machinery for ensuring that these instructions represent the views of the united nations concerned should be the same in both cases’.
The original ABDA command has now been dispersed, but you will be aware from cable No. 102 Not published.
Our views on the machinery required for the higher direction of the Anzac area are as follows:
(1) Governmental Machinery
A
The United States of
The Chairman to be the President of the
The membership might be increased as determined by the Council in the light of events and experience. Thus Canada would be added if she were to send forces to the Anzac area. The Council would be responsible for the higher policy of the war in the Anzac area and would deal with questions of policy and the provision of forces and supplies.
The proposed Council does not replace the Pacific Council. The future demarkation, function and relationship of the two bodies can be determined by experience and the changing strategical position.
(2) Strategical Control
The general strategical control of the Anzac area would be vested in the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee at
(3) Supreme Commander
The Council or the Governments concerned will appoint a Supreme Commander, preferably a
to exercise general strategic direction over the land, sea and air forces allocated to the area;
to allocate within the area the forces and equipment that are available, subject to the discretion of the Governments concerned to retain their own troops in their area should the circumstances in their opinion necessitate it.
The Supreme Commander should be guided by the principle of delegation of authority to his commanders. It should be no part of his duty to control the details of actual operations. The control of these should be left to the local commanders.
(4) Commanders of Naval, Military and Air Forces
Under the Supreme Commander and responsible to him there would be:
a Naval commander of all the naval forces allocated to the area as at present;
an Army and Air commander for each of the following:
Australian base territories and
New Zealand,
(d) Directive to Supreme Commander:
A directive in accordance with the general principles embodied in (1) to the Supreme Commander of the ABDA area would be issued to the Supreme Commander of the Anzac area.
General Observations:
(1) The establishment of a Council as suggested is considered essential from the Governmental aspect to provide for an effective voice by the Australian and New Zealand Governments in the higher policy of the war in the Anzac area, in view of their responsibilities to the people and Parliaments of these Dominions for local defence and the fact that the whole of their forces are being placed under the operational control of the Supreme Commander.
(2) The Council will provide a direct and expeditious means for prosecuting a vigorous war policy in the Anzac area and will give that centralised supervision which is so essential to the conduct of a war by allies. Its location at
(3) Adoption of the foregoing proposals would have the following advantages within the Anzac area:
The area would be a workable area and one that would accord with strategical and administrative requirements both for defensive and offensive warfare against the enemy.
Within the area there would be unified control of land, sea and air forces to ensure:
the most effective distribution of the forces available according to prevailing conditions;
the employment of all forces and equipment available according to a strategical plan that will be based upon the single aim of defeating the enemy and will not be dependent upon regard for national boundaries;
the most effective machinery for allocating available forces.
The machinery for co-ordination of the Allied effort within the area would be the minimum necessary for effective co-ordination and a wide measure of responsibility would be accorded to local commanders.
(4) In regard to the Supreme Commander to be appointed by the Council, the Government would welcome the immediate appointment of General Brett, United States Army, in view of his experience as Deputy Supreme Commander, ABDA area, the knowledge he has gathered of Australian and New Zealand requirements, and the Government and Service contacts he has made.
(5) The Advisory War Council representing all political parties in
(6) You will doubtless hear from the Prime Minister of New Zealand within a matter of hours. Both of us agree that it will be better for you to consider the proposal and we request you to recommend its adoption by the President.
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
Following from Prime Minister for Prime Minister:
Ministerial representatives of the
With reference to the proposed
The New Zealand Government note and support the proposal by the Australian Government that General Brett should be appointed Supreme Commander of the Anzac area. They regard the appointment of a Supreme Commander of that area, with power to exercise that unified command which the Japanese are apparently exploiting so successfully, as a matter of the very utmost importance and urgency calling for action without delay.
Your telegram of 6 March. Following from Prime Minister for Prime Minister:
I have forwarded to the President the Anzac plan. Our Chiefs of Staff Committee here are examining it now.
I have so informed Mr Curtin. Will telegraph further as soon as possible.
Repeated to the Prime Minister of New Zealand.
My telegram of 4 March [No. 151].
The following is our draft of the proposed directive to the Supreme Commander. The Governments concerned are the Governments of the
1. The Area. The Anzac area should embrace:
The present Anzac area.
The whole of
An area to the west and north-west of
The sea area to the south of
2. Forces. You have been designated as the Supreme Commander of the Anzac area and all operationally trained armed forces afloat, ashore, and in the air of the ANZAB Governments which are or could be stationed in that area.
3. No Government will materially reduce its armed forces stationed in your area, nor any commitment made by it for reinforcing its forces in your area, except after giving to the other Governments and to you timely information pertaining thereto.
4. Strategic Concept and Policy. The basic strategic concept for the conduct of the war in the Anzac area lies in an immediate change on the part of the
5. The general strategic policy should be related from the outset to further major offensive operations and, with this in view, should be directed to the security of
to secure the lines of communication from the
to prevent the further southward movement of the enemy into
to maintain essential communications within the area.
When these have been secured it will be possible to plan offensive operations in the light of the situation then prevailing, including that in the western
6. The Duties, Responsibilities and Authorities of Supreme Commander. You will co-ordinate in the Anzac area the strategic operations of all armed forces of the ANZAB Governments, assign them strategic missions and objectives, and where desirable arrange for the formation of task forces for the execution of specific operations, and appoint any officers irrespective of seniority or nationality to command such task forces.
7. You will allocate within the area the forces and equipment that are available or which may become available.
8. You are authorised to require from the commanders of the armed forces under your command such reports as you deem necessary in discharging your responsibilities as Supreme Commander.
9. You are authorised to control the issue of all communiqués concerning the forces under your command.
10. Your channel of communication with the ANZAB Governments upon any matter relating to your mission is through the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in
11. The commanders of all sea, land and air forces within your area will be immediately informed by their respective Governments that, from a date to be notified, all orders and instructions issued by you in conformity with the provisions of this directive will be considered by such commanders as emanating from their respective Governments.
12. In the unlikely event that any of your immediate subordinates after making due representation to you still consider that obedience to your orders would jeopardise the national interests of his country to any extent unjustified by the general situation in the Anzac area, he has the right, subject to your being immediately notified of such intention, to appeal direct to his own Government before carrying out the orders. Such appeals will be made by the most expeditious method, and copies of appeals will be communicated simultaneously to you.
13. You are not authorised to transfer from the territories of any of the ANZAB Governments land forces of that Government without the consent of the local commander or his Government.
14. Your authority and control with respect to the various operations of the Anzac area and to the forces assigned thereto will normally be exercised through the local commander. Interferences are to be avoided in the administration processes of the armed forces of any of the ANZAB Governments, including freedom of communication between them and their respective Governments. Alterations or revisions in the basic tactical organisation of any forces will not be made except in case of urgent necessity. Each national component of a task force will normally operate under its own commander and should normally be
15. Assumption of Command and Staff. Your staff will include officers of the forces of the ANZAB Governments. You are empowered to communicate immediately with the commanders of those forces with a view to obtaining staff officers essential to your earliest possible assumption of command.
16. You will report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff,
17. Superior Authority. As Supreme Commander of the Anzac area you will always be responsible to the
18. On all important matters outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme Commander of the Anzac area, the Combined Chiefs of Staff in
provision of reinforcements;
major changes in policy;
departure from the Supreme Commander's directive.
19. This directive is to be read with the agreement between the ANZAB Governments concerning the machinery for the higher direction of the war in the Anzac area. For the areas and directives finally adopted see Division of Strategic Responsibility between the United Kingdom and the United States.
1. The dissolution of ABDA [group mutilated–command?] and the Japanese capture of the Malay barrier necessitate re-examination of strategic boundaries in the
2. We are now presented with two main theatres:
The Indian Ocean theatre, including
The Pacific Ocean theatre, including
3. Under the agreement on Staff [group mutilated–representation?] with the United States Chiefs of Staff and after consultation with Planning Liaison Officers in
4. This division will in no way change any subdivision within the main theatre that the Governments concerned may decide to adopt, nor is it intended that forces assigned to one area shall rigidly be excluded from operating in the other.
5. As the
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
Your telegram [No. 155], boundary between the
Repeated to the New Zealand Minister,
A
Repeated to the New Zealand Minister,
The Pacific War Council met this afternoon. The United States message referred to in my telegram is in substance:
To a line west of
The American proposals were welcomed by the British Chiefs of Staff as containing elements of simplicity. The Prime Minister of the Dr P. S. Gerbrandy, Prime Minister of the Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, GCB, GCVO, OM; First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, 1939–43; died
Churchill favours the American proposals in general provided that the Empire has power to call attention and express an opinion on any movement. He will cable his reply to the President of the
Repeated to the New Zealand Minister,
Your telegram of 12 March. We have not so far received the message from Mr Churchill to which you refer, and we do not feel ourselves in a position properly to discuss the plan until we are in possession of the detailed proposals which we assume we will receive in due course. We can say at once, however, that we warmly welcome and generally endorse the suggestions, which appear to us to mark an important step forward in the direction of unity of command and efficient association of the
Following from Prime Minister for Prime Minister:
I had not realised till I saw Mr Jordan's cable to you that he had led you to expect a telegram from me in addition to the summary which was sent you of the President's proposals for dividing the commands. I was not in a position to send you definite advice till our Staffs had considered the proposals and I had myself clarified some points with the President. I was expecting to receive your impressions and have only now learned that you were expecting to hear further from me. However, no time has been lost, because it was necessary to examine these proposals very carefully. I have now telegraphed to the President on the main issue as in my immediately following telegram.
2. I wish here and now, however, to make the following plain to you. The fact that an American Commander will be in charge of all the operations in the See also Defence of New Zealand, p. 206 ff.
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
My immediately preceding telegram. Following for Prime Minister from Prime Minister:
Following is the text of the telegram which I have sent to President Roosevelt:
‘I have been earnestly considering yours of 10 March. See No. 164 of 23 March for summary of telegrams exchanged between Mr Churchill and President Roosevelt.
‘2. I have also had the proposals examined by our Chiefs of Staff. In principle we see great merits in the simplification resulting from the American control of the
‘3. Nothing must prevent the
‘4. We are building up and shall presently have a respectable force which will be based in the Central Indian Ocean. This force already consists of five battleships, two of our latest aircraft carriers, four modern cruisers and several older ones, and thirteen destroyers, all under the command of Admiral Somerville, Admiral of the Fleet Sir James Somerville, GCB, GBE, DSO; C-in-C Eastern Fleet, 1942–44; Head of British Admiralty Delegation, Illustrious, in two months the
HMS Illustrious, Fleet aircraft carrier, 23,000 tons, 31 knots.
HMS Valiant, 31,520 tons, eight 15-inch guns, 24 knots.
HMS Queen Elizabeth, 32,700 tons, eight 15-inch guns, 24 knots.
HMS King George V, 35,000 tons, ten 14-inch guns, 27 knots.
‘5. The
‘6. Therefore, it seems to us that all our naval forces must be directed from a single standpoint and their problems viewed as a whole. This can only be done by the machinery of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee acting directly under you and me in constant contact and agreement. All other arrangements for separate commands in the
‘7. On this basis we welcome your proposal that an American should be appointed Commander-in-Chief of all Allies and of all three Services in the
‘8. We also agree that the American Chiefs of Staff under your direction should decide day-to-day operational questions affecting the action of this American Commander-in-Chief in the
‘9. We suggest, however, that Staff officers from
‘10. So much for the executive conduct of the
‘11. As we see it, our Pacific Council in
‘12. It follows from the above that the
‘13. The First Sea Lord is anxious that I should put the following point to you:
“As the naval responsibility for dealing with seaborne raids on the north-west and west coasts of
Perhaps this could be taken care of in the final drawing of the line.
‘14. To sum up, I feel that your proposals, as I have ventured to elaborate and interpret them, will achieve the double purpose, namely (a) integrity of executive and operational action, and (b) opportunity of reasonable consultation for those whose fortunes are involved.’
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
Following from Prime Minister for Prime Minister:
Your telegrams of 17 March [Nos. 160 and 161]. We have noted with great interest your communications with President Roosevelt on the establishment of unified control for the conduct of the war in the
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief United States Forces in the
2. There are a number of matters of detail on which we are not as yet clear and on which it might be desirable or necessary to comment in due course. To enter into such matters at the present moment, however, would seem to us to be inappropriate, and at the moment it seems adequate to say that we are prepared to accept the scheme as outlined in general principle by yourself and President Roosevelt and, for our part, to do our utmost to ensure its efficient operation.
3. We trust, however, that the close collaboration between
4. Believe me also, we warmly appreciate and greatly value the assurance contained in the second paragraph of your telegram [No. 160].
Repeated to the Prime Minister of New Zealand.
1. Your cablegram of 17 March [No. 161]. We have been considering the President's proposals in the light of your cablegram and several cablegrams from Sir Earle Page and a communication received by me from the President stating that he is in general agreement with our proposals regarding the organisation and command of the Australian area, except as to some details concerning relationship to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and as to boundaries. In view of the various observations which have been expressed on the composition of the higher machinery, its functions, location, and the procedure to be followed, we consider it necessary to summarise our understanding of the position as follows, together with any necessary comments:
(1) Division of World War Theatre. This is to be divided into the following three areas:
The Atlantic, under joint British and American responsibility.
The Indian, Middle Eastern, and
The Pacific, including
The question of the relationship between operational responsibility in the
As already stated, the President in his message to me considers some [group mutilated–detailed?] adjustments are necessary in boundaries. The significance of the First Sea Lord's point in paragraph 13 of the Dominions Office cablegram [No. 161], relative to the boundary between the Indian and
Subject to the foregoing, we agree in principle with the President's proposals for the division of the world theatre into the three areas mentioned.
The Australian Chiefs of Staff consider that on tactical and strategical grounds
(2) Pacific War Council, London. It is noted that you suggest that the President should have a representative on the Pacific Council in
The functions of the Pacific Council in
(3) Pacific War Council, Washington. The summary of the President's telegram refers to the setting-up in
On 21 January we asked that a
In our proposals of 4 March
It is observed in paragraph 10 of the Dominions Office cablegram [No. 161] that reference is made to ‘the advisory bodies that will have to be consulted on larger issues’. We would not be content with an advisory body on operational matters in
(4) Machinery for Strategical and Operational Control. The Chiefs of Staff Committee is the technical advisory body to the
We are in agreement with the President's proposal that the
Agreement has already been reached on the appointment of the Supreme Commander in the Anzac area. The directive suggested by us is complementary to a higher machinery and the appointment of the Supreme Commander. The Australian Chiefs of Staff consider that the Supreme Commander should be located in
Instead of the local command in
New Zealand,
General Brett of the United States Army has already been appointed to command the Allied Air Forces in
In regard to the grand strategy relating to operations in the three areas, it is understood that advice on this would be the responsibility of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in
(5) It is understood that the joint committees on shipping and raw materials and on munitions will continue to function on their present basis.
The following, which is of the highest degree of secrecy, is from Prime Minister for Prime Minister:
The following digest of telegrams recently exchanged between the President and myself is for your personal information:
(a) Prime Minister to President, 5 March:
‘1. British affairs have deteriorated gravely since 7 December. All can be retrieved in
‘2. I hope by May your naval superiority in the
‘3. With the Tirpitz and ScheerAdmiral Scheer, German pocket-battleship, 14,000 tons, six 11-inch guns, 24 knots; raider in Note: [Group mutilated–The Prinz] EugenPrinz Eugen, cruiser, 15,600 tons, eight 8-inch guns, 30 knots. With Bismarck in Hipper Admiral Hipper, cruiser, 15,600 tons, eight 8-inch guns, 30 knots; bombed and sunk at
‘4. We hope your bombers based in North-East India may operate in force against enemy bases in
‘5. We are very thin on the See also Defence of New Zealand, No. 208.
‘6. Everything turns upon shipping, particularly troop-carrying tonnage. Our total man-lift is 280,000 men, which we cannot increase. I am told your man-lift is 90,000 and that even by the summer of
‘7. We send 40/50,000 men a month to the
‘8.
‘9. If plans were prepared now for [group mutilated–the preparation?] of ships, landing craft, aircraft, expeditionary divisions, etc., for a serious attack on the Japanese in
(b) President to Prime Minister, 8 March:
‘1. The United States have assumed a heavy responsibility in the
‘2. A large part of the United States Pacific Fleet is now operating in the Anzac region. Provided that bases are kept secure in the west of
‘3.
‘4. We agree on the importance of the
‘5. The United States can supply shipping to move two divisions from the
Direct movements to
Cargo ships required in transportation of Lend-Lease material to
In
‘6. After the arrival of the
‘7. [Group mutilated–At the utmost?] the shipping now available under the
‘8. This may be a critical period, but remember always it is not as bad as some you have so well survived before.’
(c) President to Prime Minister, 10 March:
‘Following are my purely personal views on organisation:
‘1. The whole operational responsibility for the
‘2. The middle area from
‘3. The third area would be the North and South Atlantic, and definite plans for establishing a front in
‘4. It is intended, of course, to continue all possible aid to
‘5. The second area, including
‘6. Grand strategy would remain the subject of study and decisions by the Combined Staffs both here and in
(d) My reply to the President on 17 March has already been repeated to you in telegram [No. 161].
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
The following is from the Prime Minister for your Prime Minister:
With further reference to your telegrams [Nos. 160 and 161]. We have now had an opportunity of perusing Mr Curtin's message of 20 March [No. 163] and we feel it desirable to make the following additional comments:
1. There are, as I pointed out in my telegram of 19 March [No. 162], a number of aspects in connection with the
The exact functions of the two proposed Councils, and particularly the powers of the Washington Council.
The precise authority of the Supreme Commander and his relations with the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee and with the Governments concerned.
The bearing of the present
2. Though the questions generally outlined above are in our opinion of great importance, we are nevertheless so impressed with the urgency of arriving at a decision and the necessity of implementing at the earliest possible moment the supreme command of the
3. We should be glad to be advised as soon as possible of the progress that is being made, in connection with which at the moment we are without information.
Will you kindly supply a copy of this message to Mr Jordan.
I do not know whether you have seen the text of the proposals on the division of strategical responsibility of the This telegram expands the message from Mr Jordan of 12 March, No. 158.
‘1. In order to fix responsibility as between the
In theatres in which the
In any theatre for which either the
Each Government will be responsible (within any theatre over which it exercises separate strategic direction) for arranging the necessary co-ordination and co-operation with other united powers whose territory or operational forces may be involved therein, and will, by agreement with such other Governments, set up the necessary control over machinery.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise direct supervision over both grand and minor strategy in a theatre of joint responsibility, and are charged with arranging the necessary co-operation and co-ordination in such areas with other united powers whose territorial or operational forces would be involved therein.
Theatres of strategic direction are established as follows:
The Pacific Theatre
This will include the Pacific Ocean and all land areas therein or contiguous thereto, including the American continent,
The Indian Ocean and Middle East Theatre
This will include the
The European and Atlantic Theatre
This will include the Atlantic Ocean and land areas contiguous thereto. It embraces the theatre (Western Europe) in which the major effort against
This is a theatre of joint British and American responsibility. Agreements already made between British and American authorities regarding the allocation of responsibility for specific operations (such as the seizure of the Canary Islands and the Cape Verde Islands) within this theatre will remain in effect.
‘2. Area commands as required will be created within the general theatres outlined above. Within the
To these proposals Churchill replied as per text of parts 1 and 2 of your cable No. 110, 19 March, Not published. Nos. 160 and 161 of 17 March were repeated to
‘Turning back again to highest war direction, the present arrangement centres upon the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Maj-Gen James E. Chaney,
‘I have now heard from New Zealand that they welcome your kind offer to send an American division at the dates mentioned into New Zealand.
‘On supremacy and general outlook in the
‘There are a few points of detail. In your telegram of 10 March you say, “ Not available.
‘Furthermore, in detail, we would rather have American light bombers and fighters, which you [group omitted–thought?] of sending to England by July, sent to the
They do not in any way affect the main proposals, but the information may be of value to you personally.
I am still not certain that MacArthur has been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the area which includes New Zealand.
The text of paragraph 7 of Churchill's telegram to the President reads: ‘On this basis we welcome your proposal that an American should be appointed Commander-in-Chief of all Allies and of all three Services in the In No. 161 this passage reads: ‘… with local commanders in
MacArthur does not appear to have been appointed Commander-in-Chief in the
Admiral King advised me yesterday that the area of MacArthur's command had not yet been settled. King was of the opinion that the best result in the
Subsequently, I saw Evatt for a short time and discussed the agreement reached between yourself and the Commonwealth Government for an
I am seeing the President at 12.30 p.m. today and will discuss the position with him, but will endeavour mainly to stress our urgent need of men and equipment, particularly aircraft. I personally think that we would be best served by a
If you have any special instructions in connection with my visit to the President please cable immediately…. A personal reference has been omitted.
The President this afternoon told me that he favoured a
MacArthur—South-West Pacific area:
It would probably be sufficient for us if we had one representative with the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee, and
The President emphasised the need for a naval base in the South Pacific and, if his views coincide with King's, the main base will be at
I stressed all the arguments given in the latest appreciation.
Hopkins, with whom I have spent an hour since writing the above, says it is probable that a meeting of the
I told him they could generally have it and that the contribution of
In view of the new proposals for unified American command of the whole
I know how preoccupied you must be with urgent questions of defence, but I do hope that you and your service advisers can find it possible to meet a Minister and service representatives from New Zealand with a view to a rapid clarification of the situation as it exists at present. If this is acceptable to you I would propose that a Minister, accompanied by the Chief of the Naval Staff, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Chief of the Air Staff, should leave for
I should be grateful for a reply tomorrow.
Your cablegram of 24 March.
1. I appreciate your desire for further discussions in view of subsequent developments and the appointment of General MacArthur as Supreme Commander.
2. We are awaiting advice from No. 163.
3. There are also many urgent and important matters of command and organisation affecting Australian forces still to be worked out, and these are engaging the close attention of ourselves and our service advisers. Our service advisers consider that further discussion between Australian and New Zealand service representatives cannot be carried on profitably until the area of General MacArthur's command is defined and proposals have been made by the Supreme Commander for the organisation of the area.
4. In view of these considerations I feel that it would be better if the visit of the New Zealand representatives were postponed for a short period. I understand and share your anxiety to have these important matters promptly adjusted, and I shall be happy to agree to further discussions between Australian and New Zealand representatives at the earliest opportune moment.
Your telegram of 25 March. We agree and will postpone the visit of the delegation accordingly. We assume that the arrangements recently agreed upon between
‘Our reflections are that while we must, of course, attach the utmost weight to American views, and especially to those of President Roosevelt and Admiral King, we are most definitely against the carving-up of the
‘There are very many loose strings about the proposed arrangements so far as we have been informed of them, and at the appropriate time it is intended to send a delegation to
‘We are, as you will have gathered from our telegrams repeated to you, prepared to waive all questions of detail if only we can get a combined The above extract from this telegram to Mr Nash was also sent to Mr Churchill on 26 March.
If your concur, you might consider requesting Evatt to co-operate with Nash in this connection.
I am very much obliged to you for your telegrams [Nos. 166 and 167] with reference to the establishment and organisation of the
There are very many loose strings about the proposed arrangements so far as we have been informed of them, and at the appropriate time it is intended to send a delegation to
We are, as you will have gathered from our telegrams repeated to you, prepared to waive all questions of detail if only we can get a combined
These views have been conveyed to Curtin and the suggestion made that, if the Australian Government agree, they might request Evatt to co-operate with you in this connection.
From your telegram of 26 March, I note:
your definite wish to be included within the area of MacArthur's command;
that you are opposed to any degree of separation from
that you would prefer that the area agreed upon between the Australian and New Zealand Governments should be retained under an Anzac Commander subject to the Supreme Commander of the whole
that if the Supreme Commander for the
that if
I will make immediate preliminary inquiries with regard to the necessary representations, but would be glad if you would consider the following facts and cable me your instructions:
Whilst I have no official advice, I have heard from an unimpeachable source that the Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed on the boundaries of MacArthur's command and that New Zealand is not included.
I have reason to believe from my conversation with the President, although again it is not official, that he will approve the boundaries as recommended by the Chiefs of Staff.
That it has been agreed that the United States Chiefs of Staff shall take care of strategic responsibility for the Pacific Ocean area, including all lands east of
That I am advised confidentially, but not officially (the matter must not be referred to until official advice has been received), that Admiral King and General Marshall have already completed plans for garrison, air force, equipment, etc., to be placed on certain islands.
That in some cases the forces and equipment mentioned in (d) have already left and that dates have been determined when others will leave.
That Admiral King's plans have been for
That Admiral King has completed his detailed plans for naval defence and attack, the plans are under action, and that they provide for
I agree with you entirely as to the imperative urgency for the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief for the whole
As I understand him, King proposes to carry out his plans in co-operation with MacArthur, in
Please make your reply immediate priority.
Repeated to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and to the Prime Minister of
Your telegram of 27 March.
We retain the views set out in my telegram [No. 172], which are concurred in by our Chiefs of Staff and were concurred in by the Australian Government when our delegation was there early this month. We have not yet heard the Australian Government's latest views or what comments they are making to Evatt.
If, as you say, the whole arrangement is now decided upon by the Americans, then once we have expressed our views, as outlined in telegram [No. 172], we think you are right in feeling that there is little to be gained by carrying the matter further, and we might well allow the situation to develop in the hope that the close contact with
The following telegram has been sent to Dr Evatt:
‘Your cablegram PM 5 of 25 March. Not available.
“The Chiefs of Staff are strongly opposed to the proposed subdivision of the
“It is essential to
‘2. For the reasons set out in the above report we are opposed to the proposed division of the
‘3. The Chiefs of Staff have also furnished the following additional observations, which are communicated for your information and for discussion with the Combined Chiefs of Staff or Admiral King as appropriate:
“While adhering to the proposals already made by the Governments of Vice-Admiral W. A. Glassford, USN; Commander US Naval Forces, South-West Pacific, 1941–42. Vice-Admiral H. F. Leary, USN; Commander Anzac Naval Force,
Not published.
You will note in the message repeated below that we have informed Curtin that you will confer with Evatt on this matter, and that if you consider the whole question should be reopened on the lines suggested
To the Prime Minister,
‘I am grateful for your telegram [No. 175] which has been considered by
‘We are asking Mr Nash to confer with Evatt, and if as a result of their discussions it is considered that the whole question should be reopened on the lines suggested in your telegram, he should refer the matter back to us for further instructions.
‘Irrespective of whatever course is decided upon in
Subsequent to my discussion with General Marshall this morning, Brigadier-General Smith, Lt-Gen W. Bedell Smith,
General Smith advised me that Evatt has [group omitted–agreed?] to the directive submitted, and that he would suggest that an amendment to ensure complete understanding as to control of the land defence of New Zealand would be provided, after which it would be submitted to Sir John Dill for consideration by the British Joint Staff Mission and subsequent consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, prior to submission to yourself and other Governments concerned for consideration and confirmation if approved.
The following is the text of the directives to the Commander-in-Chief of the
The directives have been approved by the President, and I would be pleased if you would immediately consider [them] and advise me at once of your decision.
Directive to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Ocean Area
‘By agreement amongst the Governments of
‘(1) The Pacific Ocean area, comprising the North, Central, and South Pacific areas, has been constituted, as defined in Annex 1.
‘(2) You are designated as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Ocean area, and of all armed forces which the Governments concerned have assigned or may assign to this area.
‘(3) You will appoint a Commander of the South Pacific area, who, acting under your authority and general direction, will exercise command of the combined armed forces which may at any time be assigned to that area. You will exercise direct command of the combined armed forces in the North and Central Pacific areas.
‘(4) In consonance with the basic strategic policy of the Governments concerned, your operations will be designated to the accomplishment of the following:
Hold island positions between the
Support the operations of forces in the South-West Pacific area.
Contain Japanese forces within the
Support the defence of the continent of
Protect the essential sea and air communications.
Prepare for the execution of major amphibious offensives against positions held by
‘(5) You will not be responsible for the internal administration of the respective forces under you. You are authorised to direct and co-ordinate the creation and development of administrative facilities and the broad allocation of war materials.
‘(6) You are authorised to control the issue of all communiqués concerning the forces under your command.
‘(7) When task forces of your command operate outside the Pacific Ocean area, co-ordination with forces assigned to the area in which operating will be effected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or Combined Chiefs of Staff, as appropriate.
‘(8) Commanders of all armed forces within your area will be immediately informed by their respective Governments that, from a date to be notified, all orders and instructions issued by you in conformity with this directive will be considered by such commanders as emanating from their respective Governments.
‘(9) Your Staff will include officers assigned by the Governments concerned, based upon requests made directly to the national commanders of the various forces in your area.
‘(10) The Governments concerned will exercise the direction of operations in the Pacific Ocean area as follows:
The Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise general jurisdiction over grand strategic policy and over such related factors as are necessary for proper implementation, including the allocation of forces and war materials.
The Joint United States Chiefs of Staff will exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operational strategy. The Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet will act as the executive agency for the Joint United States Chiefs of Staff. All instructions to you will be issued by or through him.
The New Zealand Chiefs of Staff will be responsible for the land defence of New Zealand, subject to such strategic decisions affecting this responsibility as may be made by you for the conduct of naval operations in the Pacific Ocean area. Paragraph 10 (c) was later amended. See p. 265, note 2.
‘From Cape Kamiguin, Lui-chow Peninsula, around coast of Tonkin [Tong-king] Gulf, Indo-
‘The westerly boundary of the South-West Pacific area is the westerly boundary of the
‘From Mexican–Guatemala western boundary, south-westerly to latitude 11 degrees north, longitude 110 degrees west; thence south.
‘The Pacific Ocean area includes all the
‘By agreement amongst the Governments of
‘(1) The South-West Pacific area has been constituted as defined in Annex 1. Definitions of other areas of the
‘(2) You are designated as Supreme Commander of the South-West Pacific area, and of all armed forces which the Governments concerned have assigned, or may assign, to this area.
‘(3) As Supreme Commander you are not eligible to command directly any national force.
‘(4) In consonance with the basic strategic policy of the Governments concerned, your operations will be designed to accomplish the following:
Hold the key military regions of
Check the enemy advance toward
Exert economic pressure on the enemy by destroying vessels transporting raw materials from the recently conquered territories to
Maintain our position in the Philippine Islands.
Protect land, sea and air communications within the South-West Pacific area and its close approaches.
Route shipping in the South-West Pacific area.
Support the operations of friendly forces in the Pacific Ocean area and in the Indian theatre.
Prepare to take the offensive.
‘(5) You will not be responsible for the internal administration of the respective forces under your command, but you are authorised to direct and co-ordinate the creation and development of administrative facilities and the broad allocation of war materials.
‘(6) You are authorised to control the issue of all communiqués concerning the forces under your command.
‘(7) When task forces of your command operate outside the South-West Pacific area, co-ordination with forces assigned to the areas in which operating will be effected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or Combined Chiefs of Staff, as appropriate.
‘(8) Commanders of all armed forces within your area will be immediately informed by their respective Governments that, from a date to be notified, This directive became effective at midnight, Greenwich civil time, 7–8 May 1942.
‘(9) Your Staff will include officers assigned by the respective Governments concerned, based upon requests made directly to the national commanders of the various forces in your area.
‘(10) The Governments concerned will exercise direction of operations in the South-West Pacific area as follows:
The Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise general jurisdiction over grand strategic policy and over such related factors as
The Joint United States Chiefs of Staff will exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operational strategy. The Chief of Staff of the United States Army will act as the executive agency for the Joint United States Chiefs of Staff. All instructions to you will be issued by or through him.’
Repeated to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and the Prime Minister of
Your telegram of 3 April.
We have carefully considered the proposed areas and directives for the
With regard to paragraph (10) (c) of the directive to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Ocean area, there are, as you know, substantial New Zealand forces in
The authority of the Commander-in-Chief and the Commander of the South Pacific area over the New Zealand Forces might well be construed as entitling them to move New Zealand troops from this Dominion to other portions of the area. That they should have such an authority is not contested, but we feel strongly that it should be understood, either by reference in the directive or otherwise, that any such power to move troops from the Dominion should be subject to prior consultation and agreement with the
Subject to the above considerations which we would wish you to record with the Americans, we are prepared to accept the proposals. They are not what we would wish and we are by no means convinced that they are the best that can be made, but, as you know, we attach the utmost importance to an early decision and to obtain this at once we are prepared to waive our views.
Please advise the American authorities accordingly and keep me informed of the progress that is made.
Your telegram of 5 April.
I have notified Admiral King of your continued opinion that
Following my telegram to you of 12 April, I wrote to Admiral King and raised the questions to which you required answers, and gave him copies of your telegram [No. 179] and my telegram [No. 180]. He has now replied as follows:
‘Dear Mr Nash,
Message number [179] of 5 April, addressed to you by the Government of New Zealand, raises certain points in connection with our proposed directive to the Commander of the Pacific Ocean area on which your Government desires additional information. The following is the position of the United States Chiefs of Staff:
With regard to the control of New Zealand forces in
With regard to the possible movement of New Zealand troops out of New Zealand territory, the following by the United States Chiefs of Staff to the President is self-explanatory:
“The proposals of the United States Chiefs of Staff (for operations in the Pacific Ocean areas) made to the President of the
‘I wish at this time to express to you and to the
Very sincerely,
(Signed) E. J. King,
Admiral, United States Navy, Commander-in-Chief
United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations.’
In accordance with your views I have sent the following reply:
‘Acting on the instructions of my Prime Minister contained in his cable to me numbered [179], 5 April, and accepting the answers set out in your letter of yesterday (14 April) I now advise you of the agreement of the
We are now in a somewhat embarrassing position with reference to the arrangements made for the control of the
Would you be good enough to inquire whether it is intended to make an announcement in Vice-Admiral R. L. Ghormley, USN; Commander South Pacific Force and
My telegram of 22 April.
Lengthy and accurate press reports from
In view of the clamour for information here and the imminent arrival of Australian papers which will contain this information, I have today, with the agreement of General Hurley, issued the following statement:
‘The Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. P. Fraser, announced today that, under an arrangement made by the Governments of the
‘This area will be separate and distinct from the “South-West Pacific” area which has been placed under the command of General MacArthur. It was our desire that
Viscount Caldecote.
Following for Prime Minister from my Prime Minister:
1. There is one aspect of your most secret telegram Circular Z.106 of 14 June Not published. This telegram contained for the Prime Minister's information a provisional review of the situation in the event of the collapse of French resistance. The review was framed on the basis that ‘In the unlikely event of See Appendix II. Text omitted contained a proposal by the status quo in the
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are grateful for your most immediate and most secret telegram of 30 July See Vol. I, Third Echelon, No. 223. In this telegram the Dominions Secretary notified the
(1) The rapid deterioration in the past few weeks in the Far Eastern situation has reinforced the view, which they have held for some considerable time, that relations between the British Commonwealth and
(2) In these circumstances they have felt it their duty to consider with much care the course that should be taken with the New Zealand troops now in training in the Dominion, including those for the
In considering this matter they have tried to weigh carefully every pertinent consideration, and they think it might be of advantage were they to inform His Majesty's Government in the
On the one hand they have had to recognise and attach due weight to the fact that the situation in the See Vol. I, pp. 171–2, for text omitted.
All these circumstances they have looked at with the greatest of care and in the light of the fullest possible information that they have been able to gather here.
On the other hand there are very weighty considerations against deferring the despatch of the troops as arranged.
They fully accept the fact that a large view must be taken, that in the last resort this Dominion must stand or fall according to the decision in the main theatres of war, and that as a corollary it would be wise to have all possible forces at decisive points rather than to disperse them in reserves all over the world.
Again they see that if the despatch of the
They have given the fullest weight to the recent appreciations of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff as to the vital necessity of maintaining the British positions in the
Having very carefully weighed all the above considerations and every other known factor that might conceivably have a bearing upon the matters in question, the See Vol. I, pp. 172–3, for text omitted.vis-à-vis
Circular telegram.
1. As you will be aware, we have recently been devoting special attention to questions connected with the production and distribution of warlike stores in relation to the needs of Dominion land forces. As regards the requirements which form part of our programme of purchases in the
2. Constant contact is maintained with Dominion Liaison Officers in
3. Priority of allotment must be determined from time to time in accordance with operational needs, and although the production situation has improved and is improving, production of all standard weapons has not come forward equally quickly, and interference by enemy air action may conceivably tend further to unbalance production. In these circumstances production in
4. While these deficiencies are being overtaken the requirements of the Dominion forces stationed within the Dominions, other than for coast defence, must be assigned a low degree of operational priority, and the United Kingdom Government trust that the Dominion Governments agree with the soundness of that decision, even though their deficiencies in this respect are great. The great importance of Dominion schools of instruction and training establishments being in possession of some modern equipment is realised and a reorganisation is now being carried out as to the extent to which a limited issue from the
5. The War Office, with the assistance of the Dominion representatives, are now completing an exhaustive review of outstanding orders from the Dominions for equipment, and it is hoped that by the end of this month the tabulation of these outstanding demands will be completed and handed to Dominion representatives. Thereafter the
6. Steps are being taken to see that stores allotted to Dominions from production or releases in
Your Circular telegram of 16 October.
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand much appreciate the information which you have been good enough to forward with reference to the production and distribution of warlike stores in relation to the needs of Dominion land forces, and warmly welcome the steps that are being taken and the prospect of regular reports concerning the supply situation from time to time.
They attach particular importance to the early receipt of modern equipment suitable and adequate for schools of instruction and training establishments, and would be grateful for an intimation in due course of the scale and character of equipment for this purpose that is contemplated, and of the date or dates upon which it might be expected to arrive in this Dominion.
They gather also from paragraph 4 of your telegram that requirements for the coast defence of this Dominion would be regarded as of high priority and they warmly welcome this interpretation. They feel it essential, however, to express their considered views concerning that portion of paragraph 4 which indicates that New Zealand requirements other than for coast defence must be assigned a low degree of operational priority while the deficiencies in British equipment generally (the cause of which is fully understood and appreciated in New Zealand) are being overtaken. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand fully appreciate the primary necessity of supplying the needs of His Majesty's forces in the
As another indication of the serious view they take of the position, they have, with the concurrence of His Majesty's Government in the
It is the view of His Majesty's Government in New Zealand, therefore, that in the light of recent events it is really not possible for them to concur in the view expressed by His Majesty's Government in the Brig R. S. Park, CB, CBE; NZ Military Liaison Officer,
Your telegram of 19 October. We are grateful for this expression of the views of His Majesty's Government in New Zealand and full account will be given them. We entirely recognise the great efforts which New Zealand is making for its own local defence and for the security of
Following from my Prime Minister for Prime Minister:
From time to time His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have been in communication with His Majesty's Government in the This conference, held in
Yesterday a New Zealand ship, the Rangitane,
MV Rangitane, 16,712 tons, New Zealand Shipping Company. Sunk by the German raiders
Viscount Cranborne.
Your telegram of 28 November. Please give the following private and personal message to your Prime Minister from Mr Churchill:
Am most grateful to you for the indulgence which you have shown us in our extreme need about Hudsons. I can assure you that I have throughout given my personal attention to this question, and it was with great regret that I felt obliged to ask you to defer to the claims of the North-Western Approaches. I will watch the situation constantly with every desire to meet your needs as soon as possible.
Following from my Prime Minister for Prime Minister:
I feel I must tell you at once that my colleagues and I have been most keenly disappointed by your message to me of 2 December. We all of us realise the In
Speaking in the name of all His Majesty's Ministers in this Dominion, I do most earnestly request you to have this matter again inquired into and, if it is at all possible to do so, to enable us to acquire at least a limited number of those machines which we feel to be absolutely essential in the present circumstances, and indeed vital to us should the situation worsen, as it may.
I do apologise for troubling you again in this matter—it is only our most urgent conviction of our needs that warrants my doing so.
Message from Mr Churchill for the most secret and personal information of Mr Fraser:
I have been thinking constantly about your inquiries, but I deferred answering till the results of the Libyan battle The first British offensive in the
2. We will certainly send you some Hudsons for action against raiders, but I know that you would not wish to take more from the north-western approaches to Great Britain than is absolutely necessary in these next few months.
3. When I spoke of our aircraft production being ahead of
4. The greatest anxiety is tonnage. When I mentioned the years 1943 and 1944, I was speaking of the slow processes of shipbuilding and agriculture which require to be always running in steady grooves. Of course this does not mean that I think that the war will go on as long as that. I can truly say that, having lived through a very rough time, as you will remember, I feel that we are more sure of the future than we have ever been since the war began. Every good wish.
… See Vol. II, No. 78, for text omitted.
For these reasons, and most particularly because of the great existing scarcity of fighting equipment in the country, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand press strongly for the earliest priority in the following items of equipment already on order:
The above figures are inclusive of all equipment already approved for release. A number of telegrams dealing with the provision of fixed defences for New Zealand ports have not been reproduced. See also Defence of the South Pacific.
Lt-Gen Sir Edward Puttick, KCB, DSO and bar, MC (Gk), Legion of Merit (US); Chief of the General Staff and GOC NZ Military Forces, Aug 1941 – Dec 1945.
The complete mobilisation of the New Zealand Forces has been ordered for 10 January, providing twenty-three battalions and eighteen being formed, nine mounted rifle regiments, four field regiments, and miscellaneous and ancillary troops. Medium guns and howitzers
See Vol. II, No. 53, for complete text.
Following for Prime Minister from Prime Minister:
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have reviewed the resources available to meet a Japanese attack comprising one division accompanied by possibly two aircraft-carrier groups and other naval units. This scale of attack is considered not unlikely under the present circumstances. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are strongly of the opinion that no reasonable security against carrier-borne air attack can be obtained unless the limited air striking forces available are provided with fighter protection. In addition, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand consider that some fighter protection in the form of interceptor aircraft is essential for the protection of at least the two main ports of See also Command in the Pacific: ABDA and Anzac Areas, No. 117.
Following for Prime Minister from Prime Minister:
I have given the fullest consideration to your requests for supplies of war material, and in particular to those set out in your message to me of 30 January, with the earnest wish to meet your needs to the maximum extent. Our further proposals have been conveyed to you in the Secretary of State's telegram of today No. 87. Not published. Contained details of the principal items of equipment – chiefly fighter aircraft, artillery, rifles and tanks – which the United Kingdom Government proposed to provide up till the end of
There is a large flow of reinforcements of all kinds into the ABDA area. In addition to what we are sending to you, an important consignment is being provided for the defence of
We are already heading dangerously near the point where the spreading of our resources must lead to a general weakness. There is a point beyond which we cannot interfere with the flow to the
As stated in the Secretary of State's telegram, we shall be undertaking a further review at the end of March, and I can indeed assure you that we are watching the situation in all its bearings from day to day.
Following for Prime Minister from Prime Minister:
Referring to my telegram dated 30 January [No. 195] in which we requested your urgent consideration towards the allocation of four fighter squadrons to New Zealand, I wish to inform you that an intimation was received from the Not published. Listed naval and air requirements for the defence of New Zealand and
While my colleagues and I greatly appreciate the expressed intention to allocate a number of fighters, we feel we must represent that the number mentioned, namely 18, cannot be regarded as in any way adequate for the scale of attack against which we must now urgently prepare.
In Air Ministry signal NZLO 301 dated 29 January, Not published.
We still require the thirty-six fighter aircraft asked for in December, primarily for the purpose of training fighter pilots. But in addition thereto we require at least four fighter squadrons as soon as possible, complete with personnel and all ancillary equipment, together with a Group Headquarters staff and the requisite anti-aircraft defences to enable the whole formation to operate satisfactorily, particularly in the
When my original request for thirty-six fighters is satisfied, the Royal New Zealand Air Force should be in some position to meet the requirements for maintaining the pilot strength in these four fighter squadrons. At present, as you are aware, we have neither the aircraft nor the training facilities to provide any fighter defence whatever, except by employing training aircraft which have neither the equipment nor the performance adequate to deal with modern enemy aircraft.
As I have said already, my Government and I are appreciative of the recognition so far given to my request for training fighters but we feel we must press, with all urgency, the need for a substantial contribution in the form of a complete fighter force to be allocated in this Dominion. Such a force would be available to provide reinforcements elsewhere when the situation warrants it, but we fear there is a grave risk in attempting, at the present time, to send all available forces close in to the battle zone without retaining in the base areas, of which New Zealand is now a principal part, a sufficient strength to secure those base areas if operations in the active zone should continue to go against us.
You will appreciate that this request for a fully organised and supported fighter force represents only a part of our requirements for defence. I have been hoping to hear that the whole question of the defence of New Zealand has received consideration by the Joint Allied Staffs and that a plan has been formulated to provide reinforcements of all kinds which, although finally destined for the ABDA area
Your telegram of 4 February. Following for Prime Minister from Prime Minister:
We are in full sympathy and agreement with the sense of your telegram [No. 197]. The proposal to provide you with thirty-six fighters, either half from British sources and half from American, or failing an American allotment, all from British sources, was made before receipt of your telegram of 30 January [No. 195]. Anxious as we are to help, the provision of four complete fighter squadrons presents a difficult problem. Shipping limitations alone would prevent us despatching complete units from this country at present. The only means of providing for the fighter defence of New Zealand without long delay would be for a request to be made to the After discussions with General Marshall, Mr Nash advised on 9 April that these squadrons would not be available to New Zealand.
2. This arrangement would have the advantage not only of saving shipping and time but also that it would not be at the expense of the forces now en route and earmarked for the ABDA area, North
3. If you concur in the above proposal, I would suggest that the
4. With regard to your request for long-range fighters, we are, I regret, not in a position to offer you more than the total of eighteen Beaufighters and cannot convert these in time for despatch earlier than April.
5. Reference anti-aircraft equipment, will you let us know the numbers of guns, both heavy and light, you now require in addition to those we have already promised.
6. The Pacific War Council has instructed the Joint Staffs here, which include a New Zealand representative, Brigadier R. S. Park. Not published. In this message to the Chiefs of Staff in
7. Please send the list of requirements for all your three Services, as you suggest in the last paragraph of your telegram. We will do our best to help in consultation with the Americans.
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
Following for the Prime Minister:
Thank you so much for your telegram of 14 February. We quite appreciate the force of your remarks as to the difficulty of supplying us with fighter squadrons from the No. 200.
2. In view of the serious situation in the
The Dominion of New Zealand, together with the Commonwealth of
As British Dominions to be defended because they are British.
As producers of primary products—notably food and wool, both of which are important to British security.
As sources of fighting forces.
As intrinsically desirable to the enemy for colonisation and for commodities.
In the situation that has now developed, however, it is our view that the following are the two aspects of fundamental and paramount importance:
As intermediate stages in the route for reinforcements from
As main bases from which operations could be developed against the enemy.
The deterioration in the
Our inability to develop adequate naval and air power to prevent further conquest by the Japanese in the
While of course not relaxing in the slightest degree any effort that appears to offer a promise of success in halting or at
We do not know how much further west, south, or east
Secure Burma.
Proceed through
Invade Australia.
Invade New Zealand.
The relative magnitude of each of these undertakings in relation to the advantages to be gained must be the deciding factor in
It is of course possible that, having attained control of the principal ABDA territories, the Japanese might be content to rest there, and from that defensive line to defy us to oust them from the positions that they have taken which, they might feel, provide them with everything that they need for the New Order in the
In either case it seems inevitable that the struggle in the
These minimum requirements—and we suggest they are the very minimum—are those that are necessary to maintain:
the line of reinforcement by air and by sea from the
adequate and suitable areas for the provision of naval, air and land bases.
Strategic base areas from which to fight our way back athwart the China Sea need to be established in
Confining our attention in this paragraph to the areas for which this Government is directly responsible, it seems abundantly clear to us that the retention of
As we see it,
In our view then, the defence requirements of New Zealand and
the necessity for maintaining the channel of communication to the
the necessity for preserving their integrity as bases for future action.
We feel it essential therefore to press on the highest grounds of strategy for the provision of the necessary equipment both for New Zealand and for
3. We have already told you generally of our shortages of equipment but, in accordance with your request, I am forwarding in my immediately following telegram a full statement of the equipment which we require at the moment and which we do beg of you to expedite, either from
4. We feel, however, that it is not possible to formulate fully the defence requirements of New Zealand until it is known what role is to be assigned to the Dominion in relation to
5. Believe me we are fully appreciative of what you and our American friends have already been able to provide for the defence of New Zealand and
6. This telegram is being repeated to the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of
Repeated to the New Zealand Minister,
Following for Prime Minister:
With reference to paragraph 1 of my telegram [No. 199], I now set out the immediate defence requirements for New Zealand. These
2. The air defence forces of New Zealand,
8 squadrons (3 in
Airacobras (Pursuit) – 25 now erecting in
Hudsons (Reconnaissance) – 32 (12 in
Vincents (obsolete) (Reconnaissance) – 45 (9 in
Hinds (obsolete) (Army Co-operation) – 21
Singapores (obsolete) (Flying Boats) – 3 (in
In addition, the following aircraft in training schools are being equipped for operational use and organised into emergency squadrons to be employed in the event of invasion:
We have also four air warning RDF sets (three in
An organisation is now being prepared to command and operate existing squadrons, auxiliary squadrons, and new squadrons as they become available, in three groups—Northern, Central and Southern. These groups will also comprise the training schools.
3. Requirements. As I indicated in my telegram, I have the greatest difficulty in putting forward specific requirements for defence. This relates particularly to Air requirements. It is clear that the success of anti-invasion operations depends to the greatest extent on air superiority, without which our land forces and coast defences will be at the worst possible disadvantage. In our remoteness from sources of production it is, of course, essential to keep our
2 torpedo-bomber or medium bomber squadrons
2 long-range fighter squadrons
2 short-range fighter squadrons
4 troop-carrying aircraft
These squadrons should be completely manned and equipped. The maintenance of such a force would normally require an Aircraft Depot but we could make do without. We are, of course, organising and contriving in every possible way to make the most of our resources and, in putting forward the above request for squadrons, I have taken full account of what we already have here. You will understand that a handful of Hudsons reinforced by numerous obsolete bombers and trainers will make an impression more for gallantry than for their execution…. Detailed requirements of aircraft, bombs, airfield construction and communication equipment, coast-defence artillery, field and anti-aircraft artillery, engineer and signal equipment, tanks and armoured vehicles, infantry weapons and ammunition, anti-submarine vessels, minesweepers, mines, and naval weapons, stores and equipment (covering six typed foolscap sheets) have been omitted.
Repeated to the New Zealand Minister,
Following for Prime Minister:
Reference my telegram of 17 February [No. 199]. In your telegram of 14 February [No. 198] you referred to our urgent requirements for fighters in New Zealand and offered to make certain future allocations to us to meet a proportion of our requirements. You were good enough to suggest that you would be willing for your part to agree to the two
You are aware that we have at the present time no fighters whatever in New Zealand, and that our expectation of receiving fighters is not as high as we consider necessary. Unless complete units can be
You are aware that apart from the necessity for protecting our very limited bomber forces proceeding to the attack of enemy aircraft carriers or other ships, and apart from the necessity for employing fighters over the zone of operations in the event of invasion, we have the permanent necessity for providing fighter protection over our main ports and cities, which at any time are liable to air attack.
While, therefore, two pursuit squadrons will be of the greatest assistance and will afford considerable protection for certain purposes, there will remain an urgent need for a substantial increase in our fighter defences, and I sincerely hope that the squadrons destined for this part of the world may be duly apportioned to cover this urgent requirement as far as possible and as soon as possible.
Secret and personal for General Puttick.
In allotting Joint Planning Committee activity I am somewhat handicapped by the lack of up-to-date information on the present situation in New Zealand. In this respect I particularly request your views on the scale of attacks now possible on New Zealand (a) if b) if these islands are lost. In a proposed paper the Joint Planning Committee are suggesting that in (a) only sporadic raids by enemy cruisers and aircraft carriers are likely, and in (b) one brigade group with naval and air support, which I consider too light and have not accepted. The basis of their argument is that all Japanese activity after the capture of the
For Brigadier Park from General Puttick.
Your telegram of 25 February.
My personal views, which may not necessarily be shared by the Chief of the Naval Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff, Then in
1. The scale of attack on New Zealand depends upon the following factors:
The power of Allied naval forces to interfere decisively with an expedition or at least to inflict serious casualties.
The number and quality of
The Japanese estimate of the strength and quality of the New Zealand land forces which could be concentrated at the point or points of attack.
The Japanese estimate of the value of New Zealand as
a link in the
an enemy base to intensify attacks on
the final advanced
a produce exporter.
Axis strategical plans, of which there is insufficient data to form an opinion. If these include a south-east drive by
The Japanese shipping situation. In a recent survey there is some indication of a shortage, and casualties have since occurred but are probably balanced by captures and charters. On the information available I do not accept the shortage of shipping as restricting Japanese expeditions.
The Japanese estimate of the effect of a heavy attack on New Zealand on the morale of the NZEF in the
2. Conclusions: There are so many imponderable factors in paragraph 1 that any forecast of enemy intentions must be largely guesswork. If it could be clearly established that Allied naval forces could effectively intervene against the expedition, I agree that the scale of
3. I regard any suggestion of a brigade group as fantastic. What could it hope to achieve? It is a case of either initially a division, perhaps of a special type, or mere raids. On 28 February the Prime Minister sent copies of this telegram to the New Zealand Minister in
pefraNo. 5.
Major-General Puttick has just shown me a personal telegram he has received from the New Zealand Liaison Officer in
Candidly I must tell you that my colleagues and I are appalled by this attempt to think in terms of the past, and if this line of thought is persisted in we must brace ourselves to meet the fate of
A telegram sent tonight by the Chief of the General Staff to the New Zealand Liaison Officer in
[Text of telegram No. 203]
Following from Prime Minister for Prime Minister:
Your pefra No. 5. The estimate you refer to is leakage at a very early stage of examination of the question for which you asked, and in no way represents the views of the Chiefs of Staff, who have not yet even been consulted. This shows that there are disadvantages as well as advantages in liaison between your officers and ours in initial stages of staff study.
I agree with you that whatever is likely to invade New Zealand will not be a brigade group. Your telegram will be shown to the Planning Staff at the same time that any reports from their juniors are considered.
I am aiming at three large measures for New Zealand security. First, inducing the United States Navy to give effective protection in the Anzac area; second, their reinforcement of
It is impossible to say with certainty that the Japanese will not attack New Zealand in force, but there are many other far more tempting objectives for them and their resources are not unlimited. I am hoping that the recovery of sea power during May by the
I am doing everything in my power to get you the weapons and munitions for which you have asked. All good wishes.
Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister:
I am very much obliged to you for your telegram. Your messages are always most helpful and my colleagues and I are greatly relieved to learn that the situation is as you explain it.
In view, however, of your reference to a ‘leakage’, I think I should explain at once, in order to avoid any misunderstanding or injustice to Brigadier Park, New Zealand Liaison Officer in
I am not yet in a position, nor indeed does the time seen appropriate, to comment in detail upon the more general problems your telegram raises, but I should like you to know at once that we very warmly appreciate the efforts that you are making to supply us with the necessary equipment and otherwise to improve our means of defence.
In order to assist the Combined Chiefs of Staff to estimate the degree of support, both in military formations and in weapons, required in the defence of
The New Zealand Service representatives in
A brief appreciation of the land and air defence problems of New Zealand, with an estimate of the land and air force facilities and equipment required to meet the new situation.
A statement of the facilities and equipment of the land and air forces at present available.
A summary of the steps now being taken within the Dominion to increase their security, e.g., raising and equipping new formations and increasing weapon production. This to include
A statement in order of priority of requirements in land and air reinforcements and in equipment which the Dominion considers should be provided from outside sources.
You have already supplied a very comprehensive list of equipment required, and a copy of this cable has been made available to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but it would be helpful if in your reply you set out the major types of equipment that would meet the most urgent and immediate needs.
Following for Prime Minister from Prime Minister:
1. In response to the various suggestions and requests which I made to the President for the common conduct of the war against
‘We concur in your estimate of the importance of the Indian and
2. Our 5th British Division is about to sail from the
3. It is certain, in view of the shipping position, that an American division can reach New Zealand sooner than the New Zealand Division can be withdrawn from the
4. You have never asked for the withdrawal of your Division and we have admired the constancy of spirit and devotion to the cause which has animated your Government and people. See also Vol. II, Reinforcement of 2nd NZEF, 1940–42, No. 57 ff.
Repeated to the High Commissioner for New Zealand in
Reference Mr Nash's telegram [No. 207].
A general appreciation of the defence situation of this Dominion was contained in a telegram addressed by the Chief of the General Staff to the Military Liaison Officer,
2. It is noted that in your telegram no request is made for an appreciation of the naval defence problems, and it is assumed that this omission is due to the fact that naval defence is to a large extent now the responsibility of the United States Navy. It must be emphasised, however, that the most effective insurance against invasion is that given by naval forces, which should with adequate air support intercept any enemy expedition before it reaches New Zealand. Moreover, naval forces with adequate air cover must be the mainstay of our subsequent offensive, for which we should start to prepare now. The preparation of naval bases for the United States Pacific Fleet must therefore receive very high priority. Proposals for Not published. Not published. Not published. Listed in detail the requirements recommended for anti-submarine defence at See comanzac and the Relief of New Zealand Garrisons in Fiji and Tonga, No. 292.
3. In my telegram of 28 February the scale of enemy attack estimated by the Chief of the General Staff was two divisions. We do not consider this excessive. There can be no certainty it will not be exceeded in view of the fact that a greater proportion of the twenty-nine Japanese divisions or more in the South-West Pacific area may, having now completed their first task, be diverted for the attack on this area. The problem must therefore be approached from the point of view of doing the maximum possible to secure both
4. The strength of the army required to secure the safety of New Zealand is naturally much influenced by the naval situation and by the strength of the New Zealand air forces. The naval situation, even if in our favour, is liable to a complete upset by defeat and cannot at present be regarded as in any way a substitute for local defences. Air defence depends upon quality and number of aircraft, efficiency of air units and the capacity of aerodromes, and does not appear likely to afford a sufficient deterrent against heavy scale attack for a long time. Land forces are therefore of prime importance meanwhile until the naval and air situations develop materially in our favour.
5. Factors of importance in the land defence of New Zealand are:
Isolation of New Zealand from other land, which virtually prevents enemy use of shore-based aircraft during approach and enhances the value of both strong New Zealand air forces and of strong land forces to prevent the enemy securing a footing anywhere in New Zealand.
Elongated shape, lengthy coastline, present incomplete warning system, prevalence of harbours and landing beaches, great distances between vulnerable points, the existence of Cook Strait, limited capacity of main roads, and 3 ft 6 in. gauge railways.
These factors require strong mobile forces in at least seven widely separated areas and local garrisons for secondary ports and sheltered waters in addition to fortress areas. Aerodrome protection is difficult as many are close to the coast and there is much flat land in sparsely populated areas. Thus, the forces required in each island must be considerably superior to likely enemy forces to ensure speedy and effective opposition by at least equal forces and rapid concentrations of superior force…. Detailed estimates of the land forces required for the defence of New Zealand and
8. Your paragraph (c)
Increasing existing companies to battalions and calling up personnel to form garrison battalions.
Raising Maori battalion.
Training and throwing off cadres to man additional coast, medium, field, anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery due to arrive.
Training Home Guard instructors and personnel to man various anti-aircraft equipment and Coast Defence artillery sets.
Training in the Army approximately 6000 Air Force recruits for aerodrome battalions until required in the Proposals for the production of weapons and equipment are omitted.
9. State of Readiness.
(i) By 30 June: Two-thirds of force complete minimum of six months' continuous training, balance three months. On present indications the equipment situation should then be satisfactory except for 9·2-inch equipments, anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft searchlights, tanks for nine AFV regiments, anti-tank mines, and possible rifles for 100,000 Home Guard. Forces should be well able to undertake active operations. Entrenchments, obstacles and improvements to roads and bridges should be well advanced.
(ii) By 31 December: Forces should be thoroughly fit for any operations…. Details of reinforcements and equipment required from outside sources for the defence of New Zealand and
11. It is not possible to make a satisfactory statement of immediate and ultimate air requirements for the defence of New Zealand and
12. The following roles fall to air forces countering enemy invasion:
Reconnaissance of sea areas of approach for which we will be responsible to locate enemy carriers, warships and transports.
To strike at enemy transports during their approach.
To destroy enemy aircraft carriers and otherwise to obtain air ascendancy over enemy carrier-borne aircraft in the area of operations.
To give bomber and reconnaissance support to the Army.
To provide fighter protection over important targets, main ports and aerodromes.
13. The following secondary roles fall to the
Reconnaissance of sea areas other than invasion approach areas.
Escort of shipping convoys.
14. The air forces required for all the above purposes are in excess of available aerodrome accommodation. Numerous excellent aerodromes exist in New Zealand, but these mostly require extension and concreting and the preparation of protected dispersal positions.
15. As regards land aircraft, the first essential is to supply large quantities of aerodrome construction machinery. We have, you know, sent very large proportions of our construction machinery to the
16. If Fiji and New Zealand are to be held and are to become important base areas in future offensive operations, we estimate that we require the following as soon as possible…. The Air Force units, aircraft assembly plant and airfield defence equipment required are omitted.
17. Not knowing what might be made available we cannot state our preferences for priority. We desire that we may be informed of the Combined Chiefs of Staffs' intentions and requirements as regards New Zealand and
18. At the present time we are prepared to receive and operate in New Zealand and Details of the aircraft and equipment which New Zealand was prepared to accept and operate within the next three months are omitted.
20. We possess at the present time in New Zealand and
21. We recognise that our future success in the
22. All service squadrons in New Zealand and Paragraphs 23–27 inclusive have been omitted. They discussed air requirements. In Paragraph 27 it was suggested that the major part of the air training done in New Zealand could in future be done in
28. The following is a brief statement of the manpower position:
sent overseas
in new zealand
This total represents 7·6 per cent of the total population and 38 per cent of men within the age groups from which they are drawn. A proportion of the additional 26,500 men to complete the
In addition to the above there is a
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
With reference to your telegram of 10 March [No. 208], and with further reference to your telegram of 4 March [No. 205]. Following is for Prime Minister from Prime Minister:
We warmly welcome your message of 10 March and particularly the prospect that it opens of definite reinforcements for New Zealand from
1. In connection with President Roosevelt's offer the following thoughts occur to us:
The dates of despatch and arrival of the contemplated reinforcements are distant and we cannot avoid the apprehension that they may be too late. It may well be that shipping difficulties or other restraining factors are such as to preclude the despatch of these troops at an earlier date, but it does seem necessary to say at once that from our point of view time is the very essence of the matter, that we would much prefer an earlier date, and that if, by way of illustration, we were forced to select an alternative, we would choose half the troops in half the time rather than the whole body at the times indicated.
It is not clear from President Roosevelt's message which of the flights is to come to New Zealand. We cannot, of course, enter into competition with
We note that owing to the pressure of shipping demands this movement of troops, even to the extent and at the dates proposed, must be at the expense of diverting twenty-five vessels from the supply of the
We note also that the despatch of the division is subject to the condition that our own Division remains in the
I must now tell you with what uneasiness we have noted the strength of the reinforcements which President Roosevelt proposes to despatch and, indeed, the strength of those which you hope to find it possible to send from the
It seems to us to be possible that in the
2. No doubt as a result of your communications with President Roosevelt, Mr Nash asked us last week, for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in
3. Again, please do not misunderstand me. We warmly welcome the present proposal and, indeed, we will gratefully receive any help that we can get. It is, however, as we see it, our duty to lay our position fully before you, knowing that you will do your utmost with the means that are available to enable us to defend ourselves and Allied interests in this part of the world.
Would you kindly supply a copy of this telegram to Mr Jordan.
Following from Prime Minister for Prime Minister:
1. I am very glad to learn from your [No. 210] that you welcome the President's offer and I am telling him so today as the matter is most urgent. I have not yet heard from
2. You are quite right in supposing that shipping is the stranglehold. We are sending nearly 50,000 men a month from the
3. It is true these forces will have to be sent according to need, either to the
4. We hope, however, to regain our sea power in the
5. At the same time the United States Fleet is regaining its strength and is already a powerful protection for the Anzac area. It would be a very serious enterprise for the Japanese to start a heavy invasion over the immense distance to New Zealand or
6. Our great aim must be to regain even a partial initiative, which will make the enemy fearful of every place he holds, instead of our trying to be safe everywhere, for that is utterly impossible.
Your telegram of 15 March. Following from Prime Minister for Prime Minister:
Your prompt reply to my message [No. 210] is very much appreciated. In the light of your comments we have again studied the situation as objectively as possible. I am sorry to say we are quite unable to agree with the views expressed in your paragraph 5 that anything in the nature of a serious invasion of New Zealand or
Your telegram of 19 February A copy of this message was also sent by the British Chiefs of Staff to the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff.
‘The New Zealand Government asked last month for a review of their defence problem. The following are our conclusions, though we realise it is likely to become an American problem when the
An early review of the proposals for the defence of New Zealand has brought to light the urgency of completing the following measures regarding
The Anzac area should be enlarged to include the Samoan Islands (Eastern and Western).
Naval forces allocated to the Anzac area should be reinforced by three 8-inch cruisers, one large aircraft carrier and eight modern destroyers, bringing the total strength in this area to six 8-inch cruisers, three 6-inch cruisers, one large and one small aircraft carrier, four armed merchant cruisers, and twelve destroyers. This cannot be done from British resources.
The Army and Not published. This telegram contained an estimate of the garrisons recommended for
This is not possible from British resources.
An Air Commander should be appointed to co-ordinate all air forces in islands under the strategic direction of the Commander-in-Chief Anzac area, who should also direct the necessary aerodrome development.
The United States should be invited to assume responsibility for
The development of a protected fleet anchorage in the Fiji Group should be accelerated and adequate anti-submarine and minesweeping vessels provided.
Improved coastwatching and RDF systems should be organised.
A copy of the above has been telegraphed to New Zealand, who have been invited to comment direct to you.
Report follows by air.’
It is suggested that New Zealand views on the above be communicated to
Will you kindly convey the following message through the appropriate channels from me to President Roosevelt:
‘1. Mr Churchill has advised me of the offer which you have been so good as to make through him to despatch to New Zealand a division of the United States Army in order to enable us to retain in the
‘2. In our view it is impossible to exaggerate the importance in the war against
‘3. If, therefore, in addition to the naval forces which we have been so happy to welcome in the South-Western Pacific (whose recent activities have been such a great encouragement and inspiration to us) there is any opportunity of expediting and, if possible, indeed increasing, the help in men and, not less important, in equipment which the
At an interview with the President this afternoon he handed me a message to you in the following text:
‘To the Prime Minister of New Zealand.
‘Your message of 19 March has been received through Mr Nash. I am glad to learn that the arrangement which we proposed meets with your warm approval.
‘I am in complete agreement with your statements in regard to the importance in the war against
‘I want you to know Mr Prime Minister that we are straining every effort to send the forces to which you refer at the earliest possible moment. We shall also do what we can toward increasing the help in men and in equipment. Everything that it is possible for us to do in this regard as a contribution to our combined war effort will be done. (Signed) Roosevelt.’
The original is being sent by next mail.
Repeated to the New Zealand Minister,
Your telegram of 19 March [No. 213].
The measures which the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff indicate
See No. 213. Mr Nash was asked to send a copy of this message to the Joint Staff Mission.
Secret and personal for General Puttick.
With reference to
I spent an hour with General Marshall yesterday and set out our needs as I saw them, particularly with regard to your appreciation of 13 March See No. 209.
I stressed the need for three divisions and urged that at least half a division should be sent early, and when I see him again next week I will suggest that if the 15 April convoy cannot come to New Zealand then at least half of each division should come to us.
He promised to examine the position regarding fighter squadrons, and I am to see him again on either Wednesday or Thursday next.
Most secret and personal for General Puttick.
1Although dated 28 March on all file copies, this message is later referred to by Brigadier Park as having been sent on the 27th.
The following is a summary of a report by the Chiefs of Staff on the New Zealand Defence Plan, dated
The defence of New Zealand is recognised as primarily a naval problem entailing the provision of adequate naval and air forces in the area, and dependent on denying bases to
(1) If adequate naval and air forces could operate from the South Pacific Islands and the Australian mainland be held, the invasion of New Zealand is extremely unlikely, although raiding operations against shipping and shore installations in New Zealand are possible.
(2) With the Japanese in possession of the
(3) The scale of attack is assessed at not less than one division, but this could be increased if the Japanese thought it necessary. Naval escort would consist probably of six 8-inch cruisers, three to five aircraft carriers (120 to 240 aircraft) and twenty destroyers, with the addition of one to thirty submarines operating in the area. Simultaneous attacks are possible against more than one group of islands, or alternatively these forces could be concentrated against each group in turn.
(4) The report discusses the responsibility for local defence, naval, army and air, and points out the weakness in regard to
(5) Recommendations on
The Anzac area should be extended to include the Samoan Group of islands.
The naval forces in the Anzac area should be maintained on the following scale: six 8-inch cruisers, three 6-inch cruisers, one large aircraft carrier, one small aircraft carrier, four armed merchant cruisers, twelve destroyers; reinforcements to effect this cannot be provided from British sources.
The army and air forces in the Islands should be completed to the approved target figures noted in Dominions Office telegram No. 97 dated See p. 247, note 3.
The operation of all air forces based in these Islands should be co-ordinated under the strategic direction of the Commander-in-Chief Anzac Area. A single Air Commander is essential.
The necessary aerodromes should be developed under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief Anzac Area.
The United States of
Development of a protected fleet anchorage in the Fiji Group, to be selected by the Commander-in-Chief Anzac Area, should be accelerated, and adequate anti-submarine and mine-sweeping vessels should be provided.
An improved coast-watching and RDF system should be organised.
(6) In regard to
(7) The scale and probability of attack against New Zealand depends on ability to operate adequate naval and air forces from
(8) If we hold secure bases in the Islands and can continue to operate reconnaissance and naval and air striking forces from them,
(9) If the Island Groups be lost, a full-scale attack on New Zealand is much more possible, but is considered unlikely for the following reasons:
Possession of the South Pacific Islands will place the Japanese across the Allied lines of communication and isolate New Zealand from the
The despatch of a powerful force to New Zealand entails a serious dispersion of Japanese strength and increased maintenance problems.
Moves against bases in the
The United States Fleet flanking the enemy lines of communication to New Zealand is a very real threat to an invasion expedition. This requires protection by a formidable force of capital ships, which the Japanese are most unlikely to risk at such a distance from
(10) Although arguable that
(11) In the event of
(12) In view of the distance involved, the seizure of a base in New Zealand by the Japanese would be a prerequisite to the successful occupation of the country. It is estimated that the Japanese might use one or two divisions to seize such a base, and the land forces in New Zealand should be designed to defeat such occupation.
(13) To provide sufficient land forces to prevent Japanese occupation once they had established a base in New Zealand would be far beyond the shipping resources of the Allied powers.
(14) If we are unable to operate from
(15) The report makes the following recommendations on New Zealand:
The naval forces in the Anzac area should be maintained on the following scale: six 8-inch cruisers, three 6-inch cruisers, one large aircraft carrier, one small aircraft carrier, four armed merchant cruisers, twelve destroyers; sufficient local antisubmarine and minesweeping craft for the ports of
The underwater defences of the ports should be completed.
The United States should now be asked to be prepared to move powerful naval forces south in the event of a threat to the
The military forces (excluding static anti-aircraft and coast defence guns) should comprise: seven brigade groups (including light anti-aircraft, anti-tank, and AFV elements), two light AFV regiments, twenty-three infantry battalions, but the actual target figures to be agreed with the United States Government.
Those troops now stationed in New Zealand who are at present poorly armed should be brought up as early as possible to a full scale of equipment.
The coast defence artillery and anti-aircraft requirements for ports and aerodromes in New Zealand should be provided on a scale to be agreed by the
The air forces should be the existing five squadrons comprising: 20 Hudsons, 36 Vincents, 21 Hinds, and a number of training aircraft, augmented by four fighter squadrons (two long-range), one General Reconnaissance squadron (long-range), two torpedo or medium bomber squadrons, This section of the text was mutilated in transmission. The above agrees with the printed version of the report.
Facilities should be provided in New Zealand for the operation of American heavy bomber squadrons.
(16) Coastwatching and RDF should be organised on the lines of the Williams report.Appreciation on the Defence Requirements of New Zealand in the Event of War with Japan, dated
Repeated to the New Zealand High Commissioner,
1. The War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff have had under consideration a telegram from the New Zealand Liaison Officer, Brigadier Park cabled General Puttick on 28 March: ‘Would make it clear that the Chiefs of Staff report summarised in my telegram of 27 March was prepared previous to receipt of NZ Government cable [No. 209] dated 13 March.’
2. The Army forces which the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff recommend as sufficient for the defence of New Zealand are practically identical with the forces summarised in the Dominions Office telegram [No. 213], sent to
3. We recognise that our principal security must rest in the ability of the
4. The United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff consider that the initial invasion of New Zealand would be undertaken by two divisions and that the
See p. 254, note 1.
5. We are aware that a decision to form a naval base in
6. You should inquire from the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
7. We recognise the difficulty of increasing the defences of New Zealand sufficiently to ensure our security until Japanese sea power is so effectually reduced or overshadowed as to make the invasion of New Zealand impracticable. Until this position is reached, however, it must be of the greatest interest to
8. With regard to
9. It seems to us that the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff, having adequately visualised the very possible dangers to New Zealand and consequently to the Allied strategy in this part of the
Your telegram of 19 February [No. 200], paragraphs 2, 3, and 4. Paragraph 4 was not reproduced.
1. The Air Ministry have discussed [the matter] with the New Zealand Air Liaison Officer, who has we understand been in communication with the New Zealand Chief of the Air Staff. As a result of this consultation it appears that New Zealand's requirements in squadrons as formed units completely manned and equipped are to be regarded as two fighter (long-range), two torpedo-bomber or medium bomber, one Army co-operation or dive-bomber, one flying boat.
2. It is understood that personnel can be furnished from New Zealand for the other squadrons mentioned in paragraph 3, viz., two fighter (short-range) and also the personnel for the Operational Training Unit backing. Confirmation of this is requested and also whether New Zealand still require four troop-carrying aircraft, which were not mentioned in the communication received by the Air Liaison Officer from the New Zealand Chief of Air Staff.
3. We greatly regret that we cannot transfer existing units to New Zealand from other theatres of war, and it would therefore seem necessary for these units to be formed in New Zealand by the use of aircraft allotted from time to time under the
4. Against the aircraft requirements set out in paragraph (4) (a) the
Long-range fighters.
Medium bomber or torpedo-bomber. Medium bomber aircraft cannot be shipped or flown from this country to New Zealand at present. We are also very short of torpedo-bomber aircraft, our home production of which is not likely to exceed thirty per month. We should, however, hope that it may later be possible for a share of the Australian production of Beauforts to be allotted to New Zealand.
Army co-operation or dive-bomber. The only suitable types are Vengeance and Bermuda, and of these it is feared that for some time to come priority must be given to the needs of
Catalinas. Here again we are very deficient and we cannot at present draw on our slender resources available for the protection of our lines of communication in the A brief statement of the steps being taken to meet New Zealand's requirements in
Following for Prime Minister:
Your telegram of 19 February [No. 201].
1. The question of the diversion of two
‘There appears to be no question that a real need exists for a pursuit squadron in New Zealand. I have had the situation investigated to determine the possibility of complying with this request. I find that other requirements of higher priority render it impossible to furnish these squadrons from the
2. We should be only too willing to agree to the suggestion in the last paragraph of the above reply were it not that these aircraft are those we are urgently relying upon to raise the forces in the
3. Large numbers of
4. We will continue to represent through the
5. As regards the suggestion made by the
Repeated to the New Zealand Minister,
I am grateful for your telegrams [Nos. 221 and 222] and I appreciate the endeavours which have been and are being made by the United Kingdom Government to strengthen the forces in New Zealand. With regard to paragraph 2 of your telegram [No. 221], I have to confirm that we should be able to meet the personnel requirements referred to from our own resources, with the exception of certain key personnel asked for by the Air Department in their telegram A.313 dated 14 February to the Not published.
2. Paragraph 1 of your telegram [No. 221], which alludes to an exchange of departmental telegrams, states what were then regarded as New Zealand's immediate requirements in manned and equipped squadrons from overseas as distinct from squadrons manned and equipped in New Zealand, and excluding any air forces which might accompany
3. It is, of course, of the utmost importance to New Zealand that the system of responsibility for the planning and conduct of operations in the
4. In the meantime we will employ to the best advantage such forces as we have and such assistance as is now forthcoming. I will keep you informed of any urgent requirements, more particularly in specialist air personnel to enable us to form new units with equipment which may from time to time be shipped to New Zealand.
5. I still hope that all our requirements may be co-ordinated with those for
General Marshall, who left for
Your telegram of 9 April.
We are of course most anxious that everything possible be done to accelerate or increase the assistance to be afforded to us by the See also Defence of the South Pacific, No. 280, Sections C and D in particular.
Appropriate arrangements will be made for the reception of the advance party.
The United States
We have recently given further consideration to the effect of the exclusion of the New Zealand land and air forces from Admiral Ghormley's command. It had been our intention that he should take full advantage of, and assume full responsibility for, the development and equipment of all our forces to meet the requirements both of defence and future offensive operations.
2. As regards the Army, we feel that the developments now in progress will produce forces which eventually will be capable of being employed on offensive operations in conjunction with American forces. But that does not apply to the
3. Before making any representation to Admiral King or to the
4. If you are able to answer this question adequately without reference to Admiral King we would prefer that you should do so at this juncture. If it is necessary for you to consult Admiral King, then you should make it clear to him that it was never our desire to exclude any of our forces from the See Division of Strategic Responsibility between the United Kingdom and United States.
5. It may be that the development and re-equipment of the
6. If, in the event of your consulting Admiral King, it transpires that he does not wish Admiral Ghormley to become involved in the planning for future operations except in regard to the forces placed at his disposal, then you should ask whether King would be willing to receive an appreciation of the potentialities of the New Zealand Air Force which might be taken into consideration by his own planning staff at
Your telegram of 19 June.
The statement in your first paragraph, ‘It has been our intention that he should take full advantage of, and assume full responsibility for, development and allow all our forces The text of telegram No. 227 was mutilated in transmission. In the original text this passage read: ‘the development and equipment of all our forces’.
With regard to paragraph 2. King has already expressed his agreement with the suggestion that New Zealand should train an amphibious
The circumstances which led to the exclusion of the land defence of New Zealand from the South Pacific directive, as referred to in paragraph 3, are set out in my telegram [No. 177] of 2 April.
I have several times discussed the question of the use of our forces in offensive operations with King, and in particular see my telegram [No. 299] of 9 June.
Other than normally discussing the question of command, I will await your instructions before specially raising the subject of any alteration.
It is difficult to understand paragraph 5, but if it means the handing over of command of the Royal New Zealand Air Force to Ghormley, who in turn would delegate the command of it and the American Air Forces in New Zealand to our Air Command, there seems no objection to it. But I cannot clearly understand the text. In any case, paragraph 5 of Ghormley's order from Nimitz appears to give him control of all aircraft in the South Pacific. Could you clarify the position?
With regard to paragraph 6. If you will advise me what is required with regard to the unified control of land and air forces, I will approach King and endeavour to obtain his approval of your proposals. There is nothing more important at the present time than to secure unity of command and effective co-operation, and the sooner every possible doubt is cleared up the easier our minds will be and the more effective our operations.
Your telegram of 22 June.
It is unfortunate that enciphering errors this end damaged the sense of paragraph 1 of our [No. 227]. The sentence should have read:
On the ‘Paragraph 10 ( ‘(2) In the exercise of command the “principles of command” as set forth in paragraph 14 of ABC-1 are applicable. ‘(3) With regard to the possible movement of New Zealand forces out of New Zealand territory, the following by the United States Chiefs of Staff to the President is self-explanatory: “Proposals of the United States Chiefs of Staff (for operations in the Pacific Ocean areas) made to the President as United States Commander-in-Chief are subject to review by him from the standpoint of higher political considerations and to reference by him to the The change was approved by President Roosevelt on 20 September.c) (No. 178) and its replacement by the following:c) (1). In the exercise of command over the armed forces which the
2. The significance of our paragraph 5 was, on the one hand, that in our view Ghormley should be in a position to order the
3. Ghormley's instructions from Nimitz expressly exclude the Vice-Admiral J. S. McCain, USN; commanded all Allied land-based air forces,
4. We appreciate King's recognition of our wish to train amphibious forces, but this will not cover the question of the development of the
5. We need to determine the best means of ensuring that our demands for equipment shall be in accordance with American requirements and that these demands shall be fully supported by those responsible. It may be that the best approach on this matter would be through Dill or Evill. Air Chief Marshal Sir Douglas Evill, GBE, KCB, DSC, AFC (then Air Marshal D. C. S. Evill); head of
6. At the present time the re-equipment of the
7. As regards your final paragraph, we do not see any necessity for unifying the command of the
8. In brief, we wish to have a forward plan for the
9. You should discourage any inclination of King or Marshall to place the
Sir Harry Luke, KCMG; Governor and Commander-in-Chief,
With reference to Recommendation No. 33 of the Wellington Defence Conference Report The Defence Conference was held in Rt. Hon. Malcolm MacDonald, PC; Secretary of State for the Colonies,
2 As, however, it will clearly be necessary for your Government to concert with the Fiji Government in advance the necessary arrangements to facilitate the reception of the Brigade should it be sent, I have the honour to inquire if your Government considers that the time has arrived when it would be convenient for preliminary arrangements to be considered between the two Governments concerned.
I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
With reference to your Secret despatch No. 10 of 1 February, Not published. In this despatch the Governor asked when he could expect a reply to his despatch of
I have the honour to be,
Your despatch of 19 February.
Has His Majesty's Government in New Zealand as yet been able to come to a decision as regards the Brigade Group?
Viscount Caldecote.
… See Vol. I, Third Echelon, No. 213, for complete text.
This communication has been repeated to
Your telegram of 27 June.
We greatly appreciate the suggestion that a brigade group should be sent from New Zealand to See Appendix IV. Not published.
Our examination of the situation will of course take into account the considerations advanced in your telegram of 27 June regarding the use of New Zealand forces generally.
Repeated to the Governor of
In preparation for the possibility that it may be necessary to despatch a brigade group to
Your telegram of 12 July.
His Majesty's Government in the Lord Lloyd, PC, GCSI, GCIE, DSO; Secretary of State for the Colonies,
In view of your secret telegram of 16 July and of a subsequent communication Not published. Major-General Sir John Duigan, Chief of the General Staff; Group Captain H. W. L. Saunders, Chief of the Air Staff; Commodore W. E. Parry, RN, Chief of the Naval Staff. HMS Achilles, 6-inch cruiser, 7030 tons.
On receipt of the report of the Chiefs of Staff His Majesty's Government in New Zealand propose again to consider the question of despatching a force to A copy of this telegram was sent on 18 July to the Governor of
The following telegram has been sent to the Secretary of State for the Colonies:
‘The New Zealand Chiefs of Staff after four days’ visit to
‘2. Following are their major recommendations:
The despatch of a Brigade Group from New Zealand to
Bringing the local Fijian Defence Force up to their war establishment without delay.
Mounting of two 6-inch guns on existing gun emplacements for the defence of
Provision for two flying boats and four land planes based on
The officer designated to command the New Zealand Brigade Group Maj-Gen Sir William Cunningham, KBE, DSO, ED (then Brig W. H. Cunningham); commanded
‘3. I am in general agreement with the above recommendations….’ Sir Harry Luke's comments on these recommendations are omitted.
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have now had an opportunity of considering the report of their Chiefs of Staff on their recent visit to
Your telegram of 5 August.
His Majesty's Government in the
The Governor of
In view of the threatening situation in the Pacific His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have now decided to accelerate to the utmost degree possible the despatch to The first flight left
In addition it is proposed to despatch four land planes as soon as possible…. The two passages omitted were concerned with arrangements for accommodation.
Repeated to the High Commissioner for the Western Pacific (
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have approved of the recommendations for the defence of Not published. The chief of these recommendations concerned the strength, training and command of the force – see second paragraph of this telegram.
On the assumption that His Majesty's Government in the
to make immediate arrangements to despatch to
to supply such additional equipment as may be required.
They would be grateful to receive at an early date the comments of His Majesty's Government in the
Repeated to the Governor-General of New Zealand.
The
Increase its defence force to 30 officers and 450 other ranks.
Provide the force with three months' continuous training and more if required.
Accept operational control by the Officer Commanding Troops,
Welcome key personnel from New Zealand.
In the interests of efficiency, request a New Zealand officer to take over command of the local force, the present Commandant to be a Staff Officer, next in rank to the Commanding Officer, to advise on Tongan affairs.
2. Estimates are not yet completed, but the
3. I will telegraph further when estimates are received from the Agent and Consul, Mr A. L. Armstrong, CMG, OBE; Agent and Consul,
In the opinion of
It is recognised that this will mean considerable dislocation which, however, should be accepted in the interests of the safety of the island and in order to advance the training of the men to the utmost extent possible.
Circular telegram.
We have had under consideration the question of providing some form of fixed defence for relatively isolated ports throughout the Empire which are of some commercial or other importance, but for which it has not hitherto been possible to provide defences and which have not been included in the category of defended ports. It is thought that a certain number of such places may form attractive targets for enemy raiders for the destruction of trade facilities or of shipping found in port. With our present lack of cruisers we cannot hold out any hopes of German surface raiders which are known to be operating at the moment being rounded up in their entirety in the near future, while the greater becomes the efficiency of our measures for the protection of shipping at sea the greater also becomes the temptation for raiders to attack our trade ports.
It is moreover considered that, to a raider far from its nearest base, a relatively low scale of defence should prove an effective deterrent. On the other hand, our available resources of guns which could be mounted for the purpose are very limited, and we have to take into full account in assessing the claims of individual ports overseas the necessity for maintaining the highest possible scale of defence against the threat of German invasion of the
As the Dominion Governments are aware, the programme for the modernisation of defended ports overseas is under constant review, and the claims of each major port are taken into careful account and are
Repeated to the High Commissioner for the Western Pacific.
Governor-General's telegram of 22 November [No. 242] and the telegram from the High Commissioner for the Western Pacific of 5 January to the Colonial Office [No. 243], repeated to you.
His Majesty's Government in the e) in the High Commissioner's telegram under reference, that a New Zealand officer should take over command of the local force, and we hope that the
2. It is noted that it is stated in your telegram under reference that the
3. As regards the Agent's suggestion that three 6-inch coast defence guns should be provided, we note that the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff made no mention of this in their report, which was approved by the
it would be possible to reduce the number required from three to two or one, and,
the Not published. Discussed the role and siting of coast defence guns in
Repeated to the High Commissioner for the Western Pacific.
With reference to your telegram of 3 February on the defence of In a telegram to the Dominions Secretary on 18 February the Prime Minister advised that these men and stores would sail that day.
2. With regard to paragraph 2 of your telegram, the New Zealand Army Liaison Officer in
3. The New Zealand Chiefs of Staff do not consider
4. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand warmly appreciate the offer made by the Tongan Government to make some financial contribution to the defence of their own territory.
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
With reference to your Circular telegram of 17 January [No. 245], His Majesty's Government in New Zealand note with pleasure that it is proposed to provide some form of fixed defences for relatively isolated ports, which they understand to refer to such places as
2. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have expressed their concurrence in the proposals made by the Commonwealth Government to provide fixed defences, Not published. See inter alia, at Nauru and Ocean Island, and have indicated their willingness to provide personnel for the battery at the latter island. In this connection please see my telegram No. 631 Fanning Island, No. 329, for text omitted.
4. Further recommendations have been submitted by the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff that fixed defences (one battery each of two 6-inch guns) be provided at Navula Passage, Hon. H. L. Anthony; Assistant Treasurer and Assistant Minister of Commerce, In a telegram dated 27 March the Prime Minister said that heavy guns were not recommended for Makatea.
5. The Chiefs of Staff have considered the question of the installation of fixed defences at Nukualofa and Papeete and have come to the conclusion that they are unnecessary. In this connection reference is invited to my telegram No. 39 of 7 February. Not published. The Government supported a recommendation of the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff that the port defences of
6. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand assume that if the recommendations for the provision of fixed defences at the places referred to in this telegram are accepted, His Majesty's Government in the In the text omitted the United Kingdom Government was asked to provide guns and ammunition for the ports of
Hon. W. Nash.
Repeated to the Governor of
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have under urgent consideration major questions affecting the defence of the territories of the South Pacific under their operational control and, in particular, the responsibility for ordering and financing essential defence measures in General Williams's reports on the defences of
2. In view of the deterioration of the situation in the
3. Although Fiji and
4. In reporting on the defences of
5. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand also desire to bring before the attention of His Majesty's Government in the
6. At the Defence Conference held in Estimates of expenditure and proposals for the apportionment of costs have been omitted.inter alia, that New Zealand should maintain aerial reconnaissance along the line
Repeated by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor of
Your telegram of 28 August [No. 249], and subsequent telegrams regarding the defence of These messages were largely concerned with detailed requirements (including financial arrangements) for the defence of
1. His Majesty's Government in the
2. With this object we are prepared to agree in principle that, for the duration of the war, New Zealand should be responsible for deciding upon and carrying out all general defence measures which they consider necessary in
3. We feel, however, that the Governor and High Commissioner should remain responsible in matters of civil administration to His Majesty's Government in the
4. In the event of
5. We think that detailed arrangements and the most expeditious channels of communication to give effect to the arrangements in paragraphs 3 and 4 above could best be worked out on the spot. The Secretary of State for the Colonies Lord Moyne succeeded Lord Lloyd as Colonial Secretary on the latter's death on
6. The Governments of Not published. Not published. Reported the arrangements made by the Telegrams 368 and 369 are not published. The first advised that the
7. The points in paragraph 3 ( Not published. Paragraph 3 (d) and (e) of your telegram of 18 September, No. 394,d) concerned channel of communication on minor policy matters; in paragraph 3 (e) the
8. With reference to paragraph 3 (f) of your telegram No. 394, His Majesty's Government in the
9. We ourselves see no reason why arrangements on these lines should not work smoothly and eliminate delays which might otherwise be involved by reference to
10. We shall be glad to be kept informed as proposed in paragraph 5 of your telegram No. 394, and suggest that methods of doing so be arranged in consultation with the Governor and High Commissioner. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand will no doubt keep in touch with His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Not published.k), No. 369).
11. We have not yet received General Williams's report summarised in your telegram No. 369, and any comments on detail might require modifications when the full text is available. Subject to this reservation, and without necessarily being committed to the acceptance of all requests for equipment, etc., in this and in connected telegrams, we concur generally in unrestricted defence proposals. The extent to which they can be executed, however, necessarily depends on the availability of material in relation to the general supply position and requirements elsewhere, and it is thought that allocation of, e.g., coast defence and anti-aircraft equipment, should continue to be settled in
12. The request for equipment in paragraph 4 of your telegram of 4 September, No. 368, See p. 282, note 4. Not published.j) of your telegram No. 369 as to the provision of PBYs and Hudsons, see my telegram No. 375 of 20 September.
13. We have given preliminary consideration to the financial proposal in your telegrams Nos. [249], 394, and 396 to me and your telegram No. 80 Telegrams 394, 396 and 80 are not published. See p. 282, notes 3 and 5.
Repeated to the Governor of
With reference to your telegram of 14 October.
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand agree with the suggestion that the detailed arrangements and the most expeditious channels of communication to give effect to their proposal for direct responsibility for defence in Not published. The chief members of this mission were the Minister of Defence (the Hon. F. Jones), the
Repeated to the Governor of
With reference to my telegram of 8 November.
The representatives which His Majesty's Government in New Zealand sent to
2. Not published.a) of the Agreement.
3. Paragraph 2 of your telegram of 14 October [No. 250] limits the arrangement to
4. The Agreement provides for the formation of a Local Joint Defence Committee to consist of the Commander, Fiji Defences, the Officer Commanding RNZAF and the Naval Officer-in-Charge, e) defines the procedure which will be followed for keeping the Governor or High Commissioner informed of proposed defence measures, and sub-paragraph (f) the arrangements which will apply if the exigencies of the military situation make it impossible to follow the ordinary procedure.
5. It has been agreed that local forces raised or to be raised will conform to the requirements of His Majesty's Government in New Zealand in respect of:
Establishment.
Organisation, training and employment.
Period of enlistment.
Scale of equipment.
Selection, appointment and promotion of officers, including Commanding Officers, of local forces (these to be made by the Governor on the recommendation of the Commander, Fiji Defences, or the Naval Officer-in-Charge,
Pay, rations and conditions of service otherwise of local forces will be matters for the decision of the Governor, but His Majesty's Government in New Zealand will have the right in any case to make representations.
6. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand will be responsible for keeping His Majesty's Government in the
7. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand feel that this arrangement will operate to the mutual benefit of
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
The following is a telegram addressed on 14 December by Lieutenant-General Short, Lt-Gen W. C. Short, Air Commodore R.V. Goddard succeeded Air Commodore Saunders as Chief of the Air Staff on 13 December.
‘Completion of base for heavy bombers is imperative. We are rushing completion Christmas. Maj-Gen L. J. Sverdrup,
2. A message has been sent in reply by the Chief of the Air Staff giving particulars of the strength of the forces in A further telegram from the Prime Minister despatched later on 20 December (but not reproduced here) gave a brief outline of service dispositions for the defence of
3. The defence of
Two battalions of infantry in addition to the one now allocated for the defence of the
Wire defences should be provided as soon as possible to prevent landing on the beaches in the
At least one battery of heavy and one of light anti-aircraft guns should be provided for each of the only four 3-inch anti-aircraft guns in New Zealand for the defence of the
No fighter aircraft are available for the defence of the island and at least one squadron is essential. There are no fighter squadrons in New Zealand. An MB2 radio-location equipment is being installed at
A separate wireless telegraphy installation will be necessary at
The island of Vanua Levu, which is adjacent to
4. The above is, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government in New Zealand, the provision which should be made as soon as possible to provide reasonable measures of defence for
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
Your telegram of 20 December.
We are in full agreement with your estimation of the increased importance of the South Pacific air route and have already instructed
We have now sent a further message to your telegram under reference so that your recommendations may be taken into [group omitted – account?] when this question is discussed.
My telegram of 23 December.
We have asked the Prime Minister Mr Churchill was then in
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
My telegram of 23 December [No. 254], repeated to the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of
1. The New Zealand Government have from time to time called attention to the strategic importance of Not published. A conference of inter-Allied representatives took place at Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse, the violent and successful attacks by the Japanese upon
2. As you may perhaps know also, the Not published.
In two further telegrams addressed today to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, repeated to the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Not published.
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
With reference to your telegrams Nos. 516 and 517 of 21 December See p. 289, note 1.
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have considered the conclusions of the conference of inter-Allied representatives held at Paragraph 2 listed the minimum air and land reinforcements required immediately in Paragraph 7 listed the air and sea lines of communication which the conference considered should be kept open.
2. In view of the deterioration of the position in the
3. While it is impossible to forecast the scale of enemy attack, it seems reasonable to assume that the Japanese might well devote at least a division in an attempt to capture
4. The land defence problem can be divided into four main areas:
Suva Harbour and aerodrome area;
the potential aerodrome area in the north of Vanua Levu;
Savusavu Bay, an ‘A’ Class anchorage on the south of Vanua Levu.
5. It is considered that the defence of Vanua Levu, although highly important, should not be undertaken until (a) and (b) are more adequately defended.
6. For these two areas in
7. As regards the
8. One heavy and one light battery of anti-aircraft guns will be required each for the
9. A radio-location system adequate to surround the two main islands for the detection of high-flying and low-flying aircraft is also necessary.
10. The foregoing air defence provision does not meet the requirements for air reconnaissance seaward around the islands and extending to the
11.
12. As regards naval forces, patrol motor-boats are required for the
13. The above are considered to be the minimum essential requirements, and this estimate has been made on the assumption that Japanese naval forces escorting the expedition would not include more than two carriers.
14. Although it will be possible to provide the personnel for the defence of Not published.
The following is secret and personal for
Your telegram of 8 December. See Vol. II, No. 51. Headquarters 2nd NZEF asked if the outbreak of war with On 27 December Army Headquarters advised Headquarters 2nd NZEF that the sailing of the 8th Reinforcements had been postponed indefinitely.
The following telegram has been received from the Prime Minister at
Prime Minister to Prime Minister of New Zealand.
Your telegrams [No. 257] and No. 253. No. 253 is not published.
I will send you a full telegram shortly about all the measures we are taking in conjunction with the
I profoundly admire the courage and composure with which New Zealand is facing the new situation so full of immediate danger and of ultimate safety.
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
My telegram of 24 December [No. 256].
On receipt of your telegrams [No. 258] and No. 550 of 25 December, No. 550 is not published.
‘Reference New Zealand telegrams [No. 258] and No. 550, you should urge the
In the meantime, we are accepting the possibility of sending equipment from here, but the final decision will have to await an answer from the
Repeated to the Governor of
Further to my telegram No. 539 of 20 December. Not published. This was the telegram referred to on p. 286, note 5.
1. All the field artillery mentioned therein has arrived at
2. It has also been decided to despatch to
3. Transport vehicles to the limit of shipping space available have been and will be despatched from New Zealand, where impressment is in full operation.
Following is from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister:
Your most secret and personal message
I cannot tell you how greatly we appreciate the efforts that you have been making to acquire for us essential arms and equipment for the defence of No. 117.
Addressed also to the Prime Minister of
My telegram of 23 December [No. 254].
The following recommendations have been under consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in
That the
That the
That as a temporary measure to be taken immediately after meeting the emergency in the ABDA area, the
That the Commonwealth of
2. Estimates of garrisons recommended for Not published. See p. 247, note 3.
3. It is understood, on the assumption that the proposals in general are acceptable to the Commonwealth and New Zealand Governments, that detailed arrangements are being made in
4. The text of this telegram is being repeated to the Joint Defence Mission in
In the light of the recent and rapid deterioration of the situation in the On 26 February the Australian Government replied that the defence of inter alia to
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
Your telegram of 3 February [No. 264].
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand concur in the recommendations which are under consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in
2. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand would point out that the Anzac area, for the defence of which they are committed to employ all the resources they can command, does not include See inter alia the Mandated Territory of Fanning Island, No. 330, for text omitted.
5. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand assume, but would be glad to receive confirmation or otherwise of this assumption, that the defence dispositions of the
Your telegram of 19 February [No. 266].
I have discussed the defence of See p. 300, note 2.
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
In connection with arrangements for the despatch of
2. In respect of
3. We would be glad to know whether the Commonwealth Government and the
4. It is assumed that a reply in respect of the islands under the Australian and New Zealand Administrations will be sent direct.
western samoa—Occupation by
An agreement was drawn up and signed on Maj-Gen H. L. Larsen, US Marine Corps; Military Governor of American Samoa, 1942–44; island commander, Brig F. L. Hunt, OBE, commanded 8 Bde, 3 NZ Div, May – Jul 1942; 16 Bde Gp (
The object of the agreement is to ensure that [
The United States is to have full and free use of the areas and facilities required; facilities include ports, land areas, roads, communications, seaplane base, etc.
The Samoan Group shall be considered as a tactical entity, both Western and American Samoa being under the same military status.
Under the principle of unity of command the Military Governor of American Samoa shall exercise the same authority in
The local detachment of New Zealand troops will act as patrols and military police and may be assigned missions in the general defence scheme.
Camps, airfields, and similar areas placed at the disposal of the
The New Zealand Government agrees to provide the
The airfield facilities involve some 5000 acres of land, including the waterfront along the seaplane runway at Satapuala.
The provisions of the agreement became operative immediately and were to be subject to final ratification by the Governments of the
I have today informed General Hurley that the The first detachment of United States Marines landed at
Your telegram No. 134 of 10 April. Not published. Contained the text of a memorandum dated
You will have observed the disparity between the number of personnel considered necessary for
In view of urgent demands in New Zealand itself there is little more that we can do to increase the strength in
In the further consideration of the matter which is contemplated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, please endeavour to ensure that the special position of
We note the conditions on which Admiral King has been good enough to convey to you the information contained in your telegram No. 143 of 12 April Not published. This message gave details of the American forces and equipment, including aircraft, being provided for the defence of the Samoan Group and other islands. This information was provided by Admiral King on the understanding that it was conveyed to Mr Fraser for his personal knowledge.
1. You will not have failed to notice (as in the case of
It occurs to us as possible that in the computation of the air strength required the necessities of the Samoan Group are being considered by the United States Naval authorities while those of the Fijian Group have perhaps been the responsibility of the United States Army authorities, and that the disparity in the proposals may perhaps arise from that source. Whatever the cause, it merits the serious consideration of the
2. In connection with the proposal relating to Wallis, it will be noted that only a few weeks ago the views of the United States Government were taken on a proposal of the Free French authorities in the
3. We have been very much interested in the reference to amphibious forces in your telegram The passage read: ‘I also discussed the question of amphibious divisions and stated that such troops when in New Zealand would be three parts of the way to the place where they would be required for offensives. King suggested that when the amphibious troops were in New Zealand we might object to them leaving. I replied that whatever agreement we made with regard to any troops which came our way would be kept.’
I understand that the Service authorities here have represented to you the inadequacy of present military and air forces to protect and hold
I am not clear as to the latest arrangements as regards the New Zealand Defence Area, but I write to offer you what support I may in the representations which your Government is doubtless making with the Allied Command to the effect that
It would be regrettable if our defences, while sufficiently important to invite attack, were insufficient to repel it.
Believe me,
With kind regards,
Yours sincerely,
(Sgd) H. C. Luke
P.S. I would appreciate any information you can give me as to the latest Allied Command arrangements for this area.
H.C.L.
The following appreciation by the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff on the defence of
Appreciation begins:
‘1. The increasing importance of
‘2. Since the forces in
A fleet anchorage is to be established at
Allied naval forces have been operating in the vicinity, involving greater use of
A new aerodrome (Narewa) is being established in the
‘3. The present land forces are barely sufficient to hold the two defended areas of
‘4. While the threat of Allied naval action must be a strong deterrent against a Japanese attack on
‘5. A considerable expansion of the existing air forces in
Apart from naval forces, the defence of the island can best be secured by the maintenance of adequate air forces in
The need for strong air anti-submarine patrols to escort shipping to and from the vicinity of
While existing aerodromes are capable of operating more aircraft than are at present in
‘7. Strategically it is undesirable to lock up strong air forces at every point in the strategic chain of islands across the
‘9. At the present time both Paragraphs 6, 8, 10, 11 and 12 are not reproduced. They listed army, air and naval requirements considered essential for the defence of
‘13. The arrival of
‘14. recommendations:
We recommend that—
The Fiji situation be placed fully before the Commander,
On the implementation of (a) the construction of additional aerodromes required in
Arrangements be made for the rapid reinforcement of air forces in
Your telegram of 22 April. I discussed the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff appreciation on the defence of
The appreciation will be referred at once to the United States Plans Division for report.
The Plans Division have for some time been examining the appreciation set out in cable [No. 209]
I have your secret and personal letter of 21 April No. 272.
With reference to your enquiry as to Allied Command arrangements for this area, I attach hereto a statement Not reproduced. The statement was a copy of Annex 1 to No. 178 of 3 April.
We have little information regarding Army troops which the Americans are sending to
Lieutenant-Colonel McLeod, Lt-Col J. M. C. McLeod, MC and bar; OC
This can only be regarded as a temporary measure as General Mead in
Please take up with the
There will be minor difficulties to be overcome with regard to the Defence Force, which as you know consists of local troops with a cadre of New Zealand officers and non-commissioned officers and has British weapons. Complete relief in this case will therefore take time.
Brigadier Williams has full details of the present defences at
The following précis of a report prepared by the United States Joint Working Committee after discussions with Williams is being submitted to the United States Joint Staff Planners. The report is still in the preliminary planning stage and is highly secret. It is strongly emphasised that it is submitted to you for the information only of the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff and not for transmission to any other source.
‘(1) The United States Joint Working Committee have considered the forces and facilities required for the defence of New Zealand and
‘(2) The United States Staff refused to consider
‘(3) The Committee recommends the following be completed by
Bora Bora – 4000 troops now in position.
‘(4) Initial movements of troops for
‘(5) The Joint Working Committee is recommending to the United States Joint Staff that anchorages at
‘The authorised requisition of more urgent material for the above and Not published. Contained details of naval requirements to be supplied for
‘(6) Projected operations in the South Pacific are to be under the Supreme Naval Commander in New Zealand, with a Deputy Commander to command all troop and air garrisons and all amphibious troops in the area. An advance command post is to be in
‘(7) The Committee's recommendations for
Two 6-inch naval guns and ammunition by the
The construction of the necessary houses, magazines and store-houses in
Cold-storage facilities for approximately an 800-bed hospital from the
One harbour tug,
One net tender for laying nets and loops, and one gate vessel for
Two minesweepers from the
Four units AMTB Auxiliary Motor Torpedo Boat.
Four 37-millimetre anti-aircraft guns.
‘(8) Notes by New Zealand Naval Attaché:
The Committee's attention was drawn to the request for four anti-submarine minesweeping vessels and three double L sweepers in your telegram [No. 273]. The recommendation is that these should accompany Fleet units when using
Ocean-going tugs cannot be spared from
The provision of flat-bottomed barges with two-ton derrick is being considered for gate vessels. Can New Zealand or
Any Fleet requirements of ammunition in
‘(9) The Committee's recommendations for New Zealand include:
Warehouses and storehouses to be provided locally.
Three 6-inch Navy guns from the
‘(10) The United States Joint Working Committee contend that when the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff asked for six divisions for New Zealand they were not aware of
‘(11) The United States Joint Working Committee recommend that no air facilities except [those] which can be provided as a temporary measure by the United States Navy should be established at Vanua Levu, and in consequence the forces suggested in the Prime Minister's telegram [No. 273] of 22 April should be reviewed.
‘(12) Reference No. 144 of 12 April, Not published.
present New Zealand troops in
one division
one division in New Zealand;
remaining New Zealand troops in New Zealand, in that order of priority.
‘(13) The Committee recommend that the air strengths given in my telegram No. 143 of 12 April See p. 300, note 2.
‘(14) The following then becomes the distribution of aircraft:
‘(15) Fiji: The Committee recommends the following air strength and facilities—it is desired that these be based in
‘In addition, facilities to be provided for the operation of Note: It was strongly represented that permanent air squadrons at
‘(16) New Zealand:
Based and maintained in New Zealand by
Replacement carrier group based in New Zealand maintained by United States Navy: Fighters 27; dive-bombers 37; torpedo bombers 18.
Based in New Zealand as part of the mobile forces of the South Pacific, maintained by the United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps: Fighters 36; dive-bombers 36; observation-utility (boats) 39; patrol bombers (flying boats) 12; patrol bombers (amphibian) 12.
‘(17) The Committee recommends the following torpedo storage and maintenance facilities:
‘(18) It is recommended that the additional aircraft required for strengthening the Royal New Zealand Air Force be made available by the
‘(19) It is realised that these proposals do not fill your requirements, but they are related to present strengths and production. In view of the shortage of air strength in other and equally important theatres it is not reasonable at present to press for greater allocations. For instance, the total fighter strength in Not published.
Your telegram of 29 April.
We have discussed with the Chiefs of Staff the report prepared by the United States Joint Working Committee. The general impression
2. With reference to paragraph 3 (b) it is noted that 13,000 of the amphibious troops in
3. Paragraph 3 (f) refers to one division of 12,000 troops, and paragraph 10 to the despatch of the remaining New Zealand divisions to
In all the circumstances we are still of the opinion that the reinforcement required for
4. Reference paragraph 5, it is hoped that the underwater defences required at
5. Reference paragraph 7 (a) and (h), the installation of 6-inch guns at Malolo will mean detachment of infantry to this island. It is assumed that the four anti-aircraft guns will be for anti-aircraft defence of this battery.
6. Reference paragraph 7 (b), it may be possible to secure sufficient untrained labour in
7. Paragraph 7 (c) – a hospital is already in course of construction near the
8. Paragraph 8 (b) – the provision of flat-bottomed barges will be investigated both here and in
9. Paragraph 11 – it was never suggested that air forces be sent to Vanua Levu or air facilities developed there. The intention was that land forces should be sent to Vanua Levu until such time as the air forces in Vitu Levu were sufficiently strong to ensure Vanua Levu against invasion. It was then intended that land forces in Vanua Levu would be substantially withdrawn.
10. Paragraph 12 – my immediately following telegram Not published.
11. Paragraph 16 – we assume, as to which confirmation is desired, that none of the air forces mentioned in paragraph (c) are carrier-borne and that additional facilities and accommodation will be required for operating and maintaining ashore the aircraft disembarked from two carriers when the latter are in harbour.
12. Investigation is being made into the practicability of manning and maintaining from New Zealand resources the air squadrons which it is suggested New Zealand should now form in the Royal New Zealand Air Force. This programme will certainly require substantial assistance in the matter of experienced personnel from elsewhere, presumably the
13. Paragraph 17 – it would be appreciated if more details of the type and kind of storage and maintenance facilities required could be submitted in order that a programme could be prepared.
14. You will gather from the above that the main purpose of this message is to inform you of some of our difficulties and doubts. We leave it to your discretion to raise again the question of the despatch of reinforcements from here to
Your telegram of 2 May. Replying to your paragraphs:
(2) Samoan amphibious division, if it should come to the Dominion, will be in addition to one ordinary army division and one amphibious division already provided for.
(3) The question of the provision of forces for
(5) The anti-aircraft guns will be for the defence of the Malolo battery.
(6) Planners are being notified that equipment and trained personnel must be provided.
(7) Storage accommodation asked for is for the 800-bed hospital already approved.
(11) The aircraft referred to are associated with the Marine group and are not carrier borne. Shore accommodation and facilities required.
Should two aircraft carriers be stationed at
(13) Details of storage and maintenance are being obtained and will be cabled later.
Williams is meeting Planners again today and I will discuss the matter with Admiral King tomorrow morning.
My telegram [No. 278]. Following is the detailed statement of our general views on the defence of
A. General Principles:
1. During the defensive period we must accept the penalties of the defensive—uncertainty as to where operations will develop and the consequent necessity, to some degree, of dispersing forces.
2. Clearly it must be decided which places it is essential to hold. In our opinion
B. Fiji:
1. We regard
2. We have recognised the importance of
3. Though our own defences were extremely weak, we have had a brigade group in all the anti-aircraft guns, both light and heavy, that we possessed at the time.
4. We agree that
5. We are convinced that the forces available in
C. New Zealand:
1. Having regard to New Zealand's elongated shape, its length of coastline, the present incomplete warning system, the prevalence of harbours and landing beaches, the great distances between vulnerable points, the existence of Cook Strait (which in view of the transport available at once virtually halves the force that could be made available at any one point), the limited capacity of the main roads and the 3 ft 6 in. gauge railways, and the extent to which naval and air defences are not as yet available, our Service advisers have expressed the view that six divisions are required to give adequate protection against an estimated scale of attack by one division and one in support at any point in New Zealand, north or south. This scale of attack is regarded as reasonable and may well be substantially exceeded (as the British Chiefs of Staff have pointed out) if the Japanese think the operation worth allocating more of the very substantial forces at their disposal. We must be prepared for widely separated invasions mounted simultaneously.
2. Having regard to the scale of air protection which is or is likely to be available to us, we cannot accept the
that the New Zealand troops are as yet both inadequately trained and inadequately equipped;
that the
that one of the
3. While it is a fact that for local defence the Dominion has, in addition to its forces overseas, been able to mobilise in New Zealand the equivalent in manpower of three divisions and will shortly mobilise more, a large number of these men (21,500) are required for static roles, e.g., coast and anti-aircraft defence, guards and administration, and the remainder are as yet far from being divisions ready for early operations. Moreover, the establishment proposed for these divisions is seven and not nine brigade groups, two of which will be in the north and two in the south of the
4. New Zealand has sent abroad in all services over 63,000 men, of whom 9564 are dead, missing, or prisoners of war. Only 4000 have returned, and of this 4000 only a small proportion are available for the Armed Forces here or for industry.
5. The strength of the Armed Forces now mobilised in New Zealand is over 84,000 (including 69,000 in the Army, 3000 in the Navy, and 12,000 in the
6. This gives a grand total permanently mobilised at present for the purpose of active operations and entirely withdrawn from industry of more than 147,000, which is equivalent to approximately 1 in 11 of the whole population, or 40 per cent of the total manhood between 18 and 45. These are not proposals; they are actually facts. At least a further 30,000 will be required to fill the establishment laid down for New Zealand which, together with reinforcements at the lowest rate (10 per cent) until the end of
7. To obtain these men we have long ago abandoned the voluntary principle, which provided 48,655 fit and accepted volunteers for the Army alone, and have called up for service abroad or in New Zealand all single men between the ages of 18 and 45, and all married men, irrespective of the number of their children, up to the age of 31 years.
8. Apart from what can be provided (inevitably a small number) from the combing of exemptions, there are now left for future calling up only those married men between the ages of 31 and 45, estimated to produce some 60,000. From these we have to find the remainder of the New Zealand establishments (at least 30,000) and our reinforcements for the New Zealand Division in the
D. General:
1. It is essential that we should provide for the defence of New Zealand, not only in our own interests but also for the common cause. For this purpose we consider six full divisions adequately trained and equipped to be the minimum that is required in the present circumstances. We have at the moment only the equivalent in manpower of three divisions, under strength, inadequately trained, inadequately equipped, and in many cases of low medical category.
2. We consider it would be most unwise and dangerous at present to denude the defences of New Zealand further by sending to
3. It may well be that on the arrival and deployment of the contemplated American divisions the position may be easier, though we will still be well below the strength which we consider necessary. But the reinforcement of
4.
5. Another factor which we cannot ignore is the fact that any additional men sent from New Zealand to
6. We agree that the American naval screen north of New Zealand and the strengthening of the island bases does add materially to the defence of New Zealand, but even if we could ignore the possibility of a Japanese attempt to bypass these northern defences we cannot disregard the prospect of a naval setback. In the event of a naval reverse, whether the island bases were seized or not, New Zealand would certainly be open to a full-scale attack. It would then be too late to organise reinforcements, and we feel therefore that we must prepare for an attack on New Zealand at least on the scale mentioned above.
7. With the men and equipment available here and the American reinforcements that are coming, we will do all in our power to defend this Dominion and to increase the forces that we can send to
You will observe that this paper is directed solely to land forces. We fully appreciate the difficulty with reference to air forces and what is already being done and in contemplation in respect of sea power.
During our discussion this morning Admiral King suggested that the United States Government should accept full responsibility for the defence of
The proposal as submitted in rough form would mean the transfer to New Zealand of the troops at present in
I am to see Admiral King at noon tomorrow,
Your telegram of 6 May. Our first reactions are generally favourable to Admiral's King's suggestion, but if in the interests of strategy or efficiency it is considered better that New Zealand troops should remain in
1. Admiral King advises me that up to the present nothing has been done at
Action at Wallis is apparently held up by discussions with the Free French.
3. I stressed the need for Futuna to be protected.
4. I advised the Admiral that New Zealand would favourably consider the proposal for the transfer of the defence of
We have recently been negotiating with the
The Prime Minister saw me today with reference to a suggestion made by Admiral King that the full responsibility for the defence of
This suggestion was conveyed to the
The New Zealand Government are today informing the Governor of
The High Commissioner for New Zealand in
At my interview with Admiral King yesterday, I objected strongly to the rather precipitate method followed in connection with the proposal to alter the command at
This morning I discussed the matter again with the Admiral and he stated that the need for strengthening
Yesterday he advised Sir John Dill and Admiral Stark, so the question will be raised in
The discussion this morning was in every way helpful. I stressed the imperative need of six divisions being available fully trained in New Zealand if it was to be adequately defended, and urged that further amphibious divisions should be trained in the Dominion. The trouble at present is mainly that troops are limited in number and there are pulls for them from all sources, particularly
When the proposed transfer of
King said the proposal to take over would provide for
I have arranged to discuss the Dominion position and the
Repeated to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
Your most secret telegram [No. 284] inviting my early comments on the proposal as approved by the President that the
On practical as well as political grounds it would be necessary to preserve the identity of the
Further to my cable of 8 May [No. 286], the following is the text of a memorandum just received from Admiral King, dated 9 May:
As previously indicated, in the interest of homogeneity of the
The suggested method is that two ships carrying the balance of the force (infantry, artillery) totalling 4500 men will be despatched direct to
Method. One of the two ships for
The United States division now allocated to
The United States intend to take over all the defence of
The United States generally will eventually assume command of all Army, Navy, and Air forces in the Fiji Islands.
All plans are held up pending your approval.’
I am to see Marshall tomorrow in this connection, but before I further discuss with King and Williams sees Planners, could I have your reactions at the earliest moment?
Time has not permitted a full study of this suggested plan. My present view is that it does not meet the requirement of urgency. In your reply please include remarks on the capability of
Your telegram of 10 May.
We agree generally with the proposals. Details of the relief will of course require to be worked out in consultation between
We recognise that economical use of shipping and the escort problem demand close attention and will affect the detailed planning. It may be possible to supplement from New Zealand resources the shipping required to transport
Action has already been taken to prepare for the accommodation of
Anti-aircraft, coast defence, and any other units and services required and now in
New Zealand will continue works and the operation of port facilities until relieved.
We assume that the Text omitted gave details of the capacity of
It is desirable to effect the transfer of forces expeditiously but deliberately. To effect a too hasty transfer would endanger the defence of
Your telegram of 8 May [No. 285].
Please thank the Prime Minister for his message. The United States proposals have now been considered by our military advisers, and in all the circumstances we also for our part see no objection to them.
We have been given to understand informally that the
The United States plan for the relief of Maj-Gen R. S. Beightler; GOC 37 US Div; Commanding General, CoolidgePresident Coolidge, US liner, 21,936 tons; troop transport; sunk at
The United States Staff request that
Your telegram No. 72 of 15 May. Not published. Requested information whether any decision had been reached regarding the change of responsibility for the defence of
We have just received advice from His Majesty's Government in the
The following is personal for the Prime Minister from the Secretary of State for the Colonies:
Since the outbreak of war with
I do hope you will never feel that we are taking your constant care and helpfulness for granted. Your sympathetic understanding is a powerful aid in ensuring that all resources are disposed in defence to the best advantage. It will hasten the day when we shall start to throw the invader out of the South Pacific.
With respect I express my thanks and admiration for your generosity and judgment.
Your telegram of 18 May.
The following is personal for the Secretary of State for the Colonies from the Prime Minister:
Thank you so much for your very kind message. I am glad to know that what we have tried to do for
For very many reasons it is a matter of regret to us that on grounds of broader strategy our direct responsibility for
Believe me, we in our turn have much appreciated the very full and complete co-operation which has been extended to us throughout by the
Repeated to the New Zealand Minister in
On the urgent representations of Admiral Ghormley Admiral Ghormley arrived in New Zealand on 21 May.
Following from Prime Minister to Prime Minister:
Your telegram [No. 295] is yet another example of the consistently helpful and generous attitude which your Government never fail to adopt however difficult the circumstances. Your selflessness is a source of comfort and strength to us all and we are deeply grateful. All best wishes.
Will you please see Admiral King and give him the following personal message from me:
‘We wonder whether there has been some misunderstanding of our attitude in connection with the proposed retention in Mr Nash had reported on 30 May to Mr Fraser, ‘exclusively for your personal information’, an interview with Admiral King ‘at which I discussed Ghormley's proposal re leaving our men at
2. If it is not possible in your opinion to alter Admiral King's views on the retention in A reference to morale in the
… Your telegram [No. 297] to hand subsequent to my return from an interview with King, during which I again strongly emphasised that his decision re
2The apparent incongruity in the date of this telegram and that to which it replies is explained by the international date-line. No. 297 was despatched at 1.30 a.m. on 9 June.
I am to see him again tomorrow morning at 11.30, when I will give him your message…. In the text omitted Mr Nash reported on other matters discussed in a recent interview with Admiral King.
I have just returned from Admiral King after delivering the message in your telegram [No. 297].
Without waiting to draft a written reply he asked me to convey to you his personal thanks and appreciation of the co-operative spirit of yourself and the Government. The message was particularly helpful, so he said, in that it unmistakably conveyed to him the fact that the
I emphasised that you would at all times co-operate in any plans that would achieve our mutual objective and asked if any action of the See No previous reference to this suggestion by Admiral King can be found in any of Mr Nash's telegrams during the preceding few days.Formation and Employment of 3rd NZ Division, p. 349 ff.
King said he would consult with the United States Chiefs of Staff and would then communicate with me.
As soon as I hear from him I will advise you.
In case of any possible misunderstanding of the attitude of the
Your telegram [No. 300] in fact answers my telegram to you of yesterday No. 89 Not published. The Governor of
The following message has been received from Admiral King, which he has asked me to transmit to you in reply to your personal message contained in cable [No. 297]:
‘Your personal message to me conveyed through the Minister for New Zealand is most welcome and encouraging in that it indicates recognition and confirmation of the basic strategic concept that the defence of New Zealand is most likely to be effectively done by the holding of
‘Moreover it conveys the cheering assurance that you and your Government intend full and cordial co-operation in military developments that will in time lead us to victory, for which all of us are working together.
‘I will take up with General Marshall your generous and understanding proposal to strengthen
On 16 June Maj-Gen Sir Philip Mitchell, KCMG, MC, succeeded Sir Harry Luke as Governor of
The following telegram has been received from the Agent and Consul,
‘The General Officer Commanding has received a telegram from New Zealand indicating the likelihood of the withdrawal of New Zealand army personnel, arms and equipment. The local Defence Force has a definite part in and is essential to the defence of
While I fully realise that the recent arrangements for the defence of the
The following message, dated 23 June, was received today from Admiral King:
‘With reference to my letter of 10 June, See No. 302.
‘General Marshall and I have given further consideration to your proposal that the New Zealand troops in
‘It is our intention, as you know, to further reinforce the Fijis, building up by September to a total of about 23,000 troops (ground and air). Pending the arrival of these reinforcements, it will probably be desirable to supply some New Zealand troops
Part of 37 US Division; the rest had arrived in Coolidge longer than required to transfer the
I will see Admiral King later, but will hold up the visit until I receive your comment and instructions on this message.
Your telegram of 24 June.
Please inform Admiral King that, in accordance with the decision of the United States Chiefs of Staff, instructions have been given to General Mead to arrange with General Beightler all details concerning the transfer of New Zealand troops to New Zealand and the retention in
At the same time please inform Admiral King that, while we accept this decision and are acting upon it, we must emphasise our view that 23,000 troops (ground and air) are inadequate to defend the Fiji Islands. It was because of our apprehension that the force proposed for the defence of At 6 a.m on 18 July Maj-Gen Beightler took over operational command in
Your telegram of 16 June [No. 303] and telegram from the Agent and Consul, a) to man the 4-inch coastal guns, and (b) all New Zealand personnel at present serving with native troops. This action is in accordance with the wishes of the War Department,
Viscount Galway.
Rt. Hon. Malcolm MacDonald, PC; Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 1935–38,
With reference to Lord Passfield's Lord Passfield, PC, OM; Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 1929–30; Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1929–31. Not published. Not published. Rt. Hon. M. J. Savage. As a result of a recommendation in
In view of the length of time the garrison might have to stay on the island, and the possible wastage through sickness, it has been suggested that the force should be increased to one company of infantry, consisting of two platoons of machine guns and two rifle platoons—a total of 150 men as against the present 60.
It has also been suggested that to tide over the period before such a force could arrive, the Fanning Island Defence Force Available for the force were nine Europeans employed by Cable and Wireless Ltd., two Europeans employed by Fanning Island Plantations Ltd., and the Administrative Officer. The New Zealand Government arranged to give a short course of military training to employees of the company detailed in New Zealand for employment on
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand would be grateful for the views of His Majesty's Government in the
A copy of this despatch is being forwarded to the High Commissioner for the Western Pacific, Sir Arthur Richards, Governor of
I have, &c.,
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's secret despatch of 4 November on the subject of the force which is to be sent to
His Majesty's Government in the
As regards the question raised in the third paragraph of your despatch, His Majesty's Government in the
I have, &c.,
With reference to the third paragraph of Mr MacDonald's secret despatch No. 54 of 25 February, I have the honour to state that the High Commissioner for the Western Pacific has now reported that Cable and Wireless, Limited, will co-operate in measures for the defence of
It has been ascertained that a member of the Company's staff will sail from Sir Harry Luke succeeded Sir Arthur Richards in
I have, &c.,
2Duke of Devonshire, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 1936–40.
Viscount Caldecote (at this date Sir Thomas Inskip).
… His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have been considering certain aspects of the defence situation. They would be grateful for the views of His Majesty's Government in the
In view of the world situation and with particular reference to the importance of the trans- That the Germans appreciated the importance of the Nurnberg proceeded to the island after the outbreak of war and severed the cable on Nurnberg was sunk by HMS Kent in the battle of the
Text omitted discussed the defence of
Your telegram of 3 February….
We agree that for the reasons indicated it would be undesirable to defer the despatch of the force to Text omitted dealt with the proposed expansion of the
Your telegram of 5 March.
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have given consideration to the question raised in the last sentence of the first paragraph of your telegram under reference. Under present conditions the length of time between receipt of information and the sailing of the
My most secret telegram of 5 April. My Ministers advise me that it has not yet been found possible to make the arrangements indicated in the last sentence of my telegram under reference, and that in the meantime the length of time between receipt of information and sailing of the By
My Prime Minister wishes me to inform you as follows:
With reference to the report of the Pacific Defence Conference, Part I…. Two paragraphs dealing with the defence of
3. Paragraph 49—His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have been considering the question of stationing a platoon at
4. The substance of this telegram is being repeated to His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of
Repeated to the Commonwealth of
Your telegram of 20 June…. Paragraphs 1 and 2 are omitted. The first dealt with the defence of
3. His Majesty's Government in the
Mr
Reference Defence Conference Report, Part I, page 22 ( This reference read: ‘Garrison of one platoon from New Zealand to be stationed there [d) (1),
Rt. Hon. Sir Michael Myers, PC, GCMG, KC; then Chief Justice of New Zealand.
Your telegram of 14 July [No. 315].
I am advised that His Majesty's Government in New Zealand propose to despatch to HMS LeithLeith, sloop, 990 tons, two 4·7-inch guns; at this time attached to the New Zealand Division of the
The High Commisioner for the Western Pacific is being communicated with, and His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of
Your secret telegram of 18 July [No. 316].
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have decided to despatch to Leith on or about 4 September and will carry out certain preliminary work. The question of stationing it permanently at
The New Zealand Government would be grateful if you would approach Messrs Burns Philp regarding supply of labour for the construction of native huts, landing of stores, and the use of launches and lighters, for which they will reimburse Messrs Burns Philp. Probably twenty natives and one foreman would be required.
It is requested that all negotiations and discussions regarding the despatch of this detachment be kept most secret; and that the need for secrecy be impressed on Messrs Burns Philp and on Cable and Wireless, Limited.
The decision communicated in your telegram of 16 August is noted with satisfaction. All arrangements are in train.
My secret telegram of 16 August [No. 318]. fanning island.
My Ministers state that the arrangements outlined in my telegram under reference are now subject to reconsideration in view of subsequent developments, and that a further communication will be sent to you in due course.
My most secret telegram of 16 August [No. 317].
In view of the instructions now transmitted to the Chief of the Naval Staff Rear-Admiral H. E. Horan, DSC, RN (then Commodore); Chief of New Zealand Naval Staff, Jun 1938–Apr 1940. She was ordered to Leith,
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand would be grateful for a very early intimation of the views of His Majesty's Government in the
Your telegram of 25 August.
His Majesty's Government in the
Your telegram of 28 August.
My acting Prime Minister informs me that a force of two officers and thirty men No. 1 Platoon, A Company, New Zealand Regular Force. HMNZS Leander.Leander, 6-inch cruiser, 7270 tons, attached to the New Zealand Division of the
His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of
Your telegram of 29 August. fanning island.
His Majesty's Government in the
Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden had taken over on
My telegram of 29 August [No. 323]. The force arrived at
Viscount Cranborne. This telegram was repeated to the High Commissioner for the Western Pacific.
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand consider in view of the deterioration of the position in the
Repeated to the High Commissioner for the Western Pacific.
Your telegram of 19 February.
His Majesty's Government in the
His Majesty's Government in the Not published.
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand propose to send both the extra platoon and the battery personnel to
… 3. The decision of His Majesty's Government in the See The United Kingdom Government replied on 31 March that demands for 6-inch guns were so heavy that it was not possible to make a second gun available.Defence of the South Pacific, No. 248, for text omitted.
… 3. In regard to
4. For the foregoing reasons, and as it seems essential that His Majesty's Government in New Zealand should, in view of their responsibilities in the Anzac area, contain their strength there so that it might be more effective, they would propose that the defence of See Defence of the South Pacific, No. 266, for text omitted.
Your telegram No. 60 of 11 March. Not published. Reported a statement made by Sir John Dill that the Americans ‘did not feel justified in extending their work beyond Christmas Island’, but that they might be agreeable to supplying the
Your telegram of 2 April. fanning island.
I saw Admiral King this morning and he issued instructions for an American force to relieve the
I arranged to leave all help on the island which may be required by the
Will you please attend to this and advise me. In the meantime King's order will proceed and I will keep you advised of progress. The preliminary order will provide for the transfer of our men as well as replacement.
Rt. Hon. C. R. Attlee.
Your telegram [No. 268] of 5 April.
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand feel now, as they have felt on similar occasions in the past, that it would be inadvisable to raise, in connection with the proffered assistance from the
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have already at various times and in general terms let it be known to the United States Government that they agree to the use by
The New Zealand Minister at On 17 April the Dominions Secretary replied that the
Your telegram of 4 April [No. 332].
We note and approve your arrangements for
The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs advises that Admiral King has asked the Joint Staff Mission in
This will, of course, cover the case of
At the same time as the United Kingdom Government give this general consent to American use of the
Your telegram of 8 April.
Admiral King advises me that the orders issued to Admiral Nimitz with regard to relieving the garrison at
Admiral King now advises that relief and transportation for
To the Chief of the Naval Staff Commodore Sir Atwell Lake, Bt., CB, OBE, RN, succeeded Commodore Parry as Chief of the Naval Staff at the end of
Following is a summary of a conversation between [Commodore] Parry and Rear-Admiral Cooke, Rear-Admiral C. M. Cooke, USN; Assistant Chief of Staff to Commander-in-Chief US Fleet, 1942–44; Chief of Staff to C-in-C US Fleet, Sep 1944–Oct 1945; Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Rear-Admiral R. K. Turner, USN; Director, War Plans Division, Navy Department, Oct 1940–Jun 1942; commanded amphibian forces in the
Reference Minister's cable [No. 304] of 24 June. Commander-in-Chief (Admiral E. J. King).Cominch
2. Cominch therefore proposed the removal of New Zealand troops from
3. Owing to the shipping situation, the supply of landing craft would be facilitated if these could be assembled in New Zealand. Navy Department inquired whether the necessary plant was available, observing that plates, etc., are welded and not riveted…. Paragraph 4 is omitted. It dealt with the channel of communication for requests for equipment.
5. When offensive operations start, cominch will also require garrison troops to hold captured islands, thus allowing amphibian troops to carry out a further step forward. There will therefore be a demand for troops other than those trained in amphibian operations.
6. Navy Department also inquired whether New Zealand can provide small vessels capable of carrying 100 to 300 tons of stores and sufficiently seaworthy to follow up the operations of amphibian troops. Endurance at least 1000 miles. Ships should use oil fuel, or preferably diesel, in order to facilitate refuelling.
Most secret and personal for Brigadier Park from General Puttick. Your ML 2915 of 13 July. Not published. Requested General Puttick's views on the likely divisional organisation for amphibious operations in the
1. Have no definite information as to possible area of operations or time. Assume that at some future date offensive operations will be undertaken in the
2. Would appreciate
3. Cannot state requirements in landing craft.
Hon. F. Jones, Minister of Defence, 1935–49.
1. In response to a request from the Commander South Pacific—Admiral Ghormley, USN—I called on him on Tuesday, 28 July.
2. His views on the employment of New Zealand troops in any forthcoming operations are as follows: On 24 July
To provide forces of all arms to follow up
The size of the New Zealand forces necessary for operations would naturally depend upon the scope of the operations and the actual locality or localities involved. He suggested that New Zealand should prepare at once to provide the following alternative forces so as to be able to meet any contingency at short notice:
One infantry brigade (three battalions) with anti-tank battery attached. For clarity, the abbreviations in the original text have been spelt in full.
One battery plus one troop (12 25-pounders) field artillery.
One heavy anti-aircraft battery plus two troops (12 3·7-inch anti-aircraft guns).
Two light anti-aircraft batteries plus two troops (32 Bofors guns).
One heavy battery (four 155-millimetre or 6-inch guns) (for Harbour Defence).
Proportion Signal, Engineer,
Force ‘A’ plus two heavy batteries (for Harbour Defence).
Two infantry brigades (each three battalions).
Two anti-tank batteries (24 2-pounders).
One field regiment (24 25-pounders).
One medium battery, plus one troop (8 6-inch howitzers, four 60-pounders).
Three heavy anti-aircraft batteries (24 3·7-inch anti-aircraft guns).
Five light anti-aircraft batteries, plus one troop (64 40-millimetre guns).
Three heavy batteries (12 155-millimetre or 6-inch guns) (for Harbour Defence).
Proportion Signal, Engineer,
Three infantry brigades (each three battalions).
Three anti-tank batteries (36 2-pounders).
One and one-half field regiments (36 25-pounders).
One medium battery, plus one troop (8 6-inch howitzers, four 60-pounders).
Four heavy anti-aircraft batteries, plus two troops (36 3·7-inch guns).
Eight light anti-aircraft batteries (96 40-millimetre guns).
Six heavy batteries (24 155-millimetre or 6-inch guns) (for Harbour Defence).
Proportion Signal, Engineer,
New Zealand Forces should be prepared to embark at any time after 25 August.
Regarding amphibious training, Admiral Ghormley informed me that sufficient troops trained in this type of operation were available but that the special equipment required was in short supply, though of course the a) as the one New Zealand should prepare for.
3. On the assumption that it is the wish of
Adopt Force ‘D’ as our target for planning.
Use the 3rd Division (ex
Appoint at once a divisional commander to command the 3rd Division so that in the event of
4. The proposals in paragraph 3 involve considerable work and there is no time to spare. The additions required to the 3rd Division will have to be found from all over New Zealand so as to interfere as little as possible with the plans for defence of the country. The bulk of the additional forces required will have to be found from the Army Reserve Brigade Group, and from existing anti-aircraft and coast defence units.
5. These measures will naturally reduce the strength of the forces available for Home Defence. On the other hand, the greatly increased power of the
Further, the
There must always be some danger to be accepted in war, but if every possible danger is to be guarded against to the fullest possible extent, forces which should, in order to win the war, be used offensively or in support of offensive action, will be tied down to defensive action or in other words contained by the possibility of enemy attack, and this can only lead to the creation of the very dangers which it is desired to avoid.
6. I have therefore to recommend for consideration of
In the meantime I am proceeding with the reorganisation of the 3rd Division, and have already given some preference to the Army Reserve Brigade Group in the posting of men of categories suitable for overseas service. In this latter connection I recommend that the age for such service be reduced to 20 years to reduce the reorganisation that will be necessary.
1. With reference to my memorandum S. 25/18 of 31 July, from a preliminary study of the problem I have the following observations to submit.
2. From the outset, it was clear that in view of the present state of the forces, the problem was a major one requiring very considerable energy and concentration in order to have the proposed force ready at the date suggested. Among the major difficulties involved are the following:
Distribution of manpower within the Army.
As has been previously reported to
Measures have already been taken in this direction under the scheme providing for all men of Grade I, 20–41 years of age, being concentrated in divisions and the remainder in garrison units. This action has just been commenced and will take probably two months to complete.
NZEF Reinforcements.
The 3rd Division was built up almost entirely from NZEF reinforcements. The 9th Reinforcements after training were posted to various units throughout New Zealand but care has been taken to keep a record of them so that they could be assembled if necessary.
If it is decided to send reinforcements to Several paragraphs have been omitted. They dealt with inoculation arrangements, appeal procedure, final leave, age limits for 2nd NZEF, equipment, secrecy, unit strengths, and with a proposed rearrangement of Home Defence forces in the
Return of 3rd Division from Fiji.
Some
Training.
It is clear from the circumstances outlined in the preceding paragraphs that there will be little time available for additional training. Until the various units are made up to strength with men of the proper category I will not be able to form an opinion as to the efficiency of the units. As however the men will come from various sources, there will not be such cohesion as I would desire and I would expect that the training of some of the men will be found deficient in certain respects. This situation illustrates firstly the necessity for completing with all speed the measures already in train to have our divisions made up solely of men suitable for overseas in all respects, secondly the importance of avoiding as far as possible any interference with their personnel once they are so made up, and thirdly the urgency involved in all matters relating to the force now under consideration.
As regards possible deficiencies in training, the units likely to be most affected are the artillery (of all natures) though it is expected that in this arm and all others there will be a considerable proportion of men who have had a good deal of training.
Whether or not deficiencies in training should be accepted depends upon the nature of the task for which the troops are required initially, and the urgency that may be involved in effecting a relief of
I estimate that the urgency is likely to be great and that this may be one of those occasions where the scope and nature of the operations justifies the acceptance of such risks as are involved in the employment of incompletely trained troops.
Our observations of the
It is dangerous to assume that troops will be used only for the restricted operations for which they have been
Nevertheless, circumstances may require the acceptance of this risk, but every effort should be made by all concerned, both before and after the despatch of the troops, to fit them for all operations of war.
3. Effect of the despatch of Force ‘D’ on defence of New Zealand
Omitting any consideration of the effect the operations may have in increasing the security of New Zealand, I now submit some observations on the effect the despatch of Force ‘D’ will have on the forces available for Home Defence:
On the return of the 3rd Division from
On present strengths, i.e., without deducting men absent from units for leave, sickness, and industry, the position is:
If men absent from units are deducted (12,000) the strength actually with units would be approximately 48,000, but the effect of the draw-off for industry is not yet fully known and may reduce this figure by another 4000 to 44,000. In emergency the men absent from units (less
The principal effect of the despatch of ‘D’ Force, however, would be the disappearance of the Army Reserve Brigade Group, and a weakening of the forces in the immediate vicinity of Details omitted.
4.
5.
6. I see no reason to alter the opinion as outlined in paragraph 5. On 30 December last, no useful opinion could be given as to the efficiency of the vis-à-vis the Allies. The Allied concentrations in the
7. In other respects the situation has improved in favour of the Allies. There is no doubt that
8.
9. It therefore seems highly probable that
10. Areas which fulfil these conditions are
11. I cannot conceive any probability of an invasion of New Zealand at this stage. The major defeat of Allied naval forces and the capture of
12. Allied interests would appear to be best served by strongly holding
13. I therefore come to the conclusion that the best course to pursue in furthering the security of New Zealand is to participate to the fullest extent in offensive operations against the Japanese, and at the same time leave nothing undone to strengthen the forces for home defence. This latter remains of prime importance because (i) as has already been suggested, our principal protection against invasion—the Allied naval forces—could conceivably be removed in a matter of hours, thus creating a most urgent Home Defence problem and
14. Provided therefore that urgent measures be taken to bring our forces up to establishment and that the operations proposed by the On 6 August
Further to paragraph 2 (k) of my memorandum S28/15/1G of 3 August with reference to the training of the 3rd Division, I wish to report for the information of Kiwi ‘A’ (the smallest force) will not be sufficiently well trained to undertake an active role in the forward theatre of operations until it has had a period of at least six weeks' training from date.
Nevertheless, as I stated in the memorandum referred to above, the circumstances might be such, and the emergency so great, as to justify the despatch of the force overseas before the expiration of that period of training.
My views as expressed above are being communicated to Admiral Ghormley's staff, together with a reminder that the whole question of despatch of any force is subject to
1. Attached is a copy of a signal from Commander, This signal, dated 15 October, read: ‘Present following to New Zealand authorities. Request New Zealand Government release to comsopac command a force equivalent to Kiwi C for duty to reinforce defences at
2. As you know, the force being made ready for overseas duty in the The 36th Battalion, under Lt-Col J. W. Barry, landed in Norfolk in three groups between 26 September and 14 October, and the 34th Battalion, under Lt-Col R. J. Eyre, disembarked in Kiwi ‘C’ has been reduced by the provision of garrisons for
3. I consider that the portion of Kiwi ‘C’ remaining and available should be supplied as requested and that as soon as is possible further units to make this force up to the full scale of the contemplated Kiwi ‘C’ should be sent.
4. I am having prepared and will forward today an Order of Battle showing the composition of Kiwi ‘C’ as at present available for this duty.
5. It is recommended—
That approval be given for the despatch in the first instance of that portion of Kiwi ‘C’ force as is immediately available.
That as soon as possible additional troops to make Kiwi ‘C’ up to full strength also be approved for despatch.
On 18 October Admiral Ghormley was succeeded as Commander No. 339.
1. With reference to the recommendations contained in paragraph 5 of my memorandum of
One troop field artillery (four 25-pounders).
One section field engineers.
1st Battalion New Zealand Scottish.
1st Battalion Ruahine Regiment.
Workshops for—Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment.
Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment.
Heavy Regiment.
10th Reserve Motor Transport Company.
2. Of the above, (a), (b), (c) and (d) are in replacement of units sent or being sent to e) and (f) were provided for in the original composition of Kiwi ‘C’, but have not yet been brought up to War Establishment.
3. The War Establishment of the complete force is approximately 13,500 all ranks. The War Cabinet approval for the despatch of the force was based on the War Establishment of Kiwi ‘C’ less troops assigned to
4. May I have
5. I estimate the strength of the force on embarkation will be about 80 per cent of War Establishment. It is intended to make good the deficiencies as opportunity offers.
6. Provided approval is given for their despatch, there is a possibility of the troops mentioned in paragraph 1 (a) to (d) being disembarked at
7. As shipping arrangements are now being made, I request that this matter be treated as urgent.
Minister of Defence:
Recommended:
Despatch of Kiwi force ‘C’ to The advance party left New Zealand on 29 October and was followed by the rest of the division at intervals during the next four months.
The New Zealand force in
In War Cabinet,
1. As you have already been informed, This signal is not published.
2. The major deficiencies in Not published. Not published. The date given for the main group was 7 November.Kiwi ‘C’ caused by the above withdrawals from the Division are being made good by drawing on the
3. I enclose herewith for your information copy of a memorandum to 3rd Division. Not published.
4. Obviously it is very desirable that the forces provided for
5. So far as
6. As regards
7. If you concur in this view, I would request that steps be taken to make the necessary re-adjustment as early as is practicable.
8. May I give my assurance of the earnest desire of the New Zealand Army to co-operate fully with
1. In view of the despatch of New Zealand forces to
2. The policy regarding
3. The decision to despatch 3rd Division raised various questions. As explained to Kiwi forces originally asked for by Admiral Ghormley were designed—as far as they could be at that time—for taking over forward areas captured by the United States Marines and consequently are not necessarily suitable for the specific task now confronting 3rd Division, or what is really Kiwi ‘C’. The suitability of this force is primarily the concern of the United States Officer Commanding the island, but a considerable measure of responsibility still remains with the Kiwi ‘C’ to be despatched, the United States Commander knew that Kiwi ‘D’ was not ready nor likely to be ready for some time, that the forces for Kiwi ‘C’, and that Kiwi ‘C’ (reduced by the troops sent to Kiwi ‘C’) was the largest force the
4. Before the Kiwi ‘C’ it should know:
What forces of all kinds, including naval and air, are likely to be available for the defence of the island; the defensive arrangements including sea-mining; and the ability of the forces in the island mutually to support each other.
The United States plan for reinforcing the island and for support—Navy, Army and Air—from other areas in the
The general
An appreciation by Usually comsoupaccomsopac.
5. Without information on the matters raised in paragraph 4, it is possible only to indicate what appear to be the main weaknesses in the composition of Kiwi ‘C’ These are:
No tanks—one armoured regiment would be reasonable.
Field artillery is one field regiment (24 guns) below normal establishment.
Two of the six infantry battalions are below establishments.
6. The duty of supporting the forces in operational areas lies with the Commander responsible for the operations, in this case comsoupac, and New Zealand could perhaps legitimately rely upon not being required to meet any such commitment in the absence of any warning that supporting forces might conceivably be required from New Zealand.
In my opinion, however, the nature of the campaign and the accidents of war make it advisable that New Zealand should at least make such preparations as would enable New Zealand troops to be moved at short notice to the support of its forward troops if the situation should make such a course necessary.
7. To be in a position to carry out possible requirements as set out in paragraphs 5 and 6 and to implement the policy already decided in respect of vide paragraph 2), (the latter only arising if the
The only other alternative—the raising of special units, etc.—can only be effected by withdrawing men from existing units. These units have already suffered heavily by withdrawals of men for other purposes and must still find further men for reinforcements either for 2nd or 3rd Divisions or both, and, apparently, also for industry. This destructive process must be reduced to an absolute minimum as otherwise the Home Defence forces will be so disorganised and weakened as to be ineffective against a powerful attack. If, however, complete sub-units, etc., are selected, this disorganisation need not occur, and the selection could be made in such a way as to interfere
8. Before the selection of units, etc., for the relief of the Kiwi ‘C’ in an emergency can be proceeded with, a definite and early decision is necessary as to the categories of men who may be included. As War Cabinet is aware, our Home Forces include men of 18 years and upwards, and of lower medical categories. I need hardly point out that any categories of men which
9. In view of the general manpower situation of the Army and the necessity of reducing to a minimum the transfer of men between units, I suggest the following categories for consideration by
Reinforcements for 2nd Division:
All Grade I men, 20 years of age and up to 40 years.
Reinforcements for 3rd Division:
As for 2nd Division, supplemented if necessary by selected Grade II men.
For Norfolk Island relief, also
Existing Home Defence units less men under 19 years of age, all ‘A’ grade men to be transferred to 2nd and 3rd Division reinforcement unit.
Supporting Force for 3rd New Zealand Division in emergency:
Existing Home Defence units of approximately one brigade group in strength, all ages and categories, i.e., the balance of Kiwi Force to make up Kiwi ‘D’.
10. As regards paragraph 5, I consider On 5 November Kiwi ‘C’, and recommend that an existing tank battalion with attached troops should be equipped as an armoured regiment and despatched at the first opportunity.Kiwi ‘C’ force.
Until decisions on paragraphs 9 and 10 are made I am unable to take any action in these matters. A note dated
Maj-Gen Rt. Hon. Sir Harold Barrowclough, PC, KCMG, CB, DSO and bar, MC, ED, MC (Gk), Legion of Merit (US), Croix de Guerre (Fr); commanded 7 NZ Inf Bde in
1. I have for a long time been giving consideration to the question of the composition of this Division, and I have read with a good deal of pleasure the information you have been able to give me regarding the plans which are now under consideration for making it a more balanced force than it was in its original conception. As you will remember the Force in its various forms—the Abbreviations used in the original text have been spelt in full.Kiwi A, B, C, and D—was originally conceived as a Task Force to fulfil a particular role which Admiral Ghormley then had in mind. That particular task has probably long since ceased to be important, but the Force is still characterised on the one hand by the inclusion of Coast Defence and Heavy Anti-Aircraft Artillery
2. I have not forgotten your own efforts to make up these shortcomings when the situation permits and I am confident that the
3. I would draw your attention to the Coast Defence and Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiments. As you know, both these regiments have been assigned to tasks far removed from and quite unrelated to the tasks which have been allotted to 3rd Division. They are not under my tactical control and are an administrative burden without giving the Division any direct coverage as a counterpoise to the burden. I am not complaining of the way they have been disposed. On the contrary I concede that they have been quite properly so disposed
4. In these circumstances I feel bound to suggest for your consideration and for that of the
5. I am extremely anxious to get this Division concentrated in full over here as soon as possible. Naturally I have endeavoured to obtain from General Harmon Lt-Gen M. F. Harmon, United States Army Forces in usafispa
6. There are, however, certain factors from which I can draw some pretty obvious conclusions. It seems to be generally accepted that the comsopac may adopt a policy of relieving divisions on
The first condition is that I should have a full division. I cannot completely relieve an American division with two-thirds of a British division.
The second condition is that the balance of 3rd Division should be got over here with as little delay as possible so that it can be trained to work with the rest of us and understand our methods, and so that it can become acclimatised. I cannot over-emphasise this factor. There is an enormous difference between the troops who served in
7. All this seems very elementary and is of course perfectly well understood by you as Chief of the General Staff. I refer to it only to lead logically to the conclusion which I now submit, namely, that we should get away from the Task Force idea with which we began and that we should make every endeavour to constitute ourselves as a normal division. The United States forces are organised as normal divisions and I think we should be too. General Patch's Lt-Gen A. M. Patch, necal
I urgently commend to the consideration of the
8. In elaborating this argument I would remind you of the extremely unsatisfactory results that would follow if
9. I concede that if I get my two additional field artillery units I cannot expect to retain the 3·7-inch light howitzer battery now in necal but as yet without its guns. Its personnel could no doubt be transferred to the light howitzer regiment that is being substituted for one 25-pounder regiment.
10. I should be greatly obliged if you would place these views before the
Maj-Gen Sir Keith Stewart, KBE, CB, DSO, MC (Gk), Legion of Merit (US); GSO I NZ Div 1940–41; Deputy Chief of General Staff Dec 1941-Jul 1943; comd 5 Bde Aug–Nov 1943, 4 Armd Bde Nov 1943–Mar 1944, 5 Bde Mar–Aug 1944; p.w.
1. With reference to previous discussions in
2. I am to say that except for the suggestion that the Americans should be asked to take over the heavy anti-aircraft and heavy artillery regiments, General Puttick agrees with and supports General Barrowclough's proposals.
3. With regard to the heavy anti-aircraft and heavy artillery regiments, General Puttick considers that any suggestion of those units going over completely to American command, or of being manned by Americans, should either come from the Americans themselves or be raised at a more opportune moment than the present.
4. I do not think it is General Barrowclough's intention that his Division should be brought up to the same scale as the recently introduced British organisation. For operations in which he is likely to be engaged, a division based on the old organisation, modified to meet
5. The following additional units, shown in order of priority, would be required to bring his division up to such an organisation:
One field artillery regiment.
15th Infantry Brigade Headquarters, with its signal section, defence platoon and light aid detachment, less the ‘skeleton’ personnel already sent forward.
One infantry battalion—assuming that when the 34th Battalion from
One composite
One field ambulance.
One field company engineers.
One anti-tank battery.
One light artillery regiment, less the 3·7-inch battery now with the Division.
In certain circumstances, and if the 75-millimetre howitzers ordered from
6. The relief of the
Apart from the 36th Battalion and service detachments, the garrison consists of:
One heavy artillery battery
One composite anti-aircraft battery of—
4 heavy guns
8 light guns
One troop field artillery
One section field engineers
Although these units were provided by 3rd Division, all except the heavy artillery and heavy anti-aircraft artillery have been replaced in the Division, and on relief the personnel will be available for the additional units enumerated in paragraph 5. If comsopac will agree to not replacing the heavy artillery and heavy anti-aircraft artillery in 3rd Division, there will be an even greater accretion of personnel for the additional units.
7. The remaining personnel for the additional units would have to come from New Zealand Home Defence forces. If it is decided to send an infantry battalion, 1st Battalion, Otago Regiment, would be selected, as it could be spared more easily than any other field force infantry unit. The units of other arms would probably be found by withdrawal of individuals and sub-units from Home Defence forces throughout New Zealand.
8. A summary of the above proposals, together with the number of men involved, is given in the attached appendix. Not published.
9. Although these proposals will entail an addition of approximately 3000 men to the manpower calculations submitted to the
10. I suggest that if the comsopac's concurrence, and to ascertain if he will agree to the present deficiencies in heavy anti-aircraft and heavy artillery being left unfilled.
Minister of Defence
1. That Mr Coates will raise with comsopac the question of the replacement by American troops of the anti-aircraft units in
2. That subject to final consideration at a later date, comsopac is to take place early,
3. That the battalion in
4. ( Decisions on a number of points of detail relating to the defence of a) That New Zealand assume the responsibility for the defence of
6. That the Scottish and the Ruahine Battalions in
7. That the minimum age limit for troops for
8. That volunteers be accepted for
9. That the Maori Members of Parliament be consulted with reference to the use in the Islands of a Lt-Col J. W. Barry, MBE; CO 36 Bn Dec 1941–Jun 1943; Commander N Force (
In War Cabinet,
At a conference with Admiral Halsey today, 24 February, the following decisions were reached:
Halsey approves of the proposed adjustments in the New Zealand Army and agrees that we should proceed accordingly at once.
He wishes the 3rd Division to be completed to the war establishment of a full division as planned as soon as this can be done.
He considers the proposed allowance of 10,000 reinforcements per annum to be excessive and regards 40 per cent of establishment to be ample, based on the experience of the United States Marines.
He and all his staff discount entirely any possibility of discrimination against Maoris and consider the despatch of a Maori battalion to the 3rd Division would be suitable and desirable. A proposal that a Maori battalion be formed to complete the 3rd Division was approved by
He is investigating the possibility of relieving New Zealand anti-aircraft troops in
He agrees that the
He agrees generally with our proposal as to liaison, and we are preparing a suitable directive.
Party all well. We are preparing to go north to our Division either tomorrow or next day. This will take party approximately three days and we will then return, spending one day at
Minister of Defence
Recommended:
1. That the War Establishment of 2nd NZEF in Not published.vide
2. That Anti-Aircraft and Coast Artillery personnel now with 3rd Division and Anti-Aircraft personnel now in
3. That the first reinforcements amounting to 1263 all ranks be despatched to 3rd Division and that early priority be given to the despatch of these troops.
4. That the following units be made available for temporary duty with 3rd Division:
In War Cabinet,
Maj-Gen Sir Philip Mitchell.
It would be appreciated if you could advise me whether the A proposal that the three battalions of the Fijian Brigade should form part of the 3rd NZ Division had been the subject of several telegrams and letters between General Puttick and General Barrowclough. Brigadier Stewart visited
Not published.Fijian Units. Your memo of 6 May (received 14 May).
1. There are likely to be fresh developments re above. Firstly, I hear Mitchell has offered New Zealand a brigade, and secondly, arrangements have been completed to bring back old hands from 2nd Division for furlough, involving on account of shipping the most urgent provision of reliefs for them, which may cause your reinforcements to be taken and which in any case creates an acute shortage of A grade men.
2. This shortage See Vol. II, p. 214. The Government decided on 21 May to retain the 2nd Division in the may make it impossible fully to complete your Division or, if completed, to maintain it. There are many factors and happenings involved, including the decision of Parliament re future of 2nd Division.
3. My views are—
That 2nd and 3rd Divisions should be maintained to the last gasp, even after reduction of war establishment becomes necessary.
To achieve (a) I am prepared to go right back to pre-Japan Territorial Force, plus certain additions and coast defence units in our Home Defence forces.
Rather than imperil either Division or delay completion of yours, I would accept Fijian brigade at once in substitution for two of your New Zealand battalions, these two to go to Mid-East as reinforcements rather than be absorbed as your reinforcements. This would reduce heart-burning a bit.
I would reduce Norfolk by half (manning only half the 155-mm and 25-pounders and reducing infantry still further), lower overseas age to 19 or 19½, convert
4. Those are about all the manpower saving devices I can think of. It is a case of first things first. The sudden necessity for providing about 6000 men to relieve 6000 in 2nd Division has, of course, created an emergency.
5. I am likely to be asked, almost at any moment today, to talk to the Prime Minister or
6. There is a point about the relief of 6000 men in 2nd Division. Strong feeling has grown up in various quarters that this should be done while others think the whole division should return. The former if it avoids the latter is therefore justifiable on military grounds, despite the trouble it creates.
7. My proposals under 3 (b) would mean the abandonment of our present out-of-camp training and re-mobilization scheme, substituting compulsory training for 18–20 years men, volunteers to
8. There are very real problems ahead in this manpower business. Higher authority abroad has not decided or advised whether New Zealand can best help with armed men or supplies, so we are trying to do our maximum in both, with increasing demands for the latter from
I think our present military commitments are right for this stage of the war but it is evident that the pinch will be tighter as time goes on, and this Fijian brigade has therefore a very high importance and
I will keep you advised of developments…. Personal material omitted.
Your letter of 18 May did not reach me till 10 o'clock yesterday (Sunday) evening, and I am replying to it at once. Fortunately I had my two senior Brigadiers Brigadiers L. Potter and R. A. Row.
I appreciate the extraordinary difficulties which confront the
I ought to say at once that I should be very happy and proud to accept a Fijian Brigade.
But I feel bound to renew my request that the Fijian Brigade be accepted in addition to and not in substitution for any part of 3rd New Zealand Division. I have not overlooked the manpower difficulties that stand in the way of my proposals. On the information before me it seems practically impossible to maintain both 2nd and 3rd Divisions, especially if the older members of 2nd Division are to be sent back to New Zealand and be relieved by reinforcements on the very much larger scale that such a policy involves. It seems to me that this raises the very vital question as to whether 3rd Division is always to be regarded as the Cinderella of the Forces and is perpetually to be called on to make, directly and indirectly, the contributions that are necessary for the maintenance of 2nd Division in the
What I am about to say may touch on matters of policy, the decision of which rests with
1. The resolution to bring this Division up to full strength has had a very marked effect on the morale of this Force. The belief that we shall eventually be given an active role as distinct from a purely garrison job has resulted in an unbelievable improvement in our state of training and readiness for war. I know that, but for the fact that we are still short of some of our units, we are an infinitely better division than any American division that I have seen—Marines included. Our physical standards, our tactical knowledge, our willingness and keenness to work, our staff and administrative work, far surpasses that of the American Forces. This is no vain or idle boast. It can be demonstrated to any observer and is virtually admitted by American officers who are astounded at the vigour of the exercises we are performing in the steep bush-clad mountains of this Island. There is now a fine unit, brigade and divisional spirit throughout the Force.
2. I am sure I am correct in saying that the men in this Force want to fight as the 3rd New Zealand Division or the Kiwi Division. Whilst many of the men would like to go to the if there was no prospect of our fighting here, I am sure none of my units would wish to go if there was a prospect of our getting an active role. I am certain they would not wish to go as reinforcements whose unit organisation would be broken up on arrival in Egypt.
3. If any units are sent from this Division as reinforcements to the
4. This conflict between the manpower demands of the 2nd Division and of this Division is not unknown to the troops. They have read the newspaper references to it. Now that the North African campaign is over I think the opinion of the average man in this Force is something to the following effect: ‘The 2nd Division has had an opportunity of showing its worth. It has proved to be the best division in the
5. I am sure none of us have anything but pride and affection for the 2nd Division. All would recognise the fairness of bringing the whole Division back or, alternatively, of bringing back 5 or 6,000 at a time. But the troops here would feel that it was unfair that the relief of the 2nd Division should be carried out at the expense of the 3rd Division. Nor do the men fail to see that this war in the
6. I do not forget that the suggestion is that by the inclusion of the Fiji Brigade it may be possible to keep us at fighting strength and give us an active role; but I question very much whether that will really be possible. A Brigade represents only some 2500 men including its own signals, its Defence Platoon and its LAD, all of which I assume the Fijian Brigade would bring with it. This is a small part of the Division which, with Divisional troops and hospitals and Base organisation totals up to about 17,000 men. If the demands of 2nd Division proceed on the scale now indicated as possible it is obvious that we shall be called on to supply not only two battalions of infantry mentioned in your letter but also many other troops, including Artillery, Signals,
7. A few of us for years have regarded the bearing of arms in defence of the State as both the duty and the privilege of every citizen of the State. When the war broke out most people recognised it as a duty though they did not all see it as a privilege. Today, after long and arduous preparation most of my troops now regard it as a privilege as well as a duty. That privilege has been extended to the 2nd Division and has been richly and honourably enjoyed. I make a plea that the same privilege be extended to 3rd Division, every man of whom has worked hard to fit himself to enjoy it. If, as seems inevitable, the two Divisions cannot both be maintained in an active role then I submit that a decision must be taken on the vital question as to whether 2nd Division (already covered with honours) must always take precedence over 3rd Division which has not yet had one single opportunity of fulfilling its justifiable military ambitions.
In conclusion I wish to repeat that I have no intention of attempting to formulate the policy of This letter was sent to the Prime Minister on 28 May.
Most secret and personal for General Puttick only. Have reason to believe we may be asked to undertake an active mission involving the whole Division about the end of July. Think it would be disastrous if we were not then in a position to accept. We might never afterwards get such an opportunity. This information is for you only and cannot yet be communicated to
I asked Bassett whether this information could be passed on to New Zealand as it seemed to me that it should have a very great bearing on the questions which are now being considered, or possibly have been considered, in relation to the 2nd and 3rd Divisions. Bassett explained that it would be in order for me to apprise you of the situation but, in the meantime, it must not go beyond you. General Harmon's plans have yet to be submitted to comsopac and it is thought that unfavourable repercussions might arise if the proposals came back to comsopac from comsopac.
I therefore immediately drafted a cable to give you such information as I could regarding the proposals so that you at least would appreciate this new aspect of the problem. I regret that at the moment my hands are tied and I have to stipulate that the information is for you only and not to be passed on to
I am not able to say anything more about the contemplated operation, and, indeed, I am not further informed on the matter; but I understand the proposals for this Division would involve a complete Division of full strength. I cannot help feeling that it would be a serious setback to our prestige in this part of the world if, after some of us had been in comsopac's plans would therefore be very seriously curtailed by our inability to participate. I cannot help feeling that this would put us considerably offside with the Americans and that we might thereby lose a good deal of the prestige that has been won for us in another part of the globe by the very great performances of the 2nd Division.
Once again I am compelled by circumstances to require that the contents of this letter should be communicated to no one other than yourself, in the meantime.
1. In effecting preliminary dispositions for future offensive operations in the
2. It is desired that you present this proposal to the General Officer Commanding, The file copy of this memorandum is minuted by General Puttick: ‘Original handed to P.M. in
3. In the event of a favourable response to this query, this Headquarters will be in a position to establish a firm plan, which upon adoption will be communicated as a definite proposal to the New Zealand authorities.
Vice-Admiral H. R. Thurber, USN.
1. If the Fijian units are to join 3rd Division, it is very important that they should do so with the least possible delay, so that they may carry out advanced training and be thoroughly incorporated in the Division. There is a great deal to do in this connection.
2. In a personal note, Not published. Vice-Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, USN; Deputy Commander, South Pacific, Jan–Jun 1943; commanded 3rd Amphibious Force, Jul 1943–Nov 1945. Admiral Wilkinson visited Maj-Gen De Witt Peck, US Marine Corps; served with South Pacific Force, 1942–43; commanded 1st Division, Northern China,
3. So far as United States Command is concerned, there seem to be only two points for consideration:
Whether, having regard to the security of
Assuming they can be released, whether employment with the 3rd New Zealand Division is the best role in the interests of the
4. There is no difficulty in presenting this question to Admiral Halsey by telegram, more especially as Admiral Wilkinson, General Barrowclough, and Colonel
5. On approval being received, it is urgently necessary that General Barrowclough should visit
6. I suggest, therefore, that in accordance with the procedure proposed by the Governor of comsopac Headquarters, that could quite appropriately follow at any convenient time.
7. Draft telegram is attached. A memorandum from the Secretary to the
At this date General Barrowclough was in New Zealand for discussions with
Refer your telegram of 16 June. In conference and correspondence concerning the reduction of home defences in New Zealand it was our understanding that the 3rd Division would be brought to full strength, and that full strength would be such that the New Zealand Division could be used interchangeably with American divisions in combat. Therefore, we prefer for the latter reason, and because of the reduction of strength of the
The arrangements proposed in the memorandum See p. 376, note 3.comsopac.
Your reply of 18 [17] June [No. 361] correctly states the understanding that the 3rd New Zealand Division would be brought to full strength, and in fact this had been approved some time ago by
General Harmon requested me to discuss the Fijian question with him and General Peck prior to their discussing the matter with Admiral Halsey. I made it clear I was not an emissary of the
Refer your telegram of 16 June [No. 360] and despatch of the 19th. As the
Have received copy of the signal from comsopac to GOC New Zealand Military Forces dated 24 June.
While greatly regretting the decision I feel it essential we should accept the two-brigade basis rather than refuse the proposals for active employment of the Division. I am assured that the task allotted us will
Commodore S. D. Jupp, USN; Commanding Officer and Port Director, US Naval Operating Base, comsopac's letter of 11 June [No. 358] to enable the plan to proceed and me to prepare. Please instruct whether I am to reorganise on a two-brigade basis. Request third Field Company fully equipped be included as a unit of this Division. General Harmon concurs. Request also all Divisional Signals with all equipment be sent as originally contemplated as no adequate provision has been made for Base Signals and I am faced with the additional problem of signals for mainyard.usafispa of amended requirements of shipping to complete the Division on the new basis. Understand Captain Juppusafispa can make available ships not under Captain Jupp's control.
If you agree, give the following message to Admiral Halscy from me:
‘Reference your message of 24 June [No. 365]. Fully appreciate your Admiral Halsey replied on 27 June that he approved the addition of one Fijian battalion to the 3rd Division provided it entailed no reduction in the number of Fijian troops then in the
That authority be given for the organisation of the 3rd Division on a two-Brigade basis, together with the additional units requested
That approval be given for the proposed movement of the 3rd Division and to its later employment in the combat zone, subject to a report from General Barrowclough that the Division is then suitably equipped and trained for the proposed operations. See No. 382.
In War Cabinet,
Repeated to General Barrowclough on 28 June.
Reference your letter of 11 June [No. 358] from acting Chief of Staff to General Barrowclough, the New Zealand War Cabinet approves of the proposed movement of the 3rd Division and to its later employment in the combat zone, subject to a report from General Barrowclough that the Division is then suitably equipped and trained for the proposed operations.
In accordance with the wishes of the Governor as contained in paragraph 4 (i) and (ii) of his memorandum on the administration
Paragraph 4 read: ‘Accordingly, subject to the agreement cited above, which vests the operational control of the local forces, whilst employed in It is prepared to place the It desires that the Mobile Brigade Group should be employed on active operations against the enemy anywhere, within or without the It follows also from (i) above that the organisation, training and employment of the F.M.F. are technical military questions for decision between the Chief of the General Staff in New Zealand and the U.S. Commander, South Pacific.’comsopac the question of incorporating the Fiji Brigade in the 3rd New Zealand Division. For the reasons that the garrison of comsopac refused. On further representation comsopac agreed to one
Repeated to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
Your telegram of 28 June. Have seen the Governor who says he would normally have replied that he views the break-up of the brigade with regret but regards the matter as being within the recently agreed decision to place the troops under the general direction of the New Zealand General Staff and therefore for decision as desired by the Chief of the General Staff.
2. But on 27 June an immediate most secret signal affecting the employment of the Brig J. G. C. Wales, MC; GSO I B Force, Mar 1941–Jul 1942; Commandant,
3. Meantime the Governor suggests you sell the idea to comsopac that the brigade should be attached to 3rd Division NZEF at once, the Division being directed to detach one or more battalions as desired for the
Repeated to the
Reference your telegram of 29 June.
I appreciate your desire to maintain the identity of the Fijian Brigade but consider it very unlikely that Halsey would agree to the proposal to attach the Brigade to the 3rd Division, with one battalion detached to the comsopac approval of one battalion.
Repeated to the New Zealand High Commissioner in
Reference telegram of 29 June [No. 371], Fiji Infantry Battalion as scouts for the 3rd New Zealand Division.
Have now given the matter full consideration and feel the greatest difficulty in agreeing to the proposal by Army Headquarters for the following reasons:
2. In the circumstances known to you at present it was decided last autumn to raise in
The Brigade is organised and trained as such and has a strong Brigade esprit de corps, besides being to the Fijian people what your 2nd Division is to the people of New Zealand. It would be heartbreaking now to abandon the project of participation in the fight as a Brigade, besides creating for me an exceedingly difficult position with public opinion here, especially Fijian.
3. Accordingly, while re-affirming the agreement made with Stewart and accepted by you, I feel obliged to say that I regard the proposal in Army Headquarters' telegram of 28 June [No. 370] as being excluded by the qualifying words in paragraph 4 of the text of the agreement, and must regretfully decline the request for detaching a single battalion for use as a scouting and raiding unit. But the Brigade remains at your disposal in accordance with the terms of the agreement for employment as such in any theatre of war as to which you may be able to come to agreement with comsopac and, if you wish, as part of the New Zealand Division. My personal feeling is that the question of the garrison of
4. I much regret the inability to agree with the present request by Army Headquarters, but I believe on reflection you will agree with me that for the reasons given above I cannot send the Fijians off in single battalions and abandon now the rest of the Brigade units.
5. Wales has returned and has seen the above and agrees with it. He adds that if the proposal to employ the Brigade in
Repeated to the
Your telegram of 30 June [No. 372].
Please ask to see my telegram to the Prime Minister which gives in full my reason for being unwilling to break up the Brigade and despatch single battalions to different places out of the Colony. Native troops are most valuable, but account has to be taken that they are natives with language and domestic complications, and the more I consider the matter the more impracticable the proposal appears.
2. Moreover, the consequences will obviously be known to the public here and I shall have to explain to the Legislative Council why we have gone to great pains and expense to raise, train, and equip a brigade only to break it up unused and scrap the battery, engineers, etc. I can think of no reasonable explanation.
3. General Thompson Maj-Gen C. F. Thompson, comsopac.
4. If you see no objection please show this to the Prime Minister and repeat to the Sir Philip Mitchell and Colonel Wales had discussions early in
Your message of 1 July [No. 373].
The considerations which have influenced your decision are fully appreciated. We were, as you know, most willing and anxious to have the Fijian Brigade in the 3rd New Zealand Division, though both Generals Puttick and Barrowclough considered it preferable operationally to employ one battalion with each New Zealand brigade rather than the Brigade as a whole. When, to our very great regret, comsopac declined to agree to the employment and transfer of the
comsopac has in quite definite terms registered his objections to your Brigade leaving
Repeated to the New Zealand Liaison Officer,
Your telegram of 2 July [No. 374].
I had discussed your telegram [No. 373] with the Prime Minister and advised him that there was no option but to abandon the proposal to employ Fijian troops with 3rd Division as comsopac would not agree to more than one battalion leaving comsopac, who is responsible for the defence of
Our manpower situation here is so difficult that we have been compelled to reduce 3rd Division to a two-brigade division and would now be unable to complete the necessary services and other arms for the
The Governor of On 15 July General Puttick asked General Barrowclough to inform Admiral Halsey accordingly. A number of letters and telegrams on the provision of reinforcements for the 3rd Division have not been reproduced.
My Dear Prime Minister,
I am writing about the matter of the Fiji Brigade, only to say how very sorry I am that, so early after the arrangements made with your General Staff to act as Godfather to the Brigade, there should have been a difference of opinion. I will not go over the ground again, but I should like to say that had we not last Autumn, on the advice of the Commandant here and the American Commanding General, and with the concurrence of the
It must be remembered after all that, with few exceptions, none of them can speak English and that the vast majority are simple-minded folks from the interior of the larger Islands or from the small Islands of the Group, who are very easily depressed in strange surroundings.
I had not myself ever thought that to break up the Brigade would be suggested now, especially as the question of the garrison of
The matter must rest in abeyance at the moment, but when the offensive is a little further forward I will take it up myself with the American Commanders. There seems to be some misunderstanding in Puttick's mind, because the proposal that the Brigade complete should be attached to the New Zealand Forces has not, according to my information from
With great good wishes and hopes for your success in the forth-coming election, together with grateful thanks for all you have done for us in the past,
Neither is reproduced here. On 16 July vide my A. 5270 of 10 July and details in letter posted 16 July.
My Dear Sir Philip,
I entirely appreciate and sympathize with the viewpoint you so clearly express in your personal letter to me dated 8 July.
The reasons you put forward against the splitting up of the Fijian Brigade are, I feel, from the point of view of the Native troops, thoroughly sound. I can assure you that we were just as disappointed as you were with Admiral Halsey's unwillingness to agree to the incorporation of your Brigade with our Division. We have now been forced by our manpower difficulties, as you are probably aware, to reduce our force in the
In view, however, of Admiral Halsey's decision, which was expressed in very definite terms, we felt after our prolonged negotiations on the matter that we just could not press it further. General Puttick was still of the opinion, however, that it would be of the greatest advantage to our Division if we could have the assistance of at least one Fijian battalion—a course which, we considered, might have enabled us eventually to arrange for the transfer of the whole Fijian Brigade.
After the receipt of your message, members of
The Hon. W. Perry, Hon. Sir William Perry, Kt, MLC; Member of Mr Coates died on
The very kind personal wishes contained in the last paragraph of your letter are, I assure you, warmly appreciated. The happy association of my colleagues and myself with you and the Fijian Government are greatly valued and I trust that our mutual collaboration will continue to contribute in some measure towards the achievement of ultimate victory in the
With kind regards and best wishes,
Repeated to General Puttick, General Barrowclough and various
Upon confirmation by GOC 3rd New Zealand Division of readiness for combat of that Division, comgensopac [will] issue the necessary orders for the movement of 3rd New Zealand Division from Comtransgroup sopac furnish required transportation. This movement will be completed by
Reference Not published. This telegram repeated to General Barrowclough the text of No. 369 to Admiral Halsey. Not published.comsopac signal of 26 July and your G.4943 of 28 June.comsopac, who desires certificate before arranging forward transportation? Hon. Mr Perry and General Puttick have seen and approved the text of this message. Comsopac asking urgently for certificate.
Your telegram of 31 July. comsopac.
Reference comsopac signal of 26 July [No. 381].
I report that 3rd NZ Division is suitably equipped and trained for the proposed operations in the The Division arrived in
Mr Perry had cabled the Prime Minister from Headquarters 3rd Division on 31 July as follows: ‘Have discussed [No. 382] with Generals Puttick and Barrowclough and recommend Barrowclough be authorised to certify to comsopac as he suggests.’
Despatched through the Governor of
While I did not make any definite statement to Halsey that no reinforcements would be sent to the 3rd Division, I emphasised the fact that our manpower position was acute. I pointed out that if, as
The Hon. W. Perry has asked me to ensure that your notes of his conference with you make it clear regarding the New Zealand manpower as it affects the present campaigns.
For your present campaigns New Zealand has made provision for
In view of New Zealand's
Your liaison officer, Colonel Salmon, who recently returned from a trip to the Fijis, advised my Deputy Commander Admiral R. B. Carney, USN; Chief of Staff to Admiral Halsey, Jul 1943 – Nov 1945; Chief of Naval Operations 1953–55.
It is needless for me to tell you that I have been greatly disappointed that New Zealand could not furnish a division with three full brigades, and accepted the decision on two brigades with great reluctance. I do feel that these two brigades should be maintained at full strength at all times.
I hope that their losses will not be such as to require more than the 10 per cent replacements for which you have provided, but should these unfortunately be insufficient, I am counting on you to furnish such additional replacements as may be necessary to maintain these two brigades at full strength.
Our operations in
With the assurances of my continued high esteem, I am,
I have received your letter dated 21 August, in which you comment on my message concerning the position of the 3rd Division which was, I gather, conveyed to your Deputy Commander by Colonel Salmon.
The questions raised in the communication from me and in yours are of fundamental importance and it is most essential that your exact requirements and the extent of our commitments and resources should be mutually understood.
As you are no doubt aware, and as I explained to your former Deputy Commander, Admiral Wilkinson, the decision to retain our battle-trained Division in the
In so far as our
We have for some months been particularly concerned that there should be no collapse of our war effort in any of its several directions, and that is why I have taken steps to inform you that there must come a time when one particular activity or another must be tapered off.
It is and has always been our intention to maintain the two Brigades of the 3rd Division as long as circumstances permit and in this connection I would like to observe that, in addition to the first reinforcements of 10 per cent which it is our practice to send forward with a capital force, we have also made available a reinforcement pool of over
At the end of any period of intense activity we would, of course, re-examine the position in the light of our remaining resources of manpower and of our several commitments, especially those relating to the production of foodstuffs.
We fully realise your desire that the Division should have been of normal establishment—three Brigades—but from the foregoing you will understand that this is not practicable. In this connection I would like to refer to the proposal which was advanced when we were faced with the situation of having to reduce the force from three to two Brigades, namely, the possibility of employing with our Division the other British force in your area—the Fijian Brigade—with the training and command of which the New Zealand military authorities have been and are intimately concerned.
It was our understanding that Sir Philip Mitchell was willing, and indeed anxious, that this force should be so employed under Major-General Barrowclough and it was a matter of some disappointment both
Have received instructions to undertake an operational role in
Have returned to A signal on 14 September (not published) advised that General Barrowclough was leaving ‘permanently’ for Landing Ships, Tanks; Assault Personnel, Destroyers; Landing Craft, Infantry. Commanding General.comgen
1. I arrived in
2. A portion of The abbreviations in the original text have been spelt in full.
3. The Island Command HQ is situated in a locality which was no doubt appropriate in the early stages but it is now in a totally unsuitable position. I propose to move it to an area in the vicinity of Gill's Plantation as soon as the necessary communications by road and signal have been completed. This will involve at least a fortnight and possibly three weeks as we are extremely short of the necessary road-making equipment.
4. At the present time the forces on this Island comprise:
An American Infantry Regimental Combat Team plus one Battalion.
The 14th NZ Brigade Group less one Battalion Group which is expected to arrive on 24 September.
A Construction Battalion charged with the construction of an airfield which is well under way.
A Defence Regiment comprising heavy anti-aircraft guns, light anti-aircraft guns, heavy coast defence guns and a number of heavy machine guns for coast defence.
Miscellaneous Navy personnel and a pool of landing craft of various natures.
A detachment of Fijian Scouts which I am relieving and hope to get permission to send back to
5. A considerable number of additional troops of the First Marine Amphibious Corps will arrive in various echelons at periodic intervals and they will be concerned mainly with the preparation of a Base for 1 MAC and the ‘set-up’ of this Island will rapidly become a very extensive one. 3 NZ Division HQ is going to be hard-pressed to exercise the functions of Island Command as well as the command of the Division. I could not very well refuse to accept the commission but I am taking steps as early as possible to have a proper Island Command constituted as I want to keep myself and my staff unhampered by matters outside the tactical and administrative control of my own New Zealand troops.
6. We are immediately putting in hand active operations designed to clear the Japanese from the North West and North East coastal fringe. There appear to be no Japs in the interior. How long this operation will take I do not feel at liberty to estimate as I have little experience of the rate of progress that can be made through the jungle against hostile troops. The experience in
7. I have been asked to undertake the elimination of the Japanese forces on Gizo Island but do not propose to start that operation until we are assured that the situation in
8. The present indications are that the
9. I need hardly emphasise the need for the utmost secrecy in regard to this phase of the operations and I do not think the plan ought to be communicated to anyone outside Army HQ. I have no authority to report it to
10. I am sending copies of this letter to Colonel
11. There is still in
12. The health of New Zealand troops in this island so far is good and they are in good heart and looking forward to the opportunity of coming to grips with the enemy. I feel confident that they
13. During the day we are seldom subject to air attack but every night has been considerably disturbed by the presence of hostile aircraft. American troops on the Island have adopted the policy of moving from their tents and bivouacs into fox-holes as soon as a ‘condition red’ is announced. They move back to their bivouacs after the ‘all clear’ is sounded. With as many as half a dozen raids in one night it is easy to see that the troops are not getting adequate rest. Our own troops have more or less adopted the American practice and it will be necessary for me to see that our troops sleep in suitably prepared splinter-proof shelters so that their rest is not disturbed by raids which may not result in bombs being dropped anywhere near their bivouac areas.
Balance of 14 Brigade Group and further details
Expect pincer movement to result in decisive action in a day or so. Difficulties of terrain and insufficiency of boats make progress slow. 14 Brigade Advanced Headquarters in the neighbourhood of Matu Soroto Bay. 30 Battalion Combat Team in reserve near Gill's Plantation. If 30 Battalion is not required in northern Vella I expect to employ it shortly in the capture of Gizo Island.
Our forward positions have been attacked from the air but so far without reported casualties. Several later messages giving details of the operations on
Colonel McKillop Col E. R. McKillop, CMG, OBE; Staff Engineer, HQ B Force ( Not traced. This letter was possibly dated 27 September, the day on which Colonel McKillop embarked for a brief tour of duty in the
One of the greatest difficulties confronting me is the uncertainty of the future use and employment of this Division. I can see about as far as the end of March next but after that I have little idea as to where we may be employed and how, and it is consequently very difficult to frame my requests without running the risk of over-demanding. The difficulties of shipping and supply may prevent equipment reaching me until shortly before the Division is due for withdrawal. Colonel McKillop is familiar with this aspect of the matter and will no doubt discuss it with you.
You will have learned from the despatches which I have been sending to Army Headquarters that portion of the Division has been engaged in operations against the Japanese in the north-western portion of
All Japanese resistance in
The Later figures give the brigade's casualties as 3 officers, 28 other ranks killed, 1 officer died of wounds, 1 officer and 31 other ranks wounded.
Warmest congratulations from Army Headquarters to all concerned in the successful conclusion of the initial operations against the Japanese. My personal congratulations to yourself, Brigadier
I have been informed by Brigadier Dove Then on a visit to New Zealand on duty. Maj-Gen C. D. Barrett, US Marine Corps; Commander 1st Marine Amphibious Corp in
You may also wish to know that Brigadier Dove was informed by senior
Hon. W. Nash. Mr Nash returned to New Zealand from
In the absence of the Prime Minister, who has been indisposed for some days, I am acknowledging your letter to him dated 6 October [No. 394] and conveyed by Colonel McKillop. I should add that Colonel McKillop saw me immediately on his return and gave me a full account of his visit.
I have also had the advantage of recent discussions with General
I note what you say concerning the uncertainty as to the future use of the 3rd Division. We are at present making another examination of the manpower problem which is becoming more and more acute. We are at the present moment experiencing some difficulty in providing men to make up the return furlough party to the
May I take this opportunity of expressing on behalf of
From 30 September to 12 October a General Barrowclough had advised General Puttick of the plans for the proposed landing in the
Row reports situation at 10.52 a.m. local time. Landings on all beaches made, casualties light. Perimeter at
At 2.53 p.m. on 27 October Row reported all perimeters established and situation quiet. Estimated casualties 75 all ranks. Not clear whether all New Zealand. May include some Further details have been omitted. A number of later messages giving progress reports on the operation have not been published.
Have just completed a tour of the Treasury positions. Most of the enemy are now eliminated, but there have been some desperate assaults on our positions by enemy detachments in endeavours to get food or to capture boats to escape.
The
Total New Zealand casualties to date: 30 killed, 6 died of wounds, 108 wounded, 10 slightly wounded remaining with unit.
Do not anticipate many more casualties.
Now that the forces under your command have so quickly and effectively completed the occupation of
I greatly appreciate your very kind message, which is being published in Divisional Orders and will be a source of pride to all ranks of this force. This Division has waited long for its opportunity and I am indeed proud of the enterprise and fortitude of my Command in its first contact with a very implacable foe. Please convey my thanks to the Prime Minister and my hopes that he will shortly recover from his present indisposition.
Row reports definitely accounted for 203 Japanese dead and seven prisoners. Still finding odd dead in jungle. He considers only two or three Japanese left alive in Mono. The situation generally is quiet with little or no enemy air activity. Total New Zealand casualties in the
I have the honour to submit for your information a report on the operations of my Division during the period
You will recollect that, as a result of the Dominion's commitments elsewhere, it was necessary to adopt some very radical changes in the composition and organisation of 3 NZ Division. One Brigade—the 15th—had to be disbanded and a similar fate befell the 33rd Heavy Regiment and the 28th Heavy AA Regiment. The troops released from these disbanded units were utilised to fill the somewhat depleted ranks of the remaining formations and to constitute a reserve of reinforcements for the whole Force. In addition we had to find out of the Division some 400 men for the
Early in August I had received orders to concentrate the Division in
Shortly afterwards the Division was joined by the
The
The tactical situation at that time can be briefly summarised as follows.
It is necessary to give a more detailed description of the situation in
This was the local situation in
Precise information as to the strength of the Japanese Force is not available but from captured documents disclosing the identity of the troops employed it is calculated that they numbered about 600 men. This calculation was confirmed by estimates made by 14 NZ Infantry Brigade whilst they were in contact with the enemy. It was obvious from the US troops' experience that the enemy was anxious to avoid battle and native scouts reported that he was concentrating all his force in the extreme North and North Western fringe of the Island. It was obvious that an advance up one side of the island would result only in the enemy's steady withdrawal before our troops and a long and perhaps never ending chase. Brigadier Potter therefore decided to move
This manoeuvre had one disadvantage. The enemy would be in a position to meet and engage each battalion in turn instead of meeting their joint attack. The infantry strength of one battalion was not very different from the infantry strength the enemy could muster. The presence of artillery with each battalion gave us, however, a superior strength in each arm of our pincer movement. The Brigadier very properly decided that he could afford to split his force and that such a measure was indeed essential if he was to force his enemy into battle.
The plan having been made it was speedily put into operation. Owing to the complete absence of roads and tracks and the paramount need for speed in the operation the ‘advance to contact’ was very largely an amphibious operation. Reconnoitring parties were landed well to the North of the areas occupied by the American troops and as they reported the area free from the enemy the remainder of the troops and their equipment and supplies were ferried up in the small barges and landing craft with which we had now become so familiar.
Patrols moved overland from one bay or cove to the next, and as each in turn was reported clear the balance of the force moved up by barge and landing craft. Enemy patrols were encountered and some sharp, if minor, actions ensued. It soon became evident that the enemy was concentrating his force in the vicinity of Warambari, Marquana and Timbala Bays on the North West coast of the Island. It also became evident that in this area the Jap was prepared to offer a stubborn and determined resistance. He was hoping to be evacuated by sea and had reached the area to which he expected the evacuating boats to come. He could not afford to be driven out of that area and he was prepared to defend it ‘to the death’, to use the phrase which often appears in his orders.
The
This is not the place to give in detail the progress of the battle. It is sufficient to say that with the closest possible co-operation of both
Whilst these operations were in progress in the Northern end of the island we were not altogether free from enemy interference on the South Eastern coast where the troops were engaged in various administrative tasks such as constructing roads and bridges and in unloading many thousands of tons of ammunition and supplies of all descriptions. These operations did not escape the attention of the
The whole operation cost us 47 killed and 36 wounded. A conservative estimate of enemy casualties was 200 killed. We had no means of estimating the number of enemy wounded though they must have been considerable, and as stated above it is thought that some of the enemy troops who were evacuated were subsequently destroyed at sea. From mid-October onwards the troops in Vella found themselves performing merely a garrison role.
I was now free to devote attention to the pending operation by Rear-Admiral G. H. Fort, USN.
The chief merit of the Patrol torpedo-boats.
The administrative problem involved in planning and loading and embarkation of troops, supplies and equipment and their unloading and disembarkation on very limited beaches and with the barest possible information of the hydrographic conditions prevailing there.
The danger of counter-attack from the very strong garrison stationed in South
The first problem caused me personally no concern at all. I was thoroughly confident of the ability of the Commander
The Treasury landing right under the noses of the strong Japanese forces on
The potentialities we envisaged proved to be no more than potentialities. They never materialised. The Japanese reaction to this further invasion of his territory was surprisingly supine. He completely abandoned his garrison to its fate and made no attempt either to reinforce or to evacuate it. His response in the air was equally weak and ineffective. In the events that happened the
Shortly prior to the landing Sergeant Cowan, the Brigade Intelligence Sergeant, led two separate patrols on to the islands with the object of gaining information and of establishing contact with friendly natives there. These expeditions were as useful as they were hazardous and reflected the greatest credit on the Sergeant and those who accompanied him. I am glad to report that Sergeant Cowan has since received a well merited DCM for his leadership and gallant conduct.
The landing on 27 October was effected simultaneously on both the major islands of the Treasury Group. The largest island—
The beach at
Meanwhile the 34th Battalion less one company had effected an unopposed landing on
Subsequent operations in these islands were not less successful. The Jap garrison had shown a tendency to move across country to the northern shore of
The
At the time of writing this report (late
I do not wish, Mr Prime Minister, to overestimate the importance or the nature of these operations. They were relatively minor actions so far as this Division is concerned, and indeed a proportion of the Divisional troops were not engaged at all. But I know your personal interest in the fortunes of this Force which has for so long held a Cinderella and somewhat inglorious role. I have therefore been persuaded to describe this minor campaign in more detail and at greater length than would have been appropriate had I had other conquests to relate as having taken place during the period under review. I feel confident that your interest in our welfare will preclude any possibility of your being wearied by its length or of your patience being exhausted by some further references which I feel I ought to make.
No account of our activities in the forward area would be complete without my paying grateful homage to the tremendous courtesy and consideration shown to me and to all of us by the United States Officers with whom our duties have brought us in contact. Without a single exception all our relations with them have been of the friendliest possible nature. On every occasion they have treated us in all respects as if we were one of their own Divisions. I very humbly hope that they have had occasion to find us equally helpful and equally co-operative. It seems invidious to mention any one of the numerous American Officers who have befriended us but I feel compelled to bring to your
Maj-Gen R. G. Breene,
I have already submitted through you certain recommendations for immediate awards which later were approved by His Excellency the Governor General on behalf of His Majesty the King. During his visit to the Division His Excellency was able to present the ribbons of these decorations to some of those to whom they had been awarded. I am forwarding in a separate document the names of certain officers and men whose conduct has been of exceptional merit and whose work I commend to you as entitling them to the distinction of a ‘Mention in Dispatches’. I very gratefully record my deep indebtedness to the Brigadiers and other Commanders of all formations and units in the Force, to their Staffs, to my own Staff and the Heads of my various Services, and also to the Brigadier commanding the Base and all concerned in the extremely arduous tasks that have been performed by the various Base units. But especially do I wish to record my great admiration for and my unbounded pride in the work of the regimental officers and the rank and file of my command. It is they who bear the real heat and burden of the day—they who face the greatest hardships and the thousand hidden perils of this jungle warfare. Without them our victory could never have been achieved. They never failed me once. It is indeed an honour to be associated with the men whom you have placed under my command.
I should like to conclude this, my first, report with a statement regarding the health of the Division. After continuous service of over a year in the tropics, nearly four months of which have been spent in combat areas, the health of the troops remains astonishingly good. The sickness rate is far below that which the previous experience of other formations had led us to expect. This very satisfactory state of affairs I attribute in no small measure to the strenuous training undertaken by all ranks in
My secret and personal letter to you of 6 January, paragraph 3. Not published. In this letter General Barrowclough discussed plans for a 24-hour reconnaissance in force of the Green Islands Group by 30 Battalion. The object of the operation, under the guise of a commando raid, was to find out whether the island was suitable for the construction of an airfield and to make hydrographic surveys as a preliminary to the selection of landing beaches, motor torpedo-boat base, etc.
The 3rd New Zealand Division less
Warmest congratulations to you and your officers and men on the Not published.
The 3rd New Zealand Division is fully established ashore and in process of clearing up enemy elements on the island. Enemy aircraft were over three times during the night and dropped bombs but no damage or casualties resulted. The total New Zealand casualties since landing are one killed, three wounded. A number of later operational messages have been omitted.
The seizure and occupation of the Green Islands Group is now complete and all enemy ground opposition has been eliminated with the exception of a few fugitive Japanese still hiding in the denser parts of the jungle. The forces involved comprised the greater part of 3rd New Zealand Division with, under command, a large number of
The initial landing was made at dawn on 15 February—there was a very great variety of ships and landing craft, escorted by the United States Navy and
On 17 February there was only occasional opposition to our advance on
Of three Japanese who escaped from this action by canoe, two were later killed and one taken prisoner. Between 21 and 23 February strong patrols on Pinipel Island located fourteen Japanese and killed them all. Subsequent operations involved active patrols which gradually eliminated all Japanese met. One other prisoner was taken. Our casualties throughout were relatively light.
Meanwhile the development of the island as a base for further operations proceeded with incredible speed, made possible only by the enormous variety and quantity of the equipment furnished by the
The success of the operation is not to be gauged by the extent of the fighting and the casualties, but by the smoothness with which large numbers of troops and great quantities of material were got ashore on open beaches into roadless jungle and put into immediate operation. From this standpoint the work of the planning staffs was excellent and the troops were splendid in carrying the plans into effect. Total New Zealand casualties were 10 killed and 21 wounded. See also Withdrawal of 2nd NZEF IP, No. 429, for a fuller report on the
I have just been informed that the 3rd New Zealand Division has been designated as Area Reserve for the
Target date for
My telegram of 7 March. I am now advised that the Operational code-name for the capture of forearm.
Your telegram of 10 March is acknowledged. See No. 419.Withdrawal of 2nd NZEF IP, No. 417. This telegram was from the Prime Minister, not General Puttick, although it was sent through the Army Department.
From a survey of the manpower situation See also Vol. II, Maintenance of 2nd New Zealand Division; the Replacement Scheme.
We are satisfied that the situation calls for a number of urgent measures if a serious breakdown is to be avoided, with subsequent wastage of valuable foodstuffs owing to the fact that processing will not be possible at the right season. It is understood that you are willing to make shipping available to bring the
Your prompt attention to the request contained in my message dated 4 December is warmly appreciated and we are most relieved to learn from advice received from comgensopac that firm transport arrangements are in hand.
The meat-killing and cool storage situation in New Zealand is extremely critical and every day is of value in ensuring the maximum
Arrived yesterday but Halsey is away. Have seen Admirals Shafroth, Rear-Admiral J. F. Shafroth, USN; Deputy Commander, The capture of the Green Islands Group in Maj-Gen C. F. B. Price, US Marine Corps; Commanding General, Samoan Defence Force, 1942–44.
Repeated to General Barrowclough through the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff representative at South Pacific Force headquarters (Colonel Salmon).
As you will have been advised from During January and February Mr Nash had discussions in Maintenance of 2nd New Zealand Division; the Replacement Scheme (Nos. 359, 362, 366–8, 370, 372–5). These messages should be read in conjunction with this section.
‘The essential minimum requirement of additional manpower for farms, dairy factories and freezing works is 10,650, made up as follows:
It will, however, not be possible to utilise these men unless accommodation is also provided, and it is estimated that the minimum number required for rural housing and ancillary occupations is
‘It is estimated that 7000 of these men can be absorbed at once. In any event, unless that number is available as from 1 July, the commencement of the season, it will not be possible for essential farming operations to commence. The remainder of the men could be absorbed at the rate of
‘In addition to those required for agricultural production, other essential occupations are seriously handicapped by the lack of men, and unless the labour force in certain of these industries is augmented the efforts to increase farm production will be largely nullified. For instance, unless more coal can be produced it will not be possible to move fertilisers or the actual produce, and unless staff are returned to the railways it will not be possible to provide the additional rolling stock required. Similarly, unless certain essential hydro-electric developments in the
‘The total number of men required from the armed forces over and above those now being directed from less essential to essential industries is therefore 17,500.
‘The New Zealand Government agree that the time of withdrawal of any troops in the forward areas must be dependent on strategic considerations. They would, however, point out that as the major portion of the 3rd Division have been serving under tropical conditions for nearly three years, and most of the men have been in forward areas since
The New Zealand Government have also advised the Combined Chiefs of Staff that they are anxious to discuss the whole matter with you at the earliest possible date, and it would be appreciated if you or your representative could find it possible to visit New Zealand for the purpose of examining these matters with the Government, or if that is not practicable at the present moment the Ministers concerned could fly to your headquarters.
I would be most grateful for an early reply.
1. With reference to my telegram to Admiral Halsey, repeated to you through Colonel Salmon, the Government have found it necessary to raise with the highest
2. Both the
‘Turning to the force of two brigade groups which has been taking part in operations in the Solomon Islands, apart from the fact that operations in this theatre are of secondary importance compared with those in which the New Zealand Division in
3. The text of the United States Chiefs of Staff's comments are as follows:
‘Reference OZ 995. The British Chiefs of Staff's memorandum of 23 February. See Vol. II, No. 375. CCS 499 was a memorandum dated
The New Zealand Government should be requested to furnish the Combined Chiefs of Staff with definite figures on the number of men required to be withdrawn from the armed forces for the purposes indicated.
Such withdrawals should be made from the New Zealand Army forces in the South-West Pacific considered as a whole rather than limiting consideration solely to the 3rd New Zealand Division. The New Zealand Government and the Commander
The withdrawals should not be made prior to the completion of These were the code-names for operations against forearm and mercantile
4. The whole question is being discussed by Parliament in secret session and with farmers' organisations, who are being asked to institute a new production programme based on the release of men from the Armed Forces referred to in my message to Admiral Halsey. I have learned from General Puttick of comsopac's plans for the future employment of the 3rd Division, but before consenting to such use we must know that the actions contemplated will not interfere with the need for having the proportion of the men most urgently required back in New Zealand for the beginning of the production year next July. I would be grateful for your immediate comments on these points.
I have received your most secret and personal telegram of 10 March and also General Puttick's similar message [No. 417]. This message was sent by Mr Fraser, not General Puttick.
All here will deeply regret the decision on the temporary withdrawal of the 3rd New Zealand Division but all will understand that this development was inevitable. The disappointment is largely relieved by the indications you have given of the possible resurrection of a new and complete 3rd New Zealand Division in
Firstly, the overriding requirements of 7000 men ready for work early in July will, I consider, make it impossible for us to fulfil the role of area reserve for forearm, and Halsey should be so advised at the earliest possible [date] to enable him to make other plans. An important factor will be the time required in a non-malarious area before disbanding the troops in New Zealand. The omission of this precaution is likely to result in a considerable incidence of malaria after the troops have been added to industry.
Secondly, I think, however, a scheme could be devised whereby we could fulfil until 30 April our present not unimportant roles in developing and holding operational bases in the Treasury and mercantile and forearm positions. Possibly
The scheme is dependent on the availability of shipping, which probably is not an insuperable difficulty, and also on the question whether Halsey would desire that we continue in that capacity. Would you wish me to attend the proposed conference with Halsey? If yes, request advise place and time of rendezvous and sufficient warning to enable me to obtain permission to leave temporarily my present command.
Reference your telegram of 10 March [No. 417]. Comsopac has received preliminary advices but is awaiting papers mailed on 6 March, due here within one week. In the meantime General Harmon is preparing tentative plans to meet your requirements and will be asking General Barrowclough at some near date to come here to discuss them. Admiral Halsey is cognisant of the New Zealand situation, and as he may be absent it is felt there is no necessity for a Minister to come here, but the Admiral's representative may proceed to New Zealand. This message has been repeated to General Barrowclough for his information.
Your message of 11 March [No. 419].
Thank you for your most helpful comments. We had hoped that you would be able to attend the conference with Halsey or his representative and would be glad if you could arrange accordingly. We will arrange for Salmon to advise you regarding date and place, which will probably be in
Your telegram of 13 March. No. 421 was sent through the Army Department.
Harmon saw me today. He indicated that Halsey saw no objection to the withdrawal of men from my Division, even though it precluded us from fulfilling the reserve role. It was agreed that the method of return was merely a question of arranging shipping. Harmon thought I should return to New Zealand for consultation and then submit a plan to him for the Commander-in-Chief for the necessary personnel. Harmon is to signal me shortly if Halsey approves of my temporary absence from
Reference your G. Not published. Requested information regarding the conversations with Admiral Halsey's representative referred to in No. 420. These proposals are not published.Comgensopac is extremely reluctant to lose the New Zealanders with their invaluable
1. I write to report the result of my visit to New Zealand and my interview with General Barrowclough had discussions with
2. After my conference with Admiral Newton Vice-Admiral J. H. Newton, USN; Deputy Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet and Maj-General A. J. Barnett, Not published.
3. The War Cabinet accepted this memorandum in its entirety and instructed me to negotiate with the American Commander of the South Pacific with a view to implementing it in such a way as to cause the least inconvenience to Admiral Halsey's plans. I am now conducting a survey of the industrial classes in this Division and hope, within about a week's time, to be able to submit lists showing the number of men to be returned to New Zealand, the stations from which they would be withdrawn and the approximate dates when their return would be the most acceptable to New Zealand. It is realised that it may not be practicable to provide the shipping exactly on the desired dates but I propose to send a responsible staff officer to
4. I understand it to be acceptable to you that we should reduce our strength in
Minister of Defence
It is recommended:
That in accordance with approval expressed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and in view of local tactical considerations, subject to the agreement of the Commander,
That arrangements be made in the meantime for the return of 12,000 men to New Zealand from the 3rd Division for direction to and employment in essential industry as follows:
That the men be returned to New Zealand in batches commencing at the earliest possible date and extending over the period up to
That in order to facilitate the selection of men for return to New Zealand a survey be made of the men in the Division, particulars to be obtained in respect of each man to include full details of past employment history, and whether prepared to volunteer for work in any one or more of the industries specified in (b) above.
That details regarding the above survey and the return of men to New Zealand be mutually arranged between the Army Department and the Not published.
That men who are to be returned to New Zealand will be informed in writing by the
That men who are found unsuitable for work in industries stated in paragraph (b), or who refuse to undertake such work on return to New Zealand, be re-mobilized.
That a nucleus Divisional organization be retained to enable a reorganized Division to be formed for operations in the
That the nucleus divisional organization will be responsible for:
Training of men in jungle and islands warfare to complete the formation of a reorganized Division.
Maintenance of the base organization in
Care and maintenance of equipment and installations throughout the area.
That in the meantime units will operate in gradually reducing strengths and will remain at present stations until so far reduced that it is undesirable to retain them there any longer or they are relieved for some other reason.
That as units are brought down to cadre basis they should be withdrawn to
That men who are retained as part of the nucleus divisional organization will be given a period of 28 days' leave in New Zealand with full pay—time when leave will be given will be decided in the discretion of the General Officer Commanding.
In War Cabinet,
I have the honour to write to you regarding a recent development which may have an important bearing on the question of leave for members of this Force, and on the question of the manner in which drafts returning to industry should be handled.
2Correspondence between General Barrowclough and Army Headquarters and between the General and the Prime Minister (or acting Prime Minister) in the period April – June 1944 was largely concerned with details of the release and return of men of 2nd NZEF IP for employment in New Zealand. These letters have not been reproduced in this volume.
A few days ago I received advice through Army Headquarters that This change in command was announced on 15 June.Wahine. I therefore came down to
The Admiral told me that he was quite agreeable that leave should now be taken, provided of course that I had the approval of the
It was whilst we were discussing this aspect of the matter that the Admiral told me that he was preparing a recommendation that the whole Force (or rather the remnants of it) should be maintained in New Zealand rather than in
Admiral Newton added that he did not wish it to be thought that they wanted to get rid of the 3rd New Zealand Division. He said he was sure that if it were reconstituted Admirals Halsey and Nimitz would be delighted to have us back again. He also pointed out that he could not estimate at present when shipping would be available to transport our ammunition and equipment.
This proposal is of course at variance with
The Admiral said that it might be preferable if the proposal for the recall of the Force came from New Zealand. I did not gather that this was a fully considered observation, and I made no response to it, as I had no means of knowing your views upon the subject, and indeed I thought you would not wish to act upon such a vague suggestion, at all events until future policy had been decided in the light of the Prime Minister's conversations in England.
The fact that the temporary recall of this Force is a possibility will no doubt have important repercussions. It is obvious that over here I shall have to keep down to a minimum any camp installations that cannot readily be moved. In New Zealand it may be necessary to maintain camps which otherwise might have been pulled down.
The implications for New Zealand of Admiral Newton's proposals will be more apparent to you than they can be to me. I am sending over to
I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 30 June, which was delivered to me by Lieutenant-Colonel Bennett, and to thank you for informing me of the discussions which have taken place between Admiral Newton and yourself concerning the provision of shipping to enable personnel of the Division to proceed on leave to New Zealand, and the location of the nucleus Divisional organisation.
I note that Admiral Newton proposes that the cadre organisation should be maintained in New Zealand rather than in
I recognise that any such proposal would involve difficulties, not the least of which will be the provision in New Zealand of the necessary facilities to enable the forces to be maintained and trained in
If, in the interim, you should learn of any further proposals on the subject, I shall be very glad if you will inform me of them.
For Admiral Newton from Brigadier General Puttick had accompanied Mr Fraser overseas.
General Barrowclough has reported the purport of your recent conversation with him regarding the location of the 3rd New Zealand Division in the immediate future. It is understood that several additional formations of The withdrawal of 2nd NZEF IP to New Zealand was subsequently approved by Admiral Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief Pacific Ocean Area.
Mr Fraser had returned to New Zealand on 18 July.
Sir,
In compliance with the policy decided on by
My previous report of No. 406.
The forces assigned for the operation consisted of 3rd NZ Division (less
Before the operation could be planned in any detail it was necessary to obtain a great deal of information regarding the landing beaches, depth of water in the lagoon, nature of the entrances thereto and a host of other matters. It would have been extremely hazardous to attempt to beach and unload the large initial convoy without some precise knowledge of the conditions likely to be encountered. It was therefore decided to make a preliminary reconnaissance in force. No one overlooked the fact that such a reconnaissance would forewarn the enemy of our intentions, but the advantages to be gained from it so far outweighed the disadvantages that no hesitation was felt in putting it into operation. The 30th NZ Battalion was detailed for the task and was accompanied on its mission by selected officers representing the Hydrographic, Air, Landing Craft, Intelligence, Communications and Engineer services. Lt-Col Cornwall Lt-Col F. C. Cornwall, MC, Legion of Merit (US); CO
This raiding party was carried to
It was now possible to finalize and settle all details of the plan for the seizure and occupation of the atoll. The plan conformed in all essentials to the Transport Doctrine with which we had long become familiar, and needs no elaboration except that I should pay a tribute to the splendid work of the staff in working out the enormous detail that is involved in every amphibious operation. Thanks to their skill and tireless efforts the embarkation of the first flight was effected without a hitch and the whole expedition got away in first class order. Whilst at sea the overall command was in the capable hands of Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, USN, who had had charge of both of our previous operations and for whom we all had the highest possible regard. The large convoy started from Lunga Point on
Just before dawn on 15 February the leading ships of the convoy made out the dim low-lying shores of
Complete plans had been made to support the initial landings with heavy fire from the guns of the supporting destroyers and by dive-bombing attacks. This fire was not needed, however, and was not used. The leading waves of boats hit the shore without the slightest opposition on all three landing beaches, and though on one beach a subsequent wave came under fire for a short time it was not long before the enemy post was liquidated and the rest of the landing operations
Vice-Admiral A. W. Fitch, USN; Commander Aircraft, South Pacific Force, Sep 1942 – Apr 1944; appointed to command combined air forces of Army, Navy, Marines and Australian Air Force in South Pacific,
But though the skies were denuded of Japanese aircraft, Japanese soldiers still lurked in the jungle. The infantry pushing out from the immediate perimeter of the beachheads were to encounter isolated Japanese detachments, all of whom withdrew steadily before us. We located two enemy barges and some enemy personnel on Sirot Island and these were heavily shelled; but nowhere did we encounter any serious opposition. By nightfall every gun and vehicle, every single round of ammunition, every item of equipment had been unloaded and the whole convoy had safely retired, leaving us in well established positions on the atoll. Field and anti-aircraft guns had been emplaced, radars were already installed and in operation and defensive positions were manned. The huge administrative tasks were well in hand. During the night we were twice raided by enemy bombers but they caused neither casualties nor damage to the invading force though four natives were wounded, one of them quite seriously. Thanks to the prompt installation of the radars we were able to direct our night fighters on to the enemy bombers and two of them were shot down without loss to ourselves.
During the next four days our infantry were gradually combing the jungle and driving the Japs into one area. On Sirot Island after a very sharp engagement in which we lost five killed and four wounded we succeeded in destroying twenty-one Japs—the entire party. It was a desperate fight—the Japs were cornered and fought till the last man had been killed. Elsewhere there were minor patrol clashes in all of which we were successful. On 20 February (five days after the landing) the most serious engagement took place. It was supported by four of our Valentine tanks and the enemy, who was in a strong position amongst large boulders of very hard coral, fought as usual till the last man had been killed. On this small but bloody battlefield we counted seventy mangled bodies piled one on top of another in a most revolting confusion. Never in my experience have I encountered such a concentrated spectacle of carnage as was presented here. Our casualties were relatively very light. Only a few of our troops were engaged but they behaved with great gallantry. This was the first occasion in which our tanks were in operation in dense jungle and they played their part
Though it was prosaic enough it was nevertheless a great undertaking. Speed in the development of the airfields and of the naval base facilities was the most important factor and from the very first night work proceeded all round the clock. Flood lights had been included in the equipment carried with the first flight, and from D day onwards United States Naval Construction Battalions.
This whole-hearted enthusiasm could not be denied its inevitable reward. On 6 March the Fighter Strip was opened—fourteen days ahead of schedule—and moreover the strip was built to a length of 5000 feet whereas the Master Plan required only 3250 feet. This acceleration of the programme and the provision of a longer runway than was originally specified was to prove of great assistance to our air effort in the whole theatre. The Japanese began an assault on the airfields at
With the completion of the airfields and their ancillary services we were able to devote a little more time to the improvement of living conditions for the troops on the island and the development of roads. The United States Service of Supply brought forward and installed refrigerating machinery and it now became possible to obtain occasional supplies of fresh meat and vegetables. The change in diet was most welcome. So were the arrival of a cargo of beer and the provision of picture shows. Life began to assume a more normal routine. The landing of American troops in
On 21 March I left
By the beginning of May we had received word of Maj-Gen R. G. Lehman, comsopac's intention to relieve the whole Division—it having completed the usual period in an operational area. On 11 May I had a visit from General
From time to time the Division has received many congratulatory messages from the American leaders under whose command it has been operating. I have already submitted to you, through Army HQ in New Zealand, the names of many officers and men whose conduct appeared to me to warrant special recognition and I was glad to learn that all of these recommendations had met with your approval and had subsequently been granted by His Majesty the King. More recently I forwarded through the same channel a list of American officers to whom I considered British awards might appropriately be made. I hope that these recommendations may meet with your approval. I am informed by HQ, usafispa that General Harmon has recommended certain officers of my Force for American decorations.
All such awards are limited in their allocation and representative in their nature. Of necessity they go to those few whose work happens to come most prominently under official recognition. You will be gratified to know, however, that all the members of your 3rd Division and of its Base organisations have acquitted themselves throughout in a manner which does credit to the country from which they come. As their Commander I am eternally indebted to them for the courage,
About the middle of July, Admiral Newton, who had succeeded Admiral Halsey in the command of the
Your 3rd Division is now in a very unenviable position. It is limping home depleted in numbers, discouraged by the many successive blows that Fate has dealt it and weary from the long periods of strenuous and unexciting work in tropical climates. It is but a fraction of its former self. But I do not believe for one moment that its spirit is broken. There remains a small but loyal nucleus upon which I am confident a new Pacific Division could be built. All it needs is some encouragement from an official source—some assurance that in the not too distant future it will once again become a fighting formation and be permitted to take part in the War against
I have the honour to be, Sir,
I have the honour to report that I have now returned to New Zealand, and that I have opened my Headquarters in the Auckland District.
By far the greater proportion of the personnel of my Force has now reached this country, and I have left Brigadier Dove, my Base Commandant, to supervise the shipment of such equipment as is still in
I shall be glad to receive further instructions regarding the future of my Force as soon as you are in a position to give them. I have written to General Puttick suggesting that it might be advisable for me to come to This letter is not published.
I have to acknowledge and thank you for your letter of 23 August, in which you inform me that you have now returned to New Zealand and that you have opened your Headquarters in the Auckland District.
I note also the arrangements for the completion of the transfer of your force back to this country.
I regret that it has not been possible for any final decision to be taken regarding the use of the two Divisions. Even in the short period since I saw you there have been developments which have necessitated a complete reorientation of views.
I must, therefore, have further discussions with my colleagues within the next two or three days before I can give you any indication as to
I will advise you as to the earliest date upon which you should come to
Mr
1. That 2nd New Zealand Division should not at this stage be withdrawn from the Italian theatre.
2. That after 2nd New Zealand Division has finished its work in
3. After completion of its task in A table attached to this recommendation is not reproduced. It contained estimates of the numbers of men in the 2nd Division to be replaced and of the replacements available in New Zealand from various sources.
4. Members and ex-members of the 3rd Division in the same categories as above will be liable when called on for overseas service.
5. If this scheme is adopted it will result in the gradual transfer of 3rd Division men and new recruits to the
6. The time involved in effecting the replacement of personnel will depend on the employment of the Division and the availability of shipping, which will regulate the release of troops by
7. This scheme should satisfy the popular demand for the return of the 2nd Division when the fighting in
wellington
pefra No. 4
… For the rest of the text see Proposals for Participation in Operations against Japan, No. 439.
See No. 426.
We have delayed taking a final decision with regard to the disposition of our land forces overseas, firstly, because we were reluctant to take our 2nd Division out of action in the European theatre unless we had some firm indication that New Zealand troops would be required in the In a telegram to Mr Fraser on 25 August Mr Churchill reported briefly on his visit to the Division in
Hon. Minister of Defence
Recommended:
That the 2nd Division be maintained and its future employment be reviewed after the conclusion of the Italian campaign.
That the question of participation of New Zealand land forces in the war against
That the cadres of the 3rd Division be disbanded and the personnel be made available for service with the 2nd Division.
That long-service personnel in the 2nd Division, namely, men of the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th Reinforcements, be replaced from the existing pool in New Zealand, including the residue of the 3rd Division, those temporarily released to industry from that Division, Grade A men held on appeal, and all others liable for military service.
(Note: It is not intended that the call-up for overseas service should include men over 36 years of age, men with three or more children, or those who have had three years or more overseas service.)
That, subject to The text of a statement in Parliament by the Prime Minister on 21 September appears in Documents, Vol. II, No. 395. General Barrowclough's proposals for the future employment of 3rd Division officers, warrant officers and NCOs are contained in Vol. II, No. 396.
Approved by
The greater part of 2 NZEF IP has now been dispersed in one way or another and the 3rd New Zealand Division Headquarters will
I want to tell you how proud I have been of the Division and the whole of its Base organisation. It was not my privilege to command the Force from its inception nor to have any part in its initial training. It was my good fortune to command it when the supreme test of battle tried out the value of that initial training and I am eternally indebted to Generals Cunningham and Mead and to all of you for the fine spirit and stern discipline which was so manifestly engendered in the early days of your existence. A commander owes everything to his troops. His own reputation depends so utterly and entirely on their behaviour in action. I very gratefully acknowledge your courage and devotion to duty and the uniformly high standards you established in the performance of every task it was my duty to call upon you to peform.
For most of you the war is not yet over and your services may be required in another theatre. It is a matter for regret that this further service will not be with the Division nor with the units for which we have so warm a love and regard. This is as inevitable as it is regretful. I know, however, that you are qualified to take your place in any formation to which you may be posted and that you will serve therein with credit to yourselves and to your new units. My own interest in ex-members of 3rd NZ Division and its ancillary services will never wane and I shall regard it as my pleasing duty to further your interests in any way I can. I wish you the best of good fortune—for the rest of the war and afterwards.
pefraNo. 3.
While I was in
The whole question of Far Eastern strategy is still under consideration here. I have summoned Admiral Mountbatten Admiral of the Fleet Earl Mountbatten, KG, PC, GCB, GCSI, GCIE, GCVO, DSO; Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia, 1943–46; Viceroy of
Repeated to the Prime Minister of New Zealand.
winchNo. 3.
Your Not published. johcu 78 and 81. johcu was the code-name for telegrams from the Prime Minister of pefra No. 3.
I am repeating for your private information the following telegram despatched by the Chiefs of Staff to
‘1. As agreed at the SEXTANT Code-name for the first conference at Between President Roosevelt and Mr Churchill, 14–24 Jan 1943.
‘2. Several important developments have taken place since the SEXTANT Conference:
The advance of the
The Japanese have strongly reinforced
The capture of Myitkyina rules out, as was always foreseen, any purely defensive policy in North Burma.
The likelihood of aggressive action by the
The progress of the war against
We now have overwhelming air superiority in the South-East Asia theatre.
‘The following paragraphs contain our proposals in the light of the above developments:
‘3. The present directive to the
‘4. Admiral Mountbatten has put forward two plans. The first plan (CHAMPION) is to continue to engage the Japanese in North Burma. This, in our opinion, will merely lead to a continuation of the present unsatisfactory state of affairs, and we feel bound to reject it.
‘5. The second plan (VANGUARD) put forward by Admiral Mount-batten is to capture
‘6. The capture of
‘7. Until such time as the
‘8. The bulk of the necessary resources for Gen A. C. Wedemeyer,
‘9. We are now building up a strong fleet in the Bay of Bengal, the bulk of which, including our newest battleships, will not be required for the operations outlined above in the South-East Asia theatre. It is our desire, in accordance with His Majesty's Government's policy, that this fleet should play its full part at the earliest possible moment in the main operations against
‘10. If for any reason the United States Chiefs of Staff are unable to accept the support of a British fleet in the main operations (which is our distinct preference) we should be willing to discuss an alternative. The suggestion we would make in this event is the formation of a British Empire task force under a British commander, consisting of British, Australian and New Zealand land, sea and air forces, to operate in the South-West Pacific theatre under General MacArthur's supreme command. This alternative, if decided upon, would still enable the British Fleet to be well placed to reinforce the United States Pacific Fleet if this should later be desired.
‘11. We ask for an early expression of the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff on all the above proposals. The urgency is dictated by the need to work out as soon as possible the logistic problems involved, including the development of the necessary base facilities.’
The reactions of the United States Chiefs of Staff have not yet been received. This will let you see how matters stand at present.
pefraNo. 4.
Thank you for making available to us your message to Mr Curtin, winch No. 3, the implications of which are of immediate concern to New Zealand.
You are well aware of the problem we face in regard to our two divisions, and I appreciate the ready acceptance given by yourself and the Chiefs of Staff to the general understanding that our 2nd Division should return from See Withdrawal of 2nd NZEF IP, No. 433, for this portion of the text.
From the tentative plans being discussed while I was in
This continued lack of certainty as to the probable future use of our men, and the rapidly changing circumstances in
In view of its bearing on the future participation of New Zealand troops in the war, I would be glad to have at the earliest possible opportunity the decision of His Majesty's Government in the
Code-name for the second Quebec Conference between Mr Churchill and President Roosevelt on 11–16 September. See also Vol. II, p. 361. Paragraphs 2 and 3 dealing with the Allied plans for North-West Europe and winchNo. 4. I send you herewith for your personal information a summary of the major operational decisions reached at OCTAGON
4. War against Japan. The over-all objective is to force the unconditional surrender of
Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength;
Ultimately invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of
5. Pacific Area. One of our greatest difficulties has been to find room and opportunity for deploying the massive forces which the British Empire and Commonwealth of Nations are ardent to engage against the enemy.
6. The Allied superiority in naval and air power is to be exploited to the full, and costly land campaigns will be avoided as far as possible. Unremitting submarine warfare against enemy shipping will be continued. Very-long-range bomber operations against
7. So far as British Empire participation is concerned, it has been agreed that the British Fleet will participate in the main operations against
8. In view of the fact that the Americans have given us our first choice (see paragraph 9 of my No. 438.winch No. 3)
9. Not published. This telegram advised that DRACULA was the code-name for the capture of Operations in South-East Asia. Our immediate object is the destruction or expulsion of all Japanese forces in
10. Re-deployment after end of War in Europe. The whole problem of re-deployment of forces after the end of the war in
11. Duration of War against Japan. For the purpose of planning production and allocation of manpower it has been agreed that the end of the Japanese war should be set at eighteen months after the defeat of
winchNo. 1.
1. Our plans for the prosecution of the war against
2. The considerations you advanced in your message to me, PEFRA No. 4 of
3. If, as I believe, the
To operate in
To return to New Zealand and, thereafter, possibly to be re-formed for operations in the
4. We should, of course, rejoice in the accession of your Division to the Commonwealth forces operating in
5. We do not know yet what tasks the United States Chiefs of Staff will allot to the Australian forces after the completion of the
6. I hope, therefore, that when you have had an opportunity to weigh carefully the factors involved, you will decide once again to keep your Division alongside ours to the end. Anyhow, God bless you all. On 3 February
Mr Fraser was in
1. Government and War Cabinets discussed yesterday the question of the contribution we might make, on the conclusion of hostilities in
2. We are agreed, in view of our position as a An agreement on
3. It is clear that we cannot maintain our present military commitments after the end of this year. The general conclusion reached yesterday was that, having regard to our potential and our commitments for the production of essential goods, advice should be sought on the strength and balance of our forces, particularly Army and Air. The Combined Chiefs of Staff are the logical authorities to consider this since they have full information of all resources and all requirements. But the
4. Notwithstanding the limited information available to us we did attempt some assessment of the form that our contribution in armed forces might take, and on the assumption that hostilities in
Army:
5. On the assumption that our air effort is maintained at nineteen squadrons (but see paragraph 14) and the naval contribution continues, we consider that New Zealand could provide, and maintain during
6. The force of 15,000 men can be secured as follows:
From the remaining 11th to 14th Reinforcement personnel, which at present total 11,500 but, allowing 2500 for wastage this year, will be reduced to 9000.
From the 15th and 16th Reinforcements 6500, with wastage 500, making a total at the end of this year of 15,000.
7. It is considered that only men in the present categories for Army service overseas should serve with the force, and that none over 35 years or with more than two children should be employed. The general opinion expressed is that the force should, with the exceptions mentioned, be built up from personnel who have served not more than two years overseas, and that the present rule of return to New Zealand on completion of three years' overseas service should be maintained.
8. The estimated annual reinforcement for this force is 5000. There is no difficulty in finding this number for
9. Puttick has emphasised the disadvantages of a two-brigade force. It is suggested that the
10. The theatre of employment was discussed. Our preference is that the force function under British command in South-East Asia or with the Australians.
11. No final conclusion was reached regarding the place where the force should be reorganised. There are advantages and disadvantages in the case of both the
Navy:
12. The present annual naval commitment is 770 men, but the Navy ask, and we are disposed to agree, that this be increased to 1100 to permit the replacement of men with four or more years' service.
Air:
13. The present annual intake is 5400 men, of whom 2700 come from Army overseas categories. This is on the basis of continuing the present nineteen squadron plan. In the case of New Zealand personnel serving with the
14. Reference is made in paragraph 3 to the balance between Army and Air. If the Air commitment were reduced there would be little if any direct advantage accruing to the land force, although the skilled ground personnel should increase the capacity of the engineering trades in New Zealand and contribute to the release of Grade A men held on appeal.
15. It is suggested, if you agree with the proposals outlined above, that the position be discussed with the
16. Please see succeeding message on general political issues.
My telegram [No. 442].
The general political issues involved in the proposals contained in my telegram were discussed generally in both Government and War Cabinets. On the place for the reorganisation of the land force, opinion was divided. The sentiment of both the men and their relatives would certainly be that it should be done here, particularly since it will be six months or more before the force can be ready for operations. If, however, the men return home, it is doubtful whether a force would ever become available at all. There would be pressure for the release of men and for the limitation of categories. There would be losses through questionable medical boardings, although we could take some measures to limit this. There would be incidents if men refused to proceed overseas. Shipping difficulties would certainly cause serious delays to the despatch of the force, assuming one could be marshalled, and it would be nearer to
2. Reorganisation overseas would certainly cause disappointment to men and relatives alike. There may even be incidents, but discipline overseas can be more effective and the men more readily controlled. Moreover, training can be done with greater expedition and effect. A decision to adopt this course, particularly if it is announced at the same time that the force is limited in size, that no man over 35 years or with more than two children, and only men of two years' or less service will be employed, should prove generally acceptable. It would be clear that our action was consistent and fair to all men. It would mean that we had a force and that it was available on the earliest date for operations.
3. Caucus, while favouring return to New Zealand for reorganisation, would, I feel, in the light of our detailed proposals as to size and general qualifications for service, acquiesce in the general view of the Government and War Cabinets that the force should be reorganised overseas. We all agree that decisions as to our future course of action should be taken as soon as practicable and that they should then be communicated fully and frankly to the men and the public. There will be growls and complaints, but we shall have to meet these.
4. The area where the force might operate was discussed, and we all feel it would be more satisfactory as to command and otherwise if it served either under British command or with the Australians. We have no information as to the likely roles and cannot therefore assess which would be preferred. The United Kingdom authorities may be able to give you some information on which a decision could be taken.
5. There are strong reasons in favour of the force operating with the Australians. They are our nearest neighbours. We are close politically and will continue to be. It would renew and fortify the traditions and spirit of Anzac. There is, however, some doubt, and this particularly because of the fact that the force will not be more than two-brigade strength, whether we are likely to get the most effective employment for our force with the Australians. We have experience of operations with British units which have already been satisfactory.
6. It is of course not possible to carry the matter further until we have some appreciation of likely employment.
7. There is also the question of command. We would consider
The following telegram is being sent to the Prime Minister:
[Text of telegram No. 442 of
We should much appreciate any comments you might wish to make and should be grateful if these could be telegraphed to the Prime Minister in
Repeated to Mr Fraser in
1. Your cable of 8 April arrived eight hours before our offensive This was the 2nd Division's final offensive in
2. In considering this problem I have accepted your figure of 15,000 as a basis upon which to calculate, but feel that owing to the inclusion of the 3rd Division in recent drafts the numbers will be much lower.
3. Dealing with your figures, I assume you have made allowance for the fact that the 14th Reinforcements contained some 1000 men ex-3rd Division. Presumably the 15th and 16th Reinforcements will also include at least some hundreds. These men will qualify for replacement before the rest of their draft. While, therefore, 2500 is a generous figure for wastage for normal casualties for the 11th to 14th Reinforcements, 500 seems too low for the 15th and 16th if 3rd Division personnel are to be excluded. Altogether, it appears doubtful if the total of 15,000 will in fact be attained. A safe figure would be nearer 13,000.
4. No allowance appears to be made for Base and Line of Communication troops. The standard of our Base services at present is high and, if the need arose, could be reduced, but it will then be appreciated that we would have to accept a lower standard of overseas training and of medical, ordnance, dental and welfare services than hitherto. We could do with two General Hospitals instead of three, but even with these reductions it is doubtful if the figure for Line of Communication units can be brought much below 3000. The high standard of efficiency and contentment of the NZEF has been the result of New Zealanders fighting together with a force big enough to look after itself, and with Base and Line of Communication services that looked after our health and welfare. This has been necessary in the
5. In the foregoing calculations, no allowance has been made for sickness. At the present time we have a steady 5 per cent always in hospital. The chances are that in a tropical theatre the sickness rate would rise. Five per cent for the proposed 15,000 gives a sickness figure of about 750, and this figure may well rise to double.
6. The result of deducting 3000 Line of Communication, 1000 permanently sick in hospital, and 1000 3rd Division men in the 15th and 16th Reinforcements would appear to reduce at the outset the fighting force in the field to 10,000. These figures are borne out by experience over the last five years, as on the present organisation and standard of service to troops, 30,000 are required to maintain the existing Division of 19,000.
7. If you agree that, after deduction for Line of Communication, etc., the figure would be 10,000 all ranks, then this is no more than enough for
8. The problem of the organisation of a full-strength division requires very careful consideration to achieve the correct balance between infantry and supporting arms. The war establishment of a present
Your telegram of 7 April [No. 442].
I have today had talks with Field Marshal Brooke and Air Vice-Marshal Saunders. Chief of the Imperial General Staff and Director-General of Postings at the
If it should be decided that land forces cannot be made available, it would no doubt be advisable to increase the air effort. In that event I think the air policy indicated in your telegram [No. 442] is as good a one as we can devise, but if a new division is to be formed then obviously we must save every man that we possibly can, and air and naval commitments must be re-examined and readjustments made accordingly. Saunders, who is now in charge of postings on the personnel side, explained the difficulties which are confronting the
Saunders stated quite frankly that the difficulty was not so much one of manpower as the desire to obtain New Zealanders, who have proved themselves to be of outstanding merit. I can only say that the final decision must be made in New Zealand when consideration has been given to the future deployment of our land forces.
There has been some discussion in various quarters about our men going to A personal reference is omitted.
Public opinion is not rigid on the issues. At the ceremony in connection with the cessation of hostilities the references to carrying on against See p. 475, note 2.
You will have seen See Vol. II, Return of 2nd Division to New Zealand, No. 462.
… For text omitted see Vol. II, No. 464. See Vol. II, End of Campaign in Italy, No. 443.
Further, as your Commander I know what a wise decision it was to give me wide powers in the event of a crisis. Your Commander has always been in a very strong position and, since equipment has been available, he has had a strong force capable of defending itself, with adequate powers to influence not only tactics but often policy. These powers helped me in
I still feel that defeating the main Japanese army will not be as difficult as it was to defeat the Germans. That being so, it is justifiable to embark upon the campaign in the
If it is
The numbers in the
One thousand three hundred and fifty all ranks would therefore be immediately available for reinforcements for
Although the New Zealand War Cabinet would be safe in deciding the new policy on these figures, if you decide in favour of keeping a division overseas I would like to get an expression of opinion from
Lastly, I want to make it quite clear that I am not putting forward any opinion as to whether New Zealand should or should not send a force. I do not know the facts and I realise it is not within my province to do so. All I have done is, in the light of my experience as your Commander, to give a military appreciation of the situation as a basis for your consideration.
Repeated to the acting Prime Minister.
Your telegram No. 11 of 8 May. Not published. In this telegram to Brigadier Park the Prime Minister asked what was the position regarding the Chiefs of Staff appreciation and requested that it be repeated to the acting Prime Minister in
The following appreciation concerning the future employment of the 2nd New Zealand Division is forwarded by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and dated 18 May:
‘1. In the war against
Operations against the mainland of
Operations into
Operations in the South-West Pacific area in the main Dutch islands of the East Indies.
Operations into the lesser islands of the East Indies, the completion of clearance of the Japanese from the islands around
‘2. New Zealand was one of the countries most closely threatened by the advance of the Japanese in 1945–43. As a
‘3. There are important and arduous campaigns ahead of the
‘4. Assuming that the 2nd New Zealand Division is to take part in operations in the
‘5. If it should later prove possible for a British land force to take part in the assault on
‘6. The New Zealand forces under Field Marshal Alexander Field Marshal Earl Alexander, KG, PC, GCB, GCMG, CSI, DSO, MC; Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre, 1944–45.
‘7. Conclusion. The 2nd New Zealand Division, reduced to two-brigade strength and backed by a reasonable administrative tail, could be used most effectively against the Japanese in
I am repeating to you in my immediately following telegram the text of the appreciation concerning the future employment of the 2nd Division, forwarded by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff under date 18 May and telegraphed to us by Brigadier Park and to the Prime Minister.
We are grateful for your message of 15 May [No. 448], but will defer consideration of the whole position until you let us have such comments as you might wish to make on the appreciation, and which I should be grateful if you would repeat to the Prime Minister.
Repeated to Mr Fraser and General Puttick.
Reference your telegram of 23 May.
I have read the Chief of the Imperial General Staff's appreciation most carefully, and in view of See Vol. II, No. 415.
In the
Dealing with the
I agree that the New Zealand Division should, if possible, work with British forces. Our limited experience of fighting with the Americans shows that difficulties do occur, mostly from an organisation, equipment and training point of view.
I agree that
I am not in any position to assess the difficulties which will face the
If for any reasons the Government decide to return the force to New Zealand before committing it to another theatre, a readjustment to the policy of replacement will be advisable. The sending of long-service men home first will be in conflict with the need for speed in reorganisation. It would seem advisable to take the force home in existing units made up of short-service personnel, the long-service personnel who would not have any further service coming later.
It is possible that there will be a number of changes in organisation for a
Although I fully appreciate the manpower difficulties, I urge you against the two-brigade division. I also feel that we should have our own small armoured unit and our own rearward services. We have had experience of these matters in the past, and my opinion is formed after long experience.
The result of the recent conversion of your Division from two infantry brigades to three is shown by our recent successes. At one stage, moreover, we had to be given a fourth infantry brigade to help relieve the strain on the overworked infantry.
Tactically, a two-brigade division forces a commander to fight on a narrow front without reserves, which increases casualties and minimises success. It really amounts to attempting to achieve with six infantry battalions what others do with nine. In the
I would counsel against dispensing with our armoured component and relying on
The use of
The Division we have at the present time is excellently balanced for war here in
In my telegram of 15 May [No. 448] I suggested a possible organisation for economising on manpower. I believe the proposals to be practical and I believe it to be the smallest force that should be committed. I feel that given this organisation, together with 5000 reinforcements, and provided we have no epidemics, we could fight through
To sum up my views on the Chief of the Imperial General Staff's appreciation:
It appears certain that the British Government would welcome any force that the
Time is important and the early arrival of a New Zealand Division will help the British war effort.
It is better to link up with British forces than with the Americans.
If
I urge against sending a two-brigade division. The organisation I have suggested in my telegram of 15 May is what I consider the smallest and best organisation. Before any decision in detail is made, however,
Provided a fair replacement scheme is implemented, the decision to go to
If a two-brigade division is decided upon there will be no difficulty in carrying out the necessary reorganisation.
After close consideration of all factors,
Reference your telegram of 9 June.
Regarding the Fijians, I feel that good use could be made of their infantry battalions, their engineers and a number of men for small
A reply to your cable and outline proposals for your consideration will be cabled in a few days.
Reference your telegram of 9 June [No. 452].
Your manpower difficulties, together with the necessity for New Zealand to send a force against the Japanese, will necessitate our accepting a smaller force and a lower standard of rearward services. I am therefore suggesting further cuts in the establishments of the Division and Line of Communication units. I consider that with 16,000 it will be possible to organise a division of two infantry brigades with the necessary supporting arms and its own Line of Communication. Five thousand reinforcements will enable us to carry on through
In my telegram of 11 April [No. 445] I questioned the numbers in your telegram of 8 April [No. 444]. I doubted whether your estimate of 15,000 would be available at the end of the war with
Note: It is to be urged that the 16th Reinforcements should be kept as high as possible.
With these figures it is possible to organise a force comprising a two-brigade division, plus Line of Communication, and to provide for sick permanently in hospital. It will be necessary, however, to have first reinforcements for
If only 15,000 are available we shall have to make further reductions as follows, but in my opinion this is a most inadvisable step:
These figures can only be taken as approximately correct.
Dealing with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff's appreciation, No. 449.
In his appreciation the Chief of the Imperial General Staff considered that 15,000 will be sufficient to form a two-infantry brigade division with the necessary ancillaries. With this we agree, but it will not be sufficient to form the Division, plus the force necessary to maintain it overseas, and leave any margin. He must realise this, but hopes we can contract the administrative tail by using
I am glad that
Your suggested proposal to send a Fijian brigade may enable us to solve many of our difficulties. I do not of course know the Fijians as soldiers. I have spoken on this subject with Brigadier Gentry and he bears out all I have heard of them, and I feel that they might be used in our existing organisation. General Puttick would be able to say if my proposals here would appear practical. If the Fijians are in addition to the 16,000 it will enable us to form a three infantry brigade division.
In any case we can make additional savings in existing war establishments by disbanding the existing Armoured Brigade; disbanding the Anti-Tank Regiment; reducing the
But we should have to provide men for re-forming an armoured reconnaissance unit.
The suggested reorganisation of the Division would then be as follows:
[A detailed schedule showing by units the numbers of New Zealand personnel required for a two-brigade division and New Zealand and Fijian personnel for a three-brigade division has been omitted.]
…. The division so planned would still keep the bulk of its heavy weapons such as a full Divisional Artillery and Mechanical Equipment Company, and would still have light and medium tanks in its Reconnaissance Regiment.
This proposal involves a far-reaching reorganisation, and a great deal of training would be required before the new division could take the field. But given time, and with the retention of experienced brigade, unit and sub-unit commanders, it could be achieved and would produce a fighting formation worthy of upholding the traditions of the 2nd New Zealand Division.
The smooth working of the reorganisation would be greatly assisted by getting our first reinforcements over in the
As you realise, this establishment is provisional, and it would have to be considered in the light of my visit to
The situation here is quiet. The Yugoslavs left See Vol. II, Trieste.
I do not want to move the force from this healthy area to a malarial one until necessary.
Would you please acknowledge this cable.
Your telegram of 14 June and earlier messages.
Not published.
2. We note that of the numbers required for the capital force, 12,000 are available in the
3. The foregoing is provisional at this juncture and it will not be possible to give a final decision until after Parliament has met and discussed the matter. The first opportunity for debate is not likely to occur until Wednesday, 4 July, and the final decision should come very shortly after that.
4. We are informing the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and the Governor of Sir Alexander Grantham, GCMG; Governor of
5. The United Kingdom authorities have been informed of the plans outlined in your telegram P.308 of 10 June Not published. Contained
6. Questions concerning the disposal of divisional equipment have been discussed with the Army authorities, who are telegraphing our proposals to you separately.
7. The proposed visit by
Repeated to the Governor of
We are completing plans for a New Zealand land force for employment in operations in the war against
2. We are anxious that a suitable component should be added to this force in order to complete it to the strength of a division, so ensuring that it can fight to advantage and effectively as a unit of the forces deployed against
3. Recently we consulted
4. We would like it to be understood that we have not yet reached a final decision in this matter, and indeed such a decision will not be taken until Parliament meets and the provision of a land force from this Dominion has been settled. No details of our proposals have been released to the press, and in the meantime we would be grateful if the fullest reserve with respect to this proposal could be maintained. Should the proposed employment of the Fiji Brigade be accepted and the decision to provide a force approved, then arrangements regarding announcement will be concerted with the Governor of
Following is the text of a message dated 26 June from the Governor of
‘1. I am agreeable to the new proposal and prefer it to the proposal now under consideration that the troops should be under Australian command, because of the previous association of Fijian troops with the New Zealand Army and the fact that there are a substantial number of New Zealand personnel in the Fijian forces.
‘2. At this stage I have the following comments:
I assume that the presence of more than Not published.
The Fijian troops should be employed as an infantry brigade. The first sentence of paragraph 3 of the telegram under reference [No. 456] seems to indicate that the Brigade may be split up, and I would not advise this.
The following Fijian units are available: Infantry Brigade Headquarters, with defence platoon and brigade section of Divisional Signals; three battalions; Brigade mobile workshops; detachment of
Engineers will not be available because they are already earmarked for Ocean and Nauru. See my telegram No. 90 of Not published.
‘3. I assume that New Zealand is keeping
The Commonwealth authorities, who had earlier accepted the use of this force, but only on the understanding that shipping would be provided from other than Australian resources, have been informed of the position and their agreement invited to the use of the Fiji Brigade with any New Zealand force. The Prime Minister of
As you are aware, plans for British participation in the Japanese war have until now been restricted to the
2. The over-all objective in the war against
Lowering the Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting an intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese naval and air strength.
Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of
We have not hitherto planned to provide land forces to take part in operations against the Japanese main islands, but with the early capture of
3. A preliminary examination has shown that it might now be possible to provide a British Commonwealth force of some three to five divisions, carried in British shipping and supported by British naval forces and a small tactical air component. The whole force would be placed under
4. I am well aware that the
5. I am sending a similar proposal to the Prime Minister of
6. I am sure you would agree with me that a joint Commonwealth force of British, Australian, New Zealand, British-Indian and possibly Canadian divisions would form a striking demonstration of Commonwealth solidarity, and that it is important that we should share with the Americans the burden of the assault on
7. In presenting our proposal to the Americans, we wish also to discuss the question of command in the South-West Pacific area.
8. The United States Chiefs of Staff have recently proposed that they should hand over the South-West Pacific area, less the
9. If our proposals for participation in the assault on
10. Our tentative proposals, therefore, would take the form that the
11. I would be grateful if you could give me your views on these proposals. A very early reply would be appreciated in order that the proposals may be discussed at the next conference.
I received your telegram of 5 July shortly after my return to New Zealand, and I am very grateful to you for informing me of your ideas regarding the over-all strategy in the war against
I am fully seized of the value and importance of providing a British Commonwealth force such as you have in mind, and I have no hesitation in assuring you that the units of the Royal New Zealand Air Force and Royal New Zealand Navy will be fully available if required. I regret, however, that I am not in a position to give you the definite undertaking you seek regarding the availability of New Zealand forces.
During my three months' absence, the whole question of the withdrawal of our forces from Rt. Hon. Sir Sidney Holland, PC, CH, GCB (then Hon. S. G.
I will be unable to continue my discussions with Mr Holland and with my own people on this issue until after he and I have returned to
The matter has been complicated further by pronouncements in New Zealand from American Admirals, in their well-meant endeavours to stress New Zealand's contribution to the war in the
You will, I know, fully appreciate the imperative need for complete national unity before embarking on fresh military undertakings in what will be for us, as for you, the seventh year of this long and arduous war.
I will not fail to advise you as soon as I have been able to obtain a decision, which I trust will be shortly after my return to
I send you with my warmest personal regards every good wish for a successful conference in This was the
I am now in
Your telegram of 31 July.
Consideration has been given to the plans for British Commonwealth participation in the Japanese war, as set out in your telegram of 5 July [No. 458] and in the Prime Minister's summary of the major operational decisions reached in the Anglo-American military discussions at Ibid.
The difficulties I referred to in my telegram of 14 July [No. 459] have now been surmounted and proposals have now been approved by Parliament for participation in the
It has been agreed that New Zealand shall contribute two infantry brigades with Headquarters and Line of Communication units, as suggested in paragraph 4 of your telegram [No. 458], and that the Royal New Zealand Air Force should form part of the air component. Ships of the Royal New Zealand Navy will continue to operate with the
This two-brigade force will be made up of 12,000 men now serving with the 2nd Division in the European theatre, together with 4000 troops at present held in New Zealand and a further contingent of
Considerable difficulties are being experienced in New Zealand at the present time owing to manpower shortages which are gravely affecting production.
In agreeing to the formation of this new land force, the Government and Parliament both consider that it is necessary at the same time to effect drastic reductions in the other two Services, including the air formations at present serving in the
It is therefore most essential that the 20,000 men from the 2nd Division who are due to return to New Zealand to be demobilised should arrive at the earliest possible date, and I would be most grateful if urgent attention could be given to the solution of existing difficulties in regard to the provision of the requisite shipping, which is referred to in my [earlier] telegram. See Vol. II, Return of 2nd Division to New Zealand, No. 471.
Parliament has now approved proposals for New Zealand's participation in the Commonwealth Land Force in the
Arrangements are now in hand for the despatch of the 16th Reinforcements from New Zealand.
I am informing the Secretary of State, and also requesting immediate advice regarding the shipping arrangements for the 20,000 men due for return from the
The Rt. Hon. C. R. Attlee became Prime Minister on
1. You will remember that in his telegram of 5 July [No. 458] Mr Churchill put to you a proposition for a British Commonwealth force of some five divisions to take part in the assault on the mainland of
2. Agreement was reached by the President and Mr Churchill on the recommendation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff that a British Commonwealth force should participate in the main operations against
3. Without prejudicing General MacArthur's recommendations, the Chiefs of Staff have come to the conclusion that his most likely plan will be something on the following lines. The British Commonwealth contribution would be a corps of three divisions to be used as an assault reserve afloat. The corps would be fought as an integral corps within the United States Army, though divisions might be used separately within
4. It seems from the present position of divisions that a corps could be formed by the use of one
5. I should therefore be glad to know if you can yet give a decision on the use of a New Zealand contingent in these operations so that the force commanders can be suitably instructed before they leave for discussions with General MacArthur in the very near future.
6. Agreement in principle was also reached at
This cable is to put the
1. I find that military opinion here is hardening against
2. In conversations in the
3. Coronet, the proposed operation, visualises three divisions, one each Australian, Canadian and British, and if possible the New Zealand Division as a fourth, but General MacArthur will have to agree to this.
4. The present project is still in the planning stage and is the result of the Berlin Conference. It envisages the British and New Zealand divisions at present in
5. If the New Zealand Division is accepted, this proposal would appear to have much to recommend it from New Zealand's point of view. It enables us to get clear of jungle fighting and we will be used in our traditional role, together with all our guns and heavy equipment. In principle I am in agreement. I have never been in favour
See Vol. II, No. 419, dated
6. The implementing of this new proposal presents a number of problems, which are not insurmountable. If the New Zealand War Cabinet agreed with the proposal, we would hand in all our British equipment in
7. In my inquiries in the
8. I heard unofficially that there is a proposal being formulated in military planning circles for the British division, which is to form part of CORONET, to take the shipping intended for the New Zealand forces to move it at an early date to the
9. I must advise against this proposal should it be made to you. I feel that in view of the drastic nature of our reorganisation, a very early concentration in the
10. The purpose of this cable is to let the New Zealand War Cabinet know what is happening here in the
11. Would you please acknowledge this cable, and if
1. At a a) the b) General MacArthur to the inclusion of the New Zealand Division in the British Commonwealth corps to fight under his command. Provisional planning was completed for the concentration of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the
2. As a result of the news of the Japanese surrender offer
3. As I can save a great deal of time by negotiating direct with the
Repeated to the
Following for the information of the acting Prime Minister is a summary of the broad conclusions of an appreciation by our military advisers, dated
‘1. The conclusions have taken into account approved and probable Allied operations, have assumed that
‘2. The fall of the Koiso Government and its replacement by the Suzuki Government is not in itself significant. General Kuniaki Koiso succeeded General Tojo on
‘3. The possibility cannot be excluded that, under the impact of the defeat of
‘4. The Japanese Government have no illusions about the seriousness of the situation. The dominant features in Japanese eyes are the threat of imminent invasion, the likelihood of Russian intervention, the mounting Allied bombing offensive, the severance of the inner from the outer zone, acute Japanese logistic difficulties, and the hopeless inadequacy of Japanese forces and war production.
‘5. The Japanese strategy in the inner zone is to try to build up as quickly as possible the defence of the islands of
‘6.
‘7.
‘8. For the defence of the inner zone
‘9. In the outer zone
My telegram of 6 May. Following for the Prime Minister is a summary of a recent appreciation by our military advisers on Japanese dispositions, strength and intentions in South-East Asia:
‘1. Territories still occupied by the Japanese in the South-East Asia area have now lost most of their economic importance to
‘2.
‘3. The Japanese seem to have decided not to keep open the overland route through south
I send you herewith for your personal information a summary of the major operational decisions reached in Anglo-American military discussions at
General Policy:
2. It was agreed that the invasion of
Strategic Direction of the War:
3. It was agreed—
Control of operational strategy in the
The United States Chiefs of Staff will consult the British Chiefs of Staff on matters of general strategy, on the understanding that in the event of disagreement the final decisions on the action to be taken will lie with the United States Chiefs of Staff.
Should the British Chiefs of Staff decide that they cannot commit British troops in support of a decision made by the United States Chiefs of Staff as indicated in (b) above, they will give to the United States Chiefs of Staff such advance notice of their decision as will permit the latter to make timely rearrangements.
If the
Operations in the
4. The plan for operations in the
5. Planning is premised on the belief that the defeat of the enemy's armed forces in the Japanese homeland is a prerequisite to unconditional surrender, and that such defeat will establish the optimum prospect of capitulation by Japanese forces outside the main Japanese islands.
British Commonwealth Participation in Operations in the Pacific Theatre:
6. The Very Long Range.
7. The participation of this Commonwealth land force is the subject of separate communications to the Dominion Governments concerned. See Proposals for Participation in Operations against Japan, No. 458. Replying to an inquiry from the
Operations in South-East Asia Command:
8. A directive has been approved for issue to Admiral Mountbatten. His primary task is to open the
The completion of the liberation of
The maintenance of pressure on the Japanese across the
The capture of key areas in
The establishment of bridgeheads in
9. It has been agreed that the eastern boundary of Not published.
10. A proposal is to be put to Generalissimo
French and Dutch Participation in the War Against Japan:
11. While it is at present impracticable on account of logistical difficulties for French or Dutch armed forces to take a major part in the immediate operations in the
Planning Date for the End of Organised Resistance by
12. Subject to periodical adjustment,
Cargo Shipping:
13. Present estimates indicate the position to be sufficiently manageable to provide for the maximum effort in the prosecution of the war against
Viscount Addison succeeded Viscount Cranborne on
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
Text of Three-Power Proclamation to This was the ultimatum to
‘1. We, the President of the
‘2. The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the
‘3. The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of
‘4. The time has come for
‘5. The following are our terms. We shall not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.
‘6. There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of
‘7. Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that
‘8. The terms of the Cairo Declaration The chief of these terms stated the Allies' determination to procure the unconditional surrender of
‘9. The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.
‘10. We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights, shall be established.
‘11.
‘12. The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from
‘13. We call upon the Government of At 8.15 a.m. Japanese time on 6 August an atomic bomb was dropped on
Cabinet this afternoon considered today's Japanese broadcast, which is the only intimation we have so far received of A broadcast from
His Majesty's representative at Sir Bertrand Jerram, KCMG (then Mr C. B. Jerram); Minister in M. B. O. Undén, Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs. Mr Leland Harrison, United States Minister to
2. The interim text, dated 10 August, is as follows:
‘In accordance with the desire of His Majesty the Emperor of The official English text of this Note reads: ‘… does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler.’
My telegram of 10 August [No. 471]
The following message from the United States Secretary of State Mr James F. Byrnes succeeded Mr E. R. Stettinius as Secretary of State on 1 July. Mr J. G. Winant.
‘1. This Government proposes that a reply as quoted in paragraph 3 be made to the
‘2. In order that hostilities may be terminated and further loss of life be prevented, this Government hopes that the British Government will associate itself with this Government in making an early reply as quoted in paragraph 3.
‘3. With regard to the
“From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the General MacArthur.
The following reply has been given to the United States Ambassador:
‘We have examined your draft. While agreeing in principle, we desire to make certain amendments on the ground that we doubt if it is wise to ask the Emperor personally to sign the surrender terms, and therefore we would suggest the following:
“The Emperor shall authorise and ensure the signature by the Government of
‘This is in keeping with Clause 13 of the Potsdam Declaration. This, we believe, also will secure the immediate surrender of Japanese in all outlying areas and thereby save American, British and Allied lives. We presume that if we are in accord on these terms we should get the agreement of Generalissimo Stalin and Generalissimo
If the Japanese surrender is accepted during the next few days, we assume that the
2. We shall of course keep you currently informed of developments here.
3. In view of the urgency of the situation we are also arranging for our Joint Staff Mission in
Following is the text of the Note sent by the United States Government to the Swiss Government for the
‘I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Note of 10 August See No. 471.
“With regard to the
“From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the
“The Emperor will be required to authorise and ensure the signature by the Government of
“Immediately upon the surrender the
“The ultimate form of government of
“The armed forces of the Allied powers will remain in
‘Accept, sir, etc.’
Victory in An announcement by President Truman and Mr Attlee that Missouri, in Tokyo Bay.
1. As soon as the Japanese surrender has been accepted by their Governments, the Allies will be faced with many tasks resulting from the Japanese capitulation. We trust that we may rely on your assistance in these, and indeed we regard your assistance as indispensable. The proposals set out below are to be regarded as replacing the suggestion for a British Commonwealth force dealt with in my telegram of 31 July
2. The tasks confronting us are:
The reoccupation of key areas of occupied territories in order to secure effective control and to enforce the surrender and disarmament of the Japanese armed forces.
The earliest release of British and Allied prisoners of war and internees.
Participation in the occupation of
Protection of British interests in
The ending of our state of war with See Outbreak of War and Declarations– Japan and Thailand, p. 79 ff.
3. Subject to your agreement, we suggest that plans shall be made on the following assumptions on policy:
The South-West Pacific area will pass to British and Australian command.
It is highly important that British Commonwealth forces should accept the surrender of
A British Commonwealth force shall take part in the occupation of
May we have your very early agreement in principle to these suggestions?
4. Orders have been given to the Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia, Admiral Mountbatten. Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fraser, GCB, KBE (then Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser); Commander-in-Chief Home Fleet, 1943–44; C-in-C Eastern Fleet,
The early reopening of the
The early re-establishment of a British garrison in
The acceptance of the surrender of Japanese forces in
The occupation of
5. We are asking the Australian authorities to arrange for accepting the surrender of all Japanese troops in
6. We hope that you will agree to the continued attachment of the New Zealand ships to the
7. In view of the time factor, we are informing the United States Chiefs of Staff of the proposals in paragraphs 3 and 4 above and inviting their comments.
I have been advised of the proposal for a New Zealand brigade group in the British Commonwealth Occupational Force for
It seems clear that the Commonwealth Force will be required to embark for
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
Your telegram of 13 August [No. 476].
New Zealand participation in the
2. It is agreed that one New Zealand squadron should be made available for the tactical air force contingent referred to in paragraph 3 (c) of your telegram under reference.
3. While we are agreed to the association of Royal New Zealand Air Force squadrons with the Australian force which is to accept the surrender of the Japanese troops in
4. We agree to the continued attachment of New Zealand ships to the
Your telegram of 16 August [No. 477].
It is also proposed, in the event of such a volunteer force being made available, that the strength of the brigade group should be ‘turned over’ in a period of twelve months by providing from New Zealand on a volunteer basis at quarterly intervals replacement drafts of 1250 men, and that the men in the force with the longest service should be returned to New Zealand first. Future replacements would not be effected under a period of six months. I would be grateful for your earliest comments.
Your telegram of 21 August.
The total number of single men in the 11th to 15th Reinforcements now in the Members of the 2nd NZEF enlisted ‘for the duration of the war and twelve months thereafter, or until lawfully discharged’. See Vol. I, Formation and Despatch of First Echelon, p. 34, note 4.
Maj-Gen Sir William Gentry, KBE, CB, DSO and bar, MC (Gk), Bronze Star (US); comd 6 Bde Sep 1942–Apr 1943; Deputy Chief of General Staff 1943–44; comd NZ Troops in Egypt, 6 NZ Div, and NZ Maadi Camp, Aug 1944–Feb 1945; 9 Bde (
Thank you for your telegram of 22 August. Would it be possible to obtain the requisite number of volunteers from all categories of men in the 11th to 15th Reinforcements?
Reference your telegram of 23 August. While I personally would prefer a voluntary scheme, if the force is to be found from men overseas, I feel that such a course would produce a relatively low number of men. This has been a long war and there is a general war-weariness and desire to get home and make a fresh start. I feel, and in this I am supported by all my brigadiers, that should an occupational force be required from New Zealand troops overseas, the only sure way is for its personnel to be detailed from among the last-joined reinforcements, as indicated in my telegram of 22 August [No. 480]. An early decision in this [matter] would greatly assist us here.
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
Your telegram of 21 August [No. 478].
We are grateful for your agreement to make available one Royal New Zealand Air Force squadron for the
2. Your paragraph 3. We have already informed the Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia, that as soon as he is in a position to spare the necessary forces and shipping, it is our intention to instruct him to take over by stages from
… In the text omitted
Repeated to
My telegram of 21 August [No. 478] and yours of 13 August [No. 476].
After further consideration of the question of New Zealand's participation with other British Commonwealth forces in the occupation of
It is proposed that this force should be made available for a period of six months' service in
As indicated in my telegram of 29 August, the Government have agreed to provide one brigade group for the British Commonwealth force for a period of six months. It is further agreed that the strength of this force should be 5000 all ranks, and that it should be a properly balanced brigade group with the necessary administrative and welfare services.
In the circumstances it is considered that the men required to fill the establishment should be drawn from the single men of the 13th, 14th and 15th Reinforcements. The Government also consider that suitable volunteers should be accepted from all categories of men outside the 13th, 14th and 15th Reinforcements.
It is at present proposed that the term of service in
Reference my telegram of 30 August.
Owing to the great reluctance of the Government party to agree to the compulsory direction of men for the brigade group from
I have received your telegram [No. 487] and realise the difficulties. All necessary and possible arrangements for shipping and movement and organisation of the brigade group have been made. I must now inform the
1The difference in time between New Zealand and the
Your telegram of 29 August [No. 485].
We are very glad to learn that New Zealand can provide a brigade group to take part in the occupation of
We have been considering the position in the light of Australian Government telegrams Nos. 240 and 245, In telegram No. 240, dated 17 August, to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, the Australian Government stated that the Australian force to take part in the occupation of
I am therefore sending to the Prime Minister of Not published. In this telegram Mr Attlee said that if
I hope very much that this suggestion will commend itself to you.
Reference your telegram of 31 August [No. 487].
I am now back in
My approach has been that with the shortage of shipping at least 9000 of the latest-joined reinforcements will not get back to New Zealand until March or April. These men will therefore remain where they are for at least another six months in the knowledge that there will be little to do to keep up their interest. If they volunteer they will join the occupational force for
Although none of the officers feel that they can with confidence give a definite figure, they all agree that we should not get the required number of volunteers. Their estimates run from 750 to 2500 in the extreme cases, with the consensus of opinion less than 1500.
I also discussed the problem with a selected group of officers at the General Sir William Morgan, GCB, DSO, MC; Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander,
I must point out that the fact that the Australian and
I would suggest as a possibility that the British Government, for the purpose of maintaining the Commonwealth aspect of the force, might consider accepting from us a smaller garrison force capable of carrying out guard duties but not capable of working as an operational brigade group. Such a force of three battalions plus rearward services could be formed from 4000 men. Should this proposal be acceptable, these 4000 could be detailed from the single men of the 13th, 14th and 15th Reinforcements. Officers and certain additional specialists would have to be detailed from outside these reinforcement categories. As the bulk of the men so detailed have seen little fighting they could not logically have any grievance.
I know from certain definite pointers that opinion here has altered to a marked degree since VJ Day. All entitled officers and men who volunteered to stay on at Base for the duration of the war against
The United Kingdom leave scheme is being kept in mind as a means of relieving the boredom which is bound to follow a long wait in the present surroundings. Such leave, however, could not be given to the men who will leave by the vessel promised for October, nor to those for the occupational brigade. The announcement of the scheme is therefore not being made in the meantime.
At present the tone of the Force both in
There is little more we can do here at the moment. There should not be any trouble if we are able in the near future to give the men a detailed statement of the
In a telegram on 11 September to the acting High Commissioner for New Zealand in
My telegram of 29 August [No. 485].
Advice has now been received from
The matter clearly calls for an immediate decision and I should like to take the opportunity tomorrow of discussing the whole question with the Government party and, if possible, of reaching a definite conclusion on the course to follow. Before I raise the matter I wish to know whether or not the
Your telegram of 7 September on the proposed British Commonwealth Occupation Force for
The proposal was mentioned by our Joint Staff Mission in See p. 518, note 2.
Your telegram of 5 September [No. 490].
I am most grateful for your endeavours in connection with the formation of a brigade group for This despatch was published in the New Zealand press. On 13 September
I regret to inform you that a decision is not yet possible. The Opposition did not agree that the force should be raised by compulsion. I hope that further discussions after the weekend will enable the Government to reach a satisfactory settlement.
The Leader of the Opposition is laying stress on the statement contained in your telegram of 5 September [No. 490] that the Australian
Your telegram of 14 September.
1. As far as Stars and Stripes and British newspapers for our news, much of which may be inaccurate, and it causes considerable confusion. Based on such reports, our understanding of the long-term policy for the occupation of
2. With regard to the employment of Australian, American, and British troops for the immediate occupation of
Your telegram of 18 September. See Vol. II, No. 479.
My own statement regarding New Zealand's participation in the occupation force and the initial composition of the brigade group may be delayed for a few more days pending agreement of the
There is no objection meanwhile to you making your own statement as amended and I had assumed that you would have done this.
For your own personal and confidential information, Cabinet are agreed that the force should comprise single men of the 13th, 14th and 15th Reinforcements. It seems clear that it would not be possible to organise the force in time on any other basis.
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
New Zealand's participation in the occupation of
‘In referring to the Press Association cable regarding
“The question of finding a small New Zealand Force to assist in the garrison of
‘I should add,’ said Mr Fraser, ‘that these negotiations are still taking place and, moreover, the British Commonwealth countries concerned are also discussing questions relating to the formation of a
‘I had intended making a statement in Parliament as soon as I had received confirmation that arrangements had been completed. I can only say at this stage that if a
‘In view of the press cable messages received this morning it is necessary that I should now release the following statement which I had intended to make to Parliament:
“When Parliament discussed at the beginning of August the formation of a New Zealand force for service in the
“The new proposal envisaged a land force composed of brigade groups from various countries of the British Commonwealth, together with a tactical
“I feel sure,” said Mr Fraser, “that the people of New Zealand will agree that this opportunity of proving our unity and solidarity with the Mother Country, and of sharing in the responsibilities of the British Commonwealth in the
“The Government made the fullest inquiries as to the practicability of obtaining from the Division on a voluntary basis a properly
“It is proposed that the personnel of this brigade group shall be relieved at the end of six months by men from New Zealand. The relief force will be obtained from volunteers, for whom a call will be made at an early date to enable training to be completed and such relief force to be despatched in sufficient time to take over from the brigade group in
“Despite the repeated efforts of the Government to obtain the highest possible priority in shipping, there appears to be little prospect so far of obtaining transports to bring the men of the later reinforcements back to New Zealand before March or April next. The consequent delay in the return of the single men of the 13th, 14th and 15th Reinforcements occasioned by their going to
“It will be generally agreed that New Zealand should undertake this duty, not only because it is in our interests as a
“It will be generally agreed also that our only enemy in the
“The Allied Powers have set themselves in the Potsdam Declaration, in the Armistice terms and in various declarations of policy to implement this policy, which is endorsed by the
“It is clearly our duty,” said Mr Fraser, “to undertake our share of the responsibility for the enforcement of the peace, to the achievement of which our war effort has made a notable contribution. If, moreover, the peace settlement with
Repeated to the Prime Minister of New Zealand.
Reference Australian Government's telegram of 21 September. See p. 518, note 2. This was Mr Chifley's reply advising that his Government was agreeable to participating in a British Commonwealth force.
We are most gratified that you have agreed with our suggestion for a joint Commonwealth force for the occupation of
2. We agree with the proposals in your telegram. We should like, however, to be sure that our interpretation of the machinery proposed in your paragraph 6 (v), (vi) and (vii) is correct. Paragraph 6 (v) defined the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief of the British Commonwealth force to the
3. We envisage an organisation similar to that of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which worked so well between ourselves and the Americans. This would mean that our members of the joint organisation would be representatives only and would normally consult the British Chiefs of Staff in
4. We suggest that the title ‘Joint Chiefs of Staff’ may lead to considerable confusion with the American Chiefs of Staff, who are also known by that name. We suggest as an alternative, ‘Chiefs of Staff in
5. The British Chiefs of Staff will be communicating with the Australian Chiefs of Staff on detailed questions of organisation and command of the force. When these details are agreed, no doubt you will approach the American Government with our joint proposal.
6. For New Zealand: Please despatch your agreement or comments on the above direct to
7. We are communicating separately with
Repeated to the Prime Minister of
Your telegram of 1 October.
The New Zealand Government wish to express their satisfaction that arrangements have been concluded for the formation of a
2. So far as the control organisation is concerned, the See p. 527, note 3.
3. The New Zealand Government would wish, in view of their contribution to the occupation forces, to arrange that representatives of the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff are associated with the organisation it is suggested might be known as the ‘Chiefs of Staff in
Repeated to the Prime Minister of New Zealand and other addressees.
My immediately preceding cablegram. Not published. This statement was released simultaneously in the
‘1. As a result of discussion between members of the British Commonwealth, proposals for a joint British Commonwealth force to participate in the occupation of
‘2. Following recent representations in
‘3. The force is drawn from the The New Zealand contingent was known as J Force. Its first commander was Brig K. L. Stewart. The force sailed from Gen Sir John Northcott, KCMG, CB, MVO; Chief of the General Staff, Australian Military Forces, 1942–45; C-in-C British Commonwealth Occupation Force,
‘4. The force comprises:
Force and base troops drawn from each of the contributing countries.
A land component organised as a corps of one British Indian division and two independent brigade groups, one each from
An air component comprising squadrons drawn from the
‘5. A squadron of the
‘8. The British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) will form part of the occupation forces in The first New Zealand representative was
‘9. The BCOF will be initially located in the Hiroshima Prefecture, including the cities of
‘11. The British Commonwealth Force may be withdrawn wholly or in part by agreement between the United States Government and the Commonwealth Governments concerned or upon six months' notice by either party. It has also been agreed that progressive reductions in the strength of the force will be made from time to time in conformity with progressive reductions which may be made in the strength of the The New Zealand army component ceased its occupation duties in
I circulate, herewith, for the use of the Ministers of the Dominions and the Representative of
Prior to the signature of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact on 23 August, Japanese extremists were advocating the conversion of the Anti-Comintern Pact with General Nobuyuki Abe, Prime Minister of
2. Since then the
3. rapprochement with
4. It must be remembered that Russian and Japanese aims in the
5. While, therefore, it may well be in the interests of both parties to reduce the tension which has prevailed for many years and to avoid incidents which achieve no object, the conflict of interest, which is fundamental, and the profound distrust which each has of the other are calculated to prevent the conclusion of any agreement of a durable nature.
6. fait accompli against the day when they will be free, on the termination of hostilities in
7. For the present, Head of the Japanese-sponsored puppet government set up at Nanking in
8. Until the new regime has been established and in being for some little time, it will be difficult to determine the extent to which
9. Occupied with the difficult problems which lie ahead of her in the solution of the
10. There are also other reasons why the Japanese, who are essentially cautious by nature, will hesitate to extend their attack on foreign interests. Our Naval dispositions are different from those in the last war, when, owing to the threat of a strong German Fleet, we were forced to hold the great bulk of our capital ship strength in home waters. Moreover, there is no war in the
11. In the event of a German occupation of
12. British policy towards
13. The conclusion is that
Foreign Office,
British Ambassador at
Your telegram No. 716. Not published.
There is not, I think, any particularly strong feeling in the reversal of the recent denunciation of the trade treaty comes before Congress next January, especially as the
If Japanese action left the
In accordance with the conclusions reached at the meeting between Ministers of the On the naval defence of
C[Hatfield]
Richmond Terrace, SW 1,
Singapore is a fortress armed with five 15-inch guns and garrisoned by nearly 20,000 men. It could only be taken after a siege by an army of at least 50,000 men, who would have to be landed in the marshes and jungle of the Isthmus which connects it with the mainland. As Singapore is as far from
2. Even less likely is the invasion of
It is always possible that a long-range submarine or raiding cruiser might turn up and insult Australian or New Zealand shores by firing a few shells into some seaport city, or cause temporary inconvenience by disturbing the coastal trade. But Japan would hardly be likely to reap any result except resentment from such escapades.
3. The power of a predominant fleet is exercised simultaneously in all quarters of the globe in which it has bases. This is irrespective of the station it occupies at any given moment, provided that it is not permanently tied to that station. At the beginning of the present War, the Admiralty had to contemplate fighting a fortiori to the aid of
4. Now, however, that
It seems very unlikely, however, that this bleak choice will arise during the next year or two, which is what we have to consider at the present time.
5. Hitherto this note has dealt only with the gravest issues of a major attack upon
However, should Japanese encroachment begin, or should Great Britain pass into a state of war with
6. Finally, it must be pointed out that we are now at the lowest point of our strength compared to
There are no naval grounds, therefore, always assuming that the
New Zealand's concern regarding possible developments in the See p. 267, note. 2.
The present situation as it has in fact now developed is much more favourable than the worst contingencies contemplated in This paper on Australian Naval Defence was replaced by DMV (39) 4—see Appendix II. See Vol. I, a) b) Negotiations regarding Participation of New Zealand's Armed Forces, No. 24.
At the same time, just as facts have proved that it was not possible accurately to predict the parties to the present war or the course of hostilities, so the future is no doubt equally unpredictable. Quite apart from the position that might develop were
Finally, may we take it that the undertaking given to The paper was amended to include the naval defence of New Zealand as well as of
Circular telegram.
The following is the summary referred to in my message:
1. The Far Eastern situation was considered in
Any threat to our interests would be seaborne; and that
We could send to the
2. The Japanese advance into Southern China and Hainan, the development of communications and aerodromes in
At the same time, the collapse of
3.
4. We are advised that
5. Fear of Russian action will compel
6. An attempt on the formidable
On the other hand, the forces in
7.
8. The knowledge that further aggression might lead to the rupture of trade relations with the status quo in the
On the long-term view,
9.
10. To sum up, it appears that, until the issue in
11. Our own commitments in
It is most desirable that a wide settlement in the
12. Failing a general settlement on satisfactory terms, we should play for time, cede nothing until we must, and build up our defences as soon as we can. ( Assumption 3 in the Chiefs of Staff appreciation—as explained in telegram No. 12—was that the Assumption 3 begins.) One aim of our policy should be ultimately to secure full military co-operation with the Dutch. This is dealt with further in telegrams which follow. (Assumption 3 ends.)
13. Our Far Eastern interests are the security of:
Trade routes in the
The China trade. Considerable British capital is in the
14. The territorial integrity of
15. In the absence of a fleet, we could not in such circumstances prevent some damage to our interests in the
16.
Naval—10 battleships, 3 to 7 aircraft-carriers with the necessary cruiser and destroyer forces.
Military—6 to 10 divisions.
Air—Up to 75 fighters and 206 bombers, carrier-borne. Once Japan had established herself ashore, she could dispose of the following shore-based aircraft: Between 8 and 10 squadrons of fighters, similar numbers of light bombers and of heavy bombers, and 4 to 6 squadrons of reconnaissance aircraft, giving a total of 28 to 36 squadrons or 336 to 432 aircraft. These forces are clearly large enough to give
17. The first course open to the Japanese would be direct attack on British possessions. In this event, her main effort would probably be directed ultimately towards the capture of
18. Assume, however, the worst case, in which
19. Apart from attacks on trade, no serious threat to
20. The strain on
21. The second course open to the Japanese would be penetration of Indo-
22. Japanese penetration of
23. The above action would therefore threaten under present conditions we should not be justified in going to war. For similar reasons we should not under present conditions go to war in the event of Japanese attack on Indo-
24. The third possible course would be attack on the
25. The above course is in a different category from the first and second courses considered above, since if Assumption 3 begins.) Every effort should therefore be made to induce the Dutch to resist any
Assumption 3 ends.)
26. The fourth Japanese course would be the seizure of the
It would appear that, unless
27. Therefore, while we must be prepared for sudden attack on the
28. Our untenable position in North China in the event of war with
29. Our position at quid pro quo would be in our military interests. Without such a settlement, however, demilitarisation is impossible on account of the loss of prestige which such a course would involve. In the event of war, therefore,
30. Strategy in the Event of War in the Far East in the Absence of the Fleet.
The sea communications most likely to be threatened are:
The South China Sea and the Western Pacific (north of
Seas east and south of
31. As regards (a), the main routes from the Assumption 3 begins.) Our ability to use the Dutch islands and to establish depot ships there would act as a deterrent but would not prohibit Japanese access to the Assumption 3 ends.)
32. As regards (b), we could not maintain our sea communications to the north of the Malayan Archipelago (Assumption 3 begins) but could maintain local traffic within the Archipelago to a limited extent given Dutch co-operation. (Assumption 3 ends.)
33. As regards (c), the trans-
34. As regards the defence of
35. As regards the defence of
The necessity for preventing the establishment of shore-bases for aircraft within close range of
Even if the Japanese had not previously established themselves in
The rice-growing country, on which the native population partly depends, and most Government storage cereals are in the north.
The necessity for establishing the maximum possible food reserves for the garrison and for the civil population. Though our sea communications with
The above factors emphasise the necessity for holding the whole of
36. As regards the defence of Air Marshal Sir John Babington, KCB, CBE, DSO; AOC Far East 1938–41.
37. (Assumption 3 begins.) Defence of the
Northern line of islands from
Southern line from
We could do little to dispute the passage of these channels with the forces at present available. The co-operation of the Dutch would improve the position, but the measure of control would still be very limited. Which line of defence to adopt could only be decided by the local Commanders. To deny bases, invasion must be prevented, which would entail attacks on the expedition during its approach, as the Dutch military forces are limited and mainly concentrated in Assumption 3 ends.) The establishment of a British air base in North Assumption 3 begins.) Meanwhile there would be no alternative to relying initially for the defence of this area on the operation of air forces from Dutch bases, of which there are several already established on both lines of defence. (Assumption 3 ends.) The Japanese might seize the Portuguese half of Timor as a first step, but owing to the absence of air or naval bases in this part and the risk that it might lead to war with us, such action appears unlikely.
38. (Assumption 3 begins.) The whole of the defence problem in the Assumption 3 ends.)
39. If the Japanese attacked
40. Conclusions. In the absence of a capital ship fleet we could not fully secure our vital interests in the
41. Our policy in the
42. (Assumption 3 begins.) Our ultimate aim to secure the full military co-operation of the Dutch is of the utmost importance for the denial of bases to the enemy and to enable us to exert some measure of control over the channels through Southern Celebes, thus reducing the threat to our Assumption 3 ends.) In assessing our requirements, therefore, Dutch collaboration has not been taken into account. Our requirements are not thereby substantially affected, since, even if the Dutch were co-operating with us, the enemy might carry out diversions against the
43. An exact estimate of the strength and disposition of the air forces required must depend on appreciation by the United Kingdom Commanders in the Details omitted. The total estimate was 336 first-line aircraft.
44. This is a very substantial addition to any previous programme, but in previous estimates:
The movement of a Battle Fleet to the
The situation in which the Japanese have virtually overrun South China, and Indo-
The necessity of defending British
Moreover, experience has shown that it is unsound to rely upon reinforcements from
45. Meanwhile, the air forces in
Bombers—3 squadrons, 36 aircraft.
Torpedo Bombers—2 squadrons, 24 aircraft, obsolete type.
GR Land Planes—2 squadrons, 24 aircraft.
GR Flying Boats—1 squadron, 4 aircraft, obsolete type.
Total: 88 first-line aircraft.
(Assumption 3 begins.)
Dutch air forces now in the
Bombers—9 squadrons, 81 aircraft.
Fighters—2 squadrons, 24 aircraft.
Bombers for reconnaissance—1 squadron, 12 aircraft.
Flying Boats—1 squadron, 27 aircraft.
Total: 144 first-line aircraft.
The Dutch expansion programme will add another 42 fighters about Assumption 3 ends.)
46. Until our very serious deficiency in air strength in the Omitted—for the defence of British c)Assumption 3 begins.) Nevertheless the situation is not so black as it may appear. The British and Dutch Air Forces between them now dispose of more than 200 aircraft of a quality equal, and in some respects superior, to those of Assumption 3 ends.)
47. As regards land forces, a review of the position regarding the defence of
48. Although bases will eventually be required for four shore-based squadrons in British
49. (Assumption 3 begins.) As it will be necessary to rely for some time on the operation of air forces from Dutch bases for the defence of the Dutch East Indies, the security of these bases is of considerable interest to us. The provision of the necessary troops must be a matter for the Dutch, who have a total of two divisions in Assumption 3 ends.)
50. The minimum garrison required in Lt-Gen Sir Lionel Bond, KBE, CB; GOC Malaya, Aug 1939–May 1941.
51. The provision of anti-aircraft guns for
52. Naval forces now on
One 8-inch cruiser.
Two modern 6-inch cruisers.
Four old 6-inch cruisers.
Six armed merchant cruisers.
Five old destroyers.
Three anti-submarine escorts.
Eight motor-torpedo boats.
These are entirely inadequate for war in the
The Dutch forces in the
Two cruisers.
Seven destroyers.
Sixteen submarines.
Until the naval situation in European waters is materially improved, it may be necessary to face a serious threat to our Far Eastern trade, as fully adequate forces for its protection could not be made available in the event of determined action against it by Japanese forces, particularly if they used heavy ships. Everything possible will be done by the United Kingdom Government to press on with future naval construction programmes to the maximum extent possible; this is a long-term project and no naval building programme has ever allowed for a war in which the British Empire alone would be fighting
To: The General Officer Commanding,
2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force in
1. You have been appointed to command the 2nd NZEF in
2. You are to proceed with your Force to
3. On arrival at
4. Your immediate role is the defence of the whole or such portion of the Island of
5. You are expressly authorised to make representations to His Majesty's Government in New Zealand regarding the proposed employment of your troops if in your opinion the operations you are required to undertake might unjustifiably imperil your command.
6. You will be at liberty from time to time to detach and place under the command of
Notwithstanding the provisions of this paragraph, you will at all times endeavour to keep to a minimum detachments from your force.
7. Administratively and for all purposes other than operational you are directly and solely responsible to His Majesty's Government in New Zealand.
8. Generally it is the desire of His Majesty's Government in New Zealand that your force should be employed in the closest possible collaboration with the Forces of the Allied Nations and to that end you are to use your utmost endeavours to comply with the requirements and carry out the instructions of the Commander under whose operational command you may for the time being be serving.
To: The General Officer Commanding,
2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force in
1. In addition to the powers and authorities vested in you as General Officer Commanding the 2nd NZEF in
Power to increase or vary the scale of rations if in your opinion this should seem necessary in the interests of the health of your troops but subject to supplies being available locally or from American or New Zealand sources.
Power to purchase equipment and material (in accordance with appropriate war equipment tables) which cannot be obtained or which cannot without unreasonable delay be obtained from normal sources.
Power to incur expenditure which cannot be foreseen at present and which you in your discretion may think necessary for the protection, safety and health of your troops.
Power to incur expenditure, not exceeding £250 for any one transaction, for the provision of recreation and other amenities for your troops.
Power to disburse at your discretion from an entertainment fund which will be provided amounts not exceeding in the aggregate £500 per annum.
To establish such administration headquarters and base and line of communication units as are necessary for the functions of command, organisation and administration with which you have been vested, and to fix and determine the establishments and war equipment tables of such headquarters and units, provided the same are in conformity with the establishments and equipment tables customarily adopted in British military practice.
To fix, determine and alter the establishments, equipment tables and composition of existing units and formations as the exigencies of the service may in your opinion from time to time require.
To make promotions and appointments of officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers within establishments. (All appointments and promotions of officers to be subject to confirmation by the Governor-General and published in the New Zealand Gazette.)
Provided in respect of the foregoing paragraphs (a) to (h) that additional demands on New Zealand manpower and equipment are not thereby created and that the ranks laid down in British or New Zealand War Establishments are not exceeded, and in the case of appointments provided otherwise than in War Establishments that the ranks authorised for such appointments are not exceeded.
2. You will be directly responsible to the
3. Your normal channel of communication with His Majesty's Government in New Zealand will be through Army Headquarters in New Zealand but in exceptional circumstances (or for special reasons) you are to have the right of direct communication with the
ABDA area (American, British, Dutch, Australian), establishment of,
Abe, Gen N. (PM of
Achilles, HMNZS,
ADB (American, Dutch, British) conference and report,
Admiral Scheer,
Alanbrooke, Lord (Fd Mshl Brooke),
Allied Control Council,
Allied Force HQ,
American Naval Command, etc. See
Anthony, Hon. H. L. (Aust),
Anzac area, establishment of,
COMANZAC, See also
Arita, H. (Foreign Min,
Armstrong, A. L. (Agent and Consul,
8 Army,
Atomic bombs, first used against
Augusta, USS,
Australian and NZ Naval Defence, memorandum by Lord Chatfield,
Australian Military Forces,
Babington, Air Mshl Sir J. (AOC Far East),
Barnett, Maj-Gen A. J. (
Barrett, Maj-Gen C. D. (US Marine Corps),
Barrowclough, Maj-Gen Sir H. (GOC 2 NZEF IP),
Barton, C. J. J. T.,
Batterbee, Sir H. (HC for
BD (British, Dutch) conference and report,
Bennett, Col P. L.,
Bockett, H. L.,
Bond, Lt-Gen Sir L. (GOC Malaya),
Breene, Maj-Gen R. G. (
Brett, Lt-Gen G. H. (Deputy Supreme Comd, ABDA area),
British Chiefs of Staff, etc. See
British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF),
British Fleet. See
Brooke, Fd Mshl. See
Brooke-Popham, Air Chief Mshl Sir R. (C-in-C
Burns Philp, Ltd.,
Byrnes, J. F. (US Secy of State),
Cairo Declaration,
Caldecote, Rt. Hon. Viscount (Doms Secy),
Campbell, Dr R. M.,
Canberra Agreement,
Casablanca Conference,
Casey, Rt. Hon. Lord (Aust Min to
Casualties, NZ troops in
Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. N.,
Champion, operation,
Chaney, Maj-Gen J. E. (
Chiefs of Staff Committee (See
Chiefs of Staff Committee (See
Chifley, Rt. Hon. J. B. (PM of Aust),
Churchill, Rt. Hon. Sir W., on
Clifton, Brig G. H.,
Combined Chiefs of Staff (Committee),
COMGENSOPAC, See also
COMSOPAC, See also
Cooke, Rear-Adm C. M. (USN),
Coral Sea, Battle of,
Craigie, Rt. Hon. Sir R. (UK Amb,
Cranborne, Rt. Hon. Viscount (Doms Secy),
Crosby, Sir J. (UK Min,
Cunningham, Lt-Gen Sir A. (GOC 8 Army),
Cunningham, Maj-Gen Sir W. (GOC Fiji),
Curtin, Rt. Hon. J. (PM of Aust),
Devonshire, Duke of,
Dill, Fd Mshl Sir J. (Joint Staff Mission,
DRACULA, operation,
Duff-Cooper. See
Duigan, Maj-Gen Sir J. (CGS, NZ Mil Forces, 1937–41),
Duke of York, HMS,
Dutch East Indies. See
Dutch Government, etc. See
Eden (Earl of Avon), Rt. Hon. A. (Foreign Secy,
Evatt, Rt. Hon. Dr H. V.,
Evill, Air Chief Mshl Sir D.,
Eyre, Lt-Col R. J. (CO 34 Bn),
Falkland Is., battle of,
Fanning I.,
Fanning Island Plantations Ltd.,
Fitch, Vice-Adm A. W. (USN),
Foch, Mshl F.,
Forde, Rt. Hon. F. M. (PM of Aust),
FOREARM, operation. See
Fort, Rear Adm G. H. (USN),
Fraser, Rt. Hon. P. (PM of NZ),
[Telegrams sent through the Governor-General in
Gerbrandy, Dr P. S. (PM of
Ghormley, Vice-Adm R. L. (COMSOPAC,
Glassford, Vice-Adm W. A. (USN),
Gneisenau,
Goddard, Air Mshl Sir V. (CAS,
Hague Convention (3rd),
Appreciation of probable Japanese policy in
Halsey, Fleet Adm W. F. (COMSOPAC, 1942–44),
Harmon, Lt-Gen M. F. (
Harrison, L. (US Min,
Home Fleet, C-in-C,
Horan, Rear-Adm H. E. (Chief of NZ Naval Staff, 1938–40),
Hull, Cordell (US Secy of State),
Hunt, Brig F. L. (CO,
Illustrious, HMS,
See also
Indo-Japanese Convention,
Ishihara (Company),
Isitt, AVM Sir L. (CAS,
Japan, relations with
Japanese policy in
Jerram, Sir B. (UK Min,
Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Joint Staff Mission,
Jones, Hon. F. (Min of Defence),
Jordan, Rt. Hon. Sir W. (HC for NZ in
Jupp, Cdre S. D. (USN),
Kent, HMS,
Kermadec Is.,
King, Fleet Adm E. J. (C-in-C US Fleet),
Knox, Frank (US Secy of Navy),
Koiso, Gen K. (PM of
Komet, German raider,
Kra Isthmus, threatened by
Lake, Cdre Sir A. (Chief of NZ Naval Staff, 1942–45),
Larsen, Maj-Gen H. L. (USMC),
Leander, HMNZS,
Leary, Vice-Adm H. F. (Commander Anzac Naval Force),
Lehman, Maj-Gen R. G. (
Lethbridge, Maj-Gen J. S.,
Lothian, Lord (UK Amb,
Luke, Sir H. (Gov of
MacArthur, Gen of Army D. (Sup Comd, SW Pacific, 1942–45),
McIntosh, A. D. (Secy, NZ War Cabinet),
Magruder, Brig-Gen J. (US Mil Mission,
MAINYARD (
Maisky, M. Ivan (USSR Amb in
Manus I. See
Marshall, Gen G. C. (Chief of Staff,
Mead, Maj-Gen O. H. (GOC Pacific Section,
Menzies, Rt. Hon. R. G. (PM of Aust),
MERCANTILE, operation. See
Missouri, USS,
Mitchell, Maj-Gen Sir P. (Gov of
Morgan, Gen Sir W.,
Murphy, Col W.,
Myers, Rt. Hon. Sir M.,
Nagasaki,
Nash, Rt. Hon. W. (Deputy PM of NZ), on naval dispositions in
NECAL. See
Netherlands Staff Mission,
Newton, Vice-Adm J. H. (USN) (COMSOPAC, 1944–45),
New Zealand (Government), views on Far Eastern policy, See also
New Zealand, Defence of,
New Zealand, Fraser's views on Australian and New Zealand defence,
NZ Air Liaison Officer in
NZ Chiefs of Staff,
NZ Chiefs of Staff Committee,
NZ Defence Plan, report by UK Chiefs of Staff on,
2 NZ Division, in
3 NZ Division,
NZ Forces—
NZ Naval Attaché (Liaison Officer),
NZ Supply Mission,
NZ War Cabinet, on guarantee to
‘N’ Force (Norfolk I.),
Nimitz, Fleet Adm C. W. (C-in-C
Nomura, Adm K. (Japanese Amb,
Norwich, Viscount (Rt. Hon. A. Duff Cooper), Resident Min,
Nurnberg,
octagon (Second Quebec Conference),
Orion, German raider,
Park, Brig R. S. (NZ MLO,
Parkinson, Maj-Gen G. B.,
Parry, Adm Sir E. (Chief of NZ Naval Staff, 1940–42),
Passfield, Lord (Secy for Colonies),
Patch, Lt-Gen A. M. (
Phillips, Adm Sir T. (C-in-C Eastern Fleet),
Pibul Songgram, Fd Mshl Luang (PM of
Price, Maj-Gen C. F. B. (USMC),
Prinz Eugen,
Puttick, Lt-Gen Sir E. (CGS, NZ Mil Forces, 1941–45),
Quebec Conference (octagon),
Queen Elizabeth, HMS,
Ramillies, HMS,
Rangitane, MV,
Renown, HMS,
Resolution, HMS,
Revenge, HMS,
Rommel, Fd Mshl E.,
Roosevelt, F. D. (President of
75 (NZ) Squadron,
Royal Sovereign, HMS,
Samoan Defence Force,
Saunders, Air Chief Mshl Sir H. (CAS,
Scharnhorst,
sextant Conference (
Shafroth, Rear-Adm J. F. (USN),
Short, Lt-Gen W. C. (
See
Solomon Is.,
Somerville, Adm of Fleet Sir J. (C-in-C Eastern Fleet),
Songgram, Fd Mshl Luang Pibul. See
Stettinius, E. R. (US Secy of State),
Stevens, Col (
Stevens, Maj-Gen W. G.,
Stewart, Maj-Gen Sir K. (Deputy CGS, NZ Mil Forces),
Suzuki, Adm Baron (PM of
Sverdrup, Maj-Gen L. J. (
Tactical Air Force, for occupation of
Toyoda, Vice-Adm (Foreign Min,
Treasury I.,
Truman, H. (President of
Turner, Rear-Adm R. K. (USN),
Unden, B. O.,
UK Chiefs of Staff, on situation in
UK War Cabinet, considers Far Eastern situation,
UK War Office,
US Asiatic Fleet,
US Chiefs of Staff,
US Forces—
US Joint Working Committee, report by,
US Military Mission to
US Naval Observer in NZ,
See
Valiant, HMS,
vanguard, operation (
Verduynen, Jonkheer E. M. van (Netherlands Min to
Vichy Government,
Voelcker, Col F. W.,
Wahine,
Wake I.,
Wales, Brig J. G. C. (Fiji Mil Forces),
Wang Ching-wei,
Wavell, Fd Mshl Earl (Sup Comd SW Pacific,
Wedemeyer, Gen A. C. (
Welles, Sumner (U/Secy of State,
Whyte, Cdr C. A. (USN),
Wilkinson, Vice-Adm T. S. (USN),
Williams, Gen Sir G. (Mil Adviser to NZ Govt,
Professor N. C. Phillips, MA, University of Canterbury
Professor J. Rutherford, MA (
Professor F. L. W. Wood, MA (Oxon), Victoria University of
Professor F. W. Holmes, MA, Victoria University of
This volume was produced and published by the
The Department gratefully acknowledges the valuable assistance given in the production of this volume by Professor Wood.
R. E. OWEN, GOVERNMENT PRINTER,