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2004714340Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–45Illustrations have been included from the original source.The Home Front Volume ITaylor, Nancy M.Historical Publications Branch, Department Of Internal AffairsWellington, New Zealand1986Source copy consulted: Defence Force Library, New ZealandOfficial History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–45
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NZETC Subject Headings1986EnglishNew Zealand World War II History3 December 2004Colin DoigAdded name tags around names of various people, places, and organisations.31 August 2004Jamie NorrishAdded link markup for project in TEI header.2 August 2004Jamie NorrishAdded funding details to header.2 June 2004Jamie NorrishCompleted TEI header.21:18:36, Tuesday 7 August 2007NZETCText-proofing of a sample of the text21:18:36, Tuesday 7 August 2007NZETCConversion to TEI.2-conformat markup21:18:36, Tuesday 7 August 2007NZETCAdding scripted markup21:18:36, Tuesday 7 August 2007NZETCAddition of encodingDesc21:18:36, Tuesday 7 August 2007NZETCAddition of bibls21:18:36, Tuesday 7 August 2007NZETCAssembled all images21:18:36, Tuesday 7 August 2007NZETCCreation of derivative images21:18:36, Tuesday 7 August 2007NZETCValidation of TEI21:18:36, Tuesday 7 August 2007NZETCValidation of names21:18:36, Tuesday 7 August 2007NZETCConversion to Unicode (utf-8)21:18:36, Tuesday 7 August 2007NZETCPromotion to production21:18:36, Tuesday 7 August 2007NZETCAddition of text to access control21:18:37, Tuesday 7 August 2007NZETCHarvest into Topic Map21:18:37, Tuesday 7 August 2007NZETCChecking of text using browser21:18:37, Tuesday 7 August 2007NZETCAddition of text to corpus21:18:37, Tuesday 7 August 2007NZETCAddition of text to Library Catalogue14:49:45, Tuesday 23 September 2008NZETCMake text available on NZETC website16:19:03, Friday 28 August 2009NZETCPreparation of EPUB (and other formats such as DaisyBook)14:03:59, Wedsnesday 4 August 2010NZETCIndex the text into SOLR to allow searching
Official History of New Zealand
in the Second World War
1939–45
THE HOME FRONT
THIS book is the final volume of the Official History of New
Zealand in the Second World War. This fact in itself immediately conjures up sharply etched pictures of notable New Zealanders
who were involved in the planning and production of that multi-volumed History: Prime Minister Peter Fraser, a man of large capabilities, who had led the country firmly and perceptively throughout
the greater part of the war and who worked so hard for a just peace;
Dr E. H. McCormick, who had been the archivist for the 2nd New
Zealand Expeditionary Force and who was both an innovator and a
prime mover in most of the proposals that led to the political decision
to have the Official History written; Major-General Sir Howard Kippenberger, a great New Zealander who uniquely combined the highest soldierly and scholarly qualities, and who was appointed Editor-in-Chief in February 1946; Dr J. C. Beaglehole, that most peace-loving of men who in his role as Historical Adviser to the Department of Internal Affairs had made a challenging team-mate for that
Department’s far-sighted head, Joseph Heenan, and who now made
available to a small, soon to become dedicated, staff the highest
precepts of scholarly performance; Professor F. L. W. Wood, always
ready to wrestle with the many professional problems that continuously surrounded a project of such size and who himself wrote the
volume entitled Political and External Affairs, the only major title
to be reprinted; W. A. Glue, who sub-edited—or indeed in some
cases edited—the complete Official History with the exception of
this final volume, a contribution which has often been overlooked.
It is into this context that this book must be fitted. The final
plan for the Official History divided the work into four series. The
major series, ‘Campaign and Service Volumes’, comprised twenty-four volumes (including an out-of-period volume The New Zealanders in South Africa, 1899–1902), covering in separate volumes
the war in the Pacific, the major campaigns such as those in Greece,
Crete, Egypt and on until the final North African campaign in Tunisia, and, in two volumes, Italy. It included volumes on medical
and dental services, the Royal New Zealand Navy and the Royal
New Zealand Air Force; three volumes covering the activities of
New Zealanders with the Royal Air Force; and three volumes of
documents that go far in revealing the political involvement of New
Zealand in the war.
Then there is a series, ‘Unit Histories’, covering the units of the
2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the Middle East and Italy,
twenty-one titles in all. Histories of New Zealand units which had
served in the Pacific were written under separate arrangement. In
this series the regiments, battalions and companies are treated informally and in sufficient detail to do justice to those who served in
them.
A third series, ‘Episodes and Studies’, in which there are twenty-four titles, was published with the aim of reaching a wide public
with brief but carefully compiled and illustrated accounts of specific
aspects of the war, such as life aboard a troopship, coastwatching in
New Zealand and the Pacific, long-range desert patrols, aerial and
naval combat, and so on. There is much good history in this series.
Finally there is the fourth series, ‘The New Zealand People at
War’, of which two volumes, Political and External Affairs, by
F. L. W. Wood, and War Economy, by J. V. T. Baker, are already
published. The Home Front, to complete the series, is very much the
story of a people at war, treating the people separately from the
armed services which they supported so well, so skilfully, with both
love and anguish, for six years of war.
When Brigadier M. C. Fairbrother, who had become Editor-in-Chief on General Kippenberger’s death in May 1957, asked Wellington historian Nancy Taylor to undertake the research and writing
of the ‘social history’, only two things were known for certain—that
it was an enormous job and that Mrs Taylor was capable of doing
it. Two impressive publications already stood to her credit, for she
had edited Early Travellers in New Zealand and the Journal of EnsignBest. But no one had any idea of the interaction between Industry, persistence, perception, professionalism, compassion and vision,
and the sheer bulk of the material that she examined. Her thoroughness, together with the many demands of her private life, explain
the time it has taken to produce this book.
Mrs Taylor has arranged in orderly sequence the events that press
upon civilian existence in a time of war. Some of these events are
important, even dramatic, some in their gradual unfolding of seemingly slight significance. Taken together they represent elements that
constitute the day-to-day preoccupations of a nation at war. Looking
back, after a lapse of some forty years, we are aware that life then
was very different from life today, in domestic matters, in political
affairs, in religion, education and in much else. Whether as a nation
we have changed for good or ill may be a matter for debate, but
no one will dispute that Mrs Taylor has set out, always with clarity
and often with wit, the nature of life during the Second World
War.
The book presents a carefully documented evidential account of
what that life was all about. It is largely left to others to draw
conclusions and to formulate social theories from the evidence. In
her long and patient collection and presentation of so much material
evidence, Mrs Taylor has shown herself fully entitled to be numbered
with those other ‘greats’ evoked at the beginning of this Foreword.
I. McL. WardsChief HistorianHistorical Publications Branch29 November 1982
OFFICIAL HISTORY OF NEW ZEALAND IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939–45
Campaign and Service Volumes
Gillespie, Oliver A.The Pacific (1952)McClymont, W. G.To Greece (1959)Davin, D. M.Crete (1953)Murphy, W. E.The Relief of Tobruk (1961)Scoullar, J. L.Battle for Egypt (1955)Walker, RonaldAlam Halfa to Alamein (1967)Stevens, Major-General W. G.Bardia to Enfidaville (1962)Phillips, N. C.Italy, Volume I: The Sangro to Cassino (1957)Kay, RobinItaly, Volume II: From Cassino to Trieste (1967)Anson, T. V.The New Zealand Dental Services (1960)Mason, W. WynnePrisoners of War (1954)Ross, Squadron-Leader J. M. S.Royal New Zealand Air Force (1955)Stevens, Major-General W. G.Problems of 2 NZEF (1958)Stout, T. Duncan M.War Surgery and Medicine (1954)———New Zealand Medical Services in Middle East and Italy (1956)———Medical Services in New Zealand and the Pacific (1958)Thompson, Wing-Commander H. L.New Zealanders with the Royal Air Force, Volumes I–III (1953, 1956, 1959)Waters, S. D.Royal New Zealand Navy (1956)Documents Relating to New Zealand’s Participation in the Second World War, Volumes I–III (1949, 1951, 1963)
The New Zealand People at War
Wood, F. L. W.Political and External Affairs (1958)Baker, J. V. T.War Economy (1965)Taylor, Nancy MThe Home Front, Volumes I–II (1986)
Unit Histories
Dawson, W. D.18 Battalion and Armoured Regiment (1961)Sinclair, D. W.19 Battalion and Armoured Regiment (1954)Pringle, D. J. C. and W. A. Glue20 Battalion and Armoured Regiment (1957)Cody, J. F.21 Battalion (1953)Henderson, Jim22 Battalion (1958)Ross, Angus23 Battalion (1959)Burdon, R. M.24 Battalion (1953)Puttick, Lieutenant-General Sir Edward25 Battalion (1960)Norton, Frazer D26 Battalion (1952)Kay, Robin27 (Machine Gun) Battalion (1958)Cody, J. F.28 (Maori) Battalion (1956)Bates, P. W.Supply Company (1955)Borman, C. A.Divisional Signals (1954)Cody, J. F.New Zealand Engineers, Middle East (1961)Henderson, JimRMT: Official History of the 4th and 6th Reserve Mechanical Transport Companies (1954)Kidson, A. L.Petrol Company (1961)Llewellyn, S. P.Journey Towards Christmas (1st Ammunition Company) (1949)Loughnan, R. J. M.Divisional Cavalry (1963)McKinney, J. B.Medical Units of 2 NZEF in Middle East and Italy (1952)Murphy, W. E.2 New Zealand Divisional Artillery (1967)Underhill, Rev M. L., et al.New Zealand Chaplains in the Second World War (1950)
Episodes and Studies
Volume 1:Guns Against Tanks, E. H. Smith; Women at War, D. O. W. Hall;
Achilles at the River Plate, S. D. Waters; Troopships, S. P. Llewellyn;
The Assault on Rabaul, J. M. S. Ross; German Raiders in the Pacific,
S. D. Waters; Prisoners of Germany, D. O. W. Hall; Prisoners of Italy,
D. O. W. Hall; Prisoners of Japan, D. O. W. Hall; Long Range Desert
Group in Libya, R. L. Kay; Long Range Desert Group in the
Mediterranean, R. L. Kay; Wounded in Battle, J. B. McKinneyVolume 2:Aircraft Against U-boat, H. L. Thompson; Early Operations with Bomber
Command, B. G. Clare; New Zealanders in the Battle of Britain,
N. W. Faircloth; Leander, S. D. Waters; Malta Airmen, J. A. Whelan;
Takrouna, I. McL. Wards; Coast watchers, D. O. W. Hall; The RNZAF
in South-East Asia, 1941–42. H. R. Dean; ‘The Other Side of the Hill’,
I. McL. Wardset al.; Special Service in Greece, M. B. McGlynn; Point 175, W. E. Murphy; Escapes, D. O. W. Hall
(These 24 booklets were first issued as individual publications, 1948–1954.)
All titles were published at Wellington, those before 1966 by the War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, the remainder by the Historical Publications Branch.
Preface
NEW Zealand has industriously recorded its participation in the
Second World War. Forty-four solid books about the forces,
accounts of army, navy and air force operations, of medical matters
and prisoners of war, of special military units, are rounded off with
‘The New Zealand People at War’, a series of three titles on civilian
aspects. Professor F. L. W. Wood’s Political and External Affairs
(1958) and J. V. T. Baker’s War Economy (1965), close-packed mines
of information, perception and assessment, have long proved their
worth. Straggling up years behind, but closely linked with both,
The Home Front seeks to cover areas which may have been touched
upon but were not dealt with. The term ‘grass-roots’ inevitably, if
presumptuously, comes to mind in this attempt at a social history
of a community during six years when its main energies were directed
to war. Despite the comprehensive treatment, readers will certainly
think of things that are untouched. The social elements of history
invite almost limitless exploration, illustration and qualification. Even
two volumes impose stringent limits: the original draft was cut by
about 150 000 words. Most of this pruning was healthy condensation and trimming of illustrative detail, but a few background
pieces had to join the scrap-pile. The topics treated and the extent
of the treatment are to some degree subjective; another person could
have produced a very different account. I have felt throughout that
I have merely scratched the surface and further material will certainly
be found to cast new light on dim or unknown places. I hope that
this is but a start on the social history of New Zealand in the Second
World War and that others will pursue further the many enticing
topics merely touched on here, let alone those untouched.
Newspapers were a main source, and the liberal access that I was
given to those held by the General Assembly Library has been vital.
I am deeply grateful to successive Librarians, James Wilson, Hillas
MacLean and Ian Mathieson, and their staffs, for use of this material
and other assistance. In the war years, through the Press Association,
many local reports appeared in very similar form in papers far from
their starting places. Sometimes where a report of, say, a Wellington
incident was first noticed in an Auckland paper, it may be attributed
to that source if Wellington papers seen later showed much the same
story. Occasionally, more distant papers even printed an extra detail
or two; sometimes special correspondents gave a little more information. Investigative journalism had not arrived in New Zealand
and the description of press censorship in the text indicates the
limitations. But newspaper reports, editorials and correspondence
taken together give something of the situation as presented to and
understood by people at the time. In many cases, information now
available from official sources has filled in the gaps and, wherever
possible, events are depicted more as they really happened than as
wartime restrictions permitted people to perceive them. Nevertheless, it has been part of my purpose to make clear both versions.
I am deeply grateful to Michael Hitchings and his staff at the
Hocken Library, University of Otago, for making the J. T. Paul
Papers available most freely. The Alexander Turnbull Library, under
A. G. Bagnall and J. E. Traue, has been very helpful, as always.
National Archives, under the late John Pascoe and Judith Hornabrook, assisted me greatly in lending the relevant narratives prepared
by the War History Branch and in producing records of departmental war effort. From the latter I am sure that future and more
specialised histories will find much that space would not permit to
be probed here.
I thank the Department of Labour for the use of an MS register
of strikes. I am indebted also to all the people who responded to
an appeal made in the New Zealand Woman’s Weekly in 1969 for
ration books and recollections. The ration books formed a mosaic
evoking domestic limitations that are hard to imagine or even
remember when shops are crammed. Of the recollections, a few
quoted directly are acknowledged in the footnotes; all of them added
to my understanding and, often invisibly, have helped to shape presentation. Because so many are thus hidden, I have not included in
the list of sources used those actually quoted.
Special thanks go to the late Reverend Ormond Burton, who gave
much information and illumination on the pacifist movement, and
to Professor J. R. McCreary, who read over and added to the section
on conscientious objectors. Janet Paul’s guidance in the piece on
painting was almost the writing of it.
Finally, most profound thanks are due to the Historical Publications Branch of the Department of Internal Affairs. Penelope
Wheeler is entirely responsible for the biographical footnotes, apart
from a great deal of diligent typing and general editorial work. Ian
Wards, as editor, has been infinitely patient, stimulating and exacting in the search towards clarity, accuracy and proportion. Adequate
thanks are impossible, but it should be known that he has knocked
out a great many faults and bulges, demanded checks, encouraged,
worked over problems, and polished everywhere, his zeal lit always
with understanding and humour. Any merits are much of his making.
Special thanks also go to Ian McGibbon, the current Chief Historian, and proofreader Maree McKenzie for their exacting labours
in seeing the work through the press, and to the Government Printing Office staff for their contribution to the production of this book.
The index was compiled by Debbie Jones.
N. M. T.
Contents
PageFOREWORDvPREFACExiLIST OF ILLUSTRATIONSxviiABBREVIATIONSxxiMETRIC CONVERSIONxxixVolume 11The End of Waiting12Impact of War223The First Moves684Response from the Home Front1335Pacifism1716A Dissenting Minority2097Conscientious Objectors and Defaulters2448Blood is Spilt2869The Menace of Japan31410War Comes to the Pacific33011The Challenge is Accepted37212Defence by the People45013Russia and the War57414The American Invasion621Volume II15Manpower is Directed66316The Shoe Pinches74217More Shortages79718Aliens85119Censorship88620Camp Followers101421Women at War105322Education111623The Arts Survive118324Victory at Last1219SOURCES1297INDEX1309
List of Illustrations
PHOTOGRAPHS (all held by the Alexander Turnbull Library)
Frontispiece Volume IArmy personnel engaged in harvesting. War History Collectionfacing p. 194Peter Fraser. Reeds CollectionConscientious objectors. War History CollectionConscientious objectors in a detention camp.Liberty Loan poster. Gordon Burt CollectionDraught horses in Awatere Valley, Marlborough, 1945. War History
CollectionSheep droving in the Wairarapa. War History
CollectionParliament grounds dug up for air raid shelters, 1941. War History
CollectionEntrance to an air raid shelter in Parliament grounds. War History
CollectionHutt Road, showing headlight restriction notices, 1943. Evening Post
CollectionInstalling blackout curtains. War History CollectionRace meeting at Trentham, March 1943. War History CollectionSoldiers working on the waterfront at Auckland. War History
CollectionThe Somes Battalion, Home Guard, on a route march from Petone
to Eastbourne, 1943. War History Collectionfacing p. 418Sir Apirana Ngata. S. P. Andrew CollectionJ. G. Coates. War History CollectionPeter Fraser with New Zealand servicemen in England. War History
CollectionA school air raid shelter at Devonport, Auckland. War History
CollectionAn air raid shelter under construction, Auckland, April 1942. War
History CollectionFour St John ambulance nurses at the opening of the Centennial
Memorial meeting house, Tawakeheimoa, at Te Awahou. Pascoe
CollectionEPS personnel practice first-aid.Maori section of the Women’s National Service Corps on parade.Women’s National Service Corps digging trenches. War History
CollectionHome Guardsmen. Evening Post CollectionMen of the Elmwood Home Guard prepared for work on defences,
December 1941. War History CollectionCrib (snack) time in a wet mine, Stockton, 1944. War History
CollectionDenniston, 1945. Pascoe CollectionUnited States troops at Paekakariki, 1942. War History CollectionUnited States marines lined up with their mess gear, Paekakariki,
1943. War History CollectionPolish refugees, 1945. Pascoe CollectionFree apples for school children. War History CollectionFrontispiece Volume IINational Savings poster.facing p. 866Waste metal collection. War History CollectionGlass and paper conservation. War History CollectionA winchdriver unloading war material, 1943. Pascoe CollectionSoldiers building a haystack, Hamilton, 1944. War History CollectionRation books being issued by the Post and Telegraph Department
at Auckland, April 1942. War History CollectionA ration book pageThe Coast Watching Station at Oteranga Bay, only accessible by
horse, 1943. Pascoe CollectionPatriotic poster designed by the Governor-General, Lord Galway.
Evening Post CollectionMrs Eleanor Roosevelt talking to Mrs Janet Fraser at Auckland Airport, 1943. Pascoe CollectionMrs Eleanor Roosevelt and J. T. Paul, Director of Publicity, at
Government House, 1943. Pascoe CollectionGirl Guides in Auckland making camouflage nets. War History
CollectionAircraft construction at the de Havilland plant in Wellington, 1943.
War History CollectionRed Cross supplies being loaded at Wellington Wharf. War History
CollectionGift food being loaded for despatch to Britain, January 1948. War
History CollectionA munitions factory, 1943. Pascoe CollectionManufacture of helmets. Gordon Burt Collectionfacing p. 1090A member of the Women’s Land Service holding a lamb for tailing
at Porangahau. War History CollectionBattledress being manufactured at Cathie & Sons Ltd. War History
CollectionAircraft being constructed. War History CollectionGrenade making at Christchurch. War History CollectionCabbages grown by the Department of Agriculture for use by United
States forces, Levin, 1943. War History CollectionA Levin vegetable farm, producing vegetables for reciprocal lend
lease. Pascoe CollectionCabinetmakers at work at the Disabled Servicemen’s Centre, Christchurch. War History CollectionMotor tow-boats built in Auckland for the United States armed
forces being launched in 1943. War History CollectionLoading rounds into ammunition clips at the Colonial Ammunition
Company’s factory, Hamilton, 1944. War History CollectionWoman tram conductor, Wellington, 1943. War History CollectionA stack of stripped flax fibre ready for the manufacturing process
with a flax bush in the foreground, Foxton, 1945. War History
CollectionNew housing estate, Naenae, 1944. Evening Post CollectionCelebrating VE Day, Lambton Quay, Wellington, 8 May 1945.
War History CollectionCanadian sailors in Wellington on VJ Day, 15 August 1945. War
History CollectionThe return of the 28th (Maori) Battalion, Wellington, 1947. Two
kuias express grief for the relatives of soldiers who died overseas.
War History CollectionSoldiers’ cemetery, Karori, Wellington, 1944. War History Collection
DOCUMENTSpagePermit for Railway Journey318Red Cross leaflet485Evacuation card539Approval notice for application for pair of gumboots774
CARTOONS (all by Minhinnick, New Zealand Herald)‘Westfield Aftermath’384‘To be, or not to be’411‘Moon-struck’412‘Here————There’414‘Shrunk in the Wash’480‘The Ins and Outs’492‘Reply Paid’610‘They say she knows where there’s some wool!’763‘“Come and get it!”’782‘Austerity Christmas’794‘Buttercuts and Dazes’819‘We Have no Pyjamas To-day’844‘Simple Blackout Hints, No. 163’910‘Prisoner of War?’943‘Education under Difficulties’1136
Abbreviations
A to JAppendices to the Journals of the House of
RepresentativesadadvertisementadminadministrationAdmltyAdmiraltyaetagedAEWSArmy Education and Welfare ServiceAffAffairsAIFAustralian Imperial ForceANZUSAustralia–New Zealand–United StatesAppAppendixAssn, AssocAssociation, AssociatedARPAir Raid PrecautionsASRSAmalgamated Society of Railway ServantsAsstAssistantATCAir Training CorpsATLAlexander Turnbull LibraryAUCAuckland University College (now University of
Auckland)AuckAucklandAustAustraliabbornBBCBritish Broadcasting Corporationb’castingbroadcastingBdBoardBEFBritish Expeditionary ForceBEMBritish Empire MedalBHSBoys High SchoolBMABritish Medical AssociationbrBranchC & PCensorship & PublicityCabCabinetCantyCanterburyCASChief of the Air StaffCBCompanion of the Most Honourable Order of the
BathCBECommander of the Most Excellent Order of the
British EmpireCBSColumbia Broadcasting SystemCIGSChief of the Imperial General StaffCGSChief of the General StaffCHCompanion of HonourChanc ExchChancellor of the ExchequerChapChaplainChchChristchurchchmnchairmanC-in-CCommander-in-Chiefcmdrcommanding officerCMGCompanion of the Order of St Michael and St
GeorgeCmssnCommissionCmssnrCommissionercmtecommitteeCnclCouncilCNSChief of Naval StaffCoCompanyColColonel, colonialConfConferenceCo-opCo-operativeCorpCorporationCORSOCouncil of Organisations for Relief Service
OverseasCOSChiefs of StaffCPSChristian Pacifist SocietyCSICompanion of the Order of the Star of IndiaCStJCompanion of the Order of St John of JerusalemCUCCanterbury University College (now University of
Canterbury)C’wealthCommonwealthddiedDCMDistinguished Conduct MedalDBEDame of the British EmpireDefDefenceDepDeputyDeptDepartmentDFCDistinguished Flying CrossDHSDistrict High SchoolDirDirectorDivDivisionDomDominionDSIRDepartment of Scientific and Industrial ResearchDSMDistinguished Service MedalDSODistinguished Service OrderDunDunedinEdEditorEDEfficiency DecorationEducEducation, educatedEFSEmergency Fire ServiceEPSEmergency Precautions SchemeExecExecutiveExt AffExternal AffairsFCISFellow of Chartered Institute of SecretariesfdtnfoundationFednFederationFNZIEFellow of New Zealand Institute of EngineersFoLFederation of LabourFRAMFellow of the Royal Academy of MusicFRCSFellow of the Royal College of SurgeonsFRSFellow of the Royal SocietyGBEKnight Grand Cross of the Most Excellent Order of
the British EmpireGCBKnight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable
Order of the BathGCIEKnight Grand Commander of the Indian EmpireGCMGKnight Grand Cross of the Order of St Michael
and St GeorgeGCSIKnight Grand Commander of the Star of IndiaGCVOKnight or Dame Grand Cross of Royal Victorian
OrderGenGeneralGGNZGovernor-General of New ZealandGMTGreenwich Mean TimeGOCGeneral Officer CommandingGov GenGovernor GeneralGovtGovernmentHCHigh CommissionerHoCHouse of CommonsHoLHouse of LordsHonHonourable, HonoraryHoRHouse of RepresentativesHQHeadquartersIAInternal Affairsi/cin charge ofIGSImperial General StaffILOInternational General StaffImpImperialIMTFEInternational Military Tribunal for the Far EastIndepIndependentInf BdeInfantry BrigadeInstInstituteInt AffInternal AffairsISOImperial Service OrderISSInternational Student ServiceJPJustice of the PeaceKBEKnight Commander of the British EmpireKCKing’s CounselKCBKnight Commander of the BathKCMGKnight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St GeorgeKGKnight of the Order of the GarterKStJKnight of the Order of St John of JerusalemKtKnight BachelorLabLabourLibLiberalLIBBachelor of LawsLMLegion of MeritLoNLeague of NationsLRCLabour Representation CommitteeLtLieutenantMAMaori AffairsMBEMember of the Order of the British EmpireMCMilitary CrossmembmemberMethMethodistmngrmanagerMHRMember of the House of RepresentativesMICEMember of the Institute of Civil EngineersmidMentioned in DespatchesMinMinisterMinyMinistryMLAMember of the Legislative AssemblyMLCMember of the Legislative CouncilMMMilitary MedalMPMember of ParliamentMSManuscriptNatNationalNBSNational Broadcasting ServiceNCOnon-commissioned officerNSNational Service DepartmentNZANSNew Zealand Army Nursing ServiceNZBCNew Zealand Broadcasting CorporationNZBSNew Zealand Broadcasting ServiceNZCPSNew Zealand Christian Pacifist SocietyNZEFNew Zealand Expeditionary ForceNZEINew Zealand Educational InstituteNZFUNew Zealand Farmers’ UnionNZLANew Zealand Library AssociationNZLSNew Zealand Library ServiceNZMCNew Zealand Medical CorpsNZPANew Zealand Press AssociationNZPDNew Zealand Parliamentary DebatesNZRBNew Zealand Rifle BrigadeNZRSANew Zealand Returned Services AssociationNZUUniversity of New ZealandNZWWUNew Zealand Waterside Workers UnionOBEOfficer of the Order of the British EmpireOCOfficer CommandingOffOfficerOMOrder of MeritONSOrganisation for National SecurityOpposOppositionOrchOrchestraOUOtago University (now University of Otago)OxonOxford UniversityP & TPost and TelegraphPacPacificParlyParliamentaryPCPrivy CouncillorPENPoets, Playwrights, Essayists, Editors and NovelistsPMPrime Minister, Prime Minister’s DepartmentPMGPostmaster-GeneralPOWprisoner-of-warPPUPeace Pledge UnionPresPresidentPresbyPresbyterianPROPublic Relations OfficerProfProfessorPSAPublic Service AssociationptpartPWDPublic Works DepartmentQCQueen’s CounselQMQuartermasterQMGQuartermaster-GeneralRAFRoyal Air ForceRehabRehabilitationreprepresentativeRevReverendRFCRoyal Flying CorpsRNASRoyal Naval Air ServiceRNRRoyal Naval ReserveRNVRRoyal Naval Volunteer ReserveRNZAFRoyal New Zealand Air ForceRSAReturned Services AssociationRtRightRTARailway Trades AssociationSecSecretarySMStipendiary MagistrateS Mil CmdSouthern Military CommandSocSocietySSDASecretary of State for Dominion AffairsSuperintSuperintendentTyTreasuryTEALTrans-Empire Air LineTVTelevisionUKHCUnited Kingdom High CommissionerUNUnited NationsUNESCOUnited Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural OrganisationUSAUnited States of AmericaUSSRUnion of Soviet Socialist RepublicsUNRRAUnited Nations Relief and Rehabilitation AdministrationVADVoluntary Aid DetachmentVCVictoria CrossVDVolunteer Decoration, venereal diseaseVenVenerablevolvolumeVUCVictoria University College (now Victoria University of Wellington)WAACWomen’s Auxiliary Army CorpsWAAFWomen’s Auxiliary Air ForceWCCWaterfront Control CommissionWDFUWomen’s Division of the Farmer’s UnionWEAWorkers’ Education AssociationWgtnWellingtonWHFWar History FileWHNWar History NarrativeWRNZNSWomen’s Royal New Zealand Naval ServiceWVSWomen’s Voluntary ServicesWWWorld WarWWSAWomen’s War Service AuxiliaryYearbookNew Zealand Official Year-bookYMCAYoung Men’s Christian AssociationYWCAYoung Women’s Christian Association
Note regarding newspaper material cited in footnotes: where no pagination is given the
citation is from the editorial.
Metric Conversion
Since 1960, most countries in the world, including New Zealand,
have converted from varying methods of measurement to the Système
International d’Unités (SI). The traditional English system for money
and measurement denominations has been retained in this book, in
keeping with the sources used and with the other volumes of the
Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War series.
The following information is supplied for conversion purposes:
Money
One pound (£1) (20 shillings) = 2 dollars ($2)
One shilling (12 pence) = 10 cents
One guinea (21 shillings) = $2.10
Linear
One mile (1760 yards) = 1.609 kilometres
One yard (3 feet) = 0.914 metres
One foot (12 inches) = 30.48 centimetres
One inch = 2.54 centimetres
Square measure
One square mile (640 acres) = 2.589 square kilometres
One acre (4840 square yards) = 0.404 hectares
One square yard = 0.836 square metres
One square foot = 929 square centimetres
Cubic (liquid) measure
One gallon (4 quarts) = 4.546 litres
One quart (2 pints) = 1.136 litres
One pint = 0.568 litres
Cubic (material) measure
One cubic yard = 0.764 cubic metres
One cubic foot = 0.0283 cubic metres
One cubic inch = 16.397 cubic centimetres
Weight
One ton (2240 pounds) = 1016 kilogrammes
One hundredweight (112 pounds) = 50.802 kilogrammes
One pound (16 ounces) = 453 grammes
One ounce = 28.35 grammes
Horsepower
One horsepower = 0.746 kilowatts
Temperature
32° Fahrenheit = 0° Celsius (freezing point)
212° Fahrenheit = 100° Celsius
CHAPTER 1
The End of Waiting
3 September 1939
THE years of waiting were over, the years of uneasiness, when
newspapers had reported crisis after crisis till readers were numbed
by the repetition of violence, confused by the welter of assertions,
negotiations, shifts of policy. From the complicated and faulty weaving of the dictators and diplomats had emerged a gloomy pattern—
the aggressors seemed always to get what they wanted, pushing back
the so-called victors of the Great War and gaining at every move
in strength of purpose, actual power and barefaced lack of scruple.
Now New Zealand was at war because of German demands for
Polish territory, and it did not seem fantastic. Almost it seemed
inevitable. Shocked dismay was mingled with relief that the restless,
anxious peace was ended, and the terrible excitement of war was at
hand.
How much New Zealanders felt or failed to feel about the war-presaging events of the Thirties was largely determined by their sense
of being remote in the world and small in the British Commonwealth, but also and very strongly by what was happening at home.
The effect of the Depression of 1930–5 was wide, deep and cauterising. At its worst, in October 1933, there were 79 587 men
registered as unemployed,
New Zealand Official Year-book (hereinafter Yearbook) 1938, p. 802
while it is calculated that more than
100 000 could have been so classified,
Sutch, W. B., Poverty and Progress in New Zealand, p. 134
to say nothing of women,
in a total population of 1 539 500.
Yearbook1938, p. 58
The Depression story has been
told so often, sometimes poignantly, sometimes with weary repetition, but familiarity should not dull awareness of it when the war
that followed is considered. For many New Zealanders the Depression was a worse time than the war. They found the limitations of
the creed that if a man works hard he can always get along, but
belief in the creed was still strong enough to cause deep shame and
bewilderment. So many people knew the humiliation of farm or
business failing, of being rejected by employers, of seeing their
families in want; so many others lived in fear of these things. So
many knew the uselessness of relief work, the cold and mud of
labour camps, the tyranny of bosses conscious of labour queues, the
tragedy of a lost shilling. So many women would never forget the
dreariness of worn-out clothes, of meals monotonous and poor, of
crowded living in dingy rooms. So many had feared to help their
neighbours’ want lest they need every penny themselves, yet been
ashamed of their caution. Behind the smashed windows of Queen
Street lay a deal of ignoble suffering.
The Depression deepened very steeply the division between classes,
and was to make many workers suspicious lest the bosses should
steal a march against them under cover of the war. Meanwhile, in
the Thirties, it blunted concern for more remote troubles. By 1936
prices were improving and the Labour government accelerated recovery with State spending and organisation. People were absorbed in
housing and pension schemes, in working hours, wages, the cost of
living, farming prices; they were catching up on the bad years,
improving their homes and furniture, buying blankets and china
and clothes and radios and cars, bent on climbing out of a local
hell into a local heaven. There were others, appalled at finding the
country in the hands of a rash, experimental government, who foresaw local disaster, a chaos of socialisation and financial ruin; the
enemy at home absorbed their anxious fears, their political activity.
Both sorts read of invasion and political violence in China, Abyssinia, Spain, as they might have read a serial, though no serial would
be so disjointed or contradictory. Few read anything except the daily
papers, and the opinions they derived therefrom were coloured by
a variety of existing attitudes—their attachment to Britain, their
sense of colonialism or of independence, faith in the League of
Nations, fear of Communism, fear of Fascism. Generally, however,
New Zealanders shared one attitude, and shared it with a good many
other countries—they wanted peace, and they did not want to pay
for it with money or with men.
It is a truism now that the seeds of the new conflict were sown
in the treaties of 1919 and began to germinate in October 1931.
Then, Japan having invaded Manchuria, the member states of the
League, each preoccupied with its own economic problems and not
guessing how Japanese aggression would grow on success, considered
its own chances of advantage and collectively they did nothing. It
was the beginning, the sketching in of the pattern that was repeated
implacably, with details different and freshly distressing, during the
next eight years, each precedent building up in individual minds a
sense of bewildered, helpless connivance—‘It’s wrong, but what can
we do?’
When Hitler
Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945): German Fascist dictator; Chancellor German Reich 1933;
Head German State 1934–45
came to power in 1933, attacked trade unions and
Jews and began to build up armaments and national spirit, the sense
of war in the world grew stronger for New Zealanders. Japan was
remembered as an ally; Germany was a familiar foe. Thereafter many,
as they read the newspapers, felt that they would some day have to
finish the fight begun 20 years before; in the small boys’ battles the
enemy were always Germans.
But it was Mussolini’s
Mussolini, Benito (1883–1945): Italian Fascist dictator from 1922
Italy, hungry for empire, that next thickened the war clouds, for Italy, despite the threat of sanctions by the
League, attacked Abyssinia in October 1935. Laval’s
Laval, Pierre (1883–1945): French PM 1931–2, 1934–6, 1942–4; executed 1945
France, unwilling to risk a fight or a rapprochement of Italy and Germany, connived, though not openly or enough to satisfy Italy. The British
government, though talking bravely of standing by the Covenant,
was unprepared for war and determined to avoid it. It feared to
drive Italy towards Germany; feared lest sanctions prove ineffective,
which would make Britain the object of Italy’s hostility and contempt; feared lest they prove effective, when a desperate Italy might
attack in the Mediterranean and France might forsake her ally. From
present knowledge of the ineffectiveness of Italy’s armed forces, even
years later, it seems astonishing that Britain, despite the lowered
state of her forces in 1935, should so seriously have feared a fight
with Mussolini; it seems probable that she also feared Mussolini’s
fall and the chance of another communist state. Thus, palsied with
considerations, Britain and France fumbled over the most important
sanction—oil—and instead Hoare
Hoare, Rt Hon Samuel John Gurney, 1st Viscount Templewood of Chelsea, PC, GCSI
(1880–1959): Sec State Air 1922–4, India1931–5, Foreign Aff 1935; 1st Lord Admlty
1936–7; Sec State Home Aff 1937–9, Air 1940; UK Ambassador Spain on special mission
1940–4
and Laval in December proposed
a settlement so generous to Italy that it was indignantly repudiated
by both public and Parliament in Britain.
Laval, Premier of France, and Hoare, the British Foreign Secretary, secretly agreed that
their governments would use their influence to induce Abyssinia and the League of Nations
to accept that a large part of Abyssinia should be assigned to Italy for economic expansion
and settlement. This was a sudden change from Hoare’s speech in September in support
of collective security against aggression. When the proposals became known in December
1935 they were rejected by both the Commons and the Chamber of Deputies, amid
uproar which caused Hoare to resign.
There was more delay
over the oil sanctions, while Italy pushed on with the war, occupying
Addis Ababa in May 1936; and the world—with New Zealand
modestly dissenting—accepted the fait accompli.
New Zealand did not officially recognise the conquest, and when in May 1941 Ethiopians,
with the aid of British troops, drove the Italians from Addis Ababa, it had no diplomatic
adjustments to make.
In New Zealand, newspapers gave the dispute a leading place,
starting several months before the actual fighting. There was a sincere
attempt to settle a dispute with the League’s machinery, New Zealand
was represented at the League, and the long preliminaries gave time
for attention to focus. All these were reasons why Abyssinia bulked
much larger in New Zealand thinking than did later and more
clearly ominous affairs with which it had no direct connection, which
had lost the edge of novelty and happened far more swiftly. Generally reports were either colourless or sympathetic towards the Ethiopians, a few cartoons by Low
Low, Sir David, Kt(’62) (1891–1963): b Dunedin; cartoonist Spectator Chch 1902, BuletinSydney1911, StarLondon1919, Evenig StandardLondon1927, Daily MailLondon1950, Manchester Guardian from 1953
and Minhinnick
Minhinnick, Sir Gordon, KBE(’76) (1902–): b UK, to NZ 1921; cartoonist NZ Free
Lance1926, thence Chch Sun, AucklandSun to NZ Herald1930
attacked Mussolini,
and from time to time editorials advised that New Zealand must
stand by her obligations to the League, even to armed force. There
was talk of being involved in war, which led to realisation that New
Zealand’s armed forces were very small, its air power little more
than Abyssinia’s. There was wide disapproval of aggression, of gas
and bombs dropped on defenceless people, disapproval tempered
with some reluctant recognition of Italy’s economic plight, plus a
rather thankful sense of remoteness caused by the obscurity of international manoeuvring.
A few leftists bleakly saw the League’s collective security and
preservation of peace as preservation of the status quo by the nations
already supplied with colonial markets and raw materials—‘the only
fight against war is the fight against capitalism’.
W. N. Pharazyn in Tomorrow, 18 Sep 35, p. 6; D. G. McMillan in Otago Daily Times,
20 Sep 35, p. 9
A few unions,
while censuring Italy, firmly declared against being drawn into an
imperialist war.
Federated Seamans Union, Dominion, 5 Oct 35, p. 4; Tomorrow, 9 Oct 35, p. 10; Auckland Carpenters and Joiners, Auckland Star, 11 Oct 35, p. 8
The Communist party at first declared that sanctions were the attempt of one set of exploiting powers to prevail
over the other, and that Britain herself had designs on Abyssinia
that might lead to general war;
Workers’ Weekly, 31 Aug, 21 Sep 35, pp. 3, 1
but after Russia declared for collective security it found it ‘necessary for all those who stand for
peace to support the Soviet Union in the demand that sanctions be
enforced’, the Soviet being the only power consistently and wholly
on the side of peace, whereas a war led by Britain would be imperialistic.
Ibid., 28 Sep, 12, 19 Oct 35, pp. 3, 1 & 2, 2
In several centres—Wellington, Napier, Palmerston North,
Christchurch, Dunedin—street demonstrations and meetings were
held by the Communist party or the Movement against War and
Fascism, or Hands off Abyssinia committees, and at the Italian consulates in Auckland and Wellington leaflets demanding that the war
should stop were distributed.
Ibid., 19, 26 Oct 35, pp. 1, 1; NapierDaily Telegraph, 1, 11 Oct 35, pp. 6, 4; Press,
30 Sep 35, p. 5
The Labour Party, still in opposition, had now replaced its hostility to war with belief in the League and collective security; Walter
Nash,
Nash, Rt Hon Sir Walter, GCMG(’65), CH(’59), PC (1882–1968): b UK, to NZ
1909; MP (Lab) Hutt from 1929; Sec Lab party 1922–32; Min Finance 1935–49,
Marketing 1936–41, Social Security 1938; Dep PM 1940–9; War Cab 1939–45; NZ
Min USA & member Pac War Council 1942–4; PM, Min External Aff 1957–60; Leader
Oppos 1950–7, 1960–3
for instance, said ‘those nations that carry out their undertakings can be completely effective without firing a shot’, but that
if the British Empire were drawn into war New Zealanders should
fight in sorrow for the good of the future.
NZ Worker, 25 Sep 35, p. 1; see also Standard, 16 Oct 35, p. 8
The conservative government, made doubly chary by responsibility, instructed its League
representative to collaborate very closely with Great Britain on sanctions, but stressed confidentially that public opinion in New Zealand
would not endorse any measure that might call for the application
of force.
Forbes to Parr, 2 Sep 35, PM 260/4/2, pt 1, in War History Narrative, ‘Pre-war Foreign
Policy’ (hereinafter WHN, ‘Foreign Policy’), Abyssinia, p. 19
In October, Parliament unanimously passed a bill that
imposed economic sanctions and made it clear that any military
sanctions would need further parliamentary action. The campaign
that elected Labour to 53 seats out of 80 in November 1935 gave
little space either to the war in Abyssinia or to general problems of
defence and foreign policy. Neither party mentioned Abyssinia in
its election manifesto—Labour stressed its support for the League
and promised a foreign policy to promote international economic
co-operation, disarmament and world peace, with open diplomacy
and discussion and negotiation in Commonwealth relations;
NZ Worker, 8 May 35, p. 6; Standard, 13 Nov 35, p. 1
the
National party supported the League and stressed co-operation with
the United Kingdom.
Dominion, 29 Oct 35, p. 12
In December, the new Labour government cabled that it was
‘quite unable to associate’ itself with the Hoare–Laval arrangements
but tactfully agreed to keep silent about its views.
GGNZ to SSDA, 13, 15 Dec 35, PM 260/4/2, pt 4, in WHN, ‘Foreign Policy’,
Abyssinia, p. 58
The press was
divided, the Otago Daily Times of 20 December saying that these
arrangements had met the merited condemnation of the world, while
other dailies voiced ‘realist’ opinions that sanctions were impractical,
an experiment; that collective security was based more on despair
than on reason; that Hoare was right in fact though wrong in method,
and that the fiasco resulted not from his weakness but from the gap
between popular aspirations and political reality.
Press, 20 Dec 35; Evening Past, 20 Dec 35; NZ Herald, 21 Dec 35
This last view
was echoed in the House on 15 May 1936 in a debate on foreign
affairs
New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (hereinafter NZPD), vol 245, pp. 149–84
by the youthful Keith Holyoake,
Holyoake, Rt Hon Sir Keith, GCMG(’70), CH(’63), PC (1904–): MP (Nat) Pahiatua
from 1932; Dep Leader Oppos 1947; Dep PM & Min Agriculture, Marketing, Scientific
Research 1949–57; Leader Oppos 1957–60; PM & Min Foreign Affairs 1960–72; Min
State 1975–7; Gov Gen NZ 1977–80
who saw in the rejection
of the plan ‘evidence of the fact that public opinion does not keep
pace with world events’;
NZPD, vol 245, p. 164
Forbes
Forbes, Rt Hon George William (1869–1947): MP (Lib) Hurunui 1908–43; Min Lands,
Agriculture, Deputy PM 1928–30; PM 1930–5, in Coalition govt 1931–5
and others of his party declared
that the League had been tried as a preserver of the peace and found
wanting; Labour members replied, dutifully but without much
inspiration, that the League should still be supported.
‘Sanctions failed’ was inevitably the verdict in most minds. Stubborn idealists like Savage
Savage, Rt Hon Michael Joseph (1872–1940): b Aust, to NZ 1907; MP (Lab) Auck
West from 1919; Leader Labour party from 1933; PM from 1935
might urge maintaining them
Savage to Parr, 15 Jun 36, PM 260/4/2, pt 7, in WHN, ‘Foreign Policy’, Abyssinia,
p. 62; Parr, Otago Daily Times, 4 Jul 36, p. 13
after
Italy’s victory, but even Savage knew that New Zealand’s remoteness
and its small trade with Italy made its objection pedantic, and he
acquiesced in their general removal in July 1936.
In March 1936 while bombs were still falling on Abyssinia Hitler,
seeing the League’s feebleness, the coolness between France and Britain and Italy’s estrangement from both, swiftly moved troops into
the demilitarised Rhineland, in defiance both of Versailles and of
the Locarno Pact of 1925, which last Germany had signed as a
willing equal but which Hitler claimed was already violated by the
Franco–Soviet treaty then being signed. With a gun in one hand
and fresh guarantees of peace in the other he confounded his opponents, who had either to take him at his word or be prepared to
fight—the routine that was to be repeated several times in the next
three years. France and Britain spoke with separate voices. There
were proposals and counter-proposals that changed nothing, and after
the first headlines it became an affair of the diplomats.
The New Zealand government followed Britain closely—on 16
March they wrote that they ‘entirely concur in the attitude of restraint’
of the United Kingdom and while ‘entirely appreciating the necessity
of ending the progressive deterioration in the value of international
engagements’, urged consideration of every possible means to avoid
plunging the world into chaos.
GGNZ to SSDA, 16 Mar 36, PM 6/7/3, pt 3, in WHN, ‘Foreign Policy’, NZ–
Germany to Oct 38, p. 17
Again on 6 April, after German
counter-proposals that were unacceptable to France, they urged continued negotiations for the possible improvement of European relations, and without necessarily agreeing with the proposals advanced
by Germany held that ‘these must be considered seriously with a
view to an ultimate Conference intended to establish procedure for
the avoidance of conflict’.
GGNZ to SSDA, 6 Apr 36, in ibid., p. 19
The theme of hope in conferences that
were never to be held was to be voiced again and again by the New
Zealand government during the late Thirties; meanwhile they
endorsed the restraint that seriously lessened French faith in Britain
as an ally.
Newspapers disapproved the treaty-breaking, commended British
calm, shook a reproving finger at France and generally gave Hitler
the benefit of the doubt. The Press on 10 and 11 March noted the
calm reception and held that the only way to prove Hitler’s sincerity
was to take him at his word; the Otago Daily Times spoke likewise.
The Dominion on 9 March thought that what Hitler offered now,
‘despite the breach of a bit more of the Treaty that bound Germany,
is too valuable to be spurned,’ and on 12 March said that all the
world knew that but for earlier French intransigence, Germany might
still be in the League, might still be a democratic state. The New
Zealand Herald on 11 March was outraged at Germany’s suggestion
that it might now re-enter the League of Nations—‘Could anything
be more absurd, or more offensively presumptuous?’—but by
19 March was pointing out that a cynic could heave bricks at all
the powers for their recent diplomatic pasts; even Britain, over Abyssinia, ‘bore herself none too well’. There was also the comfortable
possibility that the Rhineland march was Hitler’s ruse to divert Germany’s attention from her internal problems of food shortages and
unemployment.
Standard, 11 Mar 36, p. 6
Since the League had failed to impose the crucial
oil embargo on Italy it was manifestly unlikely to impose sanctions
on Germany.
Hard thereafter came the civil war in Spain, beginning in July
1936 as an army revolt. In February a liberal government had been
elected (with a majority of seats though not of votes), but its reforms
were resisted by the land-owning classes, to which the police and
the army adhered. Strikes, disorder, and reprisal killings followed,
and General Franco
Franco Bahamonde, Generalissimo Francisco (1892–1975): Generalissimo Spanish National
Armies 1936–9; Head State from 1939
claimed to be upholding order and religion
against anarchy. He also claimed to be leading a nationalist movement to save Spain from Russia which was organising and supporting the government—an exaggerated charge. Predictably, the
most active groups on both sides were those with the most extreme
political views, and it soon became a fight between Communism
and Fascism. Italy and Germany, for future influence and to train
and test their troops, equipment and aircraft, helped Franco from
the beginning with arms, aircraft, soldiers and technicians, and in
November 1936 recognised their protégé as the government of Spain.
Russia, from mid-October 1936, sent arms and aircraft, and thousands of Communists and others from all over Europe went to fight
in the communist-run International Brigade.
Spain, more than Manchuria, more than Abyssinia, disturbed the
conscience of the world. In Britain Chamberlain,
Chamberlain, Rt Hon Arthur Neville, PC (1869–1940): MP from 1918; PMG 1923;
Min Health 1923, 1924–9, 1931; Chancellor Exchequer 1923–4, 1931–7; PM & 1st
Lord Treasury 1937–40
determined not
to be involved, anxious to placate Italy, and of course deeply opposed
to Communism, was widely charged, even by some of his own party,
with favouring Franco. New Zealand’s Labour government joined
in this criticism, urging adherence to League principles with persistence that must have seemed both priggish and impractical to the
British government. On the League Council, Jordan
Jordan, Rt Hon Sir William, PC, KCMG(’52) (1879–1959): b UK, to NZ 1904;
1st Hon Sec NZ Lab party 1897; MP (Lab) Manukau 1923–35; NZHC London
1936–51; Pres Council LoN 1938; chmn Imp Economic Conference 1937–8
repeatedly
urged that Franco should state his charges before the League, and
doubted whether non-intervention did anything but handicap the
Loyalists and strengthen the aggressors. Twice, in March and again
in September 1937, New Zealand refused to be associated with
shipping proposals which would have come near to granting belligerent rights to the rebels; and it did not officially recognise Franco’s
final victory in March 1939.
But if the New Zealand government’s attitude abroad was definite, though limited, New Zealand people generally were confused.
Only the leftists and Catholics were blessed with clear minds about
Spain—for Communists the Loyalists were clothed in righteousness,
the reactionary Fascist villains must be fought and defeated. They
repeatedly urged joint action with the Labour party, which firmly
declined it.
Workers’ Weekly, 15 Aug 36, p. 2, 9 Apr 37, p. 2; Standard, 9 Apr 37, p. 7
The Workers’ Weekly flamed abour the Nazi menace,
its child victims, and British wickedness. A few women knitted for
the defenders of Madrid—they were flagging by March 1937—and
a few hundred pounds slowly trickled in to the ‘Spanish Aid Fund’,
forwarded through the Communist party in England.
Workers’ Weekly shows a total of £336 by 17 Dec 39
On the other
hand the Catholic Church in Spain backed Franco, and in New
Zealand followed suit, with Zealandia and the New Zealand Tablet
steadily denouncing the Communists. Many others, especially people
of property or tradition, felt (like Churchill
Churchill, Rt Hon Sir Winston, KG(’53), PC, OM, FRS (1874–1965): British Army
1895–1916, serving India, Khartoum, South Africa etc; war correspondent South Africa
1899–1900; MP (Cons, Lib) 1900–22, 1924–64, Sec State Colonies 1906–8, Home
Sec 1910–11, 1st Lord Admlty 1911–15, 1939–40, Min Munitions 1917, Sec State
War & Air 1919–21, etc; PM & 1st Lord Treasury, Min Defence 1940–45; Ldr Oppos
1945–51; PM & 1st Lord Treasury 1951–5, Min Defence 1951–2
) that their own class
and values were assailed by the Spanish government; the term ‘Communist’ drew forth an almost natural hostility. Some did not feel
secure enough in their jobs to risk even talking about Communism
in an issue clouded and far away. It was very easy to remain ignorant.
Within the Labour party there were a good many cross-currents.
British Labour, as the war went on, grew more and more hostile to
Franco, his supporters and the Chamberlain connivance. ‘The left
became war-minded: the Spanish civil war mobilised the non-trade-union sections of the Labour movement as Hitler’s brutalities had
already begun to mobilise the trade unions…. Non-intervention
and pacifism crossed over from the opposition to the government:
“no-war” became the slogan, not of the left but of the right.’
Mowat, C. L., Britain Between the Wars. pp. 577–8
In New Zealand, Labour was the government. Was it distance,
the responsibility of office, or the Catholic vote, that made New
Zealand’s Labour movement cooler than Britain’s? Perhaps members
of Parliament thought it was a matter for Cabinet, but very few
gave any lead to Spanish support in their constituencies. The Spanish
Loyalists had obvious claims on Labour principles and sympathies,
but they were soon identified with Communism which many Labour
people fervently distrusted as the rival that, claiming kinship, would
creep into the Labour organisation and send it scattering in dissension. Nor did Labour prudence wish to alienate the sizeable Catholic
vote—which was not a factor in British politics. Still, many trade
unions and a few party branches passed resolutions of sympathy (and
took up collections
The Waterside Workers Federation gave £300. Standard, 23 Sep 36, p. 7
) for the Loyalists in their fight for democracy
and freedom, and urged the New Zealand government to press for
the removal of the arms embargo. Some of these resolutions were
no doubt contrived by local Communists, but they must have been
supported by some ordinary members. The Labour Party Conference
of 1937 deplored foreign intervention and urged New Zealand to
press for withdrawal of foreign troops.
Workers’ Weekly, 9 Apr 37, p. 1
The Standard, Labour’s
official paper, though it had few editorials on Spain, printed a good
many pro-Loyalist photographs, and its column on international
affairs from September 1936 until March 1938 (when its space was
swamped by the pre-election campaign) had many sharp, far-seeing
articles on Spanish issues and the diplomatic moves. It advertised a
collection for relief of distress in Spain which opened on 3 December
1936 and totalled £951 on 11 May 1939, mostly from trade unions
and party branches. Some of Labour’s difficulties were perhaps indicated by the letter printed on 7 October 1936, attacking the unions
for backing a ‘horde comparable with the supporters of Barbarossa’
and threatening the loss of Catholic votes; this brought forth other
letters mainly opposed to it, with a statement from the Standard
that the New Zealand Labour party had expressed no opinion on
affairs in Spain and was not committed by resolutions of individual
unions.
Standard, 21 Oct 36, p. 15
Although the government in 1938 gave £2,000 to an international fund for the relief of Spanish refugee children of both sides,
Ibid., 14 Apr 38, p. 1; NZPD, vol 252, p. 584
only one or two members of Parliament joined in the few public
protests against particular bombing outrages, and only a few were
associated with the Spanish Medical Aid Committee. This body,
which was soon labelled ‘communist-front’, started in Dunedin at
the beginning of 1937. It raised, mainly through public lectures and
showings of the film ‘Defence of Madrid’, about £4,000 which sent
three nurses, an ambulance and a laundry truck to Spain between
May 1937 and January 1939.
Standard, 13 Jan 38, p. 7, 9 Feb 39, p. 2
Only about a dozen New Zealanders
actually took up rifles in Spain. A few others wielded ardent pens,
mainly in the pages of the left wing journal Tomorrow, while the
Methodist Times on 25 February 1939 said firmly that its sympathies
throughout were with the lawfully constituted government standing,
with all its faults, for the more liberal and democratic elements in
Spain. The general public in its daily newspapers had copious and
often confusing news, through cables, photographs and editorials.
Evidence that Italy and Germany were taking part was balanced by
the predominance given to Russian designs, and held in poise by
the inertia of the British government. The total effect was probably
to accustom New Zealanders to the idea of war in the world, a
faraway war, between two sets of objectionable people.
The same issues, more or less, were served up again in mid-1937
when Japan renewed her attack on China, where Chiang Kai-shek’s
Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo (1887–1975): Director Kuomintang Party, Republican
China1938; chmn Supreme National Defence Council 1939–47; Pres Republic China
1948–9, from 1950 (in Taiwan)
nationalist forces were then co-operating with Chinese communists
in a programme of moderate reform and anti-Nipponism. China, a
League member, went through the routine of appealing to the Covenant, but no basis for collective action could be found, though as
usual Jordan spoke out in Geneva for principles and the lost cause.
There was world-wide sympathy for China, many trade unions and
other organisations advocating a boycott of Japanese goods. In New
Zealand there was a curious conflict. The Watersiders Union and
the Federation of Labour objected to loading scrap-iron and other
material for war purposes on Japanese ships, in which protest they
were joined by at least one Farmers’ Union branch.
At Hororata, see Press, 9 Oct 37, quoted by Tomorrow, 13 Oct 37, vol III, p. 771
Importers,
Chambers of Commerce and wool interests complained about one
section of the community imperilling a valuable trade, and the Prime
Minister declared that only the government had authority to decide
where New Zealand would trade
Evening Post, 1 Oct 37, p. 13
but prohibited all scrap iron
exports ‘to protect New Zealand’s steel industry’.
Standard, 4 Nov 37, p. 1. Export, without the consent of the Minister of Customs, of
all cast scrap iron had been prohibited since 10 June 1937 by statutory regulation
183/1937. On 5 October another regulation (243/1937) extended this prohibition to
all scrap metal.
The Federation
of Labour, anxious not to embarrass a Labour government, contented
itself with this, with watching international trade union action, and
with urging a personal boycott.
Ibid., 28 Oct 37, p. 1, 3 Mar, 21 Apr 38, pp. 11, 5
The Standard on 7 October
explained that a New Zealand boycott, pitiably inefficient in itself,
would involve the British Commonwealth, of which New Zealand
was the least important unit, in international politics. Members of
the Commonwealth who were helpless should leave the initiative to
those who would bear the result of action. ‘To pass resolutions is
one thing: to take sporadic, unorganised, unauthorised action is
another.’
Ibid., 7 Oct 37, p. 1
On 4 November an editorial said that any widescale boycott ‘may possibly result in our own pocket being hurt with a consequent injury to the pockets of our own workers. Japan, it is well
to remember, buys a considerable quantity of our wool and… last
year helped to raise prices to our benefit. Any boycott, effective or
ineffective, will not improve our commercial or diplomatic relations
with Japan, and though this may appear to be a materialistic viewpoint, it should be remembered that we live under a capitalistic
system in a generally capitalistic world.’
The boycott was also frowned upon by a few intellectuals and
pacifists who urged that it would act indiscriminately against all
Japanese and, by proving foreign hostility and encirclement,
strengthen the military party; also, Britain should first set her own
house in order by sharing the empire acquired by earlier actions
similar to those of Japan.
Tomorrow, 30 Mar, 13 Apr 38, vol IV, pp. 351, 383
In Europe, early in 1938, Hitler had declared that the German
Reich reached out beyond its frontiers to ten million Germans in
Austria and Czechoslovakia. His rapid seizure of Austria in March
1938 was swallowed with only a slight ripple of the world’s gullet.
It was a swift decisive move, offering no scope for argument, and
those concerned were ‘all Germans anyway’. Also, to some with
knowledge of post-1919Europe, in Austria both nationalism and
economics made union with Germany inevitable. As early as 1934
an article in Tomorrow prophesied that in the long run ‘the Anschluss
must come’.
Ibid., vol I, 19 Sep 34, pp. 4–5, by J. C. Beaglehole, referring to John Wheeler-Bennett’s
Wreck of Reparations. Again, in Salient, the student paper of Victoria University College,
Wellington, an editorial on 8 January 1938 suggested that though the democracies were
‘aghast at Germany’s so-called “grab”’, many Austrians might find it economically helpful.
Chamberlain’s government, by 1938, had quite turned
from collective security to hope that a satisfied Germany would mean
peace, until peace itself could be buttressed by British rearmament.
It speedily recognised the take-over. New Zealand was not consulted
about the recognition, and did not protest. The Standard, in one of
its last articles on international affairs before immersing itself in local
matters for the November election, wrote of the event itself and its
reception.
“No Danger of War” the posters said on Monday night. It
had not seriously been suggested, however cleverly the news had
been displayed to give an effect of it, that war was imminent.
Hitler had marched his troops into Austria, just as before he
marched them into the Rhineland…. Germany acted this time
when France was without a government, M. Chautemps
Chautemps, Camille, GCVO (1885–1963): French politician; Min State 1936–7,
1939–40; PM 1937–8; in Daladier Cabinet 1938–9
having
resigned a day or two before and M. Blum
Blum, Leon (1872–1950): French politician; PM 1936–7, 1938; PM & Foreign Min
Provisional Govt 1946–7; Pres Socialist party France
still being in the
process of forming his new Cabinet. Saturday, as it invariably is,
was the chosen day to cross the Austrian frontier. The stage management was incomparably fine, for during the week-end, when
the time came to assess the repercussions, foreign feeling would
have recovered its outraged balance. A decade ago it would have
been hard to imagine such an occurrence not being the word for
war. But a decade ago Britain was still chivalrous in the self-saving cause of “balance of power.” Today it is almost ridiculous
even to contemplate Britain’s lifting a finger to redress the wrongs
of a small country. Even the sight of Germany gathering strength
at a furious rate is no pretext for action but only for added rearmament against the day when Fascist might is face to face with
Britain. So that to mention war this week was simply an
anachronism.
Standard, 17 Mar 38, p. 8
Newspapers had headlines about ruthless Nazis, Jewish purges and
the frantic efforts of Jews and liberals to leave Austria; editorials
spoke of the lengthening Nazi shadow and the blatant hypocrisy of
Hitler. But Count von Luckner,
Luckner, Count Felix von (1881–1966): good-will missioner and sailor, to Australia
1895–1900; German Imp Navy, in Battle of Jutland, then commander raider Seeadler,
world tour in Sea Devil 1937ff; in Germany, not a Nazi, 1939–45; lecture tour to further
understanding between people 1949–50
on a round of public meetings at
this very time, had in general a cordial reception, except from the
Federation of Labour. He was well known for his exploits in 1917,
when having got through the British blockade in a 2000-ton sailing
ship disguised as a trader, he sank thirteen Allied cargo ships in the
Atlantic and Pacific, the crews being all saved and sent ashore. He
was wrecked in the Fiji group, captured and interned at Motuihi,
Auckland; escaped, seized the scow Moa and made for the Kermadec
Islands, where he was recaptured. Newspapers announced on 20
April 1937 that he was making a world tour in his new motor yacht
Sea Devil, would visit Australia and New Zealand, and would ‘engage
in propaganda for German ideals’.
Dominion, 20, 22 Apr 37, pp. 9, 12
This provoked hostility from
the Communists who from a German paper quoted von Luckner as
saying, ‘I am going as Hitler’s emissary to the youth of the world
to win them for a better understanding of our new Germany. I will
tell them of my private exploits during the war and the salvation
of the Fatherland….None but criminals have been deprived of
their liberty in Germany in order that decent Germans may live.’
Workers’ Weekly, 9 Jul, 30 Apr, 7 May 37, pp. 1, 2, 1
A few trade unions
Ibid., 9 Jul 37, p. 3; Tomorrow, 21 Jul 37, vol III, p. 580
joined in urging that he be refused admission.
Some private persons also objected, while others defended a very
gallant gentleman;
Dominion, 22, 28 Apr, 1, 6, 7 May 37, all p. 13
the Acting Prime Minister, Fraser,
Fraser, Rt Hon Peter, PC, CH(’45) (1884–1950): b Scotland, to NZ 1910; MP (Lab)
Brooklyn 1918–50; Min Education, Health, Marine 1935–50; Acting PM, 1937–40;
PM, Min External Affairs, Police 1940–9, Island Territories 1943–9, Maori Affairs
1946–9; Head War Cab & War Council; UN offices 1945–8
had no
comment to make;
Dominion, 28 Apr 37, p. 13
a respected trades union secretary advised reading Areopagitica and opposed exclusion on the grounds of freedom
of speech,
Workers’ Weekly, 6 Aug 37, p. 1
a view shared by the Federated Seamen’s Union
Standard, 15 Jul 37, p. 9
and
by Tomorrow.
Tomorrow, 21 Jul 37, vol III, p. 580
A rising civil servant, Dr R. A. Lochore,
Lochore, Dr Reuel Anson (1903–): civil servant, diplomat; PM Dept, Dept Internal
Affairs with several years post-WWH as Naturalisation Officer, Dept External Affairs
1957; NZ Min India 1962, Indonesia 1964, 1st NZ Ambassador West Germany 1966
declared
that he himself was one who had privately sought to persuade the
Count to visit New Zealand, that the Count’s main object was to
cement friendship between Germany and the Anglo-Saxon peoples.
He would explain away the latter’s mercenary and selfish appearance
on the one hand, and on the other show that Germans ‘are not the
barbarians and sadists that fanatical war propaganda and its aftermath have so luridly depicted’. The press, Lochore said, constantly
put the worst possible construction on news from Germany, while
never before had Germans shown such cordial goodwill—‘I have
repeatedly heard lectures on British ideals in Germany; I have delivered some on New Zealand ideals myself. For a week, in a camp
of storm troopers we put in our mornings trying to analyse and
understand the mentality of French and British.’
Dominion, 26 Apr, 4 May 37, pp. 3, 11
Von Luckner’s lectures, which contained no propaganda, were very
popular, especially in Wellington where he received a tremendous
ovation and his talk was punctuated with clapping—this but a week
after Germany had taken over Austria. The Federation of Labour,
however, said that in Germany he had promised to preach the virtues of Hitlerism, sneered at his goodwill mission, and challenged
him to public debate on Nazi ideology. This the Count declined,
denying all political interest, but explaining that the labouring people
were the great power behind Hitler, and that no other country had
such wonderful labour organisations as Germany.
Ibid., 19 Mar 38, p. 12
There were a few
more newspaper letters,
Evening Post, 21 Mar 38, p. 8; Press, 22, 23, 26 Mar 38, pp. 8, 8, 22
mostly deploring the Federation’s bad
manners; the Royal Port Nicholson Yacht Club on 24 March honoured him with its burgee;
Dominion, 25 Mar 38, p. 5
Salient, Wellington’s university student
paper, on 30 March printed a scathing interview. To sum up, it was
mainly the Communists and the Federation of Labour who objected
to his presence as a representative of a detestable regime; democratic
feeling opposed exclusion, and many were ready to take the bluff
sailor at face value—it was comfortable to think that there were
decent Germans; most people did not concern themselves at all.
A few months earlier the area of commerce had shown similar
unconcern. Late in 1937 trade and payments agreements were made
with Germany rearranging the basis for existing trade, so that goods
were directly exchanged for goods, not for credits. This caused New
Zealand to take more German manufactures than before and send
to Germany considerable quantities of butter and apples that otherwise would not have gone there.
Comptroller of Customs to Min Customs, 29 Aug 39, in WHN, ‘Foreign Policy’, NZ–
Germany to Oct 38, p. 11; Evening Post, 6 Oct 37, p. 6
In general the arrangements
debated in the House on 6 October 1937 were received by the press
with mild favour—enthusiasm was hardly to be expected for any
Labour action. In Parliament there was some government expression
of the view that Germans were good people themselves and that
more direct trade might promote more friendly relations. The Opposition’s criticisms were that the agreement was of little practical value
to New Zealand, and might disturb the harmony of trade with
Britain; only one member was opposed to trade with a Fascist country as such.
NZPD, vol 248, p. 628; whole debate pp. 594–639
Though in March 1938Germany had expressly denied having
any designs on Czechoslovakia, the last democracy in central Europe,
by August the three million Sudeten Germans were the occasion for
Reich demands which the Czech government, relying on joint treaties
with France and Russia, refused. Chamberlain had admitted in March
that if war broke out over Czechoslovakia it would not be limited
to those with obligations—Britain would be involved. Out of the
mists of diplomacy, war suddenly loomed frighteningly close, and
Britain felt frighteningly unready for it. Chamberlain made his dramatic flights to Germany which culminated at Munich on 29 September and induced a not unwilling France to join in persuading
the Czechs to accept partition, induced Hitler to accept their sacrifice,
and so clawed off the thundering shore. September 1938 was a month
of world crisis, of frantic, confused preparation, of stunned waiting.
New Zealand was largely anaesthetised, gripped by a hard-fought
election in which foreign policy and defence had very little part. It
was obvious that in the nearness of danger the Labour government,
remote and small, would not re-utter the well-worn pleas for collective security; it merely thanked the British government for copious
official information and earnestly hoped that Chamberlain’s efforts
would succeed.
GGNZ to SSDA, 29 Sep 38, PM6/7/3, pt 4, in WHN, ‘Foreign Policy’, NZ-Germany
to Oct 38, p. 21
Newspapers nevertheless gave much space to the crisis, and for
the first time BBC bulletins from Daventry were re-broadcast over
the national network. People listened and talked, following the zigzag of successive ultimatums, negotiations and concessions, the details
largely meaningless, from which two things at least seemed clear—
Hitler was spoiling for a fight and Chamberlain was doing everything to dodge it. They realised that war threatened Britain, that
they would follow Britain into it, and it was all too late and too
far away to argue or protest.
Round Table, Oct 38, pp. 53–7; Wood, F. L. W., New Zealand in Crisis, May 1938–
August 1939, pp. 1–9
Thankfulness for peace was expressed in the first days of October
by newspapers, and by public meetings in a few towns. At Auckland,
led by R. Armstrong,
Armstrong, Richard (d 1959aet 60): with RFC WWI, to NZ 1922; exec member
Labour Representation Cmte, Auck Trades Council; former City Councillor and past
member Auck Transport, Drainage Boards
a city councillor, and at Hamilton, led by
F. A. de la Mare,
de la Mare, Frederick Archibald (1877–1962): Hamilton High School Board Governors,
1st chmn CORSO cmte, borough councillor; NZU Senate 1919–47
there were also small public dissensions, tempering relief with disapproval of the methods used to obtain it.
Evening Post, 3 Oct 38, p. 10; Workers’ Weekly, 7, 12 Oct 38, pp. 1, 2
It
was not then fully apparent how dearly Czechoslovakia had paid for
peace and the details of the Munich concession were understood by
very few. Hitler’s success could not, however, be mistaken and Peter
Fraser, who had no wish to cloud his electioneering with foreign
affairs, probably summed up widespread feeling by saying on 2 October, ‘In certain aspects the dictators of the world largely had their
way, but the calamity which threatened was terrible…. Everyone
felt that a load had been lifted from the mind and heart, and all
were thankful to Mr Chamberlain for saving the world from worldwide bloodshed.’
Evening Post, 3 Oct 38, p. 10
It was not hard to be thankful for even a reprieve from war; but
a few trade unions vigorously criticised appeasement,
Workers’ Weekly, 23 Sep–7 Oct 38; Evening Post, 29 Sep 38, p. 10
while the
government somewhat guardedly linked its official thankfulness with
hopes that settlement would prove a lasting safeguard of world peace
founded on justice and order;
Evening Post, 30 Sep 38, p. 10
it did not think it necessary to comply with a British suggestion that Commonwealth prime ministers
should congratulate Chamberlain himself.
Jordan to PM Dept, 3 Oct 38, PM 6/6/6, pt 1, in WHN, ‘Foreign Policy’, NZ–
Germany to Oct 38, p. 22
The National party
leader, Adam Hamilton,
Hamilton, Hon Adam (1880–1952): MP (Nat) Wallace 1919–22, 1925–46; Min Labour,
PMG 1931–5; Leader Oppos 1935–40; War Cab 1940
congratulating the ‘saviour of peace’,
hoped that his four-power agreement would forerun a more general
peace-ensuring settlement,
Evening Post, 1 Oct 38, p. 10
while some other National members
chided Labour for its dissident unions and its rather limp support
of Chamberlain.
NZ Herald, 10 Oct 38, p. 13
Both parties and the press—with a few bleak
comments from Tomorrow—turned back to the November elections
with renewed zeal.
Munich was accepted far more quietly by New Zealand’s Labour
government, that for years had advocated collective security, than
by Britain’s Labour and a section of her Conservatives. But British
Labour was not in office, facing an election, nor preoccupied with
installing Social Security and fighting the British Medical Association. The Standard’s main utterance was a reprint of an article from
the GlasgowForward of 24 September headed ‘Chamberlain: Hero
or Traitor? Who dares to judge?’, asking what war would achieve
and listing its horrors, including the seeds of another war. ‘Would
Hitler doing the goose-step in London, and Mussolini astride the
lions in Trafalgar Square be any worse than that?’ And it declared
there must now follow a bold and genuine peace conference to solve
the problems of nationalities, raw materials and food, even at the
expense of British imperialism.
Standard, 27 Oct 38, p. 17
No such arrangement was attempted. In mid-March 1939 Germany took over the remainder of Czechoslovakia and imposed a
trade agreement on Romania; Lithuania under pressure ceded Memeland; Italy in the general rush grabbed Albania. The German sights
shifted to Danzig and the Polish corridor and the Nazi machine
pressed hard against Poland. Chamberlain, now fully aware that
Hitler could not be trusted or appeased, fearing that a sudden coup
might within days neutralise Poland, fearing also that Hitler might
strike west before moving further east and pushed both by the warlike section of his party and by public indignation, made an astonishing about-turn; on 31 March Britain, with France, guaranteed
Poland against aggression.
The New Zealand government, on 21 March, had reminded the
British government of its desire for an international conference ‘in
the widest possible sphere’ or at least ‘for a conference of those
nations which are opposed to aggression and which are now seeing
the danger to themselves more clearly than ever before’; it pledged
that New Zealand would play its full part ‘should the occasion
unhappily arise’ in defence of the right against the brutalities and
the naked power politics of aggressor states.
GGNZ to SSDA, 21 Mar 39, PM 6/6/3, pt 4, in WHN, ‘Foreign Policy’, NZ-UK
from Munich to war, pp. 3–4
The British government appreciated these assurances but felt there was ‘real difficulty’
in arranging any form of general conference, pointing out that some
states were determined on neutrality and those nearest Germany,
from fear of immediate retaliation, wanted no part in discussions
about checking aggression.
SSDA to GGNZ, 31 Mar 39, PM 6/6/3, pt 16, in ibid., p. 4
The public of course did not know of
this exchange. On 22 March Savage declared that his government
had been informed ‘all along the line’ of international movements;
that local critics, 12 000 miles from events, could well trust people
on the spot, and that ‘when Britain is in trouble we are in trouble’.
He also advocated that Britain should call a world conference to
discuss economic problems leading to war.
NZ Herald, 23 Mar 39, p. 12
The Herald, for once,
found that the Prime Minister expressed ‘the heart, mind and will
of all in this country’ while Adam Hamilton declared that in supporting Britain the government had the whole-hearted support of
the National party. The attitudes of the coming September were
rehearsed.
In the British guarantee of Poland there was at last the firmness,
the open statement of policy, for which Labour had pleaded earlier.
Yet to fight for Poland, on the far side of Europe, with its illiberal
landlord rulers, its depressed minorities, its short-sighted foreign
policy, was a curious cause. There had been no time for consultation—it was accepted without comment by the government which
had just avowed its loyalty. A few newspapers
eg, Press, 22 Mar 39, Auckland Star, 21, 23 Mar 39
held that Britain
should keep out of east Europe and unsuitable alliances with Poland,
Russia or the Balkans, all disreputable opportunist dictatorships. But
Chamberlain had stressed that the guarantee was to cover only an
interim period, while Britain was negotiating with the Soviet Union
and other states. There was no widespread realisation that the decisive step had been taken which in just five months would lead to
war. Other apparent undertakings had dissolved in the hands of the
diplomats, leaving plain men dismayed or puzzled or relieved. By
now there was no sense that Hitler had some excuse, that he could
hardly be blamed for retrieving his own—he had already amply
redeemed Germany’s losses at Versailles, and could make no racial
claims to Bohemia and Moravia. It was plainly more than time to
stop him and if Poland were to be his next grab, Poland was the
place for a showdown. There was still feeling that a firm ‘Thou shalt
not’ in advance would be sufficient without actual fighting—the
ChristchurchPress of 3 April found ‘some reason to suppose that
the announcement of the guarantee has relaxed rather than intensified the tension in Europe.’
The intricacies of political pressures and of Chamberlain’s own
mind in making the decision were not clear in New Zealand, but
Chamberlain was known as a man who clung to peace with more
desperation than dignity, and if he now felt that firmness was necessary then anyone could be convinced. Further, it was a relief to see
the British Prime Minister cast aside his placatory role and speak
sharply.
Evening Post, 1 Apr 39
In Britain the Labour party joined in the surge of applause
and not since the war, wrote the New Statesman and Nation of
8 April, had a premier received such general support as that accorded
to Chamberlain when he gave his unexpected pledge to Poland. This
enthusiasm was echoed in New Zealand. In Britain and still less in
New Zealand the difficulties of enlarging the Polish guarantee into
a compelling ‘Stop Hitler’ bloc were not widely understood.
If the well informed in Britain still covertly hoped that the fight
might be between Germany and Russia, it was a hope vaguely but
warmly held by many a man in the street both in Britain and New
Zealand—let the two bad boys have the fighting to themselves.
Anglo–Russian peace-bloc talks, begun in April, went on slowly for
several months, while leftists fumed that Chamberlain was losing
the last real chance of preventing war. But Chamberlain profoundly
distrusted both Russia’s honesty of purpose and its competence as
a military ally;
Feling, K., The Life of Neville Chamberlain, p. 403; McLeod, R., and D. Kelly (eds),
The Ironside Diaries, p. 78
Poland, Romania and the Baltic states were all
wary of receiving Russian guarantees lest these either provoke
immediate German attack or lead to Russian intrusion to forestall
indirect aggression; Russia, dubious lest Britain and France might
withdraw at the last leaving it to face Hitler alone, declared its
unwillingness to pull other peoples’ chestnuts out of the fire and
balanced its halting movements towards a Western alliance with
cautious steps towards Germany. On 12 May, the New Zealand
government, acknowledging that the United Kingdom was much
closer to the problem and its possible results, urged that it would
be deplorable if Russian assistance in preventing aggression were not
secured, and that no reasonable opportunity of gaining it should be
lost.
GGNZ to SSDA, 12 May 1939, PM 201/4/2, pt 7, in WHN, ‘Foreign Policy’, NZ–
UK from Munich to war, p. 11
The British government politely replied that these considerations were constantly in its mind.
SSDA to GGNZ, 17 May 39, PM 6/6/3, pt 17, in ibid., p. 12
This exchange did not of course
reach the public amongst whom, leftists apart (in the pages of
Tomorrow and to a much lesser degree in the Standard), there was
little advocacy for alliance with Russia or impatience with the inconclusive moves. The public could not but perceive that peace-bloc
manoeuvres were small and cautious, compared with the drive of
German aggressiveness, but to balance and comfort there was a slight
swelling on the theme that had been sounded for years by journalists
and financial experts and refugee ministers—that Nazi Germany was
war-weary already, its workers exhausted, its economic system
strained, that it lacked adequate resources of raw materials, of oil
and gold reserves, and could not fight a long war.
Meanwhile July saw the last act of appeasement, this time in the
Far East: the Tokyo Agreement,
See Wood, F. L. W., Political and External Affairs (hereinafter Wood), p. 65
whereby Britain, recognising ‘the
actual situation’ in China, advised British subjects there to keep clear
of anything that might assist the Chinese and bring on themselves
the justified wrath of Japan. New Zealand’s government had been
informed but not consulted. Several Labour back-benchers spoke out
strongly about this ‘Eastern Munich’ and Chamberlain’s European
policies, saying that he was dominated by international finance and
war profiteers, while New Zealand dragged silently at his heels—
probably the strongest criticism of British foreign policy made by
Labour speakers while Labour was in office.
Standard, 3 Aug 39, p. 10; NZPD, vol 254, p. 699 (R. McKeen), p. 738 (A. H. Nordmeyer), p. 787 (W. T. Anderton), vol 255, p. 13 (R. M. MacFarlane), pp. 108–9
(C. M. Williams)
But this minor Eastern
discord was lost among the quickening threats of Germany. By
1 June the Standard was remarking that people no longer asked if
war were coming that year, but where it was likeliest to start, and
on 6 July reported that the newsmen of Washington placed the
betting 5 to 4 on the chance of war before 15 September. According
to Tomorrow one of the most popular pastimes of August was guessing the answers to such questions as, ‘Will there be war?’ ‘When
will it start?’ ‘Will we be in it?’; and an opinion commonly expressed
was, ‘Oh, there won’t be any war, this crisis will pass like the last.’
Tomorrow, 16, 30 Aug 39, vol V, pp. 649, 677
But August’s crisis did not pass, and when on the 22nd Russia
and Germany announced their non-aggression pact there was no
longer room for doubt or hope. The cable pages overflowed with
inch-high black headlines; anger against Hitler was matched with
shocked rage at Russia and statements that treachery might have
been expected from that conscienceless nation. There was no feeling
that anything could be done now to avert war, no doubt that New
Zealand stood with Britain. Administratively the government was
ready. The Organisation for National Security (ONS), modelled on
the British Committee of Imperial Defence, having struggled through
a starveling infancy, had come to modest growth since Munich, and
now had its prescribed departmental procedures, its ‘War Book’
prepared. A state of emergency was proclaimed on Friday, 1 September, the necessary legal preliminary to bring into force the Public
Safety Conservation Act of 1932, under which emergency regulations
were issued as Orders-in-Council, dealing with mobilisation of the
armed forces, stabilising prices and setting up censorship controls.
With these weekend preparations tidily made, New Zealand waited
for Sunday.
CHAPTER 2
Impact of War
FACING war, the Labour party was in a very difficult position.
Traditionally, Labour was anti-conscription and anti-militarist,
viewing war as part of the imperialist struggle for markets, a force
that cut clean across its aim of improving workers’ conditions and
standards of living. Apart from the obvious suffering and sorrow,
war meant loss of civil liberties and working harder for less, while
destroying fellow-workers likewise driven to arms by the forces of
capital. Labour leaders had been in prison for refusing to support
the 1914–18 war. Only a few, however, were absolute pacifists—
rather they had opposed that particular war and its abuses, such as
conscription coupled with uncontrolled prices. During the 1920s
Labour had opposed the League of Nations, viewing it as a victors’
club and saying that the world needed instead a league of peoples.
This attitude changed gradually as the League’s useful technical work
emerged, and when Germany joined in 1926 and Russia in 1934
it could no longer be considered a victors’ club. New Zealand Labour
followed the British movement in its hopes of world disarmament
by agreement, and in 1930 it supported the Forbes government in
suspending compulsory military training, a measure prompted both
by economy and sentiment—the will to peace being strengthened
by the obvious folly of spending money on armaments when the
immediate enemies were unemployment and poverty. By 1931–2
New Zealand’s armed forces were small indeed: there were only two
cruisers and while Britain spent £1 8s 5d a head on land and air
defence, and Australia 5s 6d, New Zealand spent only 2s 10d on
all these services, its air force being almost non-existent.
Round Table, vol 25, p. 214
World public distaste for war preparations was at its height in
1933–4, but already British defence authorities, with eyes on Germany and Japan, were moving slowly into rearmament. Ripples of
this reached New Zealand, and in 1934 the defence vote was almost
furtively increased, Labour opposing it with the more urgent need
to fight poverty. But Labour, growing towards the responsibilities
of office, increasingly stressed collective security as the effective means
of defending democracy and peace—H. E. Holland
Holland, Henry Edmund (1868–1933): b Australia, to NZ 1912; MP (Lab) Grey
1918–33; Leader Labour party from 1919
asked Forbes
(who declined) to urge League action over Manchuria in 1931.
NZPD, vol 235, p. 770
Labour in office strongly upheld sanctions against Italy and was critical of concessions to Spanish rebels. In 1936 it carried forward the
programme of increasing armaments, and took to the League proposals that went far beyond British ideas for making enforcement
of the Covenant automatic and powerful, while enlarging and deepening support by consulting the peoples of the world through plebiscites and broadcasts of League proceedings. It also proposed surveys
of economic problems as a preliminary to rectifying international
grievances. Against the charge of inconsistency in showing no will
to abolish armed forces, Labour declared that it had never held that
a nation should not be ready to defend itself, but that economic
aggression was precedent to and the main cause of military aggression, and could be removed by economic adjustments.
Standard, 11 Nov 37, p. 6
At the Commonwealth Conference in 1937Savage spoke out his
faith, saying that some grievous mistakes had been made, to which
New Zealand had sometimes but not always consented, urging that
peace could best be preserved not by secret diplomacy but by the
Commonwealth laying down the lines that it would pursue in future;
that as disputes between nations had always an economic basis, a
concerted international effort was needed to remove these economic
injustices, and that meanwhile the Covenant should be made real—
there would be no final end to the miseries of war until those nations
that loved peace made it abundantly clear that they were determined
to maintain it, if necessary by force.
Ibid., 5 Aug 37, p. 2; Wood, p. 49
The Labour party, then, even in such idealists as Savage and Jordan, had come increasingly to the idea of force as necessary to restrain
evil. More robustly, Peter Fraser could say to the Labour Conference
in 1937, ‘If we truly desire to see Labour Democracy continue in
our country we ought to be ready to defend it, even die for it. Do
you think we would get any mercy from Mussolini or Hitler?’
Standard, 8 Apr 37, p. 2
In
September 1937 the budget, totalling nearly £34½ million, allowed
£15,000 to the League, and £1,600,000 to defence
NZPD, vol 248, pp. 432–3
—an increase
of £585,000 on the previous year. Nash remarked that these items
were inextricably linked: effective application of the League’s principles alone could bring permanent peace, but until then defence
was necessary. The military and naval services were being modestly
increased and re-organised and an air force begun, but with no idea
of facing a major invasion. Commonwealth defence experts thought
that the most likely attack would be from a raiding ship with aircraft
and able to land about 200 men on a hit-and-run mission. Gradually emphasis was shifting from reliance on internationalism to territorial defence measures, though the economic foundations of peace
and the value of education and propaganda were still pillars of Labour
faith.
The Standard, during 1936–8, had many solid, hard-thinking
editorials giving the background of treaties and national movements
since 1919, stressing that armament makers throve on fear; that
economic grievances, the basic cause of war, could be worked out
at a world economic conference; that the League should be made a
reality with force behind it. It was not actually said that New Zealanders should be in this League force; it was always implicit that
before fairness-plus-firmness even dictators would be reasonable.
In April 1937 trade unions and district Trades and Labour councils combined to form the Federation of Labour, replacing the Alliance of Labour. The industrial section of the Labour movement now
had a more vigorous and coherent central organisation which in
foreign affairs was more leftist than was the rest of the movement.
At its first annual conference, in April 1938, the Federation passed
this general resolution on foreign policy:
This Conference… directs the attention of the whole Labour
Movement to the terrible threat to world peace by Hitler, Mussolini and Japanese Military-Fascism. The danger behoves the
working-class to more firmly unite its ranks, strengthen its organizations, sharpen its vigilance and generate greater activity in the
struggle against Fascism and war.
We consider that the policy of the Chamberlain Government
in retreating before the Fascist black-mailers, instead of averting
the drive to war, helps to promote aggression and is leading the
British Empire into war.
The cause of world peace today depends upon the checking of
Fascist aggression in Central Europe, Spain and China. Therefore
we urge the Labour Government to insist that the British Empire
will (a) support France and the Soviet Union in guaranteeing the
independence and security of Czechoslovakia, (b) lift the embargo
on arms to the Spanish Government and insist on the immediate withdrawal of the Fascist interventionists’ forces in Spain,
(c) organize collective action to bring to an end Japanese aggression in China.
Also we call on the trade union movement to improve in every
way its support for the Spanish Government and to strengthen
the boycott of Japanese goods.
Further, this conference denounces the suggestion in certain
quarters for the reintroduction of compulsory military training,
which is but the prelude to a demand for conscription for overseas
services in the event of an imperialist war. Having in mind the
experiences of the war of 1914–18, when the people of New
Zealand were subjected to what was virtually a military dictatorship, we urge the Labour Government to take steps to repeal
all legislation which provides for conscription for overseas service
for imperialist purposes.
Finally, we direct the National Council of the Federation to
give greater attention to the danger to world peace, to the issuance
of propaganda against war and Fascism and the developing of
opposition to war in the working class movement.
Workers’ Weekly, 22 Apr 38, p. 1
It was a large, impossible order, a putting-together, without compromise, of irreconcilable policies—insistence that the growing danger to peace and the working class be curbed, without any
modification of the traditional stand against conscription and ‘imperialist’ war. The government was to insist that aggression be checked,
but not by New Zealand workers—for plainly at the time the number likely to volunteer would not have caused a dictator to bat an
eyelid. It was an unhappy conflict, one which was shared by the
Labour movement in Britain, and which was to remain with them
well into the war. It is not insignificant that this resolution was
moved by a Communist and published in full by the Workers’ Weekly
(22 April 1938) but not in the Standard. A Standard article, after
remarking that in Europe the dictators were now more firmly in the
saddle than ever and probably other countries besides Austria would
soon be under Fascist domination, neatly turned the point homeward: ‘It is not enough to talk of democracy or to be anxious of its
fate in Europe, we must be careful to preserve Government by the
people and for the people here in New Zealand.’
Standard, 21 Apr 38, p. 2
In Germany a
strong working-class movement had been overcome by Fascism; New
Zealand workers must take care Fascism did not gain ground here.
The election was only seven months away.
The National party, with its sense of close adherence to Britain,
had felt the impropriety of New Zealand’s occasional divergences
from Britain at the League of Nations. Its members, with more
experience of office, were more accustomed to the idea of the inevitability of war and not at all committed to any theory of nonparticipation. Some were not afraid to say, even in 1936, that if
New Zealand subscribed to collective security it should give support
not only with words but with a complete expeditionary force.
NZPD, vol 246, pp. 311–12
They
expected quite early that the League of Nations would fail and they
wanted more defence. They were reluctant to see Labour spend on
public works and social services money which could be used for that
purpose.
The New Zealand Returned Soldiers’ Association was specially
concerned with defence and felt that its members’ knowledge of the
last war, their sufferings and their dead companions entitled them
to respectful hearing. Obviously they were not pacifists, and they
could reasonably ask other men to face what they had faced 25 years
before. Though a non-political body, their views on defence coincided with those of the National party: they felt that New Zealand
was not ready to do her fair share in Commonwealth defence, and
that compulsory training in the Territorials was a first essential.
Late in 1936 the sense of inadequate defence led some people
with strong RSA and Territorial interests or belonging to such
organisations as the Navy League (all of whom the Labour party
speedily identified with the Nationalists) to form the Defence League,
Evening Post, 15 Oct 36, p. 10, 25 Mar 38, p. 7
aiming to educate public opinion towards increased defence
measures and to encourage young men into military, naval, and air
force training. It also wanted the government to organise services,
such as hospitals, transport and food supplies, to meet a possible
national emergency. The League claimed that its intention was to
assist not hinder the government, and that it was a non-party organisation, on a democratic and national basis. On 15 October 1936 a
deputation visited the Defence Minister who politely welcomed its
assurances of co-operation, reminded it that the government was
responsible for defence and was working ‘quietly but thoroughly’,
and did not think there was any need for scares.
Ibid., 16 Oct 36, p. 11
Labour rank and file was much more sensitive. ‘More than ever
eternal vigilance is the price of popular government and liberty’,
wrote a correspondent in the Standard of 9 September 1936, alarmed
at the proposed formation by business and professional men of a
military propagandist league; it would be nothing new for such a
league to turn into a defence force, complete with shirts and salutes.
The workers must scrutinise closely the aims, objects, personnel and
sponsors of proposed leagues. ‘Europe today proves that patriotism
is the refuge for greater scoundrels and the cloak for more bestial
brutality than ever before.’
Though the Standard continued its warning against the Defence
League as the possible germ of a fascist force, the League was favoured
by the press in general, which was consistently critical of the government and friendly to its opponents. Another sign of Labour distrust
was a remit from the Easter conference of 1937 which, though not
naming the League, clearly referred to it: ‘That the Government be
urged to disband and prevent the formation of armed forces not
directly under the control of the Government, to prevent the wearing
of party uniforms, and to legislate to ensure that the manufacture
of arms and and munitions is under Government control.’
Cyclostyled paper, ‘New Zealand Labour Party, 1937 Annual Conference. Recommendations to the Government’, p. 1
During
1938, with concern for defence becoming more general, the League’s
activity increased. At Wellington on 24 March a meeting of about
800 urged that besides increased Army strength all resources should
be organised for defence. Suggested measures included a militia force
of middle-aged citizens, organisations of civilians so that in a national
crisis there would be as little confusion as possible, and instruction
about gas decontamination and gas masks. The principal speaker,
Hon W. Perry MLC,
Perry, Hon Sir William, Kt(’46) (1885–1968); barrister and solicitor Wgtn; 1NZEF;
Dom Pres RSA 1935–43; MLC 1934–50; member War Cab 1943–5, Min Armed Forces
and War Co-ordination
spoke of current negotiations in Britain to
relax conditions of labour so that more work could be put into
armaments; it was no argument to lessen the Labour movement’s
distrust.
Dominion, 25 Mar 38, p. 12
Progress in New Zealand’s rearmament was described by Jones,
Jones, Hon Frederick (1885–1966): MP (Lab) Dun Sth 1931–46, St Kilda 1949–51;
Min Defence, PMG 1935–40, Min Defence 1940–9; NZHC Aust 1958–61
the Defence Minister, on 18 May 1938 at Dargaville in a speech
widely published in the press and as a pamphlet. He spoke of reorganising and increasing the naval division, creating an air force and
making improvements in the Territorial forces which aimed to train
leaders ready for a sudden expansion if needed. A peacetime strength
of 9000 was thought sufficient, and Jones admitted that there were
then but 7400, of whom only 41 per cent had attended camp that
year. He appealed to fit, alert young men to sacrifice some of their
leisure, and to employers to give leave for service. The Defence League approved; but the next day Auckland papers published a manifesto signed by four Territorial colonels who broke soldierly silence
in a sharp criticism of the Territorial position, declaring the present
numbers, organisation and training quite inadequate, due to lack of
support from successive governments and from the public.
These statements brought defence into prominence for some weeks,
and bodies such as a Farmers’ Union Conference urged a more vigorous defence policy with universal military training.
Evening Post, 25 May 38, p. 12
The Defence
League offered to bring in the 1600 needed Territorials and proposed
a citizens’ militia of men over Territorial age. To all this the government replied that it was doing a great deal more than the Nationalists had done in the early 1930s, that its measures were adequate
for any attacks anticipated by Imperial experts, that it was spending
money and getting good value for it; that many of these criticisms
were political, a stick with which to hammer the government. But
on 2 June 1938 the Prime Minister, remarking that ‘No one can
say what is going to happen when the nation has its back to the
wall, but, whatever is necessary, when it comes to compulsion, we
will not begin with human flesh and blood’,
Dominion, 3 Jun 38, p. 12
obliquely made the
first suggestion that a Labour government might find conscription
necessary, a suggestion that he and others were to repeat with increasing significance. Delicately Savage began to accustom himself and
his party to an inevitable change that went clean against Labour
principles and tradition. Meanwhile, in July, as a practical encouragement to service, Territorial pay was raised by 3s a day, plus camp
allowances of 5s a day—the first rise since 1911.
Early in its election campaign for November 1938, while still
acknowledging the ideal of the League of Nations, the National
party urged that a strongly defended British Empire was the greatest
factor in world peace, that in foreign policy New Zealand must stand
wholeheartedly with Britain—Jordan’s assertions of difference were
deplored
‘[Mr Chamberlain’s] policy is to avert war, and we should assist him by every means
in our power, instead of making his job more difficult.’ Adam Hamilton, Dominion,
7 Jun 38, p. 8; NZPD, vol 251, p. 129, vol 252, pp. 442–5
—while land, sea and air forces should be expanded rapidly to contribute fairly to Empire defence and world peace. The
armed force would be voluntary, but in war the resources of the
country, both men and women, would be mobilised; no one would
be allowed to exploit his fellow citizens.
Evening Post, 20 Sep 38, p. 6
Countering this, Labour’s manifesto on 24 September had explained that it was increasing defence expenditure—£600,000 in
1932, £1 million in 1935, more than £3 million in 1938–9.
These figures differ from those printed in the budgets which give £1,014,370 actually
expended during 1935–6, in a total of £25,890,567; £2,099,289 for 1938–9, out of
£35,772,678.
It
was improving and co-ordinating the three Services. In foreign policy
it claimed belief in collective security through the League, Commonwealth co-operation and more defence. Neither party wished to
risk popularity by stressing war and defence; it was politically wise
to keep to familiar, blunted phrases.
During 1939 as threats multiplied, feeling again grew that not
enough men were enlisting in the Territorials, especially the more
mature who might supply leadership. The government uneasily
juggled with its distaste for militarism, with defence needs, and with
rebuttal of political opponents. The Defence League, since November 1938, had urged three months’ compulsory military training for
18-year-olds, followed by four years in the Territorials. The Chamber of Commerce considered this view in May
Commerce Journal (Auckland), 25 May 39, pp. 1, 15
and, together with
manufacturers and employers, pressed it (plus universal emergency
service) upon the government late in August.
Evening Post, 21 Jun, 29, 31 Aug 39, pp. 12, 17, 10
Even a few Labour
members with military backgrounds, notably J. A. Lee,
Lee, John Alexander, DCM (1891–1982): MP (Lab) Auck East 1922–8, Grey Lynn
1931–43; Parly Under-Sec Min Finance 1936–9; 1st Controller State Housing Dept;
expelled Lab Party 1940
W. J.
Lyon
Lyon, William John (1897–1941): MP (Lab) Waitemata from 1935
and W. E. Barnard,
Barnard, Hon William Edward (1886–1958): MP (Lab) Napier 1928–43, Speaker HoR
1936–43; resigned Labour party 1940
advocated increased recruiting. Labour’s
Easter Conference both re-affirmed its opposition to conscription and
turned down a motion to suppress the Defence League—the Defence
Minister saying that the League merely represented Labour’s political
opponents, defeated last year, and it was better to have them working openly than underground. Lee asked, ‘Are we to say there is to
be no free speech for these retired and liverish colonels who want
to see everyone doing the goose-step when there is no war?’
Standard, 20 Apr 39, p. 2
The
Prime Minister repeated that no one could tell what a nation would
do when backed to the wall, but conscription would not begin with
flesh and blood.
In the second half of April 1939 a Pacific Defence Conference
was held in Wellington. It had its origins in repeated requests by
New Zealand for discussions between Britain, Australia and New
Zealand on the strategic importance of the Pacific should trouble
there coincide with a European war.
Wood, pp. 72–82; McGibbon, I. C., Blue-Water Rationale, pp. 257, 316ff
It was made clear that help
from overseas, even of equipment, could not be quickly obtained,
and New Zealand’s defences must be sharply increased. Savage was
finally convinced that immediate strengthening of land forces was
needed. This he proclaimed on 22 May, having in the preceding
weeks fumbled reluctantly towards it. In April he still wanted an
international conference, hated the idea of conscription, and was sure
that every man would be ready to serve in an emergency;
Evening Post, 18 Apr 39, p. 12
on
25 April he suddenly spoke of a home defence force of 50 000 men
of up to 50 years old, independent of overseas sources for arms. This
was closely involved with his belief in New Zealanders’ eagerness
to defend their Labour-governed country, but it gave rise to a report
that the government was ordering 60 000 uniforms and should have
done so earlier when it would have improved the wool sales.
Otago Daily Times, 4 May 39, p. 12
This
Savage called an attempt to discredit the government both with the
wool growers and the anti-militarists; he was thinking of a citizen
army in plain clothes, ‘not goose-stepping… in uniform and spending hundreds of thousands a year.’
Dominion, 4 May 39, p. 10
The goose-stepping reference
offended the Territorials, reported the Dominion of 6 May; poor Savage complained that everything was being turned to party propaganda.
Ibid., 6, 8 May 39, pp. 10, 10
Political absurdities attended New Zealand’s approach to
war.
Besides the Defence League there were in May 1939 a few extra-governmental movements to augment the home forces. An RSA
National Guard was proposed at New Plymouth
Ibid., 3 May 39
and a Veterans’
Brigade at Auckland.
Truth, 10 May 39, p. 8
Some trade unionists made their own suggestions. The Easter Labour Party Conference had asked the government to co-operate ‘with the Industrial Labour Movement in building
up a Democratic Defence Force.’
Minutes of Labour Party Easter Conference, 1939, p. 23
The Auckland Trades Council in
May proposed a company of 200 trade unionists officered by men
with whom they normally worked, which would, said their adviser
W. J. Lyon, assist co-ordination and ésprit de corps.
Workers’ Weekly, 5 May 39; Standard, 4 May 39, p. 10
The leftist
Carpenters Union paper The Borer in May urged the recruiting of
trade unionists prepared to defend both their country and their progressive institutions, to fight enemies at home and abroad.
The Standard of 11 May strongly deprecated attempts ‘by a section of the Press and certain organisations to create a feeling of panic’
about defence, and Savage declared that private armies were not
wanted, that the bogey of invasion had been turned into a political
weapon against the government. The Defence Minister politely vetoed
all separate organisations, saying that their spirit was appreciated,
but defence must be under government control and those prepared
to join such organisations would readily enlist in the Territorial
forces.
Standard, 1 Jun 39, p. 9
In May a recruiting drive began; on the 22nd Savage, in a special
broadcast, said that while he did not believe general war to be inevitable and had no secret information of a crisis, the international
situation was bad and all, however reluctantly, must face reality.
Strength and vigilance were the conditions of survival. If war came
to Britain it came to New Zealand. He asked for volunteers, first
to the regular Army, then for 6000 more Territorials to make them
up to 16 000; for 280 to the specially trained coast defences, and
finally for all able-bodied men of 20–55 years to register in a National
Military Reserve, from which 5000 experienced men would be
selected as Territorial reserves.
Evening Post, 23 May 39, p. 16
To avoid confusion he asked the
Defence League to withdraw its enrolment cards. He stressed that
training was for home defence, defence of living standards and social
security; explained how the Air Force in particular had improved in
Labour’s time, and still declared that international discussions would
be of more use before a new war than after it. The Defence League
welcomed the speech, and withdrew its cards. The Opposition
expressed relief and qualified approval, still preferring universal
training to volunteers.
Ibid., 24 May 39, p. 12
So did the press in general. The Dominion
on 27 May gave the views of 17 assorted people on the defence
proposals, several suggesting that conscription would be necessary.
Territorial enlistment was brisk and the 16 000 were secured early
in August,
Ibid., 8 Aug 39, p. 10
but for the Military Reserve it went much more slowly.
The anxieties of the Opposition and the RSA were renewed, the
latter’s annual conference in June urging ‘compulsory universal
national service’.
Ibid., 23 Jun 39, p. 10
After Parliament opened in June the Opposition
vigorously criticised defence inadequacy and wanted universal military training for home service, while some members introduced what
was to be one of the repeated themes in the next few years: that
money should be diverted from public works and social services to
defence—national security before social security.
NZPD, vol 255, pp. 504–5
The Farmers’
Union, a body usually closely associated with the National party,
in July approved the government’s defence efforts, deprecated criticising it for inadequate preparations, saying that the people themselves were to blame, and strongly urged compulsory military
training.
Evening Post, 12 Jul 39, p. 7
In its qualified approval, the Farmers’ Union at this stage
was close to the Defence League, acknowledging advances but
demanding more.
The National party, then, in the three years before the war urged
increased defence as a need transcending politics, but urged it in the
terms of party warfare. The RSA and the Defence League, in advocating compulsory military training, stood with the National party.
Labour was sensitive and resentful about these attacks, and suspicious of their motive. Party politics dogged and clogged every defence
move.
Immediately war was declared towards midnight on Sunday
3 September 1939
See Wood, pp. 7–10
all major sections of the community voiced
support of the government to help Britain and fight the Nazis. Many
different streams of feeling and tradition could unite in this. For
instance, a Labour party caucus replying to British Labour greetings
predicted the inevitable ‘triumph of justice, democracy and socialism’;
Standard, 14 Sep 39, p. 5
the National caucus resolved ‘This is the hour to remember
the slogan which fired the patriotism of the men and women of this
country twenty-five years ago—“To the last man and the last shilling”’;
Dominion, 7 Sep 39, p. 11
Adam Hamilton declared ‘Party politics must be laid aside
so that our people may be united in their determination and effort
to live up to the high traditions established in the past.’
Evening Post, 4 Sep 39, p. 8
The Federation of Labour promised to keep production as high as possible,
stressed that Nazis were the enemies of trade unionism and of the
best sections of the German people and called all workers, including
those of Germany, to make common cause in the fight for human
justice, liberty and international brotherhood.
Press, 8 Sep 39, p. 10
The churches sonorously proclaimed loyalty to the Throne, co-operation with the State,
and the brotherhood of man.
A great many local bodies, trade associations, sports and other
groups passed resolutions and wrote to the government of their
unswerving loyalty to the Crown, and keen desire to co-operate fully
with the government in defence of the Commonwealth. Such
declarations came, for instance, from the NZRSA,
Evening Post, 5 Sep 39, p. 5
the Associated
Chambers of Commerce, which most pressingly offered to assist in
framing regulations affecting commerce and industry,
Ibid., 7 Sep 39, p. 13
the Wellington branch of the National Council of Women,
Ibid., p. 16
the New
Zealand Federation of Young Farmers’ Clubs,
Ibid., 8 Sep 39, p. 13
the New Zealand
Motor Trade Federation,
Ibid., 9 Sep 39, p. 6
the Wellington Manufacturers Association,
Ibid., 4 Sep 39, p. 11
the Municipal Association of New Zealand,
Ibid., 12 Sep 39, p. 8
the Canterbury
Progress League,
Press, 7 Sep 39, p. 10
the Christchurch City Council,
Ibid., 12 Sep 39, p. 10
the New Zealand
Bowling Association
Evening Post, 25 Sep 39, p. 4
and the New Zealand Amateur Swimming
Association.
Otago Daily Times, 4 Oct 39, p. 6
Fortunately for the government officers concerned, many
local sports bodies did not express their loyalty individually but
asked their New Zealand associations to frame suitable resolutions:
thus the rugby players of Otago, hotly followed by those of Canterbury, on 4 September telegraphed to their New Zealand Union
proposing a united resolution.
Evening Post, 5 Sep 39, p. 5; Press, 6 Sep 39, p. 16
Some took the situation very seriously: the cricketers of Wellington and Otago delayed planning their
season as their young men might be defending the country instead
of playing cricket,
Evening Post, 5, 7 Sep 39, pp. 5, 7
while the New Zealand Baseball Council declared
that though competitions would be carried on where possible, players of military age should offer their services in this dark hour.
Ibid., 7 Sep 39, p. 7
In a few aspects, war actually began. Recruiting for the National
Military Reserve, begun in May for service in New Zealand, increased
rapidly, with nearly 7000 offering in the first four days, making a
total of 25 444 by 6 September, some of whom were soon called
for guarding vital points, coast-watching and fortress duty.
Press, 7 Sep 39, p. 14; Evening Post, 1 Dec 39, p. 6
Enlistment for the overseas force opened on 12 September to an equally
enthusiastic response. Public Works carpenters and private contractors swung into action, building camps at Trentham, Burnham and
Ngaruawahia. Some eager people who, remembering 1914–18, at
once began to raise patriotic funds, were checked and chilled by the
government which promised instead a comprehensive organisation
for money-gathering. Petrol was rationed for a few weeks; prices
were frozen; day-to-day life changed not at all. For most people
there was nothing immediate to do.
With some people, self interest balanced fervour and they began
at once to hoard food. Anticipating shortages arising from import
restrictions plus war conditions, they bought tea, sugar and flour in
panic quantities. The grocers, unable by regulation to exceed their
normal wholesale supplies, were obliged to ration their customers.
Four pounds of sugar per person per time was fairly general and in
Wellington, for instance, tea was limited to one pound and flour to
seven pounds.
Evening Post, 7 Sep 39, p. 14
This embarrassed grocers, for obviously it was the
more worthwhile customers who could afford such outlay, nor did
it avoid multiple buying by the determined ones; country people,
used to 56lb bags of sugar, were bewildered when offered 4lb a
week. The flour rush lasted only a few days. The quantities of tea
and sugar entering New Zealand were not diminished, rather
increased, and by mid-November the panic had subsided. Tinned
fruit and fish were also bought up by those who could afford them,
while in drapers’ shops the belief that reels of cotton would be scarce
made the demand so strong that they were scarce indeed.
Dominion, 15 Jun 40, p. 9
It was
all small scale, but the private and petty greed contrasted with public
professions of loyalty and co-operation.
After the first moments of acceptance when all parties stood bareheaded before the great issue, the war seemed far away and local
differences re-assumed their sharp outlines. On 12–13 September
the Emergency Regulations Bill which gave the government very
wide powers to legislate by orders-in-council, was passed without
opposition, J. G. Coates
Coates, Rt Hon Joseph Gordon, PC, MC & Bar (1878–1943): MP (Nat) Kaipara
1911–43; Min Public Works 1920–6, Justice 1919–20, PM 1925–8; Min Railways
1923–8, Native Affairs 1921–8, Public Works, Transport, Unemployment 1931–3,
Finance, Customs, Transport 1933–5; Member War Cab 1940–3
saying ‘All of us dread the idea of a
Government taking omnibus powers to do exactly what it likes, but
the people of this country must realise that their very existence may
depend on the unification of effort.’
Standard, 21 Sep 39, p. 8
Fraser soon warned that the
government would advance some finance measures on which he would
not expect the Opposition to stifle its criticism: ‘Nobody should be
expected to sink his conscientious opinions even at a time like this.’
NZPD, vol 256, p. 46; Evening Post, 13 Sep 39, p. 5
Hamilton, as he himself later explained, had privately besought Fraser
to avoid contentious legislation; this he held would not seriously
embarrass the government and would be a very real contribution
towards public and sectional unity.
Evening Post, 23 Nov 39, p. 10
Here it is necessary to remember the background. The National
party was alarmed by what the government had already done and
feared more for the future. Labour, coming to power in 1935 pledged
to relieve unemployment, had done so largely by putting thousands
of men on public works—hydro-electricity, irrigation, and, conspicuously, road-making. It was not pick-and-shovel relief but fully-paid
work, often from large camps which included family housing, and
using a great deal of heavy equipment imported directly by the
government. This, plus increased imports resulting from increased
spending power, bit so deeply into New Zealand’s balance of trade
funds in London that the government was obliged to restrict imports
at the end of 1938. Nash went to England to renew accumulated
loans totalling more than £17 million due for repayment in 1940.
He found the financial authorities so hostile to his government’s
‘unsound’ experimental policies that they at first refused to convert
the loan (which would have bankrupted the New Zealand government), then consented to do so on very hard terms. In July 1939
the loan was raised: more than £1 million was to be repaid on
1 January 1940, and the remaining £16 million carried on at 3½ per
cent, with £2 million to be repaid in 1940–1 and £3½ million in
each of the four following years.
NZ Herald, 8 Jul 40, p. 6
Restrictions checking the import
of British goods were frowned on, and the New Zealand government
should not promote industries in conflict with British interests.
Information from Dr W. B. Sutch, Jan 66; cf. Olssen, Erik, John A. Lee, p. 142
Nash learned a lesson he never forgot: ever after he watched over
New Zealand’s sterling balance with a protective care which caused
him to restrain early wartime impulses to give produce and money
to Britain.
Meanwhile it was necessary to keep imports down, and as local
industry could not rapidly be built up without importing equipment, shortages were inevitable. These were soon to be swallowed
up in the larger shortages of the war, but during the first year the
complaint was often made that, but for pre-war import restrictions
imposed by a spendthrift government, various goods would still
have been plentiful. While the restrictions favoured manufacturers,
they curbed and threatened many importers and traders, and
encroached on an area hitherto free from State intrusion; they were
viewed with resentment and alarm as a long step towards socialism.
Such controls, administered by civil servants necessarily new to the
business field, inevitably occasioned misunderstanding, rudeness,
muddle and delay, which brought resentment against regimentation
to a very high pitch well before war started. However, when war
made controls inevitable not only were people pre-conditioned to
accept them, but the organisation already existed and had got through
some of its teething troubles.
War further sharpened the Nationalists’ wish to have men of
sound ideas and business ability at the helm. Many were convinced
that the country would be ruined, its war effort enfeebled and
democracy overthrown by experimenting socialists, and many saw
totalitarianism looming at home: ‘if democracy is worth fighting for
abroad, it is worth defending politically in this country’.
Adam Hamilton, Evening Post, 1 Nov 39, p. 12
Firmly
exiled from office by the 1938 election, the National party hoped
that the new need for unity would at least curb Labour’s socialistic
progress, and shrewd minds knew that wars often bring in coalition
governments. As the Standard jeered on 12 October: ‘they thought
that the sweet fruits of office, even though they had to share them
with the Labour party, were almost within their grasp.’
For the Labour party, avoidance of measures that would displease
the Opposition was a very high price to pay for co-operation. What
was the point of being the government if they were to govern according to the wishes of the Opposition? From top to bottom Labour
was exasperated at being interrupted by war when it had lately
achieved triumphant re-election and was ready to press on with social
and financial reforms. To rein in, or to accept coalition, was to abandon the position for which it had battled so long, and workers could
argue that abandonment would be giving in at home to the enemy
they were fighting abroad.
The political truce was broken early in October over the Marketing Amendment Act, which enabled the government to buy and
re-sell any produce at prices fixed by the State, and over the Reserve
Bank Amendment Act which enlarged the Bank’s powers and made
final the government’s control of it. There was a storm of protest,
directed particularly against Nash, in Parliament, in the press and
at meetings of farmers and businessmen. The national emergency
was being exploited to promote the factional end of complete socialisation.
On 5 October the Speaker ruled out as tedious repetition argument about Socialism and
the Marketing Amendment Act. NZPD, vol 256, p. 713
Nash stated that the Bank bill was an ordinary measure
which would probably have been introduced had there been no war,
but war made it still more necessary that currency and credit should
be controlled by the government. Hamilton replied that New Zealanders would never submit to autocratic dictatorship of the State,
the very thing Britain was fighting; Sidney Holland
Holland, Rt Hon Sir Sidney, PC, GCB(’57), CH(’51) (1893–1961): MP (Nat) Chch
Nth, Fendalton 1940–57; Leader Nat party 1940–9; member War Admin 1942; PM
1949–57; Min Finance 1949–54
said New
Zealand had thrown her financial captain overboard and faced a
stormy voyage with a crew of political adventurers rocking the boat;
Coates wanted to know the difference between National Socialism
under Hitler and National Socialism under Nash.
Otago Daily Times, 7 Oct 39, p. 9; actually Holland spoke about a ‘reckless crew of
political “experimenters”’, with ‘a militant section of that crew’ rocking the boat. NZPD,
vol 256, p. 772
The session closed on 7 October 1939, with Fraser remarking
that such heat was quite in order; the government did not expect
sinking of principle or curtailment of expression of opinion.
NZPD, vol 256, p. 840
The
Standard, however, wrote about obstruction of war measures.
Standard, 12 Oct 39, p. 1
During the next two or three months widespread and widely reported
meetings of farmers and businessmen complained of these new
encroachments of socialisation, plus the longer-standing grievances
of import restrictions and no increase in dairy prices for 1939–40.
Such war regulations as price and transport control were seen as
clumsy government intrusion into affairs run much better by private
enterprise. A few extremists even advocated direct action such as
closing all farms for a fortnight, or tipping milk down the drains.
Otago Daily Times, 27 Oct 39, p. 8, reporting a Rotorua meeting; Standard, 11 Jan 40,
pp. 8, 11, reporting a meeting at Coroglen ‘a month ago’.
A Dunedin newspaper correspondent wrote: ‘We are at war and it
is no disloyalty to organise and put into practice a general strike to
make this country quietly more efficient, prosperous and free.’
Otago Daily Times, 25 Oct 39, p. 3
Such wrangling could perhaps be expected, paradoxical as it may
now seem to have been. Troubled peace had been replaced by ‘phoney war’. After all the forebodings, bombs were not raining on cities;
almost stationary armies faced each other in fortifications. For New
Zealand, waiting went on. Normal living, it was felt, should be
suspended, but there was nothing to replace it. Unable to get at the
enemy without, National party people turned their frustration and
adrenalin against the enemy at hand; Labour replied in kind, and
each accused the other of using the war to grind political axes.
The need for increased production confirmed the position of farmers. Traditionally they were the backbone of the country, the vital
basis of the New Zealand economy—in fact, were the economy—
and they knew it. It was only sense, therefore, that their interests
should rank first with any government, and especially in war time.
They believed deeply that what was good for farmers must be good
for New Zealand. They had little use for secondary industries, which
the Labour government, hoping to lessen dependence on overseas
prices for farm produce, was trying to foster behind tariffs and import
controls. They had still less time for unproductive public works,
some virtually relief projects, on which the government was spending
freely and which, by offering better pay and conditions than farmers
could afford, drew workers away from farms. Traditionally suspect
were freezing workers and wharfies, always loafing behind their regulations and awards, always trying to clip a bit more than their labour’s
worth from the farmer’s returns, and cossetted now by a Labour
government. For two years or so before the war farmers had adjusted
to rising costs by trimming expenses, especially of labour, cutting
down dairy herds and increasing sheep numbers, thus maintaining
net income even though production was lessened.
Dairy cows in milk—1937: 1 805 405; 1938: 1 763 775; 1939: 1 744 478; 1940:
1 739 874; 1941: 1 779 603. Yearbook1942, p. 346. Total butterfat production fell
from 442.4 million pounds weight in 1936–7 to 419.9 in 1937–8 and 376.7 in
1938–9; despite the grumbles about incentive it rose again to 415 million pounds in
1939–40 and 448.8 million pounds in 1940–1. Ibid., p. 355
Now farmers were asked to produce more, while army enlistments
and a rise in public works pay made their labour shortage worse,
and the government took no large steps to help them. Let the
government close public works, they urged, then farmers would have
an adequate supply of men to choose from, money would be saved
for war expenses, and even the guaranteed prices might be improved
enough to make increased effort worthwhile. They resented being
asked to work harder for no more money while the rest of the
community took the war easily.
In particular, farmers were disturbed because there was no time
limit to the commandeer of produce under the Marketing Amendment Act and, when questioned, Nash would say only that the
matter would be brought before Parliament when the war ended.
Point Blank, 15 Nov 39, p. 15
It was strongly felt that the government intended to use the war as
a stalking-horse to get control of the main economic structure, and
this cut very deeply at farmers’ independence: ‘… the farmer will
not do what he is told according to the dictates of an employer. He
is the master of his farm and its production depends on his ability
and organisation. If he is given the correct incentive he will do his
job but without it he won’t. If they interfere with the individual
enterprise of the farmer they can never replace it with any other
organisation and get the same production’,
Ibid., p. 47
wrote an indignant man
from Hawke’s Bay, and similar views were widely uttered.
Labour’s guaranteed prices for dairy produce, starting in the
1936–7 season, had at first won farming approval. In that year a
loss of £272,482 was borne by the government. The 1937–8 season
saw a modest rise in prices paid to farmers and a £576,724 surplus
in the dairy account; but in 1938–9, when prices again rose slightly,
the deficit was £2,514,889.
Yearbook1941, p. 357
An advisory committee recommended
a further price rise for 1939–40 but Nash, questioning the basis of
its calculations, decreed that there would be no increase,
Evening Post, 1 Dec 39, p. 4
and in
fact butterfat prices were to continue unchanged from 1938–9 until
1 April 1943.
Yearbook1940, pp. 414–15, 1947–49, pp. 880, 890
The halt in 1939–40 caused keen dissatisfaction:
farmers were being asked to produce more with no compensation
against rising costs: it followed that the prices were a bar to increased
production, and loyalty to the Empire required their improvement.
An allied complaint was the shortage of experienced farm labour.
This was not just a wartime problem; it had succeeded the Depression problem of not being able to pay even for an experienced man
when he stood at the door asking for work. But it was accentuated
by rural labour enlisting, and a further acute annoyance was the
public works pay increase from 1 October of 5s a week (plus an
extra 5s camp allowance for married men in single quarters), giving
a minimum wage of £4 5s a 40-hour week. This brought public
works pay in line with that fixed for other industries by the Arbitration Court, but the award wage on a mixed farm was £2 5s a
week, plus board and lodging reckoned at £1 a week, and on a
dairy farm £2 12s 6d, with no 40-hour limit.
Farm wages, except those for a few groups such as shearers and
harvesters, had never been fixed by collective agreements or Arbitration Court awards. Farm workers were too scattered for organisation, farmers strongly disliked regimentation, board and lodging were
normally part of the deal, hours and conditions varied, and pay
likewise. However, following the guaranteed price scheme which was
intended to assure the competent dairy farmer a decent standard of
living, the Agricultural Workers Act 1936 passed on the benefit to
his employees. It decreed a certain number of paid holidays and a
scale of minimum wages ranging from 17s 6d a week for those of
less than 17 years to £2 2s 6d for those of 21 or more, which rose
by 1939 to range from £1 to £2 12s 6d.
Riches, E. J., ‘Agricultural planning and farm wages in New Zealand’, International
Labour Review, vol 35, no 3, Mar 37, pp. 5, 8, 21–3; Yearbook1940, p. 832
Meanwhile, by various
Orders-in-Council, the Act was extended to other farm workers,
establishing holidays and rates of pay. From 1 May 1937, on farms
producing wool, meat and grain, the rates ranged from 17s 6d to
£2 2s 6d.
Regulation 154/1937; Standard, 6 May 37, p. 7
These rates rose with those for dairy farms, except that
for men of 21 years and more pay should not exceed £2 5s a week.
Yearbook1939, p. 723, 1940, p. 815
Farmers widely allowed that good men would be fools to stick to
farms, and were certain that they could not compete with such pay;
according to newspaper reports, very few spoke like the Waimate
farmer who said that somehow farm wages must be raised: ‘Do not
think for a moment you are going to smash all other classes of the
community down to the level of the teamster who gets £2.5.0 a
week’.
Press, 6 Nov 39, p. 10
Few mentioned poor farm housing as a cause of the labour shortage. Basically, many farmers expected a supply of capable single
men, content to live in more or less primitive bachelor conditions.
They were sure that they could not afford family housing for
employees, forgetting that the resultant absence of children from
rural districts perpetuated the shortage and that it was the Public
Works Department’s provision of housing, as well as better pay,
which enticed labour away from the land. Of course some farmers
provided good houses for married men, but often even large farms
had only one or two small family houses apart from single quarters.
Naturally farm housing had been at a standstill during the Depression, and during the few intervening years of comparative prosperity
it seemed a less urgent need than the fencing, top-dressing and long-delayed repairs or improvements that soaked up the better prices.
Ibid., 2 Nov 39, p. 4
It was frequently urged that unproductive public works where
men were ‘unemployed in the sense that we understand the term’
should cease, and it was even suggested that farmers should be able
to claim particular men from public works—the obvious difficulties
‘probably could be solved if the Government faced the position
resolutely’.
Ibid.
Some thought that farm workers should not be accepted
by the Army, others that it was useless to hold a man who wanted
to enlist: ‘he would only grumble on the job’.
Otago Daily Times, 6 Nov 39, p. 4
Subsidised farm
labour was proposed at a number of meetings—one at Lawrence,
for instance, approved a detailed plan advanced by the president of
the Otago Farmers’ Union, transferring men from subsidised local
body (Scheme 13) and public works to such jobs as scrub cutting,
weed clearing, hedge cutting, ditching, draining and fencing, not
more than £1 a week of wages coming from the farmer, the rest
from government funds. Camps on wheels for easy moving could
be established where required in country districts, and the men distributed to adjoining farms to work in gangs under efficient supervision.
Ibid., 11 Nov 39, p. 5; Point Blank, 15 Dec 39, p. 13
A good many farmers would have endorsed the Canterbury
Progress League’s suggestions for suspension of the 40-hour week,
registration of manpower, national service for both war and production and the transfer of men from public works back to farms.
Press, 16 Nov 39, p. 8
After a month’s tour of the North Island, Hamilton’s summing-up of the farmers’ attitude modified somewhat the devoted support
for Britain expressed earlier: support in the form of farm produce
should fetch a decent price. He had found everywhere ‘intense dissatisfaction of the militant type’ arising from the inadequate price
of butterfat, the permanence of the commandeer of produce, the
shortage of suitable labour and the insufficient measures to check
rising costs. Though farmers were willing to make sacrifices, he said,
if they retained ownership of their produce and could sell it for
sterling, ‘thus getting possession of British money’, they would get
substantially more than at present, and ‘regain a large portion of
that economic justice that is not only their right but also the country’s vital need’.
Otago Daily Times, 8 Nov 39, p. 6
An editorial in Point Blank, the Farmers’ Union paper, of 15
December gathered together the farmers’ grievances as many saw
them:
While the farmer is asked to work fifty or sixty hours on seven
days a week, in all weathers, and for an inadequate return, the
produce from his farm is commandeered and controlled by well-paid officials who are given the benefit of the forty hour week.
It is handled on the wharves and in the freezing works by spoon-fed trades unionists, many of whom are concerned with doing as
little as possible for as much as possible…. The farmer is willing
to do his duty, but he cannot do it unless he gets a good deal
fairer treatment than he is getting now. In the first place, adequate
labour must be provided…. There is plenty of labour available
for Public Works, on which the wages have recently been increased
…. Let Mr Webb
Webb, Hon Patrick Charles (1884–1950): b Aust, to NZ 1906; 1st Pres NZ FoL; MP
(Lab) Grey 1913–14, Buller from 1933; Min Mines, Labour, Immigration, PMG
1935–46
use his influence with Mr Nash to obtain
prices, for their commandeered produce, that will enable them to
pay farm workers a wage that will attract men from Public Works
and also permit them to give their workers a forty hour week.
Why should the farmer himself not have a forty hour week if it
comes to the point, and be recompensed for the higher skill and
ability he possesses. His returns to-day are less than those of a
carpenter. When the Government is willing to look at matters
squarely and put first things first, then, and then only will increased
production be assured.
Another, more appealing, statement of attitude by the man on the
land appeared in the advertising columns of several newspapers:
I, THE UNDERSIGNED, and all those associated with me,
engaged in a 60- to 80-hour week producing Wool, Mutton and
Lamb in order that New Zealand will keep its promise to the
British Government as part of its war effort, and being quite
content to set aside all pecuniary reward for the duration, give
notice that on conclusion of peace, WE WILL ASSUME COMPLETE CONTROL OF THE SALE AND DISPOSAL OF OUR
WOOL, MUTTON AND LAMB, and will use every Constitutional and Legal measure TO PREVENT THE NATIONALISATION AND SOCIALISATION OF OUR PROPERTIES.
T. D. Burnett,
Press, 14 Nov 39, p. 1; Dominion, 15 Nov 39, p. 3. Burnett, Thomas David
(1877–1941): MP (Nat) Temuka from 1919
Mount Cook Station, South Canterbury
November 11, 1939.
This was reprinted in the New Zealand Transport Worker, the watersiders’ paper, of 15 December with the comment: ‘[if this gentleman] had to sell his wool in the market this year without
nationalisation, as he calls it, how would he get on? And who the
devil wants his Mount Cook station anyhow?’ The same paper,
remarking on talk of a farmers’ revolt, wrote that under a Nationalist
government a Labourite who talked sedition during a major war
would be summarily dealt with, and perhaps even a Labour government could be too tolerant with agitators. ‘The sooner these people
are made to realise that they are now the “agitators” and the
“spreaders of strife”, and that the Labour government is the rightful
and constitutional guardian of this country, the better.’ It remembered the baton-carrying farmers who helped to break the 1913
strike.
NZ Transport Worker, 15 Dec 39, p. 26
A few letters appeared in newspapers saying that the Farmers’
Union did not speak for all farmers, and that its president and
Hamilton should urge increased production instead of ‘continually
grousing and attacking the Government’.
Press, 24, 25 Nov 39, pp. 13, 15; NZ Herald, 9 Jan 40, p. 10
A resolute note of self-help sounded from some districts where, though young men were
scarce and wives were helping with milking, farmers claimed they
would get over this difficulty just as they had in the past;
Otago Daily Times, 19 Oct 39, p. 8, report from Taranaki
some
local committees proposed to advise and assist on properties owned
or affected by those enlisting.
Ibid., 20 Oct 39, p. 10, report from Feilding
Government spokesmen tried to placate. They saw the difficultties—including that of getting experienced labour under 21 years of
age. They explained that farm workers were on public works only
if no farm work were available (which did not, of course, account
for men who deliberately got themselves sacked from farms);
Ibid., 27 Oct 39, p. 4
that
public works men could readily have leave for seasonal farm work;
that more than 3500 men were already transferred from Scheme 13
and public works to farm work, breaking in new land or reclaiming
farms that had gone back, with the government paying 75 per cent,
and it was hoped to transfer thousands more to such work.
Evening Post, 20 Oct, 3 Nov 39, pp. 9, 9; Press, 23, 27 Nov 39, pp. 10, 12
Farmers were offered a subsidy of £1 a week for six months to take on
an inexperienced man,
Evening Post, 17 Nov 39, p. 6
and were assured that arrangements were
being made to check on enlistments, men in occupations classified
as essential being refused; of those already enlisted several hundred
would be returned to their normal jobs.
Otago Daily Times, 17 Nov 39, p. 6
In the community of trade, background discontent against Labour’s
regimentation of business, in wages, hours, working conditions and
import restrictions, was increased again by price stabilisation.
See Baker, J. V. T., War Economy (hereinafter Baker), chaps 11–12
An
early request by Auckland’s Chamber of Commerce to start selling
at replacement costs was refused.
Otago Daily Times, 27 Oct 39, p. 6
Prices could be raised after 1 September 1939 only by the actual increase of costs, applied for and
approved in each case by the Price Tribunal. Increases such as extra
imported costs of goods, freight, insurance, interest on extra capital
needed to meet increased import prices, all set forth on special application forms, could be passed on, but traders feared that there would
be rising costs everywhere—such as for stationery—with which the
forms would not cope. They did not seek extra profits, they claimed,
only the right to pass costs on, making a reasonable margin of profit;
they added that they would not get what they did not fight for.
Evening Post, 17, 18 Oct 39, pp. 10, 15
The Christchurch Chamber of Commerce and the Canterbury University College Economics Department, in two bulletins published
in November, protested that to submit a claim for every price increase
would be intolerably cumbersome and slow in the quick moving
world of business. There were as yet very few shortages and adjustment of supply and demand would be better achieved if prices were
allowed to run free.
Press, 27 Nov 39, p. 9
In the first months of the war import restrictions remained the
chief complaint of the business world. This was linked to war purposes by the idea that to pay as you go required business as usual;
hence the government should strongly assist farmers to increase production and sterling funds and allow traders to secure stocks, in
order to supply revenue and maintain employment. Also, a few shop
assistants’ unions feared that business retrenchment would lead to
unemployment ‘after Christmas’.
NZ Importers Federation, in Evening Post, 22 Nov 39, p. 10; Press, 21, 22 Nov 39,
pp. 10, 8, reporting meetings at Hamilton and Invercargill; a report in ibid.,
30 Nov 39, p. 5, suggested that these were the only such meetings so far
A large meeting at Hamilton on
4 December, combining the usually conflicting voices of farmers,
the businessmen and shop assistants (‘an unholy alliance’, said Savage),
Ibid., 4 Dec 39, p. 6
pressed for the relaxing of import restrictions, and reducing
farm costs and labour problems.
Ibid., 5 Dec 39, p. 8
Some sections of the trading interest, however, had no sympathy
with the Farmers’ Union claim that unless their conditions were
improved primary production could not be increased. This production determined how much imports might buy, and a trade journal
harangued farmers in terms reminiscent of the extreme Left:
There can be no more haggling now over prices, and anyone (no
matter what his standing) who attempts to put any brake on
production for either personal gain or political motives deserves
nothing short of a prompt trial and speedy punishment on conviction. The rest of the Empire is rallying to the tocsin and every
New Zealander worth his salt will pull his full weight, without
stopping to argue what it is worth to him.
NZ National Review (incorporating NZ Manufacturer), Nov 39, quoted in Press,
28 Nov 39, p. 10
From the Associated Chambers of Commerce, a body traditionally
critical of government interference in business and trade, came a
remarkably fair, non-sectional statement by the retiring president,
M. S. Myers, who said that had there been no war he would have
protested about regulations intruding on trade. But war inevitably
meant assumption by the State of functions neither necessary nor
desirable in peace. The government had to govern, to decide what
the country would do in all the war’s aspects. Fighting men were
only a part of defence; food-growing, factories, and financial sacrifice
were also important factors. More co-operation was needed between
all sections. Discussion and constructive criticism should not be stifled—‘it is only mean, contemptible, negative or destructive criticism
that is to be condemned’. As the State’s intervention might be more
easily borne but for lack of business knowledge in its officers, the
remedy surely was close consultation between the public authorities
and trained private interests. On the ‘sound business’ handling of
shortages he remarked that sharply rising prices simply meant that
the poor paid by going short or doing without, while the rich paid
in money. He did not believe that special profits out of war conditions were necessary for the maximum output of New Zealanders:
rather that large returns easily made, in business or in wages, induced
slackening of effort.
Otago Daily Times, 16 Nov 39, p. 5
Such far sight was exceptional. For the most part public utterances
in these first few months showed no foreboding of how long or deep
the war might be. The war was as yet only an argument to be used
by various sections of the community in support of attitudes already
held: the traders were still chafing against import restrictions, the
farmers’ complaints were really another phase of the conflict between
town and country, a conflict very strongly rooted in New Zealand.
The government felt it neither necessary nor wise to stifle—or even
to censor out of the newspapers—sectional hostility and criticisms
of itself that only a few months later would seem dangerously
subversive.
War sharpened the government’s inner trouble, the threat of schism
which could have made necessary either coalition or else an election
charged with war hysteria. It grew from the past. The distress of
the Depression had swept Labour into power after 20 years of striving growth, in which members’ differences mattered less than their
effectiveness. They were men of high purpose, fervent to bring
economic justice and prosperity to the people of New Zealand, and
at first they were so busy relieving the Depression that they scarcely
noticed a latent division in their ranks. The majority was headed by
Savage, who inspired a quite extraordinary faith and following in
the electorate, if to a lesser degree among his colleagues; under him
a shrewd, competent, hard-working pair, Fraser and Nash, gradually
came to dominance. This majority aimed to direct the economy
through existing channels, while others wanted government to take
control of it more boldly.
The cracks were held together by the pressure of the 1938 election, but afterwards there emerged a group of left-wingers. In this
group were Lee, McMillan,
McMillan, Hon Dr David Gervan (1904–51): MP (Lab) Dun West 1935–43; Vice-Pres Labour party; Min Marine, Prisons, DSIR1940–1
Nordmeyer,
Nordmeyer, Hon Sir Arnold Henry, KCMG(’75) (1901–): Presby minister 1925–35;
MP (Lab) Oamaru 1935–49, 1951–69; Vice-Pres Labour party 1940–50, Pres
1950–5; Leader Labour party (Parly) 1963–5; Min Health 1941–7, Industries & Commerce 1947–9, Finance 1957–60
Clyde Carr,
Carr, Rev Clyde Leonard (d 1962aet 76): MP (Lab) Timaru 1928–62; Deputy Speaker
HoR 1946–50, education cmtes 1929–30, 1935–49
Lyon,
Richards,
Richards, Arthur Shapton (1877–1947): b UK, to NZ 1894; MP (Lab) Roskill/Mt
Albert from 1931
Barnard and Langstone,
Langstone, Hon Frank (d 1969aet 88): MP (Lab) Waimarino 1922–5, Roskill
1928–49; Min Lands, State Forests 1935–40, Lands, External Affairs, Cook Islands1940–2; NZHC Canada1942
with some other waverers on
the edge. They felt that Labour’s government was making no advance
towards socialism, which they regarded as its original and proper
goal. Instead, the relief measures and the 40–hour week giving
employment and overtime pay, by increasing spending power had
promoted inflation and the crisis of 1938, which had compelled
import restrictions and a British loan on hard terms. Hardening of
Labour’s hierarchy discipline made these back-benchers powerless;
they felt that democracy was dying in the Labour party, with leaders
becoming less brotherly as years in office multiplied, and many voters
shared their disillusion. At Labour grass-roots in the branches there
was a broad swell of discontent, growing from lack of socialism and
from awareness that the comradely atmosphere of the branches, in
which Labour had largely grown to strength, was becoming unimportant beside the growing influence of trade union leaders, powermen elevated by compulsory but inert unionism. That mounting
Nationalist pressure for conscription of men was not being confronted by vigorous measures to conscript money augmented the
sense of Labour’s betrayal.
In this dissatisfaction John A. Lee had a forward part, advancing
a financial policy much akin to the Douglas Credit-type ideas prominent in the mid-Thirties: that the State, instead of borrowing for
development, should create a socialist bank and issue credit based
on capacity to produce, with more stress on secondary industries than
on the roads and hydro-electric schemes of Labour’s public works,
thereby checking the inflation caused by spending power not balanced
by production of consumer goods.
After the 1938 election, wherein Lee’s Socialism in New Zealand
was much pointed to, and Nationalists hinted alarmingly that he
was likely to succeed the milder Savage, Lee pressed for the appointment of Cabinet by caucus. This had been Labour’s original intention, but in the enthusiasm of 1935 Savage had been given a free
hand. He expected it again in 1938, and after initial defeat by caucus
he got his way as a personal matter. Lee, able, forceful, and his
party’s most skilful propagandist, expected Cabinet rank, and many
expected it for him, but after four years he had no portfolio, no real
power, though he was active on the Defence Council. In defence Lee
diverged from New Zealand’s traditional policy of sending expeditionary forces to seek the foe overseas. He believed in isolation
and in New Zealand being defended by air and by a small but
efficient military force. His defence thinking was not adopted but
the Air Force was substantially increased between 1937 and 1939.
Olssen, pp. 88–9
In mid-1936 Lee became Director of Housing with wide powers
and cheap finance and with Nash, his Minister, pre-occupied with
other matters. It was estimated that New Zealand needed 20 000
new houses, while 27 000 should be demolished and 55 000
repaired. Lee organised with energy and skill, making good use of
such resources as his shrewd and able permanent Under-Secretary,
Arthur Tyndall,
Tyndall, Sir Arthur, Kt(’55), CMG(’39), MICE, FNZIE (1891–1979): Under-Sec Mines
1934, Dir Housing Construction 1936; Judge, Arbitration Court 1940–65; ILO commissions 1950, 1952–3, 1957, 1964–5
and the facilities of the powerful Fletcher Construction Company, which included joinery factories.
Olssen, pp. 93–4, 96, 104
Building trade
unions, which sought to establish socialistic principles and worker
control in State house construction, were advised by Lee to form cooperative companies and to compete with tenders. Companies were
formed in Wellington, Hamilton and Dunedin, but proved successful only in Dunedin.
Ibid., pp. 103–5
Land was purchased and prepared in
many towns, architects devised standardised but not uniform houses,
and, despite rising costs and shortages of both workmen and
materials, contractors put up houses at an increasing pace. By July
1938 it became clear that the Housing Department had outrun the
capacity of the building industry,
Ibid., p. 107
but by March 1939 some 3445
houses had been completed.
Ibid., pp. 92–108; cf. p. 797ff
After the 1938 election, Armstrong
Armstrong, Hon Hubert Thomas (1875–1942) MP (Lab) Chch East from 1922; Min
Labour, Immigration 1935–8, Health, Housing from 1938
became Minister of Housing and Lee’s responsibility lessened.
Lee, restive, criticised Nash’s policies—‘shilly-shallying and drift’,
attempting ‘a Labour spending policy with a capitalist financial
machine’—in a letter which leaked out early in 1939 and was widely
circulated.
Olssen, pp. 135–7
Labour’s Easter Conference of 1939 very heartily voted
confidence in Nash, and more narrowly (285 votes to 207) censured
Lee’s disloyalty and indiscipline. With the war Lee’s impatience grew.
Five Cabinet ministers, including Fraser, had been gaoled in the
1914–18 war, while Lee, with all the appeal of a demagogue heightened by a DCM and an empty sleeve, was seemingly qualified for
wartime leadership. This did not endear him to the Fraser–Nash
group, and his financial proposals increased their irritation. He
declared that orthodox financing of the war would ruin New Zealand,
he spoke of debt repudiation, he renewed pressure against bankers,
recalling that bankers had subsidised Hitler; these ideas were attractive to many who had felt the weight of ‘the Bank’ in the bad years.
He was ready to press on towards socialism, despite the war and
the risk of financial panic. Against the charge of disloyalty, Lee and
his friends claimed that they were holding to Labour’s pristine policy, which others were forsaking. He stood for democracy in caucus,
and he was critical of New Zealand being hitched to Chamberlain’s
chariot without visible safeguards.
Savage, the beloved figurehead, was ill with cancer, though this
was carefully concealed to avoid unrest.
As late as 7 Mar 40 the Standard laughed at rumours of the Prime Minister being
seriously ill, and mentioned a chill; he was looking very fit and was in daily consultation
with his ministers. He died on 27 March.
Lee, knowing that he was
sick but not how near he was to death, wrote ‘Psychopathology in
Politics’
Tomorrow, 6 Dec 39, pp. 75–7
explaining that a leader physically and mentally sick was
fatal to his party. It was poor taste and poor timing, and Lee was
at once relieved of his post as parliamentary under-secretary to Nash.
On 11 January 1940 at Auckland’s Labour Representation Committee a motion of severest censure against him was defeated 109:85
and replaced by one expressing confidence in both Lee and Savage.
But before Labour’s National Executive two days later almost the
same censure motion was carried 15:3.
Brown, Bruce, The Rise of New Zealand Labour, pp. 205–6
On 25 March at the Easter Conference Lee was expelled from the
Labour party. With Savage dying, it was vital to the central group
underwriting the smooth succession of Fraser that Lee be got rid of
quickly. The expulsion was well organised. ‘Big Jim’ Roberts,
Roberts, Hon James (1881–1967): b Ireland, to NZ 1901; Sec Waterside Workers Fed
(later Union) 1915–41, NZ Alliance Lab 1920–36; rep NZ ILO Conf 1930, dep
member Governing Body 1930–8; Pres NZ Lab party 1937–50; Waterfront Control
Cmssnr 1940–6; MLC 1947–50
king of the waterfront unions and president of the Labour party,
made little pretence of impartiality. Savage’s death was expected
hourly and it was claimed that Lee’s attacks had killed him. Branches
unaware of the issue beforehand had not instructed their delegates,
and power was concentrated in a few hands by a voting system
established that very day whereby union delegates exercised votes in
proportion to the size of the unions, now swollen with compulsory
but often passive members. The expulsion vote however, 546:344,
showed that Lee’s challenge was far from slight, while the election
of D. G. McMillan, also prominent in the left wing, as vice-president
of the party showed that this group was not rejected.
There is little doubt that the offending article was the pretext,
not the cause, of Lee’s expulsion, little doubt that he was condemned
in an hysterical atmosphere to which Fraser contributed.
Lee also contributed. His final appeal was maladroit as he himself seemed to recognise
23 years later in his Simple on a Soap-box, p. 194. His wife came to stand beside him
as he spoke from the floor, and he embraced and kissed her, with words that had far
more emotion than relevance. The Labour Conference in 1940 was not susceptible to
matinée finales that might have been successful in an American campaign of recent
decades. It seemed contrived, a ‘jack-up’, and cost Lee votes.
But
political comradeship of 20 years mattered nothing beside the welfare of Labour, which Fraser firmly identified with his own comprehensive leadership. Lee’s expulsion was more than the removal
of an unruly member, it was a formative piece of discipline. He was
exiled to the political wilderness, a salutary example, and with him
went W. E. Barnard, the Speaker, who resigned from Labour in
principled protest. The sacrifice of Barnard’s promising career (he
had been in Parliament 12 years and was widely respected) marked
as with a gravestone the point where the rest of the leftists headed
back into the main stream. It was the task of McMillan, runner-up
to Fraser in caucus voting for Prime Minister,
The voting was published: Fraser 33, McMillan 12, Clyde Carr 3, which leaves four
votes unaccounted for. Brown, p. 209, has remarked that it could have been no comfort
to Fraser that his succession was opposed by nearly a third of those voting. McMillan
was reported in the Auckland Star, 8 Apr 40, p. 9, as saying that the voting figures
published were not correct.
to close the rift.
He firmly expressed loyalty and received Cabinet rank but resigned
at the end of the year for health reasons. Langstone, already in Cabinet, supported Lee silently and later retired to a diplomatic post.
Lyon went into the Army and was killed.
Lee set up his Democratic Labour party, with branches all over
the country, but there was no large breakaway. The election due in
1941 was postponed for two years because of the war. In the 1943
election almost all of Lee’s 51 candidates lost their deposits, though
they polled four per cent of the total votes; Labour, though losing
five seats, still had a comfortable majority.
Louise Overacker,‘The New Zealand Labour Party’, The American Political Science Review,
vol XLIX, no 3, Sep 55, p. 722
Many of Lee’s followers
would not split Labour; all their political experience held them from
this, especially with the Nationalists pressing for wartime coalition.
However much Lee had contributed to his own downfall, something
died in the heart of Labour when he was cast out. Authoritarianism
was strengthened; criticism of the leaders would not do. This change,
this narrowing, would probably have occurred without the war, but
at all levels the war was an extra reason for suppressing strife within
the government’s party.
Lee’s head on a spike was both a warning against divergence
within Labour and a show of force to those outside. It revealed, said
the New Zealand Herald of 27 March, a system as totalitarian as
Fascism, Nazism or Communism, which should be noted by people
fighting for freedom. A writer to another Nationalist paper wondered
how opponents of the government could hope for tolerant consideration when men who had served Labour faithfully for years were
discarded for divergence on the means to achieve Labour’s ends.
Point Blank, 13 May 40, p. 41
But most conservatives were thankful that Labour had shed its dangerous member. ‘The “Thunder on the Left” seems destined to pass
away harmlessly for lack of a storm centre’, predicted the New
Zealand Herald on 27 March.
It was often remarked after the first few weeks that it was a funny
war. Poland was knocked out with numbing swiftness in three weeks,
but thereafter the expected war did not happen. The cable war news,
despite bigger headlines, seemed in its day-to-day effect much the
same as people had been reading for years. In Britain air-raid precautions were switched on, children were evacuated from cities, and
everyone waited with their gasmasks, but the bombers did not come.
British ships blockaded, while British aircraft attacked a few naval
bases and dropped propaganda leaflets over Germany explaining to
Germans that the Nazis were their real foes. The French advanced
a few miles into the Saar, stopping short of the Siegfried Line; by
mid-October they were joined by some 160 000 of the British Expeditionary Force, and the western front settled down quietly for the
winter, while German propagandists assured French troops that Britain would fight to the last Frenchman.
During those first months, but for Russia New Zealand’s newspapers would have been hard up for excitement and for wrath. Russia
was rated the direct and immediate cause of the outbreak of war,
for without the treacherous Russo–German pact would Hitler have
attacked Poland? This fury of words and feeling could not, of course,
reach Russia, but part of it could be turned against New Zealand’s
own Communist party, a small, highly derivative group, zealous in
trade union activity and fringed with intellectuals,
Scott, S. W., Rebel in a Wrong Cause, p. 88
which stuck
faithfully to its duty of supporting Russia’s foreign policy through
all its changes.
After 1928 it had been the declared policy of the Comintern, to
which the New Zealand party was then affiliated, to ward off attacks
on the USSR and promote world revolution. The local party gathered
strength during the Depression, when authorities viewed it as a sinister influence among the workless, and its leaders were repeatedly
arrested on charges of fomenting unrest and strikes, and of distributing seditious literature. A closely allied body, professedly nonpolitical and cultural, the New Zealand branch of Friends of the
Soviet Union, was formed in 1932 and had 1000 members by the
following year,
Soviet News, Jun 33
its aims being closer political, economic and cultural relations between the workers of the USSR and other countries,
defence of the former against imperialist intervention and making
known the truth about Russia’s development.
Ibid., 1 Aug 32
In 1935, following
the rise of Hitler, declared foe of Bolshevism, world revolution
receded in the Comintern’s policy, while support of Russia became
paramount. Reformist governments which, by offering the workers
a slice of bread and inducing them not to seize the loaf, were no
longer the enemy. Communist parties the world over were urged to
unite with socialist and labour forces in the struggle against war and
Fascism, and to defend the USSR. In New Zealand this directed
Communists toward anti-war efforts, such as ‘hands off Abyssinia’
processions, but local leadership continued opposition to Labour till
after the 1935 election, when it was decided to give the new government unconditional support against the forces of reaction. The offer
was not welcomed. Pointing to the communist role as disrupters of
working class solidarity in Germany, Spain, France and Australia,
unions and the Labour party firmly rejected united front proposals.
Standard, 19 Feb, 8 Jul, 4, 26 Nov 36, pp. 1, 7, 3, 6
The Communists continued to seek affiliation regularly, undaunted
by vigorous rejection—as in 1937 when the Labour Conference
declared against admitting Communists or Friends of the Soviet
Union to membership of the Labour party.
Ibid., 8 Apr 37, p. 7, 20 Apr 39, p. 10
Communists were active
in trade unions, where they rallied all those anxious for rapid internal
social progress and for opposition to war and Fascism abroad. They
denounced appeasement very strongly throughout the Spanish war
and the Czech crises, and urged the formation of a peace-bloc,
including the USSR. The Polish guarantee they greeted with scepticism, unable to credit Chamberlain with a genuine change of policy. In the chequered Anglo–Russian talks they saw, rightly, evidence
of Chamberlain’s inability to stomach an alliance with Russia; they
took no notice of rumoured German–Russian negotiations except to
deny them.
Workers’ Weekly, 16 Jun 39, p. 2
On 25 August, in a widely distributed Manifesto, the National
Executive declared staunchly: the Soviet Union is right. The Pact
signed on 23 August was in the interests of socialism and the world
Labour movement. The USSR had double-crossed no one, remaining
faithful to its policy of having peaceful and friendly relations with
all countries willing to do the same. Hitler, realising that the Soviet
Union, with its people morally and politically united under socialism, was too powerful to attack, had double-crossed his backers, the
financial gangsters in London, the real criminals, who had hoped to
direct him against the Soviet Union. By signing the Pact, the Soviet
Union had disrupted imperialism’s cynical plans to involve it in a
war which, whatever its initial stages, would develop into a united
front of the Munich powers against the land of socialism; it had
safeguarded the citadel of socialism, and it had driven a wedge
between Germany and Japan, thereby greatly assisting the Chinese
people. If war came, it would be the responsibility of the pro-Fascist
leaders of Britain and France, the top-hatted gangsters who had
helped Fascism to unleash the war.
But, continued the statement, while the Pact was necessary in the
interests of socialism, Hitler’s Fascism remained the deadly enemy
of the working classes. Fascism could not be defeated by Britain
under its present leadership but only if this were replaced by a real
people’s government and a democratic defence force. In New Zealand
Peter Fraser was fraternising with Adam Hamilton, preparing to
abandon the positions of the working class for those of the reactionary imperialists who intended, under cover of the war crisis, to
attack democratic rights and living standards. If Fascism were to be
defeated, democracy must be extended and living standards maintained, for only a free people with something to defend could defeat
Fascism. An emergency conference of the Labour party, the Federation of Labour and the Communist party must meet at once, the
government must state its support of the Soviet Union and oppose
the reactionary British imperialists. All trade union standards, all
social services and all democratic rights must be maintained, defence
measures must be on a democratic basis and conscription of wealth
must begin.
This may be taken as a sample of current communist thinking,
pruned of much rhetoric. It was printed in the People’s Voice of
1 September 1939 and, as a leaflet, 40 000 copies were thrust under
doors, into letter boxes and cream cans, into factories and workshops.
It was infuriating to many citizens in that September, when the
mood of loyalty was high. Sections of the community with little in
common could at least join in berating the Communists, as could
those frustrated by having no direct means of getting on with the
war. In Parliament, protests came from both sides: Doidge
Doidge, Hon Sir Frederick, KCMG(’53) (1884–1954): b Aust, to NZ 1935; 1st Pres
NZ Journalists Association; MP (Nat) Tauranga 1938–51; NZHC London1951–4
and
Polson
Polson, Hon Sir William, KCMG(’51) (1875–1960): MP (Indep Nat) Stratford
1928–46; War Admin 1942; Leader Legislative Council 1950
on 12 and 13 September thought that Communist subversive activities should be suppressed in war time, while Labour’s
Schramm
Schramm, Hon Frederick William (1886–1962): MP (Lab) Auck East 1931–46; Speaker
HoR 1944–6
wanted the country to be protected from ‘unfair, subversive, untrue, malicious and disloyal Communist propaganda’.
Fraser soothed, explaining the folly of giving nation-wide publicity
to statements beneath contempt. The government, he said, would
take action if necessary
NZPD, vol 256, pp. 47, 87, 96
and this remained the administration’s
policy until January 1940.
Most newspapers warned against communist subversion but the
Standard, headlining ‘Nonsense from the Mental Slaves of Moscow’
on 7 September, launched a campaign that surpassed anything from
the conservative press:
The New Zealand dupes of Comrade Stalin
Stalin, Generalissimo Joseph Vissarionovic (1879–1953): Gen Sec Central Cmte of
Communist party from 1922, effective ruler of USSR from 1924; Commissar for Defence
of the USSR1941–6; Pres Council Mins from 1946
are now bellowing out that a war between democratic Britain and Fascist
Germany is an imperialist war…. The Communist decoy ducks
now say that Stalin has betrayed the European Socialists so that
he may preserve intact the so-called Socialism operating in Russia.
Exactly the same argument is used by a scab in an industrial
fight… so that his wages will keep his home comforts intact.
Stalin’s course was in harmony with the treachery of local Communists everywhere who deliberately weakened Labour movements with
internal strife, and whenever this happened Fascism triumphed. ‘Only
a person with the logic of a lunatic and the mentality of an industrial
and political traitor would try to explain the relations of Germany
and Russia away as the Communists… are attempting.’ While
democracy was making a life and death bid for law in world affairs,
the Communists were making a typically twisting attempt to cloud
the issue by criticism of the Chamberlain government.
The Labour hierarchy, zealous to extinguish in its rank-and-file
the deep-seated though not uncritical regard many had for Russia
as the exponent of Socialism, attacked this lingering loyalty in other
major Standard articles. On 21 September one, ‘The Hitler–Stalin
Axis; brief history and explanation of communist policy’, told how
Russian Communism had departed from its beginnings, and how
local Communist parties, under Kremlin direction, shattered Labour
movements, while in Russia itself Stalin’s purges made Hitler’s
insignificant, and the last ten years showed that Hitlerism and Stalinism were not opposites but twins. All Communists were now
revealed as Nazis in disguise and all the ‘confusionism’ of the New
Zealand Communist party could not hide their openly established
front with Stalin and Hitler. ‘Some are fanatical hopeless worshippers of Stalin, as doped as are the Hitler youth of today. Some are
merely mistaken. It is to be hoped that the latter will now open
their eyes and admit the existence of facts no longer disputable’.
Standard, 21 Sep 39, p. 11
A fortnight later another long article explained, allegedly from
American sources, that Russian shipments daily left Leningrad without which Germany would be starved into revolt within a year; also,
that on 9 April 1935Germany and Russia signed a pact for a 200
million Reichmarks credit during the next five years, which had enabled Hitler to absorb Austria, smash the Spanish Republic, and
seize Czechoslovakia; the August 1939 pact enabled him to invade
Poland and defy the democracies.
Ibid., 5 Oct 39, p. 1
A long editorial on Stalin’s iniquity and the disruptive folly of
local Communists concluded: ‘By the time this appears in print, it
seems almost certain that Russia will be in full military alliance
with Germany and at war with Britain. Should Russian submarines
appear off our coast and sink our ships will the People’s Voice justify
that as being in the cause of peace and democracy?’
Ibid., p. 3
Some Labour people found these attacks excessive.
Ibid., pp. 6–7, 12 Oct 39, p. 13
Early in
November, J. A. Collins, a trade union secretary, wrote that the
reported drop in the Standard’s circulation was mainly due to political and trade union leaders in Wellington who had forced the Standard into foolish diatribes against Russia, ill-founded and insulting
to the intelligence of the average New Zealander.
Ibid., 8 Nov 39, p. 14
He added that
certain trade union secretaries with a pathological hatred of Communism kept their power by gangster methods, packing unions and
meetings with supporters, or organising rival candidates against those
who opposed their policies.
The national executive of the Labour party followed up the Standard’s pressure with the so-called ‘black circular’, an authoritarian
instruction which narrowed channels for criticism within the party,
forbade the publication of any resolution or information contrary to
government policy, and also forbade Labour party members to give
any support or information to the Communist party.
Press, 20 Oct 39, p. 8
Some trade
unions passed resolutions on the Standard’s lines, for example that
of the Federated Seamen at a Wellington meeting chaired by F. P.
Walsh
Walsh, Fintan Patrick (1896–1963): Pres Seamens Union from 1927, Wgtn Trades
Council from 1937; Vice-Pres FOL from 1948; member Industrial Emergency Council
during WWII, Economic Stabilisation Commission throughout its existence
which said, ‘To us the crimes of Stalin’s dictatorship are
even more repugnant than those of his comrade and fellow-worker—
Hitler….’
Auckland Star, 9 Dec 39, p. 17
Several Ministers lent their weight: Semple
Semple, Hon Robert (1873–1955): b Aust, to NZ 1903; formed 1st Miners Union
Runanga, helped form 1st Miners Federation 1908 to become Federation of Labour
1909; MP (Lab) Wgtn East 1918–19, 1928–54; Min Public Works, Transport, Marine,
National Service, Railways 1935–49, War Admin 1942
‘belted
the ears off’ communist supporters,
Evening Post, 13 Nov 39, p. 9
Webb said that there was no
room in this country for a party which hailed Stalin or Lenin;
Ibid., 19 Dec 39, p. 8
on
18 January 1940, under Standard headlines, ‘Moscow Minikins
March to Order Goose-stepping with Hitler’, Fraser himself
described, with long quotations, how British Communists had
‘turned’ on orders from the Kremlin. At the outset of the war British
Communists had behaved ‘like ordinary, normal decent citizens anywhere’. Their manifesto in the Daily Worker of 2 September supported the war, believing it to be just: the present rulers of Britain
and France could never do anything except for their own imperialist
interests, but whatever their motives, the action now taken by them,
under pressure from their own people, ‘is actually for the first time
challenging the Nazi aggressor’, and should be supported by the
whole working class. Ten days later, continued Fraser, the emissary
from Moscow, Georgi Dimitroff,
Dimitroff, Georgi Mihailov (1882–1949): Bulgarian politician; became Russian citizen
1933; Executive Sec Comintern 1934–43; Premier Bulgaria 1946
secretary to the Communist
International, came to Britain, threatening H. Pollitt,
Pollitt, Harry (1890–1960): Chmn UK Communist party from 1956; Sec ‘Hands off
Russia’ Movement 1919, National Minority Movement 1924–9, Communist party
1929–56
Secretary of
the British Communist party, and J. R. Campbell
Campbell, John Ross, MM (1894–1969): member Executive Cmte Communist party
1923–64, of executive cmte Communist International 1925–35; Editor Daily Worker
1949–59
of the Daily
Worker with political liquidation, and himself gave orders to oppose
and hinder the war. ‘In the whole history of politics there has never
been such a shameful abdication of principle, such a complete “sellout”, as that of the British Communist Party, indeed of the Communists everywhere including New Zealand’, who, openly and
blatantly, were now supporting ruthless aggression.
Standard, 18 Jan 40, p. 4
Again, in a
Trades Hall argument, Fraser vigorously declared that there was no
place for Communists in the Labour movement; such ‘unity’ was
spurious.
Ibid., 25 Jan 40, p. 7
Labour’s rejection of Communism was not new, but it was sharply
insistent now, for two main reasons, apart from genuine disgust.
Compulsory unionism had made communist zeal unnecessary, indeed
antipathetic, to many union leaders, while to the government, mustering support as widely as possible and making use of side issues
to absorb the antagonism of powerful opponents, the Communist
party was thoroughly expendable. Nationalist interests, shocked at
the socialisation of such measures as the Marketing Act amendment
were mollified by Labour’s enmity towards Communism. Thus the
editor of Point Blank on 16 October, after stating that though New
Zealand was not yet at war with Russia, Russia was as great a
menace as Germany, with emissaries all over the world who in New
Zealand were making violent attacks on both Chamberlain and the
New Zealand government and demanding to be included in a Labour
conference, went on:
The Acting Prime Minister Hon. P. Fraser, who, since the outbreak of war, has displayed qualities of real statesmanship is not
likely to pay the slightest attention to their “demands”. Further
than that Mr Fraser is the type of gentleman who will deal very
firmly with them if they become a nuisance, and probably the
only reason why they are permitted to issue their printed rubbish
is because at a time of Empire crisis there are very few people
likely to take much notice of them. They would have been more
dangerous had not Russia come out in her true colours. Nevertheless, subversive elements should be carefully watched… and
the safest place for many of them would be under lock and key.
A month later the editor remarked that although Point Blank did
not often agree with the Standard, he was pleased to commend the
latter’s utter condemnation of Communism.
Point Blank, 15 Nov 39, p. 10
Russia’s actions continued to disgust New Zealand critics, while
demanding much agility from the Communist party. Secret clauses
in the Russo–German pact
Sontag, R. J. (ed), Nazi–Soviet Relations, 1939–41, p. 78
had allotted eastern Poland, Bessarabia
and the Baltic states as Russian spheres of influence; so on 17 September 1939 as Poland crumpled, Russia, declaring that the Polish
state no longer existed, reclaimed on ethnic grounds the Ukraine
and White Russian territory acquired by Poland after the First World
War. Two days earlier the People’s Voice had rebutted speculation
about Russian troop concentrations: ‘the daily press, true to its desire
to organise a campaign of hate against the land of Socialism, spread
all kinds of fairy tales about a secret deal between Germany and
the Soviet Union for the partition of Poland—in spite of the well
known declaration of Stalin that the Soviet Union did not covet a
foot of anybody else’s territory.’
People’s Voice, 15 Sep 39
A week later the People’s Voice
explained that the Red Army was an army of liberation, rescuing
their blood brothers both from Polish oppression and the brutal
German threat.
Ibid., 22 Sep 39
On 28 September, after signing their Boundary and Friendship
Treaty which openly partitioned Poland, the German and USSR
governments declared that they had thereby created a sure foundation for lasting peace in east Europe; that it would be in the true
interests of all peoples to end the war; that if it continued Britain
and France would be responsible; that Germany and USSR would
consult on necessary measures. At the same time Russia hastened to
improve her Baltic frontiers: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, by ‘pacts
of mutual assistance’ (28 September to 10 October), ceded naval
bases and airports to Russia.
Newspapers presented Russia’s entry into Poland as a cynical violation of treaty obligations. Some, such as the Press (19 and 22
September 1939) saw evidence of detailed agreement there, but
wondered if this would persist. Others, such as the New Zealand
Herald, guardedly welcomed it as a check to Hitler, with hints that
German and Russian interests were too divergent for their alliance
to last.
NZ Herald, 20 Sep 39
Thus a Minhinnick cartoon, ‘Snatching the Swag’, showed
a sly-grinning Stalin shaking hands with a doubtful Hitler, while
his left hand holds a bundle labelled ‘Ukraine’.
Ibid.
Another bore the
words ‘Adolf met a bear—the bear was bulgy—the bulge was
Adolf’.
Ibid., 3 Oct 39
The Standard had it both ways: its foreign affairs column
referred to the Kremlin’s diplomatic victory over Hitler, while elsewhere it said that without the August pact Germany would not
have attacked Poland, and that without Russian help there ‘Germany would be desperate and the war much nearer its end’.
Standard, 19 Oct, 2, 9 Nov 39, pp. 4, 4, 6
Russian attempts to control the Gulf of Finland and to adjust
the frontier of Finland where it approached Leningrad were resisted,
and war broke out at the end of November. World indignation
against Russia was greatly quickened by this new instance of a smaller
nation fighting against great odds. In Britain there was public readiness and official planning to send military aid to Finland, and this
came not only from the Right: the British Labour movement declared
profound horror and indignation against Soviet imperialism and its
Nazi methods and called for all practicable aid to the Finnish nation.
In New Zealand newspapers were eloquent. Thus spoke the Herald:
Decent-minded people everywhere are revolted at the grim Baltic
spectacle of bear stalking beaver…. Previously it was chauvinist
Czechs and pugnacious Poles that oppressed the innocent Nazis.
Now the fiery Finns have turned on the benign Bolsheviks
…. The technique is terribly familar and affronts commonsense.
NZ Herald, 1 Dec 39
Russia’s brutal onslaught on Finland has profoundly shocked
world opinion…. The Nazi offence against Poland was rank,
smelling to heaven, but what shall be said of this even more
cowardly aggression?
Ibid., 4 Dec 39
The Dominion saw ‘in both Nazi and Soviet methods an identical
attitude…. These dictatorships are engaged upon crusades for the
furtherance of their own political ideologies throughout the world’.
Dominion, 2 Dec 39
Russia’s act, said the Press, was an appalling declaration of her aims
and her rejection of any restraint in pursuing them.
Press, 2 Dec 39
The Otago
Daily Times on 2 December spoke of Stalin using the tactics of the
gangster to impose his will on a small country, and on 30 December
considered him a more ruthless and cynical menace than Hitler. The
latter’s ‘errant genius’ had driven him to maniacal excesses but, in
Stalin, dictatorship without charity or principle played the diplomatic game with laborious concentration on self-interest alone.
‘Where Hitlerism has persecuted and degraded thousands, Stalinism
has “purged” and starved hundreds of thousands into submissiveness or death’.
On 14 December 1939 the League of Nations expelled Russia
as an aggressor, New Zealand voting for expulsion,
PM to Jordan, 11 Dec 39, PM 344/2/1, pt 1, in War History Narrative, ‘New Zealand
and the War in Europe’ (hereinafter WHN, ‘NZ and Europe’), p. 5
and asked
member states to help Finland. The New Zealand government considered this for a month, then, having consulted the British government,
GGNZ to SSDA, 16 Jan 40, in ibid., p. 6
gave £5,000 to the Finnish Red Cross.
Evening Post, 17 Feb 40, p. 5
At first Russia used comparatively small forces and the Finns
proved unexpectedly tough. Reports of Finnish heroism, of skilful
ski-troops and success, and of Russian brutality and ineptitude filled
papers starved for excitement on the western front. It was almost a
surprise in March 1940 to realise that brave little Finland had surrendered to Russian armies which had lost so much prestige. ‘All
the honours of the campaign go to the Finns’, said the New Zealand
Herald on 14 March. ‘They have exposed the clumsiness of the
Russian military machine and banished the bogey of the Red Army.’
The Press on the same day deplored ‘the fiasco of the Allied scheme
to aid Finland’, and the Evening Post on 1 April held that the ‘Soviet
Government in its onslaught upon the heroic Finns has exposed to
the whole world the ravages which Communism makes upon the
fibre of any nation which falls a victim to that deadly mental and
moral disease. The exposure of the Russian army and the Russian
air force has astonished the world.’
Against all this the People’s Voice published Russian accounts of
border incidents, ‘the brazen provocations of the Finnish militarists’
in their ‘senseless adventure’,
People’s Voice, 15 Dec 39, p. 5
denied civilian bombings
Ibid., 22 Dec 39, p. 1
and,
more reasonably, said that Russia wanted to safeguard its frontiers,
especially near Leningrad; in 1918 the Finnish ruling class and
‘Butcher’ Mannerheim
Mannerheim, Baron Carl Gustaf Emil (1867–1951): Finnish soldier & statesman; Regent
Finland1918; planned & built Mannerheim Line against Russia & commanded army
against Russia in 1939–40, 1941–4 wars
had called in German troops to suppress
a workers’ rebellion, killing thousands, and since then Finland had
‘been the happy hunting ground of every anti-Soviet adventure’.
People’s Voice, 8, 22 Dec 39, pp. 1, 2
The Red Army had checkmated Helsinki plans for ‘incidents’ to
win United States assistance,
Ibid., 19 Jan 40, p. 1
and Bernard Shaw
Shaw, George Bernard (1856–1950): Brit socialist, dramatist, novelist, critic
and Stafford
Cripps
Cripps, Rt Hon Sir Stafford, PC, CH, Kt, FRS, QC, JP (1889–1952): UK politician;
MP (Lab) 1931–50; Solicitor-Gen 1930–1; Ambassador Russia 1940–2; Lord Privy
Seal & Leader HoC 1942; Min Aircraft Production 1947, Chancellor Exchequer
1947–50
were quoted as saying that without Western backing Finland would not have refused Russia’s proposals.
People’s Voice, 12 Jan 40, p. 3
These arguments
were put together in a pamphlet, Finland, the Truth, by N. Gould,
which, according to the People’s Voice, sold nearly 15 000 copies.
Ibid., 9 Feb 40, p. 5
Finally, in March, that paper claimed: ‘Right from the start, the
Voice, alone in New Zealand, has pointed out that the REAL issue
was the desire of the imperialist states to make Finland a war base
against the Soviet Union’.
Ibid., 21 Mar 40, p. 1
Actually this view had been advanced
by the other leftist journal, Tomorrow,
Tomorrow, 6, 20 Dec 39, pp. 73, 105, 24 Jan 40, p. 191
which also, remarking that
official enthusiasm to aid Finland was simply another very significant
step in the lining-up of world capitalism against the one socialist
power, urged that the Labour movement should make sure that New
Zealand boys were not used to overthrow Socialism on the plains
of the Ukraine or elsewhere.
Ibid., 21 Feb 40, pp. 230–1
During September New Zealand’s Communist party supported
the war on two fronts—defeat Hitler and eject Chamberlain—and
the need to defeat Hitler was stressed in the People’s Voice of 16
and 22 September. The ‘two fronts’ line was also taken by the British Communist party on the outbreak of war, as the People’s Voice
of 6 October pointed out, quoting a statement from the Daily Worker
of 2 September, presumably to show that it had erred in company.
On the other hand, the American Communist spokesman, Earl
Browder,
Browder, Earl Russel (1891–1973): US politician; member Central Communist party
US from 1921, Gen Sec 1930–44; 1st Pres Communist Political Assn 1944–5; member
exec cmte Comintern 1935–44
had said on 2 September that America must not become
involved in the war but must seek an opportunity to intervene decisively for peace. This too was reprinted in the People’s Voice on
6 October. Russian leaders, a week earlier, had said that the war
was unnecessary and should end. The Voice’s editor, Gordon Watson, wrote: ‘the clear firm voice of the land of Socialism… is
appealing for peace’. Faced by the might of Socialism, Hitler had
surrendered more in a fortnight than the appeasers gave him in six
years. Russia had snatched the Polish Ukraine and White Russia
from Hitler and their landlord oppressors, saved the Baltic states
from the Nazi nightmare, and was forming a peace bloc in the
Balkans. Peace now would enable the peoples of the belligerent
countries to get rid of those responsible for the war. New Zealand
should press Britain, with the Soviet Union and the United States,
to call a peace conference.
People’s Voice, 6 Oct 39, p. 1
On this same day the British Communist party was likewise
changing step. The Daily Worker of 6 October said, ‘This is not a
war for democracy and against Fascism. This is not a war in defence
of peace against aggression. The British and French ruling class are
seeking to use the anti-Fascist sentiments of the people for imperialist aims…. The war is a fight of Imperalist Powers over profits,
colonies and world domination. It will bring only suffering and misery to millions of working class homes.’
Russia’s new friendship with Germany was signalised by several
statements that drove its overseas supporters further towards an anti-war position. Thus on 10 October, Izvetsia denounced the British
and French idea of war against Hitler’s ideology: ‘destruction of
people because somebody does not like certain views and world
outlook is senseless and insane brutality’.
Ibid., 27 Oct 39, p. 1
On 2 November a speech
by Molotov
Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich (1890–): Russian politician; dep chmn Council Mins
USSR 1941–57; Commissar, Min Foreign Aff 1939–49; Ambassador Mongolian Rep
1957–60; Permanent Rep Internat Atomic Energy Agency 1960–1
carried the readjustment a step further: Britain and
France, who lately declaimed against aggression, were now the
aggressors, while Germany was striving for an early peace. Ideological war was dismissed, bracketed with the religious wars of old;
fear of German claims for colonies was at the bottom of this imperialist war; German relations with Russia had radically improved.
People’s Voice, 10 Nov 39, p. 1
On the anniversary of the Russian revolution the Communist Internationale issued a statement lauding Russian achievement and calling, in well worn slogans, for struggle against the imperialist war.
Ibid., 24 Nov 39, p. 2
The New Zealand party hastily accepted this doctrine and, after
a national committee meeting at the beginning of December,
explained that clearly this was, on both sides, an imperialist war
which must be opposed by the working classes. ‘The Party should
have said this decisively from the beginning. Weaknesses and
mistakes in the Party’s work and slogans were due to the fact that
it had not grasped quickly enough the decisive changes in the world
situation, brought about by British imperialism’s rejection of the
Peace Front with the Soviet Union, and the consequent extension of
the imperialist war to involve Britain, France and Germany.’ New
Zealand had come in as a satellite of Britain, her Labour leaders
proclaiming the policy of collective security, which they had helped
to destroy at Munich. These leaders had finally deserted the working
class for the imperialist war-mongers. The Communist party could
no longer seek affiliation with Labour, and called on the New Zealand
working class, along with those of other fighting countries, to oppose
the war.
Ibid., 8 Dec 39, p. 4
This opposition continued until June 1941, when Russia was
invaded. There was at least some communist thinking in the trade
union resolutions that opposed the war and conscription in the early
months, and Communists were prominent in putting anti-war
amendments, which were heavily defeated, before the Easter conferences of the Federation of Labour in 1940 and in 1941.
Defeated 224:26 in 1940, and 229:27 in 1941. Standard, 28 Mar 40, p. 14, 17 Apr
41, p. 3
Opposition was also expressed through the People’s Voice, leaflets, and
public meetings, in stereotyped and raucous phrases attacking Britain’s aims and conduct of the war, the Labour government and the
Army in New Zealand, the folly and dishonesty of recruiting and
of conscription. Some local bodies speedily forbade their open-air
meetings, and there were very few halls available to Communists.
The People’s Voice, which claimed circulation of 7500 on 22 September 1939 and 10 000 on 16 February 1940, was the main channel until it was suppressed three months later; but thereafter the
Communists, with furtive zeal, continued their attacks in cyclostyled
pamphlets, variously titled.
See chap 19, ‘Censorship’
This was in the future. During the early months of the war, the
Communist party was not stifled and its activities were limited only
by its available energy. Looking back, its persistence in seeing righteousness rather than expediency in every Russian move may combine
comedy with pathos. At the time, for many people such disloyalty
was outrageous, though its very blatancy lessened its appeal and its
danger.
During the mid-1930s the reformed churches in New Zealand,
as in Britain, voiced in varying degrees the current distaste for war
and war preparations. Many felt that if the churches could speak on
this with a unified voice the government would listen more attentively, but church union was a large, difficult and distant matter
wherein New Zealand was unlikely to step ahead of Britain; nor
were there any attempts at a direct Christian crusade against war
preparations. As events moved towards war the churches, with minor
reservations and some small differences in alacrity, accepted it, and
at the outbreak urged the members to respond helpfully to State
demands. But in each church, again in varying degrees, a rift
developed between a minority who believed that even in war time
Christians should bear witness to the wrongness of war, and the
majority who felt that it was too late for protest, that human nature
cannot be changed, and that this particular war justified, even
demanded, participation in it.
The Methodist Church went further than the others in its rejection, following its counterpart in England which had declared against
war in 1933. Pacifist feeling was liveliest among young people, but
it was by no means limited to them, nor to any protesting fringe;
it was espoused by active, ardent men in the heart of the Church,
men such as Percy Paris,
Paris, Rev Percy Reginald (1883–1942): Methodist minister from 1906; Superint Wgtn
central circuit 1935, Pres 1938; Ed Methodist Times 1924–34; founder League of Young
Methodists1920
president of the New Zealand Conference, its governing body, in 1938. In March 1935 the Conference
declared war to be contrary to Christ’s purpose and a crime against
humanity. It must be repudiated utterly and the Church would
support every means towards peaceful settlements, reduction of
armaments and removal of economic inequalities. Recognising that
if war came some would refuse to bear arms while others would
fight for national and international commitments, the Conference
upheld individual liberty of conscience in all directions. In schools
citizenship training should replace military cadet courses, but Methodist chaplains would not be withdrawn from the armed forces.
NZ Methodist Times, 30 Mar 35, pp. 7, 11, 13
By 1937 the Conference, while still declaring war to be abhorrent,
upheld the use of force to preserve law and order under the League
of Nations, and called for a world conference on economic grievances
and for repeal of the compulsory clauses of the Defence Act (which
had not been enforced since 1930).
Ibid., 13 Mar 37, p. 374; Evening Post, 25 Feb 37, p. 14; Yearbook1938, p. 208
Early in 1939 it reaffirmed
these resolutions. After 3 September some official Methodist voices,
while repeating that war was contrary to Christ, praised the labours
of British leaders for peace and reminded that the Church taught
the duty of Christians to serve their country, and give obedient, loyal
support to constitutional authority. Inner conviction, which drove
some to arms, some to refuse arms, should be honoured and for the
latter the State was asked to provide alternative service compatible
with conscience.
NZ Methodist Times, 7 Oct 39, p. 185; Otago Daily Times, 3 Oct 39, p. 3
Other speakers urged the need to respect conscience, to secure the Church against schism and its pulpits against
being used for either recruiting or pacifist propaganda.
NZ Herald, 15 Nov 39, p. 11; Press, 16 Nov 39, p. 2; Evening Post, 22 Nov 39, p. 17
At New Year the Methodist Young Men’s Bible Class passed a
startling resolution: war was contrary to Christ and they should
unswervingly follow the Cross, refusing all war service; they urged
the government to stand firm against conscription.
Evening Post, 4 Jan 40, p. 8
It was rapidly
established that this was not the general or official Methodist position.
Ibid.
The Conference, meeting in February 1940 amid recruiting
and pacifist activity, did not wish to be identified with its pacifist
element, notably with the Rev O. E. Burton,
Burton, Rev Ormond Edward, MM, Medaille d’Honneur (1893–1974): served 1NZEF;
Methodist minister 1935–42, 1955–; chmn NZCPS 1937–45
already in prison.
It no longer repudiated war, declared loyalty to the Throne and held
that New Zealand was at war because there was no honourable
alternative. Conscientious objections should be respected but all
objectors should render alternative service. It accepted the State’s
ban on subversive utterances and opposed recruiting or pacifism from
pulpits.
Otago Daily Times, 28 Feb 40, p. 4
The Methodist Times of 10 February firmly rebuked the
Church’s active pacifists.
Reprinted in Auckland Star, 12 Feb 40, p. 9
The official church, while steadfastly
claiming freedom for the individual conscience, accepted the war
and turned to the ensuing moral problems of wet canteens and raffles
for patriotic purposes.
The Church of England’s Lambeth Conference of 1930 had
declared that war where one’s own country did not attempt arbitration should be rejected. The concept of collective security under
the League of Nations was accepted in the mid-1930s by both English
and New Zealand leaders, and in 1936 the Archbishop of
Canterbury
Lang, Most Rev & Rt Hon Cosmo Gordon, 1st Baron Lambeth (’42), PC, GCVO
(1864–1945): Archbishop Canterbury 1928–42
declared that it was not un-Christian to fight in just
wars.
Evening Post, 14 Oct 36, p. 11; Year Book of the Diocese of Auckland… 1935, p. 21
In succeeding years Averill,
Averill, Most Rev Alfred Walter (1865–1951): b UK, to NZ 1894; Bishop Waiapu
1910–13, Auck 1913–40; Primate NZ 1925–40
Archbishop of New Zealand,
and other prominent churchmen, while condemning war and criticising the settlement of 1919, saw lessening hope in the League of
Nations and, though reluctantly, more need of British rearmament.
They urged strengthening the Church through increased spirituality
and claimed for all who came to conscientious and not merely convenient decisions on military service the respect of fellow Christians.
Year Book of the Diocese of Auckland… 1936, p. 27; Church News (Christchurch), Sep,
Nov 37, pp. 21, 10; Dominion, 16 Apr 37, p. 12
The General Synod of February 1940 held that the war was
the lesser of two evils, it was to save civilisation, prevent self-intoxicated men from forcing inhuman ideals on the world.
Press, 17 Feb 40, p. 9
Meanwhile
it was the duty of the Church to strengthen its hold with normal
ministration, to sow and work for the future.
Church Chronicle, 1 Feb, 1 Apr 40, pp. 3, 35
Though the word
‘crusade’ was skirted warily, the Allies were fighting for the freedom
to be Christians.
Press, 23 Apr, 15 Oct 40, pp. 3, 4; NZ Herald, 21 Aug 40, p. 6
From this position it was not difficult, on formal
occasions and with leaders of other churches, to step on to the
recruiting platform.
Press, 5 Jun 40, p. 8
In the Presbyterian Church of the mid-1930s official policy was
to support the League of Nations.
Evening Post, 14 Nov 35, p. 11
Each Christian must determine
whether or not to refuse war service and the Church would minister
all members wherever inner conviction led them.
Outlook, 11 Nov 35, p. 22
More than other
church papers, the official Presbyterian Outlook in 1938–9 had articles
on world affairs, on religious persecution in Germany and the threat
of war, generally concluding that the key to peace was in Christianity.
Ibid., 2 Mar, 1 Jun, 7 Sep 38, pp. 21, 2, 3, 22 Mar, 10 May, 28 Jun, 30 Aug,
6 Sep 39, all p. 3
After 3 September the Outlook held that Britain had made
every effort for peace; it was a just and necessary war.
Ibid., 13 Sep, 4 Oct 39, pp. 3, 3
A pronouncement prepared by a central committee on international relations spoke of a just cause and urged civic responsibility in service
required by the authorities, restraint in judging the foe, and pressing
on with the usual work. It was passed by the Dunedin Presbytery,
with a plea for kindness to refugees, by Auckland and Christchurch.
Otago Daily Times, 6 Sep 39, p. 5; NZ Herald, 13 Sep 39, p. 13; Press, 14 Sep 39,
p. 4
Wellington’s Presbytery made a separate statement,
ashamed that Christian witness had not prevented war but recognising that New Zealand could only range itself with Britain. Members should give national service as conscience, enlightened by the
Holy Spirit, would commend; some would bear arms, some refuse,
either course could express true loyalty to the will of God.
Evening Post, 16 Oct 39, p. 5
In
November the General Assembly, endorsing the pronouncement,
advocated service with due regard for the rights of conscience.
Press, 16, 21 Nov 39, pp. 2, 10; Outlook, 20 Sep 39, p. 11
On 27 September in the Outlook a correspondent (Alun
Richards
Richards, Rev Alun Morgan: b Wales 1907, educ NZ; freelance journalist Europe, Far
East; Presby minister; WEA tutor-organiser Wgtn 1939–41; with Govt Publicity
(Economic Information Service), NZ organiser CORSO 1947; Ed Outlook 1948–56;
Min Wgtn 1957–65; Ed NZ Methodist1966–8
) asked about the Church’s attitude to censorship: would
the editors censor their paper to hold it in line with government
censorship regulations or maintain freedom to prophesy? An editorial
answered crisply that ‘we shall, of course, submit to the law of the
land’; there was no reason to expect that the government would
interfere with any fundamental doctrines and certain restrictions had
to be accepted.
Outlook, 4 Oct 39, p. 3; Star-Sun, 4 Oct 39, p. 6
However, by June 1940 Presbyterian zeal for taking thought, for not yielding up judgment, reasserted itself in an
editorial claiming that freedom to criticise should be prized and
protected, that to ban it as subversive would be great error; wise
leaders could learn from informed criticism while bearing the ill-informed with equanimity.
Outlook, 5 Jun 40, p. 4; Press, 6 Jun 40, p. 6
The Roman Catholic Church, with no school of absolute pacifism,
opposed armament-making, supported the League and hoped that
education would improve economic understanding and lessen
nationalism. Traditionally it held that a state attacked might rightly
engage in war when it was the only means left to repel violation of
territory, integrity or just treaties, or to resist the fomenting of revolution.
NZ Tablet, 27 Mar, 5 Jun, 18 Sep 35, pp. 3, 33, 1–2, 29 Apr, 6 May 36, pp. 21, 7,
22 Sep 37, p. 26, 2 Feb 38, p. 27
Mussolini’s attack on Abyssinia by these definitions was
unjust and the Church in New Zealand, through its periodicals,
stoutly condemned him, while criticising other nations, notably Britain, which had earlier acquired empires by war and would not share
them.
Ibid., 28 Aug. 4, 11 Sep, 13 Nov 35, pp. 3, 20–1, 6, 9 & 29, 26 Feb, 4 Mar 36,
pp. 23, 4
There was special difficulty as the Pope, encircled by Fascism, had spoken, albeit vaguely, of the war as justified by the
defensive and material needs of Italy.
Ibid., 30 Oct 35, p. 1
New Zealand apologists,
seeing Mussolini as the arbiter of power in Europe, who could be
driven by opposition into the arms of Germany, stressed the need
for revision of colonial mandates.
Ibid.
Fortunately the Abyssinian affair
ended quickly and about Spain there was no doubt. Franco’s nationalists were fighting for religion and order against red revolution and
anti-Christ, as the Tablet and Zealandia proclaimed almost weekly;
they also mentioned that Spain proved war to be sometimes just
and necessary.
Ibid., 22 Sep 37, p. 26, 2 Feb 38, p. 27
Many New Zealand Catholics came from Ireland, did not trust
British politicians and disapproved of the Treaty of Versailles. But
Catholics were persecuted in Germany, Poland was a Catholic country, and the German pact with atheist Communist Russia threatened
the reign of anti-Christ. ‘This is why we fight not a war but a
crusade.’
Ibid., 27 Sep 39, p. 7
A Zealandia article remarked on the general decline of
pacifism as an unconscious tribute to the traditional Catholic attitude: ‘as long as man is man… human beings will believe certain
things to be so evil that they will feel obliged to stick at nothing,
short of greater evil, in order to prevent or even to protest against
them’.
Zealandia, 7 Sep 39, p. 10
CHAPTER 3
The First Moves
ON 8 September 1939 it was announced that there would be a
special force of volunteers to serve in and beyond New Zealand,
the immediate target being 6600 men aged 21–35 years for the
First Echelon (about one-third of the proposed expeditionary force).
The three long-established military districts, northern, central and
southern, sub-divided into sixteen areas, were each to supply according to its population a certain number of volunteers. Enlistments
began on 12 September: by 9 pm that night they totalled 6655
NZ Herald, 13 Sep 39
and within a week reached almost 12 000.
Wood, p. 98
Thereafter as the first
mood of acceptance and excitement waned, recruiting became slower
and slower, and by December it plainly needed gingering up to
complete the Second Echelon. For instance the Otago area yielded
567 volunteers in the week ending 16 September, but only 7 in the
week ending 11 November, while in the Canterbury area the scores
were respectively 1130 and 21.
Otago Daily Times, 16 Nov 39, p. 10
For this sudden surge and the sharp decline there were many
reasons, some practical, some emotional. A large number of men
were ready to enlist at the first call, their motives various and often
mixed. Some were moved by plain old-fashioned patriotism, or were
adventurous, restless, bored; some wanted to see the world or get
away from jobs or families that depressed them. Some, though hating war, felt soberly that Nazism was so bad, so contrary to their
own values, that it outweighed other evils and only fighting could
stop it. They themselves could not remain out of the fight. Some,
sure that they would have to go sooner or later, preferred not to
wait or to be pushed. Some saw that, for the first wave, the chances
of interesting jobs matched those of dying a little sooner. These, and
no doubt hundreds of individual reasons, lay behind those first
12 000 enlistments.
Having passed the medical examination (where a good many were
halted for teeth, which at this stage had to be repaired at their own
expense), they could not go straight into khaki—carpenters and other
tradesmen were busy extending camps at Ngaruawahia, Trentham
and Burnham, clothing and equipment had to be assembled, officers
and NCOs sorted out. Men were warned not to throw up their jobs
until actually called. Officers and NCOs were summoned in the last
days of September, and most of the rank and file of the First Echelon
during the first week of October. Volunteers for the Second and
Third echelons were still sought (by 2 October enlistments totalled
14 742
Ibid., 4 Oct 39, p. 3
) but they would not be called up for two or three months.
These necessary delays tended to check the enlistment snowball right
at the start. There was time for a wait-and-see mood to grow.
Speechmakers and newspaper editors in the next few months commented often that there was not the wave of feeling, not the flocking
to the colours, not the open-handed giving of money, not the serious
war-mindedness of 1914; they usually concluded that the country
needed a lead. But was this inertia surprising? The war was remote,
confused, and not dramatic; life was unchanged and there was no
smouldering backlog of military temper ready to flame up if skilfully
stoked or poked. Rather there was a deep reluctance, especially
amongst men of fighting age and their families, to go through
the desolate business again. Behind this feeling lay the wounds of
1914–18, when about 100 500 New Zealanders (including 550
nurses) had gone overseas. Some 58 000 casualties had included
nearly 17 000 deaths, from a population little in excess of 1 100 000.
Press, 8 Mar 40, p. 8; Yearbook1940, p. 230
These wounds had been deepened by awareness that anxiety, poverty
and failure had beset thousands of returned men, inadequately compensated for suffering and loss of opportunity, in a world that seemed
no better for their sacrifice. Also, for three years before 1914 military
training had been compulsory, producing a large body of young men
already half-way into the Army, prepared to do what was expected
of them and carrying others along with them; while very few guessed
at the long grim stretch and the savage dirty fighting that lay ahead.
In the years before 1939, by contrast, Territorial training was voluntary and not popular, nor was there complete acceptance of the
soldier as a worthy figure—if many esteemed him, to others his
uniform was an unwelcome symbol. The war itself was accepted
without protest. Almost everyone declared loyalty but dull resentment was widespread, expressing itself almost unconsciously in forgetting the war as much as possible and, for many, in feeling that
it was primarily the concern of a vague ‘they’, presumably the
government; if ‘they’ wanted an army, let them conscript it, not
expect a man to volunteer.
This absence of enthusiasm, mixed with foreboding and remembered pain, showed at the railway station farewells to the First Echelon contingents both when entering camp early in October and
when returning from final leave just before New Year. Bands did
their best, there was the usual banter, the soldiers themselves were
cheery if set-faced (‘the real feelings of the Troops were for the
moment hidden under a mask of cheerful indifference’
Southland Times, 29 Dec 39, p. 6
) but there
were few cheers, some crowds were notably silent and women wept.
At Napier and Hastings, for instance, it was the opinion of several
old soldiers that the attitude of the people towards the war was
reflected in the atmosphere of restraint: ‘There was no gloom, but
the wild and hysterical enthusiasm witnessed during the Great War
was absent.’ It seemed that no one present welcomed the war but
that all were determined to see it through now that it had started.
Hawke’s Bay Daily Mail, 29 Dec 39
Further, the slowness of the war in the west gave time for second
thoughts. It is now known that the German command thought and
hoped at first that Britain and France did not really mean to fight,
that their war would be a fire of straw and a peace could be patched
up for a year or two more. This was not known to the Allies, but
it was clear that the peace so far from peaceful had been followed
by war much less warlike than expected. The careful imprecision of
the British government’s stated war aims contributed to the sense
of uncertainty. During November the Opposition wanted sharper
definition of war aims than defence of freedom and democracy, and
to some there seemed still a chance of avoiding a big fight; Fraser
in London pressed on both these points.
Wood, pp. 106–9
In New Zealand it is hard
to guess how many, and with what urgency, asked ‘What are we
fighting for?’ Apart from pacifists and Communists, there were a
good many Labour supporters who had been very uneasy about
Chamberlain’s pre-1939 course and who were troubled now that
New Zealand’s government had identified itself completely with the
British government’s purposes.
Discussed in ibid., pp. 111–12
Could the men in Britain and France
whose judgments had been so wrong be trusted now for wisdom
and integrity? Such people felt that the war was slipping into a
likeness of the imperialism of 1914–18, that it might crumble into
an ill-advised Chamberlain peace or somehow, especially after Russia
attacked Finland, be switched against Russia. All the years of secret
diplomacy and faits accomplis favoured these doubts. Some West
Coast trade unions in December passed critical resolutions about this
imperialist war; writers in Tomorrow, including a few members of
Parliament,
F. L. Frost, J. O’Brien, W. E. Barnard
were worried about war aims, convinced that others
less articulate were also worrying, and some urged that the first
duties of politically conscious New Zealanders were to protect civil
liberties and guard against the excesses of war-mindedness and against
Fascism at home: the non-political could defeat it abroad. Tomorrow
spoke for only a very thin slice of New Zealand, but such people
were not alone in feeling a lack of purpose and direction—for instance
Rodney Coates, farmer of Otamatea and no leftist, declared, ‘There
is a spirit abroad that is anti-British. People are so ignorant of the
position they are asking, “What are we fighting for?” All are asking
for a lead.’
NZ Herald, 22 Jan 40, p. 9
He laid this bewilderment at the door of the government, but a larger despair was expressed by a writer to the Hawke’s
Bay Daily Mail who on 8 April wrote that lately a returned soldier
had asked why, after he had gone through hell for years, his sons
were required to go through it all again. The peoples of the Empire,
the letter continued, were for the most part going into the war in
a spirit of dazed fatalism. ‘Having no real understanding of the
propaganda game, they are just marching out once more, thinking
that since we’re “in it” there is no way out but to stumble and
blunder further in.’
On the other hand, in the Transport Worker, which generally
backed the government and held that the prime and proper concerns
of trade unions were the wages and working conditions of their
members, a writer asked what would happen if Germany won.
Would New Zealand be taken over? Would his own life, liberty
and standard of living be preserved? He did not want to know what
Chamberlain said to Hitler, or what the British did in the Boer War
40 years ago. ‘Whether the Treaty of Versailles was wrong or not
is not as important to me as what occurs to my carcase just now,
and the necessity of a commonsense decision of supporting the New
Zealand Government in its war effort.’
NZ Transport Worker, 1 Mar 40, p. 9
These are sample views, individual perceptions of war aims or
lack of them, each, it may be presumed, held by a number of people;
doubtless there were many others. Of those above, the clearest reason
given for fighting the war was to prevent Germany from winning.
Withal, the feeling that plain men did not know the real purposes
and maneouvres of governments behind their fronts of words induced
caution. For instance, the Southland Times on 6 October remarked
that First Echelon men were merely going into camp for three months,
after which they would receive orders to hold themselves in readiness
while back in civilian work, or to remain on military duty here, or
to go overseas. In the camps, gossip ran that troops would not be
going overseas, they would have three months’ training and return
to their jobs. Such talk could well deflect men from enlisting when
a break in employment could check promotion or even lose a job,
let alone the three months’ drop in pay.
Newspapers yield a few letters from young men saying why they
did not volunteer. They were bitter that war had arrived for them,
who had had no part in making it. Without enthusiasm, they
accepted that it was necessary to fight the Nazis. They felt that
conscription would come sooner or later and they might as well wait
for it. With the bleak days of the Depression only a little behind,
men who had known relief camps and pannikin bosses had no zest
for more mud or for Army sergeants; men who had secured good
positions at £5 or £6 a week had no mind to give them up for 7s
a day any sooner than they must; men still on relief had little urge
to fight for the country that had given them so little. Unemployment
was waning, but jobs were still eagerly sought—thus at Christchurch
and Dunedin where papers at first published the names and addresses
of volunteers, employers were embarrassed by applications for jobs
before their present holders were even medically examined.
In one newspaper, for instance, a questioning young man wrote
that a travelling companion on a train had asked him what young
men today thought about the war. ‘Some, of course, don’t think
about it at all, but the ones who do, I am convinced, think it is a
scandalous thing.’ They did not, he went on, disagree with Britain’s
policy, but war was so different from the ideals they had been brought
up with.
Unlike Germany, the war psychosis is not an integral part of
the young New Zealander’s make-up…. Every year when at
school, and perhaps after that, we marched with the returned
soldiers to the Cenotaph to commemorate those who had laid
down their lives for democracy—the war to end wars; and today
with this second Great War upon us, looking back it seems all
so farcical…. Despite these thoughts, since September war has
been our policy, to give freedom to the oppressed people of the
world, and if war it must be then every young man in this country
is prepared to do his part. Most of us are marking time and
waiting, waiting silently, for the time to come when we will be
conscripted, and I think that that time should be now. We have
known for years the way the wind was blowing in Europe, and
I think that conscription or compulsory military training should
have been brought in… two years ago. It is the only fair way
and… the general physique would have been at a higher standard. There is no doubt that Hitler is a madman, and if we are
to meet force with force every man should be asked to do his
duty and should be prepared for it.
When this war starts in earnest thousands can be expected to
suffer. But for what? Will the world be a better place when it is
all over? We hope so and will give our lives in that cause, yet
still the doubt remains.
Evening Post, 9 Dec 39, p. 12
A 23-year old, well read in the last war, said that he was holding
back not from cowardice or pacifism, but because he could not see
why he should be mutilated or blinded while others of his age
waited for conscription; instead of leaving the decision to the individual, let the government’s register and ballot decide whether one
should be called up in two days or two years.
Press, 27 Dec 39, p. 7
Another thought that thousands would be willing to serve under
conscription, without the moral responsibility of volunteering to kill;
wanting both British victory and a clear conscience, he would destroy
his fellow men if directly chosen to do so by lawful authority, with
the rightness or wrongness of it resting upon the government, not
on himself.
NZ Herald, 13 Mar 40, p. 15
A 33-year-old man wrote to the Press on 10 October:
One realises what one is sacrificing in giving up a hard-earned
situation to enlist—for what? Some of us don’t forget that a few
of the best years of our lives were spent in camps at 10s a week.
Some of us have seen pictures of acres of white crosses in France,
and in the ears of some of us still ring the echoes of the tragedies
of last war. Sacrifice and die for one’s country! Yes and again yes;
but let it be done in a fair way, and what more fair way could
there be than conscription…. I am quite content to hold my job
until John Bull whistles me up through the conscription list. Then
I shall fall in and march into the fog of duty… my step will
be no less brisk because my life is conscript to my God and my
country’s need.
Another reported that when he discussed service with married men
they said, ‘It’s not my job, I’ve a wife and kids’, while single men
said, ‘If they want me they can come and get me’, or ‘I’ve a job
worth six quid a week, I would be a mug’.
Ibid., 18 Mar 40, p. 10
Yet another wrote
that he was quite willing to go under conscription but not willing
to give up his job to ‘some scrounger who won’t volunteer’, and
that he knew plenty of others who were waiting for ‘a written invitation from Mr Savage’.
Press, 23, 30 Jan 40, pp. 6, 12
A fencer was quite willing to fight for the
country but was not giving up a good job at £1 a day while ‘Jack
So-and-So remains in the bank and John Someone-Else in the county
office’.
NZ Herald, 17 May 40, p. 11
Certainly a large part of the young men’s reluctance to immolate
themselves ahead of others was fear that being away at the war
would cripple them economically for the rest of their lives. The
recruiting air was full of promises, but they knew how promises can
become vague and shrunken. Savage on 7 January pledged that they
would not return to ‘an unseemly struggle for the right to live’.
Again on 3 March, in his last broadcast speech, he said that this
time New Zealand could and must do more than before; to reabsorb thousands back into civilian work would be a full-sized job
for the government and the community; the government was taking
steps and would welcome suggestions.
No government getting a war under way could reasonably be
expected to have its rehabilitation cut and dried, but people, equally
reasonably, were dubious of promises not backed by statutes. A first
step was made on 14 October with a regulation obliging employers
to reinstate employees at the end of their military service, but this
was not strongly publicised till later. Many officials less responsible
than Savage promised quite as much as he did on behalf of the
government—for instance, the deputy-mayor of Wellington declared
that returned men or the dependents of the dead would ‘have no
call to make on the Government that will not be fully met’, they
would lose nothing, apart from the accidents of war; he himself
would undertake as far as was in his power that Wellington would
do its share to make the pledge good.
Evening Post, 13 Mar 40, p. 12
Fine words uttered freely
and vaguely on all sides begot more doubt than confidence. At
Auckland the RSA, sharply aware of last time’s meagreness, said
that the government must remove some pension anomalies before
it would urge young men to enlist.
NZ Herald, 2 Feb 40, p. 8; Truth, 14 Feb 40, p. 14
Newspapers carried a trickle
of letters contrasting the soldiers’ 7s a day plus danger and discomfort with the ‘carry on as we are’ attitude of the rest of the community. One said:
It is rather amusing to witness the attempts being made to entice
men to enlist. Wash it all out and get down to facts. Let the
various bodies who are doing the most shouting come out in the
open and declare themselves ready to protect the vital interests
of the men…. All the mortgages, monetary interests, big businesses, shares, insurances etc., won’t be worth the paper they are
written on if the tide goes the other way and we are beaten….
Start a crusade for the protection of the men who protect wealth
and I’m sure conscription will never come.
Press, 16 Jan 40, p. 5
An example of the situation was provided at Stratford where the
Mayor and the RSA called a meeting to encourage recruiting. Most
of the young men were at a swimming carnival but 74 other persons,
while supporting a motion for conscription, firmly defeated a proposal to first levy one per cent on all capital over £500 for a fund
to rehabilitate men after the war.
Truth, 17 Jan 40, p. 9
Again, at Palmerston North,
when the Junior Chamber of Commerce recommended conscription
of both men and wealth, the senior Chamber urged conscription of
manpower as in 1917, but opposed subsidising soldiers’ pay out of
taxpayers’ money, suggesting instead that the government should,
if necessary, increase the allowance for wives and children.
Southland Times, 4 Oct 39, p. 6; Palmerston NorthTimes, 4 Oct 39, p. 8
Some
local bodies considered subsidising their employees’ Service pay to
civilian level but decided it was not practicable.
Another factor checking enlistment was uncertainty about ‘reserved
occupations’. Farmers were assured that their highest duty was to
work their land—‘Farm or fight’ was a slogan—but did this hold
for their skilled labourers? Some farmers believed that they had no
right to intrude on the decisions of their men; others pressed their
claims on the Labour Department and Army authorities, to the chagrin of enlisting musterers or shepherds, who might be passed fit then
told to go back to their jobs. Skilled technicians, too, were held at
the employers’ requests, for the government had no wish to disrupt
industry. There were protests against the hidden contrivings of some
employers and demands that reserved occupations should be publicly
listed; the government, feeling its way through new problems, was
anxious not to commit itself. Enough uncertainty existed for some
waverers to claim that they were not allowed to enlist, and for others
to distrust this claim.
Right from the beginning there were demands for a national register and for conscription. Wars are usually fought within the framework of the previous war, and in 1916 conscription had been brought
in, though volunteering continued along with it till the end, resulting in nearly 92 000 volunteers and 32 000 conscripts and some
feeling between the two. In the reasons now advanced, fairness stood
first: why should the burden and risk be borne by the willing, while
the slack and selfish stayed in safety and took the jobs? Efficiency
demanded that men keenly needed for food production or for essential industry should not disrupt these things by disappearing into
the Army. Conscription also saved the personal ordeal of deciding
between the claims of country, family and business obligations. Many
of these demands came from National party circles, from farmers’
organisations, Chambers of Commerce, the newspapers and the RSA,
some closely and calmly reasoned, some smacking more of political
attack on the government. A steady trickle of newspaper letters spoke
of fairness and efficiency, some were of the direct ‘I have two sons
in the Army. Why doesn’t the Government bring in conscription’
type, others more complex, discussing for instance the relationship
of the State, the individual, and the good of the nation.
The government was highly sensitive on this point. Labour had
decried the 1914–18 war as an imperialist struggle wherein workers
were duped and exploited for privilege and money power, and five
Cabinet ministers had been gaoled for opposing conscription or the
war itself. This war, for the protection of workers and democracy
everywhere, was, they explained, quite different, but it was no light
matter to make an about-turn on conscription, and they hoped to
avoid it. Surely, with their own Labour government and a high
standard of living to defend, which would certainly be lost if Britain
were defeated,
Savage’s ‘If Britain loses, all is lost’ became a slogan.
workers would volunteer in such generous numbers
that conscription would not be needed. For the first three months
there was no real recruiting campaign: military plans were uncertain,
and it was a task for which most Labour members felt a natural
reluctance. Those in the House most for it were Nationalists, and
the left-wingers Lee and Barnard for whom the government did not
desire prominence. Moreover, many people thought that massed
infantry had given way to aerial combat and it followed that expeditionary forces were unnecessary.
The statement by Savage in June 1938 that if conscription came
it would begin not with men but with money was now established
Labour doctrine, placating traditional feeling within the party and
fending off conservative pressures.
See p. 28. Langstone on 20 December 1939 said that if there were not enough volunteers
and strong measures had to be taken, they would be 100 per cent, with everyone on
soldier’s rations and pay; it would be a great step towards collective socialism, and those
most opposed to it would be capitalists and Communists. Evening Post. 20 Dec 39, p. 12
Conservatives however were apt
to retort that as recent legislation had already conscripted wealth,
manpower should follow. For instance a letter in the Press of 21 November 1939 said that there was a catch-phrase often heard, ‘If wealth
is to be conscripted, men should be conscripted as well,’ adding that
only an ignorant savage or a cold and finished scoundrel could weigh
a man’s life against a bag of money. Another writher, not a lone
voice, expressed a less emotional view: ‘It may be assumed that the
majority of those called up for service would return from the war
uninjured. They would merely sell their services to the State for a
short period. Wealth conscripted would be seized without payment
and would never be returned’; one class would not only give its men
but be robbed of its property also.
NZ Herald, 31 Jan 40, p. 12
The impracticability of conscripting wealth was repeatedly explained.
Ibid., 5, 8, 9, 13 Mar, 28 May 40, pp. 10, 10, 14, 15, 13; Auckland Star, 28 May 40, p. 6
The first rush of volunteers was reassuring, and until arrangements
about the use of New Zealand troops were made with Britain during
Fraser’s November–December visit, urgency was lacking. But with
Freyberg
Freyberg, Lieutenant-General Rt Hon Sir Bernard, Baron Freyberg of Wellington and
Munstead, Surrey (’51), VC, GCMG(’46), KCB(’42), KBE, DSO (1889–1963): b UK,
to NZ 1891; GOC NZ Forces 1939–45; C-in-C Allied Forces Crete 1941; Gov Gen
NZ 1946–52
appointed as General Officer Commanding and the First
Echelon due to sail early in January, while not nearly enough men
were available for the Second, a national recruiting campaign was
launched just before Christmas 1939 for 10 000 volunteers by 12
January, for the Second Echelon and the nucleus of the Third. Higher
overseas pay rates were announced, colonels rising by 17s 6d a day
to 42s 6d and privates by 6d to 7s 6d; while teeth would be repaired
by the Army. There were large newspaper advertisements and posters: ‘Your pal is in the First Echelon. Enlist today’, ‘The Spirit of
Anzac calls you. You will be proud to be among the first Ten Thousand’. Recruiting officers were to visit remote pockets of manpower
such as public works camps, sawmills and mines, with attendant
doctors to give medical examinations on the spot. Local bodies, the
RSA, Territorial Associations, patriotic councils, Red Cross societies
and the like were asked to help.
Many of these people and groups believed in conscription, and
with divided minds they pumped out their speeches. As the Press
put it: ‘They co-operate; but they do not agree.’
Press, 10 Feb 40, p. 13
Probably those
near the apex of affairs accepted more readily than those less elevated
the need to subdue their own convictions, support government policy
and work up volunteers. Thus Colonel P. H. Bell,
Bell, Brigadier Peter Harvey, CB(’44), DSO (1886–1963): QMG & 3rd Military Memb
NZ Army Board 1940; OC Northern Military District 1941
commanding
the Southern Military District, told the RSA that despite all private
opinions the idea of conscription must be abandoned and the appeal
for volunteers supported;
Press, 22 Dec 39, p. 8
Adam Hamilton declared ‘The duty of
the National Party is to assist the Government to the fullest extent
in making the voluntary system effective. If conscription is unduly
stressed it will undermine the Government’s efforts and no member
of the National Party wants that.’
Evening Post, 29 Feb 40, p 10
Many local leaders however were
less willing to stifle their feelings. The Mayor of Ashburton, for
instance, when only 100 people came to farewell the district’s 34
soldiers, said that he had been asked to appeal for recruits but would
prefer a ‘spot of conscription’.
Press, 22 Dec 39, p. 3
The Otago Farmers’ Union, though
it would ‘willingly co-operate’ in this drive for the Second and Third
echelons, declared that universal military service was the only fair
and democratic basis for an overseas force.
Ibid., p. 6
The Waipa County
Council thought likewise, but while government policy was for volunteers it would give what support it could; one councillor asked
how they could back what they knew to be wrong: ‘The Government’s attitude is absurd and they are asking us to stump the country.’
NZ Herald, 24 Jan 40, p. 12
At Te Aroha a patriotic spokesman held that voluntary enlistment had failed if civilians were expected to go round telling young
men they should go to war and he thought the young men wanted
conscription.
Ibid., 6 Feb 40, p. 9
Some local bodies declared themselves in favour of
conscription, but on 26 January Fraser said that Cabinet was taking
no notice of such resolutions.
It is probable, however, that others took notice. In Dunedin, where
from October to March enlisting was slow, the Mayor, entraining
recruits for the First Echelon on 6 October, had hoped there would
soon be conscription, while the local RSA spoke firmly for it and
not until pressed by headquarters did the president appear on
recruiting platforms.
Otago Daily Times, 15, 28, 29 Feb, 6 Mar 40, pp. 8, 10. 8, 8
At Christchurch, where enlistment also dragged
at first, the recruiting committee was very active but at least one
member, Sidney Holland, made it clear that he was doing his duty
against his better judgment.
‘Some people would like to see conscription. 1 believe it would meet with the approval
of the majority … but the Government, in its wisdom, had decided on a voluntary
system. The decision rests with the Government and ours is the job to translate it into
action.’ Press, 22 Dec 39, p. 8
The Prime Minister broadcast, appealing to sense and sensibility;
the generals and mayors made speeches; the final parades of the First
Echelon at Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch were vigorous
rallies. The Observer of 10 January said briefly what other papers
were saying at more length: it deplored the volunteer system but
congratulated the government on greater energy—‘At last some
attempt is being made to kindle patriotic fervour. Last week’s parades
were memorable events. Those long columns of eager young soldiers
provided a splendid inspiration.’
The First Echelon marches were undoubtedly moving. At Auckland on 4 January the Herald reported a steady stream of volunteers
at the Drill Hall, some obviously straight from jobs, in aprons,
minus coat or wash; and on the 10th the steady stream yielded 97
men. At Wellington the total for 5 January was 105, and 114 on
the 8th—a record. The Evening Post, interviewing recruits on 4 January, wrote that the ‘call of adventure and the roving spirit’ seemed
the main motives—though men do not necessarily speak their hearts
to reporters. Said one: ‘When I saw three of my pals in the march
yesterday I realised for the first time that they are really in for a
trip round the world and I wanted to be in the swim too.’ A good
job and obligations had kept a 36-year old from joining sooner but
when he saw the troops in the city he simply had to go. Another
said, ‘It’s well worth the risk to be in the swim with the other boys’,
and the next that soon a man would have to be in uniform to get
a girl.
The enlistment rate quickened sharply. On 30 December volunteers numbered 18 858, but by 6 January there were 20 541,
Otago Daily Times, 15 Jan 40, p. 6
and by 27 January there were 25 140
NZ Herald, 6 Feb 40, p. 9
—some 6000 in four weeks.
Various devices were used:.vans with loud speakers toured Auckland
streets, and outside recruiting booths brightly dressed girls on lorries
did tap and Highland dances. In Auckland, Dunedin, Christchurch
and Hamilton low-flying aircraft rained paper ‘bomphlets’ (‘If this
were a bomb, where would you be? Enlist today’) on Friday night
shoppers. Wellington and Auckland tried to sing men into the Army
with community sings plus recruiting speeches. At Westport it was
proposed that prominent citizens should make speeches at picture
theatres, and the clergy of the Buller district were asked to mention
volunteering in their sermons.
Press, 8 Jan 40, p. 6
At Christchurch during a football
match troops marched round the grounds with gaps in their ranks
and 22 joined in ten minutes.
NZ Herald, 29 Apr 40, p. 9
There were parades of weapons, of
bands, Territorials and returned men; there were speeches and more
speeches. Still there was talk of conscription, rumours that it would
be introduced soon, rumours which, it was feared, would shrivel the
drive to enlist. For instance a major, recruiting at Wellington, said
that he had been given fifteen different dates for its introduction,
Evening Post, 12 Jan 40, p. 9
and Dunedin people in February heard that conscription cards were
being printed and would be issued in March.
Otago Daily Times, 19 Feb 40, p. 6
While recruiting activity grew, those who enlisted and their
families began to feel hostility to the others who inevitably appeared
as selfish job-holders. Families in which several sons had enlisted
looked askance at those which had yielded none. The first call was
for single men, but some men with sizeable families enlisted, and
if their wives consented they were accepted,
F. Jones in Evening Post, 12 Apr 40, p. 6
though some citizens
regarded this as economic folly or even criminal evasion of responsibility.
Press, 2 Dec 39, p. 9; Otago Daily Times, 6, 20 Oct 39, pp. 6, 8
Under recruiting pressure some men doubted if a wife and
one or two children justified remaining. ‘I am beginning to feel that
perhaps I am shirking,’ wrote one. ‘If conscription was introduced
I would have no difficulty—I would know that my time would
come eventually.’
NZ Herald, 18, 20 Jan 40, pp. 12, 14
Another newspaper column held this heart-cry:
Today my husband enlisted. We are very proud of him and
at the same time very sad. I have a small son four years old….
My friends say my husband is foolish and ask why he did not
wait for conscription. Why give up a position with £6. 10s. per
week for a soldier’s pay. Yes, Sir, this is what the people are
thinking. Why doesn’t the Government wake up. Conscript the
men; also conscript the money. Give everyone soldiers pay; then
men will enlist. Why should my boy be separated from his daddy
when there are single men left behind…. My husband is only
29, his best years are ahead of him. We were married in 1934,
had two years on relief, and now when his country called he has
answered, but there are too many men who don’t mind how loud
or long the country’s bugle calls…,
Evening Post, 22 Jan 40, p. 6
White feathers appeared, but not widely; the National Council of
Women disapproved, quoting the Queen who hoped there would
be none.
Ibid., 6 Oct 39, p. 11
In the House, Sidney Holland, whose military service in
1914–18 was beyond question, exhibited a feather he had received,
declared that they were being sent to other returned soldiers, and
hoped that it would be made a heavily punishable offence.
Otago Daily Times, 28 Sep 39, p. 10
Another
feather was sent to the redoubtable ‘Starkie’, hero of Robin Hyde’s
Passport to Hell.
Wanganui Herald, 9 Jan 40, p. 9
A few newspaper letters and articles
Taranaki Daily News, 8 Jan 40, p. 8; NZ Herald, 9; Press 16 Jan 40,
p. 5; Otago Daily Times, 18 Mar 40, p. 10; Southland Times, 8 Jun 40, p. 15
condemned
the senders as impertinent and presumptuous. A colonel who said
that conscription would not be needed if decent women refused to
dance or play tennis with non-volunteers was firmly rebuked by an
editorial and letters in the ChristchurchPress.
Press, 22, 23, 26, 28 Dec 40, pp. 8, 10, 4, 5
Truth also reproved.
Truth, 24, Apr, 17 Jul 40, pp. 9, 14
In Taranaki a man who received white feathers went into the Army,
leaving his mother, sick father and two young brothers on a 200-acre farm. The 11-year-old boy drove the lorry to the factory, as his
mother could not drive and she ‘was told all would be OK’. However, she was taken to court and fined for aiding and abetting her
son to drive while he was under-age to hold a licence. This led to
the elder son’s release from camp.
Information from Mrs P. Duckett, Waitara, Sep 69
The claim, strongly advanced by the RSA, that rejected or waiting
volunteers should be distinguished by a badge was recognised by
Cabinet in February,
NZ Herald, 22 Feb 40, p. 10
though it was not until mid-June that these
badges were issued. Many ex-soldiers joined or rejoined the RSA,
some not having been members for 15–20 years. This increase, begun
before August 1939 and intensified with the war, was more than
7500 in the first year, giving a total membership of 30 496 by
September 1940.
Evening Post, 21 Nov 40, p. 5
They joined partly from general interest and to
identify themselves with a body knowledgeable and important at
the time; partly to avoid, by use of the Association’s badge, misunderstandings and the attentions of the distributors of white
feathers.
Press, 2 May 40, p. 8
While leaders of the community busily worked for volunteers,
conscription and anti-conscription movements were developing. The
RSA and Chambers of Commerce had advocated compulsory national
service since 1939, farmers considered it necessary if production were
to be increased and the Defence League, very quiet since the beginning of the war, at the end of January 1940 wrote to 317 local
bodies urging compulsory national service, with all citizens allotted
suitable tasks. Of 224 replies, 89 declined giving an opinion, 30
thought it the government’s business, 2 opposed the idea, and 103
favoured it— 63 of these speaking for bodies and 40 as individual
conncillors;
NZ Herald, 10 Apr 40, p. 11
a few councillors were sharply critical of the League
and its purposes.
Ibid., 7 Feb 40, p. 12 (Mt Albert); Press, 9 Feb 40, p. 10 (Westport), 1 Mar 40, p. 14
(Paparua); Evening Post, 13 Feb 40, p. 4 (Lower Hutt), 9 Feb 40, p. 8 (Makara),
15 Feb 40, p. 10 (Wellington)
The League’s proposal was echoed by at least
one private person who called himself’a democrat, an anti militarist,
an ex-serviceman and a socialist’, who scorned as hypocritical and
inconsistent the many supporters of the volunteer system who cheered
the volunteers, saw the glorious side of war, believed it to be
unavoidable, never missed a parade, and ‘let George do it’; surely
to allot tasks to every serviceable person would be more efficient,
democratic and wholesome than the ‘obnoxious campaigning of the
recruiters whose stereotyped jingo phrases and methods are sickeningly reminiscent of the last war to end war’.
Evening Post, 24 Jan 40, p. 4
Newspapers, in editorials, news reports and correspondence columns, lost no opportunity of assuring the public that the public
considered the voluntary system neither efficient nor fair. How far
newspapers suppressed or diminished the views of those opposed
either to the war itself or to conscription in particular can only be
guessed—and perhaps only by those who have tried to express other
opinions opposed by those newspapers
In this survey, newspaper letters are given a place as expressing, in the phrases of the
moment, views by random people. That few letters appeared opposing conscription cannot
be taken to mean that opposition was not felt or expressed, only that it was not published.
—but a few appeared. Some
Press, 26, 28 Dec 39, pp. 5, 3; Southland Times, 23 Feb 40, p. 9
said that men who followed their consciences in refusing to fight
needed as much courage as soldiers and should be respected. Others
held that those who would not have to go were the most avid for
conscription, and hoped that in a referendum only those of military
age or their parents could vote;
Press, 9 Oct, 29 Dec 39, pp. 5, 3; Southland Times, 8 May 40, p. 4; NZ Observer,
1 Nov 39, p. 8
some pointed out that conscription
propaganda was inimical to volunteering.
Evening Post, 17 Feb 40, p. 12
A few suggested that
older men should enlist or be conscripted, urging the value of
maturity and previous training, or that young men, who had no
responsibility for the war, should not be the first to go—‘the economy of drafting off the broken-mouths and retaining the two-tooths
is obvious. As a fighting force a body of matured men will, under
modern conditions, be superior to one composed of youths in every
respect except perhaps mobility.’
Press, 12 Sep 39, p. 5; also Dominion, 19 Sep 39, p. 9; Press, 9 Oct 39, p. 5; Evening
Post, 10 Feb 40, p. 10, NZ Herald, 2 Mar 40, p. 13 (Bishop Cherrington)
Some thought that the government should know the real need,
and that there were enough volunteers. An Otago man complained
of the slogan ‘equality of sacrifice’:
Believe me, there is no equality of sacrifice under conscription or
any other form of recruitment…. If two men are fit for war
service of whom one is engaged in an essential industry and the
other goes to fight, where in the name of common sense is the
equality of sacrifice. Hoping to see in the future more appeals to
the intelligence of the people than to their stupidity….
Otago Daily Times, 12 Oct 39, p. 11
Leftists held that all men would be needed here if New Zealand
were invaded and that self defence was the first duty. Britain was
involved in Europe, all kinds of surprises were possible, conscription
would not be needed to get New Zealanders to defend their own
country, but the government should make sure that they had the
necessary weapons. This view was shared by the Roman Catholic
Church, with the New Zealand Tablet of 25 October declaring that
there were several ways in which New Zealand could pull its weight,
but wholesale conscription would not be a reasonable service to the
Empire, ‘and it would be a traitorous disservice to our own country’.
Communists, of course, who opposed the whole war at this stage,
opposed conscription vigorously, in the People’s Voice, in leaflets, and
in any unions where they had influence.
Some Labour bodies passed resolutions urging the government to
stand firm against pressure for conscription, pressure from Labour’s
political enemies. Thus a deputation from the Labourers’ Federation
went to the Minister of Defence on 14 November 1940, and on
7 February a stop-work meeting of 1000 Wellington watersiders by
a large majority opposed conscription; as did the Rotorua Labour
Representation Committee.
People’s Voice, 16 Feb 40, p. 1
The Union Record (of the Carpenters
and Joiners Union)
The Record supplanted the Borer as the voice of the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters
and Joiners in 1940. Like its predecessor it was prepared and published in the Auckland
area, but was made available to Union members throughout the country. In July 1951
appeared the first issue of a national journal, the New Zealand Building Worker.
in communist-tinged phrases demanded ‘stern
unbending refusal’, and held that conscription would be unnecessary
if New Zealanders were positive that the troops would be used only
against the Nazis and not for policing India or for any other imperialist activity.
Union Record, 15 Jan 40, p. 2
The New Zealand Railway Review (of the New
Zealand Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants) warned against
the constant talk of conscription—‘It is just the old idea that if you
say a thing often enough and convincingly enough you will change
the opinion of the next person’; New Zealand had a big enough
job feeding Britain without worrying about conscription.
NZ Railway Review, 5 Jan 40, p. 3
The People’s Voice, which would surely have reported all the anti-conscription motions it heard of, recorded only a handful: the Auckland Carpenters and Ruawai Left Book Club (issue of 19 January);
Dunedin Furniture and Related Trades (16 February); New Plymouth Watersiders (8 March); Otago Labourers (28 March); Ngauranga Freezing Workers (12 April).
Labour authorities, while holding firmly to the voluntary system,
were cautious. On 19 December Langstone, when asked directly if
there would be a referendum before conscription were introduced,
replied, ‘We have been elected. A referendum was taken at the last
election.’
Evening Post, 20 Dec 39, p. 12
The Standard repeatedly reproved debate about conscription: ‘If the issue ever arises it will be time enough to start agitating
for a referendum.’ The government opposed conscription and ‘it is
a certainty that conscription will not be introduced here except in
an extreme emergency.’ Meanwhile the best way to counter propaganda for conscription was to give full support to the voluntary
system.
Standard, 28 Dec 39, p. 6. 1 Feb 40, p. 4
Labour’s rank and file was, of course, in difficulties: conscription
was right against the traditional grain, but to agitate against it
betokened lack of confidence in their leaders. The outspoken Union
Record voiced the suspicions of the section of the movement not
silenced by the fear of embarrassing its own government.
Union Record, 15 Mar 40, p. 7
Meanwhile, in mid-January, pacifists and a wide range of leftists at Wellington started the Peace and Anti-Conscription Council,
Ibid., 15 Feb 40, p. 6
urging
New Zealand to withdraw from the war, oppose all conscription
and protect civil liberties. Branches appeared in Christchurch, Auckland, Palmerston North and Nelson.
People’s Voice, 19, 26 Jan, 16 Feb, 15, 29 Mar 40, pp. 5, 1, 5, 1, 2; Union Record,
15 Jan 40, p. 8
At least some of its meetings
were well attended—about 1000 crowded the Wellington Trades
Hall on 18 January
Tomorrow, 24 Jan 40, p. 188
after the Mayor had cancelled its Town Hall
booking;
Evening Post, 15 Feb 40, p. 10
and the Evening Post reported more than 800 at a Miramar meeting on 4 February.
In December the West Coast Trades Council had condemned the
war as imperialist,
Press, 6 Dec 39, p. 8
with consequent furore among its affiliates.
Dominion, 8 Dec 39, p. 10; Grey River Argus, 9 Dec 39; Press, 12, 13 Dec, pp. 8, 14;
People’s Voice, 22 Dec 39, p. 1
Although it was rescinded on 10 February,
Press, 12 Feb 40. p. 8
this anti-war expression,
plus other anti-conscription activities, led to a joint conference of
the executives of the Labour party and the Federation of Labour,
which on 21 February made a statement on war policy. It was an
interesting statement, floodlighting Labour’s image of itself. In well-rounded party-rallying phrases, it condemned Nazi aggression, and
stressed that New Zealand’s high standard of living, won by democracy and trade unionism within the British Commonwealth,
depended on that Commonwealth. The British government was at
last standing for collective security, as New Zealand had repeatedly
advised; it would now be ‘politically irresponsible or worse’ if New
Zealand Labour did not give Britain fullest support. The six peace
aims of British Labour were endorsed: no revengeful peace, but restitution to victims; right of all nations to self determination; the
outlawing of war; rights of minorities; an effective international
authority; an end to colonial exploitation and trade monopoly.
Recalling that the labour movement had stated its opposition to
conscription on 13 July 1939, sure that there was no need for it,
that young men would rally willingly to the defence of freedom,
the statement continued
We now unconditionally reaffirm that statement…. in our opinion there is no good reason for either conscription or anti-conscription movements in New Zealand. There is no conscription
in New Zealand, and there will be no conscription whilst Labour
is in power. The best possible guarantee against conscription therefore is to participate in the work of the Labour and Trade Union
Movements, to help to keep Labour in power, and to support the
Government’s voluntary recruiting campaign.
Social Security registration forms were now being used for a national
register (this had been announced on 13 February), but it was for
organising economic and industrial life, not for conscription. Freedom of speech was upheld, with some rather vague qualifications.
It is hard to think that the men who compiled this statement
Several Cabinet ministers were present. Evening Post, 21 Feb 40, p. 11
did not realise that conscription would come sooner or later, but
they were running politics. Savage, whose personal hold was very
strong, was dying (though this was firmly denied till early March);
there was the dissident pull of the left wing and they were concerned
to hold the party steady. (For instance, a series of mass demonstrations of Labour solidarity and confidence in the Prime Minister and
the government had been planned in December and January, the
first to take place at Auckland on 10 March,
Press, 23 Jan 40, p. 8; NZ Herald, 31 Jan 40, p. 11
but Savage’s sinking
health made them obviously unsuitable.) It was not a time for
unwelcome changes. ‘No conscription’ was so deeply graven on many
stalwart Labour hearts that to depart from it during this mild and
muddled phase of the war might well have shaken faith in the
leaders. Moreover, if the rumours of impending conscription were
scotched, enlistment would quicken.
The declaration so assuaged the Canterbury Peace and Anti-Conscription Council, which had been very active issuing pamphlets
and canvassing houses, that it decided to suspend all anti-conscription efforts.
Press, 12 Apr 40, p. 10
The Wellington body continued its preparations for a
general conference at Easter and the Labour party executive instructed
that no Labour member might attend that conference.
NZ Herald, 13 Mar 40, p. 10
About 100
delegates and observers attended, however, from trade unions, pacifist organisations, youth groups and women’s movements. They held
that the government should initiate a peace conference of workers
as well as governments of all nations or, failing that, withdraw New
Zealand from the war; they condemned the Emergency Regulations
and the restrictions of civil liberties, denounced the compilation of
the national register and called on the government to declare unconditionally against conscription.
Auckland Star, 26 Mar 40, p. 9
At the same time the annual conference of the Federation of Labour
heartily adopted the February Statement of War Policy, with only
28 (against 223) voting for a leftist amendment calling for immediate peace, disarmament, socialism, and national independence for
Czechoslovakia, India, Ireland and Poland.
Standard, 28 Mar 40, pp. 7, 14
The concurrent Labour party conference severely condemned the
Wellington Peace and Anti-Conscription Council as a political anti-Labour organisation, contrived by Communists, to whom all opposition to the war was widely attributed. Fraser recalled that when
war was declared there was no opposition from anyone in the country, except the pacifist Ormond Burton, until Moscow gave orders.
The conference adopted the war policy statement by 821 votes to
104. One speaker remembered that in 1935
Actually 1937; see Standard, 8 Apr 37, p. 1
Fraser had told conference that its decisions were only recommendations, not binding
on the government. In fact, Fraser’s 1937 statement was very close
to what actually happened in 1940. He had said that motions of
conference were expressions of opinion, not necessarily binding on
the government, which would interpret them in the light of existing
circumstances; the final word lay with Cabinet, after consulting caucus and the national executive. ‘The Labour Party, as the Government, was now responsible for the welfare of the whole community
not merely of its own supporters.’
Ibid.
But in March 1940 it was necessary to reassure conference of its
own power. Fraser denied having said that conference decisions were
not binding, only that the government could not accept decisions
contrary to its election pledges; in such a case it would be necessary
to call a special conference.
Ibid., 4 Apr 40, p. 14
Here Fraser forecast, as he was later
to claim, the special meeting that was called on 2 June, called to
endorse, not to discuss, the change in government policy on conscription. Meanwhile several newspapers
NZ Herald, 27 Mar 40, p. 11; Otaga Daily Times, 27 Mar 40, p. 8
assured their readers that
if conscription seemed necessary to fill the drafts, the question would
first be considered by a Dominion-wide Labour conference.
Subsequently, several Labour branches expelled members who
belonged to the Peace and Anti-Conscription Council.
Standard, 11 Apr 40, p. 1; Press, 13 Apr 40, p. 12
Only a few
were involved, but this action was significant as part of the change
taking place in the party. By inentifying these people with the discredited Communists, Labour’s executive gave warning to other die-hard anti-militarists in its rank and file that Labour demanded full
loyalty to its present self and was prepared to discard people and
principles that clashed with its new task, the task of keeping Labour
in power while running the war. It could be said that Labour adjusted
itself to war, or that the need to fight the war changed Labour. This
was already being shown by the Lee affair at this same Easter conference,
See p. 48
and by the silencing of pacificists; in due course conscientious objectors were to meet firm discouragement where,
remembering an earlier Labour party, they might well have expected
more tolerance.
Meanwhile the Auckland Carpenters Union
Union Record, 10 May 40, p. 6
and the Auckland
Builders and General Labourers Union in April decided to affiliate
with the Peace and Anti-Conscription Council,
NZ Herald, 22 May 40, p. 13
‘pursuing the traditional policy of the Labour movement’ and recalling that in 1916Peter Fraser had been national secretary of a body of that name.
Ibid., 24 May 40, p. 10
The 1940 Peace and Anti-Conscription Council was soon effectively
suppressed. Two prominent Australian members, K. Bronson and
N. Counihan, were quietly deported,
People’s Voice, 26 Jun 40, p. 2; Evening Post, 12, 16 Sep 40, pp. 13, 9
halls for meetings were not
available or were cancelled at the last minute,
People’s Voice, 5 Mar 40, p. 5; NZ Methodist Times, 24 Feb 40, p. 347
and on 30 June
even the Trades Hall was permanently denied it by the police.
People’s Voice, 9 Jul 40, no pagination
Labour’s repeated reaffirmation that there would be no conscription did not put heart into enlistments. From 1–27 January, 6282
men enlisted, bringing the total to 25 140, and in each of the next
three weeks about 1000 enlisted. But only 730 signed on in the
week ending 24 February, and for the next three weeks, till mid-March, the weekly average was 571, with a low tide of 534 in the
week ending 9 March. Some areas were brimming their quotas,
notably Wairarapa–Hawke’s Bay–Gisborne and Auckland,
Evening Post, 11 May 40, p. 14; NZ Herald, 16 Apr 40, p. 9
but in
several South Island districts quota figures loomed heavily above
enlistments.
Otago Daily Times, 5 Feb, 10 Apr 40, pp. 8, 8; Press, 17 Apr 40, p. 10
The Minister of Defence on 14 March maintained
that recruiting was quite satisfactory, but on the same day at Christchurch Sidney Holland had declared: ‘We are at our wits’ end. We
have had meeting after meeting. We have made speeches until we
are sick of speaking. We have had demonstrations without end, and
we still need 615 men.’ On 22 April Christchurch business and
sporting men proffered such suggestions as: employers should let fit
men without genuine reasons for holding back know that they would
lose their jobs if they did not enlist; they should also let the men
know that they themselves were sincere in their assurances that there
would be places for them when they came back; appeal should be
made to intellect as well as emotions; marching feet were the best
recruiting sergeants in the world; school children should go home
and ask their brothers why they had not joined up.
Evening Post, 23 Apr 40, p. 11
One or two
Press letters criticised recruiting methods. One, on 19 April, hoped
that future efforts would avoid a ‘mixture of martial music and
platitudes … an insult to our intelligence’; another thought that
the recruiting committee, like a keen young salesman, had been
‘overselling’; if it were to cease activities for a few weeks the news
from Europe would fill Canterbury’s quota.
Press, 16 May 40, p. 3
These instances may
be taken as illustrative of not only Canterbury’s difficulties, but
probably those of many other districts where newspapers were less
candid. Complaints of public apathy by perplexed mayors and other
recruiting citizens were widespread; if there were real fighting going
on, there would be real recruiting. ‘The thing to kick them along
would be to learn that the New Zealanders are in action. They would
move quickly enough then,’ said an Otago footballer.
Otago Daily Times, 21 May 40, p. 6
In the first fortnight of March Fraser, still Deputy Prime Minister,
toured both Islands giving, as the Standard put it, an inspiring lead
by frankly explaining the vital issues from platforms holding representatives of both political parties. Adam Hamilton assisted,
appearing mainly at different towns, though Invercargill and
Wanganui had the privilege of hearing the leaders of both government and Opposition give the same message from the same platform; Hamilton’s photograph appeared in large advertisements—
‘Now is the time for service…. We have a high and sacred
cause…. Young men … I appeal to you, you with the blood and
traditions of your fathers, to spring to the side of your mates in the
struggle today….’
eg, Press, 20 Mar 40, p. 14
Parades of troops and returned men garnished
these political forgatherings, which some Nationalists viewed hopefully as a sign of approaching coalition.
NZ Herald, 16 Mar 40, p. 17
The victorious HMS
Achilles, having shared in destroying the pocket battleship Admiral
Graf Spee at the River Plate in mid-December, returned late in February; her men were feted in their home towns and welcomed in
the main cities with more parades and speeches. In the last half of
March the Second Echelon went on special leave, carrying their khaki
message even to remote places, and returned to give mass parades
in provincial centres during April.
The impact of one such public appearance, the departure after
final leave at Dunedin, with a band, returned soldiers’ speeches, and
hundreds of friends, was described by the Otago Daily Times with
unwonted feeling:
Without ostentation or display, hundreds of farewells were spoken. Quietly, almost abstractedly, in the manner of those who
say one thing while they are thinking of something else, the men
filled the last moments before the troop train steamed away….
one realised how the sword draws its power from within itself,
although in peace time it lies idly in the scabbard with hardly a
soul to do it reverence. The scene was profoundly impressive….
In heavy type, the article made its conclusion:
Surely more than anything else, such unrehearsed incidents in the
progress of the war will awaken a higher realisation of the national
peril and a higher resolve to see things through.
Otago Daily Times, 28 Mar 40, p. 5
In the last week of March the weekly enlistment rate climbed to
726, at which figure it remained steady all through April. April
passed quietly, though on the 10th newspapers had inch-high headings, ‘Norway and Denmark Invaded’. Under the well-prepared
lightning stroke, Denmark crumpled in a day. In Norway, although
Britain had mined part of the coast two days earlier, the assault
from Oslo to Narvik was so swift that it eluded the British fleet
and secured crucial airfields. On 14 April British forces landed at
several points but finding that they could not make headway quietly
withdrew, except at Narvik where they continued fighting throughout May. They actually captured the town on 28 May but then, not
being able to make anything of this gain, withdrew on 10 June.
New Zealand papers treated all this quite calmly. Denmark with
her small army and undefended frontiers was an undersized easy
victim—though her butter and cheese and bacon would be missed
by Britain. Norway, relying on her neutrality, was also an easy kill,
while the British withdrawals seemed inconspicuous but almost successful. To New Zealanders the fall of Norway and Denmark proved
again that the Nazis were aggressive villains and that the ‘Fifth
Column’ was a special danger; it did not follow that Nazi villainy
could really threaten man-sized powers like Britain or France. A
Press correspondent on 19 April wrote that the British propaganda
machine made the Norwegian campaign ‘look like a fight between
Joe Louis and one of the Dionne quins. One almost feels sorry for
Germany.’ There was only a modest increase in recruiting though
the age limit was raised from 35 to 40 years.
Evening Post, 12 Apr 40, p. 6
April yielded 2717
volunteers for the army, March had given 2462, and February 3779.
By 27 April volunteers totalled 34 900; of these 15 636 had gone
to camp (and overseas), and 6720 were available for posting; 1860
were in reserved occupations.
Ibid., 1 May 40, p. 11
For Services other than the Expeditionary Force, enlisting was
much keener. In February a special railway unit required 370 men
and 1142 volunteered, while 600 offered for a forestry unit wanting
160.
Otago Daily Times, 29 Feb 40, p. 8
Early in October, when ordinary enlistments were slackening,
900 ground positions advertised in the RNZAF had drawn more
than 2000 applications in five days.
Ibid., 6 Oct 39, p. 12
Those volunteering as pilots,
air gunners and observers greatly outpaced the selection committees.
By mid-February 4300 had applied and 2000 had been interviewed;
NZ Herald, 14 Feb 40, p. 10
by mid-April the Air Force numbered 387 officers and
3064 airmen, including educational and civilian staff, with 2096
awaiting selection interviews.
Otago Daily Times, 19 Apr 40, p. 8
Meanwhile, as the rate of intake was
limited, many of those waiting to be called took preliminary mathematics courses—and sought volunteer badges to show their purpose.
When the Navy in February asked for technicians and tradesmen,
many hundreds applied, quenching the demand in a few days while
more than 500 yachtsmen volunteered for the ten positions offered
to them.
Ibid., 17 Feb 40, p. 12
During these first eight months, in fact and in feeling, New
Zealand was getting used to its war. Khaki was making its impact.
Relatives and friends of volunteers felt that they were in the war;
those who gave to patriotic appeals, or entertained soldiers, or packed
parcels, or made hussifs
A tape-tied cloth folder containing needles, thread, buttons, scissors, etc. Evening Post,
23 May 40, p. 12
for the troops, felt they were doing their
bit, though a bit that changed their lives very little. As yet no New
Zealand soldiers had met the enemy, though there was, of course,
the Achilles, and the RAF included some 400 New Zealanders who
had joined before the war; from time to time their photographs
appeared in New Zealand papers—decorated, missing, wounded,
dead. The newspapers after mid-February also showed pictures of
the Kiwis in Egypt. The Second Echelon was getting ready to go
overseas. To the small towns soldiers came back on leave, the aura
of here-today-and-gone-tomorrow about them, a hint of force and
danger. In the cities near camps—Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch—hundreds appeared every weekend, some to be the private
lions of their families or friends, a few to accept the hospitality of
strangers or near-strangers, others to rove the streets and the places
of entertainment, slowly augmented by Welcome Clubs, teas and
socials and dances run by the churches, the YMCA, the YWCA
and various clubs. They hoped for beer and girls and a bit of fun;
often they found only boredom and beer of which they could not
afford much. In the streets the sound of heavy black boots, moving
in rapid groups, made heads turn with a tinge of awe, a self-conscious awareness of their protectors—or with disapproval if those
protectors showed signs of drink. The soldiers swaggered a little;
they were New Zealanders bound for overseas and they felt they
were the All Blacks; they sang the old songs, they sang ‘Roll out
the barrel’ and ‘We’ll hang out our washing on the Siegfried Line’.
The war was still far away, and there seemed to be no hurry about
it.
New Zealand knew little of the storm that hustled the Chamberlain government from office as the sluggish war ended in the first
days of May 1940, with the Allied retreat from southern Norway
after a three weeks’ campaign, reports of which had been pedestrian
but optimistic. True, the dailies of 6 May briefly quoted the Manchester Guardian on shallow ministerial optimism and the Prime
Minister’s dangerous capacity for self-delusion, the Daily Mail’s view
that British leaders had been fooling themselves and the public, and
the South African papers which charged the Ministry of Information
with deceiving press and public. But that same day the Evening
Post’s war news column held that the set-back in Norway, apart
from its implied reflection on the British government’s conduct of
the war, was not of vital consequence in the long distance strategy
of the war.
Editorials in the New Zealand Herald (7 May) and the Press
(9 May) complained about official secretiveness and evasion, of treating British people as if they had no reserves of moral courage, but
the Evening Post (8 May) held that ministerial frankness should be
qualified by strategic necessity. The Auckland Star on 6 May, however, said that through muddle and dissension in London many
Anzacs at Gallipoli had died needlessly and in vain; some apparent
errors in Norway were unpleasantly reminiscent of Gallipoli and it
must ‘be made clear to the British Government that the Dominions
would not permit their troops to be sent and sacrificed in any ill-conceived or badly organised adventure.’
Reports of the debate on Norway and the conduct of the war in
the House of Commons on 7 and 8 May gave much space to the
explanations of Chamberlain and Churchill, the former claiming that
all was not yet lost in Norway and that the Germans had paid
heavily for their gains. It was also clear that there was vigorous
criticism of the government, both in the press and in the House.
While some New Zealand papers printed more of these criticisms
than others, there was general mention of attacks by two Conservative members, Admiral Sir Roger Keyes
Keyes, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger, 1st Baron of Zeebrugge and of Dover (’43)
(1872–1945): MP 1934–43; Dir Combined Ops 1940–1
and Leo Amery.
Amery, Rt Hon Leopold Stennett, PC, CH (1873–1955): Sec State Cols 1924–9, Dom
Aff 1925–9, India and Burma1940–5
The
Admiral declared that the Norway campaign was a shocking story
of ineptitude, repeating the Gallipoli tragedy, and he expressed the
frustration of the fighting Navy. There were restrained reports of
Amery’s censuring the lack of decisive consistent action and demanding a reformed government with fighting spirit in which the Opposition took a share of responsibility, but there was no stress on the
final Cromwellian thrust that helped to sharpen the mood of the
House.
Harold Nicholson, one of the Conservatives who turned against Chamberlain, wrote of
Keyes’s ‘absolutely devastating attack’ on naval bungling, and Amery’s ‘further terrific
attack’. The latter switched attention from Norway to the whole conduct of the war,
concluding with Cromwell’s dismissal of the Long Parliament: ‘You have sat here too
long for any good you have been doing. Depart, I say, and let us have done with you.
In the name of God, go.’ Nicholson, Harold, Diaries and Letters 1939–1945, p. 73;
also Dalton, Hugh, The Fateful Years: Memoirs 1939–1945, pp. 304–11; Calder, Angus,
The People’s War: Britain 1939–45, pp. 81–2
The complaints of Attlee,
Attlee, Rt Hon Clement Richard, 1st Earl Attlee (’55), Viscount Prestwood (’55), KG,
PC, OM, CH, FRS (1883–1967): MP (Lab) 1922–55; Leader Oppos 1935–40,
1951–5; Deputy PM 1942–4, Sec State Dom Aff 1942–3; PM 1945–51; Min Defence
1945–6
Sir Archibald Sinclair
Sinclair, Rt Hon Sir Archibald, 1st Viscount Thurso of Ulbster (’52), KT(’41), PC,
CMG (1890–1970): MP (Lib) 1922–45; Sec State Air 1940–5; Leader Parl Liberal
party 1935–45
and others
on muddling mismanagement were briefly noted. Lloyd George’s
Lloyd George, Rt Hon David, 1st Earl of Dwyfor (’45), PC, OM (1863–1945): MP
(Lib) 1890–1931, (Indep Lib) 1931–44; PM 1916–22
call to Chamberlain to set an example of sacrifice by giving up the
seals of his office was widely reported, as were the cries of ‘Resign,
resign’ that greeted the vote in which the government’s majority fell
from about 240 to 81.
The vote was 281:200, showing many Conservative absences apart from those who
marched into the Opposition Lobby.
But the second day’s reports gave much
space to Churchill’s explanations, and the New Zealand Herald
(10 May) declared, ‘Highest honours in a searching debate go to
Mr Churchill.’ Many of the rebel Conservatives who insisted on
coalition were named, and it was ‘understood’ that Labour leaders
had told Chamberlain that they would not serve under him. Nevertheless the inevitability of Chamberlain’s resignation was not sharply
apparent. The Evening Post (9 May) saw the vote as the government’s
survival and a united shoulder to the wheel; the New Zealand Herald
and the Dominion on 13 May saw Chamberlain’s May 10 (British
time) resignation, with a comfortable loyal majority, as unnecessary,
but in the highest traditions of British statesmanship.
Churchill was warmly welcomed, the bulldog fit to meet the bull-like rush of the new war. On the day he took office as Prime Minister,
10 May, Germany launched its great attack in the west, first invading Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg. By 18 May startled New
Zealanders were reading that the Germans had overrun Holland and
were thrusting into France. In that week, along with details of
Churchill’s all-party cabinet, they also read Labour statements that
there was no earthly reason for coalition in New Zealand: Britain
was due for an election in 1940, but in New Zealand the government had a large majority, neither party wanted coalition, and lack
of it was not impeding the war effort.
Evening Post, 14 May 40, p. 6; Standard, 16 May 40, p. 1
They also read resolutions
from chambers of commerce and farmers’ unions, renewing their
demands for conscription and an end to the 40-hour week, and many
editorials on lack of leadership and inadequate war effort. Suddenly
the remote, unreal war was high and threatening; dismayed New
Zealanders felt that they must do something, and old discontents
boiled up with new fervour. Some farmers’ suggestions were far-reaching: thus in Hawke’s Bay they wanted coalition including outsiders of ability, conscription of all wealth and manpower, a moratorium on debts, interest and rents, all males on Army pay, graded
from private to colonel according to ability in farming and industry,
and vigorous production of armaments.
NapierDaily Telegraph, 17 May 40, p. 4
At Gore they proposed a
‘fight or work’ policy, with a national register to maintain both the
overseas forces and essential industry, and a British-style cabinet which
would also include the presidents of the Farmers’ Union and the
RSA.
Otago Daily Times, 18 May 40, p. 10
On 13 May Adam Hamilton urged that Parliament should be
called immediately, but Fraser adhered to the date already set,
13 June. On 19 May Hamilton, finding that the National party,
despite its restraint and co-operation in the past months and despite
the British example, was not being invited to join a coalition, made
a forthright attack on the government for this, for its ‘shilly-shallying’ war effort and the long silence of Parliament in its seven-month recession.
Evening Post, 20 May 40, p. 8
The same night, a Sunday, Fraser met the rising challenge with
a singularly inept broadcast, quite out of touch with the urgency
felt by many as they turned to their radios. The Prime Minister
commended Britain’s change of leadership, but found endorsement
for his own government in Labour’s victory at the by-election for
Savage’s old seat. He spoke of the German crimes against the Netherlands, of the pressing dangers to Britain and France. New Zealand
was sustaining its part and the government was prepared for a long
war. He announced a new plan for increasing home defence forces
but otherwise presaged no major change. He told how the government was helping to replace enlisted farm workers by subsidies on
housing and inexperienced labour and by a personal approach to
men on public works. Men capable of bearing arms either at home
or abroad should come forward now. The rest of the country could
serve best by going about their daily tasks and working with a will.
He commended the efforts of women and, with a final unlucky
touch, of watersiders who had loaded ships at the weekend, at overtime rates.
Ibid.
Hard upon this pedestrian statement came Churchill’s sonorous
promise to demand, in the coming battle, the utmost effort from
all. ‘Interests of property and hours of labour are nothing compared
to the struggle for life and honour, for right and freedom, to which
we have vowed ourselves’. In its context, the contrast was disturbing,
and during the next few days helped bring the general unease and
restlessness to a quite remarkable pitch, not lessened on 23 May by
news of the British Emergency Powers Defence Act, putting all manpower and property at the service of the government. Rarely except
at the height of elections had so many people gone to so many
meetings. It seems worthwhile to examine the several streams that
together made a flood.
There was anti-alien
See p. 859ff
excitement. The Nazi ‘Fifth Column’ was
prominent in Norway and the Low Countries; in Britain there were
warnings about parachute landings and temporary wholesale internment of aliens. New Zealand could hardly expect paratroopers, but
fear of a ‘Fifth Column’ sprang up overnight. On 15 May Wellington city councillors considered the possibility of enemy spies acting as saboteurs, and reviewed precautions about fires and water and
electricity supplies.
Evening Post, 16 May 40, p. 10
The same day A. J. Moody,
Moody, Allan John (d 1973aet 85): barrister & solicitor; chmn Auck Hospital Bd
1938–47
a lawyer and
chairman of the Auckland Hospital Board, declared that ‘every German national should be interned at once. The Government should
know that the responsible section of the community is greatly concerned about the large numbers of Germans who are at present free.’
He would employ no German doctors at Auckland hospital; it was
‘monstrously unfair’ that they should practise in New Zealand while
New Zealanders were fighting to make refugees safer in future, and
enlisted doctors would return to find their work taken over. These
views, he said, were being freely expressed in Auckland, and he
uttered them not to criticise government officials, but to strengthen
their hands.
NZ Herald, 16 May 40, p. 8
The Herald reported that there were 290 Germans
in Auckland, only 11 of them interned. Fraser rapidly replied that
the government had full information and was watching all aliens,
that public vigilance was commendable but the circulation of alarms
without foundation would be harmful and unhealthy.
Evening Post, 16 May 40, p. 13
Moody’s
lead proved popular, touching off newspaper editorials and a rain
of letters on the theme ‘play safe and intern the lot’; a week later
he spoke of receiving letters and telegrams of approval from all over
New Zealand and saw public demand for stringent measures.
NZ Herald, 22 May 40, p. 8
He
was backed by Sir Carrick Robertson,
Robertson, Sir Carrick, Kt(’29), FRCS (1879–1963): b Scotland, to NZ 1905, 1NZEF
1915–16: Pres Auck and NZ branches BMA
president of the Auckland
BMA, who said, ‘We do not suggest that all or any of these aliens
are spies, but what we do know is that their roots for generations
have been nurtured on German soil, and it is difficult to believe
that just because of their mass expulsion during a political upheaval
they are not at the bottom of their hearts loyal to Germany.’
NZ Herald, 28 May 40, p. 6
Of course less inflamed views were also expressed. Some Auckland
university professors led in asking for discrimination among aliens,
and warned that working up crowd hysteria damaged the war effort
by diverting emotion and energy from constructive action,
Ibid., 24, 25 May 40, pp. 11, 14
while
several people in various places wrote in strains similar to A. R. D.
Fairburn:
Fairburn, Arthur Rex Duggard (1904–57): lecturer Elam School Fine Arts; freelance
journalist & script writer; 3 years with Broadcasting Service; poet and savant
‘I find it difficult to imagine that any person past adolescence and not subject to chronic hysteria would regard the presence
among us of a handful of Germans (most of them victims of the
enemy we are fighting) as a potential menace to this small and
remote Dominion. On the other hand, a good deal of undeserved
suffering will be caused if the public sets about boycotting and persecuting German refugees. Trying as the times are, let us do our
best to avoid stupidity and inhumanity.’
Auckland Star, 23 May 40, p. 6 (slightly abridged); NZ Observer, 5 Jun 40, p. 2
In Wellington, A. Eaton
Hurley
Hurley, Albert Eaton: b 1904; barrister & solicitor Wgtn 1929–76; Sec Municipal Assn
NZ 1936–52, legal adviser 1949–76; Ombudsman Auck 1976–80
and Edward Dowsett wrote that in Britain recent steps
against certain categories of refugees were precautions against parachute or other invasion, but it could hardly be thought that New
Zealand was in the same degree of danger. All refugees had been
closely scrutinised by the authorities before coming here, many had
suffered in German concentration camps such as Dachau or Buchenwald and, if they filled the positions of men in the forces, regulations made their tenure temporary. Any Fifth Column activities
would be settled by competent investigation, not by wholesale accusations, and the writers believed that most refugees would welcome
tribunals, as in England, to investigate their credentials. War against
Nazi tyranny would be won by the morale of the Allies as much
as by military prowess, and the morale of people depended on the
justice of their cause, not on the bitterness of their emotions.
Evening Post, 1 Jun 40, p. 7
It was, however, the views of Moody’s ‘responsible section’ that
had nation-wide repetition and that were endorsed by Adam Hamilton, who declared his intention of seeking a full return of aliens
who had arrived during the last few years. ‘The Government has
utterly failed to deal with subversive elements in our midst….
Traitors, whether individuals, small groups, or members of some
“fifth column” must be given no opportunity and shown no
quarter.’
Wanganui Herald, 23 May 40, p. 4
These views were not new: for instance some Dunedin
RSA men in October had suggested that all enemy aliens should
be behind bars,
Otago Daily Times, 25 Oct 39, p. 10
there had been occasional grumbles that a German
could earn £1 a day while a soldier got 7s, and Truth on 17 January
had anticipated Moody’s opinions about Jewish and New Zealand
doctors. A week later, however, Truth published a statement by the
Refugees Emergency Committee that the number of refugee doctors
was small.
With about 1400 doctors on the Medical Register, there were only 11 Jewish doctors
in practice, and fewer than 20 training in Dunedin. Truth, 24 Jan 40, p. 7
The RSA entered swiftly. Its anti-alien attitude was well established, but it now concentrated on ‘compulsory universal national
service’. The RSA held, and it was widely agreed, that it had earned
a leading voice in defence matters, with which it linked concern
about the enemy at home, disloyalty and aliens. It strongly claimed
to be a non-political body, but basically it felt that only those who
had served or been willing to serve before were fit to lead the country
now, to ask young men to enlist and to expect willing sacrifice from
all. The Labour government, of which several had been ‘conchies’
in 1914–18, did not qualify. However it was also a soldierly duty
to support elected leaders, and this the RSA did scrupulously. Though
it had long wanted a national register and universal national service,
it had campaigned actively for volunteers, and it heartily accepted
Fraser as Prime Minister.
For instance, on 8 April the Christchurch executive declared that Fraser had already
shown his courage and capacity, his appreciation of the needs of the country at war,
and that he would not allow subversive elements to go unchecked. ‘Mr Fraser is our
leader in this time of crisis. We stand or fall by him’. Press, 9 Apr 40, p. 6
On 22 May the central executive urged
the government to meet the crisis with a national register and universal national service, and telegraphed its 90 branches to demand
these things during the coming week, especially on 30 May. ‘The
New Zealand Returned Services Association calls upon the people
of New Zealand to stand to.’
eg, Southland Times, 23 May 40, p. 6
District bodies stood to with a will.
In many places they called or took a leading part in meetings well
before that date.
In Auckland a new body, the National Service Movement, sprang
up. On 20 May its first public meeting, convened by B. H. Kingston, was attended by 300 people including returned soldiers, farmers, city businessmen and other representative citizens. Besides
endorsing the RSA demands, it called for internment of all aliens
and a war council under a ‘strong and driving personality’. It also
set up a committee of 50 with power to co-opt.
NZ Herald, 21 May 40, p. 9
A further meeting,
strongly advertised,
Such phrases as ‘This crisis demands your presence’, ‘Better to sweat ourselves now than
be sweated by the Nazis for ever’, ‘A call for ACTION’, plus large photographs of
Churchill with slogans from his speeches, struck a note of urgency and authority.
drew about 2000 on the morning of 23 May.
The RSA had announced its active support of the Movement, which
would endorse its own campaign for adequate pensions and rehabilitation of soldiers.
NZ Herald, 23 May 40, p. 13
This meeting, widely reported and unusually
excited, declared its non-party basis and approved the recent home
defence measures, but attacked the government for not leading the
country into sacrifice and effort. The chairman, Moody, called for a
national register, compulsory universal service, a national government, and a war council of the best brains, co-opted if need be. The
Rev P. Gladstone Hughes,
Hughes, Rev Percy Gladstone (d 1949): b Wales; Presbyterian minister; Dom Pres LoN
Union
a prominent Presbyterian, said that
Fraser’s speech had ‘left us cold and angry’, that Parliament should
meet immediately, that sectional interests were behind the government’s go-slow war effort. He was wildly applauded. Labour member F. W. Schramm, attacking Hitler, Communists and all lazy
workers, promised to tell the Prime Minister all about the meeting,
and Coates was suggested as Minister of Defence. Copies of the
Movement’s constitution and aims, given as the immediate summonsing of Parliament, a British-type cabinet, a war council of the
best brains, and compulsory national service, plus support of the
RSA’s efforts to improve pensions, were to be circulated throughout
the country, ‘many districts’ having expressed a desire to form similar organisations.
NZ Herald, 24 May 40, p. 9; Auckland Star, 23 May 40, p. 8
At Hamilton on 24 May a hurriedly convened meeting of 600–
1000 reiterated the demands of the National Service Movement and
also wanted the internment of all enemy aliens, the protection of
key positions and the suppression of all subversive propaganda. A
returned soldier who interjected when the government was attacked,
was ejected amid cries of ‘Communist’ and ‘Concentration camps’.
Waikato Times, 24, ’25 May 40; NZ Herald, 25 May 40, p. 13
Meanwhile a remarkable surge of excitement was spreading
through Taranaki and beyond. It was triggered off by the Hawera
Rotary Club, disturbed by pamphlets urging that Britain should
make peace.
Patea and Waverley Press, 24 May 40
On 21 May more than 50 Hawera citizens, representing trading, farming and professional interests, resolved that
Parliament should be summoned immediately and a non-party
government formed to intensify New Zealand’s war effort. ‘There is
no reason,’ said one speaker, ‘why a match struck in Hawera should
not spread a flame throughout the whole of New Zealand.’
Hawera Star, 22 May 40
They
forthwith sent envoys—‘flying squads’, the Taranaki Herald of
23 May called them—to all the towns between New Plymouth and
Palmerston North urging them to hold public meetings in support
of these resolutions, and to join in a mass deputation to the Prime
Minister—by special train if possible—stressing that the will to serve
and sacrifice was widespread but leadership was lacking. A telephone
committee prepared mayors and a few citizens for the envoys, who
in each town met the RSA and the business men to arrange public
meetings a day or so later.
Evening Post, 22 May 40, p. 15; Taranaki Daily News, 22 May 40, p. 6; NZ Herald,
24 May 40, p. 9; Patea and Waverley Press, 24 May 40
By 23 May the Taranaki Daily News
reported rapid progress: public meetings had been arranged throughout Taranaki, at Hamilton and Wanganui; an ‘organisation’ was
established at Palmerston North and from there the movement had
radiated to Dannevirke, Hastings, Napier, Levin and the Manawatu.
It was stated that 500 members of the Defence League at Wellington
would march to Parliament with the Taranaki visitors.
A coal shortage precluded the special train and on Friday 24 May
the Prime Minister announced that Parliament would meet the
following week to legislate on the lines of the Emergency Powers
Defence Act just passed in Britain.
See p. 95
Most of the Taranaki meetings
were held on that same day—at Waverley, Patea, Manaia, Opunake,
Kaponga, Eltham, Stratford, Inglewood, Waitara, New Plymouth,
Hawera—and where shops were closed they were impressively large.
It was repeated that the movement did not attack the government
but wished to inspire it to still further efforts. All meetings were
prominently supported by the local RSA and almost all, besides
calling for an immediate Parliament and an all-party War Cabinet,
endorsed the RSA demand for compulsory universal national service.
Many speakers urged that labour hours be extended and some were
anxious about aliens and subversion, but these were not included in
the motions. Though Nash had just broadcast that New Zealand
had done everything Britain had asked, that more food was in store
than there were ships to carry it and more volunteers in hand than
could be trained, there was at these meetings strong feeling that
more must be done. There was talk of being conquered—New
Zealand would be a German colony, New Zealanders would not be
allowed to walk on the footpath and would be known not by their
names but by numbers. As Kaponga speakers put it, a feeling of
shame was sweeping the country, easy times and good living must
go, it was time to get down in the scrum and push.
Taranaki Daily News, 25 May 40, p. 9; Patea and Waverley Press, 24 May 40
Hawera’s
own meeting numbered 1000 people, but critical comment came in
a letter from one of them. ‘The people who sponsored the meeting
meant well, but there was an atmosphere of aimless panic about it
all; the type of situation that often confronts a cattle drover when
his charges get scary and commence what is known in cattle men’s
parlance as “ringing”’.
Taranaki Daily News, 28 May 40, p. 8
At Palmerston North, the Taranaki envoys found a very vigorous
branch of the Defence League which on the 20th had expressed
disappointment in the war effort, demanding a national government
representing all sections, universal national service, and that all
economic and other resources should be organised towards maximum war effort, controlled by a war cabinet of four. On the 23rd,
a ‘vast audience reminiscent of election times’ repeated these demands,
adding that the government should immediately deal with aliens
and any disloyal elements. The tone was belligerent; speakers condemned the government as ‘wrapped in grave clothes’ and ‘colossally
self-complacent’ about its inadequate war effort. Fraser’s suggestion
that the widespread call for a national government was being worked
up for political ends was, declared the Mayor, insulting: the patriotism of the people transcended such petty things.
Palmerston NorthTimes, 24 May 40, p. 7
Nor did Fraser’s proposal, on 26 May,
See p. 104
for an advisory representative war council
and conscription of manpower and other resources ‘as required’ give
satisfaction; further demands were telegraphed from Palmerston
North—for total conscription and a war cabinet of unrestricted power,
composed of Nash, Semple, Coates and Holland, with Fraser as
chairman.
Evening Post, 27 May 40, p. 11; see pp. 106–7
A meeting arranged by the RSA at Feilding on the 25th called
for conscription of manpower and material and a war cabinet of
those most competent, whether inside the government or not, and
representing all sections.
Palmerston NorthTimes, 27 May 40, p. 3
Woodville’s meeting, which gave the
RSA and Defence League as its begetters and the sounding of public
opinion as its task, moved for compulsory national service and said
that the government was not doing its job about increasing production and working hours, or about aliens.
Ibid., 25 May 40, p. 4
At Hastings ‘extensive
ground work … by influential committees’ prepared for a mass
meeting on the 27th, but it was cancelled after Fraser’s weekend
announcements.
Hawke’s Bay Daily Mail, 24, 27 May 40, pp. 8, 7
Napier had no meeting though its paper gave
accounts of those elsewhere.
At Wanganui, the Taranaki bearers of the fiery cross met both a
strong RSA and the Dominion Farmers’ Union conference, and
together they raised a bonfire. The farmers on 23 May scrapped most
of the agenda and instead demanded immediate conscription of all
manpower and wealth (‘better to come out of this with only our
shirts so long as we are still under the Union Jack’), internment of
all enemy aliens and disloyal elements, a war cabinet representative
of all sections, and abolition of the 40-hour week for the duration.
Next morning many shops closed for an hour, the pipe band played,
200 returned men marched to the Opera House, followed by 100
Farmers’ Union delegates, and 3000 people heard speeches stressing
the national emergency and the need for unity. It was urged that
the present war effort was a miserable failure and that if the government could not do better it should let someone else have a go.
Attempted amendments by two Labour men were drowned by waves
of cheering, booing and counting out, in which the Dominion’s report
on 25 May saw ‘remarkable evidence of the refusal by an overwhelming majority of New Zealanders to tolerate any discordant
note in the demand for vigorous leadership and action in the present
crisis’.
Dominion, 25 May 40, p. 16
Similar unanimity and enthusiasm occurred at a very vigorous
RSA-sponsored meeting in Dunedin on Friday evening, 24 May,
where 5000 attended,
Otago Daily Times, 25 May 40, p. 12
and at Christchurch where 400 met in the
afternoon. Both these meetings pressed for total service and a non-party government; at the latter, which was convened by ‘citizens
who have been prominent in the war effort … in response to a
request from the North Island’ and which spoke of sending delegates
to join the proposed North Island deputation to the Prime Minister,
W. Machin,
Machin, William (1879–1958): b UK, to NZ 1919; Gen Mngr NZ Farmers’ Co-op
Assn 1926–39; Home Guard QM 1938–41; 1st chmn EPS Chch 1941–4
president of the Employers’ Federation, made a very
forthright attack on Nash.
Press, 25 May 40, p. 10
These seem to have been the main
South Island meetings of the week, though many bodies meeting
for normal purposes passed resolutions urging a national government, conscription, etc. On the 22nd at Blenheim 100 women,
meeting for patriotic work, urged national service for both men and
women as part of the home defence plan, with women filling the
positions of Territorials at training.
NelsonEvening Mail, 23 May 40, p. 3
At Oamaru on the 24th about
100 citizens anxious to speed up the war effort persuaded the Mayor
to call a public meeting on the 29th that would be ‘constructive
and helpful’;
Auckland Star, 25 May 40, p. 17
by that date the Prime Minister’s announcements
had silenced the most urgent complaints, and the meeting was a
rally calling for 100 per cent war effort—with conscription of manpower and of national resources, under national government.
Oamaru Mail, 30 May 40
At Wellington, criticism of the war effort came mostly from the
right-wing People’s Movement, founded at the end of November
1939. Adam Hamilton had remarked that its ideas were indistinguishable from those of the National party, except that it did not
seem to know there was a war on,
Evening Post, 2 May 40, p. 13
while its leader, E. Toop,
Toop, Ernest Richard, CBE(’65) (1895–1976): Wgtn City Council 13 years, Dep Mayor
3 years; Wgtn Harbour Bd 13 years, chmn 5 years
charged the National party with being inarticulate.
Evening Post, 4 May 40, p. 7
On 11 and
16 May, the Evening Post printed Toop’s demands for immediate
Parliament, compulsory military training and service for production,
and a non-party war council of the best brains in the country. On
22 May Toop further suggested that the government’s persistent
inactivity was due to promises concerning conscription and other
matters given to trade union leaders
Ibid., 22 May 40, p. 11
—an idea commonplace in
National party circles. Wellington’s Mayor on 25 May announced
a public meeting about the war effort, universal service and a national
war cabinet for the 28th, but later cancelled it.
This survey of the week’s meetings, while not complete, may
show the truth of the Opposition’s claim that they were spontaneous
expressions of public opinion; indeed they were not arranged by the
National party as such, nor addressed by Nationalist members—
save at Tauranga where F. W. Doidge told 1000 people, who
demanded conscription and a national government, that the Prime
Minister could best serve the State by giving up his office.
Dominion, 27 May 40, p. 11
But
there were also grounds for Labour’s view that these meetings were
organised by anti-Labour persons, and the RSA was clearly involved
in most of them.
In response some Labour bodies
Exec Council ASRS, Evening Post, 23 May 40, p. 13; Wanganui Rlwy Workshops,
Wanganui Herald, 23 May 40, p. 8; Otahuhu and Hillside ASRS, exec P & T Employees’
Assn, NZ Herald, 25 May 40, p. 13; Addington Rlwy Workshops, Press, 30 May, p. 8;
Hutt Rlwy Workshops, Evening Post, 31 May 40, p. 8; Taranaki Trades Council, Taranaki Daily News, 24 May 40, p. 8; New Plymouth LRC and Wellington district
sections of NZ Workers Union, Evening Post, 27 May 40, p. 11; exec Westland branch
of NZ Timber Workers Union, Chch Sth and Shirley branches of Lab Party, Press,
28 May 40, p. 8; Waitara Freezing Workers, Taranaki Daily News, 31 May 40, p. 8;
Blenheim Engineering and Allied Trades, Marlborough Express, 8 Jun 40; Canty Freezing
Works and Related Trades, Press, 11 Jun 40, p. 12; Wairarapa Trades Council, Wairarapa Times–Age, 28 May 40
published motions of confidence in the government’s war effort, and deplored scaremongering
and attempts by the ‘exploiting sections’ to use the war to obtain
conscription and coalition, to press against the 40-hour week and
working conditions. Inevitably these appeared both frail and stubborn among the reportings of dissatisfaction. Some defence came
from the Chamber of Commerce. Several branches had been prompt
in demanding abolition of the 40-hour week, a national government
and immediate calling of Parliament.
eg, NZ Herald, 21 May 40, p. 11; Gisborne Herald, 22 May 40, p. 6; Evening Post,
22 May 40, p. 6; Otago Daily Times, 22 May 40, p. 6
But on 23 May W. S.
MacGibbon,
MacGibbon, William Smith, OBE(’52) (1890–1962): b Scotland, educ NZ; Pres Assoc
Chambers of Commerce 1940
president of the Associated Chambers, when about
to lead a deputation to the Prime Minister, made a very moderate
statement pressing for a war cabinet or national government, for
conscription and universal service. He complained that the country
did not know what was being done and, while allowing that those
in charge were sincere, doubted if ministers in charge of departments
could give the undivided attention needed by the war effort; he
added that the country was fortunate in having a Prime Minister
who gave co-operation and help and was receptive to what was said
to him—a note very different from the widespread scolding that
Fraser received that week. He concluded: ‘Do not allow in the
Dominion anything of panic. There has been a suggestion in some
centres that there should be a march on Parliament House perhaps
to force the Government to do something. I say we are a democracy
and must not have anything out of sympathy with democracy. We
must have law and order and not get panicky. It is not British to
do so.’
Press, 23 May 40, p. 8
Newspapers in the main solidly advocated coalition, conscription,
universal service and a vastly more vigorous war effort, but a few
minor editorial voices advised more precision and less noise. Thus
the Dannevirke Evening News on 23 May remarked that neither
farmers nor workers had shared in arranging Dannevirke’s public
meeting, but only business men, executives and the RSA. Further,
did people realise that they would have to surrender a lot if the
government acted on their requests for compulsory national service
and organisation of the country’s economic resources? The Wanganui
Herald on 24 May, after commenting that such widespread public
outcry had not been heard since the bad Depression days of the
Coalition government, pointed out that rousing sentiment had
replaced reasoned statement and that farmers’ unions, chambers of
commerce and the RSAs had been advocating conscription without
being clear whether it was for overseas service or for home defence.
Meanwhile trade unions were busy talking of no conscription of
manpower without conscription of wealth, and again no one had
defined what this meant.
On Sunday 26 May the Prime Minister broadcast plans for civil,
military and financial national service ‘as required’. Each step, as
needed, would be taken by Order-in-Council with proper consideration and organisation; the government realised the need for mighty
effort. He also proposed a representative war council, of the six cabinet ministers most concerned with war, three members of the Opposition, and representatives of industrialists, employers, trade unions
and farmers. It would have powers necessary to keep the war effort
at its maximum, and joint sessions of cabinet and war council would
be held when needed.
The government had out-manoeuvred its critics. The RSA declared
its support, though the Dunedin branch, always dour, demurred.
Otago Daily Times, 29 May 40, p. 6
The Taranaki surge was spent. The government’s political opponents
found that their reproaches, their cries of emergency, had prodded
the government into taking increased powers, in which they themselves would have only a limited share. Labour traditionalists were
placated: they could believe that conscription of manpower and of
wealth were bracketed, while the anathema coalition was not
conceded.
The Emergency Regulations Amendment Act, authorising regulations that would place persons and property in the hands of the
State, passed without division on Friday 31 May, while the BEF
was fighting back to Dunkirk. On 3 June, while the Navy and the
little ships were taking off thousands of empty-handed Allied
troops,
In the main exodus from Dunkirk, 26 May–4 June, 338 226 men were taken to England; 27 936 had already gone. Roskill, S. W., The War at Sea 1939–1945,
vol I, pp. 216, 227, 239, 603
emergency Labour conferences met in Wellington, called
to ratify, not to debate, major changes in government policy. In
crisis-laden tones, Fraser stressed the dreadful and sudden changes
that were going on, changes that had sent some people into a panic,
fanned by Labour’s political opponents; he said that the government
could cope with the war only if given a completely free hand (including the question of forming a national government);
Evening Post, 4 Jun 40, p. 9
its supporters
must sacrifice some of their hard-won privileges. It was now as wrong
to boggle about holidays or overtime as to haggle over profits. Since
wealth as well as manpower was being conscripted, there was no
break with traditional policy. There had been no time to call conferences before taking action, it was a question not of days but of
hours—‘Our duty was clear. We either had to lead the people in
the hour of crisis or give place to others.’ James Roberts, president
of the Labour party, repeated the message: unless the delegates gave
their own government the mandate it asked for, another government
would take its place and such powers would be forced upon them.
These warnings and the logic of events carried the conferences. With
the condition that none should profit unfairly from the sacrifices of
the workers which would be for the wartime only, they promised
full support for conscription ‘as required’ of wealth and manpower.
The Federation of Labour’s voting was 275:50, the Labour party’s
903:100.
Standard, 6 Jun 40, pp. 1, 2; Minutes of Emergency Conference, NZ Labour Party,
3 Jun 40
Meanwhile, the Parliamentary Opposition had rejected the proposed war council as no real coalition, a sop, an attempt to acquire
their support without giving them enough power to represent those
behind them effectively. As the Greymouth Evening Star of 28 May
put it, ‘The suspicion is general that pressure may be brought to
bear on the Labour Government, by prominent supporters, to adopt
a policy calling for conscription of wealth more than for conscription
of men.’ The press in general—with the powerful exceptions of Truth
on 29 May and the New Zealand Tablet on 5 June—declared that
the coalition offered was quite inadequate: measures so far-reaching
demanded the wholehearted response of the entire community, and
could not be carried by a party representing about 55 per cent of
the electorate and tied to pledges made in peace time. All pointed
to the British example, not yet a month old, declaring that the all-party Cabinet there had instantly created unity from top to toe. A
cartoon in the Auckland Star of 28 May showed a small war council
trailer behind a cabinet limousine, with Fraser, wrench in hand,
worrying over the tow rope, while Voice of the People thundered,
‘Stop monkeying about, Peter—you must all ride together.’ Minhinnick’s Fraser, his back turned to symbols of British national
government, gazed into his Labour looking-glass saying, ‘Magnificent! I salute it! But it’s not politics’.
NZ Herald, 21 May 40, p. 8; Evening Post, 23 May 40, p. 13; Southland Times,
25 May 40, p. 6
The New Zealand Herald, on 28, 29 and 31 May, collected and
summarised resolutions from sundry bodies throughout the country,
such as the Rotorua Chamber of Commerce, the New Zealand
Manufacturers’ Federation, the South Island Dairy Association and
several local farmers’ unions. These maintained, with varying intensity, that both the situation itself and the far-reaching emergency
regulations required full coalition.
NZ Herald, 28, 29, 31 May 40, pp. 9, 11, 10
The Dominion president of the
Farmers’ Union, W. W. Mulholland,
Mulholland, Sir William, Kt(’56), OBE(’46) (1887–1971): Dom Pres Farmers’ Union
1936–44, Pres Fed Farmers 1945–6; fdtn member NZ Royal Agricultural Soc
said that if Fraser did not
now lead the country into real unity, he would face the same position
as had Chamberlain in Britain.
Otago Daily Times, 29 May 40, p. 6
At a special East Coast meeting,
one speaker said, ‘I do not say that a Coalition Government will
be better than the Government of the present time, but it will
inspire confidence.’
Gisborne Herald, 30 May 40, p. 6
The Wairoa Harbour Board also demanded, lengthily, a government holding the confidence of all electors.
Wairoa Star, 5 Jun 40
A newspaper correspondent, H. Kitson,
Kitson, Henry (1882–1959): chmn Employers Fed 1940; local govt and bds member;
HQ Southern Military District 1942–5
who had chaired the public meeting at
Christchurch, wrote that if there were to be only a ‘nebulous War
Cabinet’ the Opposition should walk out and find more useful occupation.
Press, 28 May 40, p. 14
Palmerston North’s special committee, headed by the
Mayor, thought the new proposals insufficient.
See p. 100
In Invercargill,
145 business firms petitioned Fraser for coalition: while endorsing
his proposals for action, they wanted ‘an heroic Prime Minister and
Government that will devote itself to the formation of a national
Government which will truly represent each and every class in the
Dominion and devote itself to victory.’
Southland Times, 31 May 40, p. 4
The most strident demands came from the new-born National
Service Movement. On 27 and 28 May full-page advertisements in
the Auckland papers declared that three objects of the Movement,
rejected by the government seven days earlier, were now promised—
immediate calling of Parliament, national service, and a non-party
war council. Three demands remained: non-party coalition government, internment of aliens, and removal of anomalies in the pensions
of present soldiers. The meetings set for 28 May were postponed at
Auckland and at country centres, but further announcements would
follow. A women’s branch was enthusiastically formed on 27 May,
mainly to support the coalition drive, but it also advocated internment of aliens and discussed taking on men’s jobs.
Auckland Star, 28 May 40, p. 11
On 4 June a meeting of 3000 in the Auckland Town Hall
responded to the question, ‘Do you want a lead and a leader?’ with
cries of ‘Gordon Coates’. Speakers demanded a coalition thinking
of victory not votes; a non-party war cabinet with full powers; compulsory national service and equality of sacrifice, speedy suppression
of all subversion, ‘Communist, Nazi, Pacifist or just plain disloyalty’;
justice and proper protection for the men, women and children of
New Zealand who would fight or suffer in the war.
NZ Herald, 5 Jun 40, p. 12
These demands
were also printed in widely distributed leaflets, which gave the
Movement’s purpose as: ‘one people, one aim, one voice, united
action on the part of a loyal and determined people bent on giving
all and doing all to win the war’.
Auckland Star, 15 Jun 40, p. 12
At Pukekohe on 10 June, the Rev Gladstone Hughes and another
National Service speaker from Auckland spoke to about 500 people,
who passed the usual motions for coalition, conscription and internment.
NZ Herald, 11 Jun 40, p. 9
The Morrinsville branch on 11 June held a public meeting,
with shops closed for it, chaired by the Mayor and forebodingly
addressed by Hughes.
Morrinsville Star, 7, 11 Jun 40
Two days later at Rotorua an enthusiastic
meeting of nearly 200 called by the local Chamber of Commerce,
with two speakers from Auckland, formed a branch of the
Movement.
NZ Herald, 14 Jun 40, p. 9
On 13 June the Auckland chairman, B. H. Kingston, declared
the Movement’s growing impatience for unified control of the war
effort, but on the 15th the Attorney-General, H. G. R. Mason,
Mason, Hon Henry Greathead Rex, CMG(’67), QC (1885–1975): MP (Lab) Eden,
Auck Suburbs, Waitakere 1926–66; Attorney-General, Min Justice 1935–49, 1957–60,
Min Education 1940–7, Native Affairs 1943–6, Health 1957–60
said that the Movement must dissolve. Its intentions might be very
good, but it was starting up the path which Hitler’s organisation
had taken. Its propaganda, with an ‘indefinable expanding range of
aims’, showed it likely to become a body rivalling constitutional
authority, with an irresponsible committee deriving power from mob
violence.
Auckland Star, 15 Jun 40, p. 10
Later in Parliament Mason reviewed leaflets giving these
aims and giving also the impression that the Movement was getting
and would get things done. Further, a circular asking for ‘say, £
donation and £ 1 per week’ at the discretion of the donor suggested
permanence, and another envisaged a very large organisation: should
an emergency arise calling for any form of activity within minutes
of a telephone call or telegram from the centre ‘the whole of New
Zealand would be placed in motion, you in your area playing your
part with the rest of the nation’. Mason said that the Movement’s
publicity man was just putting too much energy and combativeness
into his job, but large advertisements could in excited times quickly
work up troublesome emotion.
NZPD, vol 257, pp. 235–6
There were some protests from
Adam Hamilton and from some newspapers,
Auckland Star, 15, 17 Jun 40, pp. 8, 6; Evening Post, 17, 20 Jun 40, pp. 6, 5; NZ
Herald, 17 Jun 40, p. 6
saying that the
government’s judgment in this matter had astounded and distressed
many worthy people and that it would be better employed chasing
the Fifth Column. The Movement advertised a meeting of badge-wearing supporters on 17 June to discuss the government’s action,
but cancelled it after telephone talks with the Prime Minister that
warned of police action.
At Te Awamutu, a meeting to express dissatisfaction, set for 17 June, whose promoters
claimed to have no association with any organisation, was postponed indefinitely in view
of the government banning ‘a similar meeting which was to have been held in Auckland
today.’ Te Awamutu Courier, 17 Jun 40
Expressing dismay at such misunderstanding, it rapidly amended its aims to general zest for the war
effort and the establishment by constitutional means of a united
representative government.
NZ Herald, 17, 27 Jun 40, pp. 6, 11
By 19 June the Observer could write:
‘the Government’s little brush with the National Service Movement
seems to have been just a piece of harmless shadow sparring with
a happy ending for everyone, except perhaps for those who would
have tried to use the Movement as a screen for political attack on
the Government.’ The Evening Post on 15 June explained that in
Australia a somewhat similar unofficial movement, ‘a sixth column’
encroaching on the duties of police and defence authorities, had
‘raced like a bush fire’ to an alleged membership of 30 000 and
mass meetings before being frowned upon by the Federal Prime
Minister.
Evening Post, 15 Jun 40, p. 13
The Movement withered quickly. Its offer in early July to load
a ship that watersiders were reported unwilling to work after midnight proved unnecessary.
NZ Herald, 6 Jul 40, p. 13
In mid-July newspaper correspondence
showed that when the War Cabinet was formed, some Movement
members, including Kingston, the Auckland chairman, were satisfied,
Ibid., 18, 23, 30 Jul 40
while others, including Gladstone Hughes, wanted a ‘new
movement to convert the parody of national unity expressed by the
War Cabinet into a real unity.’
Ibid., 19, 20, 22, 24, 27 Jul 40
In August the Movement turned
its attention to physical culture classes to improve the fitness of
civilians,
Ibid., 8, 9 Aug 40, pp. 11, 8
while the women’s section arranged itself in groups concerned with clerical training, knitting and sewing for patriotic purposes, soldiers’ wives, journalism, anti-waste, and canteen work; also
a spinning circle to revive interest in an ancient craft and to ease
the knitting wool shortage.
Ibid., 16 Jul, 10, 29 Aug, 24 Sep, 5 Oct 40, pp. 11, 17, 4, 11, 16
With the principle of conscription conceded, and even a narrow
place offered to the talents of business and property, the edge was
taken off the National party argument and now the urgency of the
moment swung behind the government’s proposals; to stand out for
larger powers looked like party politics at the war’s expense. The
manoeuvrings about the War Council and the War Cabinet are told
elsewhere.
Wood, pp. 139–42
Here it can be noted that a War Council concerned
with production for war, war finance and emergency regulations, was
announced on 18 June: six cabinet ministers, one representative of
the farmers, one of employers, two trade union men, four returned
soldiers (one a Maori) and an independent member of Parliament—
National party members had refused places.
Ministers on the War Council were P. Fraser (Prime Minister), W. Nash (Finance),
F. Jones (Defence), D. G. Sullivan (Supply) and R. Semple (National Service), with
P. C. Webb (Labour) and W. L. Martin (Agriculture) alternating at meetings according
to their topics. Other members were W. W. Mulholland, president of the Farmers’
Union; C. C. Davis, of the Employers Federation; R. Eddy, president of the NZ Workers
Union; A. McLagan, president of the Federation of Labour; W. Perry, president of
NZRSA; E. T. Tirikatene MP, returned soldiers, representing the Maori people; Sir
Andrew Russell and L. G. Lowry MP, returned soldiers, appointed by the government;
H. Atmore, Independent member for Nelson. Evening Post, 18 June 40, p. 8
This became merely
an advisory body when further negotiations led in mid-July to a
War Cabinet of Fraser, Nash, Jones, Hamilton and Coates to handle
war matters, while Labour’s Cabinet retained control of the rest of
the country’s affairs. Nationalist interests, having exerted as much
pressure as they reasonably could, accepted both the emergency and
its compromise, while hoping for more in the future—the Chamber
of Commerce, for instance, while welcoming the War Cabinet, hoped
that it would be the forerunner of a national government.
NZ Herald, 18 Jul 40, p. 8
Meanwhile, during all this expression and creation of public opinion, the enlistment figures more quietly reflected the views of the
men actually involved. During April and the Norway campaign 726
men enlisted weekly. This rate was falling slightly by the end of
the month: 1232 in the fortnight ending on 11 May. With the
attack on the western front it quickened; 928 joined up in that week
and 1339 in the week ending 25 May, when the agitation for conscription and coalition reached its peak, making a total of 38 399
enlistments before conscription was promised. Thereafter, with the
French news growing worse, between two and three thousand volunteered weekly, the highest number, 3480, being for the week
ending 29 June, when France had capitulated and it had been
announced that volunteering would end on 22 July. In the last week,
3087 anticipated conscription by signing up, with 1947 more on
the final day, Monday 22nd. At that date volunteers for 2NZEF,
including the Maori Battalion’s 4103, numbered 63 740.
Ibid., 24, 29 Jul 40, pp. 8, 6
Many
who volunteered for the Air Force but failed to meet its exacting
physical requirements, enlisted in the Army, and the Prime Minister
on 19 September 1940 gave the total registered for voluntary service
with the NZEF as 65 063. By then more than 16 000 had volunteered for the Air Force, and nearly 3000 were already serving in
the Navy.
Auckland Star, 19 Sep 40, p. 15; other figures in this paragraph are from weekly totals
published in most newspapers
For the mercy of Dunkirk and other evacuations, whence between
20 May and 26 June 1940 a total of 558 032 troops were ferried
across the Channel,
Roskill, vol I, p. 239. Of these, 189 541 were Allied troops, the rest British
there was deep thankfulness. It was something
to set against the shattering realisation, in the days that followed,
that the French, who last time had slogged out four stubborn years,
were now crumpling in less than six weeks. Newspapers were
restrained: the headlines were big and bad, the reports of attack and
defeat were confused and confounding, but hopeful notes were
sounded where possible; the German radio paid tribute to the fighting quality of the British; the morale and courage of the French
forces were high and they had withdrawn without being encircled.
It was stressed that the Allies were fighting back steadily against
tremendous odds, against millions of men and thousands of tanks,
thrown in reckless of loss, that German gains were made at enormous cost, that the enemy would soon exhaust his effort and find
his lines of communication too long; that staying power would count.
On 13 June the headlines declared that Paris would never submit;
two days later Paris, an open city, received the invaders, her leaders
seeing no worthwhile reason for risking her destruction; Reynaud,
Reynaud, Paul, GCVO(Hon) (1878–1966): French statesman; PM 1940, 1946–8
the premier who talked of last ditch fighting from North Africa,
was replaced by Marshal Pétain,
Pétain, Marshal Philippe (1856–1951): French soldier/statesman; Gen-in-Chief 1917;
Sec War 1934; Chief French State 1940–44
the 84-year-old veteran of Verdun, who on 18 June sought an armistice.
Now, more even than in the first days of the war, ‘the news’
dominated conversation, people waited at their doors for the paper,
hung about the radio—a Waikato man complained to his Primary
Producer Council that the frequent BBC broadcasts from Daventry
were affecting production, as farmers instead of working remained
at home, hoping that something fresh would be announced.
Evening Post, 26 Jun 40, p. 6
There
was awe, dismay, apprehension, but no widespread sense that France’s
fall was any more than the fall of France. Nor was there any immediate railing against France in the daily papers or radio—sorrow not
anger was the note. At first editors, as in the crises of September
’38 and March ’39, shook their heads but passed no judgment; it
was too large a matter, too much was obviously not known. Leading
articles merely warned that it all showed how close the war was,
how necessary that all energy should be directed towards it. Churchill’s effort to rally French resistance by a solemn act of union between
the two countries, which failed almost before it was heard of, did
not sink deeply into New Zealand consciousness. Papers gave prominence to the messages of the King (5 June), of Fraser (14 June), of
the British Government (15 June), and of Churchill (18 June), all
speaking of French heroism, fortitude and devotion, which had been
praised by many lesser witnesses at Dunkirk and after. A terrible
misfortune had fallen on a valiant people and the size of the disaster
measured the might of the enemy. Press and radio gave forth and
echoed the words of Churchill, powerful, restrained oratory that contained the emotions of the moment.
The news from France is very bad. I grieve for the gallant
French people who have fallen into this terrible misfortune. Nothing will alter our feeling towards them or our faith that the genius
of the French will rise again.
What has happened in France makes no difference to the British faith and purpose. We have become the sole champions now
in arms to defend the world cause. We shall do our best to be
worthy of that high honour. We shall defend our island….
But sympathy was soon overrun by anger. On 19 June the New
Zealand Herald and other papers quoted a BEF correspondent who
wrote that a huge confederacy of spies and Fifth Column agents had
beaten France, and that the nation was as rotten as an old tree inside;
such reports continued, and the resurgence of Laval was viewed with
misgiving. On the morning of 24 June, with the armistice terms
not fully known, the ChristchurchPress, more restrained than many
papers, said ‘It is a betrayal, but more pitiful than infamous.’ Later
that day, when the terms were declared, all remaining sorrow turned
to anger, and editors thundered all over the country. The Press (25
June) declared that Pétain’s government must be charged not merely
with deserting an ally but with becoming an accomplice of the enemy.
France, conceding every conceivable point, had openly and shamelessly betrayed her British ally, said the New Zealand Herald. The
Evening Post (24 June) held that the Pétain government’s contract
with Hitler ‘is a breach of faith that admits of no denial and of no
extenuation. Within the bounds of common morality that Government is left without a feather to fly with …’, while the Otago Daily
Times (25 June) stated that France, without suffering a final defeat
on the field, possessing a great empire and a powerful ally, had,
through the panic precipitancy of the government, been forced into
an undertaking which spelled degradation and servitude for a whole
proud people, and had become ‘an unprotesting agent’ against Britain. Everywhere it was seen that France had made itself a springboard for the attack on Britain with no attempt at the scorched
earth policy by which the Russians in 1812 and the Chinese at
present fighting Japan snatched the fruits of victory from the invader.
The French fleet was supposed to be demobilised and interned, but
Germany and Italy would use it, as they saw fit, to defend the coast
of France; the thin pretence that French ships would not act on
German orders comforted no one.
There was no recognition that France with her armies in full retreat
and her population confused and helpless had only her fleet to bargain with, and that only by compromising was she able to obtain
any independence. Editors concluded that, by agreeing virtually to
collaborate against Britain, France had won dubious secret promises
of better terms following German victory.
Several papers at the same time published the Daventry report
of the Dunedin Rhodes Scholar, journalist Geoffrey Cox,
Cox, Sir Geoffrey, Kt(’66), CBE(’59) (1910–): Rhodes Scholar 1932; foreign & war
correspondent 1936–40; 1st Sec & Charge d’Affaires, NZ Legation Washington
1942–3; dep chmn Yorkshire TV UK; Dir Tyne–Tees and Trident TVs UK
telling
how the ministers, then at Bordeaux (but soon to move to Vichy,
which gave its name to the French collaborationist government),
outvoted premier Reynaud, the fierce little fighter, and installed
Pétain, the ancient hero of Verdun, to sue for peace. Everywhere,
he said, was the spirit of defeat; France was weary from the last war
and the years since of struggle between Left and Right. The tired-eyed, drooping Pétain epitomised this weariness and the reluctance
to face again the slaughter of Verdun. A cartoon by Minhinnick,
‘The Hollow Tree’, appeared in several papers, showing a great fallen
tree cracked through at its base, hollow and black within. Waving
his small ‘Blitzkrieg’ axe and shouting ‘I did it with my little
hatchet’, Hitler stands over a shallow cut in the trunk, with monkey-Mussolini peering from behind.
NZ Herald, 27 Jun 40, Southland Times, 2 Jul 40
Articles and reports from various overseas papers were published,
so that while all agreed on treachery and betrayal from within,
accounts of the forces and interests behind these evils differed widely.
Thus about 26 June it was copiously reported from the Chicago
Daily News that breakdown was due to the Belgian collapse, plus
treachery, inefficiency and graft in France. Early in July The Times
supplied the view that lack of foresight, fear of responsibility, divided
counsels, outmoded military thinking, and inability to understand
Nazi intentions had brought France to her knees. Hindsight makes
it clear that from this time ‘Maginot-thinking’ became anathema;
never again would a people deceive itself that a fixed, defensive wall
could protect a nation.
The ‘slothful orgies’
NZ Herald, 18 Jun 40, p. 6
of Blum’s Popular Front regime of 1936–
8 were widely named as the basic evil. Both the New Zealand Tablet
of 26 June and the Otago Daily Times of 3 July repeated a SydneyBulletin article which laid the blame on Communists and the Popular Front’s 40-hour week, with its diminished production of armaments, especially aircraft, and the squandering of French weapons
in the Spanish war which had aligned Italy with the enemy. This
view was repeated by the Tablet on 10 July. It was independently
set forth, minus the Spanish details, on 15 August by the Southland
Times, which concluded that following the labour troubles of 1938
‘the French nation was like a building riddled with borer. The ultimate collapse was by no means surprising. Communism is hand in
glove with the Nazis’. Zealandia, on 11 July, repeated the cry ‘Le
communisme, voila l’ennemi!’ and warned against Moscow-drugged
minds which attributed the collapse to pro-Fascist politicians. In the
House on 12 July F. W. Doidge claimed that France had been
reduced to helplessness because Blum, like the Labour government
in New Zealand, repeatedly made concessions to militant unions.
Fraser replied that this was ‘sheer tripe’ and ‘misrepresentation of
one of the finest men France has ever had and one who is suffering
today.’
NZPD, vol 257, p. 489
Readers of Truth
Truth, 10 Jul, 7 Aug 40, both p. 14
were told that the betrayal was planned
long before the war by Bonnet,
Bonnet, George Étienne (1889–1973): French politician; Min Finance 1933–4, 1937–8;
Ambassador USA 1937; Min State 1938, Foreign Aff 1938–40; member Nat Council
1941
Flandin
Flandin, Pierre Étienne (1889–1958): French politician; Min Finance 1931–2, 1932,
Public Works 1934, Foreign Aff 1940–1; PM 1934–5; 5-year sentence for collaboration
1946; Leader Left Republican Party pre-war
and Laval, who disliked
the Left more than they disliked Hitler, and that high officers contributed to domination by philo-Germans. This view was also put
forward by the Hawke’s Bay Daily Mail:
Hawke’s Bay Daily Mail, 9, 11 Jul 40, both p. 7, quoting the British magazine Cavalcade
factors contributing to
France’s fall were ‘the purblind interests of big money and a pathological fear in certain high places of impending social upheaval.’
Censorship was also given as a cause. France, blinkered by official
secrecy and press censorship, had stumbled to inevitable disaster,
said the Otago Daily Times,
Otago Daily Times, 11 Jul 40, p. 12, quoting the SydneyDaily Telegraph of 3 Jul 40
adding the Manchester Guardian’s
warning that if the British press became merely the mouthpiece of
official news and opinion it would begin treading a path that notably
contributed to the ruin of France. The menace of the ‘Maginot mind’
was discussed, linked with the false calm induced by censorship
which hid disaster till the last moment.
Otago Daily Times, 13 Jul 40, p. 17
The Auckland Star
Auckland Star, 15 Aug 40, p. 14
explained that France had suppressed unpleasant truths and encouraged pleasant falsehood; the New Zealand Financial Times
NZ Financial Times, Sep 40, p. 388, quoting the Economist
said:
‘rumour breeds best in a vacuum; and to take the tragic lesson of
France again, our nearest Allies fell to pieces largely because they
were not told what was happening.’
These scattered, desultory opinions, however, occupied little space.
Having poured forth its wrath in one burst, the press in the main
dropped France very quickly. It was clearly no use to cry over spilt
milk, clearly impolitic to dwell on military and moral disaster. By
28 June 1940 Japanese foreign policy and New Zealand’s budget
had driven France from the centre pages. It returned for a few days
early in July when Britain as a last resort took action against part
of the French fleet at Oran, action which, although some ships escaped
to Toulon, could be rated as a much-needed victory, removing the
threat of a German-controlled French fleet in the Mediterranean. It
was even suggested that Britain was better off without France. For
instance: ‘Our task becomes clearer,’ said Truth. ‘At last we fight
our own war, hopefully blotting out Essen, Hamburg, Kiel, Boulogne, Havre, Brest or any other German strongholds.’
Truth, 10 Jul 40, p. 14
Churchill’s
words were echoed: Britain had left the slough at the bottom of the
hill, and was toiling slowly upwards morally and physically far better
equipped, despite the loss of allies, to meet the Nazi menace than
it had been a year before.
Wanganui Herald, 3 Sep 40, p. 6
In a few months cables and articles
began to appear explaining that the French people, distinct from
their government at Vichy, desired British victory, accepted the
leadership of de Gaulle,
de Gaulle, General Charles André Joseph Marie (1890–1970): French politician, soldier;
Chief Free French, then Pres National Committee 1940–2; Pres Committee National
Liberation Algiers 1943, Provisional Government French Republic & Head Chief of
Armies 1944–6; Pres French Govt 1958–9, Republic 1959–69
and were assisting with sabotage and slow
production while suffering shortages of food and fuel.
Evening Post, 25 Nov, 3, 4, 7 Dec 40, pp. 7, 7, 8, 12–13, 21 Jan 41, p. 7; Auckland
Star, 27 Aug 42, p. 10; Dominion, 19 Apr 41, p. 9; Press, 15 Sep 41, p. 5; NZ Herald,
13 Feb 41, p. 10
If the fall of France evoked bitter surprise mingled with dismay,
the entry of Italy probably aroused a simple sense of outrage. Few
in New Zealand had ever shared Chamberlain’s evaluation of Italy’s
military and naval strength, and most regarded it as a lightweight
enemy. Expectation of this entry had been growing as the German
attack developed. The Press of 7 June 1940 reviewed the news and
the speculation of recent weeks. There had been successive predicttions that Italy would declare war within a few days. Mussolini
would prefer to keep Europe on tenterhooks indefinitely but he was
becoming the victim of his own devices:
every time he arranges popular demonstrations against the Allies
and engages ostentatiously in further troop mobilisations he makes
it more difficult to postpone the day of action without damaging
his own prestige and that of his regime. It is for this reason that
in the United States and in Great Britain and France hope of
keeping Italy out of the war has virtually been abandoned. Signor
Mussolini, it is agreed, has travelled so far along the road to war
that he cannot draw back. The only questions are when he will
strike and where he will strike.
Short of supplies and easily blockaded, Italy, reflected the Press,
would attack only when France was near collapse; its own interests
lay eastward in Greece and Yugoslavia, where intrusion would bring
the disapproval of Russia, Germany’s other ally, while attack on
France would set two great Catholic countries against each other.
Mussolini had not intended to enter the war until the spring of
1941 but now, expecting a rapid finish, he pressed forward in order
to claim spoils, though in fact France fell before any real fighting
could occur.
Deakin, F. W., The Brutal Friendship, pp. 9–10
News that Italy, denouncing the long denial of its
territorial dues by Britain and France, had struck at the Riviera
reached New Zealand at 6 am on 11 June 1940, and New Zealand’s
own declaration of war was issued by 10.30 am. Italy’s ‘cynical and
cold-blooded attack’, said the Prime Minister, would call forth in
New Zealand as elsewhere the strongest feelings of indignation.
Newspapers repeated that Italy’s action was expected and their contempt varied only in choice of metaphor. ‘The entry of Italy … has
neither surprised nor dismayed the Allies’, stated the Press; its Fascist
leaders had chosen war with dishonour because regimes born in violence have not the moral strength to live otherwise than by violence.
Nor was the Evening Post surprised by ‘the thunder which has just
issued from the famous balcony of the Palazzo Venetia’, and spoke
of the hyena borrowing the lion’s skin. ‘Italy’s entry comes as no
surprise,’ wrote the New Zealand Herald, and compared Mussolini’s
attack on France with Stalin’s on Poland; he had ‘humiliated Italy
in the sight of all men by exhibiting her as the black-shirted carrion-crow, hungrily aiding and abetting the screaming Nazi eagle’; Minhinnick’s cartoon, ‘Enter the Vulture’, showed a scrawny-necked bird
hovering over an explosion. ‘There can be no surprise, but merely
disgusted acceptance … of the vulturine nature of the Italian dictator,’ said the Otago Daily Times. At Palmerston North, the Times
held that Mussolini, not the Italian people, had stabbed France in
the back, hoping for loot and believing Hitler victorious; ‘the jackal
follows the tiger’.
The rout at Caporetto
A surprise attack in November 1917 by the freshly formed German–Austrian 14th
Army on the Italian lines stretching into Yugoslavia, after a stalemate of two-and-a-half years, which drove the Italians back, in a near-rout, to the Piave River, where they
held the offensive. This attack threatened to engulf the whole of north-east Italy, and
more than 600 000 Italians surrendered or deserted in the retreat. British and French
guns and infantry were deployed to the area and a Supreme Command established to
counter the débâcle.
in 1917 was recalled by several papers,
and a soldierly ‘old resident’, reported on 12 June by both the Otago
Daily News and the Southland Times, said that it was characteristic
of Italians to join an attack just when victory seemed assured; except
for their excellent Alpini troops, they were the worst soldiers he had
ever seen or heard of, but very good at running away. A general
comment was: ‘Fair enough, we had to carry them last time, now
it’s their turn.’
Some more realistic opinions were voiced. The Listener, repeating
the vulture theme, said that Italy had no friend on earth: ‘to call
Germany her friend is to insult even Ribbentrop.
Ribbentrop, Joachim von (1893–1946): Nazi Min Foreign Aff 1938–45; executed as
war criminal
Germany despises
and uses her; openly threatens and unblushingly bribes her; and
when she has ceased to be useful will show her as much respect as
a thug shows to the harlot who has shared his bed and his board.’
It must not be forgotten that this loathsome enemy had men, guns
and ships, and to expect its armies to collapse at first impact with
the Allies would be an ignorant and dangerous fallacy.
NZ Listener, 18 Jun 40, p. 12
The Auckland Star on 11 June said that both cupidity and fear
had moved Mussolini to take his peaceful people into war. It was
doubly certain that the war would be long and desperately hard,
but the heavy odds could be countered by Empire-wide efforts of
the kind that the British people, ‘led at last by a Government worthy
of them’, were making. Also the threat of Nazi victory would bring
new friends; already President Roosevelt
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano (1882–1945): 31st Pres USA 1933–45
had bluntly likened Mussolini’s action to stabbing a neighbour in the back, and had declared
America’s intention of giving all possible material aid to the Allies.
Despite all the disapproval, there were no demonstrations against
the Italian consul at Wellington before his departure. On 11 June,
outside the drawn blinds of his office in Aitken Street, knots of a
dozen or so gathered from time to time. Some youths had passing
designs on the Italian arms displayed at the entrance, others took
desultory interest in the evident burning of papers in an outhouse,
but the single constable posted at the door had a quiet day.
Evening Post, 11 Jun 40, p. 8
Birthplace statistics in the 1886 census had shown that 483 persons
born in Italy were scattered through New Zealand. Thereafter a
trickle had come by immigration chains, with friends and relations
following one another from certain areas in Italy to certain areas in
New Zealand. About half had come from fishing villages in Stromboli, the Bay of Naples and the far south, to be fishermen mainly
at Island Bay and Rona Bay at Wellington, but with some at Dunedin, Hawke’s Bay, Auckland and Nelson. At Nelson there were also
some market gardeners from the inland southern area of Polenza.
From scattered villages in northern Venezia a number had come to
the coalmines of the West Coast and to the market gardens of the
Hutt, where a few were Fascists; a handful from near the Swiss
frontier lived in Taranaki as dairy farmers. Among recent arrivals
were a few businessmen, well educated and pro-Fascist. Generally,
northern Italians were better educated and more politically minded
than those from the poorer south, who when without leaders were
politically inert.
War History Narrative, ‘Police Department’, pp. 56–7; Lochore, R. A., From Europe to
New Zealand, pp. 22–30
In August 1940 some 800 Italians were classified
as enemy aliens,
See p. 119, fn 248
while many others, born in New Zealand of
Italian parents, were classed as New Zealanders, liable in due course
for military service.
Most of these groups had Italian clubs, which were simply social
bodies and which were closed in January 1941 mainly out of regard
for undue public apprehension. The largest, the Garibaldi Club at
Wellington, had contributed during Italy’s neutrality to the Red
Cross and to interest-free war loans, thereby probably reflecting the
feelings of the majority, and it resisted an attempt by the Fascist
Club to use its premises. The Fascist Club, set up in 1927, never
had more than 100 members, and about 75 in mid-1940, of whom
about 50 lived in Wellington.
WHN, ‘Police Department’, pp. 57–9
It was, wrote Dr Lochore, then
senior translator in the Censorship Department, a moribund affair
that looked important on paper but would have succumbed in a
week but for the zeal of the Italian consul. Its executive members
were peasants flattered into office by that great gentleman, but even
those who had come to New Zealand from dislike of Mussolini’s
regime found it wise to maintain correct relations with the Fascists
here lest their relatives in Italy should be troubled.
Lochore, p. 30
Many Italians,
while settled to make their lives in this country, were strongly
attached to their relatives at home, and for these the war was a
tragic conflict.
Italian immigration had accelerated only mildly before the war.
Between January 1933 and March 1938, the yearly average of Italian
arrivals intending to settle permanently was 16; in the next year
29 came, and 16 in 1939–40. During 1939, 26 Italian males were
naturalised, and 4 during 1940.
Yearbook1941, p. 45, 1942, p. 42
By an amendment on 22 November 1939, persons naturalised before August 1914, and their children, were generally exempt from alien regulations and did not have
to register.
WHN, ‘Police Department’, p. 75. In all, 817 Italians were registered as enemy aliens
in August 1940. Whangarei had 2, Auckland 67, Hamilton 27, Gisborne 27, Napier
42, New Plymouth 10, Wanganui 6, Palmerston North 13, Wellington 381, Nelson
81, Greymouth 94, Christchurch 27, Timaru 7, Dunedin 30, Invercargill 3; ibid., p. 82
and Schedule following p. 124
Anxiety about aliens and the ‘Fifth Column’ was running high
by 11 June 1940, and the Prime Minister immediately announced
the internment of a ‘considerable number’ of Italians known to have
Fascist sympathies. This knowledge was derived from police investigation of aliens begun in mid-1938 and from the wartime censorship
of all overseas correspondence and all internal correspondence
addressed to aliens.
Ibid., pp. 39–40, 77; see also chaps 19, 18
In May 1940 the British government had advised that Italian
consuls in British territories had instructed their people to commit
sabotage if Italy entered the war, and that in some places there were
explosives on hand.
WHN, ‘Police Department’, p. 59
Obviously in New Zealand miners would
have more scope for sabotage than gardeners or shopkeepers or fishermen. About 50 Italians worked in the State coal mines on the West
Coast, 19 on the coal face. Many were naturalised and some were
married to New Zealand women, but ‘prompt steps were taken to
place in other employment those who were not interned’.
Ibid., p. 60
These
steps were not directly initiated by government authority; special
meetings of miners decided almost unanimously that in the interests
of general safety Italians should be suspended from all work in the
mines.
Press, 12, 13, 17 Jun 40, pp. 12, 8, 8; Auckland Star, 17 Jun 40, p. 3
A proposal to put them on public works
Press, 2 Jul 40, p. 6
produced some
indignant letters, calling for their internment and opposing high
wages to enemies.
Ibid., 3, 4, 5 Jul 40, pp. 12, 10, 13; Dominion, 4 Jul 40, p. 11
In mid-September it was announced that these
miners were being set to clear blocks of Crown land on the West
Coast; the majority had been on social security for some months.
NZ Herald, 17 Sep 40, p. 6
The regulations, following precedents of the last war, already provided that no one who was British by naturalisation only could work
on a wharf or a ship except by special licence. There were not many
Italian-born watersiders, and their retirement from this area drew
little notice, except that at Port Chalmers watersiders refused to work
with men of Italian extraction who apparently were not excluded by
the regulations.
Evening Post, 14 Jun 40, p. 5
British warnings against possible sabotage by Italians presumably stimulated the passing on 11 June of shipping safety
regulations by which police control of wharves and ships was stiffened: wharves were barred to the public, and no person was to be
allowed on board a ship without a permit, while customs officers
were given more power to search cargoes.
Ibid., 14, 19 Jun 40, pp. 8, 7
Most of Wellington’s 381 Italians, except for some market gardeners at Taita, lived at Island Bay with off-shoot groups at Makara
and Rona Bay. They owned and ran many of the local fishing boats
and a sprinkling of suburban shops. Immediately after the declaration of war, police went to Island Bay to question men thought to
be anti-British, while a launch called in the boats already out at the
fishing grounds. Even such a mild and minor group of enemy aliens
was exciting on the New Zealand scale. Several newspapers reported
the Island Bay round-up with some zest, and the Otago Daily Times’
special correspondent made the most of it.
The scene was a notable one, though there was no sort of hostile
demonstration. Indeed, many Italians have come to regard New
Zealand as their home and express abhorrence of the Mussolini
regime as opposed to the interests of both the Italian monarchy
and the Church.
There was keen excitement in the little fishing suburb of Wellington. Emotion ran high as friends and shipmates were hauled
away for internment for the duration of the war. Picturesque groups
of fishermen, some in sea-boots and jerseys and others in shore
clothes, stood gesticulating and chattering volubly along the foreshore. Their dark, excited faces and abrupt gestures were in strong
contrast with the calm, bulky figures of the police going about
their duties. Some of the internees waved and called “Arevederci”
… as though they were setting off on a pleasant holiday…. It
is understood that among those interned were some who were
naturalised New Zealanders and even of New Zealand birth.
Wellington’s fish supply, however, was not expected to be affected
seriously; the boats would find crews and continue to work.
Otago Daily Times, 12 Jun 40, p. 6
Newspapers did not publish the number interned, though the EveningPost of 12 June was told that four men did not return to their
homes that night. Police sources state that 30 Italians were taken
to Somes Island in June.
‘Aliens Administration’, a war history narrative prepared by the Police Department (hereinafter WHN, ‘Aliens’), p. 9
Away from mines and ships and wharves there was no general
intention to deprive Italians of work or business. The Mayor of
Wellington explained on 12 June that a number of men with Italian
names were employed by the Council, some in responsible positions;
the police had been told about them but there would be no hasty
dismissals. Some had worked for years for the Council, some had
been born in New Zealand, and of course there would be no action
against them, though there would be action against employees of
any nationality who took a disloyal attitude. Again, when an angry
‘Returned Digger’ in the columns of the Press asked the Minister
of Works why he had an Italian as foreman on the mid-Canterbury
irrigation scheme, Semple replied with his usual firmness and more
than usual dignity that the Italian was a decent, capable, highly
skilled man who had been 15 years with the Department and showed
no disloyalty. ‘The Government is not waging a campaign against
aliens, and proposes to interfere with them only if they are thought
to be engaged in subversive activities’.
Press, 1 Aug 40, p. 10
‘Returned Digger’ agreed
that the foreman ‘may be as good as anyone else and a good worker;
but the principle is this: my sons have to leave New Zealand for
7s a day as wages, while aliens sheltered here can draw three times
as much.’
Ibid., 12 Aug 40, p. 10
With a few safeguards imposed, Italian fishermen continued to
fish. On 11 June representatives of the Services and the Industries
and Commerce, Police and Marine departments discussed with the
Secretary of the Organisation for National Security whether the Italians should be withdrawn from that industry and replaced by British
nationals. It was decided that the fish supply should be maintained,
and that all possible Italians should be kept working rather than
have them interned and a charge on the community. It would be
most undesirable to take them out of their boats, leaving them
ashore to become disgruntled saboteurs. A proposal to insert, say,
two British subjects in each boat crew of five was dismissed as likely
to cause friction and poor fishing.
Report of Secretary ONS to PM, 11 Jun 40 in WHN, ‘Police Department’, pp. 91–3
Detailed arrangements were
proposed and with slight additions were approved by the Prime
Minister. All boats in the Wellington area were to be concentrated
at Island Bay
This involved the removal of four boats from Rona Bay, three from Makara, one from
Paremata and one from Picton.
where they would, before sailing, regularly be
inspected for explosives, and for signalling gear or charts not usual
for fishermen. Registration numbers a foot high would be painted
on the boats, which would avoid the harbour entrance, and from
time to time there would be aerial reconnaissance over the fishing
grounds. At Port Chalmers, Napier and Auckland there were similar
arrangements for inspecting boats operated by Italians. At Nelson
and Gisborne, where Italians did not own the boats and were already
working with local crew-members, inspections were less frequent.
WHN, ‘Police Department’, pp. 93–6
Italian fishermen could fish under the inspection and protection
of the police, but those in business were more subject to the pressure
of public feeling, expressed either by avoiding their shops or by open
hostility. The Evening Post of 12 June thought it unfortunate that
public disgust should extend to Italians who had no sympathy with
Mussolini. Although Italian shopkeepers had had a thin time that
day, there had been no senseless demonstrations or window-breaking, nor were any likely. The Greek consul-general, T. E. Y. Seddon,
Seddon, Thomas Edward Youd (1884–1972): son of Rt Hon R. J. Seddon; MP (Lib)
Westland 1906–22, 1925–8; Hon Consul Greece 1938–60; chmn War Pensions Bd
1930–63
reported that Greeks were suffering from the anti-Italian
feeling in Wellington; one fish shop owner was asked three times
by hesitating customers if his shop were Italian.
Otago Daily Times, 13 Jun 40, p. 6. Perhaps to counter such hostility, Greek nationals,
who numbered 600, decided to give one day’s takings from business, or one day’s wages,
to patriotic funds. The day selected was 28 June 1940, and it yielded £1,639. Press,
16 Jul 40, p. 6
There are only occasional references to the little shops that closed
or were sold: as, for instance, that of young Vicenso Basile who
started hairdressing in Eastbourne, Wellington, a few months before
June 1940, but had to give it up and do labouring work because
of public feeling.
Evening Post, 6 Nov 41, p. 10
An instance of overt hostility was the case of
Joseph Lino, who had come to New Zealand in 1913, was naturalised and married to a New Zealander, and had for 10 years kept
a popular restaurant in Dannevirke. Early in July 1940 he left the
town after sudden local unfriendliness culminated in the restaurant
being twice damaged by a man who claimed in court that his motive
was loyalty, he did not like to see Italians in business; he was fined
£5 15s. Truth, while regretting ‘Joe’s’ misfortune, held that there
was commonsense in the view that all aliens, naturalised or not,
should be interned: pro-British ones would be protected from violence and therefore happier, and the others could do no harm.
Truth, 10, 17 Jul 40, pp. 8, 9
Catholics, about 13 per cent of the population,
Yearbook, 1947–49, pp. 954–5. In the 1936 census, excluding Maoris, 195 261 or 13.09
per cent out of 1 491 484; Maoris, 11 326 or 13.76 per cent of 82 326.
faced some
inner conflict. Rome was the capital of Italy, and it was also the
centre of their faith. A lead to opinion was given by the Archbishop
of Westminster, Cardinal Hinsley:
Hinsley, His Eminence Cardinal Arthur (1865–1943): Roman Catholic Archbishop
Westminster from 1935
both Pius XI and Pius XII,
Pius XI (Achille Ambrogio Damiano Ratti) 1857–1939: Pope from 1922; Pius XII
(Eugene Pacelli) 1876–1958: Pope from 1939
the previous and current popes, had denounced Fascist paganism,
and now the Fascist leaders had dropped their disguise of temporising with religion. They had broken with Christian civilisation, and
there was no longer any possibility of a modus vivendi with the open
enemy of the faith of most Italian people. Fascism had become
radical Nazism, committed to pillage, to dominate and enslave.
NZ Herald, 12 Jun 40, p. 11
Liston,
Liston, Most Rev James Michael, CMG(’68) (1881–1976): Roman Catholic Bishop
Auck 1920–70; Archbishop 1954
Bishop of Auckland, regretfully expressed the same view,
that Fascist leaders had made Catholic Italy an enemy.
Zealandia, 20 Jun 40, p. 4
The Tablet
repeated the message: the incredible had happened and the leader
of the people overwhelmingly Catholic had thrown in his lot with
an avowed enemy of Christianity. Mussolini’s dream of a new Roman
empire and his distrust of Britain and France were stronger than the
popular dislike of Nazism, stronger than the reluctance of a Catholic
people to ally themselves with an open enemy of their faith. Fascism
must not be identified either with the Italian people, on whom it
was imposed from above, or with the Church, with which it existed
in ‘uneasy neighbourliness’. The Italian people and still less the
Church and the Pope could not be held responsible for Mussolini’s
decision.
NZ Tablet, 19 Jun 40, p. 5
War with Italy was accepted by Catholics without protest
though with reluctance. The only appeals against military service on
the grounds of not wanting to fight Italians were made by young
men from Italian families. The fight against Italy did not seem the
real fight, and possibly this eased Catholic bitterness.
New Zealand’s trade with Italy was both minor and one-sided,
its cutting-off a concern to housewives rather than ministers of supply or finance. In 1938 New Zealand exported £6,578 worth of
goods (mainly wool) to Italy, and £1,565 worth in 1939, importing
from Italy as the country of origin £163,745 worth in 1938 and
£137,835 worth in 1939.
Yearbook1941, p. 195, 1942, p. 223, which latter revises the import figures for 1939;
Otago Daily Times, 13 Jun 40, p. 6
In the latter year, prominent items were
gloves (£12,328), millinery (£16,381), silk, art silk and other piece-goods (£33,435), buttons (£3,061), wine (£2,725), olive oil
(£4,313), almonds (£21,414), cream of tartar (£4,920), motor-cars
(£7,798) and musical instruments (£2,017); others were essential
oils, acids, miscellaneous drapery, marble, and cherries in brine.
NZ Dept Statistics, Annual Statistical Reports, 1939, Annual Statistical Report on Trade
and Shipping, Pt II, p. 58
Along with concern to guard young minds from communist and
subversive influences, there were movements to promote positive
feelings of Britishness and loyalty. As the Germans pounded west
some New Zealanders, shaken into self-doubt, felt that this success
might be due in part to the Nazis’ will-to-win, their fervent patriotism, their propaganda in schools; it might be well to learn from
them, to thicken up patriotism. There were a few suggestions
Auckland, NZ Herald, 5 Jun 40, p. 10; Invercargill and Christchurch, Press, 19, 21,
25 Jun 40, pp. 8, 14, 14
that
business houses, schools, public buildings, and even cars should meet
these days of stress with flags flying, the sign of the unconquered
citadel, to stiffen resolution and defeat pessimism. This was going
further than many wanted, but something was needed to arouse
enthusiasm and the schools seemed the right place to start. The
rising generation must know that the Union Jack was more than
coloured bunting, realise the glory of their British heritage, the need
to defend it and the alternative disaster.
In primary schools, the patriotic temper varied with headmasters
and other teachers. The new Director of Education, Dr C. E. Beeby,
Beeby, Dr Clarence Edward, CMG(’56): b UK1902, educ NZ; lect. Philosophy, Education CUC 1923–34; Dir NZ Council Educational Research 1934–38, associated WEA,
adult educ 1928–38; Asst Dir Educ 1938, Dir 1940–60; UNESCO conference posts
from 1946, chmn Exec Bd 1963; NZ Ambassador France 1960–3
and the Minister, H. G. R. Mason, both rejected Nazi propaganda
methods but held that schools should teach faith in the values
underlying democracy: love of freedom, of reasonableness, and justice
and tolerance of opposition.
Evening Post, 7 May 40, p. 9 (Beeby); 9 Jul 40, p. 10 (Mason)
The Director, when asked on 6 June
for a rule on flag saluting, quoted the syllabus, suggesting that it
gave ample opportunity for inculcating patriotic ideals.
Auckland Star, 19 Jun 40, p. 6
The syllabus
instructed that head teachers should attend to the development of
a good tone, a corporate life and the patriotic sentiment; the narrow
nationalistic interpretation of history should be avoided and there
should be sedulously cultivated a strong faith in a more peaceful,
harmonious and prosperous world; annual commemorations should
be used to inculcate in the young love for their country and desire
to promote peace among nations; national anthems and songs of all
nations could always be used.
Most education boards had by-laws requiring teachers to assemble
pupils to salute the flag, with appropriate explanations, on anniversaries such as Waitangi Day, Anzac Day, the King’s Birthday,
Empire Day, and Armistice Day and a 1921 Order-in-Council called
for saluting the Union Jack and singing the national anthem at the
beginning and end of each school week.
NZ Herald, 21 Jun 40, p. 4
In general flag ceremonies
had declined: the Hawke’s Bay Education Board in June 1940 found
that 115 of its schools had serviceable flags, 28 had unserviceable
ones, and 34 had none at all.
Hawke’s Bay Daily Mail, 24 Jun 40, p. 6
The Federated School Committees
conference just after the outbreak of war had recommended that flag-honouring should be revived.
NZ Herald, 20 Jun 40, p. 10
Now as France fell, there was feeling among education boards,
school committees, teachers and others that patriotism should be
writ large and youthful loyalty increased by saluting and singing.
For instance, the Taradale RSA urged that children and teachers
should assemble daily to salute the flag and sing the national and
New Zealand anthems, to inculcate loyalty and to check subversive
teaching; any teacher not complying should be dismissed.
Dominion, 4 Jul 40, p. 5
Several
education boards issued instructions that saluting should be done
once a week;
Wellington, Evening Post, 20 Jun 40, p. 10; Christchurch, Press, 13 Jul 40, p. 10;
Hawke’s Bay, Hawke’s Bay Daily Mail, 24 Jun 40, p. 6
the Auckland Board remembered the 1921 Order-in-Council, the Nelson Board recommended that a flag should fly
at every school in New Zealand throughout the war, while the
Wanganui Board would leave the matter to the discretion of headmasters.
Wanganui Herald, 19 Jul 40, p. 6
A Masterton school stated that for more than seven years
it had had a Monday morning ceremony at which both anthems
were sung, separate classes recited verses of Kipling’s ‘Children’s
Song’, with the whole school singing the last verse. The flag was
saluted while the headmaster recited ‘Flag of the Empire, thou shalt
be/The noblest flag that ever waved/O’er river, mountain, land or
sea’. The Wellington Board thought that this should be more or
less standard practice
Dominion, 18 Jul 40, p. 8
and the Dominion called it a ‘very fine little
ceremony’.
Ibid., 19 Jul 40
The Minister suggested that saluting the flag over-often might make it a mere drill without feeling.
Evening Post, 9 Jul 40, p. 8
This drew reproof
from a non-educational public figure, Mulholland, the president of
the Farmer’s Union: so-called intellectuals who loudly proclaimed
loyalty to the people of the world and denied or were lukewarm to
their own country were traitors. ‘Why are our leaders both in Church
and State frequently so lukewarm in their patriotic expressions? Is
it that they doubt the righteousness of our fight, or is it that they
are ashamed to challenge this false sentiment to which perhaps they
had given some heed in the past…. In these days we need robust
patriotism, not the anaemic patriotism of the Minister of Education
who feared to allow the school children to salute the British flag
too often’.
Ibid., 16 Jul 40, p. 8
The Professor of Education at Victoria University College, W. H. Gould,
Gould, Professor William Horace (1877–1946): b UK; Dir Educ Tonga 1913–14; Prof
Educ VUC from 1927
thought this ‘splenetic outburst’ was itself
perilously close to subversion, and the Prime Minister said hastily
that Mulholland’s remarks, though not subversive, were not helpful,
but he was doing very good work and his words were possibly over-emphasised by the press.
Evening Post, 19 Jul 40, p. 6
Mulholland did not mind the attention
given to his statement, for ‘in these times of stress it is essential for
public men to hearten the people by giving expression to their
patriotic sentiments in a forthright downright manner free from
hesitancy.’
NZ Herald, 20 Jul 40, p. 12
The state of mind behind the flags was set forth in a memorandum from the Canterbury Education Board to its schools:
During the war, the effects of which are bound to be somewhat
depressing, it is desired to sustain in the children an abundant
source of loyalty and vitality. To date, conditions have caused
throughout the community a spirit of unrest and nervous tension,
and this is likely to react in the general atmosphere in the home
and in the school. To offset this, and to keep prominently before
the children what Britain and Britons stand for throughout the
length and breadth of the Empire, the Board has decided … that
every school day should begin with the song ‘There’ll always be
an England’.
The school committee’s incidental funds should pay for the music,
and station 3YA would broadcast the song twice weekly at 9 am.
Press, 13 Jul 40, p. 10
A correspondent doubted if ‘this attractive song’ would wear well,
and suggested instead Parry’s setting of Blake’s ‘Jerusalem’, or better
still a weekly menu including ‘God Defend New Zealand’, Kipling’s
‘God of our Fathers’ or ‘Land of our Birth’, finishing up with ‘These
Things Shall Be’ on Fridays.
Ibid., 18 Jul 40, p. 10
Flag saluting faded from the news, presumably because it was
generally accepted. In June 1941 the Teachers’ Court of Appeal held
that a by-law requiring teachers to salute the flag was ultra vires
and reinstated a teacher, a Jehovah’s Witness, who had been dismissed under it.
Evening Post, 11 Jun, 14 Jul 41, pp. 8, 10
Walter J. Broadfoot MP
Broadfoot, Hon Walter James, KBE(’55) (1881–1965): MP (Nat) Waitomo 1928–
54; Mayor Te Kuiti 1927–35; Junior Whip 1936–41, Senior Whip 1941–9; PMG
1949–54; Min Nat Service, War Cab
suggested that there
should be legislation validating the by-law.
NZPD, vol 259, pp. 687, 690
However, a regulation
gazetted on 13 November 1941 decreed that the flag should be
honoured in all public schools on seven anniversaries,
These were: Waitangi Day, 6 February; Anzac Day, 25 April; Empire Day, 24 May;
King’s Birthday, 1st Monday in June; Dominion Day, 4th Monday in September; Trafalgar Day, 21 October; Armistice Day, 11 November. See also p. 1138
the Minister
explaining that the purpose of the ceremony was to awaken the spirit
of patriotism in the children, and the purpose of the regulation was
to supercede the ultra vires by-laws of some boards and put the
matter beyond dispute.
Another minor instance of increased pressure for patriotism in
schools was the Navy League’s brush with the Wellington Education
Board. The League had long canvassed for members in schools: subscription was one shilling and when all the children in a school of
less than 100 pupils joined, or at least 100 in a bigger one, the
League presented a flag, which was used in the flag saluting ceremonies.
Evening Post, 7 August 40, p. 7
In May 1940 the Wellington Board maintained its
10-year-old refusal to allow League speakers during school hours,
saying that teachers could teach about the Navy and schools should
not become agents of propaganda, good or bad,
Ibid., 22 May 40, p. 10
and held to this
against renewed pressure in August, claiming that if the League were
admitted other organisations could expect admission. This the Evening Post condemned as ‘weak and misguided consistency’.
Ibid., 22 Aug 40
The
RSA backed the League, saying that children should be navy-minded
and that Wellington’s was the only Board in the country which
refused permission. The Board, trimming to the wind of opinion,
proposed that the League’s subscription gathering be dropped and
that a naval officer should address one big gathering of schools. Local
headmasters, through their Association, claimed deep interest in the
Navy, and ability to impart it.
Ibid., 3, 18 Sep 40, pp. 6, 11
Finally, on 16 October 1940 the
Board granted the League’s representatives an annual half-hour in
its schools, on condition that they did not canvass for members,
saying that its principal objection was to the invidious difference of
one child being able to pay while another could not. It also urged
the Department to broadcast to schools talks by experts on current
events and the various defence forces.
Ibid., 16 Oct 40, p. 10
Opposition to the League came not only from the Wellington
Education Board, but from headmasters, wary of schools becoming
propaganda centres, and private schools were among those that
declined visits. The League, considering it futile to address schools
unless allowed to form branches, visited no Wellington State school
during 1941, but resolved in 1942 to seek out any schools where
headmasters would welcome speakers, noting that some Wairarapa
schools, regardless of the Board, had formed branches.
Evening Post, 4 Feb 42, p. 4
Two Board
members, Colonel T. W. McDonald
McDonald, Colonel Thomas William (1869–1968): b Aust; Mayor Lower Hutt
1905–7: MP (United) Wairarapa 1928–31; member RSA, Wgtn Educ Bd, Wgtn,
Petone Technical College Bds; organiser & CO public school cadets Wgtn district
and T. K. Moody, who
strongly believed that if the League’s demand for a strong Navy
had prevailed the present parlous position would have been different,
independently circularised school committees, asking for an hour’s
access a year instead of half an hour, and for the right to form
branches.
Ibid., 10 Feb, 17 Apr 42, pp. 5, 6
Despite support from Wellington school committees for
these proposals, the Board in April 1942 again refused to enlarge
the League’s operations,
Ibid., 23 Apr 42, p. 9
and as Colonel McDonald lost his seat
on the Board in July, the League lost a champion within that forum.
Other channels, however, remained. On 21 July 1942 a Navy
League flag, signifying 100 members, was presented to St Mark’s
School
A private school not far from the Governor-General’s residence.
by the Governor-General, Sir Cyril Newall,
Newall, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Cyril, GCB, OM, GCMG, CBE, KStJ, 1st
Baron of Clifton-on-Dunsmoor (’46) (1886–1963): Indian Army 1909, RFC 1914,
RAF1919; Chief Air Staff, UK, 1937–40; Gov Gen NZ 1941–6
with the
Minister of Defence and Mrs Peter Fraser among the visitors.
Evening Post, 22 Jul 42, p. 4
Under
such distinguished patronage the League could quietly continue this
branch of its work. At the end of 1943 two more Wellington schools,
Newtown and Khandallah, received Navy League flags, again presented by the Governor-General, while the League’s Wellington secretary reported that in 1943 school enrolments exceeded 4000, the
highest number in the last 21 years.
Ibid., 8 Dec 43, p. 6
In schools, as elsewhere, robust loyalty linked itself with religion.
There was feeling that now was a time for soundness, for setting
one’s own house in order, mixed with a strong, vague wish to count
God among one’s allies, to get on side with God. What better peace-offering than the prayers of children? This was not a new desire, but
it gained strength and acceptance from the times. With his customary vigour F. W. Doidge MP said that if the war was teaching
people anything, it was teaching them to come back to God; he
wondered if the education vote should be spent without teaching
children to fear God and honour the King.
Dominion, 25 Jul 40, p. 11; NZPD, vol 257, p. 721
There had long been
regret in church areas that State education was, by statute, secular
and there had been persistent efforts to change this. Since schools
taught for more than the four hours daily required by law, it had
become usual, and was legal under the system started in Nelson,
for ministers of religion with the approval of headmasters and school
committees to take classes for half-an-hour weekly, though the children did not have to attend. Also during the 1930s the Bible in
Schools League had induced most boards to favour, again with the
consent of school committees and headmasters, the daily repetition
of religious exercises, usually the Lord’s Prayer, taken by teachers.
Otago and Canterbury had begun this in 1930, Wanganui in 1933, Wellington, Taranaki and Hawke’s Bay in 1937. Breward, Ian, Godless Schools, p. 97
This was of doubtful legality, and in 1938 Fraser as Minister of
Education had said that he would move against it.
Campbell, A. E., Educating New Zealand, p. 52
The feeling,
which gained strength and acceptance from the war, that religion
should have more place was expressed by a writer to the Press:
At a time when the Government is endeavouring to deal with
the spread of pernicious and subversive propaganda … it may
not be out of place to inquire whether this is a sufficient or adequate means of ensuring a broad and sane outlook on our national
life and its duties, ideals and responsibilities…. Merely secular
education will only produce a democracy without life, without
ideals and without inspiration. It is high time we in New Zealand
abandoned our silly and irrational prejudices against the Bible in
schools.
Press, 6 Aug 40, p. 12
On 21 August the Wellington Board accepted Colonel McDonald’s
proposal that, as the Empire was out to defend Christianity, and
the King had called for prayers for victory, the Board should begin
its meetings with prayer.
A few days earlier the Riccarton Borough Council had accepted the proposal of its Mayor,
H. S. S. Kyle MP, to invoke Divine blessing on its proceedings as in Parliament. Otago
Daily Times, 15 Aug 40, p. 6
Another member, C. H. W. Nicholls,
suggested as a further step that the Board should ask its schools to
do likewise, once a week. ‘We have reached a stage in the history
of the British Empire when we must come down to earth’, he said.
‘I have always opposed religious instruction in schools, but I think
this is a time when prayers should be said in schools’.
Evening Post, 21 Aug 40, p. 11
Here,
simply, was the reaction of one sincere minor public man to the
blows falling on Britain.
Next month the Board, by 11 votes to 3, decided that subject
to the approval of headmasters and committees its schools should
open each day with the Lord’s Prayer; Colonel McDonald in an
impassioned speech asked how, if God could not be mentioned in
schools, people could expect the help of Christ in the present struggle, adding that all should show the suffering British people that
New Zealand was not going ‘to blot the religious escutcheon.’
Ibid., 18 Sep 40, p. 11
In
October the Wellington Board, claiming that it was a matter for
itself and school committees, rejected the advice of the Director that
this decision was contrary to law.
Ibid., 16 Oct 40, p. 11
The Otago Board recommended
any of its headmasters who were not already doing so to open with
the Lord’s Prayer, and defied the Director. Should committees continue to legalise the matter, questioned the Otago Board,
or has the time arrived for us to turn a blind eye on the Education
Act which in this respect is hopelessly behind public opinion.
There is no doubt that the desire for religious instruction in our
schools has been increasing—particularly so in the matter of opening with religious exercises. This desire has been intensified since
the outbreak of the war and the realisation of the need for Divine
help…. It would be a fine thing at the present time if every
school in New Zealand were to open not only with the Lord’s
Prayer but also a suitable prayer of intercession on behalf of our
fighting forces and the men, women and children of the Homeland…. Education Boards and school committees are in much
closer touch with public opinion in this matter than the Education
Department and the Government.
The Otago Board hoped that all its schools would adopt its recommendation—not an instruction—to begin with the Lord’s Prayer.
Otago Daily Times, 18 Oct 40, p. 9
At the same time the Auckland Board reported that it had not
officially considered the issue, and very few if any of its schools
opened with prayer, but school committees could hold referendums
among parents.
NZ Herald, 18 Oct 40, p. 8
Professor Gould complained of an administrative body, elected
on a narrow franchise, presuming to interpret public opinion and
override the law.
Evening Post, 19 Oct 40, p. 10
The Educational Institute explained on 26 October that pressure against secular State education was longstanding,
but now the advocates of religion were making use of the crisis.
‘The Institute sides with those distinguished Christian leaders who
have objected in the strongest terms to the use of religious observances as a kind of social tonic in times of national crisis’.
Ibid., 26 Oct 40, p. 11
To clear
up public misunderstanding the Director of Education, Dr Beeby,
on 1 November stated that the Department and education boards
existed to administer free, secular and compulsory education, with
no power to give directions on religious instruction or observances.
Under section 49 (7) of the Act, school committees could grant use
of school buildings for religious instruction out of school hours, but
they could not order that the school should open with prayers, which
no child could be compelled to attend and a teacher taking part
would do so as a citizen, not a teacher; the curriculum belonged to
the Department alone. An education board, like any group of citizens, could express an opinion that certain religious observances
would be desirable, but such opinion could not be regarded as legal
instruction.
Ibid., 1 Nov 40, p. 8
Legal niceties did not perplex those who felt that the Wellington
Board had taken the right course. The Presbyterian Outlook held
that by acquiescence in earlier decisions by boards the Department
had waived its right to interfere.
Outlook, 23 Oct, 25 Sep 40, pp. 3, 3
Colonel McDonald was undismayed,
Evening Post, 6 Nov 40, p. 11; also 8, 19, 24 Oct, 13 Nov 40, pp. 6, 10, 10, 13 for
supporting letters
and he was not alone; at the end of November the
Wanganui Board asked its schools to open with the Lord’s Prayer.
Ibid., 26 Nov 40, p. 9
The Wellington Board on 20 November reported protests from only
one school committee, support from religious and social organisations and its own intention to allow the daily prayer, subject to the
approval of headmasters and school committees.
Ibid., 21 Nov 40, p. 12
For some, the 9 o’clock recital of the Lord’s Prayer by thousands
of children was the whole issue; it might do some good and surely
it would do no harm. For others, it was the thin end of the wedge,
as the Bishop of Wellington made clear:
What really is at stake … is the future of Christianity as our
national religion…. What we of the Church are asking for is
not just the right of entry to the schools, but an adjustment of
the educational system which will give free course to the Christian
Gospel. To my mind, there is no sense in pretending that we are
fighting for great spiritual issues while we make no effort to adjust
the law of the land to the clamant and urgent need of the building
up of a generation which will have some knowledge of the principles upon which alone a world of freedom and justice and peace
can be established.
Ibid., 2 Dec 40, p. 11, quoting Church Chronicle, Dec 40, p. 167
There was no further confrontation. With unity the country’s avowed
watchword, it was impolitic for the Department to do more than
wait for religious fervour to flow and ebb.
See pp. 1134–5
CHAPTER 4
Response from the Home Front
AS the ‘phoney war’ in Europe was swept away by the blitzkrieg,
and the Battle of Britain followed, there was in New Zealand
an upsurge of wanting to contribute to the struggle, to pull one’s
weight, and again frustration because there was so little to do. But
it did not wholly subside in grumbles about lack of leadership. It
produced a rising tide of enlistment, a violent spurt of giving to
patriotic funds, of loans and gifts of money to the government for
general war purposes, and renewed uneasiness about the 40-hour
week. Farm production was increased and changed to answer new
British needs; some industries, such as woollen mills, clothing and
bootmaking swelled at once; some engineering firms began making
munitions. The Home Guard was formed, Emergency Precaution
schemes took place, the chambers of commerce organised waste metal
collections. There were rapid and widespread efforts to help Britain
directly, with money for aeroplanes; typists, housewives and schoolgirls sewed and knitted for the victims of bombing. There were
proposals to ration bacon and cheese, to send gift shipments of food;
there were arrangements to billet British children.
The impulse to do something was patchy and did not overwhelm
long-standing interests. An example of its quality was provided by
the King’s Birthday holiday of Monday, 3 June 1940. As early as
8 May Truth had suggested that all proceeds from the many sports
events should go to patriotic funds. By an Order-in-Council on
30 May the holiday was indefinitely postponed, the Minister of
Labour announcing that every shop, office and factory would be
working on Monday; workers all over the country had expressed
eagerness to do so and to give the day’s earnings to patriotic funds.
How spontaneous this eagerness was may be doubted. Certainly the
Waitara and Longburn freezing workers made such an offer, which
led the organisers of the current Sick and Wounded Fund to launch
a national appeal for similar donations.
Evening Post, 25 May 40, p. 13
But the unions at New
Plymouth, for example, some of which had already decided to make
weekly contributions to patriotic funds, were surprised by the
announcement, though prepared to follow larger unions.
Taranaki Daily News, 30 May 40, p. 9
Some other
unions, while not opposed to such collections, objected to members
being compelled or stampeded into giving money they might not
be able to afford.
Dominion, 12 Jun 40, p. 3
Generally the holiday was forgone and many of
its sports fixtures cancelled, but four large race-meetings were held,
though attendances were diminished. Attention was focused on this
by the slaughtermen of Westfield who, on hearing at 10 am that
the Ellerslie meeting had not been cancelled as they had been led
to expect, downed knives and went off.
Press, 4 Jun 40, p. 8
The urge to do something faded for many people because there
was no extra or different task at hand. Speeches and posters urged
them to back up the Fighting Forces, Work for Victory, Work for
your Lives—‘in the factory no less than in the field, will victory be
won’—but many workers in ordinary jobs could not see that extra
effort would in any way help Britain or win the war, though it would
obviously benefit their immediate employers.
A few owners offered to do war-work at non-profit rates. Sidney
Holland, hoping that other firms would do likewise, offered his
Family’s engineering factory and garage for war work without profit,
including the staff who were willing to do overtime without pay.
NZ Herald, 25 May 40, p. 10
There was no rush of emulation, but one Invercargill motor engineering firm, H. E. Melhop, made a similar offer
Otago Daily Times, 31 May 40, p. 6
—admittedly the
motor industry, under petrol restrictions, was slack—while a Port
Chalmers ship-repairing firm, Stevenson and Cook Engineering
Company, first placed its plant and staff at government disposal,
then offered a unit of 50 trained men for such work anywhere in
the world.
Ibid., 16 Jul 40, p. 8
The staff and executives of two trading firms, A. S.
Paterson and Williams and Kettle, offered to work for any government purpose in their spare time
Press, 13 May 40. p. 15; Auckland Star, 12 Jun 40, p. 11
while 200 members of the Auckland State Advances Corporation offered an extra hour a day without
overtime.
Southland Times, 2 Jul 40, p. 6
Such offers were politely received and publicised for their
splendid patriotic spirit, but there was no immediate use for them,
and they did not multiply.
In a few cases workers offered or agreed to work longer hours,
giving their overtime pay to patriotic funds. For instance, those
employed by a group of Christchurch leather manufacturers agreed
to four extra hours weekly at double pay given to patriotic causes,
by which, commented the Southland Times of 7 June, they greatly
increased production and contributed £200 a week to the war drive
without reducing their pay-packets. The men of timber mills near
Rotorua and in the King Country offered an extra half day a month,
at ordinary rates, their pay plus a donation from the employers going
to patriotic funds.
Evening Post, 11 Jun 40, p. 6
On the casting vote of the president, the Temuka
branch of the New Zealand Workers’ Union offered to perform
overtime at ordinary rates and, if the Minister of Labour thought it
necessary, to work a 44-hour or 49-hour week immediately.
Press, 11 Jun 40, p. 8
But these offers touched the thorny problem of the 40-hour week.
Traditionally, Labour did not object to extra hours, within reason,
but demanded higher pay rates for them. Even sporadic setting aside
of this principle, though genuinely voluntary and patriotic, could
undermine trade unionism’s achievements as thoroughly as any scabbing, nor was it unthinkable that wily employers might contrive
such offers. The workers at Booth Macdonald, a Penrose foundry
partly engaged on munitions, offered to further the war effort by
working on Saturday mornings at ordinary rates of pay. The Minister
of Labour, backed by the Industrial Emergency Council, refused the
offer, saying that the evidence submitted did not justify extended
hours.
NZ Herald, 5, 6 Sep 40, pp. 10, 6; Evening Post, 10 Sep 40, p. 8. The Industrial
Emergency Council consisted of nine representatives of employers and nine of Labour,
chosen and chaired by the Minister of Labour. They were selected not as representing
any special sector or trades but for general ability in the industrial field. Hare, A. E. C.,
Labour in New Zealand1942, p. 25
A similar appeal made in grand style by some farm implement workers in the Waikato was less summarily but as effectively
squashed. On 16 July they resolved:
In view of Mr Churchill’s broadcast this morning and the Prime
Minister’s appeal for greater output and harder work, the factory
staff of A. M. Bisley … in work essential to primary production,
are prepared and willing and respectfully urge the Prime Minister
that they be permitted to follow the example set by the workmen
in Britain and work such hours at standard rates of pay as are
considered essential. In the interests of freedom and our Empire
we urge the Government to bring in regulations permitting this
to be done for the duration of the war.
NZ Herald, 17 Jul 40, p. 10
The Prime Minister acknowledged their patriotic spirit and referred
the resolution to the Minister of Labour. The staff of 24 worked 45
hours a week till checked by shortage of steel. In September, with
more steel on hand, the firm proposed to resume its 45-hour week,
but was told by the union that the men could work the extra hours
only at overtime rates.
Ibid., 19 Sep, 16 Oct 40, pp. 11, 10; Evening Post, 18 Sep 40, p. 5
The firm was ready to face prosecution,
In February 1941 the Auckland Metal Workers Union brought a court action against
the firm for a deliberate breach of the award, which if approved ‘would mean revolutionary changes in the industrial sphere’. The magistrate, noting that the firm had desisted
when told to, held that the breach was excusable and dismissed the case; the Arbitration
Court, on appeal, upheld his decision. NZ Herald, 1 Mar, 5 Nov 41, pp. 11, 9
considering the question one of national importance, and opposition
leaders complained in the House of ‘mass-unionism and bossocracy’
which thus prevented workers from expressing their patriotism in
the one way they best could.
NZPD, vol 258, p. 509
A writer to the Evening Post on 23 July voiced exasperation with
the slogans that could not be followed.
“Produce for Victory” … “Work for your life” … Rich man,
poor man, we have spare hours we are anxiously waiting to give.
All men, women, and youths have spent eleven months waiting
for a lead telling them where they shall seek that extra work they
are ready and willing to perform for Victory. How can the non-productive produce, except by preventing waste…. How can the
40-hour a week union worker seek extra hours of work in a trade
to the union of which he does not belong? How can an executive
outside the unions work with pick and shovel inside the union
as he would be glad to do….
Nor were trade unions the only barrier to extra work. A Christchurch
man, rejected for the Services, but desperate to help, offered his
labour free on any Sunday to enable some farmer to do more important work, hoping that this would start a Canterbury weekend service
unit among the many like himself who would be ashamed to take
a penny. The chairman of the North Canterbury Farmers’ Union
thanked him, saying that this was a very fine gesture, but such a
thing was not needed yet. ‘After all, when he’s working all the week,
the farmer really must have some leisure on Sundays, and if an offer
like this was accepted he would have to supervise what was being
done.’ With the petrol shortage, the would-be helper could not get
very far from the city.
Press, 25 Jul 40, p. 8
The 40-hour week, of course, came under heavy frontal attack
during the agitations at the end of May,
See p. 94
and continued to do so.
Farmers and businessmen held that only by producing more without
increasing labour costs could the spiral of scarce goods and rising
prices be checked. Some militant unions, however, saw the crisis
being used against them and to increase profits, while there were
still workers unemployed. For at this stage there were still thousands
without regular work. In early July 1940 it was estimated that 1200
men in Christchurch were out of work because of the closing of
seasonal jobs like the freezing works.
Press, 11, 13, 15 Jul 40, pp. 6, 10, 6
Official quarters in Wellington explained that before relief measures came in an estimated 10 000
men managed to make a bare living by working when and where
it suited them, and were satisfied to do so. These men had remained
a permanent section of the community, and so long as they did not
exceed 10 000 the position was normal. There were plenty of jobs
on farms for experienced men and even for inexperienced men if
single and fit; elsewhere openings were not so easy.
Evening Post, 4 Sep 40, p. 8
Unionists could
therefore claim that proper utilisation of manpower, drafting it to
the industries most in need, was all that the war effort required as
yet; ‘if and when there is any real need for an extension of the
working week … the workers will be the first to realise and give
effect to it’.
Press, 15 Jun 40, pp. 17, 16
Meanwhile they did not ‘wish to sacrifice the 40-hour
week on the altar of hysteria’, and knew that any unjustified extension of hours might well become a heritage of labour.
Ibid., 13 Jun 40, p. 13, also 11 Jun 40, p. 6; Evening Post, 22, 23 Aug 40, pp. 11, 8
The argument about working hours had been going on since the
beginning of the war, and was to recur again and again. Under the
shock of Dunkirk, a slightly placatory note sounded from some of
the advocates of longer hours: for unity they would make some
compromise. The Wellington Chamber of Commerce suggested
friendly, round-table discussions with its critics from the railway
workshops.
Evening Post, 5 Jun 40, p. 6
The Dominion president, W. S. MacGibbon, told Canterbury farmers that people should not say without thinking that
the 40-hour week should be thrown overboard; in some industries
this might be an advantage, in others it might only increase costs.
At the same meeting, a farmer opposing a motion for its abolition
said that a request of that sort would only irritate government and
workers, and drive a wedge between them and the farmers. Voting
however was for abolition, ‘at least for the duration’.
Press, 7 Jun 40, p., 8
The government declared that its position was clear and consistent: the 40-hour week was not sacred, it would go if and where it
was clearly hindering the war effort, but many industries were short
of raw materials and longer hours would only increase unemployment. Any company or industry requiring extended hours for work
connected with the war, and not able to afford full overtime rates,
could apply to the Industrial Emergency Council, which heard evidence from all parties concerned, and the adjustments which it
deemed necessary would be made effective by orders-in-council.
Even in 1939 men of many trades engaged on defence and emergency works, such as military camps and roads and aerodromes, had
worked two or three shifts if necessary with only two or three shillings
extra per shift, although opposition to shift-work was part of the
unionists’ creed and firmly built into awards. In June 1940 new
Labour Legislation Emergency Regulations (1940/123) gave the
Minister of Labour, advised by the Industrial Emergency Council,
power to alter conditions in any industry or firm in any way connected with the war, and many changes in labour conditions were
made, especially in the next few months.
See Baker, pp. 447–8, 455–6
Within a year there were
changes, sometimes successive changes, in the established conditions
of about a dozen industries: ammunition making, woollen milling,
clothing trades, slipper making, cement and asbestos manufacture,
brushware, timber-milling, tinsmithing for the dairy industry, tanning, shearing and cheese-making.
Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives (hereinafter A to J) 1941,
H–ll, p. 11
By these orders shifts were
allowed, hours at ordinary rates extended, overtime lessened, and
apprentice conditions waived. The effect in general was that longer
hours were worked for less pay than the peacetime awards prescribed.
Newspapers, however, did not stress that these workers were without
protest forgoing peacetime wages, though there was quite frequent
mention of the large sums that other workers gained through
overtime.
Here it may be noted that in mid-1940 the coal miners, normally
not over-willing, made a voluntary, if temporary, increase in their
hours at ordinary rates. Several factors, including floods and lessened
Australian supplies, caused a coal shortage. The miners, at the request
of their Minister and the owners, agreed to 11 days a fortnight
instead of 10, working four hours on each of five alternate Saturdays;
this, as Minister P. C. Webb put it, ‘got us out of a crisis’.
NZ Herald, 21 Mar 41, p. 6, also 3O May 40, p. 9; Press, 12 Jun 40, p. 6; A to J1941,
C–2, p. 5, C–2A, pp. 1, 3, 5
Farmers who since the start of the war had been urged to produce
more, without any particular demand or organisation, were in mid-May warned by Nash that their market was becoming more restricted.
There were in New Zealand 85 000 tons of meat and 18 000 tons
of butter more than Britain wanted, and the competition of margarine had strengthened, its quality being improved, while the price
of butter had risen by 5d a pound since the war’s start. Many British
people claimed that it was not worth risking the life of a single
sailor to import butter while margarine at 5d to 9d per lb had an
obvious advantage over New Zealand butter at Is 7d,
Evening Post, 30 Mar 40, p. 11; Southland Times, 14 May 40, p. 5; Palmerston NorthTimes, 14 May 40, p. 6; NZ Financial Times, Jun 40, p. 289
especially
when heavy war taxation compelled household economy. Relief,
therefore, mingled with the sympathy felt by farmers when dairy
supplies from the Low Countries and France were cut off. Now
Britain asked for 15 000 tons more cheese and 10 000 tons more
pigmeat. New Zealand farmers could see that protein was more
necessary than butter in the British diet, and the difficulty of selling
butter against margarine further commended cheese production. Some
6000 farmers more or less voluntarily set about sending milk instead
of cream to their factories, without waiting to be pressed by the
emergency powers.
Baker, p. 200
However, it was necessary also to maintain supplies of butter, lest its English price, rising through scarcity, should
drive it off the market, causing Britons to lose their taste for it
permanently. Earlier in the year Britain had so accepted the improved,
unrationed and much cheaper margarine that there was an actual
surplus of butter with the ration at 8 oz. When in June the butter
ration was dropped to 4 oz people preferred unrationed margarine.
In July, when the total fat ration became 6 oz of butter and margarine in any proportion, increasing butter sales made a limit of 4 oz
necessary from the end of August.
Press, 7 Dec 40, p. 8
Farmers were anxious to keep
costs (ie, wages, etc) down, lest the price they must charge should
press unkindly on war-drained Britain and, further, lest it put butter
in the position of caviar, with margarine capturing the market. This
aspect, remarked the Point Blank editorial of 15 June, was ‘perhaps
even more important than the patriotic one.’
Perhaps this aspect was a reason for the prominence of butter in
several proposals to give—not sell—food to Britain. Thus in Southland, Adam Hamilton’s brother proposed giving a million pounds
of butter, which ‘would promote lasting good-will … a more
opportune time to make such a gift might not arise’, and he himself
would contribute the cost of 1000lb.
Southland Times, 10 Jun 40, p. 4; see p. 158, fn 160
At Gisborne the Kia Ora
Co-operative Dairy Company gave £1,000 to provide a gift of butter
as a win-the-war donation to Britain.
NZ Herald, 18 Jul, 13 Aug 40, pp. 11, 8
At Whakatane it was thought
that boxes of butter and carcases of meat would be more appreciated
by distressed Britons than gifts of money, and in addition the goodwill engendered would do much to assist the marketing of New
Zealand produce after the war.
Ibid., 14 Sep 40, p. 12
A similar proposal came from Banks
Peninsula.
Akaroa Mail, 25 Jun 40
At Palmerston North the Chamber of Commerce suggested that a million carcases of lamb should be given;
Palmerston NorthTimes, 7 Ang 40, p. 6
the Red
Cross at Auckland proposed 45 000 boxes of butter.
Press, 3 Jul 40, p. 6
The Auckland
Chamber of Commerce spoke of giving £ million sterling or some
free cargoes, while admitting that the Farmers’ Union was not enthusiastic about the latter.
NZ Herald, 5 Jul 40, p. 9
A sprinkling of letters in papers hoped for
schemes whereby modest people could contribute towards gift shipments of food. These thought mainly of butter: the British ration
of four ounces a week stuck in their minds, and they often suggested
rationing themselves to make more available.
Presumably gifts of
butter would have been welcome in England, though the organisation needed in New Zealand would have been disproportionate. But
less sentimental counsel prevailed. On 28 May Fraser pointed out
that Britain had agreed to take only 115 000 tons of butter though
New Zealand could make 125 000 tons available. He later reminded
the chambers of commerce that there was considerable incongruity
in offering free produce to Britain while borrowing millions of British pounds for war purposes.
NZ Herald, 6 Sep 40, p. 6
The Farmers’ Union warned the
chambers of commerce that gift shipments might interfere with
government commitments,
Ibid., 5 Jul 40, p. 9
and it is probable that Nash, as Minister
of Marketing, signed other letters
eg, to the Whakatane Red Cross, ibid., 14 Sep 40, p. 12
like that sent to the Waiuku
Women’s Institute which had asked about giving butter: all refrigerated cargo space was being used for purchased produce, an equivalent amount of which would be delayed by gift shipments and,
apart from distribution difficulties, such a transaction would affect
the position between New Zealand and the United Kingdom in
regard to sterling and war funds.
Ibid., 6 Aug 40, p. 11
A few direct food gifts were made. For instance, in October 20 000
eggs were sent, chiefly from Hawke’s Bay, through the Women’s
Division of the Farmers’ Union, for free distribution to hospitals
and the Red Cross, but no more shipping was available for eggs
that season.
Wanganui Herald, 3 Sep 40, p. 2; NZ Herald, 26 Oct 40, p. 10
Southland schools arranged a pig-feeding scheme that
promised 155 baconers, which by courtesy of the shipowners and
with the blessing of the Minister of Agriculture, would be sent free
to the British government.
Southland Times, 24 Aug 40, p. 11
Free transport was also contrived by
J. J. Maher,
Maher, James Joseph (1889–1964): MP (Nat) Otaki 1946–60; chmn Wgtn Dairy Farmers’ Co-op Assn for many years
an Upper Hutt farmer, who sent off 25 pigs in October, with a letter naming all who took part in the enterprise.
Evening Post, 19 Oct 40, p. 11
Fairly widespread, particularly among farmers, were proposals that
cheese and bacon should be rationed in New Zealand or commandeered for export, thus increasing immediately the amount going to
Britain.
Some bodies which discussed these proposals sometimes inconclusively: Auckland and
Dunedin Councils of Primary Production, Otago Daily Times, 21, 23 May 40, pp. 6, 8;
Southern Hawke’s Bay Farmers’ Union, NZ Herald, 17 May 40, p. 9; Mayor of Hastings,
Hawke’s Bay Daily Mail, 23 May 40, p. 8; Canty District Pig Council, Press, 8 Jun 40,
p. 10; North Otago Farmers Union, ibid., 22 Jun 40, p. 7; Dannevirke Council of
Primary Production, Palmerston NorthTimes, 24 Jun 40, p. 2; Rangitikei and Makirikiri
Farmers’ Unions, Wanganui Herald, 24 Jun, 1 Jul 40, pp. 6, 6; Bay of Islands and
Hokianga farmers, NZ Herald, 4 Jul 40, p. 3; Hawke’s Bay Farmers’ Union, Dominion,
28 Jun 40, p. 5, NZ Herald, 22 Jul 40; One Tree Hill Borough Council, NZ Herald,
9 Aug 40, p. 6; Awahuri Co-operative Dairy Co, Palmerston NorthTimes, 29 Aug 40,
p. 6
One report of such a suggestion, from the Canterbury District Pig Council, indicated that the farmers’ keenness to succour
Britain with bacon was heightened by suspicion that the government
would first nourish its own supporters in the towns: ‘the government
would see that New Zealand did not want, but would disregard
the needs of the Mother country. It was on this consideration that
the motion was carried unanimously’. New Zealanders could always
eat more mutton instead.
Press,8 Jun 40, p. 10
In August a State Advances official, after
a tour of the North Island, told the Manawatu Council of Primary
Production that there was a ‘tremendous body of opinion’ in favour
of rationing bacon and cheese; the Council, however, considered that
rationing was not needed to produce the 10 000 extra tons of bacon
requested by Britain.
Palmerston NorthTimes, 16 Aug 40, p. 6
Earlier, farmers had declared that to produce more they must have
adequate labour and profit margins. Now they were at least partially
shocked into forgoing these conditions. ‘Even production at a loss
will be better than falling under Hitler’s iron heel,’ warned Mulholland in April.
Point Blank, 15 Apr 40, p. 9
A Farmers’ Union secretary found his May tour
of Canterbury and Otago ‘wonderful and inspiring’. Nowhere was
there any desire to make money out of the war. ‘The temper of the
farmers is that if the rest of the community is willing to … do a
harder day’s work for a smaller net income they are quite willing
to do the same’.
Ibid., 15 Jun 40, p. 47
A Point Blank correspondent wrote that in recent
years government sins had produced an ‘obstinacy policy’ in many
farmers, who were cutting costs by reducing production without
reducing their net incomes, but now, with fertiliser and transport
subsidies, he saw ‘certain alibis’ for not increasing production
removed, and the stage set for a change of attitude in many farmers.
Ibid., p. 9
In July Mulholland advised that they must expect declining quality
if not quantity in farm labour, also that they must accept married
men and build houses for them, using the rural housing subsidy.
Evening Post, 16 Jul 40, p. 5. Under the Rural Housing Act 1939, to help farmers build
for their workers, county councils would lend £500 at 3½ per cent, repayable over
25 years at 11s 8d a week. Further, in June 1940 the government offered a 10 per cent
subsidy on such loans, so that a £600 house could be built for £540. Also, through the
Public Works Department, houses of three rooms, plus a bathroom-wash house, could
be obtained for 5s weekly, or one-man huts for 2s. Point Blank, 15 Aug 40. p. 7
A Tamaki farmer, hearing complaints about wharf labourers, said,
‘Never mind if other sections are not pulling their weight; let us as
farmers go to the job and forget about overtime and increasing costs.’
Evening Post, 9 Aug 40, p. 6
The 1940–1 production targets announced on 17 June 1940 called
for 10 000 more tons of bacon than in the previous year, and 15 000
tons more cheese; beef and wool should be increased, while butter,
mutton and lamb should be maintained at last season’s levels. Pasture and food crops seeds should be increased.
Otago Daily Times, 18 Jun 40, p. 6
It was announced
on 12 June that Britain wanted 8000 tons of linen flax fibre and
that South Island farmers should have 15 000 acres ready for sowing
in September. Linen fibre, used in aircraft fabrics, parachute harness,
fire hose, canvas and other articles, was a vital war material. The
crop had not been grown commercially before, though during the
past four years there had been some research and experiment in its
production, and machinery for one fibre treatment unit had been
imported.
Ibid., 12 Jun 40, p. 8; Evening Post, 7 Feb 40, p. 5
Farmers in 1940–1 under government contracts tackled
a new crop and factories to extract the fibre were established, efforts
described elsewhere.
See Baker, pp. 216–18; cf. p. 736
Primary Production Councils had been established already, but
now they went to work with new energy, setting up small district
committees to see how each farm could grow more: those with tractors and other equipment would co-operate with neighbours, some
would grow more winter feed and stock crops or seed, some keep
a few more cows and pigs.
Point Blank, 15 Jul 40, p. 5
District Pig Councils, with their target
one pig per cow, advised and cajoled. For example, the Wellington
Council, explaining that every two bushels
1 bushel barley = 501b = 22.7 kg
of barley grown would
bring another store pig to bacon weight, issued a moving account
of Britain’s efforts in pig-rearing, about Wimbledon’s velvet turf
being used for grazing pigs and its groundsmen who would never
smile again. ‘Think of Wimbledon! Think of that turf pugged by
the cutting feet of pigs! Think of Britain facing the stark horror of
total war in the cold grey months that lie ahead. Think of our own
security, and then cast your eyes about your farm to decide just where
barley shall be grown this year’.
Palmerston NorthTimes, 14 Aug 40, p. 12
In Hawke’s Bay the Primary Production Council exhorted: ‘you
may think yourself a sheep farmer, but fundamentally you may be
a potential producer of pigs. So search your conscience, dig out that
curry comb or oil up the tractor that has not yet earned its keep,
and plough as you never did before. Plough your own land, plough
your neighbour’s land, plough for victory, plough for Britain’s
45,000,000 mouths, plough for your kinsmen in the battle line….’
Hawke’s Bay Daily Mail, 8 Jul 40, p. 5
Response to the barley appeals was modest and, as it later turned
out, reasonable: more than 20 000 acres of barley were proposed for
the southern half of the North Island, but by September 1940 it
was reported that less than 5000 acres would be grown.
Wanganui Herald, 10 Sep 40, p. 6
There was readiness, to improvise, to find a way round shortages.
For instance, changing to cheese meant more milk cans, so there
Was much routing out and re-conditioning of old ones.
Evening Post, 22 Jun 40, p. 7
More pigs
meant more fencing and roofing, and production councils advised
farmers to hunt up old wire from hedges and plantations and roofing
iron from old buildings in town.
Palmerston NorthTimes, 24 Jun 40, p. 2
A zealous family at Hawera,
aiming at 600 baconers by April, built portable pig houses of pinus
radiata on macrocarpa runners, all creosoted, covered with iron from
bitumen drums.
Auckland Star, 7 Aug 40, p. 10; also Press, 24 Sep 40, p. 6
Some towns, notably Christchurch, set up municipal piggeries, run by men on Scheme 13, or collected food scraps
from houses for farmers.
Palmerston NorthTimes, 10, 23 Jul, 20 Aug 40, pp. 2, 6, 6; Press. 22 Apr 41, p. 4;
Auckland Star, 5 Feb 43, p. 2
Even conferences were forgone: one which
would have taken hundreds of dairy farmers to Auckland in June
was cancelled,
Gisborne Herald, 25 May 40, p. 12
and some districts considered cancelling annual
Agricultural and Pastoral shows.
However, while the Farmers’ Union urged more and better production, it also called for proper direction of manpower and government economy on non-war objects, opposed wage increases and
wanted longer hours without overtime.
Press, 17 Jul 40, p. 8
To sum up: the farming
community, in the winter of 1940, did not throw out all thoughts
of profit and loss, distrust of a non-farming government, its ancient
enmity with the towns or resistance to the demands of labour; yet
concern with these things diminished while farmers soberly but
urgently turned to the tasks now clearly before them.
Farmers might well feel that they had their orders; women were
welcomed back to the clothing factories and woollen mills that they
had left on marriage; in many trades, workers and management
might see that only by using existing plant, both to make more and
to improvise for other products, could they fill the gaps in such
everyday requirements as nails, roofing materials, electric light bulbs
or gloves, caused by the failure of overseas supply. But there were
still a great many women and older people who felt excluded from
the excitement and sacrifice. Get on with the job was dull advice
when so many jobs had not the slightest visible bearing on war or
victory. There were, reproved Truth on 10 July 1940, too many
running round moaning and scare-mongering instead of getting
on with their jobs. They wish this, that and the other—would
like to take on some real war-work, toil seven days a week, they
can’t get interested in anything, and so forth…. This is not
England, no matter how anxious we all are to help. The time
may come (perhaps sooner than we expect) when we can all do
something worthwhile…. In the meantime, we are not helping
the nation by moping round the wireless, cackling about the war
at work, or helping to spread the latest rumour…. each can do
his part by getting on with his own job. It all helps…. We all
can’t immediately rush into khaki or war work without causing
hopeless disorganisation and confusion. So in the meantime, let
us ‘carry on’.
For weekends Truth advised fresh air instead of brooding over the
radio, possibly listening to German propaganda; one should go to
football, play golf, or walk, to help keep fit and in better spirit.
Truth, 10 Jul 40, p. 1
‘Carrying on’ was all that so many could do. Offers from women
and older persons to work on farms, as tram conductors, or in any
way at all were received politely but there was no immediate need
or niche. People wanted to do what was being done in England.
Newspapers were full of pictures of land army girls tending animals
and making hay; girls as skilled munition makers, girls clipping bus
tickets; older men growing vegetables on allotments. In New Zealand,
would-be land girls were told there was no need for them on farms
though they could do domestic work in farm houses, thus freeing
wives to help their husbands.
Evening Post, 6 May 40, p. 6; NZ Herald, 29 May 40, p. 10
They were not wanted as tram conductors for there was no shortage of male tramway workers.
NZ Herald, 15 Oct 40, p. 8
Town
dwellers wanting allotment gardens
eg, Evening Post, 19 Jun 40, p. 6
were told that there was no
shortage of vegetables, no need to cultivate parks and reserves.
Wanganui Herald, 23 May 40, p. 8; Auckland Star, 6 Jun 40, p. 5, see also chaps 16, 21
One war effort, however, was open to all: everyone could give
money to various patriotic purposes, and in that first surprised uneasy
winter, a great many did. Business firms, public bodies, banks and
the well-to-do contributed in loans and donations the main part of
the government’s War Purposes Fund, many lending thousands of
pounds interest-free, some for one year, more for the duration of
the war and longer. For example: Milne & Choyce lent £5,000 for
a year; Parisian Neckwear, Auckland, and the Devonport Steam Ferry
both lent £1,000 for the duration of the war and six months, the
Permanent Building Society, Nelson, £2,000 for the same term.
Auckland Star, 8 Jun 40, p. 10
Old Digger, Kelso, lent £200 for the duration and twelve months,
Newmarket Butchery, Christchurch, £100 for the duration, the North
Rakaia River Board, £1,000 for the duration and six months and
Woodville’s Legion of Frontiersmen, £15 likewise.
Otago Daily Times, 17 Apr 40, p. 4
The Ngati
Tuwharetoa Tribal Trust gave £150 and lent £500 for the duration
and six months;
Wanganui Herald, 19 Sep 40, p. 6
the Aupouri tribe of Parengarenga in the far north
gave £100 and lent £1,000 on like terms, from ‘cash reserves earned
within the native settlement within the past few years’.
Taranaki Daily News, 30 Aug 40, p. 6
The New
Zealand Rugby Union gave £1,000.
Evening Post, 13 Jun 40, p. 8
The Auckland Racing Club
lent £20,000 for the duration and six months,
Auckland Star, 27 May 40, p. 9
the Ashburton
County Racing Club, £200,
Evening Post, 13 Jul 40, p. 9
the Temuka Borough Council £1,280,
and the Canterbury Law Society £1,000 on like terms.
NZ Herald, 6 Jul 40, p. 13
Trade unions
lent their funds: the Dunedin Operative Bootmakers lent £500;
Ibid., 24 May 40, p. 8
the Amalgamated Carpenters and Joiners of Christchurch, £l,000;
Ibid., 6 Jul 40, p. 13
the New Zealand Workers Union on 27 June lent £5,000 for the
duration and six months and, later, members donated sums totalling
£2,088.
Southland Times, 13 Jul 40, p. 6; Evening Post, 5 Apr 41, p. 11
This War Purposes Fund stood at £1,357,297 on 21 March 1940,
at £1,692,140 on 27 April and £1,949,438 on 4 June.
Evening Post, 21 Mar, 27 Apr, 4 Jun 40, pp. 11, 7, 9
In the
next fortnight it rose by £142,002 to £2,091,440,
Auckland Star, 18 Jun 40, p. 3
reached
£2,197,921 by 24 June and £2,279,669 by 3 July,
Evening Post, 24 Jun, 3 Jul 40. pp. 9, 9
Thereafter it
rose more slowly, being £2,457,562 by 3 August and £2,631,168
on 22 November.
Ibid., 3 Aug, 22 Nov 40, pp. 10, 9
Donations also came freely to the established local patriotic boards,
which in April had launched a national appeal for present comforts
and later rehabilitation of servicemen. These donations were large
and small, given by individuals, clubs and unions and by firms,
both workers and employers contributing. Some were continuing
gifts: several racing clubs decided to give their net profits for the
duration to assorted patriotic purposes;
Ibid., 12 Jul 40. p. 9
regular contributions were
made by some workers, such as those of the Post and Telegraph
Department, who in June 1940 made their second donation of
£400;
Ibid., 6 Jul 40, p. 7
in Wellington the Karori Horticultural Society in June gave
£10 and decided that all wartime profits would be devoted to
patriotic purposes instead of prizes.
Ibid., 22 Jun 40, p. 10
The freezing workers of Waitara decided on 1 June to give 6d in each pound of their wages for
the duration.
Patea and Waverley Press, 3 Jun 40
A few firms and at least one farmer offered their
whole profits for the duration.
Imperial Hotel, Auckland, Auckland Star, 15 Jun 40, p. 8; J. B. Ball, Ltd, Auckland,
Press, 15 Jun 40, p. 10; W. Branson of Ngongotaha, ibid., 17 Jun 40, p. 6; and the
Hotel Cargen was given to the Auckland Hospital Board as a nurses’ hostel for the
duration. Auckland Star, 7, 13 Jun 40, pp. 9, 9
Giving to patriotic funds had not been very enthusiastic during
the first seven months of the war. It had rather resembled the recruiting campaign during the ‘phoney war’, with organisers working valiantly for only moderate response ‘until the surge of the May-June
crisis, which coincided with the launching of the Sick, Wounded
and Distress Fund under the banners of the Red Cross and the Order
of St John, reached purses and cheque books.’
Evening Post, 10 Jun 40, p. 11; see p. 151
The big firms gave
freely, but there were also hosts of small givers. Workers’ unions
and regular staff contributions were prominent, the latter often subsidised by their firms; small groups like the Taita Women’s Institute
and Hutt Central School pupils gathered their shillings and pounds.
Evening Post, 20 Jun 40, p. 9
The First XV of Rongotai College, Wellington, even offered to forgo
their football caps, giving instead £5 to the fund, but the Wellington College Board of Governors considered this too great a sacrifice for their school’s team to make.
Ibid., 26 Jun 40, p. 9
There were stalls and dances
and concerts and card parties and collections by children, there were
raffles, copper trails and queen carnivals, radio appeals and auctions
and flag days, and stock sales where a heifer might be sold thirteen
times. Suburbs and local patriotic committees vied with each other.
The war was urgent and close in people’s minds and giving to this
appeal was a way of taking part in it—though as yet there were
virtually no wounded New Zealanders. The giving was at times
almost exuberant. The skills of commercial travellers in particular
gained astonishing results. A Press report of 30 May thought that
all records were probably broken when an Aucklander on a decorated
float at the end of a drive auctioned two lettuce leaves for 18s 6d
and 22s 3d respectively.
Press, 30 May 40, p. 6
Such things were highlights; generally
much solid effort lay behind the fairs and stalls and entertainments.
Also people paid for the war, willy nilly, through taxation. On
28 June 1940, under tall headlines, papers explained that the war
required £37,500,000 for the current year. Of this £20 million,
earmarked for use overseas, would be lent by Britain, the rest would
be raised in New Zealand. Already all persons over 16 years were
paying one shilling in every pound of wages, salary and other income
as social security tax; now they would pay a further shilling on every
such pound as national security tax.
From May 1942 until the end of the war national security tax increased to 1s 6d in the
pound.
Income tax, on all income
over £200, had been increased by 15 per cent for war purposes in
1939. This increment remained, and in addition the basic rate was
now 2s 6d in the pound instead of 2s, rising to 12s for individuals
and 8s 9d for companies. Sales tax doubled from five to ten per
cent.
Press, 28 Jun, 17 Jul 40, pp. 5, 8
Government policy was to pay for the war substantially out of
taxation and internal borrowing, methods which checked inflation—
despite full employment, overtime and more women being at work—
by reducing consumption of goods and services and lessening private
investment. Taxation over a wide field increased progressively, but
borrowing produced even more: special war taxation yielded £225
million up to March 1946, while £27 million of general taxation
was transferred to war purposes from the consolidated fund, but
borrowing in New Zealand provided £242 million. A further £53
million borrowed in the United Kingdom was progressively repaid,
with the final payment being made early in 1946.
Baker, p. 260. War finance is lucidly discussed by Baker, pp. 251–77
After 1939, a substantial internal loan was raised in each war
year, with two in 1942. Appeals were pushed with all the persuasions of speeches, radio talks, advertisements, posters, parades and
canvassing through trade unions, shops, factories and all places of
work. Progress reports on each loan were published in newspapers,
with some subscribers mentioned, both large and small; targets were
often surpassed. In 1940, some £10 million was raised by a compulsory loan. The idea was to make all who had means do what
some were doing voluntarily in the interest-free loan. The minimum
subscription was to be the equivalent of income tax for the year
ended 31 March 1939, decreased by £50 for individuals and £70
for companies. As security, stock was issued to mature in 1953 and
not to bear interest till October 1943. Only this loan was compulsory;
Ibid., pp. 265–6
patriotism and pressure sufficed for the rest.
To cater for small contributors, the National Savings Act in 1940
provided for the issue of 3-year and 5-year saving bonds of £1, £10
or £100 at three per cent interest, and for special savings accounts
with the post office and trustee savings banks, on two and three year
terms, also at three per cent. The scheme was launched, with strong
publicity, on 10 October 1940. In the early stages district targets
were announced, appealing to local loyalty and competition. Post
offices which attained their weekly quotas flew special flags, and
newspapers announced their success. Later, pressure was largely sustained through canvassing at the sources, through places of work,
persuading people to arrange for regular deductions from pay packets. By March 1946, National Savings investment had contributed
£40 million.
Ibid., p. 268
To sum up: ‘out of a total of £628 million, the people and
institutions of New Zealand had by 31 March 1946 made available,
by lending or in taxes paid, £494 million, or close to 80 per cent.
The balance was met by reciprocal aid arrangements and, to a minor
extent, by other receipts. There was no outstanding overseas debt as
a result of World War II.’
Ibid., p. 260
The first efforts to raise patriotic funds on a national scale were
similar to the fund-raising activities of the First World War, but
the Minister of Internal Affairs had requested delay: the government
would produce a scheme for national organisation, to avoid overlapping,
There were nearly 1000 different patriotic funds in existence in 1918. NZ Observer,
21 Sep 39, p. 7
waste and abuse. This scheme appeared early in October
1939. It was topped by the Minister himself, assisted by an advisory
council. A National Patriotic Fund Board would administer expenditure appropriate to a national body, notably all money spent on
troops overseas.
Funds would come partly from direct contributions, partly from
provincial councils. Eleven such councils were placed in general charge
of collection and of local expenditure. Their areas were those already
established for the national centennial celebrations long planned for
1940 and, to start with, the centennial committees were given the
new task of organising for patriotic funds, with authority to call on
other interested bodies or persons and to delegate collecting powers.
These extensions were obviously necessary, for as the Press of 9 October remarked, ‘Members admirably qualified for one service may
not be equally well qualified, or qualified at all, for the other.’
Army camps supplied only the necessities for living and training.
Recreation huts, libraries, sports equipment, band instruments and
all extra comforts in camps, forts, guarded points and on ships were
provided by patriotic funds, with bodies such as the YMCA, the
churches and Red Cross doing on-the-spot organisation. The bare,
rapidly growing camps were obvious and immediate targets for
patriotic bounty.
In November, in conference, the National Patriotic Fund Board
and the provincial councils worked out their respective responsibilities. The National Board would provide comforts for troops overseas, on ships and for prisoners-of-war. Also, in the home camps it
would erect, furnish and maintain recreation rooms run mainly by
the YMCA and Salvation Army. The provincial councils would set
up and maintain canteens and social rooms, such as the various
Welcome Clubs, in towns near camps. They would provide sports
equipment, band instruments, fruit for servicemen, and wool to be
knitted into socks, scarves and balaclavas. They would also make
small grants to bridge some needy gaps before a serviceman and his
dependents began receiving service pay, or before a discharged man
could obtain work or relief. It was established that the National
Board would provide for the sick and wounded, while the provincial
councils would build up reserves for the care of soldiers on their
return:
Press, 23 Feb 40, p, 12
in rehabilitation no one as yet was clear how much would
be done by central government, how much locally.
At first money was slowly given. There were many backward
glances to the stirring activity and generous giving of 1914, when
women went into action with fairs, Paddys’ markets, sales of work,
flag days, and concerts; when churches raised large sums, when flags
and livestock were auctioned, when hotels had collection boxes, and
district vied with district. Government regulations now restrained
would-be fund-raisers. All money collected had to go to the provincial authorities, which seemed very remote to small towns. For
instance patriotic committees at Otahuhu and Te Aroha explained
that their communities wanted their contributions to be handled by
a local authority, so that they could know how they were spent.
NZ Herald, 6. 13 Feb 40, pp. 9, 10
Some centennial committees moved rather stiffly in their new tasks,
ready money was not plentiful, and there was room for feeling that
patriotic giving was merely paying another tax, as one newspaper
correspondent put it.
Ibid., 4 Jan 40, p. 6
It was easy to point to public works or to the new £80,000 2ZB
radio station at Auckland and say that the government should spend
such money on its soldiers. Opposition to the ‘socialistic’ commandeer of goods for marketing overseas and to the check on price rises
by the price fixing tribunal was running high, and despite repeated
statements that the government itself would not handle patriotic
funds, the regulations seemed another State intrusion into a field
properly the concern of individuals.
Such opposition was fanned, or at least strongly voiced, by some
newspapers, probably as part of their general criticism of the government. Thus the New Zealand Herald on 3 January 1940 declared
that patriotic funds were disgracefully inadequate.
As described below, p. 151, a mid-December appeal had yielded less than £7,000 in
an initial period when £20,000 was expected.
In 1914, at a
comparable stage, Auckland province alone had raised more than
£50,000 for patriotic purposes, and £20,000 for Belgian relief. The
present organisation, designed to prevent small abuses, waste and
duplication, was blameless but barren. ‘Any faults in 1914, on the
other hand, were washed away in bountiful showers of cash.’ Organisation from Wellington and nominated local committees had taken
the heart out of a very human business, substituting a cold slab of
officialdom. Response would not fail if it were all put back into the
hands of the people. Let the districts go to work in their own way,
electing their own committees, devising ways and means subject to
popular will. Let there be recognition of district patriotism and desire
to have a voice in spending local money.
NZ Herald, 3 Jan 40
A Press report on 13 January
Press, 13 Jan 40, p. 12
similarly contrasted Canterbury’s
lavish giving in 1914 with current meagreness. Its editorial on 17
January said that the public missed the variety and energy of the
1914–18 collecting devices; appeals should have clear aims and the
prestige of established bodies like the Red Cross should draw money
to appropriate specific causes rather than to a general pool.
The Patriotic Fund scheme, however, had some early and reputable champions. The Associated Chambers of Commerce on 16
November suggested that the regulations had been misunderstood,
and urged warm support. The Governor-General, Lord Galway,
Moncton-Arundell, Lord George Vere Arundell, 8th Viscount Galway, GCMG, DSO,
QBE, PC (1882–1943): Gov Gen NZ 1935–41
president of the National Board, in his New Year speech answered
objections. He stressed that the money contributed would not be
handled by the government, as many seemed to believe, but by men
of known integrity on the National Board and provincial councils,
who were generously giving their services. The scheme was designed
to avoid overlapping and waste, ensuring that each shilling would
reach those for whom it was intended; anyone could earmark his
contribution for a particular purpose, such as the Red Cross, or the
YMCA.
NZ Herald, 2 Jan 40, p. 9
Already, for both national and local funds collectors were busy
with street collections and the like. For instance the Wellington
Provincial Council’s ‘very successful’ flag day on 8 December 1939
raised £1,235.
Evening Post, 9 Dec 39, p. 15
In mid-December the first national appeal, to provide comforts for the troops soon starting overseas, was launched.
Its organisers hoped for £20,000 in the first fortnight
Ibid., 14 Dec 39, p. 11
but it began
slowly, totalling £6,696 at New Year.
Press, 4 Jan 40, p. 6. This sum excluded an unknown amount from a postal seals
campaign.
It was to become known
as the Governor-General’s appeal, from his advocacy, and drew some
large contributions. Notably, T. H. Lowry
Lowry, Thomas Henry (d 1944aet 79): sheepfarmer, Okawa
of Hawke’s Bay repeated
a family effort in the last war by giving £10,000 for a recreation
hut in the main base camp overseas.
NZ Herald, 29 Jan 40, p. 8
This appeal eventually reached
about £55,000.
A to J1941, H–22A, p. 2
Meanwhile in mid-February 1940 another national appeal, known
as the Fighting Services Welfare Fund or the ‘Army Huts appeal’,
had begun, with the YMCA and the Salvation Army as collecting
agents, aiming at £100,000. In the first month it collected
£32,000;
Press, 16 Mar 40, p. 14
by May, with active collecting over, it had almost
£90,000 with some returns to come;
Gisborne Herald, 21 May 40, p. 4
eventually it reached
£104,000.
A to J1941, H–22A, p. 2
In Nelson, Otago, Invercargill, Westland, Motueka
and Whakatane there were no special campaigns for the appeal,
contributions being made instead from provincial patriotic funds,
Evening Post, 23 Mar 40, p. 12
thus presaging the methods of the future.
Statements on the purpose and methods of the patriotic scheme,
its working with existing nation-wide social welfare organisations
both as collecting and expending agencies, appeared in newspapers.
NZ Herald, 21 Feb 40, p. 10; Press, 23 Feb 40, p. 12
A letter by the Governor-General, widely published in
mid-March, asked the Prime Minister to remove from people’s minds
apparent doubts that money would be sent overseas.
Press, 15 Mar 40, p. 10
Response
however was still grudging in some places. In March collectors for
the YMCA-Salvation Army appeal were getting ‘a rough spin’, some
city business men refusing to see them, others putting them off with
‘a miserable five shillings’.
Ibid., 12 Mar 40, p. 10
Not surprisingly, there was rivalry between local and national
collectors. Local workers, anxious to concentrate on the needs of the
men in nearby camps and to build up resources for rehabilitating
them afterwards, resented centralised appeals skimming off the cream
of ready money in their districts. In April the Otago Council, for
instance, complained about national encroachments. The YMCA and
Salvation Army had had their appeal, the Red Cross and the Order
of St John were about to have another, there were appeals for the
Poles, for the Finns, for the Anglican Church; Otago might do well
to follow other councils in forbidding collections by outside organisations.
Otago Daily Times, 10 Apr 40, p. 8
In May, a conference decided that there would be no more
national appeals after the one just about to start; instead national
fund purposes would be supported by contributions from the provincial councils.
Evening Post, 11 May 40, p. 14
The Sick, Wounded and Distress Fund, run by the Red Cross
and the Order of St John, was launched on 12 May, at about the
same time as the blitzkrieg against the Low Countries and France.
New Zealand, shaken into a new mood, gave with a will. The target
of £250,000, larger than any so far, was passed in about five weeks;
the final figure was £746,451.
A to J1941, H–22A, p. 2
At the same time there was brisk
giving for Spitfires, and for the relief of London, themes treated in
later paragraphs.
In September 1940, a fresh start was made. Teething troubles
had been worked out in the reluctant ‘phoney war’ period, and
although the shock of the new war was subsiding, New Zealanders
were geared to give steadily. National purposes were to be supplied
by quotas, determined by population, from the provincial councils:
these, and agents appointed by them, became the sole collectors. A
new All-Purpose appeal for £1 million was launched, to provide a
year’s comforts for the fighting forces, rehabilitation for servicemen
and their dependents, and to relieve distress in Britain and other
affected places. The 11 provincial councils each had to raise a given
proportion of the £1 million: Auckland’s share was £250,000,
Southland’s £25,000, Wellington’s £200,000, with about half to
come from the metropolitan areas.
Evening Post, 16 Oct 40, p. 8; Press, 27 Feb 41, p. 8
Provincial councils in turn set
targets for centres within their districts. There was much publicity,
with statements of aims and channels, area quotas, progress reports
and exhortation to ‘give till it hurts—it is the least you can do’.
eg, Evening Post, 19, 20 Sep, 16, 21 Oct 40, pp. 13, 9, 8, 13
All the usual fund raising devices were used, from massive queen
carnivals to children’s concerts. Effort focused on various aspects and
sub-branches of the appeal at different times, to increase interest.
Some districts far exceeded their quotas: Wanganui, for instance,
doubled its, with £30,838.
Ibid., 23 Jul 41, p. 9
By August the target was exceeded
by £150,000.
Press, 15 Aug 41, p. 10
It was not easy for patriotic campaigners to raise money. There
was competition from the successive government loans raised to
finance the war, which drew off patriotic fervour and paid modest
interest. Some feeling persisted that the government should provide
the jam on the bread of service life instead of leaving it to the public.
For instance, some workers’ organisations in Dunedin explained that
they opposed all appeals on principle; they had no quarrel with
Patriotic Council members but they were ‘mutts’ to do the work of
collecting; if they refused, the government would have to conscript
the wealth of those who had it.
Otago Daily Times, 14 Apr 42, p. 4
In particular, it was felt that
collection for rehabilitation was out of place, but to this the secretary-general answered that these reserves were intended not for general
rehabilitation but for helping cases which no legislation could cover;
even 25 years after the previous war men were being helped by
funds raised in 1914–18.
Evening Post, 14, 15 Apr 43, pp. 4, 4
Expenditure objectives changed with the war. In the first year or
so recreation huts were a large item; later prisoners-of-war became
a major concern. By 1942 more than 6000 prisoners each needed a
weekly parcel costing £1. Clothing, books and an inquiry bureau
demanded further expenses. In that year Wellington’s quota of the
nation-wide £1 million appeal was £106,000, of which 40.5 per
cent was destined for the sick and wounded and prisoners-of-war;
21 per cent for relief of distress in Britain and elsewhere; 20 per
cent for service comforts in New Zealand and overseas; 14.25 per
cent for spiritual needs; 4.25 per cent for mobile canteens, administration expenses and contingencies.
Ibid., 4 May 42, p. 6
The collection targets set for 1942 proved to be too high for many
areas,
Ibid., 5 Mar, 14 Apr 43, pp. 5, 4
though others met and passed them. Dunedin, which in
June decided that direct giving had failed and resorted to a queen
carnival, run by Labour organisations, had by 22 August passed its
quota of £73,500 by £1,500, being the first of the main centres to
reach its goal.
NZ Herald, 23 Jun 42, p. 4; Otaga Daily Times, 24 Aug 42, p. 2
Te Aroha, by direct giving, over-subscribed its quota
of £8,600; Opotoki, with a population largely Maori, exceeded its
quota of £5,769 by £317.
NZ Herald, 19 Dec 42, p. 8, 8 Jan 43, p. 2
A conference in November, 1942 asked
the government to pay for POW food parcels and War Cabinet
agreed to do so, granting £340,000 for 1943.
Evening Post, 19 Nov 42, p. 3, 20 Jan 43, p. 4
This was a considerable relief for the fund-raisers; prisoners-of-war were to exceed
8000.
As an example of allocation, in 1943 for the Wellington provincial area the target was £205,410, to be collected from 10 zones
ranging from the Wellington metropolitan area, £100,651 (49 per
cent), through to the Wairarapa, £26,703 (13 per cent) and Wanganui and Feilding £18,487 (9 per cent) each to Taihape and Marton
£4,108 (2 per cent) each.
Dominion, 2 Mar 43, p. 4
This provincial total was allocated thus:
Ibid., 6 Mar 43, p. 4
National Patriotic Fund Board for overseas and work
of national character£173,580Provincial Patriotic Council’s normal requirements,
including £22,000 for parcels, £9,000 for wool
and money for entertainment, sports gear, service
clubs, etc.£42,000Welfare Fund£12,000Contingencies£6,000Outstanding accounts£15,942———£249,522less cash in hand at 30 Sep 194244,112———£205,410
At the same time the Otago Provincial Council was bent on raising
£70,000 for its National Patriotic Fund Board levy, being 8.7 per
cent of the national requirement, and £45,000 for its soldiers’ parcels, wool and welfare.
Evening Star, 1 Feb 43
Money came in from direct donations by persons, firms, trade
unions, employers’ associations, from collections and street appeals.
It came from patriotic shops and stalls and from special sales of
goods ranging from silver thimbles and old jewellery to paintings
and books more or less rare.
Late in 1942 donated books, paintings, prints, coins etc were auctioned at Dunedin,
Auckland and Wellington in the Churchill Auctions, so called because a leading item
Was a book entitled Divi Britannici (1675) written by an ancestor of Churchill and
autographed by both Churchill and Fraser. It sold for £350 and was then given to the
Wellington Public Library. These sales realised £3,000 in all; for an example of prices,
a fine copy of The New Zealanders by G. F. Angas (1847) fetched £46. Evening Post,
5, 6, 7 Nov 42, pp. 3. 4, 8
Many activities and entertainments,
ranging from chamber music concerts to university revues, race meetings and public sports gave their profits, and school children raised
money for soldiers’ parcels. Profits from some art unions were handed
over.
Ibid., 13 Aug 43, p. 4
Considerable sums came from the salvage of scrap. The
National Council for the Reclamation of Waste Materials, set up in
June 1940, organised 110 volunteer committees which over the war
years collected 27 250 tons of paper, 6014 tons of rubber, including
600 000 used tyres, 2170 tons of metal, mainly non-ferrous (such
as toothpaste tubes) but including some cast iron, five million glass
containers for re-use and 331 5001b of cleaning rags for the forces.
In all, these collections brought £51,485 to the provincial patriotic
councils.
Ibid., 20 Feb 46, p. 11
One way and another the organisers and collectors toiled on
towards their recurring targets and the public gave, some regularly,
some rarely. Annual gross expenditure of the central National Patriotic
Fund Board, exclusive of the provincial councils, marked the rise in
patriotic business: 1939–40, £233,737; 1940–1, £547,644; 1941–2,
£1,097,944; 1942–3, £1,601,725; 1942–4, £1,857,281; 1944–5,
£1,868,962; 1945–6, £995,684.
A to J1947, H–22A, p. 1
The wish to help Britain directly was evidenced by the warmth
of several mid-1940 drives: money for aeroplanes, for relief for London, clothing for refugees, homes for British children. Perhaps the
most clear-cut was the campaign for fighting aircraft.
The idea, propagated by Lord Beaverbrook,
Aitken, Hon William Maxwell, Kt(’ll); 1st Baron of Beaverbrook, New Brunswick
and Cherkley, Surrey (’16) (1879–1964): b Canada; MP (UK) 1910–16; Min Information 1918, Aircraft Production 1940–1, of State 1941, Supply 1941–2; Lord Privy
Seal 1942–5
British Minister for
Aircraft Production, was that £5,000
Or £6,250 in New Zealand currency. Nash, Evening Post, 23 Aug 40
would ‘pay for’ a fighter
and £20,000 for a bomber, and those who raised the money could
name the aircraft. It caught the public imagination. Captains of
industry and maharajahs gave very large sums, enough for several
Spitfires; some bereaved devoted parents gave enough for one; city
after city, town after town, colony after colony, started Spitfire Funds,
and so did all manner of institutions and organisations—newspapers,
factories, breweries, trades, sports and hobby clubs; there was even
a fund from women called Dorothy.
Turner, E. S., The Phoney War on the Home Front, pp. 291–2
Of course all this was not realised by New Zealanders, particularly
at the start, although the papers in June and July had several reports
of substantial Empire gifts. The idea of a money gift was first put
forward at the end of May 1940 when C. G. White,
White, Charles Gilbert, OBE(’46) (1880–1966): Dir Union Airways, TEAL; chmn
Dom Exec Joint Council St John & Red Cross 4 years during WWII
a director
of the Union Steam Ship Company, recalling Sir Joseph Ward’s
Ward, Rt Hon Sir Joseph, KCMG(’30), PC (1856–1930): b Aust, to NZ 1859; MP
(Lib) 1890–1919, 1925–30; Colonial Treasurer 1893–7, establishing State Advances
office 1894; various portfolios 1897 ff, introducing universal penny postage 1901; PM
1906–11, 1928–30, Deputy PM, Min Finance, National govt 1915–19
offer in 1909 of the battlecruiser HMS New Zealand, proposed some
large gesture of loyalty, say £1 million in cash or kind. He was
backed by Sir Charles Norwood,
Norwood, Sir Charles, Kt(’37) (1871–1966): b Aust, to NZ 1897; Mayor Wgtn
1925–7
motor magnate and civic figure
of Wellington, who said that such a sacrifice from New Zealand in
her present financial state would carry weight;
NZ Herald, 23, 24 May 40, pp. 10, 6
an old Scot wrote
that thousands of exiles would gladly give a day’s pay to help the
Motherland now and enclosed his £1, hoping that the New Zealand
Herald would put forward his appeal and that it would rise, like
Baden Powell’s
Baden Powell, Roberr Stephenson Smythe, 1st Baron Baden-Powell (1857–1941): British army officer; service India, Afghanistan, Ashanti, Matabeleland (including Mafeking);
founded Boy Scout Movement 1908 and with sister Agnes, Girl Guides
scouts, to millions.
NZ Herald, 24 May 40, p. 11. The Herald paid the £1 into the National Patriotic
Fund.
This theme of a plain cash present was not taken up, at any level,
but a week later the papers reported that the Nizam of Hyderabad
had given a further £50,000 to maintain the RAF squadron bearing
his name, for which he had paid £100,000 the previous October,
and that the Straits Times at Singapore had opened a fund to raise
£250,000 for a squadron of bombers.
Ibid., 1 Jun 40, p. 13; Evening Post, 31 May 40, p. 8
Some Evening Post correspondents, while doubting that New Zealand could equal the Nizam
or the Straits Times, suggested a fund here through which New
Zealanders could help to provide a squadron, one offering £10 in
appreciation of the RAF heroes and of ‘Cobber’ Kain,
Kain, Flying Officer Edgar James, DFC (1918–40): b Hastings; joined RAF1937; killed
in flying accident 1940; acclaimed Empire’s first air ace, credited with destruction of at
least 14 enemy aircraft in France, probably more
a New
Zealand RAF ace who had lately been killed in a crash.
Evening Post, 6, 10 Jun 40, pp. 10, 8
The Post
stated that others had strongly advocated such a fund but that it
was necessary first to obtain the sanction of the National Patriotic
Fund Board. It is clear that the government was not at first wholly
enthusiastic for a scheme that would bite into sterling funds, though
it later accepted public opinion. Nothing grew visibly from these
early Wellington suggestions. Fraser later said that the first proposal
to launch an appeal for a fighter aircraft came to him in June, by
telephone, from the Mayor of Taumarunui, who had deferred to
Fraser’s view that it all required more careful consideration.
NZ Herald, 6 Sep 40, p. 6
However, the idea struck sturdy roots in Southland, where on 18
June the Southland Times printed a letter from a woman suggesting
that patriotic funds, lately become substantial, should buy aircraft
and tanks from the United States for Britain; such funds would soon
be replaced and multiplied by New Zealanders just now awakening
to their danger. A few days later another Southlander, G. A. Hamilton,
Hamilton, George Alexander (d 1971aet 83): Southland farmer; Pres Southland Fed
Farmers 1935–7; brother of Adam Hamilton
wrote that winning the war was more urgent than rehabilitating soldiers or sending them socks. The war seemed likely to be
mainly at sea and in the air, therefore let some of the patriotic funds
buy aircraft and let New Zealanders fly them. ‘If our province could
purchase even one, and call it Southland, no doubt one of our Southland pilots would take great pride in it and his achievements would
become memories for us all’; other provinces might follow, and
‘should final victory be assisted by the gift of 1000 planes from
New Zealand the cost would be cheap indeed.’ He would contribute
£100 for a start;
Southland Times, 25 Jun 40, p. 3
he made it £500 a few days later. A flood of
supporting letters appeared, meetings were held, and a special committee, aiming at £25,000 to buy two Spitfires, sought government
permission.
Ibid., 4 Jul 40, p. 8; the cost of two Spitfires was reckoned at £21,000 (Otago Daily
Times, 20 Aug 40, p. 6); Southland raised this in eight weeks; ibid., 7 Sep 40, p. 4.
According to information supplied from London in 1977 a Spitfire cost £UK5,000, ie,
£NZ6,250, in 1940.
This was granted by 12 July, the Prime Minister
praising the splendid patriotic spirit while denying that such subscriptions would actually increase Britain’s air strength, as all Empire
factories were already working at full capacity. He declared the aircraft fund a proper patriotic purpose under the Regulations, and to
avoid conflicting appeals advised the provincial patriotic councils to
take up the various proposals being made, co-opting those taking
the initiative in the affair.
Evening Post, 12 Jul 40, p. 9
The urge to help an immediate fighting purpose, the magnificent
RAF men in their Spitfires, was breaking out all over the country.
On 3 July the Kauri district of Whangarei, rivalling Southland’s
lead and possibly ignorant of it, raised £161 in a stock drive, making
£250 to date, the nucleus of a fund for a bomber to be flown by
a Kauri airman.
Press, 5 Jul 40, p. 14; NZ Herald, 6 Jul 40, p. 10
The Auckland Chamber of Commerce on 4 July
proposed £1 million from sterling funds, or alternatively two or
three free cargoes, to be used for buying aeroplanes.
Press, 5 Jul 40, p. 14
The Christchurch RSA suggested that the NZRSA should present a fighter
named after Cobber Kain.
Ibid., 16 Jul 40, p. 6
During August Hawke’s Bay, Taranaki,
Auckland, Hamilton, Wellington and many other centres started
funds. At a smoke concert of the New Zealand Dairy Co-operative,
Hamilton, the proposal to buy an aircraft produced £500 in five
minutes, and more than £6,000 in the following fortnight.
NZ Herald, 17 Aug, 3 Sep 40, pp. 15, 6
On
29 August the Meat Producers Board decided to give £30,000 of
its accumulated £65,000 in appreciation of the RAF, and by 3 September the British government’s thanks for this gift were published.
Ibid., 30 Aug, 3 Sep 40, pp. 8, 6
The Women’s Division of the Farmers’ Union announced
their plans to buy a £20,000 bomber.
Wanganui Herald, 23 Aug 40, p. 6. They raised £5,000; Evening Post, 5 Dec 40, p. 14
There were critics. The newspaper Truth on 7 August noted with
misgiving Invercargill’s hopes that the scheme would spread and
produce £1 million for Britain’s aircraft. New Zealand’s London
funds had been increased with difficulty in the last two years, the
war had added problems, and Southland’s £20,000 could not seriously affect the funds. If the appeal were to sweep the country it
might, said Truth, create troubles and its supporters might regret
the money lost to New Zealand’s own soldiers abroad. A forthright
expression of hostility came from the Wellington Provincial Patriotic
Council, which said that the appeal was exploiting the patriotic
feelings of New Zealanders and depleting sterling funds to no good
purpose while local appeals were being neglected.
Evening Post, 29 Aug 40, p. 13
An NZRSA
spokeman thought it useless and a drain on general funds.
Ibid.
The
president of the New Zealand Workers Union at Waitara was not
enthusiastic about Spitfires, thinking that free meat and cheese would
be better for Britain, while New Zealand, being in greater danger
than ever before, needed to concentrate on home defence.
Taranaki Dally News, 30 Aug 40, p. 3
The Minister of Finance checked any wildness by announcing on
17 August that only £100,000 would be remitted to the British
government. Echoing Fraser, he warned that this sum would not,
despite the splendid spirit behind it, provide any additional aeroplanes, while using money otherwise available for war expenditure
overseas. The appeal would close on 30 September and any surplus
would go towards New Zealand’s share in the Empire Air Training
Scheme.
Southland Times, 17 Aug 40, p. 4; for Empire; Air Training Scheme, see Thompson,
H. L., New Zealanders with the Royal Air Force, vol I, pp. 209–11
This curb caused some protest: for instance the Mayor of Palmerston North telegraphed asking Nash to review his decision and
devote the whole amount to the purpose for which it was given.
Wanganui Herald, 26 Aug 40, p. 8
A few published letters asked, should we not help to win the war
now rather than accumulate funds to be used when the war was
won for us by others, for what would it profit to have sterling in
London if we lost London?
Otago Daily Times, 30 Aug 40, p. 4; NZ Herald, 5 Sep 40, p. 12; Evening Post,
3 Sep 40, p. 6
A few editorials defended the idea of
sharing in the cost of the air war, of taking part of the financial
burden from British shoulders.
Evening Post, 21, 29 Aug 40
Support for the Spitfire fund was lively and widespread. Newspapers collected, publishing subscriptions: some were large—the
Evening Post had an anonymous gift of £5,000–but many were
small amounts, like ‘Hostel girls, £2; Kelburn Croquet Club, £16.5s;
Mum, Petone, £1.’
Ibid., 30 Sep 40, p. 8
Mayors, Rotary clubs and local patriotic committees used all the numerous devices of the New Zealand community bent on raising money: 16 farmers on Waiheke Island sold
32 cattle raising £160;
NZ Herald, 6 Sep 40, p. 6
sports clubs donated, there were raffles,
entertainments, sales. New Zealand Herald readers gave more than
£33,000 between 17 August and 12 September. The appeal, except
in Otago, closed on 30 September. Otago, preoccupied until
November with a long-planned Queen Carnival for other patriotic
funds, then began its Spitfire Fund, which closed on the following
1 February with £10,587.
Meanwhile on 5 December it was announced that the aircraft fund
from the provinces (excluding Otago) then totalled £102,940, and
some special sums—£7,500 from the New Zealand Co-operative
Dairy Company, £5,000 from the Women’s Division of the Farmer’s Union, £30,000 from the Meat Producers’ Board and £158
from Niue Island—gave in all £145,600. Further, the government
had decided to give the whole amount to the purchase of 23 fighter
aircraft, attributed and named thus: North Auckland, 1; Auckland,
5; Waikato, 1; Taranaki, 1; Hawke’s Bay, 2; Wellington, 3; Marlborough–Westland–Nelson, 1; Canterbury, 2; Southland, 3; New
Zealand, 3; Country Women of New Zealand, 1.
Press, 6 Dec 40, p. 4
It was not
explained why £45,000 more than the limit fixed by Nash in August
was being handed over. Possibly complaints about the government
not allowing money subscribed for special purposes to leave the
country may have been influential. For instance, the Hawke’s Bay
Patriotic Council wanted assurance that surpluses from appeals would
not go into the Consolidated Fund or be used for government purposes; one mayor stated that he had not opened a fighter aircraft
appeal because he believed that the money was going into the
Consolidated Fund, not into Spitfires.
Auckland Star, 25 Sep 40, p. 9
TheObserver on 2 October
said ‘the surplus is being brazenly collared by the government to
help with its own defence organisation’.
Lord Beaverbrook responded gratifyingly, speaking for the whole
British nation, and for freedom-lovers every land: ‘Our hearts are
uplifted, our spirits fortified, by this magnificent gesture of support.
You enable us to strike even harder blows at the evil forces of Nazi
and Fascist aggression, bringing nearer the day when the hosts of
Hitler and his Italian jackal will forever bite the dust. …’
Press, 6 Dec 40, p. 8
Early in March the last instalment of £11,160, largely from Otago,
was sent to Britain, making a total of £156,776 in New Zealand
currency.
Evening Post, 8 Mar 41, p. 11 [sic. £156,767]
This was applauded in the BBC series ‘London Calling’,
which said that the money would buy a squadron of 25 Spitfires,
New Zealand’s own, flown and serviced by New Zealanders and
bearing the names listed earlier, plus two called ‘Otago’.
Ibid., 5 Apr 41, p. 11
In fact,
485 (New Zealand) Squadron RAF had been established in March
and equipped with Spitfires: at the start of May were published the
names of 20 pilots picked to fly these aircraft,
Press, 2 May 41, p. 10
and a month later
came news of the squadron’s first kill, by its leader, M. W. B.
Knight,
Knight, Group Captain M. W. B. DFC, Legion of Merit (US), RAF: b Dannevirke1916; joined RAF1935, cmd No 485 (NZ) Squadron from 1941
of Dannevirke.
Evening Post, 7 Jun 41, p. 9
It was not until the Squadron was re-equipped in 1942 with an improved type of Spitfire that the fighters
could be regarded as being provided by New Zealand.
Thompson, p. 212
The Spitfire Fund was not the only exotic appeal to flourish in
the dark days of 1940. The Lord Mayor of London’s appeal for
help, answered by the British public and by Commonwealth countries, drew both clothes and cash from New Zealand. The Red Cross
Society had earlier made known the plight of refugees in Poland,
Finland, Norway, and in the first nine months of the war had sent
off more than 300 cases of clothing, mainly for women and children.
Evening Post, 8 Jun 40, p. 13
In June, when thousands of refugees were pouring into Britain, Lady Galway launched her Guild to collect, repair and pack
clothes for them, and soon in every town mayoresses headed branches
of the Guild.
NZ Herald, 13 Jun 40, p. 11
As the Battle of Britain developed in August, to
the refugees from Europe were added thousands of bombed-out British people, homeless, bereft of possessions. The Guild and the Red
Cross redoubled their efforts; postmen, Boy Scouts and other volunteers collected clothing, women sewed and sorted and tons of
clothes were shipped away.
Otago Daily Times, 7 Aug 40, p. 6
The National Patriotic Fund Board in September 1940 voted
£100,000 to London relief, £10,000 to come from the over-subscribed Sick, Wounded and Distress appeal, and the government
immediately sanctioned the whole transmission, confident that the
payout would soon be made good. Response was wide and strong,
speedily outstripping area quotas. Newspapers ran collections, publishing contributors’ names and stirring articles: thus the Auckland
Star of 14 September wrote of the fiendish attack by the soulless
air force that Hitler and his scum had launched on the afflicted
people of London, whose fortitude and endurance were as much a
part of the fight for deliverance from serfdom as were the magnificent
courage and self sacrifice of the fighting men. The Star’s, appeal in
two weeks brought in £22,628
Auckland Star, 30 Sep 40
and Auckland province gave more
than £30,000, though its quota was only £8,000. For Wellington
province the quota was £5,075, but by 10 October £11,242 had
been paid in.
Evening Post, 25 Sep, 10 Oct 40, pp. 11, 7
There was strong feeling that money given for this
purpose should not be diverted to any other,
Ibid., 30 Sep 40
so it was decided
to keep the surplus apart and remit it later for the relief of other
bombed British towns as well as London.
Auckland Star, 2 Oct 40. p. 10
Another £100,000 was
sent in June 1941.
Evening Post, 5 Jun 41, p. 10
Over the years, often through the international
Red Cross, New Zealand’s national patriotic funds contributed goods
and money to the relief of distress in many countries. By March
1943, amounts exceeding £283,000 had been sent: £7,000 to much-bombed Malta, £2,500 to Belgium, £6,726 to France, £28,750 to
Russia, £10,500 to Greece, £622 to Norway, £20,377 to Poland
and £206,834 to London.
Auckland Star, 3 Apr 43, p. 6
Children from London and other centres likely to be bombed had
been partially evacuated in the early days of the war. When the
expected bombing did not happen many returned, but as danger
loomed higher they were again sent forth to remoter areas of England
and Scotland. Some parents privately sent their children to places
thought safe in England, or abroad, many going to Canada and the
United States. The idea was widespread of large numbers of children
going overseas, for safety and decent, unafraid living, leaving Britain
more free to concentrate on fighting.
In New Zealand it was brought forward by T. W. Hercock,
Hercock, Thomas William, OBE(’46) (1889–1965): Mayor Napier 1938–50
Mayor of Napier, which city still remembered that other centres had
helped by taking in its women and children when it was wrecked
by earthquake in 1931. At the end of May, Hercock telegraphed
50 other mayors, asking them to petition the government to offer
hospitality and, if necessary, permanent adoption in private homes
to 25 000 British children: there was likely to be a food shortage
in Britain, and New Zealand could offer happier conditions, each
district sharing in the task, with government help in organising and
making arrangements with Britain. The suggestion had already been
voiced in mid-May by W. E. Barnard, MP for Napier, at a Democratic Labour meeting in Wellington.
Dominion, 16 May 40, p. 11
Hercock explained that
C. Williams
Williams, Charles W.: Napier resident from birth, one of city’s oldest residents; d 1953
of Napier had been working on the idea for eight
months.
Hawke’s Bay Daily Mail, 30 May 40, p. 8
Williams had proposed it to the government soon after the outbreak of war but, as he later wrote, ‘the people of Britain were not
ready to part with their children, and we here were not ready to
receive them.’
Williams to Min Int Aff, 8 Nov 40, IA 173/1, pt 3
The government then was dubious, but learned
through the High Commissioner in London that a Children’s Overseas Reception Committee had been set up, chaired by Geoffrey
Shakespeare,
Shakespeare, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey, PC, 1st Baron (’42) (1893–1980): MP (UK)
1922–3, 1929–45; Parly Sec Min Health 1932–6, Bd Educ 1936–7; Parly & Financial
Sec Admlty 1937–40, Dept Overseas Trade 1940, Parly Under-Sec State Dom Aff &
chmn Children’s Overseas Reception Bd 1940–2
the Under-Secretary for the Dominions, to inquire
into and accept such offers from the Dominions and the United
States.
Report to Committee on Homes for British Children, 22 Nov 40, p. 1, IA 146/1
In June 1940, public response was warm and on the 22nd the
New Zealand government offered to take, in the first instance, 2500
children, adding that the maximum limit would be the country’s
ability to provide for them. Meanwhile as the threat grew, British
parents by 5 July applied to send 200 000 children abroad; for
about 20 000 New Zealand was preferred,
Ibid., p. 9
although no authority,
British or overseas, had any intention of mass emigration, only of
a safe refuge for a limited number on a well-ordered plan.
Bay of Plenty Beacon, 28 Jun 40, quoting statement by Under-Secretary for the Dominions
The British committee, which alone selected the children, aimed
to send a cross-section of the community. Where possible, parents
should pay 6s to 9s or more a week, according to their means,
towards the cost of organisation and fares, but no child would be
excluded solely on account of its parents’ inability to pay. The New
Zealand government refused any of this money for the foster parents,
who would maintain the children as part of their effort to assist
Britain. The children should be healthy, between 5 and 16 years,
and would stay only for the duration of the war. Mothers would
not come with them,
Some mothers in reception areas in Britain had proved to be a tougher problem than
the children.
except for approved widows of servicemen
of this war who would promise to take jobs in New Zealand.
In New Zealand, organisation was undertaken by the Child Welfare branch of the Education Department and the Local Government
branch of the Department of Internal Affairs, working through local
committees. On 25 June it was announced that for this purpose
there were 26 zones in the country, in each of which one local
authority (ie, city, borough or county council) was selected as the
zone authority, which would appoint a zone committee of, say, the
mayor, a Child Welfare officer, ministers of religion, and social
workers. It would also arrange for the setting up of similar local
committees within its area. Would-be foster parents applied to these
committees, which had the exacting task of deciding whether or not
they were suitable. Tactful vigilance was needed to ensure that there
was no intention of exploiting the children, that the homes were of
good average standard, handy to schools and not too crowded, that
the foster parents were not too elderly and that they could adequately
maintain their guests—for sometimes enthusiasm outran means. At
the outset it was assumed that ministers of religion could readily
advise on these points but, as a Timaru clergyman pointed out, quite
a lot of applicants were not known to any ministers, and he doubted
if his brethren were fitted to be investigation officers judging homes
on one visit.
Timaru Herald, 10 Jul 40, p. 6
Inevitably a good deal of this responsibility fell on
the Child Welfare branch. The local lists of approved homes were
sent to the zone committees and thence, summarised, to Internal
Affairs which, with the Education Department, decided on quotas
to districts. When the children arrived, the zone committees settled
who would go to which home. In these committees, Child Welfare
officers had decisive roles, being in effect the final guardians of every
child guest, reporting on each once a term. It was hoped that the
local committees would also maintain contact with them.
A suggestion from the Mayor of Sydney to Hercock that French
and other allied children, perhaps with their mothers, should be
included, as they needed help more desperately than did British
children at the moment, was not taken up: New Zealanders were
wary of foreigners.
Hawke’s Bay Daily Mail, 12 Jun 40, p. 7
At first it was intended to keep children for
each area together for a few days while they became acquainted with
their new environment and with their foster-parents. Some obvious
difficulties were plainly voiced by the Whangarei zone committee:
it would lead to ‘picking and choosing’, bad feeling and uncertainty,
while one man likened it to ‘herding them in a compound in which
people picked their slaves’.
North Auckland Times, 2 Jul 40
This arrangement was changed, the
children going direct from railway stations to homes.
Many factors were weighed in making allocations. Members of
families were to be kept together as much as possible; friends should
be able to attend the same school; the children should go to families
of their own religion and preferably of their parents’ occupational
background, while their age and sex should fit in with the other
children in the family. Some of these things could be known only
when the children actually arrived and, as security forbade advance
notice of their arrival, final allocations had to be quickly made.
Late in June it was known that the British authorities desired
that children who had friends or relatives wanting them in New
Zealand should go to them rather than to strangers.
Evening Post, 27 Jun 40, p. 13
Relatives
wrote to Internal Affairs asking for particular children and, through
the High Commissioner in London, the parents were asked if they
wished to send these children to them. The Department was flooded
with applications, 1000 within three days.
NZ Herald, 5 Jul 40, p. 8
It was not thought
necessary to inspect homes in these cases, as the parents themselves
would consent. Actually, many parents of these ‘nominated’ children
did not wish them to come to New Zealand. There were also applications from England for children to go to friends or relatives, some
of whom could not receive them.
On 12 July, after the loss off Ireland of the Andora Star, drowning
1100 interned aliens and their guards on their way to Canada, the
British government announced that sending children overseas must
be postponed until naval escorts could be provided. Further, Churchill admitted: ‘It was not foreseen that the mild countenance given
to the policy would lead to a movement of such dimensions, or that
a crop of alarmist and depressing rumours would follow at its tail.’
Any large-scale exodus was most undesirable and, in view of the
relative dangers between going and staying, he did not think that
the military situation required or justified it.
Ibid., 20 Jul 40, p. 12
In New Zealand it
was held that the children would still come, perhaps several hundred
at a time, under convoy. Preparations for securing the maximum
number of approved homes went ahead, and at the end of August
the government could report that there was accommodation for
10 000 children: 1844 families had nominated 3564 children, and
5800 other homes would welcome 6500 strangers.
Ibid., 30 Aug 40, p. 10
It was decided
that foster-children would rate as family members for income-tax
purposes, but not for assessing military service liability; in approved
cases family benefit would be paid; the New Zealand Dental Association offered free treatment, where clinic and hospital services did
not suffice; hospitals would give out-patient treatment free to British
children.
There was genuine zest to help Britain and to comfort children
whose homes were or might soon become heaps of rubble. People
who could not be soldiers, whose work did not involve them in the
war, felt that here there was something they could do, simultaneously satisfying both their kindly and their loyal impulses, while for
once remoteness from the gunfire made New Zealand more effective.
Response was particularly strong in some country districts; at Morrinsville, for instance, 59 families offered to take in 70 children.
Ibid., 3 Jul 40, p. 12
Some people whose own children were grown up turned warmly to
the idea of a new little one, or two; some wanted a companion for
only or lonely children; some felt that they could cheerfully cope
with another young nipper anyway. There were few misgivings: when
a doubtful zone member wondered about slums and the influence
of a young Bill Sykes on other children, he was told ‘they are British
children and that is all that matters’, that people with such worries
should not concern themselves with the scheme, and that a good
home might influence young Bill Sykes.
Press, 2 Jul 40, p. 8
Some districts expressed
a strong preference for girls.
Wanganui Herald, 1 Jul 40, p. 6; Hawke’s Bay Daily Mail, 10 Jul 40, p. 6; Rotorua
Morning Post, 29 Aug 40; Press, 3 Sep 40, p. 8
Perhaps this was due to fear of young
Bill Sykeses, or to belief that girls would be gentler, more manageable than boys; perhaps to feeling that girls especially should be
protected from war.
In the two shipments of children in 1940, there were 82 girls and 120 boys
Some wanted to adopt children permanently,
Taranaki Herald, 5 Jul 40; Taranaki Daily News, 10 Jul 40, p. 6; Hawke’s Bay Herald-Tribune, 4 Jul 40
dreading to lose
them after a few years, and forgetting that as yet, except in orphanages, there were very few British children who had lost both parents.
A few newspapers held that ‘orphans are best’, for they would remain
as citizens, compensating for ‘the sluggish birthrate’.
Truth, 3 Jul 40, p. 11; NZ Observer, 26 Jun 40, p. 6; Palmerston NorthTimes,
3 Jul 40, p. 6
Only one or
two citizens publicly remarked on the keenness to adopt British
orphans while local institutions held plenty of unsought New Zealand
children.
NZ Herald, 14 Jun 40, p. 10
There were proposals for a national patriotic fund devoted
to British children, for assistance with clothing through the Lady
Galway Guild, and there were offers of some large houses as special
homes where children might be kept together and where people who
were unable to take a child could contribute to their upkeep.
Timaru Herald, 11 Jul 40, p. 10
The term, ‘Little Britons’, emanating from Wellington,
Evening Post, 28 Jun 40, p. 8
was
warmly and widely used to avoid ‘refugee children’ and ‘child evacuees’, which were unpleasant and inaccurate. Government departments, however, fearing that the habit of contracting official
designations might reduce Little Britons to LBs, ‘which suggests
possible variants of an offensive character’, stuck firmly to ‘British
children’.
Report of Interdepartmental Committee on Homes for British Children, nd, IA 146/1
At last, on 27 September 1940, a ship brought 89 Scottish children to Wellington. They were welcomed by all the important people,
the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, the Mayor, the
British High Commissioner, heads of departments. They were
photographed, they were declared—and looked—a very fine lot.
Thirty-one were girls. Relatives claimed 35; of the rest, 10 went to
Masterton, 10 to Palmerston North, 10 to Lower Hutt and 24 to
Wellington. They were billeted in children’s homes for a day or two
while individual allocations were made by the local committees,
assisted by the escorts of the ship journey.
Evening Post, 28 Sep 40, p. 13
A week later, a further 113 children arrived at Wellington from
all over England, and were similarly welcomed. Of this party, 51
were girls.
Timaru Herald, 5 Oct 40, p. 8
Sixty-eight children went to relatives scattered over
New Zealand and from the rest, four were allocated to Wellington,
10 to Dunedin, 15 to Christchurch and 16 went to Auckland, where
homes were selected by ballot from the hundreds available.
NZ Herald, 8 Oct 40, p. 9
On 23 September, it was reported that from a Canada-bound
ship, City of Benares, sunk by a U-boat in bad weather, 294 people
had been lost, including 83 children. On 2 October, the British
government announced that with winter gales and heavy seas in the
Atlantic it would not take the responsibility of sending any more
children abroad in the official scheme at present; so far, 2650 had
gone under this scheme, while many others had gone privately.
Evening Post, 3 Oct 40, p. 12
New Zealand’s High Commissioner in London explained further
that the Admiralty was reluctant to provide the special escorts needed
by child-carrying ships. Since the sinking of the City of Benares,
another ship had actually embarked children, but she was recalled
and the children went back to their homes.
NZHC, London to Min Internal Aff, 29 Oct 40, IA 173/1/1
It was announced on 11 October that with approved homes listed
for 10 000 children, no further offers would be accepted until the
scheme was re-opened.
Evening Post, 12 Oct 40, p. 12
It had not been re-opened before Japan’s
entry to the war totally precluded it. Indeed, anxious British parents
were assured that while city populations were not fleeing inland
ahead of attack, country areas were preparing to receive them if
necessary, while trenches and shelters were being prepared in school
grounds.
UKHC to Sec Dom Aff, 29 Jan 42, IA 178/247
Meanwhile Child Welfare officers learned that their care was
needed by nominated children—those in homes approved by their
parents—no less than by those sent to strangers, and decided that
in future such homes would also be inspected. By December 1940
about 40 of the total 202 children had been transferred to different
homes, for various reasons—such as expense, or relatives asking for
them after arrival; a very few for objections to the conduct of the
children, and a few because certain homes, though satisfactory in
other respects, proved unsuitable for particular children. In 1943–4
there were 41 more transfers, mainly for ill-health in foster parents
or to facilitate employment or extended education for the children.
Report of Superintendent of Child Welfare, 20 Dec 40, IA 173/1/1; A to J1943,
E–4, p. 3, 1944, E–4, p. 6
Guardianship of all the children was vested in the Superintendent
of Child Welfare, who kept in touch with his charges both directly
and through district officers who regularly visited both schools and
foster-parents. Apart from the death of one 16-year-old girl reported
in 1944–5,
A to J1945, E–4, p. 7
annual departmental reports told of continuing good
health, buttressed by free attention from doctors and dentists. In
general, the children adapted happily to their new situations and
did well at school. ‘On the whole, their educational attainment is
very satisfactory, and there are a few who show exceptional ability’,
wrote the Superintendent in 1944.
Ibid., 1944, E–4, p. 6
During 1941 a few left school to take up approved positions, but
all were encouraged to pursue education as far as possible. By 1945,
about 12 of the older boys and girls had returned to Britain, eight
to join the forces. Only 38 children were still in primary schools,
mainly in the upper classes, though there were still half a dozen in
Standards II and III; 71 were in post-primary schools, and in all
32 had passed the University Entrance examination. Of the 82 who
had left school, eight were full-time students at university, seven
were at teachers’ training colleges, three of them already probationary
teachers; 14 boys were farming, 10 were in various engineering jobs,
seven girls were nursing, one boy was sign-writing, two were in the
New Zealand Navy, about 22 boys and girls were in banks, insurance offices, the Public Service and other office work, and the rest
were in shops, domestic work or dressmaking; ‘quite a few’ were
attending night classes in various subjects and eight were at university part-time.
Ibid., 1945, E–4, pp. 7–8
From the start it was assumed that the children would return to
Britain, and they were encouraged to keep in touch with their parents.
A cable company arranged for each child once a month to send a
free cable of a pre-arranged text to the parents,
Evening Post, 12 Oct 40, p. 12
and full use was
made of this concession.
A to J1945, E–4, p. 8
Also, there were arrangements for parents
to broadcast messages to their children at regular hours, the children
being advised by letter a few days ahead in each case.
Evening Post, 6 May 41, p. 5
As soon as
fighting ceased 145 children returned, in three main groups, but in
March 1946 46 were still in New Zealand, staying on to finish
examination courses, or until their parents could come and join them.
A few had declared that they would remain regardless of their
parents.
A to J1946, E–4, p. 14
In July 1940, when the idea of Britain becoming an island fortress, with children evacuated to remote areas or overseas, was at its
height, parents of nearly 200 000 children applied for them to be
fostered overseas. Commonwealth governments had by then offered
to take 20 000 children, while indicating that this figure could be
greatly increased.
Extract from House of Commons official report of 16 July 1940 on Children’s Overseas
Reception Scheme, read by the British High Commissioner, Sir Harry Batterbee, at a
meeting of British Children Reception Committee, Wellington, 4 Sep 40, IA 146/1
As stated above, New Zealand at the end of
August had homes listed ready to take 10 000 children. In the event
just over 200 came: only they themselves could really judge the
success of the enterprise, but it seems clear that it was attended with
much sustained goodwill.
CHAPTER 5
Pacifism
ALTHOUGH pacifism was not a subject on which many New
Zealanders thought often or clearly, it had two distinct sources.
First, there was a small but sturdy stream of religious thought, stemming from the war of 1914–18 and running strongly through the
churches, especially the Methodist Church and especially among their
young members. This can be traced back to a Student Christian
Movement conference at Woodville in 1913–14, where a travelling
Quaker speaker caught the minds of several. One, H. R. Urquhart,
Urquhart, Henry Ritchie (1879–1963)
thereafter set forth in Men and Marbles (1917) and many other
pamphlets that war could not be reconciled with Christianity. He
was gaoled for a year, lost citizenship rights for 10 years, and came
to be known as the father of Christian Pacifism in New Zealand.
Shocked by the khaki election in 1918, I surrendered to Henry Urquhart while still in
uniform’, wrote Ormond Burton to author, 31 May 1968
Increasingly at Student Christian Movement conferences during the
1920s and 1930s pacifist discussions roused deep interest, while
pacifists came to know and strengthen each other.
Ideas expressed in Britain were the second source of pacifist
thought, appealing not only to people of religion but to a broad
spectrum of those holding socialist and humane ideals. In Britain
during the late 1920s the tide of pacifism ran very strongly, in
1929–30 producing—and being augmented by—books telling of
slaughter without achievement in a war run on both sides by fools
and knaves: notably Richard Aldington’s Death of a Hero, Ernest
Hemingway’s Farewell to Arms, Richard Baker’s Medal without Bar,
and, most moving of all, Erich Remarque’s translated All Quiet on
the Western Front, from which an American film was made which
some found even more haunting than the book. During the 1930s,
anti-war writing, both imaginative and documentary, continued, with
Beverley Nichols’s expose, Cry Havoc (1933), probably the most
widely read. The Depression, which shook faith in the established
order and its leaders, while showing how unwanted war heroes could
become, swelled the tide. In March 1933 at Oxford more than 250
élite young Englishmen declared that they would not fight for King
and country; in October 1934 Canon Dick Sheppard’s
Sheppard, Very Rev Hugh Richard Lawrie (1880–1937): Hon Chaplain to HM
1912–29, Chaplain in France1914; Dean Canterbury 1912–29, Canon and Precentor
St Paul’s Cathedral from 1934
Peace Pledge
Union began to gather its 150 000 members totally renouncing war.
In June 1935 the results of the Peace Ballot taken eight months
earlier showed that more than 11 million Britons wanted continued
membership of the League of Nations, nearly 10½ million wanted
international armament reduction, more than 10 million supported
non-military sanctions against an aggressor, while more than 6½
million would if necessary take military action against aggression.
The idea of collective security was replacing absolute pacifism, but
people were thinking more about negotiation and economic pressure
than of international armed forces.
Other indications of this shifting mood were such books as Robert and Barbara Donington’s The Citizen Faces War (1936), and articles like C. E. M. Joad’s ‘Pacifism is not
enough’ in News Chronicle, 3 Apr 36, and Ritchie Calder’s ‘Peace or pacifism?’ in LondonHerald, 30 Jul 36.
New Zealand echoes of all this were faint and belated. Perhaps
one index of public feeling on war and peace may be found in Anzac
Day speeches. These began in 1916, a year after New Zealand troops
were first tested in the sacrificial fires of Gallipoli, establishing a
reputation and a self-regard which they were to sustain through at
least two wars. Later, Anzac Day became a strict Sunday-type holiday, a day for remembering all New Zealanders dead or maimed,
for telling children of effort and sacrifice and inspiring them in turn
towards unselfish service. Speakers of the early 1920s were certain
that the British Empire had fought in a righteous cause, but it was
the war to end war, and the sacrifices of the dead imposed social
obligations on the living. Thus in 1922, General Richardson
Richardson, Major-General Sir George, KBE(’26), CB(’17), CMG(’15), Legion d’Honneur, Belgian Croix de Guerre (1869–1938): b England; into Royal Artillery1887;
instructor and Dir Artillery NZ Military Forces 1891–1911; NZ rep IGS at UK War
Office 1914, QMG Naval Div Gallipoli; GOC Admin, GOC NZ forces in England
1917; GOC Admin in NZ 1919–23; Administrator Western Samoa 1923–8; on return
to NZ member Auck City Council
said
that a man did not need a uniform to serve his country.
Evening Post, 26 Apr 22, p. 8
We should
go forward to our duty, seeking to sweeten life for the community,
said an Australian Gallipoli chaplain, ‘Fighting Mac’ (Colonel
W. Mackenzie), in 1926, adding that in the day of trial we should
acquit ourselves like men.
Ibid., 26 Apr, 26, p. 10
Many spoke like the Mayor of Christchurch who in 1924 said, ‘May we all prove worthy of what has
been done for us, by placing the interests of the community before
those of self, and making the Dominion a sweeter and better place
for those who will come after us.’
Press, 26 Apr 24, p. 9
There were, of course, a few like
Massey
Massey, Rt Hon William Ferguson, PC (1856–1925): b Ireland, to NZ 1870; MP (Cons)
Franklin, from 1893; PM, Min Lands, Agriculture, Labour 1912–25 (inc Nat govt
1915–19)
who wanted defence maintained so that the British Empire,
specially chosen by a Higher Power, might be handed on in growing
strength for the benefit of peace and mankind,
Press, 26 Apr 23, pp. 13–14
but as early as 1924
a member of Parliament thought that the reign of peace would be
helped if all governments prevented the manufacture of munitions
by private enterprise.
T. M. (later Sir Thomas) Wilford, Evening Post, 26 Apr 24, p. 13
About 1930, there was a notable cry against war and for the
League of Nations. One lieutenant-colonel in 1931 urged training
college students to let their charges know something of the horrors
of war—of the world’s 10 million dead, with nearly as many disabled; of the crippled, the unsightly, the mad; of the overwhelming
economic disruption—in order to bring them firmly behind the League of Nations.
Lt-Col W. T. Austin, Evening Post, 27 Apr 31, p. 5
A Salvation Army speaker, after saying that war
was hell and settled nothing, regretted that the Motherland, while
commendably forgiving war debts, had lately been spending £200
a minute on armaments and 2½d on peace.
Brigadier C. Walls, MC, ibid., 26 Apr 32, p. 5
Another churchman
prayed that hearts would revolt not only against the horrors of war
but against the greater horrors that cause wars.
Canon P. James, Dominion, 26 Apr 35, p. 12
In the educational field, also, this shift of feeling was recorded
by the New Zealand School Journal where, between 1929 and 1933,
accounts of Empire glory and sacrifice were succeeded by articles
outspoken on the horror and waste of war.
Jenkins, D. & S., Social Attitudes in the School Journal, p.24
In 1930 the successors
to Massey’s party suspended military training largely as an economy
measure, but the Minister of Defence spoke of strong feeling everywhere for world peace and against militarism.
Towards the end of 1935 a writer in Tomorrow remarked on the
growth of anti-war sentiment ‘of the most mixed, the most diverse,
frequently the most contradictory character.’ Pacifists, supporters of
the League of Nations, revolutionary socialists, ultra-left critics of
communism, even supporters of Britain’s imperialism, were jostling
one another for leadership of the anti-war movement.
Tomorrow, vol II, 6 Nov 35, p. 5
Another gauge
of the anti-war climate of the mid-Thirties is provided by Colonel
T. W. McDonald, an ardent wartime watch-dog of patriotism. Being
a candidate in the 1935 election, he was asked if he favoured conscription, and replied ‘No, I am dead against conscription. Conscription means lives, and the first thing I say should be conscripted
is wealth.’
Evening Post, 12 Nov 35, p. 7
A New Zealand section of the League of Nations Union arrived
modestly, to enlist support for the League’s policy. Though the League proposed, as a last resort, collective force against aggression,
people thought of it primarily as a means of avoiding war through
arbitration and economic pressure. In 1922 there were seven local
branches of the section and a Dominion body was set up. It was a
numerically small, élitist group with a core of about 2500 supporters
and its office holders were highly respectable.
Attwood, B. M., ‘Apostles of Peace: the New Zealand League of Nations Union’, research
essay in history
Its methods were
dignified, being mainly infrequent meetings addressed by distinguished persons, and it had no continuing widespread appeal. But
support of the League was advocated by all the churches and, particularly after 1935, by the government. Given this, the Union’s
limited activity and the absence of vigorous concern for or faith in
the League itself were perhaps the measure of New Zealanders’
laissez-faire, their sense of impotence in keeping the peace of the
world.
Since 1911 a Peace Council, fragile but persistent, had sought to
co-ordinate all efforts for peace. As well as the League of Nations
Union, the Society of Friends and pacifist churchmen, several peace
bodies flickered through the 1930s, with many of the same devoted
people belonging to them. The No More War Movement, which
grew out of the No Conscription Fellowship in Britain during the
1914–18 war, appeared in 1928, refusing support for any war and
striving for the removal of all causes of war. In 1934 its membership
was 270.
Peace Record, Feb 34
At Dunedin in 1935 it had about 50 members, including
young men from the churches and university, and but for groundless
fears that it had concealed political interests might have had more.
Otago Daily Times, 11 May 35, p. 5
The political interests of the Movement against War and Fascism
were scarcely concealed. It arose overseas soon after Hitler came to
power and appeared in New Zealand early in 1934, beginning in
Auckland.
Workers’ Weekly, 16 Jan 34
At Wellington on 4–5 August 1934 interested groups
conferred, and its first New Zealand-wide congress of 2–3 February
1935 established an elaborate organisation.
Grey River Argus, 5 Mar 35
While open to all
opposed to war and Fascism, or to war only, it declared support for
the peace policy of the Soviet Union as the world’s clearest, most
effective opposition to war. It had support in some unions, and was
lively in mid-1935, according to the Workers’ Weekly. Membership
was frowned on by the national executive of the Labour party in
August of that year,
Ibid., 17 Aug 35
and though on Anzac Day 1936 at Auckland
it produced a sizeable procession and an anti-war meeting,
NZ Herald, 27 Apr 36, pp. 8 (photo), 11
it was
too noticeably and confusedly Communist to have any wide support.
The New Zealand Youth Council, inspired by the World Youth
Congress, was formed in Wellington in May–July 1937, but though
admirably intentioned never came alive and evaporated early in 1939.
The New Zealand University Students Association in September 1935
tried to test student opinion on peace and war by a questionnaire.
Of all students, 49 per cent replied.
32 per cent of Auckland’s 800 students, 37 of Otago’s 1139, 53 of Canterbury’s 980,
73 of Victoria’s 720, and 100 per cent of Massey’s 54 students.
Of these, 62.26 per cent would
resist without question a threatened invasion of New Zealand, 28.66
would not, 9.09 were doubtful. In any war at all, 28.19 per cent
would assist Britain, 59.19 would not and 12.62 were doubtful.
Against a nation declared aggressor by the League of Nations, 87.99
per cent would take economic sanctions, 6.94 would not, 5.07 were
doubtful; 42.01 would resort to war, 40.03 would not, 17.96 per
cent were doubtful. Replacement of national armies by an international League police force was favoured by 56.91 per cent with
30.61 against it, and 12.48 doubtful. Nearly 93 per cent wanted
all-round international reduction of armaments and nearly 89 per
cent opposed armament trading for private profit; only 22.37 per
cent wanted reduction of British arms alone, 71.73 per cent did not,
and 5.9 were doubtful. The revival of compulsory military training
in peace time would be opposed by 64.78 per cent, while 31.1
would accept it, and 4.12 were doubtful. If war occurred next day,
27.23 per cent would enlist or urge their friends to do so, 56.15
would not, 16.62 were doubtful; 58.24 per cent would oppose conscription, 31.29 would not, 10.57 were doubtful. For 75.5 per cent,
hopes for permanent peace were offered by development of the League of Nations, for 67.25 by general acceptance of the Sermon on
the Mount, and for 20.93 by the overthrow of capitalism.
Evening Post, 17 Dec 35, p. 12
This
last suggested that voters were not merely or mainly the radical Left.
One of the supervisors, Dr C. E. Beeby, while doubting if the
government knew the country’s views on war, said that the students’
attitude would not represent the country; if it did, expensive education would have been wasted.
Ibid., 14 Sep 35, p. 27
The New Zealand Tablet
NZ Tablet, 1 Jan 36, p. 1
found
in it definite revulsion against useless and commercialised warfare.
The Otago Daily Times
Otago Daily Times, 19 Dec 35
thought that the public would not seriously
ponder this college questionnaire, and other papers,
Press, 18 Dec 35, p. 14; NZ Herald, 19 Dec 35, p. 14
beyond
remarking a pacifist tendency, reported it briefly and incompletely.
Probably most of the people who noticed it thought that it was
typical of students, but that students usually grow up.
By 1936–7 faith in pacifism or in the League, never widespread,
was wilting and under pressure. ‘Are pacifists a menace to peace?’
queried the Farmers’ Union journal,
Point Blank, 15 Aug 36, p. 53
and it concluded: ‘The tragedy
is that they are so honest and so sincere about it all. They simply
cannot see that the best guarantee for peace is preparedness.’ At a
1937 Anzac service Mr Justice Northcroft
Northcroft, Hon Sir Erima Harvey, Kt(’49) (1884–1953): INZEF 1916–19; Judge
Advocate Gen NZ Military Forces 1933–5; Judge Supreme Court 1935–; Dir Artillery
S Mil Cmd 1940; NZ Judge at International Military Tribunal Tokyo 1946–8
held that peace and
pacifism were falsely valued, were often downright cowardice, and
that for a proper defensive cause the nation must subdue its fears
and fight. It was common to deplore war, he said, and many aspects
were deplorable, but to the soldier it gave adventure, manly living,
and relief from artificial conventions; many to whom the narrow life
of good citizens was not satisfying found their manhood and won
distinction in war; soldiers, as distinct from hate-filled civilians, had
fought each other in a dispassionate spirit, almost of goodwill, ‘as
profound as it was surprising.’
Press, 26 Apr 37, p. 8
Certainly this drew pacifist comment,
Ibid., 27, 28, 29 Apr 37, pp. 13, 4, 4; NZ Methodist Times, 8 May, reprinted in Standard,
20 May 37, p. 2
but the ‘Come on, it’s not too bad’ note was probably
acceptable to many ex-soldiers at this stage of memory, and heartening to younger men. Almost the same comfort was given by Bishop
St Barbe Holland
Holland, Rt Rev Herbert St Barbe (1882–1966): b UK, to NZ 1936; Temporary Chaplain Forces, France 1918–19; Bishop Wgtn 1936–46, Norwich (UK) 1946–52
at Wellington. Looking back over 22 years, he
said, with time as always wiping out the tragic and beastly, a soldier’s life was not so bad–he was carefree, his wife and children
were provided for, he was not always in the trenches, there were
cheerful things. Soldiers were better men than usual in some ways,
unselfish and loyal. He spoke also of the sickening moment before
attack, of mud, gas, wounds, and of the dead, quoting ‘Heaven is
crammed with laughing boys’; their sacrifice demanded a world free
from war, full of justice and brotherhood, and present dangers
required men to open their hearts to God.
Evening Post, 26 Apr 37, p. 5
At Auckland there were
no speeches, but at Dunedin W. Perry, president of the NZRSA,
said that victory in 1918 had ‘saved us from being hewers of wood
and drawers of water’ for a foreign power; German colonies had
been annexed and mandated and such a fate would surely have
befallen New Zealand. Democracy would perish if not prepared to
withstand aggressors, but younger men were not making any sacrifices to preserve institutions kept for them by the dead.
Otago Daily Times, 26 Apr 37, p. 6
By such public but non-political leadership were New Zealanders
guided from official pacifism towards the approaching conflict. In
April 1939 the Peace Council, moved by Savage’s well-hammered
plea for a world economic peace conference, organised a petition for
it. Many of the 890 bodies that signed—labour groups, school committees, friendly societies, churches, women’s organisations, farmers’
union branches—did so before the outbreak of war, and it was presented, faithful but late, in December 1939,
Press, 7 Dec 39, p. 10
perhaps exemplifying
the straggling, ineffective but persistent nature of peace movements
in New Zealand.
Meanwhile, as League-based pacifism withered, two fresh springs
of absolute pacifism appeared, the New Zealand Christian Pacifist
Society (1936) and the New Zealand Peace Pledge Union (1938),
drawing in the veterans of earlier peace organisations.
Inevitably pacifism, both religious and political, became more
prominent as recruiting increased. Some pacifists, as individuals within
various churches, held simply and passionately that all war was contrary to God’s will. Others believed that the fruitless waste and
suffering of war grew from the anguish, hate, greed and faulty settlements of previous wars. Many, in varying degrees, combined both
streams of thought. Beyond their rejection of war, pacifists had no
common set of beliefs; it was essential to them that each must be
guided by his own mind and conscience.
The New Zealand Christian Pacifist Society, begun in Wellington
in April 1936, was deeply Christian and inter-denominational, but
found many of its supporters in the Methodist Church—in July
1938 about 50 of New Zealand’s 150 Methodist ministers were
members; some Baptist and Presbyterian ministers were associated
with it,
Peace Record, Jul 38
and a few Anglicans. By September 1938 it had 270
members and the secretary, A. C. Barrington,
Barrington, Archibald Charles, FCIS (1906–): Hon Nat Sec NZ Meth Young Men’s
Bible Class Movement 1933–6, Nat Sec, Pres NZCPS 1936–61; Sec WEA Wgtn
1937–47, Nat Sec 1938–47; Vice-Pres NZ Meth Church
wistfully remarked
that the Defence League gained as many members in a month as
the CPS did in two years. There were small but active groups in
Motueka, Wanganui and Palmerston North, and informal branches
at Auckland and Christchurch. Christchurch held its first public
meeting in May 1938 and began weekly street meetings in conjunction with the Peace Pledge Union. In Wellington, starting in
August 1938, Friday night meetings were held near Courtenay Place
preceded, after January 1939, for an hour by a three-man sandwich-poster parade, under city council permit.
NZ Christian Pacifist Society Bulletin (hereinafter NZCPS Bulletin), 1938 report; Peace
Record, May, Jun 38
The Peace Pledge Union, a branch of Canon Dick Sheppard’s
Peace Pledge Union, was established in Christchurch in mid-1938
and later in Wellington.
Peace Record, Apr, Jul, Dec 38
Its adherents were often, but not necessarily, Christian. As 1939 advanced these bodies were active,
Ibid., May 39
distributing literature and holding open-air meetings. Most of the ardent
pacifists lived in Wellington and Christchurch but they tried to open
branches in smaller towns–thus between March and June 1939
Peace Pledge Union branches were started at New Plymouth, Cambridge, Lower Hutt, and Masterton.
Tomorrow, vol V, 26 Apr, 10 May, 21 Jun 39, pp. 413, 447, 525
It could be said that proselytizing pacifists in New Zealand were a very small group of devoted
people,
By 3 September 1939 there were 375 Christian Pacifists, and about 200 other pacifists
in the Peace Pledge Union. By November 1939 the Christian Pacifists total was not
quite 450. NZCPS Bulletin W8, p. 4
of very modest means, trying to put their point of view
before a public which mainly preferred not to think about the issue
while a fair proportion wrote off pacifists as ‘cranks’ or worse.
There were other religious pacifists, mostly from minor sects such
as Assemblies of God and Jehovah’s Witnesses. They did not preach
pacifism outside their own churches, and their rejection of war was
evidenced in military service appeals and defaulters’ camps where
they lived quietly, giving no trouble. There were also pacifists convinced on intellectual not religious grounds that war achieved only
destruction, and ready to face defaulters’ camps rather than take part
in it. There were others who drew their anti-war conviction mainly
from distrust of capitalism. They did not, like the pacifists, oppose
all war, and many would change their minds after mid-1941, when
Russia was attacked. Till then they opposed the war as part of the
capitalist design to enslave the workers, urging instead that the
world’s wrongs should be righted by socialist reforms, with Russia
as the guiding star. They saw the government of Britain, actively
supported by New Zealand, running the war in the interests of
imperialism and the exploiting capitalist class, and strongly suspected that it would be ‘switched’ against Russia.
Christian and intellectual pacifists, in claiming that the policies
pursued by Britain and France were in part responsible for the war,
shared some ground with the Communists. By many, pacifists were
regarded not only as cranks, but as dangerous cranks, closely linked
with communism, the long-standing enemy of New Zealand’s whole
society, and there was little perception of gradations. Actually, the
Peace Pledge Union, while co-operating often with the Christian
Pacifist Society, had among its adherents socialists of varying degrees
and those whose opposition to war was not derived from passionate
Christianity. Its chairman was Gordon Mirams,
Mirams, Gordon Holden (1909–66): journalist, NZ Listener, on secretariat UNESCO1948–9, 1959; chmn educ & publicity cmte CORSO; chmn NZ Peace Pledge Union;
Censor & Registrar Films, NZ, from 1949
journalist and film
critic, who incurred no penalties, though its secretary, Michael Young,
was imprisoned for a subversive pamphlet. Apart from a few public
meetings early in the war, the PPU sustained itself mainly through
private meetings and newsletters.
The Christian Pacifist Society, as its name implied, drew its vitality from its intense belief that war was contrary to Christ’s will.
Some of its members believed that they must do their share in
making a world in arms hear Christ’s call to peace, no matter how
sacrificial or futile their witness might appear to the unconvinced.
Barrington was its secretary and originally the producer of its Bulletin, a newsletter through which its scattered members were informed
and strengthened, although the conscience of each member remained
independent. Of the Bulletin, Barrington later said: ‘I kept a stencil
in my typewriter. Everything went in, as and when I could, higgledy-piggledy, news flashes, jottings, reports, quotes, propaganda. When
dispatch was needed there could be anything from one to ten stencils.
And what a pain hand-duplicating was!’
Trials of a Pacifist’, script of broadcast talks by A. C. Barrington, Oct 69 (hereinafter
Barrington broadcast)
To reach the non-attached, the passers-by, pacifists depended on
open-air meetings sometimes preceded by poster parades; it was no
use preaching in a hall to the converted handful. Consequently pacifism was very closely involved with rights of assembly and free speech.
When war was declared pacifists did not consider their cause lost,
rather that it had become more urgent. They argued that the last
war, won though at a great price, had brought only 20 years of
uneasy peace; it had clearly achieved nothing that lasted. Was it not
time to try the way of peace? The slow pace of the present war was
another factor. Did not this slowness suggest that Germany too really
wanted peace? Besides condemning all war and urging having no
part in it, they examined the events leading to the present situation;
inevitably this meant criticism of the governments of the Allies and
was opposed to recruiting.
Prominent in the movement was Ormond Burton, chairman of
the Christian Pacifist Society, a Methodist minister remarkable for
his social salvage work in a near-slum area of Wellington, a former
Labour party official at Auckland, a soldier in 1914–18, promoted
from the ranks and twice decorated for bravery, but long convinced
that no war could be justified before God. He held that the Christian
Church in its first 300 years had refused to countenance war, but
had then compromised with the Emperor Constantine for his support and had become a department of state. The so-called glory of
war was that men endured hardship and terror believing that they
would save or build something worthwhile, but this was a mirage
that fled forever because out of the waste and loss, bitterness, poverty
and revenge of each war, new fights arose. The present war was only
an incident in a vast movement of the world towards conflict and
chaos, which could be countered only by the Cross, by turning the
cheek when smitten and resisting evil with the power of good. Such
a policy would certainly not lead to ease and security, admitted
Burton and the other pacifists; it would mean the ‘haves’ sharing
with the ‘have-nots’, but they thought it the only means by which
war could be overcome. It was not possible to distinguish between
wars of righteousness and aggression: both sides believed they were
fighting for right, but what the Allies regarded as right was based
on the arrangements of Versailles, which thinking men now knew
to be immoral.
Press, 17, 18 Nov 39, pp. 2 & 10, 8; Otago Daily Times, 17 Nov 39, p. 8
For a year before the outbreak, Burton and his colleagues had
preached absolute Christian pacifism from their soapboxes at Courtenay Place, Wellington. The day war was declared Burton spoke
outside Parliament Buildings and with two others was arrested for
obstructing the police. He wrote later, ‘The police were very courteous and from their point of view exceedingly long suffering. They
argued and persuaded and tried to get me to stop speaking. They
were so decent that I felt rather a pig at not complying, but from
my point of view that would have painlessly yielded the whole right
of free speech; so I had to go on.’
Burton, O. E., In Prison, p. 10
Remanded in court, they were
told that they must promise not to address another meeting, refused,
and were sent off to gaol,
Evening Post, 5 Sep 39, p. 4
whence they were speedily released by
the intervention of Peter Fraser. Two days later, a magistrate, J. L.
Stout,
Stout, John Logan (1879–1952): SM 1918–47, from 1938 Wgtn
decided that the meeting had been hostile, that trouble had
threatened, and that Burton and the others, in refusing to stop when
asked, had obstructed the police; they were convicted and ordered
to come up for sentence if called within twelve months. Inside a
week Burton was arrested again on the same charge, and fined £10
on 18 September. Although the City Council had cancelled the
Society’s permit for meetings, Barrington had quietly held a two-hour one on Friday 15 September.
Tomorrow, 27 Sep 39, vol V, pp. 763–4
The charge of obstructing the police was repeated many times in
the next few months, Burton and his colleagues claiming the right
to speak to quiet meetings, while magistrates found the police entitled
to stop any meeting which they thought might turn nasty. From
November another charge was sometimes used: obstructing a public
street or place. Thus H. G. Lyttle and two others, on 9 December,
were fined £5 each for obstructing blind lanes off Cuba Street in
Wellington on 17 November 1939,
Evening Post, 9 Dec 39, p. 8; Tomorrow, 20 Dec 39, vol VI, p. 125
and on 19 January 1940 Burton and Lyttle, together answering seven such charges, were convicted and discharged on five of them and fined £5 and £10
respectively on the others; the Attorney-General deplored ‘this stupid
desire for self-immolation’.
Truth, 24 Jan 40, p. 9
On 25 January Barrington wrote that
there had already been 14 prosecutions of pacifists in Wellington,
and outside Wellington he himself had five convictions, all for
obstruction,
Tomorrow, 7 Feb 40, vol VI, p. 207
while the Observer of 7 February pointed out that Burton had five different obstruction convictions and fines totalling £28.
Clearly the pacifists were an acute minor embarrassment to a government which included several conscientious objectors of 1914–18,
and was now responsible for the zealous running of a war. The
arguments of Burton and his fellows clearly opposed recruiting and
were therefore subversive under the censorship regulations of September 1939, but instead they were attacked obliquely for obstruction under the Police Offences Act, 1927. Certainly there were
administrative difficulties in these regulations. There was no power
of arrest, of stopping a speaker on the spot; it was necessary to lay
an account before the Attorney-General and obtain his consent to a
prosecution which might convict and punish an offender, but meanwhile he ‘could address a meeting for two hours or more and with
impunity make one subversive statement after another’.
WHN, ‘Police Department’, p. 215
The
government was resolved to silence the pacifists, without a clash of
principles which would make the dock their rostrum; obstruction
charges were rather deflating. The Otago Daily Times of 10 January
was relieved that the police had ‘been able to secure convictions
under a law which applies equally in time of peace and in time of
war. It would be unfortunate if the emergency legislation should be
employed to check free comment … when the preservation of
personal freedom is one of the aims which the Allies have set before
themselves.’ The Observer of 7 February, on the other hand, thought
that if the Crown deemed Burton’s campaign objectionable, ‘let it
tackle him in a direct and forthright way, instead of bringing irrelevant charges against him.’
Public and private persons, however, were very ready to attack
the pacifists for their doctrines. Some were impatient at their untimely
persistence—for instance, a writer to the ChristchurchPress on 20
November demanded, ‘How much more rope is to be allowed to
the so-called pacifists? This is no time to make a hobby of pacifism,
to harp on the Versailles Treaty, to make odious comparisons, and,
in effect to lay on Britain the blame for this war. The Prussian urge
for domination is much older than Versailles…. Let us get the war
over quickly and surely; and then the pacifists may have their turn.’
Some were indignant that pacifists would not fight for the society
that nurtured them: what, they asked, would happen to pacifists in
Germany or Russia; and fancy our brave boys going away to fight
for such people. Some thought that pacifists should be silenced and
all political privileges taken from them during the war.
eg, letter in NZ Herald, 31 Jan 40, p. 12
Some,
including the Minister of Defence, held that the views of sincere
pacifists should be respected unless they tried to influence others.
Otago Daily Times, 18 Apr 40, p. 6
Also, in the public mind pacifists were confused with Communists,
who for their own reasons, between October 1939 and June 1941,
opposed the war. Christian Pacifists on principle would speak from
any platform, but always from their own point of view, as Christians.
They thus spoke at peace and anti-conscription meetings, along with
those of leftist views.
In January 1940, just as the First Echelon departed, Barrington
and Lyttle toured the North Island, speaking in the open at Palmerston North, Wanganui, Hawera, Stratford, New Plymouth, Te
Kuiti, Hamilton, Auckland, Tauranga, Gisborne and Napier, meeting various forms of hostility and some support.
NZCPS Bulletin W10, Report of tour, Jan 40
Being a novelty
in most of these places, they excited much attention—thus the
Wanganui Herald of 3 and 4 January gave them four and a half
columns, including a seemingly full report of Barrington’s speech,
with questions and answers. The magistrate there, fining Barrington
£3 for obstructing the street, said that he was not concerned with
the nature of the speech but with the likelihood of an accident. At
Hawera ‘it was well for the speakers that the police were there for
several … returned soldiers were anxious to go through and deal
with the men in their own way’; the police moved the speakers to
an open place where they would not impede traffic, and when the
Mayor, reminding the crowd that they had lately farewelled 50 young
men, asked them not to listen, he was cheered and the crowd ‘speedily dispersed’.
Wanganui Herald, 5 Jan 40, p. 6
At Stratford a woman threw tomatoes, ‘although
they cost 10d a pound’; one speaker was pushed off the box by
returned soldiers, and both were jostled by an angry crowd of 200;
police took them to a side street and let them go.
Ibid., 6 Jan 40, p. 6; NZ Herald, 6 Jan 40, p. 8
At New Plymouth eggs were thrown, the second speaker was silenced by the
National Anthem, a rush toppled him off his box, and ‘the meeting
dispersed as the central figures, with their box, made an inconspicuous exit’. There was no direct physical violence here although, in
a desultory barrage of rotten eggs, one or two found their mark, not
necessarily on the speakers. The spectators were mostly tolerant and
good-humoured except for a few truculent spirits whose challenges
to the pacifists to fight were not accepted. The crowd did not disperse
immediately, ‘thoughts on the subject of pacifism apparently being
divided, although unequally’.
Taranaki Daily News, 6 Jan 40, p. 6
Te Kuiti’s RSA had been forewarned
by New Plymouth and feeling ran high in a large crowd that hustled
the pacifists out of town with threats of the river, although a local
clergyman and an unknown person pleaded for a fair hearing.
King Country Chronide, 8 Jan 40
At
Hamilton, where they spoke before several Army officers, there was
‘a certain amount of dissention [sic]’ before police led the speakers
away.
NZ Herald, 6 Jan 40, p. 8
Barrington said that he spoke for 25 minutes at Tauranga,
then closed the meeting because of the action of a small irresponsible
section of the crowd.
Gisborne Herald, 12 Jan 40, p. 5
At Gisborne on 11 January he was again
fined £3 for obstructing the police. Both the Gisborne Herald
Ibid., p. 11
and
Barrington himself reported that interest in the meeting was mild
and sluggish. Of the Napier meeting, one paper
NapierDaily Telegraph, 13 Jan 40, p. 8
said that it lasted
about two hours with many and various interjections from a good-humoured audience of more than 100; another
Hawke’s Bay Herald–Tribune, 13 Jan 40
remarked that the
visitors’ earnestness contrasted oddly with the derisive reception of
their views by some 75 people, but there was no real hostility to
the men themselves and a very good time was had by all except
perhaps the speakers; Barrington called it a ‘good lively meeting’.
NZCPS Bulletin W10, Report of tour, p. 6
It seems worth quoting two letters that appeared in the Gisborne
Herald, one raucous in tone, one milder, as direct examples of how
some New Zealanders thought about pacifists; in particular showing
how, at different levels, pacifists were linked with Communism, then
as now the label of extreme discredit. The first letter said:
… I would like to express my disgust that such doctrines
should be voiced in Gisborne.
We are engaged in a struggle against the forces of tyranny and
injustice and the spectacle of an able-bodied man mouthing such
weak-kneed drivel is pitiful. When he brings in the name of
Christ to bolster up his specious arguments, then he becomes
nauseating.
If these half-baked intellectuals had their way Nazism would
be on the ascendant in New Zealand and the standard of living
of which we are so justly proud would very soon be nothing but
a memory. The sooner the Government takes action against the
sob-sisters, Communists and their ilk, the better for us all.
Gisborne Herald, 15 Jan 40, p. 9
The other writer took a longer, less rugged path to the same conclusions: pacifism had gained ground in England and New Zealand
because people loved peace and abhored war. Pacifist leaders had
intensified their propaganda, directed largely towards the young,
leading to the shocking New Year resolution of the Methodist Bible
Class convention which by 44 votes to 3 had rejected even non-combatant military service. The British Empire, although many things
in it needed righting, was making progress, leading the world in
justice and freedom; yet a short while ago Gisborne people, invited
to a film on Soviet Russia shown in a local theatre, had been treated
to a ‘tirade against Britain’.
Similar abuse is to be heard from pacifist leaders. They make
light of the persecution, concentration camps, godlessness, etc., in
Germany, and expect us to believe that we are probably no better
off under our leaders than the German people are under theirs.
I have no doubt they are sincere, but I would suggest that years
of following the communistic doctrine has blinded them to the
main facts and has made them intellectually dishonest.
The two pacifists who have been touring the North Island have
perhaps gained a certain amount of sympathy, so I feel that their
true motives for trying to secure support should be made known,
that is, not merely because they profess to be Christian but because
they hold the same opinions as the Communists regarding the
British Empire.
Ibid., 16 Jan 40, p. 10
It is interesting that this writer thought that Barrington and Lyttle
might have gained some sympathy; the newspapers spoke almost
wholly of hostility. The same page that carried the first letter had
a report from the New York Times saying that freedom of expression
in Britain after four months of war was amazing compared with that
in France at the same time or in the United States during the last
war; recently published articles blamed Chamberlain’s appeasement
policy for the outbreak of war, and letters in newspapers dwelt more
on Britain’s faults than Germany’s, while left-wing publications even
debated whether the war merited support.
Peace Pledge Union speakers met varying receptions at a few West
Coast towns in March. At Greymouth a Friday evening street speaker
was pushed off his box in a crowd of about 200, including soldiers
on leave, but good-humoured argument continued for nearly an hour,
when a ‘mere handful of people remained out of idle curiosity despite
a drizzling rain…. No police intervention was necessary.’
Press, 16 Mar 40, p. 12
The use
of the town hall had been refused by the Council.
Grey River Argus, 5 Apr 40
In the miners
hall, Runanga, 200 heard the national organiser, Michael Young,
and a local man, speak on the uselessness of war and the need to
face past economic mistakes, offering the German people a better
deal than they had in 1919. The Mayor, as chairman, spoke proudly
of the tolerance and democracy of Runanga.
Ibid., 19 Mar 40
At Blackball on a wet
night the same speakers had a small but enthusiastic audience which
formed a Peace and Anti-Conscription Council on the spot.
Ibid., 25 Mar 40
At Rangiora, where a branch of the Peace Pledge Union had been
formed in July 1939, a public meeting of about 50 people on 8
April 1940 drew many hostile interjections, and subsequent criticism
caused the Union to announce that it would hold no more meetings
there.
Ibid., 16 Apr 40
The Rangiora County Council told the North Canterbury
Power Board that one of its staff was the PPU’s local secretary and
asked what disciplinary action the Power Board was taking. The
Board said that the man had been severely reprimanded, and drew
attention to the loyalty evidenced by its staff’s contributions to
patriotic funds.
Press, 13, 17 Apr 40, pp. 9, 8
Natural opponents to pacifist meetings were soldiers on leave,
returned soldiers and recruiting agents. For groups of soldiers, some
drunk and all looking for a bit of excitement, it was good sport to
ruffle up the ‘conchies’ or ‘commos’ as the pacifists were loosely
termed. Interjections, singing, counting out and shoving were the
usual methods. The police preferred to arrest the pacifists rather than
the disorder-makers, reasoning that it was the provocation of the
speakers that made breaches of the peace likely to happen. Realising
that the government was embarrassed and reluctant, those hostile to
pacifists pressed for action from city councils, which usually contained some persons willing to give the government a lead. Pacifist
meetings were part of the rights of freedom of speech and assembly
which were tested by different bodies in several places. In Wellington, where pacifists and the Peace and Anti-Conscription Council
were strong, with the Communist party much weaker, the two former clashed with authority; in Christchurch, again it was the pacifists
who tried the issue. At Auckland, stronghold of the Communist
party, the battle was shared. At Dunedin neither body was strong
enough to hold meetings regularly. The varying attitudes of mayors
and city councils in these places were important factors.
In Christchurch, changing attitudes towards the rights of free
speech were neatly exemplified. On 2 October 1939 the City Council
had resolved to continue issuing permits for street meetings, deciding
each case on its merits; it thereupon gave a permit to a combined
pacifist committee, while refusing the Communist party and the
Christchurch Anti-Conscription League—though the latter, as the
Press of 4 October pointed out, was in line with current government
policy, while the pacifists were not. There was sturdy advocacy of
free speech from some of the councillors, though some others held
that small groups should not be allowed to thwart the government
and subvert impressionable people.
During January the Christchurch RSA, possibly chagrined by poor
response to the recruiting campaign,
S. G. Holland complained that when recruiting meetings started ‘bottles were thrown
on the stage, pennies were thrown at the speakers, and they were counted out. That
actually happened in my beloved Christchurch, in my own Cathedral Square.’ Ibid.,
1 Feb 40, p. 15
moved, both at their meetings
and before the City Council, against the pacifists, who included a
strong core of Anglican clergy. After several noisy meetings, on 12,
19 and 26 January, when pacifist speakers had been heckled, pushed
off boxes, and escorted away by police, the Council debated the
cancellation of their permit. A police deputation was heard in private, several free speech champions changed their minds, and one,
Mabel Howard,
Howard, Hon Mabel Bowden (1893–1972); b Aust, to NZ 1903; MP (Lab) Chch East
1943, Sydenham 1946–69; 1st woman Cabinet member, Min Health, Child Welfare
1947–9, Social Security, Child Welfare & in charge Welfare, Women and Children
1957–60; chmn WWSA Chch
was absent. The Mayor, Labour member R. M.
Macfarlane,
Macfarlane, Hon Sir Robert, KCMG(’74), CMG(’54) (1901–82): MP (Lab) Chch South
1939–46, Chch Central 1946–9; Speaker HoR 1957–60; Mayor Chch 1938–41,
1950–8, Dep Mayor 1971–4; 2½ years 2NZEF
fervent to preserve law and order, questioned whether
the pacifists were a law-abiding body, held that their propaganda
was not genuine pacifism but showed an obvious bias towards the
enemy, and stated that in Auckland pacifists and Communists had
spoken from the same platform. ‘Hands had been laid on soldiers
and the soldiers were going to resent that. When that happened
there was a prospect of trouble.’ The Council decided to ban pacifist
street meetings.
Press, 30 Jan 40, p. 6; Star-Sun, 30 Jan 40, p. 9
Both the Press
Press, 31 Jan 40
and the right-wing New Zealand Freedom
Association
NZ Herald, 30 Jan 40, p. 9
disapproved of local authorities taking away a basic
constitutional liberty from one section while leaving it to others,
though the Press preferred that all political street meetings should
be prohibited in war time. A later Council meeting maintained the
ban, although Mabel Howard vigorously championed free speech,
declaring that the Council had been panicked by a little RSA group,
and reproached Labour members for scrapping the principles for
which party pioneers had fought and suffered: ‘They should remember that the Labour movement was built out of suppression.’
Press, 20 Feb 40, p. 8
In Wellington, the pacifists’ permit for meetings had been cancelled in September but they continued their Friday night speaking,
although frequently arrested. To the argument that they should use
halls, not the street, they could answer that open witness was their
policy and also that halls were not available to opponents of the
war. Thus the Peace and Anti-Conscription Council’s booking of the
Concert Chamber for 18 January was cancelled by the Mayor, and
various other halls, though booked, were denied them at the last
moment.
NZCPS Bulletin W12, p. 3
On 6 February, opening a recruiting rally, Hislop
Hislop, Thomas Charles Atkinson, CMG(’35) (1888–1965): Mayor Wgtn 1931–44;
HC Canada1950–2
made
a fighting speech, attacking subversive propaganda at the so-called
pacifist meetings of a group containing several ‘gravely deluded’ reverend gentlemen who should rather concern themselves with atrocities in Poland. ‘I believe these people talk of holding a meeting on
a piece of Corporation land by the Royal Oak Hotel
The Dixon–Manners Street Reserve, at the head of Courteney Place, site of a Methodist
Memorial, and the Christian Pacifists’ regular place of witness from the end of September
1939 onwards.
on Friday. I
am going to do my best to see that that meeting is not held. I don’t
mind what they do in other parts of New Zealand, but if they want
a fight in Wellington they can have it.’
Evening Post, 6 Feb 40, p. 10
The local Post approved:
pacifism could be ruled out as not subversive only if it were completely futile and ineffective, but when sincere misguided idealism
was joined to cunning Communism one could not afford to believe
it would have no effect. Though freedom of speech should be preserved as far as possible in war, it was time that the State stopped
this propaganda; if not, local authorities must act.
Ibid., 7 Feb 40
Later Hislop said that he received appreciative letters from all
over the country.
Ibid., 5 Mar 40, p. 8
The Post also received a large batch, of which it
published a representative selection.
Scott, Walter James, CBE(’74) (1902–): teacher, educationist, lecturer English, Wgtn
Teachers’ College 1936–48, Vice-Principal & Principal 1949–65; chmn NZ Council Civil Liberties 1952–72, Pres from 1972; Pro-Chancellor VUW from 1975; member
NZ Council Educational Research 1965–73
Several approved the Mayor’s
forceful and courageous speech, one found it a ‘violent and undignified outburst’, one (W. J. Scott
Evening Post, 8, 10 Feb 40, pp. 12, 10
) explained that if the Mayor and
those who agreed with him excercised their power to silence dissident
views ‘they prove rather conclusively that they do not believe in
some of the fundamental principles of the democracy they are asking
others to fight for. The true test of our belief in democracy comes
only when we are asked to allow others to express views with which
we passionately disagree.’
Ibid., 8 Feb 40, p. 12
Not surprisingly, instead of the usual hundred or so, there was
a crowd of several thousand when Burton arrived at the Dixon–
Manners Street Reserve on Friday, 9 February. There were also many
police: they asked him to be silent, he refused, and was arrested.
He wrote later: ‘I barely managed to say, “Ladies and gentlemen”
when the blue wave broke over me. I went down with a mass of
them on top of me. It was quite the same homely feeling that a
half-back has when he goes down under the feet of half a dozen
big forwards.’
Burton, In Prison, p. 11
Two other pacifists, Barrington and J. Doherty tried
to speak but were rushed away by the police and released.
NZCPS Bulletin W13, p. 3
A Communist, W. D. O’Reilly, independently began to speak on freedom
of speech and was also arrested. The crowd remained for an hour
or so but apart from a few arguments and incipient fights nothing
happened. Mayor Hislop arrived, was greeted with cheers and boos,
and his brief speech could not be heard for the noise. A witness in
a later case, Gordon Mirams, referring to this incident said that there
was a lot of opposition when the Mayor spoke, but no hostility
earlier.
Evening Post, 11 Apr 40, p. 13
A party of young soldiers enlivened proceedings throughout, several persons fainted in the crush, and the crowd was generally
good humoured.
NZ Herald, 10 Feb 40, p. 10
In court, the police explained that when they
arrested Burton there had been no breach of the peace but had he
spoken there would have been: J. L. Stout SM, declaring that the
police, if they had reasonable anticipation of violence, could stop a
meeting at its outset, had the painful duty of sentencing both Button
and O’Reilly to a month’s hard labour.
Evening Post, 12 Feb 40, p. 9
At Auckland circumstances closely linked the pacifists with Communists and free speech supporters. The Communists, who regularly
held Sunday afternoon meetings at Quay Street, on 8 January gave
the touring Wellington team, Barrington and Lyttle, use of their
site before their own meeting. The police were courteous and there
was applause from the 500–strong crowd, which presumably was at
least partly made up of communist supporters, opposed to the war.
Immediately after this they went to speak at the Domain, where a
centennial service crowd was dispersing. The police here rapidly and
rudely interrupted, wrote Barrington;
NZCPS Bulletin W10, Report of January tour 1940; Barrington broadcast
the crowd was hostile, said
the police. A woman was stopped from striking Barrington with her
umbrella; she was not arrested, but the pacifists were fined for
obstructing the police.
NZ Herald, 9 Jan 40, p. 9
On 26 January at Newmarket Reserve,
from a crowd of about 70, there were many interjections but no
suggestion of serious disturbance, and when Burton and C. R. Howell were led away but not arrested by the police, a man from the
crowd mounted the soapbox, shouting, ‘As a private citizen I have
just seen an example of what we are fighting against in Germany—
Hitlerism—and as a believer in free speech I protest.’
Ibid., 27 Jan 40, p. 12
On 28 January, before the start of the communist meeting at
Quay Street, Burton was speaking ‘in deprecatory terms of Mr
Chamberlain and disparagingly of the very causes for which men
were going to war’ when a group of soldiers, who had already been
asked by the police not to make disturbances, surged round him,
knocking him off his box, and one scuffled briefly with a civilian.
Burton was warned to stop, arrested, and later fined £13 on two
obstruction charges. The soldiers, said the magistrate, probably came
to disturb the meeting, some were affected by liquor but not drunk.
‘The stage was all set for a nasty bit of trouble. The police had a
bounden duty to perform and they adopted the best course by arresting the accused.’
Ibid., 31 Jan, 1 Feb 40, pp. 11, 11
The press and various other bodies called for government action
against the subversion of both pacifists and Communists. Thus in
the Evening Post on 10 February the National party caucus called
the government’s attention to the subversive activities of certain
persons and organisations, and the National Council of the Federated
Saddlers, Bagmakers, Canvas Workers, Umbrella Workers, Sailmakers, Riggers and Related Trades Union, declaring itself steadfastly behind Parliament and the war, concluded trenchantly: ‘Take
warning. Be ye not misled by pacifists, be they termed Christian or
otherwise, nor fooled by the babble of anti-conscription opportunists.
Quit ye yourselves like men in this war. The battle is one for the
welfare of mankind the world over.’
Evening Post, 10 Feb 40, p. 12
The Government was moving. On 25 January 1940 the Attorney-General had broadcast that while the government had not expected
everyone instantaneously to realise that loyal men must all stand
together to defend the Commonwealth, there had been ample time
for reasonable and loyal minds to accept the new realities. The
government would remain tolerant of legitimate comment or criticism on public affairs, but it would not tolerate utterances ‘designed
to distract, divide or disturb’ people in their war effort. He went
on to give examples
eg, calling the war a capitalist struggle, with nothing to choose between the Allies and
Germany; criticising Chamberlain for embarking on war for inadequate reasons or for
sectional interests; advocating the fight on two fronts, against Hitlerism and against New
Zealand’s economic system.
of statements subversive under the Censorship
and Publicity Regulations of September 1939 that pointed clearly
to Communists but applied also to pacifists. Pacifists also had criticised Chamberlain, and denied that the cause of the Allies was any
more righteous than that of the Germans, and they certainly intended
to ‘prejudice the recruiting’ of the forces; yet they were not prosecuted under these Regulations.
The Labour Statement on War Policy of 21 February declared
for freedom of speech and opinion, but added: ‘Freedom of speech
does not mean freedom to disorganise traffic by holding open-air
meetings in busy streets or to wilfully court disorder, but facilities
should be provided for meetings in suitable selected places approved
by the recognised authorities to enable the expression of opinion by
those who are willing to abide by the laws of the country.’ Next
week new Public Safety Emergency Regulations (1940/26) (which
must have been shaped before this Statement was issued) appeared.
As before, prosecutions for subversive statements had to be authorised by the Attorney-General, but such statements now included,
besides those against recruiting, those promoting resistance to any
law relating to military service (which could, of course, mean conscription, still five months away). Further, the police could now
prohibit or stop any procession or any meeting in a public place or
elsewhere if they thought the procession or meeting likely to be
injurious to the public safety, and arrest without warrant any person
involved. Fraser, introducing these regulations, clearly referred to
recent pacifist meetings but subtly linked them with ‘persons, some
openly agents of a foreign Power’.
Evening Post, 26 Feb 40, p. 6; see p. 212
That same day H. G. Lyttle was charged with obstructing the
police at the Manners Street Reserve. It was, said Stout, sentencing
him to three months in prison, time to deal with such offenders
without kid gloves. People were getting restive because of this antirecruiting campaign under the guise of Christian pacifism, and the
police knew that if these meetings continued there would probably
be disorder as different sections of the crowd were likely to come
to blows. The police claimed that during the past three or four weeks
a decidedly hostile attitude had been taken towards the pacifists.
Evening Post, 26 Feb 40, p. 9
In the appeal from this verdict a witness, R. I. M. Burnett,
Burnett, Robert Ian McKenzie (1915–): 4 years with 2NZEF; Sec NZ Historic Places
Trust 1964–70; Senior Research Officer Dept Int Aff 1971–6; Research Fellow Institute
of Criminology VUW 1976–81
said that the crowd was so orderly he had carried a dozen eggs
through it, and he thought that it had been the action of the police
which had caused the crowd to surge forward. Mr Justice Johnston
Johnston, Hon Harold Leatherstone, KC (1875–1959): Judge Supreme Court & Court
of Appeal 1934–45, Court of Review 1935
upheld the sentence: the police should not only quell riots but prevent them; he did not for a moment believe that the police were
concerned with Lyttle’s opinions but it would be sheer lunacy for
them not to take cognisance of the fierce resentment his views would
now arouse in soldiers or their friends; Lyttle was honest and courageous but obtuse; he and his society should express their opinions
in a retired place, remote from people likely to resent them.
Evening Post, 11 Apr 40, p. 13
On 29 March Burton, coming to the same Reserve, was told that
he could not speak because the police anticipated trouble. He said
to the small crowd, ‘The words of our Lord Jesus Christ call us to
peace’, and was arrested for obstructing the police. In court the police
said that for more than two months whenever the pacifists spoke it
was necessary to have extra men on duty, and they had been warned
that this evening there would be organised opposition from the Army
and Navy; they admitted that there were no soldiers present, nor
any formed body of returned soldiers, when Burton was arrested.
Several defence witnesses said that the meeting was very quiet—‘as
orderly as a Salvation Army prayer meeting’. Stout, complaining that
it was very hard to know what to do with a man who should know
better, and that as the war progressed the likelihood of trouble would
increase, sentenced him to three months in prison.
Ibid., 1 Apr 40, p. 9
On appeal before the Chief Justice, Sir Michael Myers,
to test
Myers, Rt Hon Sir Michael, PC, GCMG(’37), KC (1873–1950): Chief Justice NZ
1929–46
to test
the whole matter Burton said, first, that beginning very gradually
about Christmas there had been increasing interference from soldiers,
whom the police allowed almost any latitude, while they warned,
removed and arrested speakers; he thought that this would have
been checked if the military authorities had been consulted. Secondly,
he thought that the police were in a difficult position under conflicting orders and with an unfamiliar problem: they wished that
the meeting would be hostile, for then their course would be plain,
and this wishing coloured their perception. Finally, if the police were
to close any political meeting because they thought that a violent
group might attend, there would be a very grave abuse of free speech.
Myers held that police apprehensions were reasonable in view of
the situation and the Christian Pacifist Society’s total rejection of war
and even non-combatant war service. He was very sorry to see a
person of Burton’s attainments, education and culture in this position, through his persistent refusal to look things in the face and
see for himself that his doctrines were likely to offend and insult
soldiers and their friends. The penalty was not excessive.
Evening Post, 12, 16 Apr 40, pp. 9, 15
This case
Burton v. Power, New Zealand Law Reports 1940, pp. 305–8. Power was the police
officer leading the prosecution
had persisting importance for New Zealand civil liberties. Had Burton and other pacifists been gaoled for subversive
statements under emergency regulations, their cases would have had
no legal significance after the war. But by applying a-section of the
Police Offences Act, under wartime tensions, and establishing the
right of the police to stop any action, however orderly in itself,
because the action might produce hostility, a wartime expedient was
built into civil law. Burton v. Power remains, like an erratic boulder
dropped by a retreating glacier, in the peacetime legal landscape.
The pacifists gave up street speaking for a while, withdrawing to
private study groups. It is hard to guess how far the public conscience was troubled by their prosecutions—always remembering that
in New Zealand, as elsewhere, the public conscience is housed in
very few persons. But those who knew Burton in particular—his
fine record and personality, his devotion to his God and to his needy
unsuccessful people—were uneasy that such a man was sent to prison,
and on the issue of free speech. Obviously newspapers would be
unlikely to publish protesting letters, but in the provinces a few
appeared—for example, one in the Hawke’s Bay Daily Mail, 6 April,
quoting Savage’s statement that it would be terrible if those overthrowing Nazism themselves went Nazi, sacrificing liberty on the
altar of efficiency; Burton and the men of HMS Achilles both thought
that they were doing their duty to God and the right, but one was
dishonoured and prosecuted, while the sailors were feted. A few
other letters warned that Nazi-like authority could appear outside
Germany, and one quoted Sir Herbert Samuel,
Samuel, Rt Hon Sir Herbert, 1st Viscount of Toxteth, Liverpool (’37), PC, GCB(’26)
OM(’58) GBE(’20) (1870–1963): Chancellor Duchy Lancaster with seat in Cab
1909–10, 1915–16; PMG 1910–14, 1915–16; Home Sec 1916, 1931–2; Leader Lib
party 1931–5
Home Secretary
in 1916, as saying that there might be cases when the most patriotic
service in time of war would be to arouse public opinion to demand
speedy peace.
Hauke’s Bay Daily Mail, 20 Apr, 2 May 40, pp. 8, 6; Otago Daily Times, 4 Mar 40,
p. 9
It is clear, however, that on the issue of free speech the majority
of New Zealanders accepted without much demur the doctrine that
freedom must be curtailed to be preserved. Others again, though
most loth to accept war, were perplexed and defeated by the inadequacy of the pacifist argument in the face of Nazi barbarism, reports
of which steadily stippled the newspapers. ‘Pacifism,’ pronounced
magistrate W. R McKean
McKean, William Roy (d 1958): appointed Bench 1919
at the end of April, ‘at the present time
cannot lead to a peaceful examination of differences. It can lead only
to abject surrender to Nazi aggression.’
Quoted in editorial, Evening Post, 22 Apr 40
Though regretfully, many
had to agree. No doubt many echoed the Bay of Islands farmer who
declared robustly, ‘Pacifists who maintain their ideals at the present
time are cranks’; all people were probably pacifists at heart, but there
were times when all had to scrap their ideals.
Auckland Star, 30 May 40, p. 14
Pacifism and free
speech, linked ideas, were luxuries which should be sacrificed willingly to the war effort.
Pacifists were silent for a few months after the Supreme Court
From 1 April 1980 the Supreme Court became the High Court, Magistrates’ Courts
became District Courts and magistrates were given new status as District Court judges.
The work of both courts and the Court of Appeal was reorganised. Yearbook1980,
p. 228
in April 1940 upheld the three-month sentences on Burton and
Lyttle.
See pp. 191–2
It was difficult for them to have public meetings elsewhere,
as newspapers would not print advertisements and only the trades
halls would now receive them. In several towns besides Wellington,
however, Christian Pacifists, often loosely associated with the Peace
Pledge Union, maintained fellowship and purpose by meetings in
private homes, notably in Christchurch and Auckland, but also at
Hamilton, Wanganui, Palmerston North, the Hutt Valley, and
Motueka.
NZCPS Bulletin W19, p. 7 (Jul 40), W20, p. 6 (Aug 40), W27, pp 2, 5 (Mar 41),
W35, p. 2 (Oct 41), W43, pp. 4–5 (Aug 42)
Since 1938 the Wellington City Council had permitted three CPS
members on Friday evenings to walk the streets wearing sandwich-board posters, paying a fee of 1s per person per hour. These parades
were banned in October 1939, but persisted intermittently and were
continued fortnightly during May and June 1940, often by girls.
The slogans on the posters were carefully chosen; sometimes a traditional statement such as ‘War is a sin against God and a crime
against humanity’, sometimes taken from the words of Christ or St
Paul, sometimes from Robert Semple in 1916.
Ibid., W15, p. 10
It must be remembered that placard-bearing was not then common, and for three
people to walk the streets bearing their message on sandwich-boards,
‘being conspicuous’ and objects of derision to many, demanded
devotion and resolve unknown to many demonstrators 40 years later.
There was also the risk of being tackled by irate citizens or the
police. Repeatedly boards were seized and torn by citizens, actions
not always approved by others present, and at the end of June the
police, anticipating breaches of the peace, threatened arrest.
Ibid., W14, p. 1, W15, pp. 7, 10, W17, p. 1, W19, p. 1; Report of national conference.
Labour weekend 1939, NZCPS papers
When Burton emerged from prison in July 1940, the mild phase
of the war, when the idea of peace negotiations was not quite fantastic, had ended; fighting was on and conscription was in. During
August the more militant pacifists still urged that fighting should
cease and a world peace conference be called. In advance, Britain
should offer concessions, such as immediate freedom for India and
aid in reconstructing Europe; there should be self-determination for
all colonial people, including those of mandated territories, open
trade, open diplomacy, and disarmament. It was admitted that such
offers were harder to make than earlier, but it was never too late.
Ibid., W20, p. 4
A planned series of public meetings in the Wellington Trades Hall
was prohibited by the police, whereon the CPS wrote to the Prime
Minister that if the ban were sustained they must again take to the
streets.
Ibid., p. 8; Barrington to PM, 14 Sep 40, MS Papers 238, ATL
But even within the Society opinion was much divided,
pacifists unlike Communists being strongly individual in thought
and action. ‘Many thought that we had done all that was possible’,
wrote Burton in his autobiography,
O. E. Burton, typescript ‘Autobiography’ (hereinafter ‘Autobiography’), p. 420, ATL
‘and all that we could do now
was to remain quiet, help the conscientious objectors, where possible
put in a quiet word, and meet needs arising from the war wherever
there was opportunity. Others of us thought that irrespective of
consequences we should go ahead.’ All, however, felt that they should
help in any way possible with the war’s massive suffering.
To explore possibilities in this direction and to make their attitudes plain, in November 1940 a deputation met the Prime Minister
and the heads of National Service, Censorship, and Police. Burton
explained that their opposition to war was absolute and they must
bear witness to it, but they would be frank and open with the
authorities. They would do anything they could, without military
control, towards healing the wounds of war and helping the community, such as working with nerve cases or venereal disease patients.
He also explained that some of their young men, believing that they
should not shelter behind church resolutions, would not appeal
against military service, but take the path of defaulters. They expected
gaol, but hoped when they came out to attempt community farming,
and hoped also that the government would not obstruct their efforts
thus to build a unit which might be of real service to the
community.
Notes of deputation from NZCPS to PM, 18 Nov 40, War History File, ‘Defaulters
and Conscientious Objectors’ (hereinafter WHF, ‘Defaulters’)
The Prime Minister was ‘at his very finest—courteous, controlled,
and with a touch of real greatness’, wrote Burton.
He showed sympathy and understanding but said he had to be
practical. An individual conscientious objector who was willing
could be given alternative service but when a person believed it
his job to convince people that the war was wrong a conflict
inevitably arose. The State was representing the general consensus
of opinion of the people, and was compelled to uphold these
views. They could not permit anything which was subversive of
the country’s war effort…. The salvation of the country depended
upon winning the war, and it was necessary for the Government
to prevent the expounding of doctrines which would strike at the
foundations of the State. In their view it was better to suffer a
temporary handicap in regard to expression of opinion rather than
a permanent extinction of freedom of opinion.
Ibid.; Burton, ‘Autobiography’, p. 421
It was made clear that indoor meetings would not be permitted.
The activists decided that they must resume sacrificial witness
against the war, speaking at the Methodist memorial in Manners
Street, Wellington, on Friday nights, and volunteers were invited
from all over the country. ‘You do not need to be a good speaker
as there will not be time for many words. You will be arrested and
sentenced…. This may break your career and lose you your job but
it will help to keep a light burning.’
Burton, ‘Autobiography’, p. 422, quoting letter written to NZCPS members at the time
In court they would not use
counsel, but would again bear witness, stating their principles and
hoping to be reported in newspapers.
The NZCPS secretary, Barrington, wrote a cyclostyled notice
‘Defend Peace and Freedom at Home’ which urged that evil should
be met not by war but in ‘the Christian way of unremitting friendliness, co-operation and goodwill, at whatever risk or cost’. He
declared the Society’s right and determination to speak out, despite
‘the totalitarian usurping of power by the State acting in the fear
and frenzy inseparable from those who wage war’. As free men preserve their freedom only by exercising it, Friday meetings in Wellington would resume on 7 March 1941 at the Trades Hall. If
locked out, pacifists would speak in the streets and continue each
week while there was a volunteer to face arrest and imprisonment.
Copies were circulated modestly, and one was sent to the Wellington
police.
Barrington broadcast; Evening Post, 7 May 41, p. 11
On 7 March, in Manners Street, isolated cries of ‘Give him a fair
go’, ‘Where’s our freedom of speech’, greeted the arrest of Arthur
Carman,
Carman, Arthur Herbert (1902–82): bookseller, author, Quaker, Wgtn Hospital Board
member 1935–41, 1944-, chmn 1960–2, and other civic posts
well-known citizen, Methodist lay preacher and bookseller.
Dominion, 8 Mar 41, p. 13
Two months later in the Supreme Court he was charged
with holding a prohibited meeting
This charge, laid under the emergency regulations, was the first of its kind.
and with publishing a subversive statement. He had enclosed about a dozen copies of ‘Defend
Peace and Freedom at Home’ with his accounts, and eight were
intercepted in the post. The jury held that his single statement ‘We
have been prohibited from the Trades Hall’ did not amount to
holding a meeting, whatever his expressed intentions may have been,
but he was convicted on the second charge and received the maximum sentence of a year in prison.
Evening Post, 27 Mar, 7, 8, 10 May 41, pp. 11, 11, 11, 7
Meanwhile on 14 March, a 21-year-old school teacher, J. H.
Woodley, had uttered his few words and on 9 May was sentenced
to six months for attempting to hold a prohibited meeting.
Ibid., 27 Mar, 10 May 41, pp. 11, 7
On
21 March Barrington took the stand, was arrested, and in due course
he was awarded a year’s imprisonment both for holding a prohibited
meeting and for publishing a subversive document, his cyclostyled
notice.
Ibid., 26 Mar, 6, 7, 10 May 41, pp. 11, 8, 11, 7. The terms were concurrent and with
normal remission he actually served 10 months.
After D. Silvester on 28 March made his brief witness, he
was first sentenced in the Magistrate’s Court to three months on the
familiar charge of obstructing the police, then sent to the Supreme
Court for holding a prohibited meeting, as were the speakers for
the next four Fridays—J. R. Hamerton, J. Doherty, O. E. Burton
and J. W. Boal. At Silvester’s first trial on 2 April, J. H. Luxford
SM
Luxford, John Hector, CMG(’52) (1890–): SM from 1928; Chief Judge Wn Samoa
1929–35; principal SM Auck 1953–6
remarked that the law seemed inadequate. Christian pacifists
had become an asocial body because of their obsessions and their
honest but, to the normal person, erroneous interpretation of Scripture; prison was not the place for them, but authority would be
justified in putting them out of the way for the duration. It was,
he said, almost Gilbertian that they should defy the law and get
crowds out week after week while each time only one person was
arrested. He had been told that there were 500 CPS members; if
they all volunteered the process could continue for 10 years.
Dominion, 3 Apr 41, p. 11
No doubt trying to get at the root of the problem the police,
when they charged John Hamerton with obstructing a policeman
on 4 April, also charged Burton with aiding the offence. For this
Burton was on 23 April sentenced to three months’ gaol. On a
further charge of obstruction, when he himself spoke on 18 April,
he was sentenced to an additional three months.
Evening Post, 10, 23 Apr 41, pp. 9, 10
On 5 and 9 May these five speakers were convicted on the Supreme
Court charge of holding prohibited meetings.
Ibid., 6, 10, 16 May 41, pp. 11, 7, 9
As they refused to
be represented by counsel, and as a phrase in the Emergency Regulations Act 1939 stated that no person should be punished twice
for the same offence,
Clause 9 (2). ‘Nothing in this Act or in any emergency regulations shall be so construed
or shall so operate as to take away or restrict the liability of any person for any offence
punishable independently of this Act, but no person shall be punished twice for the
same offence.’
the Chief Justice required that the Court of
Appeal should decide whether this offence was substantially the same
as that for which they had each already been sentenced by the magistrate. On 10 and 11 June, with counsel E. S. Parry, instructed by
the Crown, appearing for the prisoners, five judges—Myers, Blair,
Blair, Hon Sir Archibald, Kt(’46) (1875–1952): Judge Supreme Court 1928–48
Callan,
Callan, Hon John Bartholomew, KC (1882–1951): Judge Supreme Court 1935–49
Kennedy
Kennedy, Hon Sir Robert, Kt(’49) (1887–1974): Judge Supreme Court 1929–50
and Northcroft—considered the legal problems. The pacifists could not follow the intricacies, but they enjoyed
the spectacle: ‘Everything was very homely and jolly…. The old
gentlemen were very much like so many puppies with a good smelly
bone’, wrote the irreverent Burton. ‘Strings and strings of precedents
were quoted on both sides…. No attempt was made to get down
to the real inwardness of it all as to what was just and fair and
right.’
Burton, ‘Autobiography’, pp. 436–7
The double conviction was finally deemed proper; accordingly Burton, the ‘head and forefront’ of the movement, was sentenced to 11 months in prison and the others to five and six months,
concurrent with the terms they were already serving.
Evening Post 10, 11, 27 Jun, 1 Jul 41, pp. 9, 9, 8, 8
Meanwhile on 9 May, to counter the jibe that the attempted
speeches and resulting sentences were a ‘funk-hole’ for men liable
to be called in the ballot,
Ibid., 30 Apr 41, p. 11, at trial of J. W. Boal
a young woman, Connie Jones, had
spoken. She was charged only with obstruction because, said the
police, they were being as considerate to her as possible.
Ibid., 12 May 41, p. 8; NZCPS Bulletin W29, p. 10
The next
three speakers, H. R. Bray, B. C. Dowling
Dowling, Basil Cairns (1910–): author; Presbyterian min 1939–41; librarian 1947–51,
chmn Otago Branch NZLA 1948–9; since teaching English in London
and R. J. Scarlett,
were treated likewise, as the prohibited meeting charge was then
being referred to the Court of Appeal.
Evening Post, 19 May, 3, 9 Jun 41, pp. 8, 9, 9
On every Friday, except two, from 7 March to 6 June 1941 a
Christian Pacifist demonstrated in Wellington and was arrested,
sometimes before crowds of two or three hundred. In June, with 12
speakers under sentences ranging from three to twelve months, the
Wellington meetings paused. They were renewed for a few weeks
in October–November. John Doherty, just out of prison, told the
police on 24 October that he would speak that evening, carrying
on from where he had been interrupted six months earlier. He did
so and was returned to prison for three months for obstructing, being
followed on succeeding Fridays by J. Willets, D. Silvester again and
A. Shearer, all duly arrested.
Ibid., 29 Oct, 1, 10, 17 Nov 41, pp. 9, 10, 9, 9
Public witness was again taken up at Auckland, with speeches in
the Domain on five Sundays of November and December 1941. No
disorder occurred, for speakers were not allowed to get past their
Bible-reading preliminaries. All five were sentenced to three months
gaol for obstructing the police.
NZ Herald, 28 Nov, 9, 12, 17, 23 Dec 41, pp. 9, 6, 8, 9, 4
On the further charge of holding
prohibited meetings Mr Justice Fair,
Fair, Hon Sir Arthur, KC(’25) (1885–1970): Solicitor-General 1925; Judge Supreme
Court, Court of Appeal 1934–55
speaking of their intellectual
and religious arrogance and taking into account their previous sentences for similar offences, sent Boal and Bray to prison for 10 months,
concurrent with their lower court sentences.
NZ Herald, 6, 7, 13 Feb 42, pp. 7, 8, 2
To C. R. Howell,
who had also published a pamphlet
Ibid., 27 Jan, 6, 7, 14 Feb 42, pp. 4, 7, 8, 4
and who made a 90-minute
speech from the dock, Mr Justice Callan gave 12 months for the
pamphlet, cumulative on the three he was already serving, and 10
for the prohibited meeting charge, concurrent with the other sentences. He remarked that Howell had considerable facility of expression, both in speech and writing, and it was the plain duty of the
Court to keep such a person quiet in war time. The other two speakers, J. Riddell and Hamerton, were not charged twice.
Ibid., 17, 23 Dec 41, pp. 9, 4; NZCPS Bulletin W38, p. 5
At the Wellington trial of Silvester on 10 November 1941, the
magistrate, J. L. Stout, remarked that if the leaders of the movement
had been interned for the duration at the start of the war, much
trouble might have been saved. Burton himself wrote later:
I think the Government from its own point of view was wrong.
Immediately after my first meeting and without trial, I should
have been removed—with Barry [Barrington] and our families—
to the smallest of the inhabited islands of say the Cook group.
We should have been given shelter and rations. If I was willing
to teach the local school I should have been paid. Occasionally
small notices should have appeared in the Press saying what good
work I was doing with the children—but every line of communication with the outside world should have been cut.
Burton, ‘Autobiography’, p. 389
Short of such decisiveness, the police and armed forces appeal boards
did what they could piecemeal. Michael Young, secretary of the
Peace Pledge Union, whose conscience appeal had been dismissed
and who served three months for failing to report,
Dominion, 11 Dec 41, p. 3. Stout SM remarked that considering his subversive activities
it would be foolish to send him to make trouble in a defaulters’ camp.
was in May
1942 given two years’ hard labour for subversive publishing (including Laval-like statements about Britain leaving France in the lurch).
The Chief Justice said that the appropriate penalty would be incarceration for the duration and deprivation of civil rights for a lengthy
period.
Ibid., 26 Feb, 8, 15 May 42, pp. 8, 6, 3
Barrington, emerging from prison in February 1942, was immediately charged again with subversive publishing in the first Bulletin
after his release, No 38. This Bulletin was throughout fairly mild,
the identity of its editor confused: it was compiled by the Auckland
group which had run the publication while Barrington was in prison;
as the Society’s national secretary, his home address was reinstated
on the heading of Bulletin W38 and he was asked to write on how
he then felt about things. His article, after remarking on the imprisonment of Howell, who had lately been CPS secretary, and on Howell’s current trial for a document headed ‘Peace on Earth, Goodwill
to Men’,
See p. 199
was chiefly concerned with the attitudes of pacifists both
in their inner lives and towards Emergency Precautions activities,
which lately had been made compulsory.
Barrington wrote that the war makers, who had enlarged their
operations tremendously, talked in terms of tanks and planes, not
of human misery. Pacifists needed a ‘deepening sense of identification’ with the world’s suffering, in two ways. They should imaginatively think of, ‘feel’, the individual suffering of individual families
like their own, Belgian, German, British, Russian or Japanese, or
of a town caught in the blast of war. They should also identify
with the war makers themselves, the Hitlers, Stalins, Churchills
and the others, and the millions of lesser lights, the soldiers who
honestly feel they are fighting for noble ends and the greater number who fight because they are driven. We cannot share their war
making in any way, we must continue to win them and all the
world to peace, but we must always remember that our own sin
and insufficiency, our own failures in charity, our own frequent
violence of mind or of spirit, our own selfishness and compromise,
our poor showing forth of the Christian life have helped to make
the war and the war makers what they are. A big part of our
work for peace must always be the bold showing forth of life as
it should be in ‘the good society’. ‘Sensitiveness’ is the key to the
core of the matter. It is necessary continually to test ours in relation to those nearest to us, to prepare to love Hitler by practising
nearer home.
As for fire-watching and EPS work, Barrington wrote that both were
part of the organisation of the whole people for the more effectual
prosecution of the war, making it less and less possible for the people
to ask for peace, and as such he could not share in these activities.
But pacifists could put out fires, tend the wounded, or rescue people
from bombed buildings. They could work in separate units without becoming part of the general mobilisation and agitation. Such
independent units had worked well in England, and had helped to
lessen hostility towards pacifists and conscientious objectors generally.
NZCPS Bulletin W38, Mar 42, p. 2
Elsewhere, the Bulletin contained reference to a new editor
taking over,
In NZCPS Bulletin W41, Jun 42, p. 2, Burton explained that the editor of W38 was
Rev R. W. Mayson who, when Barrington was charged, wrote to the Registrar of the
Supreme Court claiming full responsibility.
there were branch notes including discussion of EPS
service, comment on the Auckland witnessing, a long section of ‘Fruit
plucked from books’, and a request for the names of all members
who had appeared before armed forces appeal boards.
Four copies, postmarked 10 March 1942, were picked up by
censorship, and Barrington was charged with publishing, or attempting to publish, a subversive document.
Evening Post, 23 Apr 42, p. 9
In the Supreme Court, on
13 May, a jury could not agree; another, on 18 May, convicted him
on the second charge.
Ibid., 14, 20 May 42, pp. 6, 6
Chief Justice Myers, always punctilious in
matters of law, said that certain points should be decided by the
Court of Appeal, which heard the case on 10 June and on 28 July
quashed the conviction.
Ibid., 10 Jun, 28 Jul 42, pp. 6, 3; New Zealand Law Reports1942, pp. 502–22
Meanwhile Burton
He had been dismissed from the Methodist ministry in February (Dominion,
28 Feb 42, p. 6) and was stacking fruit boxes and making ice-cream. Burton, ‘Autobiography’, p. 451
had become editor of the Bulletin, and he
too was charged with subversive publishing, in No 41 of 6 June
1942, written while Barrington’s Court of Appeal hearing was pending. The charge rested on some rather Sassoon-like poetry by a young
Waikato girl, and a strong-toned editorial. This stated that Barrington’s two trials were very significant. The war had never been
popular: the British government was very vague about its purpose;
all the things being said about freedom, democracy and a new world
had been said in the last war and everyone knew the troubles that
had followed. Ordinary men had no clear idea what they were fighting for: they had been ‘bluffed, cajoled, or bullied’ into taking part;
but without belief men could not continue great suffering indefinitely. Lest Barrington’s ideas—that love was stronger than hate and
that a man crucified for love’s sake was stronger than his executioner—should infect crowds of ordinary people, he had to be put
in prison. The time would come when ‘like the Russians in 1917,
ordinary folk will just go home, and then the slaughter will come
to an end…. The first sign of this movement towards sanity may
well be that juries of the common folk will refuse to convict on
subversion charges men, whose whole wish is for peace and universal
brotherhood.’ If the first jury had actually acquitted Barrington, or
if the second one had also disagreed, ‘it would have been a major
disaster for a Government that is leading us along the brimstone
track to confusion and chaos. Sooner or later there will be acquittals
and then the end of the bloodshed will be near…. The time is
coming when men will refuse to continue with the useless, senseless,
slaughter.’
Burton wrote out of burning conviction. G. H. Scholefield,
Scholefield, Guy Hardy, CMG(’48), OBE(’19), JP (1877–1963): journalist, London
correspondent NZ Associated Press 1908–19; Parly Librarian & Dom Archivist
1926–48; foreign aff broadcaster
who
was not a pacifist, noting in his diary on 13 May 1942 that the jury
could not agree to convict Barrington, continued: ‘I would not be
surprised to find that there is a growing feel of uneasiness on the
part of the public against these prosecutions. What people are openly
calling the gestapo has been prominent in various prosecutions lately
and is said to have insisted on some cases being brought against the
advice of the government’s counsel.’
But for Burton, on 23 October 1942, there was no acquittal. The
jury convicted him, with a strong recommendation to mercy, generous in an anxious time.
These were the worrying days before the breakthrough at El Alamein and before the
American hold on Guadalcanal was certain.
Mr Justice Blair, who was kindly and
courteous throughout the trial, acknowledged Burton’s honesty—‘a
lot of mad people are honest’—but said that ordinary people believed
it the plain duty of everyone to repel the attacker. There were too
many conscientious objectors already, and these statements were
intended to attract others. He stressed the duty of rendering unto
Caesar what was Caesar’s, and explained that although the statutory
penalty was a year in prison he could also impose reformative detention of up to 10 years; he would, however, impose only two and a
half years in all, this being his—very accurate—estimate of the length
of the war.
Dominion, 24, 28 Oct 42, pp. 10, 6
The sentence attracted attention in British pacifist circles, and a
few notable war resisters took up their pens for Burton. In July
1943, writing to the New Zealand government, three members of
the House of Lords, and 14 of the Commons, expressed grave concern at Burton’s sentence ‘which appears to us to savour of persecution’, especially as his statements were made in a duplicated news-sheet for private circulation among people holding similar views. As
in Britain there was still a reasonable and tolerant attitude to the
expression of opinion, even of opposition to the war, surely New
Zealand need not fear allowing the practice of the principles for
which the Allies were said to be fighting.
Quoted in NZCPS Bulletin W61, May 44, p. 1
Not having received a reply by 1 December, they cabled a series
of reminders to Fraser, Nash and others. Meanwhile the answer of
the Minister of Justice, dated 12 October 1943, which reached England in January, assured Lord Ponsonby
Ponsonby, Lord Arthur Augustus William Harry, 1st Baron of Shulbrede (’30) (1871–
1946): diplomatic service 1894–1902; MP (Lib) 1908–18; Under-Sec State Foreign Aff
1924; Parly Under-Sec Doms 1929, Sec Min Transport 1929–31; Leader Oppos HoL
1931–5
and his friends that Burton’s case had received careful thought; his character and record
made this a ‘most painful case’ but he had been most persistent
despite repeated convictions. New Zealand cherished freedom and
justice, but this did not mean licence to incite others to action that
would play into the hands of its enemies.
NZCPS Bulletin W61, May 44, pp. 1–2
From America some
18 senior ministers in Protestant churches, including several bishops,
wrote on lines similar to those of the peace-men of England.
Ibid., p. 2. These overseas protests of 1943 could be seen as forerunners of the name-bearing advertisements (eg. NZ Listener, 7 Jun 68) that appeared in support of Dr
Spock and others who 25 years later faced possible terms of 5 years in prison for inciting
young Americans against service in Vietnam
With
the normal remissions for good conduct, Burton actually served only
20 months, emerging at dawn on 2 June 1944.
This was the last major incident on the pacifist front. Already
many of the sacrificial witnesses had gone into defaulters’ detention,
whence several graduated to prison for non-co-operation. Even with
these the armed forces appeal boards displayed their well-known
variations: thus the appeal of 40-year-old Arthur Carman, who had
a very long and well attested record as a conscientious objector, was
dismissed on 4 March 1943 but that of Barrington, several years
younger, was allowed by the same board, with the comment that
if there were two genuine conscientious objectors in New Zealand,
they were Burton and Barrington.
Barrington broadcast
Despite the numerous prosecutions and stiff sentences, the Christian Pacifists’ candour made their relations with the police oddly
amicable. In all the investigations which the police were required
to make in respect of this movement it was found that in essential
things the organisation adhered to the principles indicated to the
Prime Minister,
By the deputation of 18 Nov 40. See p. 195
and on the numerous occasions when the law was
infringed they displayed a total frankness, both in the commission
of the offences and towards the investigating authority.
WHN, ‘Police Department’, p. 209
It was
quite usual, especially during the period of the Manners Street meetings, for the police to telephone inquiring whether there would be
a speaker that Friday, adjusting the number of men on duty according to the answer.
Mrs Burton to author, 28 Jan 68. NZCPS Bulletin W29, p. 9, records such a conversation, on 24 Apr 41, the day before Good Friday. ‘Detective Brown: Is your meeting
tonight or tomorrow night? A.C.B.: Tomorrow night. That will save you coming out
in force tonight. Detective Brown: Right. Thanks very much.’
Police who visited Barrington to examine his
typewriter and carry off miscellaneous papers etc were the ‘height of
courtesy and geniality’, and they were served with tea and matching
courtesy,
Ibid., p. 5
though, as Barrington explained later, he did not show
them the stencils behind his father’s portrait, the files hurriedly
shoved into his daughter’s cot or the pamphlets under a heap of
sand in the basement.
Barrington broadcast
Pacifists had no organised line of conduct or belief, each thinking
out his own position, deciding for himself what was God’s and what
Caesar’s. Thus the total number was never actively behind any one
form of protest. There were many, indeed, who for the sake of their
jobs and their families remained quiet, though they gave sympathy
and money to those convinced that they must oppose the war at
whatever cost. Hopes that the government would be embarrassed
by widespread, steady, respectable opposition were therefore disappointed. It was a lonely few who lost their jobs or went to prison,
and inevitably these felt some bitterness towards those who did not
stand shoulder to shoulder at the outer ditches of war resistance. For
instance, Bulletin W33 remarked on the success of the State’s ‘divide
and conquer’ policy over the order, on 7 June 1941, that married
men should at once register for service: all who obeyed assisted conscription to work smoothly, yet only a few refused, so that authority,
instead of having to gaol more than a hundred men, some in prominent positions, had to deal with a mere handful. Again, some when
their appeals against military service were dismissed accepted non-combatant service, some disappeared quietly into defaulters’ camps,
while others found it necessary to resist all the way, courting imprisonment and hardship. Probably those who had strong religious faith,
passionate belief in the crucified Christ, could fight the anti-war
battle most stoutly, for fight they did. This strong faith, plus the
vital personalities and steady work of a devoted core, were perhaps
why in police estimation the Christian Pacifist Society was more
formidable than the Peace Pledge Union, which was described as ‘a
rather futile movement of little organisation’ which met in private
homes in most of the larger centres, issuing fairly regular newsheets
mainly about these discussions and quoting pacifist propaganda from
other journals.
WHN, ‘Police Department’, p. 210
A fair proportion of Christian Pacifist Society members were
clergymen and many other clergy were pacifistic, but the churches
with increasing firmness took the view that the war was necessary
to preserve conditions in which Christianity could survive, and that
church unity must not be endangered by unreasonable preaching.
Even the most forthright few were silenced by these pressures. Burton provided a formidable warning. The 1940 Methodist Manifesto
on War insisted that neither recuiting propaganda nor pacifism
should be preached from pulpits but Burton, claiming that so long
as he did not speak against Church doctrines he must be free to
speak his mind, refused to accept this limitation, and in February
1942 was dismissed from the ministry.
‘For myself and Helen and the children it was the worst of all the things that happened.’
Burton, ‘Autobiography’, p. 449
Other peace-minded clergy,
while making no secret of their views, forebore to press them too
strongly. The majority, knowing that otherwise they would create
schism and lose their congregations, remained patiently silent, with
how much unhappiness it is impossible to guess; presumably for
them as for so many other people, as time passed the war moved
out of the sensitive reaches of the mind, was deplored and accepted.
Active pacifists stranded by the withdrawal lamented:
‘God!’ Shake the church wide awake! Here are men in your
own midst gaoled because they dare to be Christian in the face
of a Godless State. Some day when someone writes a supplement
to Baxter’s book entitled, say ‘We Did Not Cease’ people will
read the history of these times and with eyes hot with tears will
ask whether these things really happened. But they are happening
and the Churches are still more concerned with their tiddly winking problems and their endless discussions on trivialities than they
are with the sweep of world trends as evidenced on a small scale
by the gaoling of Christian men for being Christian…. No church
has raised an official voice about the treatment of C.O.s—and it
seems hardly likely they will. No Church has raised a voice about
the very dangerous curtailment of liberty of assembly and speech
as shown recently in the high hand action of the Auck. City
Council with regard to meetings of the Rationalists and the Aid
to Russia Committee. The Church will pay heavily for its present
unholy alliance with the State.
Bulletin W32, p 8 [c. Jun 41]
Young men in detention camps bleakly watched those who in Bible
classes had helped to mould their ideas now take an apologetic
attitude towards them,
Ibid., W68, p. 8
realising that one after another of these
mentors had proved amenable to non-pacifist suggestion, at least to
the extent of silence. For some the cup overflowed with the expulsion
of Burton. ‘It was the influence of his writing and speaking and the
selfless pattern of his living that to more than a handful brought
the profound conviction that if men would go all the way with
Christ they … and society itself could be saved in a very practical
as well as a mystical sense, and brought the knowledge that for
them the choice had narrowed to that of giving Christianity over or
going the limit. And yet when the showdown came O.E.B. had to
go and go alone.’
Copy of unidentified letter from Hautu Camp, dated ‘Feb. 1943’, in Barrington MS
Papers 439/81
Various social pressures beset pacifists. There was of course the
distress of parents or friends who could not understand or respect
their views. In the first year or so, until manpower needs were sharp,
an outspoken pacifist was likely to lose his job, and mere anticipation
of this, amid rising prices and Depression-bred fears, made for silence.
So too did several subtle but strong influences described in the Bulletin of March 1944:
While rationally we know that all the alleged arguments to prove
us heretics, traitors, cowards and members of a despicable sect are
false, are often purely emotional, too often, by our actions and
lack of action we show that the propaganda has been effective.
Against our convictions we are being forced into silences and whisperings; into keeping our talk on pacifism and all related things
among the initiated only.
We get new jobs and keep quiet so that we shall not be thought
abnormal people. It was so uncomfortable in our last job where
we and our views were so well known. Some of our friends are
in Detention Camp. Since there is a stigma attached to C.O.s it
is so easy never to discuss them, never to speak of corresponding
with them, but to keep it a simple secret. And we can always be
sure to post the letters ourselves so that no one shall see the
addresses….
Often we are ashamed. The battle of the emotions has gone
against us. The constant attacks have created a situation which
we by our silences and artificial conversations admit to be real
while denying it strongly with our wills. Not that we advocate
constant profession of this one article of our faith…. Whatever
be the subject, some of us always get round to pacifism and defeat
our cause by sheer monotony. The fault, however, is more often
to be found in the silence of shame.
NZCPS Bulletin W59, p. 1, Mar 44
Further, a pacifist’s adversities were fully shared by his family, which
also had to face the disapproval of the community. A woman whose
husband was away in the Army had the sympathy of everyone in
her loneliness, but it was another matter for one with a husband in
detention. Fortunately defaulters were mainly single or childless, but
other pacifists had children and were vulnerable through them.
Mothers grieved over children returning from school in tears or with
shut faces, having been jeered at or avoided. There were of course
some ‘saints’ who did not join in playground teasing, which teachers
did not always combat, and a few even stood up for the oppressed.
A few pacifist offspring managed to overcome prejudice by excelling
in sport.
‘I had to play football very hard’, the son of A. C. Barrington told the author in 1967;
one of his teachers said to his father ‘Your son won’t be a pacifist, Archie, he’s too
good at rugby.’
The Christian Pacifists found themselves at odds with most other
professed Christians: as the Chief Justice pointed out, either the vast
majority had renounced Christianity or there was conceit and vanity
in those protesting.
Evening Post, 8 May 41, p. 11
Some pacifists were themselves aware that they
risked smugness. ‘It would be foolish and snobbish’, wrote one, ‘for
the pacifist to think of himself as the only person with a conscience
towards war’; among the soldiers, multitudes had thought their way
though the war situation, hated it, but took part in it as an ugly
necessity, suffering discipline, heat, danger, wounds and death for
consciences’ sake.
NZCPS Bulletin W34, p. 7, Sep 41
Early in 1943, the Bulletin referred to ‘mutual
commiseration gatherings of pacifists’ protesting about their own
wrongs, not those of suffering humanity, and gave a parable. A
soldier and a pacifist went to a church to pray. The pacifist was
righteous, thankful he was not as other men; he had lost his job
but saved his soul. The soldier was humble, saying ‘I know it’s all
wrong Lord, but in honesty I can see no other way. Yet I love thee
Lord.’
Ibid., W49, p. 3, Feb 43
In April 1944 a front page article by a Presbyterian minister,
A. A. Brash,
Brash, Alan Anderson, OBE(’62) (1913–): Presbyterian minister Wanganui 1938–46,
Chch 1952–6; Gen Sec Nat Cl Churches 1947–52, 1957–64; Sec E Asia Christian Conf
1964–7; Dir Christian Aid 1968–70; Dir World Cl Churches Cmssn on Inter-Church
Aid, Refugee and World Service 1970–3, later Dep Gen Sec World Cl Churches
speaking of soldiers who were far better Christians
than himself, warned pacifists against intolerance, against blundering
outspokenness which hardened prejudice against them, and against
conceit—‘almost every pacifist I know is guilty of spiritual pride,
and the pacifist I know best is myself.’
NZCPS Bulletin W60, p. 1, Apr 44
A handful turned towards communal living on farms, pooling
resources and joining in work, fellowship and prayer, in hopes of
building centres of Christian living and of refuge for jobless pacifists.
By August 1940, a tiny fruit-growing community was under way
at Moutere,
Ibid., W20, p. 5, Aug 40
and about April 1942 another was started on a dairy
farm at Otorohanga.
Ibid., W39, p. 5, Apr 42
The latter barely survived the war, but Riverside Community at Moutere was able to grow both in its acres
and its people,
Ibid., W58, p. 2, Jan 44, W67, p.8, Nov 44
remaining prosperous and vital 40 years later.
CHAPTER 6
A Dissenting Minority
PACIFISTS were the first targets of the drive against subversion
that gathered force along with the recruiting campaign. Then, as
the question of conscription sharpened amid the deepening gloom
of April, May and June 1940, Communists plus a wide range of
‘subversive elements’ came under fire.
The first prosecutions of Communists, as of pacifists, arose from
street meetings. The Auckland Communists regularly held a meeting
at Quay Street on Sunday afternoons. On 28 January 1940, after
Ormond Burton had been arrested nearby, there was a large crowd,
and boisterous soldiers chanted, sang and pushed about during the
two-hour meeting, wherein W. Ashton
Ashton, William (d 1965aet 73): foundn member Otago Plasterers’ Assn
and T. Stanley were arrested,
like Burton, for obstructing the police and obstructing a public place.
NZ Herald, 29 Jan, 1 Feb 40, pp. 6, 11
The acumen of their lawyer got them acquitted on the first charge,
for which Burton was fined £10, but on the second they were fined
£2.
Tomorrow, 21 Feb 40, vol VI, p. 254
Later two other speakers were convicted for obstructing a public
place, but as further communist meetings had meanwhile been called
off, the Court imposed no penalty.
NZ Herald, 10, 17 Feb 40, pp. 8, 13
That same night, 28 January, again at Auckland some servicemen,
a few wielding belts, tried to enter a Newton hall where Communists
were holding a meeting, and threw eggs and tomatoes through a
broken skylight. The police kept them out till an Army captain
persuaded them to withdraw to one end of the street, while the
people in the hall were escorted in the opposite direction, dispersing
through side streets. Outside the hall a civilian jumped on to a
window-sill, shouting ‘I have never spoken in public before, and I
won’t be much good. But I am frightened, I am frightened for
democracy….’ He was arrested, but not convicted, the magistrate
holding that he genuinely had had no desire to antagonise anyone
or cause trouble, though his judgment had been wrong.
Ibid., 29 Jan, 1 Feb 40, pp. 6, 11
To the Quay Street communist meetings on the next two Sundays
came crowds of more than 2000, attracted largely by prospects of
trouble, but including many who went ‘not as Communists but as
supporters of free speech and the right of assembly’.
Ibid., 5 Feb 40, p. 9
On 4 February,
a strong police force with the unwanted assistance of the crowd
separated the Communists from the soldiers’ party, which good-humouredly drowned the speakers’ voices for more than two hours;
differing opinions were expressed in the crowd and the ‘general spirit
of the meeting was anti-recruiting’.
Ibid.
On 11 February the first and
only speaker was overwhelmed in a rush, and shreds of a calico
banner decorated soldiers’ hats. Thereafter, as most of the crowd was
present to witness trouble rather than to cause it, ‘excitement rather
than bad feeling distinguished the rushes that were almost invariably
aimless, ending as suddenly as they began. Indeed, in several spirited
scrimmages, in which there appeared to be no “beg pardons”, police,
soldiers and sailors jested together as they struggled. These encounters always ended in cheers by dishevelled soldiers and sailors for
the police. As much by their good humour and jests, as by their
weighty and scientifically-packed wedges, that always split any rush,
the police restrained the crowds’.
Ibid., 12 Feb 40, p. 8; Evening Post, 12 Feb 40, p. 9
One Communist was arrested for
striking a soldier,
He was later fined £1. In two other fights in these Sunday frolics F. H. Levien SM found
that soldiers had been aggressive. NZ Herald, 17 Feb, 9 Mar 40, pp. 13, 15
but the police clearly avoided arrests, though
‘they suffered much provocation. Several were thrown down in the
course of the struggles, in which wrestling and pushing was the
general rule rather than hitting’.
Ibid., 12 Feb 40, p. 8
This was all good clean fun and
it seems possible that the soldiers were disappointed when on 14
February the Communists announced that there would be no further
meetings at Quay Street. Both the Auckland press reports and the
law had been tolerant and objective about these clashes, but an
Evening Post editorial remarked on ‘the absurd spectacle of a large
body of police and detectives turned out to assure protection for
Communist speakers.’
Evening Post, 7 Feb 40
Auckland’s by-laws required permits for meetings only in Queen
Street or within 50 yards of it, in other busy streets or in Albert
Park.
NZ Herald, 3 Feb 40, p. 10
On 2 February the Council, on the casting vote of the Mayor,
Sir Ernest Davis,
Davis, Sir Ernest, Kt(’37) (1872–1962): Mayor Auck 1935–41
decided to make no change, and communist street
meetings continued, producing several charges of subversion in the
next few months. Most other civic authorities were more suppressive.
In Wellington the Communists’ permit, like that of the Christian
Pacifists, was speedily withdrawn. Christchurch banned them, along
with the Anti-Conscription League, on 6 October. The Petone
Borough Council inconclusively debated on 11 December whether
they should be allowed to hold meetings on the foreshore,
One councillor thought that they should be allotted a ‘decent place on the beach’, adding
‘The Hon. Robert Semple is after the Communists at the present time and I think we
can leave them to him.’ Evening Post, 12 Dec 40, p. 4
but
decided against it on 12 February. At Whangarei, meetings likely
to cause a breach of the peace were not to be allowed in any reserve
or public building.
NZ Herald, 10 Feb 40, p. 12
At Whakatane it was decided that henceforth
any meetings must first be approved by the Council; one member
spoke of Hyde Park and free speech, but even to him communist
meetings were unthinkable.
Bay of Plenty Beacon, 14 Feb 40
The Hamilton Domain Board at the
request of the police in May withdrew permission for communist
meetings in their park.
NZ Herald, 16 May 40, p. 8
The Mt Albert Borough Council in April
permitted them fortnightly, subject to traffic control.
Ibid., 10 Apr 40, p. 8
In the early months of the war, police attended all public meetings of Communists and pacifists, not only to suppress disorder but
to record the views expressed, which were referred to the Solicitor-General for advice on their degree of subversiveness.
A total prohibition was not imposed on the public meetings of
the Communist Party, although several prosecutions were successfully taken…. Several of the more able speakers having been
sentenced to terms of imprisonment, public meetings had almost
ceased and were of little moment at the time Russia became
involved in the war.
WHN, ‘Police Department’, pp. 228–9, 216
The party did not, however, depend on public meetings to set forth
its views. Through personal contact in work-places and in unions,
in the weekly People’s Voice, and in leaflets printed and distributed,
by thousands, Communists attacked the war for advancing imperialist and sectional interests and attacked the government for betraying the workers to these interests. Such propaganda also praised and
explained the ways of Russia. In some minds, doubt and dislike of
the war grew into actual opposition, and party membership rose.
According to police estimates, in 1935–6 there were 243 Communists, about 111 of them in Auckland; immediately before the
war there were about 300, and 690 in 1941.
Ibid., pp. 207, 240–1
The party also claimed
an increase, though it did not publish membership figures. The
People’s Voice gave its circulation as 6700 copies in July 1939,
People’s Voice, 10 Nov 39, p. 1
rising to 9500 by 15 December and more than 10 000 by 16 February 1940. In March the Auckland provincial secretary declared
that the party’s fight for free speech and its attitude to the war were
attracting a steady flow of recruits: during the last month every
branch in the province had increased, so that Auckland now had
almost as many members as the whole country had had twelve
months ago. Wellington numbers were also increasing, Christchurch,
formerly a weak point, had seen a remarkable influx, and new
branches were forming on the West Coast; even Dunedin, in April,
decided to form a People’s Voice readers’ group.
Ibid., 8, 21 Mar, 12 Apr 40, pp. 4, 5, 1
At the Auckland
West by-election in May, to replace Savage, Gordon Watson gained
368 votes, the highest till then recorded for a communist candidate,
while Labour’s man P. Carr
Carr, Peter (1884–1946): MP (Lab) Auckland West from 1940; Pres Auck Tramways
Union 1928–40
had 6151 and the Independent Conservative W. H. Fortune,
Fortune, Wilfred Henry (1897–1961): MP (Nat) Eden 1946–54; Min Police, etc
1949–54
2958.
The definition of subversive statements in the new Public Safety
Emergency Regulations of 26 February 1940 clearly bore more
directly against communist activities. False reports, reports likely to
impair relations with a friendly state, and those likely to undermine
confidence in government financial policy were no longer included.
Statements likely to cause disaffection to the Crown, or to interfere
with the success of the armed forces, to prejudice their recruiting,
training and discipline, or to disrupt morale, remained subversive
and to these were added statements likely to cause undue alarm, to
interfere with any law relating to military training or service or the
administration of justice, or to interfere with the production of anything associated with the war effort. As before, no one should do
any act, or possess any thing with a view to making or facilitating
the publication of a subversive statement. Still no prosecution could
be brought without the consent of the Attorney-General, but now
the police could stop or prohibit any meeting likely to injure public
safety, and could arrest offenders without warrant, while their powers
of search were much increased.
The mid-March discovery of communist-printed yellow stickers—
‘Down with conscription and the imperialist war’—on boxes of butter bound for England
Evening Post, 13 Mar 40, p. 7
was one of the first forms of subversion to
excite public attention, useful in that month of apathy. A cartoon
by Minhinnick showed evil-looking rats crawling up ship mooring-ropes above the caption ‘Bigger rat guards needed’,
NZ Herald, 15 Mar 40, p. 8
while Fraser
declared that these misguided workers were doing the greatest wrong
to their country: dockers in London or Liverpool might be disturbed,
and their faith in New Zealand shaken.
Ibid., 18 Mar 40, p. 15
In May a watersider was
fined £10 for putting on such stickers in a coastal vessel, and the
Court warned that in future penalties would be much higher, up
to £100 or three months in gaol.
Evening Post, 3 May 40, p. 8
The first subversive statement trials did not take place till mid-April 1940, though early in February it was decided to prosecute.
War History Narrative, ‘Censorship of the Press’, chap III, p. 4a, quoting police file
S40/180
In a group, the acting editor of the People’s Voice, C. J. Gould, and
its publisher, D. McCarthy, were tried for its issues of 9 and 16
February, along with W. Ashton and W. G. Dickenson, both of
the Auckland Communist party’s provincial committee, for writing
and publishing pamphlets in October, January and February. A non-communist printer was tried for printing them. The pamphlets denied
the sincerity of the Allies’ war aims, and stressed the anti-Soviet
purposes of Chamberlain’s government, the profits of bankers and
industrialists, and the misery and loss of workers in war. Fines totalling £190 were imposed.
Standard, 18, 25 Apr 40, pp. 7, 7
At the end of May, in the midst of the
conscription crisis, several Communists were imprisoned for distributing leaflets. At Dunedin on 3 March, E. W. Hunter and I. M.
Jamieson had quite openly put into letterboxes copies of Soldiers
and Workers,
Printed in People’s Voice, 23 Feb 40
which claimed that soldiers were pushed off to fight
by those who swindled and lied to them while remaining safe at
home to rake in profits and encroach on workers’ living standards.
It was clearly prejudicial to recruiting, the plea that it was honest
criticism like much of the other criticism then being directed at the
government was dismissed as specious, and they were gaoled for
three months.
Otago Daily Times, 25 May 40, p. 12
Two Invercargill Communists, who early in April
had been found distributing leaflets, were gaoled, the lesser man,
W. Sparks, for two months, the magistrate saying that this was a
warning and only a fraction of what future offenders might expect;
the local party secretary, J. E. Lawrence, who chose to go to the
Supreme Court, was sentenced to six months, Mr Justice Kennedy
remarking that no country would tolerate this action at such a time
and in Russia punishment would be swift and final.
Southland Times, 27, 28 May 40, pp. 9, 9
H. G. Darbyshire, a roadman of Eketahuna, arrested in the street with a sandwich
board and selling the pamphlet The War and the Working Class,
was sentenced to six months.
Evening Post, 6 Jun 40, p. 7. Ormond Burton, who saw him in gaol, described him as
a simple and harmless man. NZCPS Bulletin W 18, p. 8. According to the People’s Voice
of 26 September, he was released at about that time, one month in six being the normal
remission for good behaviour.
Tom Stanley, chairman of the New
Zealand Communist party executive and secretary of the Auckland
General Labourers Union, in March had written and published
50 000 leaflets, The Real Criminals, which in June earned him nine
months’ gaol.
NZ Herald, 5, 8 Jun 40, pp. 15, 12. Four months later the printer, E. J. Brooks, was
also charged for his share in this leaflet; the magistrate, finding some doubts, fined him
£30. Ibid., 12, 16 Oct 40, pp. 8, 11
At Palmerston North, also in June, L. Sim, a
farmer, and H. W. Klein, law clerk, were each sentenced to a year
in prison for cyclostyling ‘Spark’ for the New Zealand Bolshevik
party, which urged civil war in New Zealand and condemned the
Communist party as pacifist, Trotskyite and dominated by petty
bourgeois intellectual adventurists.
‘Spark’, 23 Jun 40, quoted in WHN, ‘Censorship of the Press’, chap III, p. 10; Dominion,
19, 25 Jun 40, pp. 11, 9
At this time also there were prosecutions for speeches: R. Hurd,
J. Angelo and J. Langdon (the last two from the Otahuhu railway
workshops) for street speeches on 5 April were each sentenced to six
months’ gaol;
NZ Herald, 5, 8 Jun 40, pp. 15, 12
two months later W. G. Dickenson, who spoke on
the same occasion, received the same penalty.
Ibid., 3, 8 Aug 40, pp. 14, 14
The Auckland West
by-election, where Gordon Watson stood for the Communist party,
brought forth a crop of subversion charges which, arising from election speeches, were considered with extra care and caution by the
courts: Tom Stanley, on 13 May, had called the war ‘another Imperialist slaughter’, but F. H. Levien SM
Levien, Felix Hector (1882–1964): SM 1918–49, INZEF 1917–18
considered it part of the
pamphlet offence for which Stanley was already in prison, and convicted him without further penalty; he discharged J. Angelo, saying
that his carefully equivocal statements on 7 May to 20 listeners could
be called subversive only by roundabout methods and a man should
not be found guilty in that way.
NZ Herald, 15, 18 Jul 40, pp. 13, 4
A 26-year-old bootmaker, J. D.
Morey, chose trial in the Supreme Court, where he was strongly
recommended to mercy as his speech on 8 May was at an election
campaign meeting and to a very small audience. Mr Justice Fair
fined him £25 plus three years’ probation, remarking that the situation then had not been as serious as it had since become, and
election results showed that such speeches had been ineffective.
Ibid., 30 Jul 40, p. 8
Next day in the same Court a veteran Communist, A. Drennan, for
an open-air speech on 10 May, was similarly convicted and received
the same sentence, though the judge added that had the jury known
his record they might not have recommended mercy and he would
have to be very careful in future.
Ibid., 31 Jul, 3 Aug 40, pp. 6, 14
The same judge heard the appeal
of Roy Stanley, who on 1 July had been awarded four months’ gaol
for urging workers to stop the Imperialist war as they would get
nothing even out of victory. The judge thought that he had been
properly sentenced, his speech having been worse than those of the
other two, but was loth to allow a sentence which appeared heavier,
and thought that justice would be done if the sentence were halved.
Ibid., 2 Jul, 14 Aug 40, pp. 8, 12
Meanwhile in Wellington two men, declaring from the dock that
they must tell others the truth as they saw it and that punishment
would make a martyr, light a torch, were each sentenced by the
Chief Justice to a year in prison, the maximum penalty. On 10
March in the Trades Hall A. Galbraith, the local Communist party
chairman, had said in a waterfront dispute that workers were being
exploited in the war by the ruling classes and should form councils
of action.
Evening Post, 7 Jun, 17, 18 Jul 40, pp. 9, 9, 8, 13
Douglas Martin, a former Presbyterian minister and a
pacifist who had become a Communist, on 19 May had chaired a
Trades Hall meeting called to protest against the imprisonment of
Burton and Lyttle which was given a second purpose—to warn and
to prepare against the growing threat of conscription. Also, on 26
May, he had chaired a Miramar meeting against conscription and
Fascism in New Zealand. Sir Michael Myers explained that though
conscription was not in force at the time, it was subversive to hinder
recruiting. Widespread feeling that voluntary enlistment was unfair
might have restricted recruiting unless it was clear that conscription
would soon be applied; hence it was a proper inference that delay
in enacting conscription, and certainly anti-conscription agitation,
would be calculated to restrict recruiting. Normally a man might
speak out his belief in pacifism, Communism, etc, but in time of
dire peril to the State he must keep silent; the prime purpose of
law in such times was to preserve the safety of the people, hence
the emergency regulations. These men were enemies within the gates,
attacking the safety of the people at the very root, and their offences
were much worse than ordinary criminality.
Ibid., 15, 16, 18 Jul 40, pp. 9, 11, 13
At the same time W. McAra, a well-known Communist, was
acquitted by his jury. His speech at the 19 May meeting had been
mainly quotations from Semple, Fraser, Thorn
Thorn, James (1882–1956): Sec Canty Farm Workers Union 1907–8; helped form NZ
Lab party 1909, Pres 1929, 1930, Nat Sec 1932–5; Lab & socialist propagandist UK
1909–13; Ed Maoriland (now NZ) Worker 1918–32; MP (Lab) Thames 1935–46, Parly
Under-Sec PM 1943–6; HC Canada 1947–50; NZ rep 5 sessions UNESCO
and others in 1916.
It was, said Myers, much less inflammatory than Martin’s; it was a
rambling discourse by a misguided person which should never have
been made, but that did not mean that it was subversive. He warned,
however, that people could not with impunity quote statements made
by others 20 years ago that would be subversive today.
Evening Post, 17 Jul 40, p. 9
Earlier, a
non-communist speaker at this meeting had been acquitted in the
Magistrates’ Court. A major of the last war and a rejected volunteer
of 1940, W. G. Bishop,
Bishop, Walter George (1873–1970): b UK; Pres Miramar Branch Lab party, then joined
J. A. Lee’s Democratic Labour party
went there to speak for Burton, who he
thought was suffering injustice. The prosecution suggested that his
statements were intended or likely to interfere with recruiting, but
A. M. Goulding SM
Goulding, Arthur Morice (1888–1973): lecturer AUC 9 years; SM from 1938; chmn
Licensing Control Cmssn 1949–59
thought that his record made such intention
improbable, and his speech, though ‘injudicious and unfortunate in
some respects’, was not inflammatory or subversive.
Press, 15 Jun 40, p. 12
Meanwhile the government had struck at the main source of communist printing, the press of the People’s Voice. On 26 May, in the
speech that promised conscription ‘as required’, spoken above the
rising outcry against Communists, subversion, and government insufficiency, Fraser had said that subversive propaganda would be
stopped: ‘The leaflets which have been flooding the Dominion have
not done much harm, but the people and the Government are in
no mood to stand any more of it.’
Otago Daily Times, 27 May 40, p. 6
On 29 May new Censorship
and Publicity Regulations (1940/93) empowered the Attorney-General to seize any press that had printed subversive material and
was likely to do so again; in like case, to order any periodical to
cease publication. Accordingly, on 30 May the People’s Voice was
suppressed and its machines taken by the police.
The editorial of the issue which had just been printed, dated 31
May, exemplified its view of the war:
The New Zealand working class today faces the gravest crisis
of its existence. All that two generations of politically conscious
workers have fought to achieve is now at stake.
The hyenas of capitalist reaction, the enemies of the New
Zealand people, see in the extended bloody slaughter in Europe
the opportunity for which they have waited so long….
Nazi-ism threatens the people of New Zealand today—not primarily through the German military successes—but primarily
through the pupils of Hitler in New Zealand, who are more
concerned with winning their war against the New Zealand working class than they are with the outcome of events in Europe….
Those who left the bridges standing against which the enemies
of the working class are now advancing are those who were pledged
to defend them—the leaders of the Labour Party. They have
proved themselves the ‘Fifth Column’ of capitalist reaction in the
Labour movement of this country.
The People’s Voice continued underground, in meagre form. Restriction condensed its stridency. In its issues of a few cyclostyled foolscap
sheets it set party devotees quite impossible targets of class struggle.
It did not oppose the war against Hitler, as such, but trenchantly
attacked every aspect of its management; it spoke of war on two
fronts but was solely concerned with that on the home front. At
Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch separate pamphlets were
produced. On 5 September it was widely reported that some boys
had found a duplicator and papers in a damp cave three miles from
Papatoetoe, but generally the leaflets were produced now in one
house, now in another. The Wellington leaflet on 26 September
1940 stated that since the suppression 14 editions totalling 11 200
copies, had been circulated in the Wellington district, sold for £140,
and a further £100 had been donated. In mid-October the Wellington production began calling itself Tribune, and in September
that of Christchurch became Torch, which lasted till early 1941,
when it was the only illegal paper still being published.
WHN, ‘Censorship of the Press’, chap III, p. 12, referring to letter Cmssnr of Police to
Sec ONS, 26 Feb 41, file PM 84/3/8
A People’s
Voice reappeared on 21 May 1941 remarking that just over six months
had passed since its last issue.
Copy in General Assembly Library
According to the police, ‘distribution was exceedingly well organised and done in the utmost secrecy’.
WHN, ‘Police Department’, p. 218
But when its agents were
discovered they did not escape lightly. A young Wellington taxi-driver, W. McCready, found on 12 July with 50 copies of the People’s
Voice dated 10 July was censured by Sir Hubert Ostler
Ostler, Rt Hon Sir Henry, Kt(’39), KC (1876–1944): Crown Solicitor 1910–15; chmn
VUC Council 1913–14; NZU Senate 1915–19; Judge Supreme Court 1924–42
for an
offence far worse than theft, affecting the well-being of every member
of the community, a real danger to the British Empire in its lone-handed struggle. The jury, however, recommended mercy, so
McCready got nine months’ hard labour instead of twelve.
Evening Post, 25 Sep, 18, 19, 24 Oct 40, pp. 11, 8, 13, 13
Again, when E. Harrison, janitor of Weir House, a Wellington
university hostel, was found with three copies of a booklet, Peace
and Socialism, published in May, and six copies of Tribune of 15
October 1940 (the first of that name), Mr Justice Johnston said that
the maximum 12 months was a light penalty in the circumstances,
and that an offence against the State was accentuated when committed by a man whose good character gave him a job that was an
excellent distribution centre. He gave little weight to a declaration
from the students that Harrison had never attempted to spread subversive propaganda. To the grand jury the judge remarked that in
most countries such an offender would be shot without trial, but in
New Zealand the matter had to go before a jury.
Ibid., 3, 7, 11 Feb 41, pp. 9, 9, 8
Earlier, at the end of August 1940, lamp-posts in several Wellington areas were stuck with crude leaflets from the underground,
issued by the Peace and Anti-Conscription Council, which had for
some time seemed defunct. The leaflets blamed three Cabinet
ministers for the shipboard miscarriage by the wife of an Australian
Communist, K. Bronson, prominent in the anti-conscription movement, who had been deported in June. It ended, ‘Mothers! Would
you entrust your son’s life to these people?’ The police, led by complaints of disloyal statements and Communism, found J. Kelman,
a barber, with 127 copies and party instructions; Stout SM, saying
that the leaflets were scurrilous and subversive, sentenced him to a
year in gaol.
Ibid., 12, 16 Sep 40, pp. 13, 9
This was upheld on appeal by rehearing before Sir
Hubert Ostler: the attack on the ministers, though grossly libellous,
was not subversive; but, with the feelings of hatred this worked up,
the purpose of the final words was to make women hostile to enlistment or conscription.
Ibid., 8, 24 Oct 40, pp. 9, 12
One communist trial eclipsed all others, for in it press censorship
was exercised to screen temporarily in the interests of public serenity
a high official’s indiscretion. Late in 1940 at Christchurch, H. A.
Ostler and T. C. Christie, local secretary of the Communist party,
were charged with publishing subversive statements by producing
the cyclostyled People’s Voice.
Press, 6 Nov 40, p. 13
On trial in February 1941 Ostler,
besides technical points, argued freedom of speech: the criticisms of
the Voice were reasonable, and though it attacked capitalism and
the lies of the New Zealand press, while upholding socialism and
Russia, socialism’s only exponent, this was not subversive for New
Zealand was not at war with Russia.
Ibid., 14 Feb 41, p. 10
But Alec Ostler, the son of
a judge, also told the Court that the Solicitor-General, H. H. Cornish,
Cornish, Hon Henry Havelock, KC (1882–1952): Prof Law VUC 1930–4; Solicitor-Gen 1934–44; Judge Supreme Court 1945–50
had sought to bargain with him: Cornish had met him and
suggested that he himself, the Attorney-General, and the Prime
Minister would drop the prosecution if Ostler would put aside Communism and quietly join the Army, where a comfortable post could
be found.
For details of this trial and discussion of its implications see p. 898ff
Ostler and Christie both received the maximum penalty,
12 months’ hard labour.
Press, 19 Feb 41, p. 12
Their petition for bail while preparing
their appeal, signed by more than 1300 persons,
Ibid., 4 Mar 41, p. 12
was refused and
their appeal was dismissed.
Ibid., 18, 19, 21 Mar, 4 Apr 41, pp. 10, 3, 12, 10. They were released on 11 October,
and Ostler, whose name had appeared in an overseas ballot earlier in the year, was
immediately drafted into the Army by the procedure usual for defaulters. In Print,
29 Oct 41; NZ Herald, 15 Oct 41, p. 6
Communists were credited, rightly or wrongly, with having distributed leaflets urging those called in ballots to refuse military service.
On Monday 7 October 1940, many Christchurch men called in the
first territorial ballot a week earlier found a circular delivered overnight, urging them not to serve. Timaru and Ashburton received
the like by post. The Press reported that the circulars were distributed ‘practically throughout New Zealand’, though it referred specifically only to Christchurch, Ashburton and Timaru. Semple said
that it was a foul and treacherous document, the most treasonable
he had ever read, and its wide distribution showed a large organisation, the ‘fifth-column’ against which he had warned so often.
The Mayor of Christchurch thought that distribution was probably
general, and not the work of pacifists but of Communists.
Press, 8 Oct 40, p. 8
Several papers repeated these explosive Christchurch opinions. A
solitary copy of the circular reached Dunedin, from which the Evening Star of 10 October concluded that its 900 words were well
written and designed to ‘drive the foul message home’. The Canterbury Provincial Committee of the Communist party firmly denied
all responsibility, condemning the leaflet as provocative and contrary
to communist propaganda.
Ibid., 10 Oct 40, p. 12
Certainly the party did not propose
pacifism,
For instance its slogan, ‘No more troops overseas, New Zealand comes first’ and such
statements as: ‘The idea that the Imperialist war can be ended by refusal of military
service is as illusory as to think that exploitation can be ended by refusal to work for a
capitalist exploiter’; or ‘The People’s Voice has always … pointed out the futility of
advising workers to “Boycott the war” or adopt the standpoint of conscientious objectors.’
People’s Voice, 17 Jun, 26 Sep 40
but otherwise its opposition to the war was total. It seems
probable, though it is mere guess-work, that this anti-Service circular
might have been put out by the Peace and Anti-Conscription Council which was strong in leftist circles at Christchurch.
After the second territorial ballot of 7 November, a similar circular was more widely scattered. According to the Auckland Star of
16 November and the Standard of the 28th, it reproduced the first
circular but also attacked Semple and the Standard, and stated:
‘Whatever happens, stand firm against the attempts of the Government, family and friends to force you into a uniform.’ Though the
extracts quoted by the Star had a communist sound, it was anonymous. The issue was confused further by the Christian Pacifist
Society’s Conscientious Objectors Committee which, at about the
same time, sent out to some 1200 men chosen at random brief
notices offering to help the conscience-troubled with information;
these, of course, were not anonymous.
NZCPS Bulletin W25, p. 2; Press, 14 Nov 40, p. 8
In Auckland, late in November, the slogan ‘No more troops for
overseas’ appeared in white paint on some Papakura lamp-posts,
without any arrests being made.
Otago Daily Times, 27 Nov 40, p. 6
The first overseas ballot on 5 December 1940 was greeted in Dunedin with night-delivered cyclostyled criticism of the government’s war policy,
Ibid., 10 Dec 40, p. 7
while in Auckland
police caught four men with stickers saying ‘No more troops overseas, New Zealand comes first.’ One man against whom there was
no direct evidence was acquitted; another, convicted of posting stickers, got four months; two, who also had copies of a subversive pamphlet Forward, got six months each. They claimed that the slogan
was reasonable criticism and in the nation’s interest, but Mr Justice
Fair said that exemplary punishment was needed; the war effort must
not be made ineffective by disputes among New Zealanders—propaganda of this kind led to the fall of France.
NZ Herald, 6, 7, 17 Dec 40, pp. 8, 13, 12; 6, 7, 8, 15 Feb 41, pp. 6, 9, 10, 11
Stickers and chalk signs appeared more frequently in the streets
than did accounts of them in the newspapers, which usually reported
them only in court proceedings, that is, when someone was caught.
Editors were asked by the Censor not to mention such things as it
was the object of the Communists to obtain wide publicity from
relatively small efforts.
Telegrams sent to newspapers, 23 Jan 41, Censorship and Publicity file D.20, quoted
in WHN, ‘Censorship of the Press’, chap IV, p. 2
In May, with very minor press notices, two
Christchurch Communists, E. A. Jackson, who had eight copies of
Torch and 64 ‘No more troops overseas’ stickers, and H. J. Greatorex, who had five copies of Torch, were sent to prison for 12
months, Mr Justice Northcroft remarking that Jackson was clearly
a menace to the community and it would be appropriate if he could
be imprisoned for the duration of the war.
Press, 14, 17 May 41, pp. 10, 5. They were discharged on Christmas Eve, and their
letter to the Prime Minister, thanking him for this timely release and approving the
democratic action of freeing political prisoners, was published in In Print, 7 Jan 42
The Justice Department in 1940 recorded 59 charges of ‘subversive statements, making, publishing, etc.’ Of nine heard in the
Supreme Court, eight were convicted; 37 were convicted in the
Magistrates’ Court, and 13 dismissed.
A to J1941, H–16, p. 14
Some were Jehovah’s Witnesses and one was plain anti-British, but the majority were Communists, as were all of those going to the Supreme Court. In 1941
there were six subversive offences. Thus popular excitement about
subversion in 1940 produced relatively few charges, and for some
the grounds appear rather slight. The above resumé of cases may
also suggest that while the Bench was not carried away by popular
alarm, magistrates and judges were not uniform in their attitudes
to subversion. Some felt that the dangers of the hour called for the
silencing of all anti-war utterances by maximum penalties, often
remarking how much tougher punishment would be in Russia.
Others, despite personal antipathy, stuck to the law simply as the
law, weighing greater and lesser offences. Some alternated between
the two attitudes. It must be remembered that the law is not consistent or even-handed in any field or at any time, though it may
try to be.
It was widely believed that Communists dominated many trade
unions: certainly they tried to do so, and held leading positions in
a few. But at the Federation of Labour conference in 1940 the communist delegates’ proposals for immediate peace, for the recognition
of the rights of all nations including Czechoslovakia, India, Ireland
and Poland to national independence, for complete disarmament and
immediate advance of socialism, were defeated by 224 votes to 26.
Standard, 28 Mar 40, pp. 7, 14
Again, in April 1941, their motion that in the interests of the working class New Zealand should withdraw from the war gained only
27 votes, against 229.
Ibid., 17 Apr 41, p. 3
Communists were held to be at the root of all industrial disputes,
before, during and after the war. A notable instance occurred in
March 1941, among the 1600 men of the Hutt railway workshops.
See p. 902
Semple declared that the trouble was caused by a handful of Communists taking instructions from a foreign source.
Evening Post 10, 14 Mar 41, pp. 8, 8
Fraser said fervently in Parliament on 19 March that if necessary he would again
impose total censorship:
The Communist party in this country, not yet declared illegal but
meeting as if it were an illegal organisation, in groups here and
there, discusses matters like the railway workshops, plans trouble
in them, and its agents carry out the plans. One of its methods
is publicity—a resolution is framed, not expressing the honest
opinion of those involved, but framed for propaganda purposes
in order to stir up the other workers of the Dominion by misrepresentation. Do members of this House imagine that the
Government is going to allow members of the Communist party
to use such ammunition?
NZPD, vol 259, p. 79
In the outcry against censorship, the Auckland Star on 20 March
noted that all the men, including the handful of Communists blamed
for the trouble, were back at work: if they were so dangerous surely
it was necessary for the government to apply war regulations against
them, rather than against the press. On 5 April the Star again asked
why the government did nothing about the Communist party except
abuse it; why was it not declared illegal? A correspondent in the
same paper a month later wrote that the Communist party was not
suppressed because it was useful: the government, having lost the
support of many workers,
requires an Aunt Sally—a bogy. Communism serves this purpose.
When the workers complain of broken promises or of betrayal,
the cry of Communism is raised. This wolf-cry scares the workers
who do not wish to appear to be allied with Communists. Any
criticism, any complaint, becomes, ipso facto, Communistic….
Communism is a negligible quantity in the political life of the
Dominion. The genuine, loyal workers would welcome its
suppression. The party leaders and the industrial bosses make no
effort to have it suppressed. It is too useful as a bogyman to silence
the workers.
Auckland Star, 9 May 41, p. 6
The government had thought of suppression. On 26 March the
Attorney-General had consulted the Commissioner of Police about
the expediency of declaring the Communist party a subversive organisation. The Commissioner, replying on 7 April, was strongly in
favour of doing so. The requisite orders were drafted but were not
brought immediately into effect,
Perhaps they were held ready to be applied to a fresh disturbance.
and on 3 July the Attorney-General
told the Commissioner that, as Russia’s entry to the war would
probably modify communist activities, the proposed order would be
deferred.
WHN, ‘Police Department’, pp. 240–1
Since Communists opposed the war it followed that all others
who did so were tarred with the Bolshevik brush, and tolerance of
them was merely licence. Thus an editorial early in January 1940
cautioned against imprudent liberalism. Citing some British students,
the Evening Post assailed a ‘so-called intelligensia’ [sic] to whom all
wars were imperialistic and Russia always right, even when allied
to Nazism and attacking Finland; New Zealand too had excessively
vocal minorities like the West Coast Trades and Labour Council,
which called the war an imperialist struggle. Such anti-social elements within the freedom of democracy might be dangerous in times
of crisis and, while not a reason for suppressing freedom of speech,
called for vigilance and surveillance by authority.
Evening Post, 6 Jan 40
To one side, the issue was freedom of speech; to the other, it was
subversion. Some held that unless they uttered their doubts and
criticisms they were already forsaking one of the principles for which
the war was being fought. Others (including the Chief Justice) held
that while a person was legally entitled to any beliefs such as Communism or pacifism he must, while the State was in danger, keep
them to himself. Said Hislop, Mayor of Wellington, ‘I stand for
freedom of speech as much as anyone but there are limits to freedom
of speech’.
Ibid., 15 Feb 40, p. 10
A manufacturer said that there was a lot of loose talk
about preserving democracy at all costs, but to win the war ‘democracy would have to sacrifice some of its minor conveniences and take
its war shape’:
Ibid., 5 Mar 40, p. 8. He was a member of the Coach and Motor Body Builders Association.
become, as it were, slimmer. The National party
caucus warned against the cancerous growth of organised subversive
propaganda not only by supporters of foreign influences, but by some
high officials of the Labour party, even by members of Parliament
and by employees of the State.
Ibid., 10 Feb 40, p. 12
A magistrate, J. H. Luxford,
summed up the apprehensions and linked ideas of many: ‘The
insidious attack from within may be just as dangerous as that from
without. It may be launched under the guise of pacifism, freedom
of conscience or of speech, or any other of these simple devices an
unscrupulous and cunning enemy uses or causes to be used by unsuspecting cranks or dupes to disrupt order and good government and
render the country less able to defend itself from without.’ He called
for complete subordination of sectional interests: any attempt to
redress grievance, even genuine grievance, by direct action or the
threat of it was tantamount to treason. It was better that a grievance
should go unredressed while national existence was threatened than
that the ground should be prepared for harvest by the Red sickle.
The biggest fraud ever perpetrated upon the world was the Marxist
doctrine that all men were equal, and the consequent demand for
world revolution to bring about government by the proletariat. No
sane person denied that all men have equal rights to social and legal
justice but it was a monstrous fallacy to think all men equal; the
proletariat never had ruled and never could rule in accordance with
Marxist theory. The germs of Marxism had been disseminated in
British countries and it was the duty of every citizen to sterilise them
quickly. A form of propaganda recurring several times since the war
began was the demand that the Allies should state their war aims.
‘I firmly believe’, said Luxford, ‘that this demand has been fostered
by the enemy. It is an attempt to embroil us in internal controversy
and weaken our war effort by making people ask, “What are we
fighting for, anyway?” Let me say, as forcefully as I can, if we start
public discussions on war aims before we have won the war we will
be doing one of the things the enemy wants us to do.’
Evening Post, 15 Mar 40, p. 6, headed ‘Hand of Moscow and Berlin’
This statement was widely printed, and the Otago Daily Times of 18 March
backed it with a be-wigged photograph.
Irritation with the running of the war, plus anger growing out of
fear for sons, husbands, lovers, brothers or friends in the Army, or
likely to be there, directed itself, assisted by the press, against those
opposing or criticising the war itself: ‘the intellectuals’, the WEA,
the Left Book Club, the universities, the education system. To some,
a wide range of even mildly non-conformist opinion appeared anti-British, disloyal and, by implication if not directly, pro-Russian.
Teachers were a predictable target. Many responsible teachers, knowing that their pupils would have the task of making the peace work,
were anxious that they should come to it with minds free from war
fervour and hate. Consequently their words, especially when subject
to juvenile reporting, often did not satisfy war-excited parents. Even
before 1939 it was not uncommon for vague general charges to be
made that teachers, from primary schools to universities, were tainted
with disloyalty, or anti-Britishness, or communism. These charges,
often in anonymous letters to newspapers and to educational authorities, multiplied as the war deepened. It must be remembered that
newspapers may select and even produce letters that endorse their
own viewpoint. The following by ‘A New Zealander’ is a succinct
example:
Slowly, insidiously, unchecked, an influence has been permeating
our land. We dare no longer live in a fool’s paradise. We must
face this menace of Communism. Yes, we have indeed been lax.
How long are we going to pay men simply to influence, by propaganda and destructive criticism, the youth of our land—those who
in a few short years will be holding positions of trust.
Ibid., 20 Mar 40, p. 8
Sometimes quite minor activities were taken as evidence of communist influences, such as lack of zest in singing the national
anthem.
A Dunedin RSA speaker, Press, 12 Mar 40, p. 8
A committee of the Board of Governors of Otago Girls’
High School believed that the loyalty of teachers could be determined by whether or not they attended morning assembly and stood
for ‘God Save the King’;
NZ Herald, 2 Jul 40, p. 8
a writer to the New Zealand Herald on
26 June thought that this test could be applied by all head teachers.
In mid-March 1940 the Dunedin RSA expressed anxiety about
extensive communist propaganda in high schools, universities and
public libraries, advocating the dismissal of any public servants
involved.
Otago Daily Times, 13 Mar 40, p. 6
Letters in the Otago Daily Times vigorously supported
this attack, while a few opposed it, including one by Dr D. G.
McMillan MP in defence of the Left Book Club.
Ibid., 20 Mar 40, p. 3
The Otago Education Board rapidly expressed faith in its teachers, saying that even
if some did not conform to ideas generally held, that did not necessarily mean they were disloyal. In at least two districts there were
similar moves: the Pukekohe RSA echoed Dunedin’s protest,
NZ Herald, 16 Mar 40, p. 12
while
at Ruawai, Northern Wairoa, a Welfare Association was established
to guard the district against anti-British communist propaganda.
Ibid., 23 Mar, 1 May 40, pp. 14, 10
On 11 April the Dunedin RSA arranged a meeting representative
of local bodies and political and sporting organisations. It was called
a ‘Communist-hunt’ by all the main dailies, and most speakers held
that the communist menace, though not yet formidable, was capable
of spreading dangerously, especially in war time, and there was special
mention of the WEA. Counter measures were discussed, such as
forming an RSA national defence corps, ready to march at 24 hours’
notice; strict enforcement of regulations against meetings and the
distribution of pamphlets, and inducing the saner members of trade
unions to be as active as the Communists in union affairs. No
decisions were made as few were authorised to vote for the bodies
they represented, but further discussion was to take place in those
bodies. The local Chamber of Commerce and the Territorial Association applauded, while the Otago Daily Times warned that ‘Red
prophets in pink cloaks’ who used union membership or State positions to spread corrupting propaganda and subvert youth were more
dangerous now than recognised Communists, and were perhaps the
most difficult problem of the moment.
Otago Daily Times, 13 Apr 40, p. 10
The Director of the WEA
demanded specific charges,
Ibid., 16 Apr 40, p. 13
and Chancellor W. J. Morrell
Morrell, William John (1868–1945): Rector Otago BHS 1907–33; Council Otago Univ
1912, Chancellor from 1933
vigorously defended Otago University and the WEA against vague
general accusations;
Otago Daily Times, 12, 17 Apr 40, pp. 6, 6
the Minister of Defence reminded that the
Allies were fighting for freedom of opinion, provided it was not
detrimental to the war effort.
NZ Herald, 18 Apr 40, p. 6
On 3 May the annual conference of the NZRSA demanded that
communist activities be investigated and any persons involved be
sacked from governmental or public office. Newspapers, notably the
Otago Daily Times, had letters attacking universities and teachers in
general, in such terms as:
History is perverted by these [so-called intellectuals] to serve their
ends, and pupils of all ages have their minds poisoned.
These people are the most dangerous class in the community.
Many of them, directly supported by the State, are using all their
influence … to create an undercurrent of feeling hostile to the
national interest. The noisy Communist is easily tracked down;
the danger from ‘the intellectual’ is that he works in the dark.
If challenged he maintains that he is merely a ‘Leftist’—a term
which now serves as a cloak apparently for the pacifist, the anti-Godist, and every type of subterranean revolutionary. The activities of these subversive individuals are a challenge to constituted
authority. When are our national, civic, and educational authorities going to take action?
Otago Daily Times, 10 May 40, p. 2; also 11, 13, 14 May 40, pp. 7, 4, 14
On 21 May, as the Blitzkrieg crisis gathered, an RSA deputation
asked the Otago University Council to inquire into subversive elements on its staff, adding that they could name such. The Council
decided to set up a committee of inquiry and asked the RSA to
submit evidence. The RSA refused, saying that the Council should
have its staff and WEA tutors answer a questionnaire on their attitudes to the Crown and the war, and listing the pacifist or leftist
societies with which they had been associated.
Ibid., 17 Jul 40, p. 3
Dr C. E. Hercus,
Hercus, Sir Charles, Kt(’47), OBE(’19) (1888–1971): Dean OU Medical School
1937–59
dean of the medical faculty and himself a returned soldier, said that
the RSA had made sweeping and damaging assertions on hearsay
evidence, that it could not support definite charges and should put
its energy into more constructive war effort.
Otago Daily Times, 17 Jul 40, p. 3
At an RSA meeting
a minority criticised the executive
Ibid., 26 Jul 40, p. 8. A letter on 24 June had also complained of ‘the antics of this
small party’, not supported in its ‘mischief-making campaign’ by the majority of RSA
members.
for making unsustained charges,
but the majority commended its courteous, tactful and able methods,
suggesting further that a royal commission should inquire into the
loyalty of the whole educational and library system, claiming that
not only should definitely subversive acts be dealt with, but the
influence, atmosphere and curricula of the universities should be
reviewed.
Ibid.
The RSA executive, in skilful rearguard action, explained
that it had sought to draw the Council’s attention to growing public
criticism of some of its staff, maintained that academic tolerance of
anti-British discussion should cease, and that the Council should
have made a domestic investigation without waiting for outside evidence ‘given in confidence, which could not accordingly be used’;
instead, the Council had held that its staff was innocent until proved
otherwise, which view might be justified in peace but not during
war. However, the RSA executive believed that publicity had checked
at least some of the evil.
Ibid., 8 Aug 40, p. 8
Thereafter, the RSA took its anxieties
to the Otago Farmers’ Union, from which the Dominion conference
passed a remit calling for drastic government action to stop all subversive propaganda and to dismiss all government employees concerned.
Press, 5 Jun 40, p. 6; Point Blank, 15 Aug 40, p. 41. Similar motions has been passed
earlier by NZRSA.
The Women’s Division resolved to be on school boards
and committees to see that children were trained to loyal and patriotic
standards.
Point Blank, 15 Aug 40, p. 47
Meanwhile the Auckland Education Board on 19 June declared
alarm at the increase of communist activities, wanted searching
inquiry into their source and growth, and urged that the civil service
should be closed to all concerned in such. A motion before the
Canterbury School Committees’ Association in support of academic
freedom to teach unpopular philosophies, and regretting unjustified
attacks on university teachers, was defeated 19:7. The chairman
remarked ‘You are dealing with Communism’.
Press, 15 Aug 40, p. 6
In the House,
J. A. Roy
Roy, James Alexander McLean (1893–1971): MP (Nat) Clutha 1935–60
of Clutha, who had not had time to check a complaint
that things a child said he had been taught were definitely disloyal,
wanted to know the Minister’s attitude if the complaint should be
found true. The Minister replied swiftly that he would exert all his
powers to see that no disloyal teacher was in the schools, but it was
unfair to bring forward such a report without verifying it.
NZPD, vol 257, p. 721
The New Zealand Educational Institute complained that widespread vague attacks, irresponsible and anonymous, were being made
through press and radio;
Otago Daily Times, 4 Jun, 9 Jul 40, pp. 5, 6
so did the chairman of the Canterbury
Education Board.
Press, 22 Jun 40, p. 7
The Minister of Education on 20 June said that
despite much talk of subversive teachers, no education board or
school governing body, or the Department or he himself had been
told of any real instance; proper complaints could be made close at
hand to school committees, who had certain powers to remove or
suspend teachers, but irresponsible allegations were unjust. The Press
on 5 June urged anyone who knew or thought he knew a fact about
a subversive propagandist to take it to the nearest police station, not
merely pass on talk while complaining of government apathy; on
25 June it criticised the Dunedin RSA: ‘If they have evidence they
should produce it…. If they have no evidence they have no charge
and should make none’. The New Zealand Observer of 5 June said
that Communists had ‘a certain qualified support among the liberal
and academic classes’, but these were neither disloyal nor revolutionary. ‘A great deal of what passes for Communism is actually a
sort of intellectual effervescence, which is certainly preferable to complete mental inertia, and does not in the long run do much harm.’
In the House, on 12 July 1940, C. W. Boswell
Boswell, Charles Wallace (1886–1956): headmaster Kawakawa DHS 1935–8; MP (Lab)
Bay of Islands 1938–43; NZ Min Soviet Union 1944–9
defended
teachers who had been accused of subversion all over the country
and, amid outcry from the Opposition, said that a Communist could
be a good citizen if he did nothing subversive. ‘We do not gaol
men merely because they are Communists but we do gaol men if
they are subversive.’ He added that it would be a good thing if the
interpretation of ‘subversive’ included any untrue statement alleging
disloyalty against perfectly loyal people.
NZPD, vol 257, pp. 473–4
Clyde Carr, pleading for
freedom of thought even if there could not now be full freedom of
speech, quoted Mr Justice Ostler who some months earlier had said,
‘This is a free country, and any person can hold any political views
he likes. He is doing nothing illegal being a Communist and holding
Communistic views. He only does something illegal when he does
anything seditious.’ People must be careful in war time, continued
Carr, not to destroy liberty of thought, not to cherish personal enmity, animus and vindictiveness against others simply because their
ideas differed.
Ibid., p. 553, with quote from Police Journal, Feb 40, p. 5; Evening Post, 17 Jul 40,
p. 13
The disciplinary zeal of education boards varied: the basic attitudes of their members were not uniform, but as time passed liberalism was inevitably eroded by events and the changing climate
of ideas. The Wellington Board in April 1940 refused to take action
about a teacher who had chaired a pacifist meeting.
Ibid., 17 Apr 40, p. 10
The Auckland
Board on 19 June had expressed alarm at communist activity, and
in August, having disregarded a number of anonymous letters, investigated a training college student who, according to such a letter,
had ‘boasted’ of intending to teach communism. In this the Board
was backed by the Minister who declared strongly against the
spreading of communism in schools, as it carried with it a view of
life destructive of morals, religion and human values, the antithesis
of everything desired from education.
Ibid., 8 Aug 40, p. 8. The Southland Times of 9 Aug reprovingly remarked that it would
be unwise to make a practice of basing police investigations on anonymous letters. In
fact, the police and the National Service and Army departments checked on all charges
of subversion, evasion of service, etc, made in anonymous letters: ‘often these letters give
helpful information, but more often the complaints they contain are founded on a tissue
of fabrications’. Report in Otago Daily Times, 4 Oct 41, p. 8
In November the Auckland
Board, having received a letter from the Minister giving details of
the meetings attended by two probationary teachers, asked the
Department to withhold their certificates; though they had as yet
done nothing against the law they should not be in the schools as
they had taken part in political activities of a communist nature.
NZ Herald, 21 Nov 40, p. 10
It soon after dismissed a young woman reported to have refused to
salute the flag.
Evening Post, 12 Dec 40, p. 15
This withholding of certificates produced a conflict very similar
to that between the Dunedin RSA and Otago University. Professor
P. W. Burbidge,
Burbidge, Professor Percy William, CBE(’57) (1891–): Prof Physics AUC 1921–57;
member Academic Bd NZU and Research Grants Cmte; Defence Scientific Advisory
Cmte 1939–45, chmn Auck War Tech Development Bd 1939–45; war service
1917–18
though ‘totally unacquainted’ with the persons
thus deprived, thought that the Board’s action, in banning them
not on professional grounds but for their political opinions, called
for vigorous protest from those who valued freedom. There were
laws to protect the community from subversion and conspiracy, but
this sort of proscription could spread dangerously. ‘It belongs to
Berlin, is modelled on Moscow, and tainted with Tennessee.’
NZ Herald, 23 Nov 40, p. 15
Sixteen members of the Auckland University College Council and staff
then also protested, claiming that a person should not be penalised
for political views so long as he did not use his position for political
propaganda. As the action was initiated by an anonymous letter, the
Education Board had given public recognition to a cowardly attack,
repugnant to British traditions, a Nazi method which could expose
any public servant to menace by unscrupulous persons.
Ibid., 12 Dec 40, p. 11
Two members of the College Council and staff openly objected to this view,
W. Anderson and L. K. Munro, ibid., 13, 14 Dec 40, pp. 11, 13
and another correspondent pointed out that only a small part of the
Council and staff numbering 77 had protested.
Ibid., 13 Dec 40, p. 11
Some Board members agreed that disloyalty had not been proved, but others attacked
the University itself and the WEA for teaching communism underground and corrupting young teachers. One, F. A. Snell,
Snell, F. A. (d 1948aet 79): Auck Educ Bd for more than 20 years, Hamilton School
Bd Govs & Technical College Bd Management
said that
the Board’s right to accept those it thought fit to teach children and
reject others was being challenged. It was time that the Minister
had a purge of the universities and ‘cleaned this element right out.’
The chairman of the Board, W. J. Campbell, declared that for years
there had been complaints about the university, the keystone of the
educational arch, and no doubt the police would be glad to have
the names of those signing the protest.
NZ Herald, 12 Dec 40, p. 11
When W. H. Cocker,
Cocker, William Hollis, CMG(’50) (1896–1962): member NZ Broadcasting Board
1935–6, NZU Senate; Pres AUC Council 1938–; chmn Nat Council Adult Education
president of the College Council, asked for instances of these complaints,
NZ Herald, 14 Dec 40, p. 13
Campbell said that Cocker was retreating behind a legalistic red herring, and was obviously himself in sympathy with the
subversive elements at the University, adding that this was now a
personal matter, not one for Board action.
Evening Post, 25 Jan 41, p. 13
Cocker replied that this
was sheer nonsense and probably libellous, and advised production
of evidence or silence.
Ibid.
There the public exchange ended, but in
the next two months the Board received several approving letters,
three from school committees, while another school committee
wanted to confirm that the Board had acted upon an anonymous
letter; a branch of Lee’s Democratic Labour party, and five trade
unions protested.
NZ Herald, 23 Jan, 20 Feb 41, pp. 11, 9
At its February meeting the Auckland University
College Council strongly disapproved of Campbell’s making public
charges and refusing to support them.
Ibid., 18 Feb 41, p. 8
The Board however had
the last move, for it required its teachers to reaffirm their oaths of
allegiance; only 6 out of more than 2400 did not do so.
Ibid., 6 Mar 41, p. 10; Auckland Star, 3 Sep 41, p. 9
Dunedin’s RSA had led the attack against the enemy who did
not sabotage factories or bridges but who might distort young minds.
Returned soldiers sincerely felt themselves necessary guardians against
the inner enemy, alien or native born, and the community likewise
largely felt that they were experienced and competent in all fields
of defence. The Wellington RSA in the May crisis had advised its
members to report all subversive activities to the police.
Evening Post, 30 May 40, p. 10
In Christchurch the RSA secretary commended public keenness to wipe out
the Fifth Column by reporting to the RSA office persons either making unpatriotic statements or thought to be potentially dangerous
aliens.
Press, 7 Jun 40, p. 8
The information was passed on to the police when warranted. An article in the New Zealand Herald on 12 June
Also Otago Daily Times, 18 Jun 40, p. 8
said
that government measures had not fully allayed public concern.
Recently, returned soldiers, meeting at regimental reunions, had been
discussing possible dangers. Some indignantly, some sadly, spoke of
complacent handling by civilian Ministers who could not understand
the effrontery and daring of trained spies and the Fifth Column.
‘These ex-soldiers who are not readily disturbed or inclined to submit to mass emotion’ had talked of land-buying by refugees in
certain areas, of foreigners at meetings of a communist character, of
the local Jewish community being hoodwinked by spies sent out in
the eviction to establish an organisation behind the lines; they wanted
a ‘thorough clean-up’ of aliens.
This expression of anxiety was directed mainly against aliens, but
others were alert for the local subversives. Their line of thought was
conveyed by a letter signed ‘Remember Narvik’, which explained
to other writers, ‘Anti-Hun’ and ‘Safety First’, that
the real enemy in our midst is not the unfortunate refugees, but
the Communists, with allegiance sworn to Soviet Russia, Nazi
Germany’s partner and first cousin in frightfulness, treachery and
anti-Godliness. These constitute the fifth column danger here in
case of invasion. Mr Semple could, if he would, tell us who are
responsible—and have been for years—for go-slow policy, stop
work meetings, strikes in mines and on wharves, sabotage and
general mischief-making in the ranks of the workers…. This is
where New Zealand should start its home defence by interning
the ringleaders, who are unfortunately now well entrenched in key
positions.
Press, 22 May 40, p. 9
The New Zealand Permanent Forces Old Comrades Association
passed Colonel T. W. McDonald’s motion to report any subversion,
adding that if the authorities did not take adequate action in reasonable time the Association would do all in its power to bring the
offenders to account; they did not have to be Nazis or Fascists, there
were far more Communists than all the others combined. Further,
it elected two senior policemen to its executive.
Evening Post, 22 Jul 40, p. 5
Six weeks later
the Wellington RSA at a special meeting set up a vigilance committee. Proposing it, A. B. Sievwright
referred to Semple’s Home
Guard-raising remarks about a Fifth Column and thought that people
would go to a citizen’s committee with information more readily
than to the police, to whom the committee could pass it on.
H. Haycock spoke of earlier pacifist meetings, saying that he had
told the Commissioner of Police ‘that if the police did not prevent
this sort of thing we would make a regular Donnybrooke in the
streets’; the police had acted firmly and pacifist meetings had ceased.
The police now had too much work; he was sure that they would
welcome vigilance committees, which he hoped would appear in
every city. Other speakers warned against various forms of subversion
and Colonel McDonald reminded that such people were in the
schools, influencing children.
Evening Post, 3 Sep 40, p. 4
A lawyer, Eaton Hurley, protested
that such a body would undermine and embarrass the police,
Ibid., 6 Sep 40, p. 6
while Truth declared that ‘Vigil-Aunties or Cooper’s Snoopers’
A home intelligence section in the UK responsible to Duff Cooper, Minister of Information 1940–1.
were not wanted in New Zealand, or it might as well accept secret
police of the Gestapo sort.
Truth, 11 Sep 40, p. 15
No further groups appear to have been
formed.
Despite all the patriotic fervour of mid-1940, it seems that only
one prosecution resulted from information directly laid by citizens,
though it is probable that many more tales of subversive speech or
actions were taken to the police by those anxious or zealous. Four
railway surfacemen working in the Lyttelton tunnel, disturbed by
the anti-British, pro-Nazi talk of their ganger, went to the police.
The ganger, W. E. Aitken, was charged with saying, on 24 May,
‘I do not care if the British get beaten’, ‘I would just as soon be
under Hitler as under the British Government’, ‘We would be better
off under Nazi rule, anyone who goes to fight for the British Empire
is a fool’; and on 21 June, ‘I hope the Pommy … get beaten’, ‘I
would rather fight for the Nazis than the British Empire’, ‘I would
never fight for Britain’. In court it appeared that he was ‘not an
agitator’, and that these statements had been made in arguments,
but similar remarks had been reiterated over several months. His
counsel urged that the regulations were concerned with statements
made to larger groups of people. The Crown agreed that it was not
a case of a member of the intelligentsia putting over specious and
insidious arguments to a large crowd; fortunately these statements
were made to men ‘strongminded, honest and decent, and not likely
to be swayed in their loyalties’, but E. C. Levvey SM,
Levvey, Ernest Charles (1877–1947): SM from 1918, Gisborne, Invercargill, Chch
saying that
these offences were very serious, sentenced him to six month’s hard
labour.
Press, 23 Oct 40, p. 12
Nine months later a similar charge was tried: a railway carpenter,
in a Timaru barber’s shop after a few beers and thinking he was
among friends, produced a pamphlet about censoring news of strikes.
He said that if such Fascist methods continued he might as well be
under Hitler as under Fascist Churchill and Fascist Fraser; that those
going to the war were ‘bloody fools’. Mr Justice Northcroft warned
the jury against the natural indignation of British subjects hearing
such words and urged a calm, dispassionate approach. The man was
acquitted.
Ibid., 11, 16 Jul 41, pp. 9, 8; Truth, 16, 23 Jul 41, pp. 7, 27
Some pacifists and Communists directly opposing the war were
imprisoned for subversion, but the only organisation as such declared
subversive was a religious sect, Jehovah’s Witnesses or the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society. This world-wide organisation originating in America in 1879 was active in Australia, where it had a
printing press. In New Zealand it had, by the 1936 census, only
450 members but they proselytized vigorously, playing records
through loudspeakers from cars. By car, bicycle and on foot they
went from house to house distributing pamphlets and preaching
their message. Holding that the end of the world was not far off,
they urged people to study the Bible, forsaking established religions
and clergy who weakened the strong truth of Jehovah’s word. They
asserted the authority of Jehovah God above all other authority,
thus refusing to salute flags, take oaths of allegiance or serve in
armed forces; they believed that those chosen by Jehovah as his
servants, his special flock, must teach others.
The Police Department War History Narrative states that their
canvassers gave offence by their intrusiveness and by their pamphlets.
These attacked other religions, especially Roman Catholicism which
they alleged was the cause of world unrest and the war; they contained defeatist statements such as that ‘Hitler would win the war
but after that God would destroy Hitler and Hitlerism’ and advocated a ‘Government of the peoples of earth administered by the
immediate direction of Almighty God’.
WHN, ‘Police Department’, pp. 213–4
Army Headquarters stated
on 21 February 1940 that in some cases Witnesses had discouraged
enlistment, and in some districts it was reported they had an unsettling, mischievous effect on Maoris.
Ibid. The Wairoa Harbour Board complained of subversive literature ‘against the British
government, the government of this country and Christianity’ which was ‘creating discontent among Maoris’. Hawke’s Bay Daily Mail, 17 Apr 40, p. 8; NZ Herald,
18 Apr 40, p. 11
The Roman Catholic Church had long complained of this sect,
eg, NZ Tablet, 3 Jun, 1, 15 Jul 36, pp. 3, 33, 33, 11 Aug 37, p. 5, 24 Apr,
8 May 40, pp. 9, 10
and in August 1940 declared that the Witnesses of Jehovah were
a religious body but not Christians: ‘To attribute the anarchical,
subversive and mendacious rubbish which appears under the name
of an American ex-convict and bogus judge to Christ is blasphemy,
even if it be unconscious blasphemy on the part of most of the
“Witnesses” …. Scurrilous lying sectarian venom and theories subversive of all law and order have nothing in common with the Gospel of Christ.’
Ibid., 14 Aug 40, p. 9
A reprint in the Anglican Church Chronicle was
similar: ‘Perhaps the most debased of modern heresies is that cult
known as “Rutherfordism” or Jehovah’s Witnesses…. The Church
must realise that this is a virulent and dangerous attack. Masquerading as a religion, and claiming all the privileges of such, it spends
its whole energy on traducing the British Empire and calumniating
the clergy and congregations of the one Holy Catholic and Apostolic
Church founded by our Lord.’
Church Chronicle, 1 Dec 40, p. 164
Truth on 10 July 1940 claimed to have received many complaints
in the previous two years of people being pestered by ‘canvassers of
offensive trash’ who ‘littered the country with lying scurrilous propaganda’; it said that Canada had recently outlawed the sect, and called
for similar government action against ‘the activities of this crowd of
racketeers and the religious mania they are developing right under
our noses.’ Further articles stressed subversion.
Truth, 10, 17 Jul 40, pp. 13, 8; 4, 18, 25 Sep 40, pp. 8, 9, 15; 23, 30 Oct 40,
pp. 39, 3
Perhaps stimulated
by the Canadian ban, the New Zealand government, through the
Customs and Postal departments, stopped the import of pamphlets,
and in August the police seized stocks at the sect’s Wellington headquarters, but supplies were already well scattered.
WHN, ‘Police Department’, p. 234
On 7 August the Observer had reported Australian agitation against
Jehovah’s Witnesses: the visit of their leader, Judge Rutherford,
Rutherford, [Judge] Joseph Franklin (1869–1942): US religious zealot
to Australia was opposed by the Returned Servicemen’s League, while
the governments of New South Wales and Tasmania wanted to ban
them as subversive in that they taught converts not to fight and to
refuse to recognise the King. In New Zealand there had been similar
outcry but, said the Observer, ‘there is no evidence whatever of any
subversive activities’; they might have unusual ideas about certain
conventions normal to loyal and patriotic citizens, such as saluting
the flag and standing for the national anthem, but these things,
while reprehensible, did not amount to active disloyalty. The sect’s
Auckland secretary, Robert Reid, stated that for Jehovah’s Witnesses, loyalty to King and country was quite secondary to the cause
of Christ, but otherwise they shared in normal patriotic feelings and
in detestation of Hitler; a few had sons in the fighting forces. They
obeyed the laws of the land except where these conflicted with the
laws of God, which meant that they must not take part in any
movement that would prevent them from preaching the Gospel, or
would bring about the death of a fellow man. They had no political
affiliations; in Russia they were persecuted and 6000 Witnesses were
in Nazi concentration camps. In Auckland there were about 150
brethren, not all of them canvassers, and many adherents.
NZ Observer, 7 Aug 40, p. 9
Flag saluting in schools raised a few unhappy little issues. According to letters in the Taranaki Daily News it led to one man, a
returned soldier, being dismissed from his job as a cheesemaker. He
had asked, when his 5-year-old daughter started school, that she be
excused from religious ceremonies and flag saluting. The school did
not perform these rites but ‘this was seized on by some self-styled
super-patriots and brought before the directors of the dairy company
who are reported to have unanimously voted on the dismissal of the
father of this child from their employ’.
Taranaki Daily News, 22, 31 Jul 40, pp. 8, 8
In a few cases where parents
asked that children be excused from flag saluting teachers and school
committees were uneasy. To one teacher, who asked if she should
suspend such pupils, the Wellington Board replied that it had no
authority to enforce attendance; in a general sense, flag saluting was
a history lesson, and pupils, for conscientious reasons, could stay
away from history lessons.
Evening Post, 17 Oct 40, p. 13
The Timaru South school committee
reluctantly accepted the Canterbury Board’s ruling that such children
should be ‘tactfully excluded’ where there was no doubt about the
religious conviction.
Ibid., 21 Oct 40, p. 4; Press, 19 Oct 40, p. 11
The Witnesses explained their attitude to flags
in letters to papers, asking, ‘Is it right to compel people to salute
a flag?’, referring to God’s specific commandment against it (Exodus
XX, 3–5), and stating that Jehovah’s Witnesses were in Fascist and
Nazi prisons on this issue. They were refusing the ceremony not
because they were disloyal to the country, but because their first
loyalty was to Jehovah God.
Press, 24 Oct 40, p. 12; Otago Daily Times, 25 Oct 40, p. 12
A more unhappy incident occurred on 13 October at Oamaru. A
meeting had gathered to hear a recorded speech, ‘Government and
Peace’, by Judge Rutherford, the leader of the sect, that in New
York’s Madison Square Garden had sparked a riot with the followers
of Father Coughlan,
Coughlan, Charles Edward (1891–): b Canada; US radio priest 1930–40
the radio priest. A returned soldier, W. Meehan, armed with a rifle and bayonet and talking about Fifth Columnists, intruded. In a scuffle with the doorkeepers one man’s hand
was cut with the bayonet and the rifle went off, wounding a man
in the thigh.
Otago Daily Times, 14 Oct 40, p. 6. The leg was amputated at the hip. Press,
11 Dec 40, p. 12. When Meehan was tried in February for attempted murder and
several lesser crimes, Mr Justice Kennedy pointed out that the sect was not on trial, but
it seems clear that the Witnesses’ having meanwhile been banned argued strongly for
the defence. Meehan was convicted on the minor charge of assaulting two men by
threatening them with a loaded rifle and fixed bayonet, and in view of his having already
been four months in prison was sentenced to two months’ hard labour. Otago Daily
Times, 5, 6, 7 Feb 41, pp. 5, 9, 10
The Oamaru RSA secretary on 16 October telegraphed the NZRSA to urge the government, in view of this ‘tragic
occurrence’ and strong public resentment, to ban the sect before more
trouble occurred, referring to its Nazi and pacifist activities as
expounded in Smith’s Weekly
A popular Australian weekly with a considerable New Zealand circulation.
of 5 October, and complaining that
Oamaru people had been much annoyed at the Witnesses advertising their meeting ‘by a loud speaker in public places, denouncing
the Catholic religion in terms calculated to cause a breach of the
peace’.
Press, 26 Oct 40, p. 12
The Police Department Narrative, referring to this, states that ‘at
one place a serious act of violence was found to have arisen out of
[the sect’s] activities. Having regard to all the circumstances, the
Commissioner of Police, on 18 October 1940, referred the papers
to the Prime Minister with the comment that its activities were a
disturbing influence and it appeared that the movement could be
declared a subversive organisation.’ The Prime Minister and the
Attorney-General concurred in this view, and by a notice issued
under section 2A of the Public Safety Regulations 1940, it was so
declared on 21 October. It was thus an offence to use or permit to
be used any premises for the purpose of the organisation; to put up
any signs or to organise or address any meetings for any such purpose; to participate in, or to encourage in any way the organisation’s
continuance, activities or objects, or by any badge or banner to identify oneself with or express approval of it.
WHN, ‘Police Department’, p. 235; NZ Gazette, 24 Oct 40, p. 2752
The Attorney-General, Mason, explained that Jehovah’s Witnesses had been unfavourably noticed for some time: their propaganda seemed devoted to vilifying other religions, the State and
government. ‘Under each heading the propaganda was clearly subversive. It tended to disrupt national unity and destroy national
morale when the nation was fighting for its life.’
Evening Post, 25 Oct 40, p. 8
The Observer,
on 30 October, held that whether or not Jehovah’s Witnesses were
subversive, all who disliked religion clothed in strident commercialism would welcome the suppression of their activities. High-pressure sales methods had built a vast and wealthy organisation
around the American Messiah, Judge Rutherford, and New Zealand
could well do without such enterprises. ‘But it has taken the exigencies of war to bring about a prohibition which common sense
had always demanded.’
There followed a small crop of prosecutions on charges of participating in the activities of a subversive organisation. Police, usually
acting on information, found Jehovah’s Witnesses delivering pamphlets, or admitting posting pamphlets, or going to people’s houses
to explain the Bible. Often they would not promise to cease doing
such things. Sentences varied from three months in prison to fines
of a few pounds or being ordered to come up for sentence within
three months. Several charges were dismissed for insufficient evidence, or doubt whether the regulations applied: for example, when
the police made what Truth called a ‘dramatic early morning raid’
on a tent by the Tutaekuri River, Napier, they found two young
men and a boy with 363 books and 27 records, but no evidence
that they had been selling them since the prohibition.
Truth, 27 Nov 40, p. 11; other trials were reported in, for example, ibid.; Evening Post,
2, 19, 26 Nov 40, pp. 11, 11, 9; Press, 18, 21 Nov, 6, 19 Dec 40, pp. 10, 8, 14, 8;
Otago Daily Times, 22, 30 Nov 40, pp. 6, 13; NZ Herald, 5 Mar, 9 Apr (appeal to
Supreme Court), 13 Jun 41, pp. 8, 9, 8
The ban and the first arrests aroused some protests and questioning, causing the government to deny having suppressed a religious
body as such. On 19 November the sect’s Australasian headquarters
in Sydney cabled the King to restore Christian freedom to Jehovah’s
Witnesses in New Zealand, saying that their homes had been raided
by the police, standard Bibles confiscated and their study banned.
‘Homes of Jehovah’s Witnesses have been raided by the police. Common version Oxford
Bibles have been confiscated, and the study of same banned. Innocent Christians have
been imprisoned for refusing to cease preaching the Gospel of God’s Kingdom … such
proceedings accord with the totalitarian action of Berlin and Rome, and not with that
of British justice. The Attorney-General has so far refused to answer the following question:—“Does the New Zealand Government refuse to Jehovah’s Witnesses the right of
assembly to worship God with song, prayer and Scripture study? Answer: Yes, or No.”
We appeal to Your Majesty to act on our behalf in harmony with your Coronation oath
…. We respectfully request that you should advise the New Zealand Government to
restore Christian freedom to Jehovah’s Witnesses’. Press, 27 Nov 40, p. 10
The Australian Federal Attorney-General, W. M. Hughes,
Hughes, Rt Hon William Morris, PC, CH(’41), QC (1864–1952): b Wales; PM Aust
1915–23; Min Ext Aff 1921–3, 1937–9; Attorney-General 1908–21, 1939–40; Min
Navy1940–3
said
that his government would ask New Zealand its reasons for the ban;
Alexander Mair,
Mair, Hon Alexander: b 1889: Premier NSW 1939–41, Ldr Oppos 1941–5
Premier of New South Wales, had for some time
claimed that their religious activities cloaked subversion, but so far
the Federal government had not accepted this view. Hughes did not
know what the position was in New Zealand, but under Australia’s
constitution everybody was guaranteed freedom of religious belief.
‘It is said that Jehovah’s Witnesses are not a religion. Perhaps that
is a matter I am not competent to determine. Certainly I am not
in favour of shutting people up simply because they do not believe
what I believe. As far as I have heard, this sect seems to be a rather
weird and barbaric interpretation of Christianity.’
Evening Post, 19 Nov 40, p. 11. But in January 1941Canberra decided that Jehovah’s
Witnesses should be declared an unlawful organisation. Ibid., 17 Jan 41, p. 6
Fraser, commenting on the cable to the King, said that the
government had not interfered with the right of people to worship
according to their religious beliefs and conscience; if Jehovah’s Witnesses would confine themselves to ordinary religious observances
there would be no interference.
The difficulties in New Zealand arose through Jehovah’s Witnesses constituting themselves a propaganda body against other
churches, and thereby causing widespread ill-feeling, resentment
and bitterness, which resulted in at least one unfortunate incident
in this country. Such provocative conduct and incitement would
be inimical at any time, and cannot be tolerated during wartime,
when the greatest amount of unity—and co-operation—among
members of all religious faiths is essential. There has been no
interference with the right to worship; but there has been a prohibition imposed on the dissemination of literature and other
propaganda directed against religious organisations.
Press, 20 Nov 40, p. 8
A week later a writer to the Otago Daily Times, who claimed that
he had no connection or sympathy with the sect and who had found
in his letter-box a booklet Government and Peace, the substance of
an address by Rutherford, suggested that in fair play some facts
should be known; the booklet set out beliefs about God’s plan of
the ages and the manner of the future establishment of Christ’s
Kingdom on earth.
Otago Daily Times, 29 Nov 40, p. 11
In the House on 4 December 1940, F. W. Doidge wanted to
know why the sect’s ‘pitiful rubbish’ should be suppressed; New
Zealand was fighting for freedom of speech and in Australia and
Great Britain it was not banned but presumably treated with the
contempt it deserved.
NZPD, vol 258, pp. 500–1
John A. Lee blew all round the compass:
in Jehovah’s Witnesses’ literature there was a good deal that did
not accord with his opinions but he could not find anything subversive in it. ‘There was an attack on certain institutions which the
Jehovah’s Witnesses claim played the Fascist game in Spain and
destroyed democratic privilege.’ The community should not allow
what would promote violent feeling between groups, but must respect
others’ opinions. The Prime Minister and Attorney-General should
provide means whereby Witnesses could express their viewpoint while
refraining from all talk likely to produce a breach of peace. Lee did
not favour pushing pamphlets on to people or hawking records
denouncing certain churches, or effort by any creed, large or small,
to thrust its doctrines down other people’s throats. Finally, he realised that to defend an obscure sect, with few votes, was politically
risky.
Ibid., p. 515
Fraser’s reply revealed a good deal of the current criticism. Opinions, harmless in normal times, might now become very dangerous,
affecting the war effort and peaceful civil relationships. In war it was
absolutely essential that there should be no sectarian warfare. He
had himself requested representatives of the leading churches to
refrain from anything leading thereto. ‘It is hard to lay down an
exact rule’, continued Fraser, ‘but, after all, a man’s home is supposed to be his castle, and if people go to, say, a Catholic home
and thrust into the hands of people there literature that was not
sought and that attacks the dearest faith of those people, is not that
looking for, and instigating trouble…. Does not the House think
that the Government is absolutely justified in preventing that kind
of thing? That is all that was done in regard to Jehovah’s Witnesses.’
The government would not object to literature that expressed only
their own faith, without attacking others’. Every officer of the law
did not have the cultural background necessary for enforcement of
the law as it was intended to be enforced; some might not have
recognised bibles, concordances etc, which did not come under any
ban. But the government knew from the rumblings of the gathering
storm that what had happened at Oamaru would happen all over
the country: widespread acrimonious controversies, sectarian bitterness and religious enmity leading to trouble and violence. The
government had no quarrel with Jehovah’s Witnesses as such and
he hoped that the Attorney-General could make some arrangement
whereby they could worship normally like other churches.
Ibid., pp. 502–3
Fraser had the unwonted support of Polson, who said that he had
read in a recent Saturday Evening Post that it was necessary to suppress the sect in America, a country at peace, so that New Zealand
could not be blamed if it took similar action when at war.
Ibid., p. 522
On 18 November Fraser had received a deputation of Jehovah’s
Witnesses asking that the order against them be rescinded and that
they be allowed to meet for worship.
WHN, ‘Police Department’, p. 235
On the latter aspect some
de facto arrangement must have been made, for on 2 December
newspapers reported that gratitude to the Mayor of Auckland, Sir
Ernest Davis, and the Superintendent of Police, James Cummings
for their ‘kindly courtesy and simple commonsense’ had been
expressed by R. Reid, principal speaker at a religious gathering of
Jehovah’s Witnesses in the Auckland town hall concert chamber.
About 300 were present; proceedings were entirely orderly with a
constable in the background. It was announced that further weekly
meetings would be held in another hall.
NZ Herald, 2 Dec 40, p. 9
Truth was indignant that
a proscribed body should meet for any purpose by arrangement with
such officials; was it proposed ‘to permit the Witnesses of Jehovah
to worship in whatever manner they worship—in other words, to
recognise as a religion an organisation that defames other religions
and constituted authority.’
Truth, 11 Dec 40, p. 9
There was no further outcry against this relaxation and on 16
January the Commissioner of Police instructed that no action should
be taken when Jehovah’s Witnesses met only for worship or religious
study.
WHN, ‘Police Department’, p. 236
A Gazette notice on 8 May 1941 announced that Jehovah’s
Witnesses could meet for Bible study or worship within a building
or tent provided that only members or former members of their
organisation were present and that the meetings should not be publicly advertised save with police consent. The government, said the
Attorney-General, had been told that it was interfering with the
right to meet for worship, prayer and Bible study. There was no
intention to interfere with these rights if exercised without detriment
to the community; consequently activities of the Jehovah’s Witnesses
which could not be construed as subversive would be permitted,
with adequate safeguards against mischief.
Evening Post, 9 May 41, p. 6; NZ Gazette, 8 May 41, p. 1298
That the Presbyterian Church had spoken for religious freedom
in this area was indicated by an Auckland Presbytery decision, on
6 May 1941, to take no further action on behalf of Jehovah’s Witnesses. At the same time it urged that the Public Questions Committee should be vigilant against any actions which would confine
the Christian Church to worship and prevent the exercise of the right
to proclaim religious truth, denounce error and remedy social
wrong.
NZ Herald, 7 May 41, p. 11
The Whangarei County Council in April decided, although
some ratepayers had objected, to take no action against a surfaceman,
a Jehovah’s Witness, as he was not taking part in disloyal gatherings.
Ibid., 12 Apr 41, p. 11
In July occurred the Teachers’ Board of Appeal ruling that
the Auckland Education Board was ultra vires in dismissing a Jehovah’s Witness for refusing, from sincere religious conviction, to salute
the flag.
Evening Post, 11 Jun 41 p. 8; See p. 236
An appeal against the regulations themselves as ultra
vires and void, argued before the Supreme Court in March 1941,
was dismissed.
NZ Herald, 5 Mar, 9 Apr 41, pp. 8, 8
Some Jehovah’s Witnesses continued to canvass. They admitted
that they were welcomed in about only one house in 2000.
Press, 22 May 42, p. 4
A
few persisted in distributing leaflets.
Evening Star, 27 Jun 42, p. 2
Others more cautiously offered
Bibles to householders, where possible directing attention to certain
passages which could lead to exposition of their doctrines. Frequently
they refused to avoid penalties by promising to give up these activities.
NZ Herald, 3 Jun 42, p. 4; Evening Star, 12 Aug 42, p. 4
In some cases magistrates were resolute against the Bibles
as the thin edge of the wedge;
NZ Herald, 2, 4 Apr 42, pp. 6, 6
others were uneasy about convictions over Bibles.
Ibid., 11 Aug 42, p. 2
One, faced with a 17-year-old youth on such
a charge, said: ‘I cannot see that this is anything but a technical
breach, but what am I going to do with him…. There should be
a straight-out ban on this organisation or else nothing at all. Then
we would know where we are’.
Ibid., 13 Jun 41, p. 8
In November 1942 a Supreme
Court judge upheld the appeal of a convicted Bible-canvasser, saying
that there was no evidence of propaganda but adding that his decision
should not encourage belief that such activities would in all circumstances be within the law.
Evening Star, 12 Aug 42, p. 4; Press, 21 Nov 42, p. 6
After 1942 Jehovah’s Witnesses seldom appeared in the news.
On 15 October 1943Canada’s ban on the organisation was
removed.
Auckland Star, 28 Oct 43, p. 4
New Zealand’s was not officially revoked until 5 April
1945.
NZ Gazette, 5 Apr 45, p. 371
The Attorney-General said that their leaders had assured
the government that their activities would not give rise to objection.
In other countries, including Australia where the policy, principles
and methods of Jehovah’s Witnesses were the same as in New
Zealand, they had been free from restrictions for some considerable
time, with entirely satisfactory results, and the government expected
the same in New Zealand.
Press, 29 Mar 45, p. 6
Counsel before the Defaulters’ Revision
Authority said on 28 June that New Zealand was the last country
in the Empire to lift the ban.
Dominion, 29 Jun 45, p. 8
CHAPTER 7
Conscientious Objectors and Defaulters
NEW ZEALAND faced its conscientious objectors and defaulters
with attitudes largely derived from the First World War. By
the Military Service Act of August 1916 only the man who could
satisfy a board that before and since August 1914 he had been a
member of a religious body to which the bearing of arms was contrary to divine revelation, that he himself conscientiously held such
beliefs and was prepared to do non-combatant work in or beyond
New Zealand, could be recognised as a religious objector and be
exempted from military service. The Society of Friends, the Christadelphians and Seventh Day Adventists were the only creeds which
qualified, and only a handful of their adherents convinced boards
of their personal religious sincerity. These happy few, numbering
between 20 and 30 by February 1918, were sent to alternative service
with the Department of Agriculture.
Conscientious Objectors, a pamphlet issued by the Defence Dept, 28 Feb 18, p. 1
The remainder, some hundreds,
were treated with varying severity that included gaol sentences,
deportation, compulsory front line service or non-combatant duties.
The distinction between defaulters and conscientious objectors was
often very slight.
With this background, New Zealand faced its defaulters in the
new war with mixed feelings. There were precedents for severity,
honoured by time and the RSA: ‘we are united in a common love
of Empire and of home, and we are united also in a common belief
that those who are living under the Union Jack and are not willing
to fight should be made to do so,’ said Mr Justice Ostler at an RSA
luncheon in May 1940.
Evening Post, 29 May 40, p. 11
On the other hand Truth, a paper by no
means tender to objectors, a month earlier had contrasted current
conscience tribunal decisions in Britain with 14 New Zealanders
shanghaied to France in 1917: ‘Briggs’s case is an almost unbelievable story of sheer sadism and vicious atrocity, perpetrated in the
name of patriotism and freedom, the details of which almost make
the blood run cold….’
Truth, 1 May 40, p. 17. The 14 had included Mark Briggs (1884–1965), whose sufferings
were described by H. E. Holland in Armageddon or Calvary and who in 1936 became a
member of the Legislative Council, and Archibald Baxter (1861–1970), author of We
Will Not Cease.
Again, a year later, while demanding
equality of sacrifice, a Truth article began: ‘No right-thinking citizen
wants to see a repetition of the grave injustices and vicious treatment
that were meted out to some objectors in the last war’.
Truth, 25 Jun 41, p. 9
In Parliament, F. W. Doidge, an Empire stalwart, declared: ‘We on this side
of the House have every sympathy for those who are “honest-to-God” conscientious objectors and for those who are truly troubled
in their conscience. I do not want to see conscientious objectors forced
to go through what they had to go through during the war of
1914–18.’
NZPD, vol 260, p. 573; Evening Post, 11 Sep 41, p. 5
A few plain men spoke of tolerance and useful work on
farms or other production.
I did my bit in the last war, and there were a few conscientious
objectors in those days. One or two I knew personally, and I found
them quiet God-fearing people. Although I could not see eye to
eye with their views I had at the same time every respect for
them, and I may say that although I was full of fight in those
days I could not muster enough pluck to stand up to what was
said to these sincere people…. It is much easier to go into camp.
Southland Times, 24 Jun 41, p. 7
Another practical man stated:
These individuals, whether genuine in their beliefs or merely super
‘lead-swingers’, are nothing but an embarrassment and a nuisance
to the army. I had some slight contact with them during the last
war. Some spent their period of military service alternately doing
terms of imprisonment and in the awkward squad. There is no
doubt that they suffered a good deal of unnecessary brutality. At
one time there was a hut full of them at Trentham camp, some
doing home service, some doing nothing but eat good army rations.
These men could have been much better employed, from a national
viewpoint, in a non-military occupation. It would be unwarranted
and unjust, however, to leave them in their present safe and well-paid jobs.
Otago Daily Times, 10 Mar 41, p. 5
Labour had opposed 1914–18 as a capitalist war. Fraser, Semple,
Armstrong, O’Brien
O’Brien, Hon James (1875–1947); b Aust, to NZ 1904; MP (Lab) Westland 1922–
46, introduced Invalid Pensions Bill 1930 (effective 1936); Min Transport, Marine from
1942
and Webb had each served a year for opposing
conscription or for seditious utterances. Webb in June 1918 was
also sentenced to two years as a military defaulter and in 1919 lost
civil rights for 10 years. Others in the non-Parliamentary Labour
hierarchy suffered similarly, and most of those gaoled or gazetted
were working men. Even when the government in 1940 accepted
the need for conscription, Labour and liberal circles believed that
conscientious objectors in this war would have sympathetic treatment.
Labour’s opponents and RSA critics waited expectantly for such
softness, ready to assert effectively that these men were by their pasts
unfit to be leaders in war. Against their gibes Labour argued that
this war was different, that it was not a capitalist brawl but a fight
for freedom, a fight for unionism and the rights of workers who
under a Labour government each had a stake in the country. But
people of any party whose sons or husbands, fiancés, friends or brothers were dead, suffering, in peril, or in any case absent, very readily
flamed against those who refused to share the battle and all who
favoured them. The government felt insecure and uneasy in this area,
and was exasperated that current objectors would not join them in
perceiving the difference between 1914 and 1940, as had such noted
overseas pacifists as Bertrand Russell
Russell, Bertrand Arthur William, OM(’49), 3rd Earl (1872–1970): Brit philosopher,
author
and C. E. M. Joad.
Joad, Cyril Edwin Mitchison (1891–1953): Brit philosopher, author, Head Philosophy
& Psychology Dept Birkenhead College, Univ London from 1930
As the
years unfolded, the paradox appeared that in New Zealand, where
the government’s background might have led to considerate handling of conscientious objectors, those who would not fight received
much harsher treatment than did those in Britain and other Commonwealth countries.
Uneasily, the government set aside its past and its inclinations,
and thought about the unwelcome topic as little as possible. On
this subject its opponents could make political capital, while if Labour
lost office objectors would suffer more and lose civil rights as in
1919. Its uneasiness appeared in the slowness with which it tackled
the problems, the long delay in devising alternative service and in
setting up defaulters’ camps, delay that fostered public irritation.
Mason, Minister of Justice, gave liberal counsel to the boards which
judged conscience, but despite the British example no appeal body
was set up, and indefinite prison sentences could be imposed on men
still not called criminals. The boards, drawn from the responsible
and respected layers of society, reflected broad-based feeling that
unless the path of conscientious objection was rough and narrow,
there might be thousands with delicate consciences undermining the
sacrifices of brave men and making prosecution of the war impossible.
The conscription regulations provided for six, later nine, Armed
Forces Appeal Boards, appointed by the Minister of National Service.
Each had as chairman a stipendiary magistrate, with another senior
legal man as his deputy; each had a member with some knowledge
of workers’ interests, another with knowledge of production and
industry, and a Crown representative who was always an experienced
lawyer. They dealt with all appeals against overseas service, on
grounds of public interest, status, undue personal hardship and conscientious objection; they also handled conscience appeals against
Territorial service, other Territorial appeals being heard by local
manpower committees.
Besides being men of standing in the community, appeal board
members had to be over military age and without sons eligible for
service. They were well qualified to discern and weigh the merits of
appeals in the public interest, which were by far the most numerous
sort, deciding whether a man would assist the war effort better by
remaining at his job or being in the Army. The few problems of
status did not perplex, nor was it too difficult to assess undue personal
hardship, as of a widowed mother struggling against sickness, poverty or an unmanned farm, though it did not rate that a man’s
business would collapse without him, unless that business was of
value in the war. But matters of conscience were more elusive. In
August 1914, Walter Nash had said: ‘My own opinion has been
confirmed by that of eminent legal authorities that, while our Courts
are eminently fitted for the ascertainment of facts, there is no
machinery devised by the human brain which can unerringly detect
the state of a man’s conscience.’
NZPD, vol 260, p. 327
However, this task was handed
to the appeal boards and their decisions were final. In the United
Kingdom, by contrast, there were local tribunals which dealt solely
with conscience cases, and those dissatisfied could go to appellate
tribunals, which by December 1944 had heard 18 653 cases and
varied the decisions of the local boards in 9422 of them.
Efford, L. A. W., Penalties on Conscience, p. 34; cf. A to J1945, H–11A, p. 26 for 1943
figures
Initially, boards were guided by National Service Emergency
Regulations 1940/117, clause 21, which said that to succeed the
conscientious objector must satisfy the board that he held a genuine
belief that it was wrong to engage in warfare under any circumstances. Active and genuine membership of a pacifist religious body
might generally be accepted as evidence and in particular to have
been an active member of the Christadelphians or the Society of
Friends for a substantial period before the war would be sufficient
proof.
On 9 July 1940 churchmen representing Anglicans, Presbyterians,
Roman Catholics, Methodists, Baptists, Congregationalists, the
Church of Christ, the Salvation Army and the Society of Friends
wrote to the Prime Minister. They were anxious that appeal boards
should regard conscientious objection as a general moral principle,
not the monopoly of particular sects, for while most of their churches
did not adopt the pacifist view they recognised the right of individual members to do so. They hoped that work serving the community, or non-combatant duties in the armed forces, would be
arranged for objectors; that, in the interests of uniformity, appeal
board chairmen would consult together before beginning their duties
and that there would be an appellate tribunal, as in Britain. In
conclusion they realised that the government was anxious, for the
sake of the country’s morale in times of strain, that the work of the
churches should not suffer; they therefore suggested that all ministers
of religion, all home missionaries, and theological students accepted
prior to September 1939 should be exempt from military service.
The Prime Minister replied on 9 September that the War Cabinet
had decided that conscience appeals would be considered on their
individual merits. The appeals of those who established genuine
belief that it is wrong under any circumstances to engage in warfare
would be allowed, and alternative service recommended. Whenever
ministers of religion, including Marist Brothers and theological
students, were called in ballots, the head of the church should appeal
on public interest grounds; such appeals would cause little difficulty
or embarrassment and probably no actual hearing would be needed.
Copies of both these letters are on WHF, ‘Defaulters’
This was published in the New Zealand Herald and other dailies of
5 October, and in the Presbyterian Outlook of October. It was repeated
in a National Service circular sent to appeal boards, along with an
Army statement, dated 29 November 1940, that men posted to
Medical or Army Service Corps must understand that the exigencies
of war might require combatant service. The circular considered the
desirability and difficulties of uniformity in the decisions of boards,
offered the services of the Department in maintaining the ‘closest
liaison’, and urged chairmen to consult each other whenever possible.
It also stated that, while the onus of establishing his conscientious
belief fell on the appellant, there was grave difficulty in distinguishing the genuine from the false, quoting from the Year Book of
Edward IV ‘the thought of man is not triable, for the devil himself
knows not the thought of man.’ Cases based on such recognised
religions as the Society of Friends and the Christadelphians would
not be unduly difficult, but since the last war there had undoubtedly
been a marked growth of conscientious objection, of which the most
important instance was perhaps the Peace Pledge Union, which
promised never to support or sanction another war. The circular also
pointed out that in England the term ‘conscientious objection’ had
not been defined by the tribunals which, rather than laying down
general principles, dealt with each case on its merits.
Copy of pp. 19–21 National Service Department Circular A. B. No 1, undated, but
apparently early 1941, on WHF, ‘Defaulters’
The exemption of the clergy was smoothly implemented, but when
the appeal boards had been working for a few weeks it was clear
that in several of them the individual conscience met a rough passage
and a narrow gate. In February 1941 the combined churches wrote
to the Prime Minister
Bishop of Wellington to PM, 21 Feb 41, on ibid.
and sent a deputation to Semple and other
heads of the National Service Department.
Notes of a deputation from various churches to Min Nat Service, 26 Feb 41, ibid.
The appeal boards, they
said, were not interpreting the regulations as expected from the Prime
Minister’s letter of 9 September 1940. The boards were concentrating on the church membership of appellants and on whether
such churches absolutely rejected war, with the result that ‘many of
our young men who have seemed to us to have been genuine conscientious objectors and whose sincerity has been vouched for by
their own Minister have had their appeals summarily dismissed.’
There was no provision for alternative service outside military control, nor was there any surety that the Army would keep those whom
appeal boards recommended for such service in non-combatant units.
Further, tribunals differed enormously in their treatment of objectors.
Semple gave the government’s position quite simply: ‘We do not
want wholesale exemptions. By 1943 every young man at present
of military age will be out of the country or in camp. If we are too
liberal and too sympathetic with the fellow who wants to dodge,
we will have trouble.’ The government could not interfere with the
decisions of tribunals, even if they were inconsistent, but amendments to the regulations were necessary and had already been drafted.
Appeals should depend on each man’s genuine conscientious belief
that it was wrong to take part in any war, and independent corroborative evidence of conscience would be strongly advised. Successful
appellants would perform alternative civilian tasks at soldiers’ pay;
the Services must ensure that those granted non-combatant duties
were required to do only these, and if such duties were not available
a non-combatant might be allotted alternative civilian service. Reference to the Society of Friends and the Christadelphians, which had
tended to provide an absolute yardstick, would be omitted along
with the demand that such beliefs should have been held for a
substantial period before the war, which was too exacting, especially
for young Territorials.
In general these proposals placated the clergy, though they
remained anxious lest some tribunals would still not accept that
honest conscientious objection existed. They were particularly concerned about the Wellington Board where the Crown representative
was by profession a Crown prosecutor, and largely took over the
questioning. The Bishop of Wellington declared himself ‘honestly
staggered…. They are just catch questions, every one of them, given
by a skilled legal mind. It seems to me to be absolutely unfair.’
Semple soothingly promised to ‘do our best to give these boys a
fair go’ with the new regulations.
Ibid.
On 15 May 1941 new regulations (1941/73) established in detail
the changes proposed in February. Where an appellant, assisted by
corroborative evidence but not necessarily dependent on it, convinced
a board that he genuinely believed that it was wrong under any
circumstances to engage in warfare, the board should allow the appeal,
and thereafter the Minister of National Service might direct the man
to any civilian work and at such pay and conditions as he thought
fit. If the appellant established his genuine belief that it was wrong
to do combat duty, the board should ‘dismiss’ the appeal, directing
that he should go to non-combatant duties only, and if these were
not available in the armed forces, he should be directed to civilian
work by the Minister likewise.
It was not in a sense always accurate to say that such an appeal was dismissed, when
sometimes a man got all that he asked for, but perhaps the government was not unwilling
to heighten harmlessly the impression that appeals did not often succeed.
All other appeals would be dismissed unconditionally. Those who had appealed successfully or been
allotted non-combatant duties could at any time change their minds
and enter the forces; if applied for within a fortnight, appeals previously dismissed could be reheard under the new regulations. It
was also decreed that conscientious objectors were to be medically
examined before their cases were heard, and against those unfit no
further action would be taken, thus reducing the number of these
vexed issues.
Press, 16 May 41, p. 10
The Minister of Justice, Mason, explaining the changes to a conference of chairmen, Crown representatives and secretaries of appeal
boards, spoke of the difficulties of assessing conscience and the need
for approaching a uniform standard. There had been criticisms of
boards’ decisions by churchmen and others, most of them not pacifists but anxious for the genuine objector; he was sure much of it
was ill-founded on abridged newspaper reports or on disappointed
appellants’ complaints. But the previous regulations did not convey
the government’s policy. The government, he said, earnestly desired
to prevent the coward and slacker from sheltering under an invented
conscience, but to extend every consideration to the sincere objector.
‘To this end the standard of proof should not be harsh. Until and
unless an appellant shows himself to lack sincerity, I suggest he
should be handled by a friendly examination rather than by a rigorous cross-examination.’
Remarks by Hon H. G. R. Mason on the Conscientious Objector, WHF, ‘Defaulters’
This was liberal-minded direction, but laws depend on those who
actually administer them. There was no notable change in the boards
that felt their first duty was to prevent slackers dodging their obligations. Further, although Semple had publicly announced that military exemption now definitely involved alternative service and
sacrifice, there was no machinery to effect this: it was all left to the
direction of the Minister, who remained inactive. As weeks and
months passed public opinion, spearheaded by the RSA and newspaper editorials and sharpened by the military disasters of Greece
and Crete, pressed for clarification of this alternative sacrifice. Possibly lack of definition increased the reluctance of some appeal boards
to accept conscience easily, and it is likely that they were confirmed
in that tendency by an influential British judgment during April
1941, in a case of appeal against wrongful dismissal, which ruled
out politically-based objection, no matter how sincere.
Atkinson J, in Newell v. Gillingham Corporation, All England Law Reports1941,
pp. 553–4; endorsed by the English Law Journal, 3 May 1941, XCI, p. 176. Copies of
both were sent to appeal boards. Dir Nat Service to Min Justice, 24 May 43, WHF,
‘Defaulters’. This judgment was also widely reported in the daily press, eg, Evening Post,
20 Jun 41, p. 9
The question of alternative service and sacrifice was tackled in
August 1941 by more regulations, which created a Special Tribunal
to examine every recognised conscientious objector, directing him
where necessary to essential work and arranging, by levies varying
from 2s 6d to several pounds a week paid into the Social Security
Fund, that he receive only the equivalent of Army pay and allowances, the basic rate for a single man being £4 a week. Many of
the young men concerned were not earning more than this. Grade
III men were totally exempted. Members of the Tribunal, all distinguished lawyers,
A. H. (later Sir Alexander) Johnstone, Kt(’50), OBE(’46), KC(’34), of Auckland,
d 1956; H. F. O’Leary (later Rt Hon), KCMG(’47), PC(’48), KC(’35) (1886–1953),
of Wellington, Chief Justice NZ from 1946; A. T. (later Sir Arthur) Donnelly, KBE(’49),
CMG(’39) (1890–1954), Crown Solicitor Chch from 1920, Dir NZ Newspapers, member CUC Bd Governors, chmn Directors Bank NZ from 1937, chmn Economic Stabilisation Cmssn during WWII; Maurice James Gresson (1884–1948), barrister & solicitor,
dep chmn Red Cross 1917–18, of Christchurch
worked alone, examining each objector in camera and checking with his employer, Social Security and National
Service. In most cases men were not ordered to change their work
except where it was of no use to the community or their employers
did not wish them to continue. This Tribunal, which began work
late in November 1941, was generally accepted by both pacifists
and public, though some newspapers, notably Truth and the Dominion,
Truth, 13 Aug, 1 Oct 41, pp. 16, 23; Dominion, 30 Aug, 29 Oct, 5, 12 Dec 41,
22 Feb, 30 Apr 43
found the sacrifice insufficient and the secrecy disturbing. By
the end of 1944 the Tribunal had dealt with 500 recognised objectors, plus 72 of those given non-combatant duties whom the Army
did not require, and during 1945 defaulters released from detention
camps also came before them. Financial orders were made in 343
of their total 826 cases, with an estimated annual yield to Social
Security of £6,502.
Report of Nat Service Dept, A to J1946, H–11A, pp. 25, 129
Some orders had to be reviewed frequently, to
fit variations in the amounts earned.
Press, 3 Sep 42, p. 4
Despite the regulations of May 1941 and Mason’s liberal directions, appeal boards continued to judge objectors by their own
differing standards. On 8 August 1941 J. A. Lee said that boards
varied so much from place to place that they were making the law,
not administering it. In Auckland, for instance, the Labour representative had ‘taken up at times a most ferocious attitude to conscientious objectors…. It was an outrage that in some centres men
were hectored for the attitude they took up, while in other centres
they were exempted for the same attitude.’ Some boards were still
making conscience dependent on belonging to certain religious groups.
There should be definite instruction and effort towards co-ordinating
their decisions so that the tribunals might work uniformly.
NZPD, vol 260, pp. 65–6
Clergymen often testified to the sincerity of appellants, and they
were disturbed when their evidence was ignored. Towards the end
of 1941 Baptist, Presbyterian and Methodist churches, while earnest
in loyalty and in support of a righteous war, expressed dissatisfaction
with the boards, and also with magistrates who sentenced defaulters.
The Baptist Assembly on 22 October deprecated ‘humiliating and
unfair treatment’; it was wrong, said Dr Alexander Hodge, to conclude that all who resisted being in the forces were malingerers and
cowards; some magisterial comments savoured too much of Judge
Jeffreys.
Jeffreys, George, 1st Baron of Wem (1644–89): Lord Chief Justice Britain from 1682;
notorious for injustice and brutality and his ‘Bloody Assize’ after Monmouth’s rebellion
against James II 1685
Dr J. J. North,
North, Dr John James (d 1950aet 79): b UK, to NZ 1882; principal Baptist Training
College Auck from 1928, Pres Baptist Union 1931
principal of the Baptist training college,
wrote more comprehensively of the world’s current danger and its
debt to conscience in the martyrs of the past. Those sitting in judgment must remember that conscience existed and was recognised by
law; the exonerating reason for exemption must be a man’s own,
related to God and human society, and its final proof was his willingness to suffer for it, to pay cheerfully the price of his costly
convictions.
NZ Herald, 12 Nov 41, p. 11, quoting NZ Baptist, Nov 41; Auckland Star, 22, 23
Oct 41, pp. 6, 8
The Presbyterian General Assembly, disappointed that National
Service regulations were being ‘so unsatisfactorily administered’,
offered its sympathy to those who suffered in consequence.
Evening Post, 10 Nov 41, p. 9
Its Public Questions Committee stated that in accepting the regulations of
May 1941 it had expressed its view that they could be administered
satisfactorily only by special tribunals, as in England. ‘It is impossible to follow the decisions of the Boards; and it is hard to understand why the evidence of a minister concerning the conscientious
beliefs of a young man he had known intimately should be entirely
ignored. As a result a number of young men have already been
imprisoned for conscience sake.’
Timaru Herald, 6 Nov 41, p. 8; Evening Post, 26 Nov 41, p. 11
St John’s Church, Wellington,
under Gladstone Hughes vigorously dissented, declaring that such
statements misrepresented the Presbyterians of New Zealand.
Evening Post, 1, 4 Dec 41, pp. 8, 10, letters 4, 11, 12, 20, 27 Nov 41, pp. 8, 6, 6,
8, 8
The Methodist Church, with Burton, Barrington and their company so prominent, was anxious to avoid the label ‘pacifist’, while
also concerned for justice. In November the synods of Auckland,
Wellington and North Canterbury deplored that appeals by young
men of undoubted sincerity had been dismissed, thought that there
should be a higher tribunal, as in England, and regretted that there
was no alternative service other than defaulters’ camps for those
whose appeals were dismissed.
NZ Herald, 20 Nov 41, p. 10; Press, 19, 21 Nov 41, pp. 8, 6; Otago Daily Times,
20 Nov 41, p. 8; Evening Post, 21 Nov 41, p. 7
The synod of Otago and Southland,
however, regretted the indiscretions of some ministers at appeal boards
and wanted discipline from Conference,
Otago Daily Times, 20 Nov 41, p. 8
while the church at Hataitai, Wellington, approved by the RSA, strongly affirmed its loyalty
to the war and the British Empire.
Evening Post, 1, 10 Dec 41, pp. 8, 7
In the Observer, a paper somewhat prone to pacifist-hunting, the president-elect of Conference,
Reverend W. Walker,
Walker, Rev William Walter (d 1969aet 89): b UK, to NZ 1909; superindendent
Methodist Central Mission Dunedin 1923–9; Pres Methodist Church 1942–5; foundation
member RSA
an ex-president of the Christchurch and
Canterbury RSA, stated stoutly that the Methodist Church was not
pacifist, that hundreds of young Methodists were fighting valiantly
in a war which they believed to be righteous, and that fully three-fourths of the current trouble was due to the government not producing worthy forms of alternative sacrificial service; young men of
deep sincerity and sterling character had had appeals dismissed and
been imprisoned, even when vouched for by men of high standing
who knew them well.
NZ Observer, 10 Dec 41, p. 7
At the Methodist Conference, while stating
clearly ‘It is right to fight’, he saw need for Church and State to
clarify the position regarding genuine objectors for the guidance of
appeal boards and suggested a little more sweet reasonableness all
round.
NZ Methodist Times, 21 Feb 42, p. 348; NZ Herald, 20 Feb 42, p. 7
In its resolutions Conference itself was cautious: while most
members would be active in the war effort, freedom of conscience
should be respected but those sincerely unwilling to bear arms should
render alternative sacrificial service.
NZ Methodist Times, 7 Mar 42, p. 372
The conduct of appeal boards and the clergy’s attacks drew differing comments, both critical of the boards, from two Wellington
lawyers. One, O. C. Mazengarb,
Mazengarb, Hon Oswald Chettle, CBE(’52), KC (1890–1963): MLC 1950
regretted that certain ministers of
religion in their support of pacifists were doing real disservice to
their denominations and to the State by fostering antagonism to civil
law. There was, he said, no real conflict between divine and civil
law; the conflict arose only when people sought to interpret the
unrevealed law of God in a way that opposed the duties of citizens.
If such a conflict occurred, the obvious course was to ask the legislature to amend the law so as to bring it into harmony with the
presumed will of God. Newspaper reports showed that there was
urgent need for change in the law, but while the law was there the
clergy should respect it and not criticise the tribunals which had the
unpleasant task of trying to penetrate into the real minds of men.
Churchmen should confine themselves to their proper province; ‘any
movement which white-ants the law is quite capable of white-anting
the Church itself.’ Cabinet ministers were currently wrestling with
problems that they had helped to create by nurturing pacifists in
days gone by, and churchmen doing likewise might easily split their
congregations, might drive a wedge between Church and State.
Evening Post, 27 Nov 41, p. 8
Another lawyer, A. Eaton Hurley, saw the statements of these
churches as
primarily a protest against the taunts and insults delivered against
some conscientious objectors by certain public men and by some
Magistrates who have forgotten the historical position of Quakers
and other pacifists who for their faith have suffered. Such taunts
lower the dignity of the Magistracy and impair the impartial
administration of justice… we pride ourselves on our tolerance,
but it is absent from our midst; in its place are growing bitterness
and hatred…. Unless we are able to retain respect for individuals
with whose opinions we are not in sympathy, there can be no real
solidarity within our country.
New Zealanders were standing for the common people against the
despot, for the right of each to the freedom of his own conscience,
freedom recognised by the law of the land. ‘The measure of our
sincerity is the measure by which we ourselves in New Zealand are
able to live with respect for beliefs that are not our own.’
Ibid., 4 Dec 41, p. 8
An Evening Post correspondent feared that newspaper reports of
appeal board dialogues gave ‘ready-made arguments and excuses’,
encouraging other objectors to ‘give it a go’.
Ibid., 23 Oct 41, p. 8
The Evening Post, in
an editor’s comment, thought that more would be deterred than
encouraged. Another correspondent, Oliver Duff,
wrote that while
he did not sympathise with five per cent of appellants, and if on a
board might not allow two per cent of them, yet the law gave every
man called up the right of appeal, and every citizen the right to
know on what grounds appeals were granted or rejected. ‘Justice
with the blinds down is an experiment that we can’t afford to risk.’
Evening Post, 24 Oct 41, p. 4
Meanwhile, on 24 October when an Opposition member, W. P.
Endean,
Endean, William Phillip (1884–1957): MP (Nat) Parnell, Remuera 1930–43
asked for an appellant tribunal, Fraser answered that the
government had considered this but found it ‘neither desirable nor
practicable’; the boards were fully competent to deal fairly and
impartially with the evidence submitted and they could grant a rehearing if they had reason to suppose that a decision had been fraudulently obtained or if new and material evidence had been discovered.
NZPD, vol 260, p. 1254
Two incidents may be cited here, one to show how decisions could
vary in apparently similar cases, one to suggest the zeal of some
boards against conscientious objectors. A member of the Brethren
sect got a month’s imprisonment for failing to report for military
duty. His lawyer explained that his appeal had been dismissed by
the same board that had allowed an identical appeal by his elder
brother, brought up in the same religion; the only difference was
that the elder brother had employed counsel while the younger had
not, thinking that the earlier decision would be followed.
Evening Post, 24 Oct 41, p. 6
The zeal
of the Auckland board was shown in its reception of an amendment
to the regulations in mid-November. Previously, if a conscientious
objector also appealed on other grounds his conscience appeal was
heard first, before undue hardship or the value of his work were
considered, but now these grounds were to be heard first. The New
Zealand Herald of 15 November had promptly protested that this
amendment would favour the objector on work of national importance, who would continue on full pay, while the pay of recognised
conscientious objectors was reduced by the special tribunal. The
chairman of the Auckland board, C. R. Orr-Walker,
Orr-Walker, Charles Rutherford (d 1947): barrister & solicitor 1896–1920; Chief Judge
Dept Admin Western Samoa 1921–3; SM from 1920
was surprised
that boards had not been consulted before the amendment was made;
possibly a man exempted in the public interest might be a ‘fraudulent conscientious objector, or even a disloyal subject or a fifth-columnist, in a very important position, but his employer would
know nothing of that and the Board would have to exempt him.’
NZ Herald, 20 Nov 41, p. 11
By this amendment, 1096 conscience appeals were adjourned sine
die, appeals on other grounds taking priority.
A to J1945, H-11A, p. 23
In Britain an advisory board for conscientious objectors was
officially recognised. In Wellington in October 1940 several senior
pacifists offered to act in this way, but after one appearance their
advertisements were refused on instructions from the Prime Minister’s
Department. A deputation explained to the Prime Minister that this
group would not proselytize but merely advise young, inexperienced
men of their legal rights,
NZCPS Bulletin W22, p. 5
but on 24 October Fraser told them that
as the National Service Department would give conscience objectors
full legal information, any other organisation was unnecessary, would
lead to misunderstanding and resentment and would not be conducive to the interests of the country’s war effort or of the conscientious objectors themselves.
Ibid., W23, p. 8
The group thereon sent out its notices
to 1200 names chosen at random from the second ballot.
Ibid., W25, p. 2; See p. 220
Several
newspapers made disapproving comment, but while the Press obligingly printed the document, giving the names of the committee
members and an address, the Evening Post spoke of ‘subversive letters’ and the Observer, with a large heading ‘A School for Shirkers’,
urged the government to stamp out the suppliers of ‘bullet-proof
consciences’.
Press, 14 Nov 40, p. 8; Evening Post, 22 Nov 40, p. 9; NZ Observer, 25 Dec 40, p. 14
Another body, the Fellowship of Conscientious Objectors, formed
in Wellington on 5 June 1941, also denied having propaganda purposes. But despite its lofty aims—to give fellowship, advice and
financial relief to objectors, and to be a channel of communication
with government
Dominion, 28 Feb 42, p. 10
—its secretary, John Davis, in mid-1942 was sentenced to a year in prison for subversive newsletters.
Evening Post 9, 15 May 42, pp. 6, 6
Conscience objectors whose appeals were pending or allowed met
various sorts of hostility. Their services were rejected by some branches
of the Emergency Fire Service,
Press, 20 Aug 41, p. 6
the St John Ambulance Brigade
Evening Post, 26 Aug 41, p. 6; Press, 12 Dec 41, p. 8
and the EPS,
Evening Post, 25 Jul, 22 Aug, 24 Nov 41, pp. 6, 7, 9; Press, 12 Dec 41, p. 8
which did not want to be regarded as refuges for
‘conchies’, and which claimed that as they would be in the forefront
of action in a crisis, persons opposed to war would be unsuitable.
Apart from known pacifists, who usually signed newspaper letters
with their own names, there were very few who took the line of one
anonymous writer to the Press:
… ordinary submissive citizens … take a lot of annoying, and
so we have not said anything publicly about the way conscientious
objectors are hounded by a few noisy publicists. J. B. Priestley
Priestley, John Beynton (1894–): UK author, dramatist, literary critic, popular wartime
broadcaster
in ‘Postscripts’ says the Nazi is found in every community, that
he is the intolerant and stupid bully who wants to bash everybody
who does not think as he thinks. Well, he is here. What I am
getting at is the way women teachers are refused jobs because
their husbands are in defaulters’ camps, the venomous way people
write about c.o.’s in these columns, the way the W.E.A. is criticised for sending lecturers to defaulters’ camps. We plain, sober
folk believe in British justice and we take the side of the underdog. We think the C.O. is not getting a fair spin and we are
getting annoyed. If a man is paying the penalty of his opinions,
let him be.
Press, 22 Jul 42, p. 4
This letter was applauded by one correspondent, a veteran pacifist,
but strongly attacked by three others.
Ibid., 24 Jul 42, p. 6
The regulation that prohibited dismissing a man because he had
enlisted or been called up was, on 14 May 1941, extended to protect
those who appealed against military service on any grounds, but
when on 14 June 1941 an officer of the Labour Department, R. T.
Bailey,
Bailey, R. T. (d 1950aet 72): Labour Dept officer 1909–44, including officer-in-charge
Lab Dept Chch, certifying officer for Unemployment Board during Depression
stated clearly that it was an offence, liable to prosecution,
to dismiss a man who exercised his legal right to appeal and perhaps
to be exempted on conscience grounds, there was considerable outcry.
What would the men overseas feel, what would their brothers feel,
queried the Star-Sun on 15 June. The Wellington Manufacturers
Association challenged Bailey’s statement; the head of a large Wellington firm said, ‘If I find anyone who even looks like a conscientious objector among our employees he will get his walking shoes’;
Evening Post, 17, 18 Jun 41, pp. 8, 8
a correspondent asked if the Labour Department expected an
employer with a son overseas to keep on a conscientious objector
Ibid., 16 Jul 41, p. 6
and the Labour Department remained silent.
Its silence was remarked on by the Evening Post, 22 Aug 41
Sometimes the presence of such a man was actively resented by
his work-fellows. A firm appealing in public interest for a clothing
cutter who had appealed on conscience grounds, withdrew its appeal
when other workers opposed it, one having a son who had lost an
arm overseas.
Evening Star, 28 Jan 42, p. 8
At the Ruakura Animal Research Station when the
Minister of Agriculture refused to dismiss an objector, saying that
though his views were repugnant he should be allowed freedom of
conscience, 25 employees protested emphatically, with plans for a
public meeting and pressure in the coming election.
NZ Herald, 3 Aug 43, p. 2
There was strong feeling that objectors should not hold government or local body jobs, drawing money from the public purse. The
Waitemata County Council decided not to employ one any longer,
although Semple wrote that the government considered that no special
action should be taken by individual bodies, that so long as a man
fulfilled his obligations to his employers the rest should be left to
the government.
Ibid., 22 Feb, 22 Mar 41, pp. 8, 11
Several letters heartily supported the Council
Ibid., 10, 13, 15, 21 Mar 41, pp. 9, 13, 12, 10
but one held that a man released by law from the Army had as
good a right as any to a public job and should not be persecuted
for his opinions.
Ibid., 17 Mar 41, p. 10
This view was also put forth a few months later
by A. R. D. Fairburn, who wrote that among several recent dismissals of successful conscience appellants by local bodies, the latest
was of a hospital orderly by the Auckland Hospital Board, its chairman, A. J. Moody, saying, ‘We do not want the type of man who
preaches the rubbish he does.’
Auckland Star, 17 Jul 41, p. 6
The Wellington Hospital Board adopted a motion against
employing any active pacifist, brought forward by a member anxious
that hospital service should not be ‘used as a funk hole by people
with distorted ideas’, but the chairman and others thought that it
was unnecessary, outside the range of the Board, and would be so
ineffective as to be innocuous.
Evening Post, 30 Aug 41, p. 6
The Wellington City Council decided
not to employ any objector who would give no community service
at all, but would take each case on its merits.
Ibid., 12 Jun 41, p. 10
The Temuka Borough
Council disapproved of the Health Department retaining a successful
appellant as an inspector.
Press, 14 Apr 42, p. 6
A questionnaire issued by the Christchurch City Council to its staff included questions on their attitudes
to war service that were resented as ‘Fascist and Gestapo methods’
by a meeting of 200 employees.
Ibid., 18, 23 Jun 41, pp. 6, 4
One councillor said that this data
was needed to answer critics who ‘twitted’ the Council about its staff
being a ‘hot bed of pacifism, conscientious objectors, and subversion’,
but another said that if all bodies were going to set up their own
authorities, they might as well do away with State tribunals; it was
decided that those questions need not be answered.
Ibid., 24 Jun, 15 Jul 41, pp. 8, 8. Later it transpired that there had been 5 conscience
appeals among about 700 employees. Ibid., 23 Dec 41, p. 4
All this helped to show the government how the wind of opinion
was blowing, and by the regulations of August 1941 no employer
was obliged to retain an exempted objector. Late in 1942, however,
the Dunedin City Council braved the displeasure of the local RSA
by declining to inquire into the attitudes to war of applicants for
jobs, though there were instructions to avoid those known to have
expressed subversive views.
Auckland Star, 22 Dec 42, p. 6
Moreover, an attempt by the Hastings
Rugby Union to bar all who refused the King’s uniform from rugby
clubs and grounds was promptly rejected by the provincial union.
One member held: ‘There are worse people than conscientious objectors. There are any amount of them hiding behind their jobs as an
excuse for not wearing uniform’, and another declared, ‘I would not
undertake the responsibility of debarring a man from Rugby grounds.’
A similar response was made at Wellington.
Evening Post, 25, 26 Mar 42, pp. 6, 9; Auckland Star, 28 Mar 42, p. 6
Rugby might remain open to conscientious objectors but the minds
of children were another matter. There had been in mid-1940 alarums lest school children be corrupted by disloyalty or pernicious
doctrines about Russia,
See p. 228
and during 1941 a movement against conscientious objector teachers gathered strength till in December all
who lodged appeals were excluded from State schools.
Some teachers, when questioned by appeal boards, made statements that excited indignation, for example, that they would not
help wounded men, or use force to defend women or the children
in their care. There was delay, often of months, between the lodging
of an appeal (readily known of in school circles), the hearing of it,
and the calling up of those rejected. Meanwhile objectors with pending appeals continued in their jobs, along with any whose appeals
were successful and those found to be unfit and therefore free from
military obligations but whose unwillingness to serve was known
and resented by parents. It was, these parents said, hard on children
whose fathers and brothers were overseas to have such teachers, and
if they were allowed in the schools there would grow up a nation
of conscientious objectors.
In May, the Canterbury Education Board wanted the Department
to stipulate that those ‘war profiteers’, the pacifists and exempted
conscientious objectors, should not be eligible for positions carrying
higher salary and temporarily vacated by soldier teachers.
Evening Post, 26 May 41, p. 5
A ground
swell of protest was also rising in several country districts.
For example: at Kaiti near Gisborne, prompted by the RSA, and at a school near Dannevirke where parents would not send their children to school while a teacher whose
appeal had been rejected remained there. Ibid., 7, 10, 19 Jul 41, pp. 8, 10, 11. Of a
teacher’s appeal allowed at Lynnford near Ashburton, Truth said that it was heard late
in February, the decision announced in June and that since February parents had been
twitted on letting the teacher’s views go unchallenged. At a public meeting there were
angry references to his statements to the Appeal Board, and the general feeling was that
he should not be allowed to continue in an easy job, at good pay, accepting the protection
of soldiers in the Middle East. Truth, 16 Jul 41, p. 4
By July
the Hawke’s Bay Education Board had taken the stand that if a
man was not prepared to defend the British Empire he was not fit
to teach British children; it was promptly congratulated by the Nelson Board.
Evening Post, 19, 22 Jul 41, pp. 11, 5
The erosion of more liberal attitudes was instanced by the Wellington Education Board. On 16 July, Colonel T. W. McDonald
and T. K. Moody proposed that a list should be made, for use in
future appointments, of all teachers, men and women, who were
pacifists or who had appealed on conscience grounds. The Board
refused this ‘inquisitorial list’; people were entitled to their opinions
and it was not the Board’s duty to decide who was a pacifist.
Ibid., 16 Jul 41, p. 8
Soon,
however, the combined Wellington school committees, with Moody
prominent in their counsels, recommended such a list to the board;
Ibid., 20, 21 Aug 41, pp. 8, 11
the country-wide clamour was rising. The central executive of the
RSA declared that it would bring forward instances of disloyal attitudes.
Ibid., 17 Jul 41, p. 8
Education boards, pressed by school committees and parents,
were either dismissing teachers who had appealed
They had power to dismiss summarily for immorality or misbehaviour.
or asking the
government for regulations enabling them to dismiss conscientious
objectors as such and at once.
Wanganui Board, Evening Post, 19 Aug 41, p. 8; Southland Board, ibid., 23 Aug 41,
p. 11, NZ Herald, 6 Nov 41, p. 8; Canterbury, Evening Post, 19 Jul 41, p. 6, Press, 22
Sep 41, p. 6; Auckland, Evening Post, 3 Sep 41, p. 9; Otago, Press, 19 Sep 41, p. 6;
Marlborough College Board of Governors, Evening Post, 12 Aug 41, p. 9. Col McDonald
(Ibid., 9 Sep 41, p. 9) claimed that one reason for the hostility of the Minister of Education towards himself was the strong stand that he had taken against pacifist teachers,
which attitude was being adopted by other boards; outside the Wellington area the
Colonel was not visibly in the lead.
When saluting the flag was discussed
in the House on 8 August, Clyde Carr’s remarks about ritual observances and totem poles drew strong protest.
eg, Evening Post, 11, 13, 14, 20, 22 Aug 41, pp. 6, 6, 10, 6, 7
A national conference
of school committees meeting in Wellington on 25–6 August was
fervent for flag saluting, teachers’ loyalty, and penalties against those
not conforming.
The Wellington Board on 20 August had turned down another
McDonald/Moody motion that no teacher who was a conscientious
objector or a pacifist should receive promotion, but decided to ask
the government for authority to terminate the engagements of conscience objectors immediately, when warranted. On 26 August a
deputation told the Minister of Education, Mason, that from the
nature of their occupation ‘a very fierce spotlight’ bore on the few
teachers concerned. The statements of some to appeal boards, that
they would take no action even if their own mothers or the children
in their charge were attacked, had created very strong public opinion
against children remaining under such influences. Conscientious
objectors should not remain in the schools, even at soldiers’ pay, if
their appeals were accepted or, if rejected, even for the month or
two until they were called up.
Report of deputation from Wgtn Educ Bd to Min Educ, 26 Aug 41, WHF, ‘Defaulters’
The Minister pointed out that such
dismissal was punishment for being an objector, which was not a
crime; he hoped that the special tribunals for arranging alternative
service which were just about to emerge would provide remedy, but
if they did not he would consider increasing the education boards’
powers.
Ibid.; Evening Post, 26 Aug 41, p. 9
These tribunal regulations did not oblige an unwilling employer
to retain a recognised objector, even with his pay reduced to Army
level, and they did nothing about appellants who proved to be medically unfit and were therefore exempted.
National Service Emergency Regulations 1940 Amendment 5 (1941/148)
When the NZEI tried to
support teachers whose appeals were accepted by appeal boards, the
Minister of Education thought that no further regulations would be
needed,
Deputation from NZEI, referred to in War History Narrative, ‘Education Department’,
(hereinafter WHN, ‘Education Department’), p. 166
but pressure on and by boards continued. On 2 October
a conference, between them, the Minister and departmental heads,
set in train the regulations of 10 December 1941 which banished
all conscientious objectors from State school staffs. The Minister
explained that the removal of conscientious objector teachers was
necessary because of their close contact with children, a factor affecting no other occupation. When a teacher in any State school lodged
an appeal he was given a month’s notice to go on leave without pay
for the duration; if considered a bad influence he might be required
to leave at once, though with the month’s pay. Teachers who became
defaulters by refusing service without making an appeal could, with
the Minister’s consent, be dismissed immediately or, if not dismissed, go on leave without pay for the duration.
By February 1942, 120 teachers had appealed on conscience
grounds,
Press, 13 Feb 42, p. 4, quoting a circular received by school boards
and altogether 123 made such appeals, though a number
later joined the forces as servicemen or non-combatants.
WHN, ‘Education Department’, p. 168
At the end
of the war, despite many requests that these regulations should be
revoked, the Education Boards’ Conference of April 1946 firmly
refused to re-engage defaulters and did not favour the return of
recognised objectors.
Ibid., p. 170
In October 1947 it was decided to bar defaulters permanently from the teaching service; recognised objectors, and
defaulters whose consciences had satisfied the Revision Authorities,
could re-join when the regulations that excluded them were revoked,
which happened at the end of 1948.
Ibid., pp. 170–1
Education boards, anxious to clear the slur of disloyalty with evidence of military service, would not appeal for any teachers, refusing
in February 1942 to hold even headmasters of Grade IV schools
and high school teachers of mathematics and science. By mid-1942
shortage of teachers was so acute that boards were forced to make
appeals, and in November teaching was declared an essential occupation. This meant that teachers could not readily transfer to other
work, but did not fend off the demands for military service. In
Roman Catholic schools from the start teachers (Marist Brothers)
were exempted on the formal application of their Archbishop. In
the furore of August 1941 the small voice of the Randwick School
committee, in Lower Hutt, was hardly heard as it asked for the
same consideration that was extended to Archbishop O’Shea, and
for the Wellington Board to make a definite stand in claiming
exemptions.
Evening Post, 21 Aug 41, p. 11; see p. 1123
In April 1942, Canterbury University College recommended that
the regulations excluding conscientious objector teachers should be
extended to universities. The other colleges firmly rejected the idea,
and the government assured them that it would not interfere.
NZ Herald, 21, 29 Apr, 19 May 42, pp. 6, 5, 2; see p. 1165
Canterbury imposed its ban on 31 August 1942, and placed one of
its staff on leave without pay for the duration.
WHN, ‘Education Department’, p. 169
A month later,
and again in February 1944, some college council members failed
to have this measure rescinded.
Press, 29 Sep 42, p. 4, 29 Feb 44, p. 4
The students, through their executive and a petition in 1942 and at a general meeting in April 1944,
opposed the ban.
Ibid., 14 Apr 44, p. 4. The voting was 66:47.
With Japan in the war, ballot swiftly followed ballot. From February 1942 fathers were called in age groups regardless of how many
children they had. After June, all soldiers were liable for overseas
service, though in practice those under 21 years were not sent abroad.
In this climate few felt over-delicate about conscientious objectors.
When Pacific tension slackened, however, uneasiness emerged from
within the government. On 16 April 1943, in reply to questions
raised by the Minister of Justice (Mason), the Director of National
Service, J. S. Hunter,
Hunter, James Stanley, CBE(’46) (1889–1975); Dir Social Security Dept 1938, Nat
Service 1940, Organisation Nat Development 1944
thought that inconsistencies in appeal board
decisions were not serious, especially as in some districts there were
groups of particular religious beliefs, and in the smaller centres cases
were few. It would be unwise at that time to set up an appellant
tribunal; there might be ‘grave embarrassment’ for the government
if decisions on those in detention were reversed. An accompanying
table showed that in conscience appeals from the 13th ballot of 20
January 1942 to 10 November 1942 the percentage of those allowed
ranged from 14 at Napier, and 15 at Wellington, Wanganui and
Greymouth, to 20 at Auckland and Hamilton, 24 at Dunedin and
29 at Christchurch. Those given non-combatant duties ranged from
32 per cent at Whangarei, 44 per cent at Dunedin, 48 per cent at
Auckland, 57 per cent at Christchurch, and 66 per cent at Wellington, to 70 per cent at Greymouth and 73 per cent at Hamilton.
Appeals dismissed outright were 7 per cent at Hamilton, 14 per
cent at Christchurch, 19 per cent at Wellington, 32 per cent at
Auckland and Dunedin, and 68 per cent at Whangarei. The countrywide average was 20 per cent of appeals allowed, 55 per cent granted
non-combatant service and 25 per cent dismissed.
Hunter to Mason, 16 Apr 43, WHF, ‘Defaulters’
However, returns
published later that year showed that of the total appeals, 2869,
heard up to 10 November 1942, 19.3 per cent (554) were allowed,
39.2 per cent (1124) were dismissed subject to non-combatant duties,
and 41.5 per cent (1191) dismissed outright.
A to J1943, H–11A, p. 33
This suggests that
in the early ballots, before January 1942, boards were harder to
satisfy than they were during the 10-month period that Hunter
reviewed for the Minister.
To further queries from the Minister, Hunter replied on 24 May
1943 that some inconsistency was inevitable but he had no evidence
that the boards had not dealt fairly and reasonably with conscience
appeals. The views of many appellants, though sincere, were ‘purely
political’, while the legal authorities available (he cited two legal
articles and Atkinson’s judgment
See p. 251, fn 21
) were clear that the basis of belief
must be religion. Had the boards been lax or set an easy standard
the consequences would have been ‘more serious and gravely
embarrassing’.
Hunter to Mason, 24 May 43, WHF, ‘Defaulters’
On 17 July 1943 criticism from the Press further perturbed Mason.
In matters of conscience, said this editorial, the sole task of the
boards was to establish
whether the appellant’s objection is genuine. Too frequently members of Appeal Boards take a far wider view of their responsibilities, with the result that they resort to long and aggressive
arguments with appellants about the rights and wrongs of their
views, possibly to the neglect of their purely judicial function.
Occasionally their attitude is hectoring, not to say insulting. This
is not the judicial, impartial attitude expected by the law of Appeal
Board members, and is therefore incompatible with their functions. Moreover, it wastes many hours of the time of their fellow
members and of appellants who, objecting on other grounds, are
waiting for their cases to be heard. To say this is in no sense to
uphold the views of conscientious objectors. But it is necessary to
draw attention to the precise and proper limits of Appeal Board
functions in determining their appeals, and to say that these limits
should be more carefully respected than they have sometimes been.
The National Service Director, stirred on by Mason, sent copies to
the appeal boards; the Minister had said that these comments were
justified if newspaper reports he had seen bore any relation to the
facts of hearings, in which it often seemed doubtful just what boards
were deciding. Hunter added that allowing for the difficulty of
understanding conscientious objectors, it seemed from newspaper
reports that questions were not always such as to enable an appellant
fairly to disclose his beliefs and outlook so that the board could
decide whether he had genuine belief that it was wrong to engage
in warfare. Often it seemed that he was placed on the defensive by
a volley of questions obviously hostile and not always relevant.
‘Examination must be clothed both with the fact and the appearance
of complete impartiality.’
Dir Nat Service to Appeal Boards, 30 Jul 43, ibid.
From when balloting began in October 1940 to 31 December
1944, after which appeals on conscience grounds were negligible,
5117 conscience appeals were lodged, 1.7 per cent of the 306 352
men called by ballot. Of these appeals, 1096, or 21 per cent, were
adjourned sine die because they succeeded on other grounds, mainly
that of essential civilian work; in 944 other cases the appellant was
unfit for service, or the appeal was withdrawn or dismissed for lack
of prosecution.
A to J1946, H–11A, p. 24
The remaining 3077 were determined by appeal
boards. Of these 606 (19.7 per cent) were allowed, 1226 (39.8 per
cent) were dismissed subject to non-combatant duties, and 1245
(40.5 per cent) dismissed outright.
Ibid., 1945, H–11A, pp. 23, 68
Most were judged within the
first two years: up to November 1942, appeals allowed numbered
554 (19.3 per cent of the total to that date), those given non-combatant service 1124 (39.2 per cent), those dismissed outright
1191 (41.5 per cent), totalling 2869.
Ibid., 1943, H–11A, p. 33
Awareness of past and
possibly continuing variation in the boards’ standards continued to
trouble Mason as the years of detention ticked by, and led to arrangements for wholesale review in the latter half of 1945.
See p. 283
About a quarter of the men whose appeals were dismissed outright or who were assigned to non-combatant duties were resolute
in refusal;
A to J1943, H–11A, p. 7, 1945, H–11A, p. 23
the rest accepted service rather than face a future of
penalties. The stubborn or steadfast quarter were in due course
brought to court as defaulters, along with those who refused service
without having lodged an appeal.
In January 1943 there were 68 of the latter among the 614 men in detention camps.
Ibid., 1943, H–11A, p. 39
At the start, they faced a £50
fine or three months in prison or both, and thereafter, if still unwilling, military detention as in the First World War.
In one instance a member of the Assembly of Christians, refusing to don uniform or
obey orders after his appeal was dismissed, was sentenced by court-martial to six month’s
hard labour in Auckland’s gaol. NZ Herald, 2, 9 Aug 41, pp. 12, 10
In Britain during the Second World War an appeal could be
allowed outright, with no conditions, or a man might be directed
to specific civil work; it could also be dismissed subject to non-combatant military duties, or dismissed outright. Those dismissed
who refused service were gaoled for terms ranging from three months
to two years, and thereafter recognised as conscientious objectors,
having proved their sincerity by accepting prison. In New Zealand,
the government was reluctant that young men, who though lawbreakers were not ordinary criminals, should be kept indefinitely in
civil or military prisons. But public opinion could not accept that
men whose consciences had not convinced an appeal board should
go free, even after a prison sentence. Defaulters’ detention was the
compromise.
In the First World War defaulters court-martialled into prisons had been a severe problem to their administrators, who did not regard them as ordinary criminals and strove
to keep them separate, working on afforestation, roadmaking and building for the State.
Their highest number was 293 in March 1918, and in August 1919 the Permanent
Head of the Prisons Department wrote that in any future war ‘I sincerely trust that an
endeavour will be made to confine military offenders in camps or other places entirely
outside the jurisdiction of the Prisons Department.’ A to J1919, H–20, p. 2, 1918,
H–20, pp. 1, 3
Introducing it in August 1941 Nash had said that
there was no machinery which could unerringly detect the state of
a man’s conscience. Many dismissals had been correctly given because
the appellant failed to satisfy the appeal board that his objection
was genuine; ‘his subsequent conduct, however, may show that there
is some substance in his objection.’ It was bad for the Army to have
unwilling and unsatisfactory soldiers in its ranks, and it was bad for
the community to place these men in gaol. They would be detained
in special camps, doing useful work under strict discipline.
NZPD, vol 260, pp. 62, 327
By Regulation 44A, clause 2, of 27 August 1941, when a man
refused service ‘the Magistrate, if in the circumstances of the case
he thinks fit to do so, may in addition to or instead of imposing
any other lawful penalty, order that the man shall be committed to
defaulters’ detention… for the duration of the present war.’ The
government considered sending out circulars instructing magistrates
that they should probe cases to ascertain whether non-compliance
‘was based on conscientious objection and was not merely a contumacious refusal or the act of a deliberate shirker’, but it was decided
that magistrates could not be asked to review a matter already determined by a more experienced board, and that they would properly
resent any such interference in their judicial discretion.
Under-Sec Justice to Min Justice, 9 Oct 41, and Minister’s comment, PM 83/10/1
Variations in magisterial discretion soon appeared. At Wellington,
J. L. Stout stated that he intended to impose a short term of imprisonment to let a defendant think it over and decide to accept military
service; on a second appearance he would be committed to defaulters’ detention for the duration, however long that might be.
Evening Post, 24 Oct 41, p. 6. Actually prison was not the only place where a defaulter
could change his mind; 13 did so there, but the regulations of May 1941 provided
that he could accept the Army at any time, and 69 left the camps for service.
Stout
also stated plainly, ‘There is no such thing as a conscientious objector
in this court’; all those with dismissed appeals were considered ordinary defaulters.
Ibid., 7 Nov 41, p. 6
At Auckland J. H. Luxford and F. H. Levien
declared that a straight-out slacker would go to prison. ‘If he is
betwixt and between he will go to prison for a shorter term and
then be sent to defaulters’ camp. If he is just a poor, misguided
person with an inflexible idea he will be sent straight to defaulters’
camp.’
NZ Herald, 15 Nov 41, p. 12
At Rotorua, W. H. Freeman,
Freeman, William Henry (b 1891): SM from 1935
who probed the beliefs
of a man whose appeal had been dismissed in order to decide what
to do with him, came to the conclusion that he was a genuine
conscientious objector. ‘What other tribunals have done is nothing
to do with this court, which must preserve its judicial viewpoint’,
said he; until a defaulters’ camp opened, the man should remain
free, reporting daily to the police.
NZ Herald, 12 Nov 41, p. 6
At Christchurch Levvey, hoping
that ‘the other establishment’ would soon be available, repeatedly
remanded a man who had refused military service on 2 July 1941.
Dominion, 8 Oct 41, p. 8
A pacifist observer, noting that in 48 South Island cases 14 men
were sentenced to three months in gaol, 18 to two months, 11 to
one month and 5 sent direct to defaulters’ camp, said, ‘The position
is, roughly, that if you are sentenced in Southland you may be sent
direct to the detention camp; in Otago you receive one month; but
if you belong to Canterbury or the West Coast you are sentenced
to two or three months.’
Press, 27 Feb 42, p. 8, and 28 Feb, p. 2, where a letter tells of a 20-year-old and six
others receiving a second dose of two months in the Paparua shingle pit
J. A. Lee in October 1942 also remarked
that whether a man went to gaol or defaulters’ camp depended on
where he lived.
NZPD, vol 261, p. 871
The magistrates, however, were within the margins of the regulations, and similar variations have been noticed in,
say, the treatment of drunken drivers.
During 1941 about 168 men went to prison for breaches of military obligations,
A to J1942, H–20, p. 1
and in 1942 the number of persons sent to prison,
then averaging about 2300 a year, was notably increased by the
committal or transfer
There were 39 transfers. Ibid., 1946, H–20, p. 4
of more than 500 military defaulters; there
were 39 such committals in 1943 and 24 in 1944.
Yearbook1946, p. 156
Later, L. J.
Greenberg,
Greenberg, Len Joseph, OBE(’46) (1891–1957): broadcasting administrator; b Aust;
27 years Gen Sec Wgtn YMCA; army & navy YMCA work Aust 1939; Controller
Defaulters’ Detention NZ from 1941; Sec Juvenile Delinquency Cmte 1954
Controller of Defaulters’ Detention, remarked that as
the camps were designed to avoid having these young men in gaol,
‘It is difficult to realise what good purpose was served by this initial
term of imprisonment’, which in many cases soured youths only 18,
19 or 20 years old. It also caused them to view prison lightly; for
compassionate reasons, they were, where possible, placed under
favoured conditions, ‘which left them with the impression that prison
life wasn’t so bad after all, and that the men they met in prison
were just as good as any other citizens. Hence the hankering for
prison life on the part of so many of the younger defaulters… who
found by experience, that defaulters detention was far more irksome
than a short term spent in prison.’
L. J. Greenberg, ‘The Men Who Would Not Serve’, War History Narrative, p. 54
(hereinafter WHN, ‘Greenberg’)
Originally there was some thought of graded camps. ‘I understand
that there are to be two classes of camps, one for bona fide conscientious objectors, and the other for defaulters’, the Under-Secretary
for Justice wrote rather surprisingly
Under-Sec to Min Justice, 9 Oct 41, PM 83/10/1
and a Press article also ‘understood that those considered to be genuine on religious, ethical, or
political grounds will be committed to the camp near Rotorua, and
those regarded as being not genuine will be sent to the more isolated
camp.’
Press, 10 Nov 41, p. 6
The British High Commissioner was told in January 1942
that defaulters detention ‘was not intended for the obvious shirker
or the man whose refusal of service has no background of conscientious objection.’
ONS to UKHC, 27 Feb 42, PM 83/10/1
Nq specific provision was made for the obvious
shirker, however, apart from the three months’ prison sentence for
refusing a military order, which was a frequent preliminary to detention for the duration. The several main camps established in due
course took all sorts together, though Hautu also became a punishment centre for ‘bad boys’ and the unco-operative, who were not
necessarily insincere in their convictions, while the smaller sub-camps
took the most docile.
In mid-November 1941 Strathmore camp at Whenuaroa, 30 miles
from Rotorua, received its first inmates, 40 men whose resolution
had already been tested by imprisonment and who were subsequently in military detention at Trentham.
WHN, ‘Greenberg’, p. 12
Greenberg had no
prison-officer background. In 1941 he was working in the broadcasting service, but he had had lengthy organising experience with
the YMCA and he was known as a youth leader. In the mid-Thirties
he had expressed sympathetic understanding of the resolute pacifist
‘… nothing short of sincere conviction and superlative courage can make a man a
Christian “conscientious objector.” The story of the treatment of many “objectors” in
New Zealand during the last war makes very sorry reading indeed…. There are indications that no amount of bullying will change the views held by these young men,
and certain it is that the martyrdom of the pacifists will not kill pacifism any more than
the Crucifiction of Christ killed Christianity.’ Evening Post, 17 Sep 35, p. 11
and pacifists welcomed his appointment as showing that the government had the objectors’ personal welfare at heart to some extent.
NZCPS Bulletin W36, supplement
But much had changed since 1935, and Greenberg as Controller
had wide and final disciplinary powers. There were basic difficulties
arising from the environment, the staff, and the defaulters themselves, many of whom had a sense of grievance and some a compulsion not to co-operate. Hardening of attitudes was inevitable in
these remote, inward-turning communities and it was not surprising
that Greenberg, despite his sympathetic background, became as chief
gaoler widely and heartily disliked.
Paul Oestreicher, ‘They would not Fight’, unpublished thesis, p. 101
About the camp scheme, pacifists were divided. Some considered
it an honest attempt by a partially sympathetic government to solve
a very thorny problem.
NZCPS Bulletin W36, supplement
A Quaker, advocating co-operation to make
the camps work smoothly, said that Nash had done his best to avoid
the penal side of the issue, and he himself felt that ‘we ought now
to co-operate in showing that the genuine man with genuine Christian principles is able to go the other mile.’
Ibid., W33, supplement
Others felt that it
would be too easy to accept the government’s kindly intentions by
living quietly in comfortable camps while conscripted men faced
horror; their purpose was not merely to keep their own hands
unbloodied but to witness against war, and by fighting all the way
make what stand they could against conscription.
Ibid., W33, p. 6, W35, p. 7
At the outset Greenberg and his officers were faced with a raw,
half-built camp, a mixed and rapidly growing bunch of defaulters,
and insufficient staff, too often poor in quality. For the first 12 months
at Strathmore both defaulters and staff lived under improvised conditions, in mud, on their bleak treeless plain, with monotonous rations
and many shortages, for defaulters had no priority rating and some
private traders even refused supplies.
WHN, ‘Greenberg’, pp. 10, 11
Gradually, by the inmates’
own labour, the one-man huts,
They were unheated but lined with building paper to make them draught-proof, and
cost £14 10s each. Dominion, 17 Mar 42, p. 6
the kitchens and community rooms
were built, water and sewage systems installed; vegetables, milk and
meat were produced on the camp farm, distinct from the regular
task of developing a block of Crown land; a ‘splendid corps’ of
carpenters, gardeners, garage and electrical mechanics and domestic
helpers made it all work.
WHN, ‘Greenberg’, p. 37
This pattern was repeated more or less in other camps. By January
1943 there were 614 men at Strathmore, Hautu, Shannon, Galatea,
Balmoral and Conical Hill, doing farm or forestry work, cutting
firewood, weeding and cultivating flax. In all, there were 13 camps
and sub-camps, and 803 men occupied them; they were, claimed
official spokesmen, neither spartan nor soft.
Dominion, 17 Mar 42, p. 6
The guiding principles
were segregation, useful occupation and strict discipline, along with
wholesome, adequate food, reasonable living conditions, and social
amenities above prison standard. These included libraries, stocked
by the National Library Service, approved hobbies and educational
pursuits. Camps were not geared to the severity of prisons, but they
were intended to be substantially less attractive than Army life.
A to J1945, H–11A, p. 24
There was no leave; pay, at 1s 3d a day, depended on good conduct
and industry; books were censored, visitors limited, mail both limited and censored (though letters to the Minister of National Service
went to him unopened and in large numbers). There were checks
and roll-calls; there were rules such as that men might not congregate together and that work must satisfy the overseer. Inmates wore
borstal grey uniforms and blue denims for work. There were penalties and boundaries and barbed wire.
Dominion, 19 Mar 42, p. 8
Penalties ranged from fines to bread and water and solitary confinement in the camp or terms in gaol. Regulation 44B (11) of 12
November 1941 ran:
Instead of imposing a minor punishment on any inmate for any
breach of the rules, the Camp Supervisor may refer the matter to
the Controlling Officer, who may in his discretion, impose on the
inmate a minor punishment as aforementioned or a punishment
involving close confinement within the camp or a reduction in
the dietary scale, or both such confinement and such reduction.
In any case where he considers it necessary, the Camp Supervisor
may place the inmate in close confinement pending the consideration of the matter by the Controlling Officer.
The Auckland Star commented:
In plainer English, this means that the controlling officer can punish a man by having him locked up, and fed on bread and water,
apparently for no specific period. Why should this be necessary,
and why should such power be given the controlling officer when
it is not given to experienced prison officers? If a man merits this
punishment, as he may, his place should be no longer in a detention camp [but in prison where] he could be sentenced to breadand-water confinement but… only by a magistrate after hearing
evidence.
Auckland Star, 19 Nov 41
From the start, such offences as disobeying an order could bring
defaulters before a magistrate who could send them to prison for a
set term,
For example, two men who persisted in walking to a job by a track through scrub
instead of through allegedly wet grass got two months’ gaol; they had previously ‘just
kept within the regulations’. RotoruaMorning Post, 22 Dec 41
and in all 66 men were so sentenced.
A to J1946, H–20, p. 4
After May 1942,
if a magistrate were satisfied by the camp authorities that a defaulter’s presence was prejudicial to the good order and discipline of the
camp, he could order his removal to prison for the duration, though
the Minister could transfer him back to camp. During 1942, 28
men were gaoled for the duration, and 48 had been by the end of
1944, when the Controller-General of Prisons was ‘constrained to
conclude that the transfer of military defaulters to criminal prisons
has not been an altogether satisfactory or happy arrangement’, because
in many of them a long-held sense of grievance and injustice had
become obsessional;
Ibid., 1945, H–20, p. 2
this did not lessen when they were still there
a year later.
Short terms proved almost popular, or perhaps something those
dedicated to non-co-operation must incur. ‘For a period there was
an epidemic of escapes’, wrote Greenberg; at one time 30 were out,
some using their liberty to complain publicly about the detention
scheme. When regulations against escaping were stiffened in February 1944, escapes almost ceased and the protestors then refused
to obey orders, aiming to be put in prison. ‘The trickle out of the
Camps into the Prisons threatened to become a flood’,
Controller Detention to Dir Nat Service, 2 Sep 44, WHN, ‘Greenberg’, App F
and 38 in
that year went to prison for set terms.
A to J1946, H–20, p. 4
To combat this, Hautu
camp, closely associated with a nearby prison and already holding
the more difficult defaulters, became a penal centre for close confinement in locked huts in a separate wired compound. It was cold,
dull and lonely. Greenberg wrote with satisfaction: ‘A block has
been placed across the road to Prison and it has been found that
the defaulter inclined towards non-co-operation thinks very carefully
before becoming bold enough to declare himself’. He quoted from
a letter written by a man in close confinement who looked back to
a recent spell in Mt Eden as ‘happy days’. The Crown Solicitor
recommended that such confinement should not be for an unlimited
time, and at first 90 days was the maximum; ‘After consultation
with the Minister, this was reduced to thirty days, subject to renewal’,
and later again it was thought that 30 days in itself would be sufficient.
Controller Detention to Dir Nat Service, 1 Sep 44, WHN, ‘Greenberg’, App F. Mr
Justice Fair, sentencing an escaper to nine months reformative detention, stated that
close confinement, while sometimes necessary for persistent, troublesome offenders, should
never exceed 30 days and often could well be less, depending on the person concerned.
Evening Post, 3 Mar 45, p. 6
Only if men were still defiant thereafter were they sent on
to prison for the duration.
‘Possibly the most valuable result of the detention scheme, with
its penalties of incarceration for the duration of the war and its
restriction of liberty, etc., has been its deterrent effect upon others’,
wrote Greenberg. ‘The numbers who eventually arrived at detention
were well under those originally anticipated’.
WHN, ‘Greenberg’, p. 15
The expected figure
was 2000,
Parry/Hamilton report to War Cab, 18 May 44, PM 83/10/1
the actual total 803.
There was, however, continued criticism by those who suspected
the government of pampering objectors: the camps were too comfortable, food was too good, privileges were too many. On 12 February 1942, when Singapore was falling, the House heard questions
and answers about defaulters living better than soldiers, with sheets
and pyjamas.
NZPD, vol 261, pp. 52–3
The Matamata Record on 23 February headed a report, ‘The Strathmore Hotel, “Conchies” Comforts, Rotorua seething with Indignation.’ The Observer
eg, NZ Observer, 4 Mar, 10 Jun 42, pp. 5, 12
and Truth
eg, Truth, 19 Nov 41, p. 4, 11 Mar, 22 Apr 42, pp. 9, 10
were vigilant,
and so was the RSA, although many of the camp staff were returned
soldiers. RSA officials were asked to see for themselves, and their
vice-president, B. J. Jacobs,
Jacobs, Bertram Joseph, OBE(’46) (d 1964aet 79): 10 years Vice-Pres, 4 years Pres,
NZRSA
having inspected Strathmore in June
1942, reported that while defaulters were better treated than they
should be, exaggeration had produced most of the complaints and
small departures from the regulations by camp authorities had had
reasonable grounds. The men were treated as human beings but there
was no pampering.
Otago Daily Times, 19 Jun 42, p. 4
The charges, however, were made again and
again.
eg, NZ Herald, 7 Jul 42, p. 2; Taranaki Daily News, 16 Oct 42, p. 2; Press,
21 Jul 42, p. 6, 21 Jan 43, p. 4; Evening Star, 10 Jun 42, p. 7
The RSA, remembering the ten year disenfranchisement of defaulters after 1919, was prominent in the pressure that produced emergency electoral regulations in July 1943 by which persons committed
to defaulters’ detention and not discharged therefrom were deprived
of the vote.
It was hard to draw suitable officers, overseers and patrolmen to
these remote camps. Staffing, wrote Greenberg, ‘was of more concern
to the authorities than many of the difficulties involving the inmates’,
whose customary good behaviour was remarkable considering the
inadequacy of some members of the staff, though others ‘rendered
conspicuous service in the most difficult circumstances’.
WHN, ‘Greenberg’, pp. 9–10
Obviously
it was not possible to avoid the officious, the unreliable, even the
dishonest ‘screw’.
It must be remembered that most defaulters had entered a camp
by the end of 1942 and thereafter, shut away among themselves,
were excluded from all the influences that might have drawn them
into the national effort. Apart from their original beliefs, they were
held by the forces of inertia, pride, and loyalty to battered ideals
and fellow-defaulters. Whatever had set them on their path, most
by now felt committed to pursue it. Many defaulters were well
grounded in the dubious nature of the atrocity stories from the First
World War. For those unwilling to believe in the necessity of war
it was easy to extend these suspicions to accounts of the starvation,
torture and death of Jews, Czechs, French, Poles and others.
The 803 men in detention varied widely, ranging from a few
minor criminals, as, for instance, a man sentenced to a month’s gaol
for theft and then sent on to defaulters’ detention,
NZ Herald, 25 Nov 41, p. 8
to the ‘intellectuals’ whom Greenberg thought ‘perhaps ought not to have been
there.’ He described the latter as quiet and thoughtful, reasonably
accepting the penalties of being out of step with the State in war
time, and so much ‘all that an ordinary citizen envisages concerning
the true conscientious objector’ that it seemed strange that appeal
boards had not been convinced of their intellectual honesty.
WHN, ‘Greenberg’, p. 24
Besides the ‘intellectuals’, Greenberg classified his charges as
escapists, indifferentists, exhibitionists and recalcitrants, with some
overlapping and interweaving among these types. Right or wrong,
his opinions shaped the administration. The ‘escapists’ simply wished
to escape from the war, to forget it and their obligations as far as
possible. Some ‘were just plainly frightened and were only too satisfied to find shelter in a detention camp.’ Many belonged to religious
sects which had no standing with appeal boards and which opposed
war largely because it made demands on time and allegiance due
to their God, and many of these had refused even non-combat service.
Of 592 men reviewed in October 1944, 231 belonged to such sects;
Christian Assembly (107), Jehovah’s Witnesses (78), Brethren (35),
Pentacostal (11).
Ibid., pp. 20–1 and App B. Among adherents of the main churches (which broadly
considered the Allies’ struggle a necessary and justified evil, while advocating respect of
conscience on the one hand, and, on the other, willingness to pay the penalty for it),
Methodists led with 68 members, followed by Anglicans (32), Presbyterians (28), Roman
Catholics (23), Seventh Day Adventists (9), Christadelphians (8), Baptists (6), others
30; 156 were non-religious.
These men, though often fanatical in their
religion, were usually docile and co-operative in other respects, and
were vital in making the detention scheme workable.
Greenberg applied the term ‘indifferentists’ to those, not religious
escapists, who were indifferent to the war and its issues: ‘in the first
place, those who appeared to be confused and immature, or perhaps
frightened, in their thinking about the war, and obviously didn’t
bother to pursue the matter far enough to ascertain what the war
did mean to themselves or others; and in the second place, this
category included those who found a comfortable “funk hole” for
their indifferentism in their glib and plausible use of the word
“Humanitarian”.’ Many rationalised their decision after making it,
and were confirmed therein by segregation with other defaulters;
many ‘would have become tired of detention, and would have joined
the Army, if it had not been for their fears of others, especially the
so-called politicals in the camps.’
Ibid., pp. 22–3
‘The exhibitionist strutted across the war scene as the one person
who had the right idea and whose main urge was to let the world
know what this idea was.’ His mission was to witness to his own
idea, not by seeking alternative service in dangerous zones, but by
assuming ‘a peculiar personal kind of arrogance and superiority, which
demanded exemption from every duty, but required rights and privileges which were not given to ordinary citizens in war-time…. His
conceit in his own ideas was colossal! His conscience apparently said
little to him about peaceful nations trodden under-foot by a wicked
invader; or millions of innocent victims cast into extermination
chambers and furnaces….
This was written in 1947; these details were not fully known until late in the war.
All these evils were just summed up
in the one word “War”…. all war was wrong and all nations
participating in it were equally culpable.’ When the camps were
closed, men of this type inscribed on the walls such words as: ‘In
this hut lived James Thomas Smith, so-called defaulter, from May
4th 1942 to March 8th 1946, because of his refusal to murder his
fellow men.’ Though many came from ‘an honoured religious organisation’,
The Methodist Church. WHN, ‘Greenberg’, p. 35 and App B
these young men were among the most difficult to handle,
and were very ready to ally themselves with ‘the non-religious-quasi-political-agitator group’, often with the express object of embarrassing the government and detention officials. To the latter they
were the ‘greatest moaners, agitators and trouble-makers’ in the
camps. As a last resort, in prisons they hunger-struck and, in the
cells of Mt Eden, shouted and battered on the walls.
Ibid., pp. 18–20
Greenberg’s ‘recalcitrants’ pushed these attitudes just a little further. They grew around the ‘so-called politically-minded individuals
who, with the agitator’s technique, quickly found the detention
community suitable soil for the propagation of their quasi-political
ideas’, some of which could have developed into sedition and subversion. Although a minority, they soon became the most vocal and
difficult inmates, ‘and quite early in detention history, a trial of
strength took place between them and the authorities, with the result
that the camp at Hautu, near Turangi, was devised as a special
disciplinary centre’ for them. Co-operation or non-co-operation,
whether one should accept the camps and their routine, or whether
one should carry rejection of war and all its works to the logical
extreme of refusing orders to work, remained burning questions for
many inmates. Finally, by the amendment of 23 May 1942, the
real non-co-operators, in Greenberg’s estimate one-sixth of the total
number, would be sent to prison for the duration: 58 were so transferred and 66 others served set terms. In January 1943 there were
614 men in the camps, 610 in March 1944 and 608 in March
1945; in all, 803 entered, 69 later deciding to accept military
service.
A to J1943, H–11A, p. 39, 1944, H–11A, p. 14, 1945, H–11A, p. 23, 1946,
H–11A, p. 27
Between officials and recalcitrants there was ‘unending
conflict’, and the persistence of their nuisance tactics, Greenberg held,
showed the value of retaining the offenders in camps, for outside
they would have attempted illegal meetings, unauthorised street
speaking, subversive publications, and efforts to influence members
of the forces.
WHN, ‘Greenberg’, pp. 24–7
The total cost of the camps, from November 1941 to 31 March
1946, was £502,535, of which £109,076 was capital expenditure,
while running expenses totalled £393,459. It could be worked out
that the average cost of maintaining each inmate was £164 a year,
or £3 3s 1d a week, but the value of work done reduced this to
£2 5s 5d.
Figures from ibid., pp. 43–5
The work actually performed varied from place to place, from
time to time, from man to man. For instance, at Balmoral in North
Canterbury, a camp without barbed wire for about 40 good conduct
men, the pruning of trees, making of roads and cutting of firewood
was approved by the Director of Forestry, A. R. Entrican,
Entrican, Alexander Robert (1898–1965): Dir Forestry 1939–60; Dir-Gen Forests 1960;
Permanent Head NZ Forest 1939–61, Timber Controller 1939–48; member Nat Parks
Authority 1953–61
a man
by no means automatically pleased;
Press, 15 Apr 43, p. 4
at Shannon during one period,
some men contrived to weed a very small area of flax each day.
Dominion, 20 Mar 43, p. 4; NZ Listener, 10 Jan 72, p. 13
A good many fenced, cleared and drained land, cut manuka and
other firewood, or worked at camp upkeep industriously; others put
in their 40 hours adequately but without drive. It was dull work,
almost without pay or any positive incentive except willingness to
do the job before one, and for some there was the persisting problem:
should one, by working, co-operate in a system which, however
remotely, was part of the war effort, or resist it by minimal work,
plus protest and complaint wherever possible? The zealots, often
most sincere in their objection to war, who inevitably appeared to
authority as political agitators and recalcitrants, sought to influence
others, and all the attitudes associated with trade unionism and loyalty to one’s fellows, including moral intimidation, were involved.
Many were willing to do essential non-war jobs at a soldier’s pay,
sacrificial work for the community, such as in the acutely short-staffed mental hospitals, or among VD patients, but these proposals
were not taken up by authority sensitive to the difficulties of organisation, opposing alteration to what had been established, and fearing outcry and repercussions.
Auckland Star, 20 Feb 45, p. 6
Throughout 1943–5, despite ministerial assurances that defaulters
were doing useful work,
eg, Standard, 1 Oct 42, p. 4; Press, 11 Jan, 15 Apr 43, pp. 2, 4; Dominion, 5 Mar 43,
p. 4; annual reports of the Nat Service Dept
there was a trickle of complaint that the
camps were unproductive and expensive, and that defaulters should
work under supervision on farms or in essential industries.
eg, Otago Daily Times, 10, 14 Mar 41, pp. 5, 7; Southland Times, 24, 26 Jun 41,
pp. 7, 3; Press, 13 Apr 42, p. 6; NZ Herald, 3, 11 Nov 42, pp. 2, 2; Auckland Star,
4, 12 Nov 42, pp. 4, 4; 9, 12, 13, 18 Mar 43, pp. 2, 2, 4, 4; Dominion, 10, 17, 19
Feb, 10 Mar, 25 Jun 43, pp. 6, 4, 5, 6, 6
A few
such comments came from ex-overseers,
Auckland Star, 7 Dec 42, p. 4; Otago Daily Times, 12 Mar 43, p. 3; Dominion,
20 Mar 43, p. 4
though one wrote of hard
work and good administration at Strathmore.
Gisborne Herald, 15 Jan 43, p. 5
The letter from
‘Disgusted Overseer’ in the Dominion on 20 March 1943, describing
futility and frustration at Shannon’s flax camps, was accompanied
by an editorial questioning whether the camps should not be abolished and the defaulters supervised in essential industry, and this
was not the Dominion’s only criticism on these lines.
eg, Dominion, 6 Mar, 6 Jul, 11 Aug 43
The remarks
in court of a Shannon man, sentenced on 2 July 1943 to three
months’ gaol for refusing an order to cut kindling wood, that in 14
months he had not done one day’s useful work and that hundreds
of men were twiddling their thumbs, gained wide publicity.
eg, Evening Post, 5 Jul 43; Hawera Star, 8 Jul 43, and the Nat party’s Freedom,
Jul 43, with a 4-column heading ‘Men Who Twiddle Their Thumbs’
The
government, concerned to protect its projects from criticism and not
to excite further attacks for pampering ‘conchies’, ignored such proposals. To put defaulters into essential industry would greatly lessen
the distinction between those recognised by armed forces appeal
boards and those dismissed. There would also be uneasiness about
assigning them to employers like the North Otago farmer who
demanded of a Minister, ‘How many miserable, damned crawlers
have you got tucked away in conscientious objectors’ camps? Why
can’t they be made use of?’
Press, 11 Jan 43, p. 2
On 4 March 1943, when a Labour
member inquired about their doing firewatching or other war work,
the Minister of Justice stated that about 650 men were in the camps,
which was the first public statement of their number, and ‘the question of utilizing the services of defaulters on outside work has been
considered but deemed to be inadvisable.’
NZPD, vol 262, p. 99; Dominion, 5 Mar 43, p. 4
However, proposals for change and for making the work-force
more effective came from the Controller of Detention himself. In
March 1943, with 35 refractory men in prison and a total of 614
in three main and four small camps, Greenberg wrote that they were
a weird collection of individuals, some of them quite cold blooded
and calculative in their designs to frustrate the present Government and anything in connection with the war effort. Others again
have an intense fiery passion for the cause which they believe they
are serving, the cause of witnessing against war and of suffering
for their beliefs. Religion in many instances intensifies their fervour. In between these two extremes there is a large bunch of
inmates who are not sure of themselves, some lazy, many cowards,
and mostly ignorant of the real issues involved.
The large camps seemed a mistake: they posed the threat of mass
action, slowed down work, ‘and kept the staff on nerve ends’, while
the smaller groups on extension jobs showed better work and healthier spirit.
With the passing of time, camp routine and loss of liberty had
become more irksome, increasing the sense of grievance held by
many. ‘Unrest and unsettlement’ were growing and Greenberg
thought that the scheme should be reviewed. Releasing defaulters
to essential industry had many difficulties, but men whose objection
to war seemed genuine and who had six months of good conduct
in camp should join civilian service units. Each would have 100
men, in five 20-man sections, available for essential work anywhere,
on military pay or slightly less, under National Service supervision
but not required to live in camps, and with one week’s leave a year.
Technically they would still be in detention, but work would be
more effective and would not be forced labour. Less staff would be
needed, though at least one camp should be maintained for those
who had not qualified for civilian work and those who proved
unreliable.
Controller of Detention to Dir Nat Service, 29 Mar 43, PM 83/10/1
With the war at full pitch and an election in the offing, nothing
came of this except some more small, lightly guarded camps to
which the more tractable were transferred, mainly the other-worldly
Christian fundamentalists.
Oestricher, p. 120
In October 1943, with the election over,
Greenberg again stated his ‘urgent plea’ for reform, stressing that
the present system offered no incentive or hope to any inmates till
the war’s end. There were humbugs and rascals who opposed the
war effort and who should not be at large, but some men who had
not convinced their appeal boards had in camp clearly shown the
genuineness of their objections; others were weak and confused but
bolstered in resistance to the war by those about them; others were
deeply afraid. Greenberg believed that particularly in these last two
sorts camp life promoted mental deterioration. He advocated that
all cases should be reviewed, unhurriedly and in camera, by a judge
or magistrate who would make recommendations to the Minister,
based on genuineness and good conduct; knowledge that this was
going on would improve morale and lessen the escapes that were
causing ‘utmost concern’. There should also be stiffer penalties for
escapers and those who harboured them.
Controller of Detention to Dir Nat Service, 8 Oct 43, PM 83/10/1
This opened up far-reaching principles, commented the Director
of National Service, J. S. Hunter. The real penalty for refusing service
after failing in an appeal was loss of liberty for the duration; any
change would have to preserve the difference between those who
won their appeals and those who did not. That a policy which had
been designed to extend toleration and sympathetic understanding
to the conscientious objector resulted in the detention of many whom
Greenberg showed must be considered genuine, in an atmosphere
of frustration and mental deterioration, could not be regarded as
satisfactory but he could not offer an alternative.
Dir Nat Service to Min Justice, 13 Oct 43, ibid.
Reforms based on Greenberg’s ideas were proposed to the War
Cabinet by Mason in December 1943. All who had been in camp
12 months or more should be re-examined and, under powers already
held by the Minister of National Service,
Regulation 44A, 5b (1941/148, 27 Aug 1941), whereby the Minister could temporarily
release any defaulter to work as directed by the Special Tribunal.
those showing genuine
conscientious objection, or medical or mental unfitness, provided that
they did not oppose the war effort and otherwise behaved themselves, should be released to work of public utility, on the terms
that Greenberg had suggested. Similarly, defaulters for whom there
was now no military service, ie, 18 and 19-year-olds, men over 41
years and those of medical Grade III, should be released, to work
as directed by the Special Tribunal. There should be penalties for
harbouring escapers, and escapers should serve the time of their illegal freedom after the war.
Min Justice to all Mins, 1 Dec 43, PM 83/10/1
Measures against escapers, gazetted on
10 February 1944, were the only outcome of these proposals.
However, the government now inquired how conscientious objectors were treated in Britain, learning that up to 31 December 1943
there were 57 329 registered objectors, 0.83 per cent of those eligible
for service; the higher appellate tribunal had varied 50.4 per cent
of the 17 657 decisions taken to it from local boards, mostly in
favour of the applicants; of all appeals finalised, 6 per cent were
recognised unconditionally, 48 per cent were recognised conditionally, that is, directed to essential work, 25 percent were given non-combatant duties and 21 per cent were dismissed. For those refusing
to comply the penalties were up to 12 months’ imprisonment or a
£50 fine. Usually after serving three months or more, in one dose
or more—‘a sentence of imprisonment of three months or more is
regarded as substantial’—they were directed to vital civilian work.
Cables from Ext Aff to NZHC, London, 4 Feb, 1 Mar 44, and replies 24 Feb,
18 Mar 44, ibid.; A to J1945, H–11A, p. 26
Again, in May 1944, Mason advocated large changes. Internees,
he wrote, were mainly those whose appeals had been rejected. This
did not mean that an internee was not a conscientous objector but
often merely that he had failed to prove it. ‘The camps largely
comprise those whom the law in accordance with Government policy
was intended to exclude therefrom. This fact has been troubling me
for well over a year.’ The position was ‘illogical in the extreme’,
offending humanity and commonsense, while the camps had cost a
quarter of a million pounds. Two magistrates should interview every
man, consider his record and decide whether any worthwhile purpose
was served by keeping him in camp; otherwise he should be released
to useful civilian work under Manpower direction.
Min Justice to War Cab, 1 May 44, PM 83/10/1
The reforms
thus forthrightly proposed by the Minister were not accepted by his
colleagues, and instead Cabinet on 7 June 1944 set two detention
administrators, Greenberg and C. J. Hay,
Hay, Caryll James, JP (d 1966aet 68): 20 years Pres Miramar Branch Lab party; asst
organiser Home Guard throughout NZ WWII; Immigration Office London 1946–8;
liaison officer immigration ship Atlantis 1948–50; Dir State Advances Corp 1950–3
to review defaulters
with conditional release in mind; they also decided that men with
good records for 12 months should have two days’ parole each
quarter, plus travelling time, to visit their homes, at their own
expense. Payments for good conduct and industry could be doubled,
giving a top rate of 2s 6d a day. These two morale-lifting arrangements were effective from October 1944.
WHN, ‘Greenberg’, p. 39
The Greenberg–Hay report, completed in October 1944, described
the problems and sorted 592 defaulters into categories;
49 others were in prison, 25 had escaped and 10 were missed in transit; See p. 274
82 of sincere mind and good conduct were recommended for immediate
release; 354 for deferred release, under special supervision; 98 should
be considered for release later, if their detention records improved;
37 should not be released and 21 would not be interviewed. No
immediate releases were made but, ‘in pursuance of information
contained in the report’, the War Cabinet on 20 November 1944
directed that regulations should be drafted setting up one-man
Revision Authorities to deal with defaulters’ applications for release
on parole.
Dir Nat Service to Sec Cab, 4 Apr 45, PM 83/10/1
All this, of course, was unknown to the public, though some
rumours arose of intended release
eg, NZ Herald, 19 Sep 44, p. 4
and in 1944–5 there was
increasing pressure towards it. Interested persons wrote persistently
to the government.
By June 1945 Nash had received 118 such letters. Tabulation on PM 83/10/1
In July 1944, four petitions, with 6641 signatures in all, including some from university staffs, trade unions
and the Labour party,
Efford, p. 45
were made to Parliament. These urged that
detention was wasteful both economically and in human values. It
was no longer a deterrent, as ballots were exhausted; indeterminate
sentences were not British justice, and there should be appellate
tribunals as in Britain. The Petitions Committee (including several
members of the National party which was firm against any softening)
shelved the matter as one for government decision. The New Zealand
Tablet on 16 February 1944 had stated boldly that defaulters should
be released in the national interest; the Auckland Star on 28 July
1944, and again on 2 March 1945, while not forgetting the thousands of soldiers and prisoners-of-war detained indefinitely, began
to think that appeal boards could have made a few mistakes; by
April 1945 it disapproved of unlimited sentences and found the
lack of appellate tribunals remarkable.
Auckland Star, 28 Jul 44, 2 Mar, 20 Apr 45
The Dunedin Presbytery
on 3 April 1945 gave out disturbing figures on the unevenness of
appeal boards in New Zealand and the tolerance towards defaulters
in Britain.
Ibid., 5 Apr 45, p. 3; Southland Times, 6 Apr 45
A letter from England appeared in many newspapers
between May and July,
eg, NZ Herald, 1 May 45, p. 3; Press, 6 Jun 45, p. 3; Standard, 5 Jul 45, p. 10
signed by nine notables including Bertrand
Russell, C. E. M. Joad, Dame Sybil Thorndike,
Thorndike, Dame Sybil, CH(’70), DBE(’31) (1882–1976): UK actress & manager
Vera Brittain
Brittain, Vera (d 1970): UK writer and world lecturer 1934–63
and the Bishop of Birmingham,
Barnes, Rt Rev Ernest William (1874–1953): Bishop Birmingham 1925–53
contrasting the rigid severity of
New Zealand’s system with the flexibility of Britain’s which enabled
conscientious objectors to do widespread useful work and, in many
cases, sacrificial service for the community. In New Zealand in February 1945 five defaulters in gaol refused work and went on hunger
strike to draw attention to their indefinite sentences and the lack of
any appeal. Magistrates J. H. Luxford and J. Morling
Morling, Joseph (d 1959aet 78): practised law Napier 25 years. SM from 1937
spoke against
‘morbid sentimentality’ and firmly sentenced them to 30 days’ confinement;
Auckland Star, 20, 21 Feb 45, pp. 6, 3
Truth was sure that, ‘If a bunch of these troublemongers want to starve themselves the people of New Zealand aren’t
likely to worry much’,
Truth, 28 Feb 45, p. 8
but a spate of letters appeared in the Auckland Star, and made further impact when repeated in H. R. Urquart’s
pamphlet, The Searchlight on R.S.A.’s and C.O.’s. On 16 May a
protest meeting under the Howard Penal Reform League’s banner
filled the Auckland concert chamber, and two more pamphlets were
seeking publication.
The C.O. and the Community, by ‘Humanist’, S. Wignall, a returned soldier, was ready
in March 1945; Efford’s Penalties on Conscience was ready in April.
Meanwhile the RSA and its supporters, including the Farmers’
Union,
Sec NAFU to PM, 22 Nov 44, PM 83/10/1; in Evening Post, 17 Jul 41, p. 11, the
NZFU had urged the loss of civil rights.
mounted a powerful counter-offensive demanding that the
government should impose the penalties which the RSA had advocated since October 1941: that defaulters should be detained for at
least six months after troops were demobilised and should lose civil
rights and government employment for 10 years. Pressure was exerted
directly, backed by a threat to publish previous correspondence
Sec RSA to PM, 29 Mar 44, PM 83/10/1
which the government rejected, saying that it would add little to
existing publicity.
Dep PM to Sec RSA, 9 Jun 44, ibid.
Strongly worded articles appeared repeatedly in
the RSA Review;
Review, Apr, Aug, Dec 44, Jan, Mar, Jun 45
there were well publicised branch resolutions,
supported by newspaper editorials, and a forceful deputation attended
Nash and others on 7 March 1945.
Record of RSA deputation to Acting PM and members of Cab and War Cab,
7 Mar 45, PM 83/10/1
Fighting in Europe ceased on 7 May 1945 and in Britain all
detained defaulters were released,
Dominion, 11 May 45, p. 7
but wars do not officially end
until so proclaimed and a long battle against Japan was still expected.
On 7 June regulations appointed two Revision Authorities,
The eminent A. H. Johnstone KC and W. H. Woodward SM, who as an appeal board
chairman had shown unusual understanding.
each
to hear, with counsel if desired, applications from any defaulters,
save those in prison, for release on parole. The defaulter had to
establish that he held conscientious beliefs against participation in
war. His good conduct was not directly a key to release for, as Nash
said in debate, it did not necessarily follow that a ‘good boy’ was
a real conscientious objector, while the man most difficult to handle
might prove to be so.
NZPD, vol 268, p. 61
It was carefully established that the purpose of the Revision
Authorities was not to lessen severity to defaulters but to find whether
any would not have been committed to detention had the original
appeals been more uniformly judged, as was suggested by variations
ranging between 14 per cent allowed in one district and 33 per cent
in another, with an over-all average of 19.7 per cent. If it were
decided that a defaulter had thus suffered injustice, the original
decision would not be reversed, nor would he be classified as a
proven conscientious objector, but he would be released on parole,
under Manpower direction, forfeiting to Social Security all pay above
what a private received; he must notify changes of address and do
nothing to oppose the war effort.
A to J1945, H–11A, pp. 23, 25; ‘The case for the Appointment of Revision Authorities
and for the review of defaulters in defaulters detention’, circular issued to MPs by
H. G. R. Mason, in WHF, ‘Defaulters’
It was a practical compromise, a device to get the genuine objectors out of the camps quickly, avoiding the legal difficulties of
admitting error and wrongful detention, while minimising the outrage of frustrated RSA spokesmen, whose arguments about ‘betrayal’
were fully and fiercely put forth by Holland and the Opposition.
The Inter-Church Council on Public Affairs thought that revision
would be approved by all right-thinking people,
Dominion, 7 Jul 45, p. 6
but most papers,
inflamed by two misconceptions, that proceedings would be in camera and that the Crown would not be represented, strongly disapproved at the outset. Several said that appeal proceedings should
have been arranged right from the start. A few approved temperately: ‘a commonsense step’ said the Auckland Star of 8 June; the
Wanganui Herald on 12 June quoted Churchill saying ‘Anything in
the nature of persecution, victimisation or man-hunting is odious to
the British people’; the Grey River Argus of 8 June said that New
Zealand had been singularly severe on objectors; so did the Hawke’s
Bay Daily Telegraph of 29 June. The Pres and the Southland Times
on 27 June rebuked the attacks of the RSA.
In the next six months 467 men, 76 per cent of those in detention,
appealed to the Revision Authorities, who released 283 of them.
WHN, ‘Greenberg’, p. 41
Review of those in prison also began, 14 being released by 31
December 1945.
A to J1946, H–20, p. 5
Under ministerial powers (Regulation 44A, 5b),
226 others who were over-age, medically down-graded or who had
been in detention more than four years, quietly emerged and by 31
March 1946 only 132 men remained in camps and 26 in prison.
Ibid., H–11A, p. 27
Having so belatedly sorted out the ‘conscientious’, it was awkward
to free the rest at almost the same time, and the RSA was not
sleeping. Cabinet decided on 14 December 1945 that all defaulters
would be released by 30 April 1946 but that they would remain
under Manpower direction.
War Cab Minute, PM 83/10/1
On the night of 16 January 1946 a
government Pacific news broadcast stated that defaulters in the camps
would be released in April and that the cases of those in prison
would be reviewed individually. Next day it was announced that
the Auckland Watersiders Union had asked that a deputation from
Auckland’s Trades Council and Labour Representation Committee
should urge the Minister of National Service to release the defaulters.
If the deputation gained no satisfaction, the Auckland watersiders,
whose president was also president of the national union, proposed
a one-day strike each week until the defaulters were released.
Evening Post, 17 Jan 46, p. 8
For
a few nights previously a group of defaulters in Auckland prison,
who for offences such as escaping had been sentenced to 12 days’
close confinement on bread and water for infringing against prison
discipline, had begun noisy nightly protest against their situation.
Auckland Star, 12, 15 Jan 46, pp. 4, 6
Not surprisingly, the NZRSA was critical of the government’s ‘hasty
decision’, under threat of direct action, and the ‘indirect method of
publicity given to the impending release of military defaulters.’ It
called on the government to reconsider the decision, reiterating its
own demands: that defaulters should be detained for 12 months
after the end of the war (calculated to cover the return, furlough
and rehabilitation of all loyal servicemen), be banned from government employment at the taxpayer’s expense and be deprived of civil
rights for 10 years.
Ibid., 2 Feb 46, p. 6
Instead, Cabinet decided on 15 March that
defaulters who had escaped would be released in the first or second
half of May according to the length of their period of escape.
Cab Minute, 15 Mar 46, PM 83/10/1
A
fortnight later Cabinet dismantled the last controls on defaulters and
conscientious objectors: Manpower direction of defaulters who had
been released on parole would cease on 29 June 1946 and at the
same time the Special Tribunal curbing the earnings of conscientious
objectors would cease to function along with all its orders.
Ibid., 28 Mar 46
CHAPTER 8
Blood is Spilt
THE Battle of Britain faded. For security reasons its worst dangers
were kept from the public; only when the battle had become
history was it known how slender British air defence had become
in the August-September crisis of 1940. Accounts vary on just when
the battle began, and it did not end distinctly: attacks on shipping
and scattered bombings of coastal areas began in July; early in August
these were intensified, concentrating on defence aerodromes; late in
August and September came the mass raids on London, and in October these settled into the regular nightly bombings of London and
other centres that, with varying intensity and sometimes with lulls
lasting several weeks, continued till in mid-1941 the main Luftwaffe
strength turned to the Russian front.
Newspapers built a picture of German might inflicting woeful
losses but impotent before the resolution and superior quality of
Spitfires and Hurricanes, ack-ack barrages, fire-fighters, factory workers and the British public. British losses were officially minimised,
German losses exaggerated: for instance, in the last great day raids
of 15 September 1940 accounts at the time said that 185 German
planes were destroyed, while the post-war figure is 56. Indeed, the
massive lists of day-by-day German losses published by many New
Zealand papers inevitably gave the feeling that the Luftwaffe was
being bled white. At the same time RAF bombardment of German
targets was given full value—‘blow for blow’ was the note, and
British aircraft losses were much lighter. Thus the New Zealand
Herald had two large headlines on 9 September: ‘War Comes to
London in Earnest’ and ‘Many Fires in Berlin’, and on 12 September,
‘Intensive Bombing of Berlin’ and ‘London again Raided, Damage
rather less Severe’. By early October newspapers were giving slightly
less space to the raids on Britain though every few days the headlines
sprang high: ‘New German Fury’, ‘Bomb on St Paul’s’, ‘Long Night
Raid’,
Evening Post, 10, 11, 19 Oct 40
with balancing prominence to the RAF’s smashing blows on
invasion and naval bases, on German industry and oil targets, on
Berlin and Italian centres such as Milan and Turin. Despite the bleak
monthly statements of thousands of civilians killed and wounded
in the Blitz, it was obvious that England could take it and the RAF
was giving it. And still the only New Zealanders actively fighting
were the 400 in the RAF
See Thompson
and those in the Navy. The new tough
war was still far away; New Zealand got used to it, excitement
ebbed. The conscription issue had been settled, the Home Guard
and Emergency Precautions Services formed, absorbing the energy
of those most anxious to contribute, and the Industrial Emergency
Council was modestly extending working hours ‘as required’. Effort
had been increased on farms and in most factories, patriotic giving
had drawn in almost everyone, waste materials were being salvaged.
There seemed little else immediately to do. The 1940 King’s Birthday holiday, postponed on 3 June amid widespread feeling that this
was no time for holidays, was taken on 25 November. Nearly 50
per cent of those in the first Territorial ballot, due for camp from
January to March 1941, appealed, many asking merely for postponement during the farming season.
Press, 8 Nov 40, p. 10
Local interests and conflicts re-asserted themselves. A five per cent
wage increase in August 1940, to meet the rising cost of living, reopened the old issues between employers and workers, the latter
finding the rise inadequate, the former deploring the inevitable further pressure on prices, while dairy farmers renewed demands for a
rise in the guaranteed price of butterfat.
Point Blank, 15 Nov 40, p. 3
Farmers and members of
the National party opposed the Small Farms Amendment Bill
designed to obtain land for ex-soldiers as altogether too drastic, striking at fundamental rights;
Press, 26 Nov 40, p. 10
the government was using the conscription of men as an excuse for the conscription of everything else,
Ibid., 28 Nov 40, p. 8; NZPD, vol 258, p. 315
complained W. S. Goosman MP;
Goosman, Hon Sir William, KCMG(’65) (1890–1969): MP (Nat) Waikato, Piako,
Waipa 1938–69; Min Works, Electricity 1949–60
the Farmers’ Union would oppose
it with all its strength.
Point Blank, 15 Nov 40, p. 5, 14 Dec 40, pp. 3, 14, 17; Evening Post, 22 Nov 40, p. 8
The National party, having just acquired a
vigorous new leader in S. G. Holland, was looking expectantly to
the general election in 1941. New Zealand, said Holland, was fighting on two fronts, overseas for the Empire and for national freedom,
and at home for private enterprise and ownership.
Press, 19 Dec 40, p. 8
It was, in fact, business as usual in many areas. Fraser’s New Year
speech declared that the tide had turned in favour of the Commonwealth. Admittedly, the same papers reported London’s worst
blitz in three weeks, but in other theatres there was positive brightening during the first three months of 1941, in which it could almost
be said that the government’s battle with the British Medical Association over Social Security services competed with the war for New
Zealand’s attention.
In Somaliland, during August, the capitulation of France had
compelled British withdrawal, and in September Italian forces in
North Africa had advanced to Sidi Barrani, some 50 miles within
the frontier of Egypt. Then, late in October Italy, intending a quick-profit trawl of troubled waters, attacked Greece. The Greeks, however, held their own handsomely, while early in 1941 British forces
defeated the Italians in Somaliland and Abyssinia, and drove them
back along the Libyan coast to Benghazi, captured on 7 February.
New Zealanders were not in these advances, but about 15 February,
many newspapers printed in general terms the ‘thrilling story’ of the
‘raiders of the sands’, the Long Range Patrols
Later renowned as the Long Range Desert Group
which included some
New Zealanders and which for months had harassed the enemy,
attacking isolated forts and depots, supply columns and grounded
aircraft. Then, on 10 March 1941, the Lend–Lease Agreement promised more and speedier American supplies to Britain.
It was possible for the Bishop of Wellington,
Owen, Rt Rev Reginald Herbert (1887–1961): b UK; chaplain RNVR 1939–45; Bishop
Wellington 1947–60, Archbishop NZ 1952–60
celebrating the
King’s special day of prayer on 23 March, to look over the past few
months with reverent awe, recollecting an almost miraculous opening of the door of hope when things seemed desperate: after six
months of agony England was adorned with new lustre and glory,
there was the miracle of Greek courage, the lightning stroke of the
Libyan campaign, and now the strong friendly hand stretching out
across the Atlantic, all showing the work of God. The Bishop was
not, of course, a strategic commentator, though he perhaps voiced
the hopeful views of some men in the street, and he overlooked the
portents in both Libya and Greece, areas of combat which at that
very moment were giving many New Zealanders painful thought.
The Battle of the Atlantic had had relatively little public notice:
there was no advantage in stressing U-boat successes, which rose
steeply in June, following the French collapse. The impact of statements of shipping losses was lessened by their irregular appearance,
but they were given uncouth reality by the announcement in January
1941 that shortage of refrigerated ships was obliging Britain to buy
her meat from across the Atlantic. Some 350 900 tons of meat had
been sent from New Zealand in 1939–40,
NZ Herald, 24 Mar 41, p. 6
but on 20 December
the government was told that in the coming year Britain wanted
only 217 650 tons, plus 21 000 tons of bacon; by 5 March another
cable reduced this to 180 556 tons in all. Bacon, which had earlier
been specially requested and for which there had been a vigorous
New Zealand campaign, was now excluded; the government, at first
thinking that the cable about this unkindest cut must have been
mutilated, withheld the bad news till it was confirmed.
Ibid., 26 Mar 41, p. 9; NZPD, vol 259, pp. 181, 182
Thus, while in full cry for more production, New Zealand had
an embarrassing food surplus. The glut of apples was met by eating
more: they were sold at two shillings a case and were distributed
free to school children. The shrinking demand for butter was partly
answered by the change to cheese production. But how were New
Zealanders to eat 300 000 baconers in place of their usual 150 000,
Wanganui Herald, 9 May 41, p. 8
or dispose of thousands of tons of unshipped export meat?
Late in March 1941 the government announced that to make the
best use of storage space freezing companies should take only lambs,
prime beef, porkers of up to 120lb, and ewe mutton of up to 52lb.
Farmers were distressed, for although the amount of wool sold had
risen, the price had not,
The wool cheque for 1940–1 was nearly £14 million, for a record 798 365 bales, average
price 12.222d per lb. This had been exceeded only by that of 1936–7, of £15,344,231
for 686 994 bales. NZ Herald, 29 May 41, p. 8
and there had been an exceptional season
for fattening mature sheep. Extensive canning was called for, and it
was not forgotten that delays at the wharf had contributed to the
length of New Zealand voyages.
Urgently the government negotiated with Britain, built more cool
stores and declared that it would not evade its promise to buy all
exportable meat in the current season; it was merely delaying the
killing.
Ibid., 22 Feb, 26 Mar 41, pp. 8, 9
The mutton restrictions were gradually eased and the
government paid for meat before shipment, while it was still in
store.
Evening Post, 7 Apr, 4 Jul 41, pp. 4, 6; Otago Daily Times, 21 Apr 41, p. 4
The crisis was eased by the British government agreeing, at the
end of April, to take 248 000 tons of meat including about 8000
tons of bacon then in store. Actual liftings for the season ending 30
September 1941 were 268 650 tons, leaving 77 902 tons in store.
Evening Post, 21 May 41, p. 8; Press, 27 Jun 41, p. 6; A to J1943, H–30, p. 10
The new figure was much less than the 350 900 tons of 1939–40,
but much better than the 180 556 of March. During April and later
months the ocean battle had more space in public utterances than
before, though Admiralty reports of losses were made only once a
month until June,
April, 488 000 tons, Evening Post, 10 May 41, p. 9; May, 461 330 tons, Dominion,
23 Jun 41, p. 8; June, 329 300 tons, Evening Post, 16 Jul 41, p. 7
and thereafter at selected intervals.
In the midst of the meat worries New Zealand troops, despatched
overseas in echelons from January 1940 onwards, came into the
fighting, 19 months after the war’s start. German pressure through
the Balkans and Britain’s resolve to strengthen support of Greece,
victim of Italian aggression since October 1940, led to British, Australian and New Zealand troops being sent to Greece from Egypt
during March 1941. This troop movement was not made public.
Britain in fact was seeking to create a Balkan front to oppose Hitler
and, as well, sought to honour the pledge to Greece renewed in
September 1940 of British protection from Axis invasion.
See McClymont, W. G., To Greece, chap 6
Meanwhile, since January, control of Axis forces in North Africa had been
taken over by Germany, and at the end of March they struck. On
3 April British forces withdrew from Benghazi, their furthest west
holding in coastal Cyrenaica, a ‘strategic move’, and a few days later
were besieged at Tobruk, about 75 miles west of the Egyptian border. But North Africa was already eclipsed. On 7 April came news
that Germany had invaded Greece and Yugoslavia and that New
Zealanders, along with British and Australian troops, were in
Greece.
Evening Post 7 Apr 41, p. 8
There was scarcely time for editors and office strategists to begin
to prophesy before the Germans were winning again. As in France,
they struck at a weak point between two commands and had seized
Salonika by 10 April, compelling the Allies to shorten their lines.
Yugoslavia crumpled in a week. The papers of 19 April told of
New Zealanders holding the pass on Olympus; on the 21st they
had withdrawn from it, and by 26 April the news was all of rearguard action, orderly embarkation and retreat to Crete.
New Zealand had been certain that its troops, many of whom
had been about a year training overseas, would stand up to the
Germans. Then, like the Poles and the French, they had been bombed
and strafed from undefended skies, and had retreated, though fighting hard and making the enemy pay. While faith in the troops was
not lessened there was feeling that they had been mismanaged, the
cold clutch of defeat. But there was also the precedent of Gallipoli,
eg, ‘The engagement in Greece was foredestined to be as hard, as cruel, and perhaps in
material ways as unrewarded as the adventure of Anzac.’ Otago Daily Times, 24 Apr 41
hallowed almost into victory, and prophets of doom were far fewer
than those possessed of a vague certainty that things would be better
soon. In a mid-April newspaper, a correspondent wrote that in the
past few days he had met several people who felt unhappy about
events but not one carried foreboding any distance into the future.
NZ Herald, 16 Apr 41, p. 10
All through the fighting, and for days afterwards, reports of German air mastery were balanced by reports of New Zealand gunners
and others exacting a terrific toll. The fighting qualities of the troops,
their resistance to the nerve-strain of screaming dive-bombers, the
accuracy of the artillery and Maori prowess with the bayonet were
all stressed: almost daily there were comments on the splendid hand-to-hand fighters of the Maori Battalion who covered themselves with
glory at Olympus and other places. There was ‘sickening sacrifice’
of German troops. They were thrown in wave after wave by the
high command, mown down in swathes;
Ibid., 21, 22 Apr 41, pp. 7, 7; Evening Post, 23 Apr 41, p. 10
50 000 were estimated
dead by 19 April. The London Times correspondent’s statement that
German casualties outnumbered the entire British force was ‘starkly
eloquent’.
Otago Daily Times, 28 Apr 41. Post-war casualty figures: German official sources gave
their Greek campaign losses as 1160 killed, 3755 wounded, 365 missing. British losses,
out of a total presence in Greece of 62 612, were 903 killed, 1250 wounded, and 13 958
prisoners. Of 16 720 New Zealanders there, 291 were killed, 599 wounded and 1614
prisoners, ie, 2504 in all; while of 17 125 Australians, 320 were killed, 494 wounded,
and 2030 prisoners. McClymont, p. 486
As the retreat developed, Australian concern for the Australian
Imperial Force in Greece demanded an immediate session of Parliament.
Star–Sun, 22 Apr 41, p. 7
There was no such move in New Zealand. Here there
was widespread editorial endorsement of honour outweighing all, a
good deal of silence coupled with interest in other matters, and there
were a few questioning articles. The Christchurch Star–Sun found it
hard to imagine any good purpose at this stage in criticism or debate;
it was easy to say that the Allies should have left Greece and held
Cyrenaica, but the Imperial Cabinet, knowing all the facts, judged
otherwise, and ‘while the Anzacs are fighting grimly in Greece there
is no call for blethering in Canberra.’
Ibid., 23 Apr 41
The Dominion called for sober
calm and a sense of proportion; there was nothing to be gained by
raising doubts and casting aspersions; to have broken the solemn
pact with Greece would have been an indelible blot on British honour, and would not have ensured Cyrenaica against later attack.
Dominion, 19 Apr 41
The Evening Post said that by hearkening to the call of Greece and
of honour the British government had risked the charge of unduly
dispersing its forces, but only ‘unanswerable argument’ should
embolden a critic to attack the Churchill leadership at such a time,
and ‘picking small holes in vast problems’ was rebuked.
Evening Post, 22 Apr 41
Those
who in 1938 accused Britain of selling the Czechs down the river
would, had Britain not sent its army, have said that Greece was
thrown to the eagles;
Ibid., 23 Apr 41
the worst that could attend the honouring
of the pledge to Greece would not outweigh the moral disadvantage
of failing to honour it;
Ibid., 24 Apr 41
the British Empire had entered into the
alliance in much the same way as a man marries, for better or for
worse.
Ibid., 26 Apr 41
Some papers wanted the ‘full story’ of the campaign, and felt
that steadfast British people deserved and could thrive on truth, even
harsh truth. The Otago Daily Times on 28 April remarked on a
‘disconcerting lack of definite official information as the situation
developed from the perilous to the parlous.’ The New Zealand Herald on 26 April, asking why the key point Salonika had been seized
so quickly, called for a clear account of the plans and course of the
campaign as soon as possible. It repeated this demand on the 29th,
remarking that so far there had been only disconnected reports of
resolute stands and grim fights against great odds, and that Greece
was a lesson against the dispersion of limited forces on secondary
objectives. The Auckland Star probed rather near a tender point,
saying that Australia and New Zealand were entitled to know whether
their war cabinets had been fully consulted beforehand—consulted
not in the sense of being informed of what was about to happen
but informed of all the foreseeable dangers and disadvantages of the
campaign, as well as of its advantages if successful.
Auckland Star, 23 Apr 41
On 24 April Fraser said that the British government had fully
consulted the Dominions concerned, they had consulted each other,
and his government fully accepted its share of responsibility for the
decision, taken with the best military advice available. While the
prospects of effective resistance to German aggression in Greece had
been reasonable, though hazardous, every consideration of honour
had impelled New Zealand to join in helping the gallant Greeks;
he added that in like circumstances he would do the same again, a
phrase that did not pass unnoticed. He did not, of course, explain
that his government had believed that Freyberg had been fully consulted by the British command and had actively approved the enterprise; neither of which was true.
Wood, pp. 182–6; McClymont, pp. 103–4; Murphy, W. E., ‘Blamey’s and Freyberg’s
“Charters” a study in civil-military and Commonwealth relations’ (hereinafter ‘Charters’), pp. 10–12
On 27 April Churchill put the Greek affair into perspective. While
admitting that in Libya the Germans had advanced sooner and more
strongly than expected, he stated that honour must be the only guide
for British policy: a pre-war pledge to help the Greeks was binding
and they could not be left to their fate: ‘there are rules against that
kind of thing’. Though it was known that the forces Britain sent
could not stem the tide alone, there was very real hope that intervention might cause neighbour countries to stand with Greece, and
‘how nearly that came off will be known some day’. This campaign
was only part of the wider strategy of the Middle East, which in
turn was not the decisive area of the war. The war could not be lost
while Britain was unconquered, and the recent United States decision
to patrol the West Atlantic had vastly improved the life-line to
America.
Dominion, 29 Apr 41, p. 7
On 1 May concern about losses was eased by Churchill: only
60 000 Imperial troops had been sent and 45 000 were taken off,
there were about 3000 casualties and the rest would be prisoners.
By the final UK figures, the Allied force in Greece was 62 612 and had 16 111 casualties,
13 958 being prisoners; included were 4670 Palestinians and Cypriots, of whom 36 were
killed, 25 wounded and 3806 prisoners. See p. 291, fn 25
On 2 May Freyberg’s first report soothed local fears: 100–200 killed,
500–600 wounded and about 800 missing. Newspapers brightened,
some citing with minor variations the more savage losses of the last
war: Gallipoli’s 2721 dead, 4752 wounded; the Somme, in September 1916, nearly 1100 killed, nearly 5000 wounded; Messines,
three days in June 1917, total casualties 3633, with 473 killed,
2726 wounded, 434 missing; Passchendaele, October 1917, 1536
killed, 4309 wounded, 233 missing, total 6078.
eg,NZ Herald, 26 May 41, p. 6; Evening Post, 7 Jun 41, p. 8
While relieved that losses were not worse several papers noted
that air power was crucial. A critic not widely reported was J. A.
Lee who said that in view of home defence needs, New Zealand’s
manpower was over-committed. It was astounding that while 4 million soldiers were needed to defend Britain, the Allies invaded Europe
with four divisions. Fraser’s saying that he would do the same again
‘appalled’ Lee: ‘mistakes are inevitable in war, disasters reparable,
but only if we profit by them and not if we insist on a willingness
to repeat them…. It was the “do the same again” strategy that
gave us Passchendaele.’
Auckland Star, 1 May 41, p. 5
People were still reading about the Greek campaign and about
small parties escaping in fishing boats, were still waiting for casualty
lists to be checked, when on 21 May came the first reports of German paratroops attacking Crete, where Freyberg was in command.
At first the slaughter of these paratroops seemed to promise victory
but by 23 May Churchill had explained that in this ‘most strange
and grim battle’ there was no local air support because there were
no usable aerodromes nearer than Africa. The picture emerged of
New Zealanders and other troops pinned down by dive bombers,
trying by desperate sorties, especially at evening when air attack
ceased, to check the Germans who from parachutes, gliders and
recklessly landed troop-carriers, swarmed from all directions to capture airfields. On these, heavy carriers landed, spilling out more and
more men who drove the defenders back to the western end of Crete.
The Navy prevented a sea landing, there were reports of beaches
littered with drowned Germans, while stubborn rearguard fighting
exacted a fearful price for every foot of ground won. Hopes rose a
little on 30 May with news of British troops landing on the south
side of the island and cutting their way towards Freyberg’s garrison,
but continued air attack and the now superior enemy numbers made
escape the only success. ‘Battle of Crete Ended’ headlined the papers
on 2 June: losses were severe but 15 000 men had got away, after
12 of the war’s fiercest days, having inflicted huge penalties, with
the only air support coming from Africa.
In the midst of this debacle came the bill for Greece. On 25
May, in a Sunday evening broadcast, Nash gave the hard news that
2200 men were missing, probably prisoners, and in the next six days
just over 2300 names of missing men were printed, along with those
of a few wounded and killed and some no longer missing.
NZ Herald, 31 May 41, p. 11
As the
Press put it, hitherto most New Zealanders had read about the war,
discussed it, understood it in their minds; now, when thousands saw
familiar names, they began to feel it.
Press, 27 May 41
‘Missing’ gave room for both
fear and hope: a man might be dead, a prisoner, befriended by
Greeks, or somewhere on the way back to Egypt.
As much consolation as possible was wrung from another Middle
East theatre. In Iraq, main source of British oil in the Mediterranean,
a pro-Nazi, Raschid Ali,
Raschid Ali (b 1892): PM (Iraq) 1933, 1940–41; fled after unsuccessful coup d’etat1941
had seized power at the beginning of
April. Early in May, attacks on British forces were seen as the start
of an Axis drive on Egypt and Suez. British aircraft and troops
moved in, Raschid Ali fled and the rebellion ended at the same
time as the last ships left Crete. It was clear, and it was stated on
all sides, that the defence of Greece and Crete had delayed Hitler’s
strike towards Suez, so that the Iraqi rebellion was premature and,
without German aid, could be suppressed, while Egypt’s defences
were improved. Nash, as Acting Prime Minister, explained this on
3 June; he also explained that only by magnificent effort had the
men who had lost so much in Greece been re-equipped; that Crete
was part of a wider struggle, that there were other advantages which
would later be revealed. He quoted a cable from Fraser about the
overwhelming odds, with German troop-carriers coming in ‘like
trams’ every five minutes.
Evening Post, 3 Jun 41, p. 6
Newspaper editorials played the theme of Iraq saved and time
gained, with minor variations, and sometimes fingered the darker
theme of Germanic air mastery. The Dominion was cheerful throughout. After initial optimism, it dwelt on the Navy’s success in preventing a sea-borne landing, even at the price of two cruisers and
four destroyers.
Dominion, 23, 28, 29, 30 May 41. Total naval losses for Crete were: 2 battleships and
1 aircraft-carrier damaged; 3 cruisers and 6 destroyers sunk; 6 cruisers and 7 destroyers
damaged. Roskill, vol I, p. 446
Thereafter it discoursed on the heavy losses of German aircraft and highly trained men, on the delay in Hitler’s timetable, on Raschid Ali, oil and Egypt. Hasty criticism and unsound
conclusions were to be avoided; there was ample evidence that the
reasons for defending Crete were strong enough to justify the known
risks.
Dominion, 30 May, 2, 4 Jun 41
The Otago Daily Times news reports on 30 May stressed the fierceness of the fighting, Maori valour and German losses; a Cairo report
told of beaches thick with washed-up dead, and the slaughter of
parachutists who were splendidly equipped but ‘rotten marksmen,
and all mongrels when our chaps get among them.’ The editorial
on that day stated, in leisurely phrases, that the Allied air disadvantage ‘is so considerable as to have what may prove to be a decisive
effect on the outcome.’
The Press, dignified, almost academic in its few remarks on the
campaign, concluded that Crete should not be too readily written
off as a military failure; its tenacious defence must be related to the
absence of German aid in the Iraqi rebellion and to the Suez timetable. But it criticised the ground defences of the aerodromes, saying
that the British had held the island for six months, and it must
have been obvious that if Germany invaded the Balkans, Crete’s
aerodromes would be a target.
Press, 2 Jun 41. This point was again made in a Sydney article reprinted in ibid.,
10 Jun 41, p. 6
The Evening Post, which as early as 22 May had seen the Crete
attack as part of the drive on Iraq and Syria, gave little more editorial comment till 2 June, when it spoke of evidence ‘that probably
will be amplified later’, that the 12 to 14 day delay would be of
great time value in the battle for the east Mediterranean as a whole.
Its war news column of that day found the ‘conclusion inevitable’
that Crete was ‘inadequately equipped’ against air invasion; whether
such overwhelming attack was or could have been foreseen by British
High Command was uncertain and would probably always be a
matter of opinion.
The strongest immediate criticism came from Auckland. The New
Zealand Herald was sharp about the lack of air strength, particularly
the inadequate ground defence that made Crete’s three airfields
unusable from the outset, even though the British had occupied the
island for more than six months. It was a fortnight since Churchill
had said that Crete would be defended to the death—‘This default
is inexplicable’. None but the best troops could have withstood such
an ordeal and ‘none should ever again be left to do so. Air support
must be assured in advance of commitments’.
NZ Herald, 30 May 41
Next day it deplored
the lack of tanks which might have compensated for weakness in
the air, while praising the stubborn resistance which by deranging
Hitler’s timetable might still defeat his wider aims. Wavell
Wavell, Field Marshal Archibald, PC, GCB, 1st Earl (’47), Viscount Wavell of Cyrenaica
& Winchester (’43), Viscount Keren of Eritrea & Winchester (’43) (1883–1950):
C-in-C Middle East 1939–41, India1941–3; Supreme Commander SW Pac 1942;
Viceroy & Gov Gen India 1943–7
was
gaining time to finish off the Italians in east Africa, organise an
outpost in Cyprus, take a firm hold in Iraq;and build up the defences
of Suez in Palestine and the Western Desert. Also, highly trained
airborne divisions, men not easily replaced, had been smashed on
the rock defences of Crete; ‘Hitler’s wings have been clipped before
he can spread them for the flight to the Levant’.
NZ Herald, 31 May 41
The Auckland
Star went even further: if Crete’s airfields could not be used by the
RAF, the next best thing was to be sure that they did not come
into enemy hands, yet it seemed that the Germans gained control
of Maleme airfield in half a day, from which moment nearly everything became possible to them. The men who had fought so magnificently had a right to ask, and those safe at home had a duty to
ask for them, ‘Why, in Crete, so soon after the experience of Greece,
have they been sent into battle without adequate protection from
the Luftwaffe?’
Auckland Star, 30 May 41
A few days later it pressed the attack: ‘Machines
against men. How often have we heard of that before? How often
are we to hear of it again? How long before it will be possible to
say that British soldiers are being sent into battle on even terms
with the enemy? That is the question for British people to ask their
leaders, and it is for the leaders to give a straight answer, or be
replaced.’ It was impossible to say, went on the Star, whether the
dogged delaying action in Crete and the surrender of rebel forces in
Iraq were connected, but it was clear that the magnificent defenders
would have been successful had they been adequately armed. There
must be no repining, but insistence that the sacrifice should not be
in vain and should not be repeated. The Australians were still in
Tobruk, holding up the whole German advance, because they had
something like parity in the air.
Ibid., 2 Jun 41
Later again the Star noted a British
tendency to treat Crete as a glorious episode, but to New Zealand
losing one-third of its division was of more than episodic importance. Though used to accepting losses, New Zealand should be
assured beyond any doubt against a repetition.
Ibid., 6 Jun 41
On 4 June, when it was announced that 2800 New Zealanders
were missing from Crete, and that 768 wounded had reached Egypt,
the cable pages told that the British public and press were asking
questions more widespread and heart-searching than on any previous
withdrawal. The general conclusion was in line with an Australian
war correspondent who wrote: ‘A brutal fact, proved in two campaigns, is that the Allied Forces were without hope from the beginning, because it is admitted that there was no chance of adequate
air support…. no commander should still be allowed to nurture
the delusion that… his men can hope to avert defeat from the sky
by hiding in holes or relying on ground defences.’ ‘We cannot afford
in Cyprus a repetition of the events of Crete’, pronounced The Times.
‘Mr Churchill declined to believe that there was uneasiness about
Greece. Perhaps he can be persuaded that the people are deeply
disturbed about Crete’, said the Daily Mail.
All quoted in Evening Post, NZ Herald etc, 4 Jun 41
Other overseas criticisms appeared during the next week or so: Hore-Belisha’s
Hore-Belisha, Leslie, 1st Baron of Devonport (’54) (1893–1957): Sec State War
1937–40; War Cab 1939–40
complaints about the repeated immolation of the Empire’s best fighting
material through lack of foresight and through misjudgments,
Evening Post, 7 Jun 41, p. 10
the
American Naval Secretary’s comments on the ‘appalling’ lack of
unified command which had led to the defeat in Crete.
Ibid., 13 Jun 41, p. 7
At home
Truth on 11 June, under headlines ‘There must be no more Cretes,
Tell the Nation the Facts’, stressed the failure to protect Crete’s air
fields with anti-aircraft guns or to mine them against German use,
blunders through which thousands of New Zealanders were sacrificed. Speaking for Lee’s Democratic Labour Party, W. E. Barnard
asked questions: was the New Zealand government consulted over
sending troops to Greece and Crete? Would it require assurance from
Britain that in future they would have better air support? Was not
the Division, having lost half its strength in eight weeks, due for a
rest? He was concerned about New Zealand being undefended against
a possible aggressor, and warned against smashing the industrial
front by putting too much into the fighting forces.
Ibid., 10 Jun 41, p. 8
From Cairo on 9 June came reports of Fraser telling the troops
that the government would make sure—‘we must and we will see
to it’—that when they next went into action they would have the
air support and ground equipment that would give them crushing
victory. This won brief approving comment from several newspapers
which did not often approve of the Prime Minister. Years later Freyberg revealed that Fraser had bluntly told him that in future operations he must personally find out in advance about air cover and
tank support, and tell his government if he were satisfied or not.
Wood, pp. 188–90; speech by Freyberg in House of Lords, 1953, quoted in Murphy,
‘Charters’, p. 11
This, of course, was between the Prime Minister and the General.
Fraser’s public pledge to the troops was tacit admission that they
had been wrongly used without such support, but it was tacit only.
In the House on 12 June Nash stoutly maintained that the campaigns in Greece and Crete had been essential to Commonwealth
war plans; strategically they had had splendid results, not as good
as they could have been, but justifying the sacrifice, and he thought
that the men if asked would want to go again. He also thought
that an official statement on the campaigns should be given to the
people, and meanwhile he assured them that no action taken by the
government was not fully justified by facts.
Evening Post, 13 Jun 41, p. 6; NZPD, vol 259, p. 297
On 11 June came Churchill’s authoritative statement that Crete,
that ‘sombre and ferocious battle’, was only one part of an important, complicated campaign. The decision to hold it with minimal
air defence had been made in the expectation of air-borne invasion.
What would have been said if the enemy had advanced unopposed,
overrunning any place that could not be held for certain? Might not
the Germans already be masters in Syria and Iraq? Aircraft had been
withdrawn from Crete by the Middle East Command, on the recommendation of Freyberg. Anti-aircraft guns were needed in many
places, needed by Britain and by merchant ships. Killed, wounded
and missing totalled 15 000, and 17 000 had been retrieved; the
Navy had lost more than 500 men. The Germans lost at least 12 000
killed and wounded, and about 5000 drowned, plus 180 fighters
and bombers, and at least 250 troop-carriers.
Press, 12 Jun 41, p. 5. Davin, D. M., Crete, p. 486, remarks that British reports of
German losses were exaggerated. From German army records it appears that about 4000
Germans were killed attacking Crete, and about 2700 wounded; probably 324 were
drowned, certainly not more than 600. British casualties totalled 15 743, of whom 12 254
were prisoners, 1728 wounded and 1751 dead. The final Royal Navy losses were 1828
killed and 183 wounded. Playfair, I. S. O., The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol II,
p. 147
Churchill’s words, as usual, carried weight; but the Auckland Star
on 12 June still doubted whether there was soundness in hoping
that an army on the ground without air support could destroy an
air-borne attack, and said that stubborn resistance quickly overwhelmed had a bad effect, not on British troops, but on British
prestige abroad. Also on the 12th, J. A. Lee criticised both Greece
and Crete, his speech being off the air at his own request. Lee repeated
that New Zealand must not consent to the Division being again in
a situation where it had not a chance of winning, and must be ready
to recognise mistakes quickly, not deny them because such admissions would be politically disadvantageous. Against the argument
that sending troops to Greece was a matter of honour, Lee said that
to send them where they could not possibly win was to pay debts
of honour with other men’s lives; he did not believe that ‘our
fellows’ had had a chance in Greece, and he believed that most of
the House thought likewise.
NZPD, vol 259, pp. 292–4
Sir Apirana Ngata,
Ngata, Hon Sir Apirana Turupa, Kt(’27) (1874–1950): MP (Lib) Eastern Maori from
1906; Min Native Affairs, Cook Is, i/c Govt Insurance depts etc 1928–34
taking Lee’s speech as claiming that New
Zealand should be able to choose what battles its troops took part
in, said that very soon after the evacuation of Greece all the tribes
on the East Coast had something to say on similar lines and after
Crete still more. They complained that the authorities in Egypt and
Britain, with the consent of the Dominion prime ministers, ‘had
agreed that with all the risks, even to the extent of it being a forlorn
hope, the Forces of the Empire should take part in the fighting in
Greece and Crete. What they resented most of all was the lack of
air support. And they singled me out as the representative of the
combined intelligence of the Empire authorities—military and
Civil—to be battered over the telephone.’ Their attitude, said Ngata,
amounted to saying to Wavell and Churchill, ‘All right, we will
pick and choose where the fight shall take place. We will go in for
safe battles, but if there is a risk, for God’s sake do not send any
New Zealanders there.’
NZPD, vol 259, pp. 294–6
In all, there was little public outcry over Greece and Crete. Awareness that such outcry might reach and hearten the enemy made for
silence, especially in the newspapers. The heavy losses of 1914–18,
the retreat from glorious Gallipoli, were precedents. Easy victory was
not really expected and there were not enough details known to
sustain questioning. There was widespread feeling that New Zealand
men were good soldiers, better man-to-man than the Germans, but
the Germans were fighting from aeroplanes. Churchill, on 10 June,
said: ‘I have been asked a lot of questions about the Battle of Crete.
Why for instance were the air fields not mined beforehand or commanded by long range gunfire, or why were not more tanks allotted
to their defence. I could answer all those questions but I do not
propose to do so here. If defeat is bitter, there is no use trying to
explain defeat. People do not like defeat or its explanation. There
is only one answer to defeat and that is victory.’
Auckland Star, 6 Aug 41, p. 13
This probably voiced the feelings of many New Zealanders, who
linked it with Fraser’s statement that next time there would be the
tanks and aircraft needed for success. Neither government nor public
wished faith in ultimate victory to be disturbed by carping at the
high command. Criticism of criticism may be instanced at two levels.
First, at grassroots, a writer to the New Zealand Herald on 23 May
who questioned the optimism of early reports and whether it was
worth while ‘for our boys to fight to the death for Crete’ was bitterly
answered by others. One said that nothing could be more cruel, or
crippling of effort, than raising doubts about the truth of the news;
another said that, as the war developed, the buzz of mosquito-like,
uninformed criticism, if not voluntarily withheld, must be suppressed: what leaders, military or other, could function healthily
when exposed to numberless, fierce little suggestions from interested
but irresponsible spectators?
NZ Herald, 27 May 41, p. 12, also 24 May 41, p. 12
Secondly, in the House, on 12 June, J. A. Lee, on behalf of
Barnard and backed by Holland, pointed to debates on Greece and
Crete in the Commons and called for open discussion.
NZPD, vol 259, pp. 285, 286–7
Nash replied
that the government would allow and welcome criticism of generals
or decisions when it would help win the war. But if criticism became
factious, fed the enemy with the idea that this country was discontented with the decisions of its own government or with Imperial
arrangements, and tending therefore to pull out of the war effort, it
ought to be silenced, as should any criticism likely to retard effort.
He explained that in the Commons much could be said without
harming the war effort, but if similar things were said here Goebbels
Goebbels, Dr Joseph Paul (1897–1945): Nazi Min Propaganda & Nat Enlightenment
from 1933; committed suicide 1945
could claim that the Commonwealth was disintegrating; there was
no difference in the standard of freedom, but there was difference
in the effect of words spoken here and the same words spoken in
London.
NZPD, vol 259, pp. 288, 297
New Zealand Army officers assumed that the campaigns were
valuable, while admitting defects. On 13 June the cable pages bore
a message from Freyberg: our troops had done everything that they
could do and, though eventually forced to withdraw, they had the
satisfaction of knowing that their fight was not in vain. Colonel
R. A. Row,
Row, Colonel Robert Adams, DSO (1888–1959): OC Central Military District 1940
who had left Crete on 11 May, had already stated
that the Allies had the better men but needed more tanks and aircraft; that attack from the air, while a great strain on the nerves,
caused fewer casualties than the old style of war; that the defence
of Crete had been vital, giving time to clear up Iraq and killing the
cream of the Nazi army.
Dominion, 9 Jun 41, p. 6
Towards the end of June, Brigadier
L. M. Inglis,
Inglis, Major-General Lindsay Merritt, CB, CBE, DSO, MC, VD, ED (1894–1966):
barrister & solicitor; INZEF 1915–19; cmdr 4 Inf Bde 1941–2, 4 Armd Bde 1942–4;
temp cmdr 2 NZ Div twice during 1942–3; Dep Dir Military Govt Courts, British
Zone of Occupation, Germany1945, Dir 1946; Chief Judge Control Cmssn Supreme
Court, Pres Court of Appeal 1947–50; SM Hamilton from 1953
commander of 4 NZ Brigade, in London to report
on Crete, said that lack of air support was the chief reason for its
loss. He explained other difficulties more fully, such as that equipment lost in Greece could not be made up because shipping and
the harbour were damaged by regular heavy bombing long before
the attack; that vehicles were hard to land and many were affected
by sea-water in half-sunken ships. An air force sufficient to cope
with the attack could not have been based on Crete’s small airfields;
it would have been blitzed out of existence very soon. Narrow, hilly
roads made transport difficult, and attack had to be expected all
over the island.
NZ Herald, 25 Jun 41, p. 8
Overseas news continued to produce scattered items on aspects of
the Greece and Crete disasters. In the Auckland Star of 10 July a
Fleet Air Arm lieutenant was reported from the House of Commons
as speaking of almost chronic lack of weapons; of no heavy anti-aircraft guns at Maleme airfield and of many British tanks in Greece
breaking down before they saw the enemy. The more informed and
critical readers added up credit and loss as these emerged, while
admitting that much was still obscure. For instance, early in July,
when Wavell was replaced as commander by Auchinleck,
Auchinleck, Field Marshal Sir Claude John Eyre, GCB, GCIE, CSI, DSO, OBE
(1884-): C-in-C Northern Norway 1940, Southern Command England 1940, India1941, 1943–7, Middle East1941–2
the Press
remarked: ‘Whether or not the campaign in Greece was a blunder
is a question on which there must be two opinions, and for the
present so little is known of the reasons behind the decision to intervene in Greece that it would be unwise to attempt a final judgment
….The failure to provide more adequately for the defence of Crete,
and the painfully slow progress of the campaign in Syria, are evidence of bad organisation….’
Press, 3 Jul 41
The Evening Post, on the same day, in its notes on the war news,
said that in Greece the ‘corporal’s guard’, hopelessly outnumbered
and out-munitioned, suffered disaster relieved only by prodigies of
valour, then continued: ‘It is believed in some quarters now that
Crete even at the eleventh hour might have been held, if one last
effort could have been made at all costs to recapture the lost Malemi
[sic] airfield. The Germans had by that time exhausted their supply
of parachute troops and were loth to attempt air-borne landings on
an insecure airfield. Sea-landings had failed. But the moment passed,
and Malemi was secured by the Germans, and the rest of the story
is known. The loss of Crete, however minimised, was a terrible blow
to Britain and in the Middle East.’
Evening Post,3 Jul 41, p. 8
This perception of the airfield
situation came very close to that of historians.
Davin, pp. 114–5, 134–8, 180–2, 462–4; Murphy, W. E., ‘Crete: a Command Failure’,
in Comment, Dec 63, pp. 28–30
Continued discussion, although low-keyed, caused Major-General
E. Puttick
Puttick, Lieutenant-General Sir Edward, KCB(’46), DSO and bar, MC(Greek), Legion
of Merit(US) (1890–1976): 1NZEF 1914–19; cmdr 4 Inf Bde Egypt, Greece1941,
2 NZ Div Crete; CGS and GOC NZ Military Forces 1941–5
to state on 3 September: ‘I do not agree with those who
imagine those campaigns were a waste of men and material. The
defence of Crete in particular has had far reaching consequences, and
was, in my opinion, a necessary operation.’ The Germans, he said,
lost practically all their best parachute troops, hundreds of aircraft,
and ten critical days, giving the Allies time to consolidate their hold
in Iraq and prepare to advance in Syria; otherwise the Germans
would have moved into Syria and Iraq, captured Tobruk and threatened the Suez Canal. Greece and Crete were, in military language,
‘a tactical defeat and a strategic victory’.
Auckland Star, 3 Sep 41, p. 6
In response, a correspondent wrote: ‘… few of us object to the undertaking of the Cretan
defence, but to a man we do object to its pitiful muddlement.’
Generals on the spot must have known the importance of Crete,
but let months go by without adequate preparation.
Ibid., 11 Sep 41, p. 6
Early in June casualty lists began to appear. The names of killed
and wounded were carefully checked and issued in small groups.
Lists of missing were longer and were revised repeatedly as scattered
men rejoined their units, or it became known, through Red Cross
headquarters at Geneva, that they were prisoners-of-war. On 11 June,
using the latest available figures (which failed to check in totals),
Nash reported that of 16 530 New Zealanders who went to Greece,
7100 were in Crete when ‘fighting began there. From Crete, 4650
were taken off, some wounded; 87 were set down as killed, 671
were wounded, 2450 not accounted for, a total of 3208 casualties,
though figures were subject to correction. From Greece the lists so
far were 126 killed, 516 wounded, 41 known prisoners, 1892 missing, making 2575 in all. Thus the total casualties of the two battles
were 5783 men.
NZPD, vol 259, p. 285–6
Later reckonings would show that in Greece, from a total strength
of 16 720, there were 261 killed, 387 wounded, 1856 prisoners
including 212 wounded and 30 who died of wounds, 2504 in all.
In Crete, out of 7702 New Zealanders, there were 671 killed, 967
wounded, 2180 prisoners, 488 of them wounded, 3818 casualties
in all. The grand total was 6322 or 37 per cent of the original
force.
Davin, p. 486; McClymont, p. 486; Kay, Robin, Chronology, New Zealand in the War,
1939–1946 (hereinafter Chronology), pp. 25, 29
Inevitably in these months the friends and kindred of the Division
knew grief, anxiety, hope, fear and long-drawn uncertainty. For those
less close, aware how units were jumbled in the exodus, it was easy
for a while to hope vaguely that all would be well for particular
people, that they would turn up safe in Egypt, or at worst be prisoners. Occasional stories of arduous escapes, of sheltering Greeks
and helpful fishing boats, nourished hopes.
Prisoners-of-war were a new feature. Amid the trenches and
machine guns of 1914–18 only a few hundred New Zealanders were
captured. In this war, a few flying with the RAF had already come
down in German territory but now, in the first few weeks of its
fighting, the Division had lost 4030 men as prisoners, of whom 700
were wounded and 30 others had died of wounds,
Kay, Chronology, pp. 25, 29
although the
full number was not known for months; thus the New Zealand
Herald on 13 October 1941 noted that some 2000 New Zealanders
were definitely reported to be prisoners. In April newspapers began
printing information on international conventions governing prisoners-of-war, allaying confusion between their camps and concentration camps. There were reassuring reports from Red Cross officials
eg, Auckland Star, 10 May (supplement), 20 Jun 41, pp. 6, 6; Evening Post, 2 Jul 41,
p. 6; NZ Listener, 13 Jun 41, p. 3
and some photographs of hearty-looking captured airmen.
Auckland Star, 13 May 41, p. 6
There
were directions to next-of-kin about sending letters and parcels, and
appeals for helpers to pack the Red Cross parcels, one per man per
week, that were to prove their mainstay for so long.
On 10 July the hospital ship Maunganui brought home the first
338 invalids from Greece and Crete.
Stout, T. D. M., Medical Services in New Zealand and the Pacific, p. 300
The papers bloomed briefly
with photographs and with stories of bravery against great odds, and
there were heroes’ welcomes in Wellington and the home towns.
This was repeated when more came back on 10 September in the
Oranje. Fraser’s return at about the same time led Nash to tell how
in Egypt Fraser, pointing out that each man lost to our small country
would be more serious than forty times the loss to Britain, had
helped to persuade Admiral Cunningham
Cunningham, Admiral of the Fleet Andrew Browne, 1st Viscount (46), 1st Baron of
Kirkhope (’45), Kt, GCB, OM (1883–1963): Dep CNS 1938–9; C-in-C Mediterranean
Fleet 1939–43; 1st Sea Lord & CNS 1943–6
to send a ‘suicide ship’
back to Crete after all chance of rescue seemed gone, a ship that managed to bring off a further 2000 men, mainly New Zealanders.
Evening Post, 15 Sep 41, p. 9
On 9 October 1941, under headlines stressing the value of the
campaigns, newspapers quoted large portions of a short, unofficial
account of the fighting in Greece and Crete, prepared by Freyberg
for the Minister of Defence, and now presented to Parliament. The
concluding paragraph was given prominence:
In Crete the enemy underestimated our strength and expected
to capture the island with parachutists alone. He failed and had
to lay on a full scale attack which used up in all 35 000 highly-trained and perfectly-equipped troops. Although successful, his
losses were great and he was severely mauled. He lost at least
4000 killed, 2000 drowned and 11 000 wounded. By having to
fight he was delayed a month in his plans, and, when the time
came, he had neither material nor the troops nor the inclination
to face further air landings in either the Western Desert or in
Syria. What is even more important, he has now no illusions
about the fate which awaits any attempt at air-borne operations
against Great Britain.
Ibid., 9 Oct 41, p. 11; A to J1941, H-19A, p. 4
The figures for German wounded and drowned were too high, but
this evaluation, straight from Freyberg, had the ring of authority.
A few days later came the proud news that Lieutenant C. H. Upham
Upham, Charles Hazlitt, VC & bar (1908–): sheepfarmer; won VC, Crete1941, bar,
Ruweisat 1943; POW 1943–5
and Sergeants A. C. Hulme
Hulme, Alfred Clive, VC (1911–): company dir; VC, Crete1941
and J. D. Hinton
Hinton, John Daniel, VC (1909–): former Works Dept employee; VC, Greece1941;
wounded & taken POW
had each been
awarded the Victoria Cross, which so far in this war had come to
only one other New Zealander, J. A. Ward.
Ward, James Allen, VC (1909–1941): school teacher; served RNZAF, won VC returning
from German bombing raid 2 Jul 1941; killed on air operations Sep 1941
Their impressive citations reinforced the sense that New Zealanders had fought well and
proved their quality.
Evening Post, 15, 16, 18 Oct 41, pp. 8, 7, 10
A year later Air Commodore R. V. Goddard
Goddard, Air Marshal Sir Victor, KCB, CBE, DSM(US), RAF (1897–): b UK; Royal
Navy 1910–15; RNAS 1915–18; RAF1918; Dep Dir Intelligence Air Ministry
1937–9; Dir Military Co-operation 1941; CAS RNZAF 1941–3; AOC i/c Administration, SE Asia1943–6; British Joint Services Mission USA 1946–8; Air Council Member for Technical Services and Commandant Empire Flying School 1948–51; Principal
College of Aeronautics 1951–4
was to say that the defence of Greece and Crete had delayed the
German attack on Russia by a month.
Otago Daily Times, 29 Jun 41, p. 4
Both Churchill and Halder,
Halder, General Franz (1884–1971): CGS Germany 1939–42
Chief of the German General Staff, have agreed.
McClymont, p. 484
Throughout the campaigns New Zealanders, apart from the friends
and kindred of the Division, kept the even tenor of their ways. There
were a few public marks of concern, mainly in religious services and
the chiming of Big Ben. England had lately, with the approval of
the King and of Churchill, taken to a minute’s silent prayer during
the broadcast striking of Westminster’s great clock at 9 in the evening. On 8 April, the Bishop of Wellington suggested that now, with
New Zealand troops in the front line, was the ‘psychological’ moment
to introduce this practice to New Zealand.
Evening Post, 8 Apr 41, p. 8
He was supported by
other church leaders, the Governor-General and the Prime Minister.
The noble Empire-binding boom of Big Ben striking nine was heard
on 13 April, and on every evening of the war thereafter, heralding
the news from Daventry.
Another attitude in the post-Crete days was indicated by a large
advertisement by the Paramount, a small Wellington cinema. ‘A
monster cheer-up week, Just the kind of show you want right now
… Wholesome, Real, Human, Happy, Entertainment. It doesn’t
attempt to solve World Problems or propound an Important Message—unless it be that a good laugh and a good time is what we
all need right now.’ The films were My Love Come Back, with Geoffry Lynn, Olivia de Havilland, Jane Wyman and Charles Winn, all
freshness, gaiety and music; Desire, with Gary Cooper and Marlene
Dietrich—‘a boy, holiday-bent, thinking of gay senoritas and romance—a girl, expert jewel thief, exquisitely beautiful…losing her
own heart’.
Ibid., 19 Jun 41, p. 3
Other Wellington cinemas were offering various escapes
from the war: Gone with the Wind; A Despatch from Reuters; Goodbye
Mr Chips; Wuthering Heights; Pride and Prejudice; The Invisible
Woman; Son of Monte Cristo; Gene Stratton-Porter’s Laddie; The Thief
of Baghdad; The Tree of Liberty (in Virginia); Dark Streets of Cairo
(jewel mysteries); A Date with Destiny (mystery); and Give us Wings
starring the Dead End Kids.
Ibid., 20 Jun 41, pp. 2, 3
A similar note was sounded in another advertisement:
Life must go on! In times of stress and strain it is well to give
some attention to those things from which we can draw new
inspiration, and keep up our morale.
Here, then, James Smith’s present for your inspection an arresting array of spring Fashions in Frocks, Suits, Coats and Millinery.
Dominion, 25 Jun 41, p. 4
Greece and Crete sent some ripples of uneasiness over the large
area of New Zealand life devoted to racing, which had been almost
untroubled during the crisis of mid-1940. In April 1941 a few
newspaper correspondents thought that race meetings, drinking etc,
were now unsuitable pleasures: Greece was lost through lack of aircraft while thousands were spent on liquor and the ‘tote’.
NZ Herald, 17, 21, 24 Apr 41, pp. 13, 10, 12
These
killjoy sentiments, ‘the last thing that the boys at the front would
wish’, were deplored by another correspondent who wrote that hanging round the radio with gloomy faces would not win the war, while
racing kept up morale, filled the Treasury, gave to patriotic funds
and employed hundreds.
Ibid., 24 Apr 41, p. 12
The day after the capitulation on Crete,
2 June, was King’s Birthday observance day. In 1940 the holiday
had been postponed because of the French crisis. In 1941 the New
Zealand Herald remarked that the mines were working, though with
some absentees, but elsewhere leisure and pleasure held sway. At
Ellerslie, 31 500 people put £ 106,283 through the tote. On the
second day of the meeting, when 15 000 people bet £73,097, about
150 Westfield butchers stopped storage killing in the afternoon to
see the Great Northern Steeplechase. ‘You’d never think there was
a war,’ lamented a Westfield official,
Ibid., 5 Jun 41, p. 6
and disapproving comment
appeared in many papers. Alone on 2 June the Auckland Star said
that mid-week meetings should be banned during the war. But a
day later A. S. Elworthy,
Elworthy, Arthur Stanley (1874–1962): farmer; Pres NZ Racing Conf 1939–42; chmn
Canty Jockey Club 1945–58
chairman of the Canterbury Jockey Club
and president of the New Zealand Racing Conference, spoke out
his private thoughts without consulting his committees. For some
time, he said, he had been troubled; there were 240 racing days in
New Zealand and 80 for trotting. His confreres should set an example
and refuse to cater for a public that seemed unaware of the war.
Could those at home, with the troops facing death and worse, really
make themselves believe that they were facing up to their responsibilities? He knew the arguments of revenue, and necessary relaxation, but he doubted if those most in need of relaxation, the friends
and relatives of the fighting men, sought peace of mind at the races;
they were more likely to achieve it by work. He urged not a stop
to racing, but reduction of the days given to it.
Evening Post, 4 Jun 41, p. 8. See also p. 321
These views were hailed as wise and courageous by several leading
papers
Star–Sun, Auckland Star, Press, 4 Jun 41; Otago Daily Times, Evening Post, 5 Jun 41
and a few racing men, while the Waimate Farmers’ Union
hastened to pass a supporting resolution.
Evening Post, 4, 6, 11 Jun 41, pp. 11, 9, 6; Press, 9 Jun 41, p. 6
Trotting authorities,
however, did not follow Elworthy’s lead. The president of the New
Zealand Trotting Conference, H. F. Nicoll,
Nicoll, Harry Frederick (d 1955aet 86): Pres NZ Trotting Conf 1922–47
would not comment
without consulting his Executive except to say that in England, with
suffering and bereavement the daily lot and every ounce of effort
demanded, there were races three days a week: New Zealand racing
authorities had already declared that they would, if it could be shown
that their sport was interfering with the war effort, be the first to
reduce it.
NZ Herald, 5 Jun 41, p. 6
The Wellington president, J. E. August, said bluntly
that less racing would not make things any better for the boys overseas, and while people would cheerfully pay revenue through gambling, they hated paying taxes.
Evening Post, 4 Jun 41, p. 8
Elworthy’s argument that in seeking relaxation people were not
facing up to their responsibilities applied equally to other amusements.
Auckland Star, 5 Jun 41, p. 9
In the House W. J. Polson, complaining of wasted petrol,
said that Elworthy’s proposal should have come from the government; Webb, Minister of Labour, said that Elworthy should first
have consulted his Conference and the Minister of Internal Affairs;
S. G. Holland called Webb’s remarks ‘colossal cheek’.
NZPD, vol 259, pp. 309, 313, 322–3
The New Zealand Racing Conference on 11 July, while not
endorsing Elworthy’s proposals on curtailment, unanimously reelected him president. The Press and the Evening Post on the 12th
joined the Auckland Star in criticising unlimited racing. But support
by a large sector of the community merely proved that New Zealanders were content to leave judgment to the government and the
racing clubs: while taking what was offered, not all would think it
wisely offered, and reduction would be accepted either approvingly
or with grumbling resignation.
Press, 19 Jul 41
Racing officials and some newspaper letter writers still spoke of
the relaxation of races, their part in the social structure and their
large contributions to war funds, painlessly extracted, in contrast to
raffles and national savings campaigns.
Evening Post, 7 Jul 41, p. 6; Press, 18, 23 Jul 41, pp.6, 6; also letters in Press,
10, 12, 14, 18, 27 Nov 41
Polson repeated his complaint of time, energy and petrol wasted;
Evening Post, 1 Aug 41, p. 6; Press, 17 Nov 41, p. 6
a few critics wrote to
newspapers.
Press, 4, 7, 10, 14 Nov 41, pp. 10, 10, 9, 10
There were some military encroachments on race
courses (notably at Trentham when an outbreak of measles and
mumps coincided with the winter meeting of 8, 10 and 12 July
1941),
Evening Post, 2 Jul, 10, 16 Sep 41, pp. 8, 9, 6
which amounted to twelve days in the 1940–1 season.
Otherwise the sport of kings continued substantially unchanged till
the Japanese war checked mid-week racing.
The 40-hour week was again challenged. The usual advocates for
longer hours, the Chambers of Commerce, Farmers’ Unions, employers and newspaper editors, raised their voices. The Lakes County
Council circulated other local bodies advocating a petition to the
government for cessation of the 40-hour week. Only by increased
effort could the war be fought and paid for; as it was not going
well, current effort was clearly not enough.
eg, NZ Herald, 31 May 41, p. 12, letter; Auckland Star, 3 Jun 41, Evening Post,
4 Jun 41, editorials; Wellington Chamber of Commerce, Evening Post, 4 Jun 41, p. 8;
Auckland Primary Production Council, ibid., 10 Jun 41, p. 5; Bureau of Importers,
ibid., 11 Jun 41, p. 4; Otago Farmers’ Union, Otago Daily Times, 4 Jun 41, p. 4; Lakes
and Riccarton County Councils, Press, 10 Jun 41, p. 6; Foxton Harbour Board, Evening
Post, 4 Jun 41, p. 8; Hamilton Borough Council, NZ Herald, 5 Jun 41, p. 3
However, rank and
file Labour defended the status quo, the Wellington Trades Council
calling on its 36 000 unionists to defend hard-won living standards
and working conditions against unscrupulous attack.
Evening Post, 10 Jun 41, p. 8
On 9 May, attacks by the Auckland Chamber of Commerce on
the Industrial Efficiency Act and import control
Dominion, 9 May 41, p. 6
were answered by
Sullivan,
Sullivan, Hon Daniel Giles (1882–1947): MP (Lab) Avon, Bay of Plenty from 1919;
Mayor Chch 1931–5; Min Rlwys 1935–41, Industries & Commerce from 1935, Supply
& Munitions 1939; Acting PM 1942, 1944
Minister of Industries and Commerce, who charged all
Chambers of Commerce with indiscriminate opposition to the
government. This became linked with the question of lengthening
hours,
Evening Post, 10, 21 May, 4 Jun 41, pp. 14, 10, 5 & 8
but there was much less noise than in May–June 1940.
Perhaps the meat and butter piling up in the cool stores dulled it,
while many realised that the Industrial Emergency Council was
extending hours where necessary. The Wellington Trades Council
and the secretary of the Coal Mine Owners Association (T. O.
Bishop)
Bishop, Hon Thomas Otto (1878–1952): MLC from 1943; Speaker Legislative Council
1950; Acting Under-Secretary Mines 1918–20; Sec Employers Fed 1922–40, NZ Coal
Mine Owners Assn 1921–47; chmn Industrial Emergency Council 1940–45
both said that this Council, on which workers and
employers were equally represented, was dealing harmoniously with
applications for extended hours when these proved necessary for the
war effort or where the burden of overtime would be too heavy.
Evening Post, 10, 18 Jun 41, pp. 8, 9
The issue was smoothed down with great amiability on 18 June.
To a large deputation of employers’ representatives Webb, Minister
of Labour, said that the bogey of the 40-hour week had been raised
where no law prevented 80 or even 100 hours being worked; it was
a question not of hours but of overtime. The Industrial Emergency
Council, and the fairness of the workers on it, were commended by
the Coal Mine Owners Association (and coal mines were notorious
for hold-ups in 1941). The president of the Associated Chambers
of Commerce, Gordon Fraser,
Fraser, Gordon Mackintosh (1888–1958): Pres Taranaki Chamber of Commerce four
times, of Assoc Chambers of Commerce 1940–1; sometime chmn, Managing Dir Taranaki Daily News, exec Racing Conf
said that the 40-hour issue had
been raised by the counties, whose agitation had received more notice
than it warranted, and that his body was resolute against political
propaganda, though some local Chambers had been less careful.
Webb admitted that some Wellington speakers had excited his ire,
but the Wellington president had been very fair and Labour irritation was passing. The Wellington president, R. H. Nimmo,
Nimmo, Robert Hamilton, OBE(’46) (1892–1965): b Scotland; past Pres Wgtn Chamber of Commerce, nat exec Assoc Chambers of Commerce; Wgtn city councillor from
1944; YMCA work from 1926
said
that people in public places were too reticent in giving credit where
deserved to the government, and urged the clearing out of prejudice
in labour-employer relations.
Evening Post, 18 Jun 41, pp. 6, 9
The contrast, the gap between the few thousand men who were
losing their lives, limbs and liberty in Greece and Crete and the rest
of New Zealand which in the main worked its 40 hours, was disturbing, even though in many areas at this stage more effort could
not be effectively directed into the war. Several advocates of all-round longer hours seemed as much concerned with moral aspects
as with practical issues. As the Evening Post of 4 June put it ‘Over
and above the economic argument there is the great and important
consideration of what is fitting and seemly. It is not seemly that we
should retain all our plenitude of welfare, all our leisure, and all
our relaxation while overseas there is blood, and in bereaved and
anxious homes, tears.’
On 30 June Webb, stressing that working hours were increased
where necessary without overtime payment, surveyed the more
important adjustments made by the Industrial Emergency Council.
Already 14 labour legislation suspension orders had, in certain
industries or factories, lengthened hours on ordinary pay, permitted
shift work, slackened apprenticeship conditions and increased the
overtime permitted for women and boys.
Ibid., 30 Jun 41, p. 8
A recent order, on 25
June, had prescribed 48 hours at ordinary time rates in cheese factories during 43 weeks of the year (Regulation 1941/100). Another
(1941/99) on the same day permitted shift work up to 1 am for
women and boys in biscuit factories, now busy with big British
service contracts; on 7 July a further order (1941/110) extended
the overtime that these women and boys could work, including Saturdays and holidays.
The other long-standing anti-Labour theme, the need for coalition
government, was also sounded firmly. The election due late in 1941
seemed untimely in the steepening war, and to Nationalists the alternative was coalition. The National party, with S. G. Holland its
leader since November 1940, had renewed criticism of the government’s continuing ‘socialization’ policies such as the Small Farms
Amendment Act and the Industrial Efficiency Act.
eg, Star-Sun, 26 Feb 41, p. 8; Press, 14 Feb 41; Dominion, 28 Feb 41, p. 8; NZPD,
vol 259, p. 68
In February
Holland, backed by caucus, had proposed that members returned
at the next election should hold office for the duration of the war,
and that both parties should undertake to form a national government regardless of which held the majority.
Dominion, 20 Feb, 1, 3 Mar 41, pp. 8, 12, 9
Fraser had declined
public comment on this proposal,
Ibid., 21 Feb 41, p. 8
whereupon Holland called for
elections later in the year to last for the duration.
Ibid., 4 Mar 41, p. 8
On 16 April the National party caucus unanimously held that
the gravity of the situation could be met only by a truly national
government; mere inclusion of the Opposition’s leader in the War
Cabinet could not be sufficient. Next day Fraser stated that he had
already discussed with Holland the war situation and his own projected visit to the United Kingdom, inviting Holland to join the
War Cabinet in order to reduce public controversy as much as possible in his absence. Now, on the eve of his departure, it was not
possible to form a national government; he would decide on the
proposal when he returned, in the light of circumstances then prevailing. He added that as the war developed, postponement of the
election might be advisable, even inevitable, and this would necessarily involve the question of forming a national government—
‘neither I nor my colleagues would even suggest postponement if its
only effect was to retain the Government in office’—and he hoped
for a party truce in his absence.
Press, 18 Apr 41, p. 6
This statement was later taken in some quarters as clear indication
that if the election were postponed in November a national government would be formed. Said the Press on 18 April:
Mr Fraser says one thing very plainly and usefully. If it is…
undesirable or impossible to hold a General Election, he will
regard this as a decisive factor. The present Government will not
carry on without a further mandate; and a national Government
will be formed. In the meantime—and if this is not political
astuteness it is candour which deserves a candid response—Mr
Fraser suggests that party campaigning should cease. The National
Party need not hesitate to agree and to look to the Labour Party
for equal forbearance.
In the Standard of 24 April, Fraser repeated that if the war situation
made elections difficult he would consult Cabinet, caucus, and the
executives of the Labour party and the Federation of Labour, ‘and
if it seems then that the formation of a National Cabinet is the only
hope for the Dominion we will not hesitate. We will summon the
conference together and tell you what the situation is.’ Further, he
would not tie the hands of his trusted colleagues in his absence: if
national danger developed or if he were cut off by an extension of
hostilities, they would act on their own initiative.
Standard, 24 Apr 41, p. 10
Newspaper editorials, as usual, advocated coalition as the only
road to the unity still more necessary now that New Zealand troops
were fighting and as the alternative to a divisive election. The Evening Post on 4 June quoted several widely scattered speakers calling
for national unity.
Evening Post, 4 Jun 41, p. 8
Among other advocates, the South Island Dairy
Association, focusing on economic rather than military issues, on 5
June called not only for a truly national non-party government but
also for a council competent to advise government on economic,
financial and other matters.
Ibid., 6 Jun 41, p. 9
At Hawera 400 residents, drawn from
the farming and business communities, returned soldiers and Maoris,
adopted a resolution calling for a non-party cabinet, not necessarily
limited to members of Parliament, on lines already taken by Churchill.
Dominion, 14 Jun 41, p. 10
The secretary of the Farmers’ Union, A. P. O’Shea,
O’Shea, Hon Alexander Paterson, CMG(’62) (1902-): Dom Sec NZ Farmers’ Union
1935–45, Fed Farmers 1946–64; MLC 1950
said
that only a national government, devoted to New Zealand but not
to any party, could deal with sectional difficulties such as apprentices
and watersiders getting too high wages while excess profits tax pressed
hard on other sections.
Dominion, 14 Jun 41, p. 10
The Farmers’ Union Dominion conference
in July called for unity and a national government.
Ibid., 17 Jul 41, p. 8
Holland pressed hard against delaying the election. In the House
on 12 June he said that a national government was long overdue,
and if the government would not establish it, people should be told
that there was going to be an election; he personally could see no
reason for postponing it.
NZPD, vol 259, p. 326; Evening Post, 13 Jun 41, p. 6
Possibly many advocates for coalition
took Fraser’s words as indication that coalition would come out of
the war situation without political uproar, and there was nothing
like the clamour for it that had been raised in May 1940.
The Westland Labour Representation Committee early in June,
writing to other Labour committees, was ‘gravely perturbed’ by the
possibility that the Prime Minister, after consulting the national
Labour executives, might form a coalition. That would be the ‘greatest disaster’ for Labour. It would be better to face the polls and be
defeated, thus retaining ‘our national organisation, our enthusiasm,
our fighting spirit and our souls’, than to form such an unholy
alliance.
Press, 2 Jun 41, p. 4; Evening Post, 6 Jun 41, p. 8
Most papers advocating coalition spoke of current lack of decision,
uncertainty of function, devotion to party and excessive officialism,
without relating these sins to Greece and Crete,
eg, Press, Evening Post, 7 Jun 41
but the Auckland
Star on 26 April held that ‘we shall not, by a re-shuffle of the
Cabinet in which a number of National Smiths will replace a number of Labour Browns, gain the kind of administration that is needed’.
Getting things done was slow and difficult even when there was
agreement on what should be done. There was need at the top for
a small executive with the will and power to act swiftly and decisively, to cut through the meshes of bureaucracy which, with the
mass of war regulations, at present gave New Zealand the disadvantages of a totalitarian regime without the advantages.
In the decision to send troops to Greece, Holland had been consulted,
Auckland Star, 24 Apr 41, p. 8
and there was no suggestion that a national government
would have acted otherwise. After the first shock, stirring the sense
that bad times required more unity and effort, the reverses had little
direct political effect, but coming just as the election tide was about
to rise they promoted feeling that an election was now an untimely
diversion. Growing tension in the Pacific consolidated this, although
the parties announced candidates and made other preparations.
Standard, 28 Aug 41, p. 8
After Fraser’s return on 13 September deputations and discussion
led, on 15 October, to the unopposed Act that prolonged the current
parliament for one year.
Wood, pp. 170–1
CHAPTER 9
The Menace of Japan
AT the start of the war there was suspicion of Japan rather than
fear. Its war with China was remote, although the Tokyo Agreement of July 1939 wherein Britain promised to avoid any action
which might obstruct the Japanese or benefit the Chinese was attacked
by some Labour members as the ‘Eastern Munich’.
There was strong faith in Singapore. Few realised that the effectiveness of the naval base depended on a fleet being sent there and
that by 1939 this basis of Pacific strategy had become highly
improbable.
Wood, pp. 67, 76; for discussion of the Singapore base see McGibbon
The fall of the Netherlands and France in mid-1940
withered the last prospects of British naval protection from Singapore and made unstable their mosaic of imperial holdings around
Japan; Fraser saw that he must look to America.
In July 1940Japan’s demand that Britain close the Burma Road
through the Yunnan mountains, by which supplies trickled to China,
was perforce obeyed for three months in which peace with China
was supposed to be attempted. The embargoes which America
imposed at this stage, nominally for its own defence needs, on high
quality scrap-iron and on aviation gasolene were of limited force as
other grades of oil were available and could be converted to aviation
fuel. There were 23 million barrels of American oil in the 37.1
million which Japan imported in 1940.
Feis, H., The Road to Pearl Harbor, pp. 91–3, 268n
In September the government of French Indo–China permitted Japan to establish garrisoned
air bases in the north and to use the area as a corridor for troops
and supplies against China, thus providing stepping-stones for later
southward moves by Japan. At the same time the Tripartite Pact
between Japan and the Axis proclaimed the leadership of Japan in
greater East Asia, of Germany and Italy in Europe, and the three
powers agreed to help each other should any be attacked by a power
not yet in the war. It was designed to frighten America away from
upholding the existing order in the Pacific and, although met with
outward nonchalance, it hardened American attitudes towards the
approach of war.
Schroeder, Paul W., The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations, 1941,
pp. 22–3
During the following year there were repeated assertions of Japanese plans for its ‘greater co-prosperity sphere’ in a vaguely defined
Asian-Pacific area. New Zealand comforted itself with certainty that,
if these went too far, America would check Japanese expansion, and
also that Japan was bogged down in China. A succession of minor
crises in Japanese-Western relations bubbled through newspaper
columns with alternating hopes of peace and fear of war. In March
1941 Indo–China and Thailand accepted Japanese mediation in a
border dispute, emphasising Japan’s leadership in East Asia. At about
the same time America’s support of Britain was notably strengthened
by its Lend-Lease Act. April brought the five-year Soviet–Japanese
neutrality pact, while a Canterbury farmer, deploring his neighbours’
Home Guard apathy, pictured such delinquents ‘in the shafts of a
rickshaw trotting a Japanese officer over the property from which
they once derived a comfortable living.’
Press, 9 Apr 41, p. 12
In late July, when Japan
obtained bases in southern Indo-China, the United States, Britain
and the Netherlands government-in-exile denounced aggression and
froze Japanese assets, notably checking its imports of oil. The Press
on 20 August explained that the democracies’ half measures achieved
a sort of balance: giving China just enough to keep it fighting,
squeezing Japan hard enough to make it aware of their power, not
hard enough to provoke war. In August Churchill and Roosevelt,
meeting in the Atlantic, established that if America’s efforts for
peaceful settlement failed, Britain would be a forthright ally. Japanese negotiators continued to discuss their differences with Cordell
Hull,
Hull, Cordell (1871–1955): US Congressman 1907–21, 1923–31; Senator 1931–7;
Sec State 1933–44
urging that America should stop helping China, encourage
China into peaceful economic collaboration with Japan, and lift
restrictions on shipping and commerce. America required that Japan
should separate from the Axis, withdraw troops from China and
Indo–China, renounce further aggression and permit equal trading
rights to all nations in the Pacific. The likelihood of war persuaded
New Zealand politicians, without dispute, to postpone the distraction of the election due towards the end of the year.
The see-saw of news and opinion continued between forecasts of
Japan’s attack, triggered by that country’s narrowing oil supply and
the expected collapse of Russia, reeling under the German advance,
and confidence that Japan could be held in check by the combined
strength of America, Britain and the Dutch.
On Monday 8 December 1941, morning papers reported that very
large Japanese convoys had been sighted in the Gulf of Siam, that
in Singapore all able-bodied men could be conscripted either into
the forces or to assist them at the ‘moment of actual or apprehended
attack’, and that Australia was arranging to convoy its ships on vital
routes.
Across the dateline, at Hawaii at 7.50 on the morning of Sunday
7 December (1.50 am, 8 December, New Zealand time), Japanese
carrier-borne aircraft surprised and bombed Pearl Harbour, where
most of the United States Pacific fleet was anchored. Within hours
came reports of attacks on Guam, the Philippines, Thailand, northern Malaya, Hong Kong, northern Borneo, on Wake, Midway,
Nauru, Tarawa and Ocean islands, on Rangoon and Singapore. All
began with air and naval strikes but, save at Singapore, Rangoon,
Midway, Nauru, Ocean Island and at Pearl Harbour itself, land
assaults speedily followed.
That Japan had struck was not surprising; peace in the Pacific
had grown very thin. But the lightning-swift blows at so many places
almost at once, and in particular the skill and audacity of the Pearl
Harbour attack staggered New Zealand as it staggered America.
Pearl Harbour’s strength had been extolled for months. It was the
headquarters of the Pacific fleet, the emblem of America’s technological supremacy; it was 3400 miles from Tokyo and not much
more than 2000 from San Francisco. Such attack, by all expectation,
should have been blasted from the skies. Pan American Airways’
staff at Auckland were incredulous; not till late on Monday afternoon
were successive bulletins accepted as facts, along with certainty that
the raiding ships would be cut off, that Japan had sent its oldest
ships and was prepared to sacrifice them. ‘Those aircraft carriers will
never get back to Japan.’
NZ Herald, 9 Dec 41, p. 6
The attack was a diplomatic short-circuit, without the formality
of an ultimatum, made while Japanese envoys were still talking in
Washington. Cordell Hull spoke of lies and distortion, Roosevelt
of infamy, while New Zealand editors dwelt on the success of surprise and treachery, with expectations of swift Allied riposte, and
some criticism of American complacency. ‘Why do the nations …
so furiously rage against the Japanese…. The blame rather lies with
those who allowed themselves to be so thoroughly gulled, and the
watchmen who slumbered’.
Auckland Star, 6 Jan 42, p. 4
The jolt of Pearl Harbour was made worse by the loss on 10
December of the British battleship Prince of Wales and the battlecruiser Repulse, lately arrived at Singapore, which had steamed north
to check landings on the Malay isthmus only to be sunk by land-based aircraft.
News of these sinkings, described by Churchill as the most painful and heavy blow in
his whole experience, was received in New Zealand with chilled disbelief.
Thereafter, a dreary cycle of attack, brief resistance
and collapse was tediously repeated. Thailand yielded in a day, easing access to Burma and Malaya. British Borneo was invaded on 16
December, Wake Island was taken on the 23rd, Hong Kong yielded
at Christmas, with no immediate mention of the 12 000 prisoners
taken; Kuching, capital of Sarawak, was occupied on 30 December,
and paratroops seized airfields in Sumatra; Manila fell on 5 January,
though on Bataan peninsula MacArthur’s
MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas, Hon GCB(’43) (1880–1964): C-in-C US
Forces Philippines 1941–2; Supreme Cmdr Allied Forces SW Pac Area 1942–5; C-in-C
Far East and Supreme Cmdr for the Allied Powers in Japan 1945–51; C-in-C UN Forces
in Korea1950–1
forces were stubborn.
After Pearl Harbour, for a few days, the sound of an aeroplane
caused ordinary people to wonder for a moment, ‘Is it ours?’, and
as the Japanese continued to strike unchecked, an astonished and
almost defenceless New Zealand faced up to the idea of attack within
weeks or even days. ‘Preparation without panic’ was the phrase of
Jones, the Defence Minister; there were no calls for massive volunteer
movements, and most people continued their routine lives until the
government or civic authorities encroached upon them.
Obviously the first step was to increase home defenders; 4600
men of Territorial and National Military Reserve units were immediately summoned as fortress troops to the defended ports, to coast
guarding, and other vital areas.
War History Narrative, ‘Military Manpower 1940–41’, p. 23; Otago Daily Times,
12 Dec 41, p. 4; for Emergency Precautions Scheme See p. 480ff
For some 21 000 Territorials due
to start two months’ training on 10 January, mobilisation began on
15 December ‘for the duration’, and several schools were taken over
as temporary accommodation. A ballot due to be gazetted on 20
January would call up 27 104 single and childless married men for
Territorial service, but to hasten military intake the Minister of
Defence, on 19 December, called for volunteers to the National
Military Reserve, aged between 21 and 55 years with not more than
three dependent children. Previously the Reserve was for ex-servicemen only, but now the limitation was cast aside: an early start in
the Reserve, urged Jones, would give men soon to be called up an
opportunity for military training that would stand them in good
stead when they were balloted.
What were the domestic effects, if any, wrought by this nearer
war, breaking three weeks before Christmas? There was at once a
rush, speedily checked by the government, of private motorists to
buy petrol with all available coupons; there was also a rush, checked
by the limits of retail supply and the discretion of grocers, to buy
sugar and tea. Then, on 16 December, came restrictions on train
travel, and heavy reductions in petrol for public and commercial
use, which cut transport services in all directions and gradually
reached far into daily life. There was also, for about 10 days, a check
in pre-Christmas routines, almost a wondering whether everything
would continue as usual, induced by the news, the trench-digging,
and the military stand-to.
With minor adjustments, New Zealand had been set for a normal
Christmas, with heavy bookings for trains and holiday resorts. Apart
from mobilisation, and cancellation of leave and travel, the season
passed largely as planned. Shops were well stocked with gifts and
general goods. For about ten days after Pearl Harbour there was a
marked flattening of trade, but by 18 December shopkeepers were
saying that tension was easing, people were adjusting; by Monday
the 22nd a Wellington manager believed that even an enemy landing at Waikanae beach would not stop the city celebrating Christmas
in the time-honoured fashion,
Dominion, 22, 23 Dec 41, pp. 4, 6; NZ Herald, 19 Dec 41, p. 8
and on Christmas Eve and Boxing
Day most of the main dailies reported a brisk season with returns
as high as or higher than the previous year’s. Lack of overseas goods,
which had long caused irritation, was now accepted, making shopping easier. Unable to travel, people spent more freely on gifts and
provisions, with a ‘Let’s have a decent Christmas while we can’
feeling. As yet petrol was the only thing rationed. Most items of
the usual cheer, such as hams, nuts, raisins and chocolates, were
plentiful, though canned fruit, especially popular as a holiday luxury
when most households did not have refrigerators, was scarce. Christmas cakes were as abundant as ever,
Rich mixture and new season’s fruits. Un-iced: 21bs, 3s 6d. Iced: 31bs, 6s 6d; 41bs,
8s 6d; 6bs, 12s 6d, or with almond icing 1s extra.’ NZ Herald, 20 Dec 41, p. 16
though wine and spirits were
not, and there was a shortage of bottles of beer.
Ibid., 8 Dec 41, p. 6
High prices for
fowl food and fewer small producers had lessened the supply and
raised the cost of poultry.
Ibid., 6 Dec 41, p. 12
For various reasons, including a late, cold spring and the demands
of military camps, vegetables were scarce and dear. Even potatoes
were selling at £46 a ton wholesale instead of the £12 to £14 usual
at this season, retailing at 6d and 7d a lb—which put the humble
potato into the rank of luxury foods. The Price Tribunal ordered
growers to charge no more than £20 a ton and brought the retail
price down to 3½d a lb or lower.
Evening Post, 24 Dec 41, p. 6; see p. 780ff
On Christmas Eve, though in most places shops were open till
10 pm, there was no last-minute rush. Streets were darkened, few
soldiers were about as leave was restricted, and there were very few
cars or taxis, while trams and buses were crammed; Auckland’s
crowds were smaller than usual, and went home earlier; they were
a little subdued and the boisterous hilarity customary among the
young people was missing. At Wellington the Post noticed less frivolity, more sense of family reunion, a feeling that pleasure and ease
were slipping behind, and that heedless expense was not only unwise
but not in the best form. At Christchurch, where Christmas Day
was usually welcomed by a cheery gathering in Cathedral Square,
the streets emptied soon after the cinemas, and when the Post Office
clock struck midnight the only sign of festivity was one ‘cheerful
gentleman’ singing Silent Night. Dunedin, perhaps helped by its
twilight, perhaps by a southern sense of security, had large and
happy crowds shopping till 10 pm, and 10 trams left the city at
midnight. Though coloured lights and festoons were missed, there
was much gaiety in the streets, even after the shops closed, with
fireworks exploding, and with squeakers and other noisy instruments, as at other Christmas Eves; the spirit, especially of younger
people, ‘was happy and often boisterous—perhaps a reaction from
so much grimness during the year.’
Otago Daily Times, 26 Dec 41, p. 2
Christmas holidays, focal point of much family life, were eroded
by lack of petrol, restriction of train travel, and, in some industries,
by work continuing. On 11 December Fraser strongly urged people
to stay at home, cancelling holiday arrangements; after 13 December
all petrol for private cars was stopped indefinitely and people were
asked to conserve what was in their car tanks ‘for themselves or the
country’ in the emergency.
Hon D. G. Sullivan, NZ Herald, 15 Dec 41, p. 6; see p. 747
From 20 December till after New Year,
all excursion and extra trains for distances of more than 100 miles
were cancelled. People with bookings on normal trains had to apply
again for reservations, giving reasons for their journeys. Trains were,
of course, the main method of travel, and record bookings had been
made, some for as far ahead as Easter 1942. Fifteen trains had been
expected to leave Auckland on Christmas Eve, eight of them for
Wellington, and the cancellation affected 50 000 seats from Auckland alone. There had been heavy bookings at resorts such as Franz
Josef and Fox glaciers, Queenstown, Milford Track, Rotorua, Wairakei, Waikaremoana, Wanganui River, the Chateau, the Hermitage
and Stewart Island, which were now out of range for most.
Otago Daily Times, 25 Nov 41, p. 6; NZ Herald, 18 Dec 41, p. 8; Dominion,
26 Dec 41, p. 7
Some
of the time and money usually devoted to holidays went into shopping; drapers in mid-January reported that women were stocking
up on household linen and all kinds of clothing except hats and
summer frocks.
Evening Star, 14 Jan 42, p. 4; Wanganui Herald, 6 Jan 42, p. 4
War and work encroached on many holidays. The Territorial and
National Military Reservists, hastily packed into fortress areas and
training camps, made gaps in many homes. All police leave was
cancelled on 9 December, and on 17 December hurriedly prepared
regulations decreed that in all industries and undertakings concerned
with the war effort and maintaining essential supplies, holidays should
not begin before Christmas Day and should end on Sunday 4 January. Some had even less time off: the Colonial Ammunition Company agreed to work on, except for Christmas Day;
NZ Herald, 17 Dec 41, p. 6; See p. 373
the railway
workshops, which normally gave their men annual leave at Christmas, closed only for Christmas Day and Boxing Day;
NZ Herald, 24 Dec 41, p. 8
girls on an
Army mattress order worked well publicised overtime (nearly 12
hours a day) on Boxing Day and the day after.
Ibid., 27 Dec 41, pp. 4 (photo), 9; Dominion, 30 Dec 41, p. 6
Coal was chronically short for many reasons, including unseasonably cold weather, and now a reserve of 80 000 tons was wanted.
Normally, mines would have closed between Friday 19 December
and Tuesday 6 January. (The extra Monday was to be taken in lieu
of King’s Birthday worked the previous year). At the government’s
request, miners in the Waikato, the Grey and the Buller agreed to
work on Saturday 20th, and on 22 to 24 December, and to resume
on 5 January,
NZ Herald, 16, 18, 22 Dec 41, pp. 6, 10, 4
although actually very few in the Waikato came to
work on Christmas Eve,
Press, 26 Dec 41, p. 4
while the Denniston mine near Westport
kept the normal holidays,
Ibid., 22 Dec 41, p. 4, 6 Jan 42, p. 10
as did the Kano and Hikurangi mines
in Northland.
NZ Herald, 22 Dec 41, p. 4
There was no immediate check to racing and to some this seemed
inconsistent. For instance, soon after Pearl Harbour a newspaper correspondent deplored that racing broadcasts continued unabated,
‘before and after news announcements, every half-hour and hour’;
no wonder there was a complacent attitude everywhere; the continual
cry from Cabinet ministers for increased production was simply ‘a
repetitive bleat’ in these circumstances.
Press, 12 Dec 41, p. 10
On 15 December the
Minister of Internal Affairs, with full agreement from the New
Zealand Racing Conference,
NZ Herald, 19 Dec 41, p. 8
announced that while Christmas and
New Year meetings would not be affected, there would in future
be no racing on working days. Racing and trotting meetings then
totalled 320 days a year; on Saturdays, racing 134, trotting 50;
public holidays, racing 30, trotting 8; working days, racing 76, trotting 22.
Ibid., 16 Dec 41, p. 6. See also p. 447ff
There was no call, however, for a complete recreational
blackout, for in a long war some recreation would be needed. Meanwhile, though the Commissioner of Transport had rather apologetically included horse-floats in the general petrol cut-off after 13
December, horses, unlike people, were not restricted on trains.
NZ Herald, 19, 26, 30 Dec 41, pp. 6, 4, 4; Press, 30 Dec 41, p. 4
In
Minhinnick’s cartoon, a horse sneered while a guard looking like
Peter Fraser turned away a family with suitcases: ‘Sorry, sir, wartime
emergency, no body allowed to travel more than 100 miles except
racehorses.’
NZ Herald, 26 Dec 41, p. 6
But a trotting official probably spoke for many in saying that it was necessary to consider depression and the lowering of
morale; people would ‘want somewhere to go’.
Press, 16 Dec 41, p. 8
Four meetings were
abandoned for such reasons as military occupation of race courses,
Dominion, 30 Dec 41, p. 6
while bad weather and lack of petrol cut racing crowds although,
for instance, hundreds of cars appeared at Ellerslie,
NZ Herald, 27 Dec 41, pp. 4 (photo), 6
Totalisator
returns, compared with the last year’s, fell at nine of the eleven
gallop meetings (Greymouth and Hawke’s Bay were the exceptions),
and five of the seven trots (Westport and again Greymouth having
increases). The combined tally was £935,964, down by £377,538
from the record £1,313,502 of the Christmas before, and by
£258,350 from the 1939–40 score.
Press, 5 Jan 42, p. 4
It was a gloomy holiday. The news was disastrous and the weather
so remarkably cold and stormy that it made cancellations and early
returns to work easier: a Wellington cartoonist suggested that the
petrol restriction had saved many people from a very uncomfortable
Christmas in fly-away tents.
Dominion, 30 Dec 41, p. 6
There remained the quiet pleasures of
visiting friends by bus, working at odd jobs such as the shelter
trench, and going to films. Cinemas offered cheerful diversion and
were well filled. Apart from Burma Convoy (‘heroes on death’s highroad, dodging bombs and bullets’), there was very little war about;
at Wellington for instance there was Bob Hope in Nothing but the
Truth, Sonja Henie in Sun Valley Serenade, with Glen Miller’s band;
Deanna Durbin in It Started with Eve; the Marx Brothers in The
Big Store; a new star, Red Skelton, in Whistling in the Dark; Orson
Welles’s Citizen Kane and Walt Disney’s The Reluctant Dragon.
Ibid., 22, 26 Dec 41, pp. 3, 3
By 10 January there was not a serious film showing. The fare then
included a ventriloquist’s dummy in Look Who’s Laughing, Great
Guns with Laurel and Hardy, In the Navy (Bud Abbott and Lou
Costello), Quiet Wedding, and Ziegfeld Girl, a ‘Pageant of Stars’
including Judy Garland totally pre-war in its lavishness, spectacle
and sparkle.
Since August 1941 the private petrol ration had been at its lowest
since the start of the war but Japan’s entry made matters worse.
The 8 December rush on supplies was quickly followed by the 13
December cut-off and it was not until March 1942 that coupons
again became redeemable.
See pp. 747–8
From 16 December 1941 commercial
rations were cut: for public passenger and goods services, including
local body and government cars, by one-third, for private trucks by
half. Licences for rental and business cars—except for doctors, nurses,
veterinarians, ambulances, fire brigades, police, traffic and vehicle
inspectors—were cancelled, though allowances were made for cars
directly connected with war businesses. Taxis working one shift got
75 gallons a month, those on double shift 120 gallons.
An immediate and lasting effect was the crowding of public transport, as motorists took to the trams and buses while the number of
buses was reduced. Travelling was plagued by uncertainty and waiting, let alone discomfort. The problem was acute at workers’ peak
hours, and it promoted at least one strike.
See p. 378
Some municipal services, such as refuse collection, were curtailed.
Auckland, as an urgent temporary measure on 17 December, ceased
weekly collections in outer suburbs such as Remuera and Epsom for
three weeks only,
NZ Herald, 17, 18 Dec 41, pp. 6, 8, 6 Jan 42, p. 4
but smaller and more spacious towns like
Wanganui put the service onto a monthly basis.
Ibid., 23 Jan 42, p. 6
Commercial concerns sought various solutions. On 17 December
in Auckland an advertisement for a leading department store asked
customers to carry small parcels. Some laundries and dry cleaners
arranged depots to replace deliveries
Ibid., 20, 22 Dec 41, pp. 20, 2; Press, 22 Jan 42, p. 2
but others, with careful organising and co-operation from customers, continued to run vans.
NZ Herald, 7 Jan 42, p. 1; Evening Star, 2 Feb 42, p. 7
Advertisements appeared stating that certain products were still
available on order but agents could no longer call.
Press, 14 Jan 42, p. 1
Butchers had long been anxious to escape from ‘wasteful and
worrying’ house deliveries which cost about £9 a week, and some
had already done so: by November 1941 in Auckland, 20 out of
150 shops were doing cash-and-carry trade, and in Wellington the
proportion was thought to be higher.
NZ Herald, 6 Jun 42, p. 6; Dominion, 17 Aug 40, p. 5; Press, 26 Nov 41, p. 8
A good deal of meat was
delivered by boys on push-bikes and this continued meanwhile, nor
was there any suggestion of zoning customers, but vans now came
only on certain days, not every day,
NZ Herald, 6 Jan 42, p. 4
and there was steady guidance
towards the cash-and-carry system. By June 1942, ‘with minimum
fuss and complaint’, about 70 per cent of Auckland’s meat deliveries
had ceased and they were further reduced after August.
Ibid., 6, 13 Jun 42, pp. 6, 6; Auckland Star, 22 Aug 42, p. 6
The most notable cut in delivery was that of bread; house-to-house delivery, with bakers competing for custom, was common
although many people bought it at grocers, dairies and cake shops.
In December and early January bakers in Wellington, Christchurch,
Dunedin, Wanganui, Hamilton, Palmerston North and Thames
NZ Herald, 18 Dec 41, p. 10, 5 Jan 42, p. 4
arranged to send their bread to shops only, saving both petrol and
manpower, and other towns followed. In his diary G. H. Scholefield
on 9 February noted that the distribution of bread through small
local stores ‘induces a procession of husbands each time a tramcar
stops, and tends to create custom to the shop which would not
otherwise get it.’ There were a few grumbles, as at Christchurch,
Press, 9, 14, 19, 23, 24, 26, 30 Jan 42, pp. 4, 8, 4, 8, 5, 8, 8
although 70 per cent of Christchurch’s bread was already sold through
shops;
Ibid., 5 Jan 42, p. 6
a few shopkeepers murmured that a troublesome and
profitless trade had been foisted on them,
Auckland Star, 23 Jan 42, p. 4; Press, 28 Jan 42, p. 4
but generally the change
was quietly accepted. In country districts deliveries were reduced—
as at Geraldine to twice a week, saving 100 gallons a month—and
farmers put bread boxes at their gates to save time and manpower.
Press, 16 Jan 42, p. 4
Auckland retained private bread deliveries, of which it had more
than most places, until May,
NZ Herald, 18 Dec 41, p. 10, 9 May 42, p. 6
running a mixed delivery to both
shops and houses, but easing out overlapping runs and reducing
varieties of bread. Some large Auckland bakeries had been turning
out up to 40 sorts and sizes of loaf, but now people had to take
what was available. ‘Tastes in bread—one might call them fashions—vary greatly,’ stated an article in the New Zealand Herald on
21 February, ‘When the loaf is more or less standardised, public
taste will be much simpler.’
Ibid., 21 Feb 42, p. 6
Several bakers were still delivering their wares to each shop, but
public taste was to be trimmed much further in a few months, when
after the loss of the Netherlands East Indies, the need to save tyres
and manpower brought in bread zoning on the basis of one bakery
for any one shop.
Bicycles, of course, were used more. After the petrol cut-off on
Saturday 13 December, a Wellington dealer’s home telephone rang
incessantly and by Monday orders had been taken for every machine
in his shop.
Dominion, 16 Dec 41, p. 6
Sidney Holland was photographed cycling under a
large umbrella.
NZ Herald, 19 Dec 41, p. 4
There were new parking problems which some
councils met by devising bicycle stands over the gutters;
Evening Post, 3 Feb 42, p. 4
bicycle
stealing increased.
NZ Herald, 29 Dec 41, p. 4
Horses re-appeared to some extent. They had not yet totally vanished from city streets, being still prominent in milk deliveries. In
Wellington, for instance, the city corporation had 50 light draughthorses in its milk carts, and about a dozen on other work; a few
more worked on the wharfs and hauled gravel on beaches; of the
Gear Meat Company’s house-to-house high-wheeled carts, which had
been a feature of Wellington life, four were still in operation.
Evening Post, 30 Jul 42, p. 6
Now
horses were occasionally hitched to cars
NZ Herald, 22 Dec 41, p. 4
and to improvised delivery
vans ‘of rather unusual design’ with car wheels and tyres,
Press, 11 Feb 42, p. 4
but more
often to gigs and drays that emerged from sheds and retirement.
Auckland Star, 20 Feb 42, p. 3
By 18 December, a Canterbury dray and pair were delivering beer
and by New Year horse-drawn vehicles were so common in Hastings
as to excite little interest, while Taranaki farmers were asked to hire
out horses and gigs to keep their 22 herd testers in action.
NZ Herald, 3 Jan 42, p. 6; Press, 3 Jan 42, p. 6
The
Christchurch City Council bought 12 horses, at prices ranging from
£25 to £30,
NZ Herald, 3 Feb 42, p. 4
to collect refuse; there were additional trips to shorten
hauls
Press, 10 Mar 42, p. 4
and streets were top-dressed with grit to prevent slipping.
Ibid., 9 May 42, p. 6
But though more use could be made of existing animals, any ‘back
to the horse’ movement faced severe limitations: it took four years
to rear a working horse, as long as it took to build a pre-war
battleship.
Ibid., 18 Jul 42, p. 4; Evening Post, 30 Jul 42, p. 6
There were many minor side-effects of the petrol cut. The Hamilton golf club, its motor mower laid aside, bought sheep to graze
its grass.
NZ Herald, 17 Jan 42, p. 6
There was less golf, more picnics in parks, more camping
in near-city reserves.
Press, 14 Jan 42, p. 4
More distant beaches were largely deserted,
except where crowded excursion trains, buses or ferries spilled out
their loads. A number of Agricultural and Pastoral associations cancelled their annual shows.
NZ Herald, 9, 10 Jan 42, pp. 6, 6; Evening Post, 8 Jan 42, p. 8; Straight Furrow,
16 Feb 42, p. 20
There were a few minor nervous movements, mainly at Auckland. Auckland’s schools were closed on 16
December, three days early, to save petrol used by buses in the
country and to let holiday-going mothers with children leave town
earlier. The Mayor in fact suggested that it would be helpful if such
mothers would depart promptly, easing railway traffic and, though
this was less clearly expressed, achieving partial evacuation.
NZ Herald, 15 Dec 41, p. 8
Auckland’s Public Hospital promptly cleared 250 beds, ready for
emergency casualties, by sending 250 patients to their own homes
or to its emergency hospital at the Teachers Training College, and
also temporarily emptied the Wilson Home for crippled children at
Takapuna, sending 30 of them to their own homes and 30 to an
orphanage at Papatoetoe.
Ibid.
Wellington Hospital calculated that in
a raid there would be 900 civilian casualties, of whom 20 per cent
would be killed, 50 per cent hospital cases, and 30 per cent less
seriously injured.
Dominion, 19 Dec 41, p. 6
It decided to wait until casualties actually occurred
before sending its most movable patients to emergency hospitals, for
which equipment was arranged and buildings were earmarked but
not taken over.
NZ Herald, 18 Dec 41, p. 6
During January, Wellington Hospital admissions
were much reduced, with 440 operations performed in place of the
1189 done in January 1941.
Evening Post, 27 Feb 42, p. 7
Christchurch proposed to make room
for emergency casualties by sending home all patients for whom
institutional care was not essential.
Press, 7 Jan 42, p. 3
For a week, beginning on 15
December, Auckland’s city cinemas closed at 9.30 pm, starting their
programmes at 7 or 7.30, while Auckland drapers and allied retailers, anticipating government orders which did not come, decided to
close at 8 on Friday nights and on Christmas Eve, and at 5.30 on
New Year’s Eve.
NZ Herald, 15, 17, 19 Dec 41, pp. 8, 6, 6
Zookeepers at both Auckland and Wellington
announced precautions: in a raid visitors would go to safety areas
under trees and in steep places, while attendants would lock dangerous beasts in inner cages and, at the all-clear, patrol the grounds
with nets and rifles.
Ibid., 2 Jan 42. p. 2; Press, 15 Jan 42, p. 6
The danger of glass blasted from shop windows was well known
from British experience. Complete protection with sandbags or
replacing glass with boards, besides being expensive and depressing,
would diminish trade. The relative merits of shutters, wire netting,
surgical tape, varnish and paper strips had been published,
NZ Herald, 5 Dec 40, p. 12
but
shutters were unwieldy and expensive,
Only a few Auckland shops acquired them. Ibid., 19 Dec 41, p. 6, 3, 5 Jan 42,
pp. 4, 2; Auckland Star, 17 Feb 42, p. 6
wire netting was scarce, varnish had to be thick, and miles of heavy surgical tape would be
needed for the close criss-crossing of large windows. Strips of paper,
though quite ineffective, were cheap and plentiful. Starting with a
group of Auckland retailers in the second week of December, a rash
of paper lattices appeared on windows in Auckland, Wellington and
other centres, some ingeniously combined with Christmas or patriotic
decorations,
NZ Herald, 16 Dec 41, p. 6; Auckland Star, 17 Feb 42, p. 6
and probably largely induced by readiness to follow
a fashion and to soothe customers. Mayor Allum denied their usefulness, while Semple declared that they must have some value as
every town in England had them.
NZ Herald, 17, 18
Dec 41, pp. 6, 10
Articles derived from a British
ARP book
Civil Protection, by F. J. Samuely and C. J. Hanann; see Dominion, 20 Dec 41, p. 12
and other British reports
NZ Herald, 18 Dec 41, p. 11
declared that paper strips
were no good; so did the Southern Military Command in a circular
to EPS units,
Press, 30 Jan 42, p. 6
but while Auckland shops were scraping off their
papers, at Hamilton the Mayor was ordering them to remain, on
the principle of better some protection than none at all.
NZ Herald, 13 Jan 42, p. 4
Most
Auckland shops had shed their strips by mid-February, but still in
April a few were combining them with window displays.
Ibid., 23 Apr 42, p. 8; Auckland Star, 17 Feb 42, p. 6
It was established that incendiary bombs were likely to be used,
and for over a year, smothering in sand or dowsing with a fine spray
of water had been advocated; throwing water on a burning bomb,
it was said, would make it explode, scattering fiery fragments. Just
before Christmas news came of the simple Russian way with a bomb:
dunking it rapidly in a large bucket of water. As senior firemen said,
this cut across everything fire fighters had been told previously, but
it worked most effectively against German magnesium thermite alloy
bombs, though they could be so treated only in the first minute of
burning. Extinguishing bombs thus, and also with a spray, a jet,
and thrown buckets of water, along with sand smothering, was demonstrated before crowds and before the cameras of newspapers and
the film unit by firemen, middle-aged women and schoolgirls; Peter
Fraser in his bowler hat dropped bombs into buckets; schoolgirls
plied stirrup pumps and hurled buckets of water.
NZ Herald, 22, 30 Dec 41, pp. 7, 4; Evening Post, 6, 16, 19 Jan 42, pp. 6, 6, 6
‘Courage and
plenty of water’ was the new creed, with sand in second place. A
country-wide conference of fire superintendents recommended departure from British instructions and the recalling of earlier anti-water
films.
Press, 7, 8 Jan 42, pp. 6, 4
This about-face did not pass without question. The New Zealand
Herald, on 12 January, after cabling its correspondent in London,
quoted a Home Security pamphlet which stated clearly that a burning bomb should not have water thrown upon it like an ordinary
fire: in the open it should be smothered in sand; elsewhere a stirrup
pump and hose producing both a fine spray and a jet of water would
put out both the bomb and its surrounding fire. Truth deplored
back-yard experiments and upheld English experience,
Truth, 14 Jan 42, p. 8
and Sidney
Holland wanted to send to London for experienced men to take
charge of air-raid precautions.
Press, 15 Jan 42, p. 6
British authorities reported that they were revising their instructions, and the Press decided that the controversy was in no way
damaging to those in New Zealand who had been quick to follow
suggestions derived from Russian practice. The only error had been
in announcing these decisions without first checking them in London, which would have spared the public the ‘doubts of an interval
in which it looked as if rash men in Wellington were defying experience in London.’
Ibid., 16 Jan 42
The official line was that both water and sand
equipment should be in every building.
Evening Post, 13 Jan 42, p. 6
Sand was cheap and plentiful, while stirrup pumps and hoses were still scarce.
A stirrup pump cost about £6, and by 24 December 70 had been distributed to the
most hazardous top floors in Auckland, where the EPS then arranged for 2000 lighter
pumps, costing about £3 2s 6d, which could be made more quickly, and offered free
delivery of sand gear. NZ Herald, 24 Jan 42, p. 8
Sand was
still rated effective against bombs on non-inflammable surfaces and
could so retard any bomb that water could be fetched from some
distance to finish it. There was also the chance, with mains broken
or overdrawn, that water might not be available. For this reason as
well as for speed, people were urged to keep water always ready in
buckets or tubs: ‘leave the bath water in the bath till next time,’
advised an Auckland EPS notice on 22 January. Business premises
should have 44-gallon drums on each floor with buckets handy.
Evening Post, 18 Feb 42, p. 4
A thin film of oil on top of the water was recommended to reduce
evaporation and avoid mosquitoes.
Ibid., 17 Jan 42, p. 8
At the start of Japan’s war, there were preparations, practical curtailments, adjustments to thinking. But there was no sense of doom,
no widespread break in values or ways of living. While many people
dug shelters in their gardens, others were searching hardware stores
and second-hand shops for lawnmowers.
Imports had been stopped about two years before. Mason and Porter of Auckland were
coping with the national demand, making among other implements about 17 000 mowers a year, but beset increasingly by shortages of material and staff. NZ Herald, 26 Nov,
12 Dec 41, pp. 8, 9
Peacetime pursuits continued: at New Year the 7th annual gathering of the Amuri Cob
and Pony Gymkhana drew a large attendance, many in conveyances
other than motor cars;
Press, 6 Jan 42, p. 8
at Ashburton’s Domain more than 9000
seedlings for display in the early spring—wall flowers, pansies,
polyanthus, Iceland poppies and daisies—were being pricked out
into boxes.
Ibid., 9 Jan 42, p. 7
There was immediate increase in the scope and urgency of the
Emergency Precautions Service, already well established. In 1942,
in its multiplying protective measures, thousands of average civilians
prepared against attack, with trenches and shelters, steps to protect
schoolchildren, evacuation plans, blacker blackouts, fire watching.
These activities, a major effort, are described elsewhere in the continuing saga of the EPS. The Home Guard, battling for itself since
1940, sprang to attention, acquired weapons, uniforms, more men
and an active defensive role, recognised by the Army.
On both EPS and Home Guard see chap 12
CHAPTER 10
War Comes to the Pacific
Malaya was expected to hold. Its defences had been publicised, its jungle reported impenetrable to troops. But in 1942
as January followed December it was clear that the British were
retreating, the expected stand was not made, aircraft did not arrive
to drive the Zeros from the skies, and day by day the miles lessened
between the fighting and the last bastion, Singapore.
The Japanese octopus was also striking into Burma and southward, seizing islands almost in clusters. Every few days unfamiliar
place-names studded the news, then disappeared, as they were raided,
invaded, and fell into the oblivion of occupation. In the news of 12
January, Japanese forces had landed at Tarakan on the north-east
of Borneo and in the northern Celebes, and they were claiming Kuala
Lumpur. Rabaul was seized on 23 January, soon becoming a base
for strikes at settlements in New Guinea and the Solomons. On
Saturday 31 January 1942 their spearhead was reported 18 miles
from Singapore’s causeway, and by Monday the British had withdrawn to Singapore Island. British forces had also left Moulmein in
Burma, while the Japanese had landed at Ambon (Amboina), and
raided Salamaua, Wau and Bulolo in New Guinea, and Kupang
(Koepang) in Timor. By 4 February, Surabaja in Java was being
bombed, so was Port Moresby, capital of Papua; the Salween river
on the border of Burma had been crossed.
Regard for the Japanese as fighters was drastically revised. Various
voices warned that they must not be judged by their long-drawn-out battle in China, and that their military resources, particularly in
the air, had been underestimated. The end of Allied reverses had
not come, warned John Curtin,
Curtin, Rt Hon John, PC (1885–1945): PM Aust from 1941, Min Defence Co-ordination
1941–2; chmn Advisory War Council 1941ff, Min Defence 1942
Australia’s Prime Minister, on 31
January: Japan was fanatical, very efficient and armed with mountains of supplies and equipment. With this reappraisal came awareness that once again, as in Norway, in France, in Greece and in
Crete, the Allies were failing through their own inefficiency, notably
in the air; now the failure was on a long finger of Asia that pointed
towards Australia and New Zealand. Malaya focused alarm more
than did the Philippines or Borneo or the Celebes, more even than
Sumatra and Java. Singapore had been an article of faith and with
it fell much other faith. It appeared that official optimism in 1941
about the defences of Malaya, justifiable only as an attempt to discourage attack, had not deceived Japan, while the British had believed
their own bluff. As early as 23 December the Evening Post, a paper
not usually over-critical of established values, declared that ‘telling
the public only what the public wish to hear is a common democratic fault for which the public themselves are partly to blame.
Wishful thinking has become a sedative; and politicians, even soldiers too, have been tempted to feed the public on this “dope” and
to risk … a rude awakening … the soothing pre-war assurances
about the defences of Malaya and Pearl Harbour are now totally
disbelieved … the pendulum may now be swinging from unwarranted optimism too far towards pessimism. But the indignation of
the public … is understandable.’
Two weeks later the Press set forth the immediate errors that were
plaiting the maypole of disaster. ‘No one who sifts the official and
unofficial reports of the fighting in Malaya can escape the conclusion
that the advance preparations were badly made, that land, sea and
air strategy was imperfectly co-ordinated, that the military and civil
authorities were at loggerheads and that preliminary intelligence work
was faulty.’
Press, 5 Jan 42
Muffled news further exasperated the Press, which on
17 January complained that for almost a week the daily communiqués from Singapore had told little or nothing. ‘Dr Goebbels at
his worst has seldom been more puerile and dishonest than British
officialdom in its versions of what is happening in Malaya’. The
public knew well enough that things had gone badly wrong; its
anxiety was only increased when official news services and commentaries tried to cushion the impact of the truth by wrapping it round
with euphemisms, excuses and evasions; these shook faith in official
news and damaged public morale. The Dunedin Evening Star on 24
January gave a few samples of not-so-old propaganda: ‘An attack
on Singapore from the mainland would now prove as costly as direct
assault from the sea’; ‘Great camps have been built for British and
Indian troops now fully trained for jungle warfare’; ‘Bombers and
fighter aircraft of the Empire are now using aerodromes and sites
covered a few months ago by dense vegetation’.
The inactivity of the American fleet was bewildering. Very properly, the United States navy did not reveal the extent of damage at
Pearl Harbour, did not say that of the eight big ships in ‘battleship
row’ Japanese bombers had sunk six and damaged the other two.
Only Arizona, which blew up, and Oklahoma, which capsized, were total losses. Maryland,
the luckiest, was back in active service in February; the others, raised and repaired, returned
during late 1942 and 1943. Morison, S. E., History of United States Naval Operations
in World War II, volume III, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931–April 1942, p. 143
On 17 December a report from Colonel Knox,
Knox, Colonel William Franklin (1874–1944): Republican candidate Pres US 1936; Sec
Navy from 1940
Secretary of the
Navy, said that the battleship Arizona and five other warships had
been lost; three of the five were destroyers and one was the training
ship Utah. Other vessels, including the battleship Oklahoma, were
damaged; some were already repaired, others would be in dock for
several months; about 2900 men had been killed and 890 injured,
but harbour facilities and oil-tanks were not damaged. He also said
that the entire United States Pacific fleet, consisting of a battleship,
aircraft-carriers, light and heavy cruisers, destroyers and submarines
was ranging the ocean in search of the Japanese fleet.
Press, 17 Dec 41, p. 7
Alert readers
might have wondered why there was only one battleship in the
chase, but more wondered why, since the fleet was not seriously
damaged, it did not appear in the South China Sea, or at Singapore,
now bereft of Prince of Wales and Repulse.
See p. 316
Reports that Washington
and London were resolved to defend Singapore, hailed hopefully,
eg, Otago Daily Times, 30 Dec 41; NZ Herald, 6 Jan 42
were succeeded by railings at inaction. Above the title ‘Make it
snappy, Sam’, cartoonist Minhinnick showed his Lincoln-like Uncle
Sam, blueprint for victory under his arm, racing towards production-shops against Death, with his sickle and hour-glass.
NZ Herald, 8 Jan 42, p. 8; Evening Star, 12 Jan 42, p. 6
Next week
Uncle Sam had a huge gun, ‘USA war power’, its barrel sharply
depressed towards ‘Pacific coast local action’, while in the distance
a rising sun, with a cloud of ships and aircraft, showed ‘Jap progress
in Malaya’; the caption was ‘Raise your sights, Sam’.
NZ Herald, 15 Jan 42, p. 9; Evening Star, 19 Jan 42, p. 6
In mid-January Knox warned against expecting a naval showdown in the near future: ‘I do not mean to imply that the Pacific
Fleet is idle. You will hear from it again and again when and where
careful strategic considerations dictate.’ The British and American
navies had to maintain their fighting strength in all seas, and he
emphasised that the chief enemy was Germany; as soon as Germany
was destroyed, the whole Axis fabric would collapse.
NZ Herald, 14 Jan 42, p. 7
The NewZealand Herald contrasted his caution with pre-Pearl Harbourassur-
ancesassurances and noted New York press references to Darwin as an American base. But Darwin’s value depended on the retention of New
Guinea, the Solomons, New Hebrides, Fiji and Java. While it was
suicidal to send ships into narrow seas without air cover, the United
States should be able to send considerable fighter aircraft to the Far
East, a theatre quite as important as the Middle East. To win the
war with reasonable quickness, America must hold the Dutch East
Indies. ‘The great essential is speed. Darwin will not be secured if
the United States concentrates most of its energies “mopping up”
submarines in the Eastern Pacific.’
Ibid., p. 6
Repeatedly, the Herald and other papers
eg, Otago Daily Times, 23 Dec 41; Auckland Star, 14 Jan 42; Press, 3 Feb 42
protested against the
British and American view that Germany was the enemy of importance. Malaya was not a side show, to be dealt with at the Allies’
leisure after Hitler’s overthrow; Australia and New Zealand were
entitled to more than comforting words, they should have practical
evidence that the Pacific would be protected while there was yet
time.
NZ Herald, 16 Jan 42
Churchill’s confidence in the eventual outcome was cold comfort: ‘the people of the Dutch East Indies do not ask for eventual
redemption from the invader—they ask passionately to be saved
from him now.’
Ibid., 22, 24 Jan 42
In Britain there was a surge of indignation at yet another defeat
due to air inferiority and inadequate preparations. Churchill, Minister
of Defence, first Lord of the Treasury and Leader of the Commons
as well as Prime Minister, was inevitably a target: he had chosen
the men who had made mistakes, if he had not made them himself.
Australia, now alarmingly exposed, and with many troops lost in
Malaya, complained angrily of trust betrayed and war mismanaged.
On 28 January (New Zealand time), admitting that things had
gone badly and would go worse, Churchill, opening a three-day
debate on the war, demanded a vote of confidence: ‘It looks as if
we are in for a very bad time, but provided we all stand together
and use our utmost strength it looks also, more than it ever did
before, as if we are going to win.’ He explained that, facing Germany
and Italy, Britain had never had enough arms to provide effectively
for the Far East. Apart from Britain’s own large needs, all that Russia
had asked for had been sent, and though there were more than
60 000 men at Singapore, the Nile Valley had priority in aircraft,
artillery and tanks. These supplies had helped the Russians to turn
retreat into attack, and whereas in November Rommel
Rommel, Field Marshal Erwin (1891–1944): joined German Army 1910, served Western
Front, Italy in WWI; cmdr Hitler’s mobile headquarters 1938–40, 7th Panzer Div 1940;
C-in-C Panzer Group (later Army) Africa1941–3, Army Group B, Northern Italy 1943,
NW France, Belgium and the Netherlands1944; implicated in attempt on Hitler’s life
on 20 July 1944 and forced to commit suicide on 14 October 1944
had been
threatening Tobruk prior to advancing on Egypt, the British offensive had regained Cyrenaica, though they had yet to hold it, and
Rommel’s army was not destroyed.
Rommel had already begun his counter-attack, and was to recapture Benghazi two days
later.
Churchill took on himself ‘the
fullest personal responsibility’ for the disposition of arms and for
diplomatic policy. ‘Why should I be called upon to pick out scapegoats and throw the blame on generals, airmen and sailors—to drive
away loyal, trusted colleagues, and submit to the clamour of certain
sections of the British and Australian press?’ As for Japan, it had
been British policy at almost all costs to avoid disagreement unless
certain that America would come in; hence they had stooped to
closing the Burma Road in 1940. ‘It seemed utterly irrational to
suppose that the Japanese, having thrown away the opportunity of
attacking us in the autumn of 1940, when we were much weaker
and all alone, should at this period plunge into a desperate struggle
against the combined forces of the Empire and the United States.’
Japan now had naval superiority in the Pacific and would inflict
many heavy and painful losses on all nations with possessions in the
Far East, but ‘we should not allow ourselves to be rattled by this
or that place being captured, because once the ultimate power of
the United Nations has been brought to bear the opposite process
will come into play and move forward remorselessly….’
NZ Herald, 29 Jan 42, p. 8. There are minor variations between the text of the edited
versions of Churchill’s speeches (Eade) and the cabled versions printed in contemporary
newspapers.
Although Churchill had shouldered responsibility for Malayan
errors, especially for the disposal of arms and for diplomacy, both
Auckland papers directed bitter reproaches across the Pacific. The
New Zealand Herald, its irritation at American slowness increasing,
attacked the United States in an editorial that probably topped New
Zealand press censure of Allied policies. Why, asked the Herald, if
the eastern defences had always been inadequate, were the peoples
concerned repeatedly assured that all was well, and troops from India,
Australia and New Zealand sent to Britain and the Middle East?
Why had the Allies adopted a policy towards Japan that made war
inevitable, thus exposing half the human race to the savage attack
of a well-armed adversary? ‘The consequences are now falling, not
on London or Washington, but on their wards and friends in the
populous lands of the Orient.’ Churchill himself had been wary,
seeking to avoid disagreement with Japan. ‘Mr Churchill does not
say so, but the conclusion cannot be escaped that the primary responsibility for provoking war with Japan rests upon President Roosevelt.’ No doubt American assurances of support had induced both
Dutch and British to join in the sanctions that had given Japan
three choices: to surrender, to suffer economic strangulation, or to
fight. ‘Mr Churchill makes it plain that the Allies banked on Japan
flinching. Instead she called their bluff and found them unprepared.
They had no right to accept such a palpable risk without adequate
cover.’ The heaviest responsibility fell on America, which had taken
the diplomatic initiative and had the means to back it, but Churchill
should have satisfied himself that Pacific Commonwealth countries
were not being helplessly exposed, and he now revealed that their
defence was fourth in his strategic priorities. In these, Britain and
the Atlantic were properly first, and the Soviet second, which staunch
and tenacious China might well question, while the defence of the
Nile Valley was rated more important than that of Singapore, Tobruk
and Benghazi and the desert of Cyrenaica preferred to Hong Kong
or the riches of Malaya. Without the Libyan offensive, Malaya might
have been saved; a fair and proper distribution of Allied forces was
still wanting.
Ibid., editorial. Prosecution for this editorial was seriously considered, but no action was
taken. A. H. Johnstone advised that it was subversive as likely to interfere with the
success of HM forces or those of his Allies, and as likely to cause undue public alarm;
but the subject matter was controversial and ‘when criticism is offered in good faith on
a matter so vital as the conduct of the war it is possible to err on the side of legalism.’
Johnstone to Attorney-General, 2 Mar 42, C & P file 3/5, quoted in War History
Narrative, ‘Censorship of the Press’, chap VI, p. 7
The Auckland Star on the evening of 29 January struck a glancing
blow in the same direction. It was ‘utterly irrational’ to suppose that
Japan would submit indefinitely to economic sanctions. It was hard
to believe that this aspect was not considered; probably Britain was
depending on the United States and Japan struck before there was
firm and precise agreement. No one had dared to suggest that the
British government and its leader were so wrong that both should
be replaced, and as every critic held that it would be a national
disaster if Churchill’s leadership were lost, it was certain that he
would be given an overwhelming vote of confidence in the Commons. Despite present misgivings and a growing feeling that
Churchill took too much on himself, ‘there can be no doubt that
if a vote of the British peoples everywhere could be taken, it, too,
would be overwhelming. They would be miserably ungrateful people
if it were not.’ Churchill had said that though Japan would inflict
more losses, in the end with hard fighting and unity the Allies would
win. Everyone believed this, cold comfort though it was, and none
should waste time railing at fate. All should do everything possible,
with existing means, to defend New Zealand, while the government
must demand more and better weapons.
Auckland Star, 29 Jan 42
The Churchill mana did not fail in Britain, where he won his
vote of confidence 464:1; nor did it fail in New Zealand, where his
irreplaceable leadership was valued everywhere.
Some Gisborne citizens, holding that New Zealand should dissociate itself from Australia’s anger (see below), sent him a message of unbounded admiration and confidence.
Evening Star, 29 Jan 42, p. 2
Outside Auckland,
papers were less critical, accepting that Britain’s difficulties were
enormous and its priorities understandable; there was approval of
the Commons’ full ventilation of war matters, in contrast to New
Zealand’s secret sessions; there was hope that the news from Makassar Strait might be the start of better things. Some, however, firmly
stated that Churchill was overburdened and should admit others to
share the load. Thus the Press, while fully endorsing his priorities
given the shortage of munitions, questioned the causes of that shortage; production had vastly increased, but there was evidence that
reforms in policy and method could have raised it much higher.
Churchill’s explanations did not cover the muddles and blunders in
this field, or the official statements, complacent and foolish, on
Malaya, which had misled everybody but the Japanese. ‘It is saying
far too much to say that he nowhere, in the Cabinet or on his staffs,
needs wiser and stronger heads to match his own.’
Press, 29 Jan 42
Newspaper lamentations over foredoomed Singapore had much
in common. Several recalled the Maginot Line and the fall of France.
NZ Herald, 13 Feb 42; Evening Star, 14 Feb 42, p. 7; Auckland Star, 16 Feb 42
Japan’s massive gains, in territory and war materials, all in ten weeks,
were held up to view, plus the immediate threat to the oil wells of
Sumatra, with hope and doubt that American aid would come in
time. Quick victory was seen as Japan’s only chance, therefore the
Allies had to hang on everywhere till their real strength came to
bear. New Zealand must at once intensify its own defences, though
not all papers were quite as definite as the Dominion on 14 February:
‘It is not now a question of whether we will be attacked, but when.’
Singapore finally yielded on 15 February 1942. Churchill,
announcing this in a worldwide broadcast, said that this was another
occasion to show that British people could meet reverses with renewed
strength, drawing from the heart of misfortune the vital impulses
of victory. Darker trouble had been passed before, in the awful
summer of 1940 when Britain stood alone, and in 1941 when it
seemed that Russia and its resources would fall. He assured Australia
and New Zealand that Britain would strain every nerve for their
safety. The good must be viewed with the bad, side by side; America
was in the war and Russia was not destroyed, but was already driving
back the foul invader. Disunity was the only crime that could destroy
the Allies. Whoever was guilty of it would be better with a millstone
hung on his neck and cast into the sea. He spoke strongly of Russia,
which in dire straits had kept its unity, kept its leaders, and struck
back.
In Australia, which had lost thousands of men in Singapore, there
was sharp complaint against those who had mismanaged so greatly.
In England some Labour critics spoke of Churchill’s ‘stupifying
magic’. ‘Fine words don’t win battles. Whenever we suffer a reverse
we are treated to a superb example of mastery of the English language. The nation is being drugged with high-sounding phrases.’
Evening Star, 17 Feb 42, p. 5. Churchill’s admirer, Harold Nicolson, wrote of his speech:
‘He is grim and not gay. Unfortunately he appeals for national unity and not criticism,
in a manner which recalls Neville Chamberlain. Moreover, although he is not rhetorical,
he cannot speak in perfectly simple terms and cannot avoid the cadences of a phrase. I
do not think that his speech will have done good.’ Nicolson, p. 209
Fraser, approving Churchill’s speech as ‘true, realistic and
unflinching’, had his own eloquence. It would be idle and wrong
to suggest that danger was not nearer; there was ample cause for
well-grounded concern, but no room for foolish or frantic panic.
We will neither wince nor tremble, we will not fall into undignified complaining or weeping or grizzling or growling, or indulge
in stupid; uninformed, unhelpful carping criticism about those
who have had the higher direction of our joint war effort and
who, with the forces and means at their disposal, could not possibly overcome the huge handicap of time and material which
confronted them. New Zealand will face courageously whatever
situation will develop. It will do so with calm assurance and
dignity as well as with courage. Our danger, which I do not
minimise, will decrease in ratio to the effort we all make to build
up resistance to any possible attack and contribute to the programme of victory now being planned in the Pacific.
Press, 17 Feb 42, p. 4
There were other troubles to digest in this mid-February. The battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and the cruiser Prinz Eugen broke
out of Brest, where they had been the target of many expensive and
supposedly damaging raids, and sped north, harried but successful,
to Norwegian waters, thereby arousing gloomy comparison with the
Repulse and Prince of Wales. Already the Japanese had attacked
Sumatra, capturing the great oil centre Palembang on the 16th; the
Burma retreat was quickening; Darwin was bombed on the 19th.
Gains in Cyrenaica had been short-lived: Rommel since 21 January
had struck back, and was now uneasily held at Gazala 50 miles
west of Tobruk. The only good news was about the ‘sweeping
advances’ of the Russians towards the old Polish frontier.
In post-Singapore comment in New Zealand papers several themes
interwove: the great need in the Pacific was for aircraft; New Zealand
must quicken its own defences and insist that the government demand
aircraft, guns, etc; there should not be easy acceptance of soothing
assurances from authority. Some papers, such as the Evening Post
and Evening Star, accepted without further outcry the repetition in
Malaya of exaggerated self-confidence instead of forethought, and
echoed Churchill’s demand for unity, pointing to Russia where Hitler had found no quislings and had been beaten back. Others were
more critical, reiterating the need for better work in high places.
The New Zealand Herald said that drift, muddle and complacency
must end; to regard questioning of the highly placed as almost sacrilege was often an excuse for failing to face facts; intelligent criticism
was the very breath of democracy.
NZ Herald, 20 Feb 42
The Press held that Churchill’s
demand for unquestioning faith asked more than most people would
readily or reasonably give. ‘Faith in his leadership is unshaken. But
that leadership is in the main moral; there is not the same faith in
the leadership of those who organise and direct the Commonwealth’s
war effort…. The British peoples can accept disaster with fortitude;
they cannot accept bad leadership with fortitude, and there is no
reason why they should learn to.’
Press, 17 Feb 42
The Standard, which on 8 January had said that the Pacific war was merely part of a greater
struggle and Japan merely Hitler’s puppet, on 26 February had an
article from London saying that on every street corner puzzled men
were beginning to consider that Britain, far from winning the war,
was fast approaching the danger of losing it through political ineptitude in high places. Churchill’s government was cluttered with discredited politicians, privilege, red tape, muddle and inefficiency.
Changes in the British War Cabinet met the edge of such criticism
and gave room for hope that things might now go better. During
late February and March articles from overseas on the recent disaster
continued to appear, telling of selfish citizens, lack of Service coordination, the paralysing effects of routine and the tropical way of
life, of blundering and red tape and unreality, of English soldiers
three days off the ship struggling in full battledress, in contrast to
Australians in shorts, boots and tin hats and to the Japanese, who
travelled light and fast, co-ordinated all effort, improvised, infiltrated, and used guerrilla methods. Roughly, this could boil down
to criticism of pompous, impractical British officialdom. On 7 March
an article in the Auckland Star concluded: ‘The root of all these
troubles lies “at Home”. An English officer simply cannot view any
crisis but from the windows of Whitehall. An Australian, New
Zealand, or Dutch commander, given a free hand early, would have
saved Singapore.’
Auckland Star, 7 Mar 42, p. 5
Was there any general reaction or activity after Singapore? There
was no immediate mobilisation flurry, because three weeks earlier
27000 men, married but without children, had been called in a
Territorial ballot and were already being taken into camps which
had been growing rapidly since December 1941; but in the first
weeks of March 1942, within a month of Singapore’s fall, it was
announced that 17 500 men, aged 18–28, married and with children, would be called up on 25 March at very short notice for Territorial service. There was no clamour to reclaim the troops from the
Middle East;
See p. 711ff
J. A. Lee, who had always held that there were too
many men overseas, urged that one of the New Zealand Division’s
four brigades should be brought back
Auckland Star, 11 Mar 42, p. 5
but there was no supporting
outcry. Newspapers were directed by the censor early in April not
to emphasise that Australian forces were returning to their own country.
Wood, p. 225
Naturally, it was not known that Roosevelt had agreed early
in March to send a division to New Zealand while 2NZEF remained
in the Middle East.
Ibid.; Documents, vol III, p. 235
Construction of defence works—camps, aerodromes, coastal fortifications—was strongly accelerated; on 6 March
a Defence Construction Council was set up, with James Fletcher,
Fletcher, Sir James, Kt(’46) (1886–1974): b Scotland, to NZ 1908; founder with brother
Fletcher Holdings Construction Co; Cmssnr Defence Construction, Controller Shipping
1942–4
a building contractor who had proved his ability in this field, as
Commissioner of Defence Construction, to organise and push forward all defence works, deciding the priority of projects, with wide
powers to control supplies of materials, plant and labour and to
ensure co-operation from everyone. A week later, a 54-hour week
for defence construction was established, with provisions for transferring needed men from other districts, and for flat rates of pay.
Maximum pay for carpenters, at 3s 3d an hour, was £8 15s 6d, and for labourers, at
2s 9d an hour, £7 8s 6d, with a minimum weekly wage in bad weather of £5 5s
But for most people not called to camps or construction jobs, life
was not broadly changed: commercial, social and public affairs went
on as usual. Schools held their swimming and athletic sports, still
publishing lists of winners; cricket and bowling and yachting interclub championships were won; stock sales were held; Scout Week
took place throughout the country; ladies held garden parties for
kindergartens; members of Parliament opened school fund-raising
fêtes; the Prime Minister opened new rooms for the Hard of Hearing
League;
Dominion, 26 Feb 42
Wellington’s sixth school swimming pool was opened.
Ibid., 2 Mar 42, p. 6
Cinemas were showing much comedy and little war. For instance,
Auckland was seeing Las Vegas Nights, ‘the happiest musical medley
that ever sparkled from the screen’; Gloria Swanson in Father Takesa Wife, with supports including the latest pictures from the Singapore front; Spencer Tracey, Ingrid Bergman and Lana Turner in DrJekyll and Mr Hyde; Margaret Lockwood in Quiet Wedding (‘all
Auckland is talking about this delightful comedy’); Wallace Beery
in Barnacle Bill; Laurel and Hardy in Great Guns; Abbott and Costello in Hold that Ghost, plus a March of Time newsreel, Norwayin Revolt; My Life is Yours, with Lew Ayres as Dr Kildare, had a
special first half showing Australia Prepares (‘a good chance for comparison with ours’), U-boats in the Atlantic, Moscow and Odessa,
and the AIF facing Japs in Malaya. In the large Civic theatre was
Dive Bomber, in colour with Errol Flynn, ‘the Allies’ answer to the
devastation of Pearl Harbour … hell-diving heroes of the air and
the girls whose hearts fly with them.’
NZ Herald, 14 Feb 42, p. 14
Business enterprise was carrying on. At Wellington in the Wainuiomata Valley private enterprise was developing a new housing
scheme: 16 houses had already been built and there was talk of
space on the flat for 5000 homes.
Dominion, 26 Feb 42, p. 2
There were also advertisements
such as: ‘Can you spare an hour? Time is precious these days what
with war work and additional domestic cares. But one owes it to
oneself, as well as one’s family and friends to keep up personal
appearances …’ with an hour a week at James Smith’s beauty salon
for cleansing, rejuvenating facials and lustre-restoring hair treatment.
Ibid., 20 Feb 42, p. 3
And again, ‘Morale is a woman’s business. The way you
look affects so many people … a woman’s beauty stands for courage,
serenity, a gallant heart. But you’ve less time to spend on beauty
care, so learn to make the most of it. Come to Milne and Choyce
….’
Auckland Star, 26 Feb 42
Another advertisement, for National Savings, asked: ‘Would you
rather pull your weight in the country’s war effort or pull a rickshaw?’ It showed a farmer-type New Zealander jogging in the shafts
before a gross, bemedalled Japanese officer, while two soldiers, with
rifles and bayonets, grinned in the background.
Dominion, 29 Jan 42, p. 7; Evening Post, 5 Feb 42, p. 12
This drew protest
from the Dunedin Manufacturers’ Association as more likely to lower
morale than to strengthen it, ‘as it presented a picture no New
Zealander would visualise or tolerate’.
Evening Post, 14 Feb 42, p. 8
Probably the most widespread feeling was that, though things
were bad, they were bound to get better because the Allies had both
might and right on their side; not the might of surprise and swift
blows, but the massive strength of America, once it got into its war
stride, plus the redoubtable Russians and the tough Chinese. ‘We
must hang on and do the best we can till the tide turns’ might sum
it up.
Evening Star, 7 Feb 42, p. 7; Dominion, 14 Feb 42; Evening Post, 7 Mar 42, p. 6
The Wanganui Herald on 4 March remarked, ‘The war
mood of a large portion of the public of New Zealand may be said
to range between lively apprehension of imminent catastrophe and
near apathy, according to the tone of the latest news. Observers have
not noted a general line of thought on the war, except that it will
probably be won by the Allies “somehow and sometime”.’
In talk and in newspapers people debated whether Japan would
invade New Zealand. Some said that Australia and all the islands
north of it would have to be taken first, others saw New Zealand
as an early target, a base for cutting United States–Australia communications. Some said that New Zealand was too remote and,
lacking oil, minerals and rice, of no use to the Japanese; others held
that even mutton would not deter them.
eg, Dominion, 9, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17 Feb 42, pp. 6, 8, 8, 8, 6, 6; Auckland Star,
11 Feb 42, p. 6; Star–Sun, 11 Feb 42, p. 4
The long pause at Rabaul,
the thrust through Burma, showed that Japan was not coming our
way, argued some;
NZ Herald, 14 Apr, 4 May 42
others said that this was merely wishful
thinking.
Dominion, 7 Mar 42, 11 Apr 42, p. 8; Press, 14 May 42
Diagnosing the errors of Malaya—accepted as lack of forceful
leadership, staff work and knowledge of the country, lack of vigorous
training for actual combat and of skilful, resolute use of the men
and material available—produced anxiety to avoid similar errors in
New Zealand. There were proposals that Territorial training should
be overhauled, that officers should hold rank on their present merit,
not on seniority, and preferably should be less than 45 years old;
that repelling of invasion should be strenuously rehearsed.
Auckland Star, 7, 24, 25, 26 Mar 42, pp. 6, 4, 6, 6; Truth, 29 Apr 42, p. 11
There
were many references to Major-General Bennett,
Bennett, Lieutenant-General Henry Gordon, CB, CMG, DSO, VD (1887–1962): b Aust;
cmdr 2nd Div Aust Military Forces 1926–31, 8th Div AIF 1940–2, 3rd Aust Corps
1942–4; GOC Aust Imp Force Malaya 1941–2
who had emerged
from Malaya with a fighting reputation and who urged new ways
of war, believing that every Australian was a natural guerrilla. There
were wishes that New Zealand’s military leaders would be as outspoken. ‘We have plenty of drab radio talks from politicians but
when it comes to defence matters we want to hear direct from the
men whose job it is’, wrote one newspaper correspondent; another:
‘We all want to hear from our military leaders. Sunday night radio
soporifics are not good enough for martial times.’
Dominion, 7, 8 Apr 42, pp. 3, 6
Truth, comparing
talks by Bennett and Fraser, repeated that people would rather hear
from the heads of the fighting services than from politicians.
Truth, 11 Mar 42, p. 13
There was complaint that the public did not know what was
going on, Parliament’s secret sessions and the time spent on trifles
drew comment.
NZ Herald, 13 Feb 42; Auckland Star, 17 Feb 42; Press, 17 Feb 42
A cartoon by Minhinnick showed Fraser outside
a door labelled ‘Parliament. Secret session as usual’, saying ‘Tell you
what I’ll do—I’ll let you look through the keyhole for a few minutes, but I’ll have to keep the key in!’
NZ Herald, 6 Mar 42; Evening Star, 20 Mar 42
At the same time the
spreading of rumours, many derived from enemy broadcasts, was
reproved by mayors, editors and others.
Evening Post, 17 Feb 42, p. 5 (warning from Tojo on useless war); Dominion, 21, 24,
25 Feb, 2, 5 Mar, 4 Apr 42, pp. 8, 4, 7, 6, 6, 6; Evening Star, 27 Feb, 19 Mar 42;
Auckland Star, 21 Feb, 7 Mar 42, pp. 6, 6; NZ Herald, 24 Feb, 3 Mar 42, pp. 4, 6
On 3 March, W. E. Barnard, reproving rumour-mongers as ‘dangerously silly people’, said
that disturbing hearsay reports flew about because the authorities
did not sufficiently take the community into their confidence. Secret
sessions were necessary but afterwards more information should be
given. In England there were secret sessions but also Churchill openly
reviewed the whole field of the war, members could criticise and
their criticisms were reported in the press. He thought that New
Zealand radio should discredit Tokyo’s misrepresentations and use
a wide range of speakers in whom the public had confidence: Coates,
the only ex-soldier in the War Cabinet, seldom spoke on the air,
and J. A. Lee also had military experience.
Dominion, 4 Mar 42, p. 8
The Wanganui Herald,
on 4 March, endorsing this, said that the country sometimes seemed
‘a huge whispering gallery’. The Press said that Parliament had almost
ceased to inform the public, while the official Publicity Department
was better called non-existent than incompetent.
Press, 4 Mar 42
Minhinnick’s cartoon ‘Moths flourish in the dark’ showed a dismal-faced Home
Guardsman Fraser taking tattered trousers, ‘Public Confidence’, from
a box labelled ‘Secret Sessions Complex’ amid a cloud of moths
called ‘Rumour’, ‘Enemy Radio’ and ‘Axis Lies’.
NZ Herald, 4 Mar 42; Evening Star, 11 Mar 42
Dr D. G.
McMillan MP complained that this cartoon was subversive and that
for purely personal and political reasons certain newspapers were
trying to undermine the government.
NZPD, vol 261, p. 112
Government publicity, fearful of informing the enemy, relied much
on broadcasts and statements by ministers from material more soothing than informative, prepared by departments. These repeatedly
assured that the government was coping with the situation and doing
everything possible. They were in generalised terms without many
concrete examples, and often had a party-politics flavour: Webb,
Minister of Labour, spoke of taking off his hat to various industrial
workers who were toiling like Trojans, even while strikes in meat
works and stoppages in coal mines were disconcerting the public.
No New Zealand ministers worked on their speeches as Churchill
worked on his. They relied on their natural style, which did not
match the war situation, and the public waited in vain for words
that would fill them with strong confidence and purpose. Months
earlier the Press had deplored that ministers did badly what an
announcer could be left to do well, seizing all occasions instead of
choosing essential ones, ‘and they alone, it seems, do not know how
commonplace and wearisome they have made them.’
Press, 4 Nov 41
There was a flare-up of political discontent. Sidney Holland again
pressed for coalition, backed in this by allies such as the Farmers’
Union executive, which also called for the complete abolition of
racing in wartime.
Ibid., 28 Feb 42, p. 8
There were murmurs against the 40-hour week,
although regulations at Christmas time had made overtime much
cheaper. The NZRSA, which perceived that Fraser had the strongest
and coolest head in the field, was making its representations not
through public meetings but directly to government for a broadbased war administration. These representations, secretly submitted
to RSA branches on 23 March, were the starting-point of negotiations that produced a re-organised and enlarged war administration
on 24 June 1942.
Wood, pp. 231–5, 237–8
There was again the odd call for leadership, linked often with
demands for weapons. What, asked the Dominion on 16 February,
would each and every one do to help should there be an attack?
Some were guarding vital points or watching the coast, some preparations were being made; but the great mass of the public seemed
only vaguely conscious of its danger and of individual responsibility.
New Zealand needed someone with the passion of Mr Sumners
Sumners, Hatton W. (1875–1962): US Congressman 1913–47
calling on the United States Congress to rouse the nation to its
danger: ‘“My God, are we going to let the hope of the ages perish
from this earth because of our own unworthiness, and because, like
France, we insist upon business as usual?”’
Dominion, 16 Feb 42, also 18, 21, 26 Feb 42, pp. 6, 8, 7 (letters); Auckland Star,
17 Feb, 7 Mar 42
An article in the
Dominion remarked on the lack of urgency: ‘Time seemingly is
thought to be on our side—tons of it. We still find time to argue
about hours and wages, time to walk out of a coalmine because
somebody might get wet, time for weekend sport much as usual,
time for a not-too-quick one after a not-too-heavy day’s work.’
Everywhere was a deadening sense of frustration. ‘We want to be
fired with a flaming zeal to be up and doing. We want to be taken
more fully into the Government’s confidence on how each of us
individually can help in a positive way to confront these Japanese.’
Emphasis was on passive defence, on EPS, which was coming to
mean Everyone Play Safe and was eroding the fighting spirit.
The talk everywhere goes like this: ‘Have you dug a trench’?—
‘Do you keep your bath full?’—‘Have you laid in a week’s provisions?’ … Is that all a country with the traditions of Gallipoli,
the Somme, Crete, Libya has to talk about at an hour such as
this? … We want, Mr. Prime Minister, to be roused with words
and acts that are positive…. The real but dormant spirit of New
Zealand is a fighting spirit. We want to give these insolent Japanese a run for their yen that they’ll have cause to remember. That
spirit can be stimulated by giving us something active to do and
by proclaiming the doctrine of the offensive. Too many people
are wagging their heads in resignation.
Dominion, 7 Mar 42, p. 8
Awareness that Home Guard uniforms, boots, rifles and other equipment were still inadequate sharpened anxiety. What use were men
without weapons? Some urged that the government must demand
aircraft, tanks and guns from Britain and America; some urged that
New Zealanders should contrive their own tools of destruction. Thus
a man complained that for nearly two years he had been trying to
interest the Army in anti-tank landmines that could be made by
thousands in any foundry; ‘official dry rot is not confined to Malaya
…. It seems the army slogan is “Civilians, keep out.”’
Auckland Star, 2 Feb, 13 Mar 42, pp. 4, 4
A prominent member of the Chamber of Commerce, M. G. C. McCaul,
McCaul, Michael Graham Cox (1883–1975): INZEF; Pres Wgtn Chamber Commerce
1935–6; Pres Assoc Chambers Commerce 1936–7; member Town Planning Institute NZ
1937–41; trustee NZ Employers’ Federation 1937–53; hon Trade Commissioner for
South Africa in NZ 1951
complained in several newspapers about preoccupation with slit
trenches and protection for civilians; people must insist on an efficient, adequate Army, complete with tanks and aircraft, or share the
blame for wilful blindness and complacency.
Auckland Star, 11 Feb 42, p. 6; Dominion, 12 Feb 42, p. 8
The Auckland Chamber of Commerce urged the government to strengthen the Home
Guard and see that local manufacture of arms and equipment
increased.
Auckland Star, 12 Mar 42, p. 8
This feeling crystallised in the ‘Awake New Zealand’ movement.
At Hamilton late in February the Home Guard commander, Major
T. H. Melrose,
Melrose, Major Thomas Harrison (d 1952aet 66): cmdr Home Guard Hamilton WWII
launched a campaign to arouse civilians to more
active and belligerent defence. He spoke of Cromwell, the obscure
farmer who raised an ‘iron army’, of stubborn Boer commandos, of
Yugoslav resisters and Russian guerrillas. He urged a Home Guard
vastly increased, with red tape thrown away and ingenuity rampant.
Its men must have weapons, from sharpened slashers to flame-throwers, bombs, trench mortars and any destructive devices that could
be contrived with the materials and machine-tools locally available.
Awake New Zealand’ articles in Waikato Times, 20, 23, 24, 26 Feb 42; reprinted as
a pamphlet, Sound the Tocsin; NZ Herald, 3 Mar 42, p. 6
A Hamilton businessman, P. O. Bonham,
Bonham, P. O. (d 1961aet 56): b Aust, to NZ early 1920s; prominent in farming
circles in the Waikato for more than 30 years
promised to give £200
and would raise £1,000 within a month; by 16 March donations
totalled £2,250.
Evening Post, 5 Mar 42, p. 5; Evening Star, 16 Mar 42, p. 4
The readiness of some people to respond to such
a movement was suggested by a letter in the Dominion from a woman
who wanted weapons and assurance that New Zealand would never
surrender, recalling Churchill’s Dunkirk promise to fight on the
beaches and the hills. ‘There are hundreds of women living alone,
carrying on farm work, business, etc., who have gladly dug their
own slit trench; some are first class shots, but their only weapon of
defence against paratroops is the wood axe…. Give the women
weapons, they can fight. The Japanese will never have the chance
to take the women and children alive.’
Dominion, 21 Feb 42, p. 8
On 11 March came the British government’s revelations of Japanese atrocities at Hong Kong: of British soldiers bound and bayoneted, of women both European and Asian raped and murdered, of
prisoners crowded into insanitary, dysentry-ridden camps. These horrors, reinforced by others from the capture of Nanking in 1937, had
a good deal of prominence. The Auckland Star in an inflammatory
special article urged every man and woman to get some weapon,
practise with it, and die fighting: ‘to die of a hot, sharp twisting
bayonet plunge through the belly, when trussed like a fatted rooster,
would not be as good a death as being shot in half by a tommygun…. Put the wind up our women so that they will die fighting
like cats rather than painfully and lingeringly of an Eastern disease
….’ There should be Molotov cocktails to fling at the invaders
and one for the final explosion that would leave no wife or screaming
child to suffer. ‘Stop thinking you are too fat, too old, too comfortable, too superior! Join the Home Guard! Push your husband
out the front door and send him running to join it….’ All who
could should get a rifle and learn to use it. Maybe the Americans
would be here to prevent disaster, maybe they would not. ‘Remember the barbarities of Hong Kong and get ready to fight and to die
fighting.’
Auckland Star, 12 Mar 42, p. 6; another article on the women’s page stressed the message
that there were no nice Japanese.
The Standard printed ‘a stark exposure of the barbarous atrocities
which have been the stock-in-trade of the Japanese army’, stressing
that the bayoneting and raping at Hong Kong could be repeated in
New Zealand. ‘Fight, work and save as never before. We are in the
battle zone and the victory must be ours … or else.’
Standard, 19, 26 Mar 42, pp. 6, 1
All this fanned the ‘Awake New Zealand’ movement which,
blessed by the RSA and the Chamber of Commerce but without
political bias, had spread through the Waikato and sprung up in
distant places. It sought to kindle a spiritual fighting force within
people and to make both public and government aware of the urgent
need for total war, with every fit man trained to fight, all factories
and workshops fully engaged on arms and equipment, and people
roused to individual action without waiting for compulsion by the
government.
Press, 17 Mar 42, p. 6
Reports from some small towns gave grass-root detail. At Te
Aroha a meeting of 600 people recorded emphatic protest at the
long failure of the authorities to arm and equip the Home Guard,
and subscribed £491, calling on people to act for themselves, to
support Major Melrose’s movement, and to improvise weapons. Hand
grenades from Hamilton were shown and 5000 of them were to be
the first step, a local firm setting up half its workshop for this purpose.
Auckland Star, 19 Mar 42, p. 5; Wanganui Herald, 20 Mar 42, p. 4
At Te Kuiti, on similar lines, a crowd of 500 subscribed
nearly £400.
Auckland Star, 19 Mar 42, p. 5
A Rotorua meeting on 22 March donated more than
£1,000 and was told of the keenness at Hamilton: a group of Te
Pahu farmers had offered to come to town three days a week to
make munitions; other farmers, some with trade skills acquired before
going on the land, had offered to work on munitions at night and
between milkings; it had been suggested that as butter was now less
important some factories should close and calves be left to run with
the cows till the next season, freeing farmers and dairy factory workers for training or war work.
Ibid., 23 Mar 42, p. 6
By 20 March Levin had raised £800
and its signalling equipment, and hand-grenade throwers and trench
mortars, locally made from scrap, were approved at Foxton.
Dominion, 20 Mar 42, p. 8
What was probably a fairly typical course of activity occurred at
Hastings. On 9 March a ‘rally for unity’ meeting called for the
honouring of Fraser’s promise of universal service, with all fit men
trained in arms and all women’s organisations directed to war activities. A week later the Hastings Chamber of Commerce urged a
national government, publicity to combat subversion and defeatist
rumours, and support for ‘Awake New Zealand’.
Evening Post, 18 Mar 42, p. 4
A Hawke’s Bay
Weapons Council was organised and it speedily made contact with
both the Army and the Home Guard, examined the possibilities of
a local engineering workshop, and sent to Hamilton for drawings
and samples of weapons.
Dominion, 21 Mar 42, p. 10
There was an immediate start on making
camouflage nets and suits, staple-drawers from old rasps and Molotov cocktail belts from sugar bags. A member of the War Weapons
Council, Mrs J. R. Stevenson, told a meeting of women that the
Japanese wanted to frighten people from their homes. They should
‘stay put’ and fight if necessary—‘a broken beer bottle would make
an excellent weapon.’
Evening Post, 27 Mar 42, p. 8
In fact, weapon-making remained simple.
Truth, six months later, commenting on Hawke’s Bay zeal, told of
knuckle-dusters and daggers made from old car springs, of 100
staple-drawers, 50 camouflage suits and thousands of camouflage
nets for helmets and trenches, many made by Maoris from green
flax.
Truth, 28 Oct 42, p. 16
At Auckland on 7 March, Brian Kingston, prominent in the
National Service movement
See p. 98
that had been suppressed in June 1940,
called a meeting at which speakers from Hamilton urged all-in effort.
Kingston himself said that while the government had done well in
many ways, such expressions of public feeling might encourage it
to require stronger effort towards improving defences. There were
resolutions demanding the immediate mobilisaton of a citizen army
and of industrial resources to equip it, speeded by a moratorium on
rents, interest, etc.
NZ Herald, 9 Mar 42, p. 6
A few days later at a larger Auckland meeting
with locally-made weapons displayed on the platform, Mayor Allum
Allum, Sir John, Kt(’50), CBE(’46) (1889–1972): b London; Auck City Council from
1920; Mayor Auckland 1941–53; 30 years Pres Auckland Free Kindergarten Assn
called for shoulder-to-shoulder effort, with all feelings of politics,
class or creed set aside, saying that the Prime Minister joined him
in approval of the people’s desire to take part in the defence of their
city. Trade unions advocated production councils, Auckland engineers had already set up a special committee to bring all facts forward and there was stirring talk of citizens’ defence in all aspects.
The Mayor, again stressing government approval, thereafter set up
a committee to consider local defence matters and to improve war
production, inviting communications from all citizens or manufacturers with constructive proposals.
Auckland Star, 18, 21 Mar 42, pp. 5, 8; In Print, 25 Mar 42
An example of weapon-making may be given. One R. Mackrell
of the EPS demolition squad at Onehunga, a handy man with tools,
was asked to make a mortar of the type widely used by the Home
Guard in Britain. By the end of February he and his helpers were
making about 12 mortars a week out of the 2½-inch piping used
in refrigeration plants. The mortar had a spade grip by which it
could be dug into the ground, and as it weighed only about 161b
it could be carried by one man, with a second man carrying its
bombs, which were being made by the same group.
NZ Herald, 25 Feb, 12 Mar 42, pp. 9, 9
Major Melrose
decided that these could be made at Hamilton and by mid-April
the Mayor of Hamilton had presented its Home Guard with eight
trench mortars, plus ammunition and an auxiliary trailer from the
research members of ‘Awake New Zealand’.
Ibid., 26 Feb, 13 Apr 42, pp. 8, 6
There was less activity at Wellington, seat of government. However, a Lower Hutt meeting of about 150 persons, ‘where the loudest
voices got the best hearing’, criticised many things—the public’s
ignorance of the running of the war and of the need for complete
mobilisation, the faults of ministers, race-day trains and vegetable
supplies—and resolved to support the government in a total war
effort mobilising every fit man and woman.
Evening Post, 17 Mar 42, p. 4
In the South Island
there were a few scattered outbreaks: Oamaru’s Borough Council,
speaking of the need for national awakening, for quadrupled munitions and longer hours, called a public meeting.
Press, 13 Mar 42, p. 4
Gore on 24 March
launched its ‘Awake New Zealand’ campaign by subscribing £1,000
at one meeting.
Ibid., 25 Mar 42, p. 6
The ‘Awake New Zealand’ movement was eyed askance by many.
Inevitably, its drive for do-it-yourself defence implied criticism of
government action or inaction. The sensitive Standard complained
of irresponsible politically-motivated criticism of the government’s
defence preparations by Holland and others who did not know what
was being done: ‘Mass meetings and resolutions are not going to
help defend this country.’
Standard, 19 Mar 42, p. 6, also 19, 26 Feb 42, pp. 6, 11
The Labour member for Invercargill,
W. Denham,
Denham, William Mortimer Clarence (1887–1969): b Aust, to NZ 1907; connected
with Labour movt from 1916; Pres Invercargill branch Lab party; MP (Lab) Invercargill
1935–46; Invercargill Borough Council from 1921
wanted the Prime Minister to explain that the criticism, far from being valuable and constructive, was querulous, fretful and might play into the hands of the enemy.
Press, 18 Mar 42, p. 6
Truth suggested
that the campaign’s munitions proposals encroached on areas that
could be run only by the government.
Truth, 18 Mar 42, p. 13
R. H. Nimmo, no Labour
party man, and a pillar of the Chamber of Commerce which in
some areas endorsed the ‘Awake’ campaign, wanted caution before
criticism of the war effort. After visiting military camps he believed
that the government had done a very good job and Service chiefs
were experts, with information that the public would not have.
Evening Post, 18 Mar 42, p. 4
Wisely, Fraser accepted assurances from Hamilton that the movement’s belligerence was not directed at the government and he went
there himself to strengthen the alignment. On 30 March, after seven
hours with delegates from the Waikato, Bay of Plenty, Rotorua and
the King Country, Fraser declared that he had enjoyed every minute
of his day, and that it was a splendid movement, an inspiring example
of democracy.
Ibid., 31 Mar 42, p. 8
The Standard meanwhile trimmed its course,
explaining on 26 March that while well informed public opinion
was of tremendous value in a war, it was most difficult for the
government to decide where publicity should end and censorship
begin. The ‘Awake’ agitation showed the result of saying too little;
the government could have given more publicity to what had been
done but it had preferred to work and not talk. ‘The lesson to be
learned from the recent campaign is that governments cannot afford
to hide their lights under a bushel.’
Standard, 26 Mar 42, p. 6
In mid-April the movement spread to Taranaki, beginning with
Inglewood’s County Council.
NZ Herald, 15 Apr 42, p. 6
By the end of May Bonham, chairman at Hamilton, had toured Taranaki, finding keen interest and
a great deal being done for the Home Guard, ‘in fact, more had
been done there than in the Waikato, and several Taranaki schemes
would be submitted to the Hamilton Battalion for adoption.’
Ibid., 27 May 42, p. 5
Early in May, ‘Awake’ began at Whangarei, where £550 was subscribed within a fortnight.
Ibid., 4, 16 May 42, pp. 6, 8
At about the same time, advertisements
from Hamilton proclaimed that New Zealand was unmistakeably
faced with invasion, that thousands had banded themselves together
‘to Awaken this country to a sense of its danger, to the need for
the sacrifice by all, and to see that offensive weapons are manufactured to the limit by the full utilisation of all untapped resources’,
and that growth had been such that it was lately decided to launch
a nation-wide campaign asking all organisations and persons actively
to support the movement, so that all New Zealanders, with God’s
powerful help, would stand four-square against the real and terrible
danger.
Ibid., 11 May 42, p. 2
By this time the Prime Minister was becoming a little dubious.
His Waikato friends, he said, had started out with excellent ideas
and he had hoped that their efforts would be confined to the Waikato where good work was being done in a particular way; he had
the highest respect for those behind the movement, of which he
would express no opinion, though he thought it was well intentioned; time could not be wasted squabbling and the best way to
win the war was to get whole-heartedly behind the war effort.
Hawera Star, 21 May 42
Also, by this time the Director of Publicity (J. T. Paul), close
behind whom stood the Prime Minister, and Army were giving more
information. Articles in the Auckland Star from 2 to 16 May told
of the arming of the North, and on 17 May Puttick told the nation
clearly, if not with the flair of MacArthur or Bennett, that New
Zealand’s defence had come a long way in a hurry, that there had
been need to keep quiet about it at first, but now the Army could
afford to be less hush-hush about its achievements.
The ‘Awake’ stir was not profound. Although some people who
envisaged invasion set strenuous words reverberating and fired some
others with their vision, only small free-lance ardours of preparation
ensued. The sums collected provided many Home Guardsmen with
useful gear such as groundsheets and haversacks, but could do little
for weapons. There were limits to the explosives that could be manufactured by amateurs with safety to the users, the Army was cautious
about accepting them, and regular weapons were gradually coming.
The real depth of the movement may be measured by the fact that
in April 1942 regulations compulsorily transferred more than 25 000
men from EPS to the Home Guard where needed, although in some
areas the Guard was already at full strength.
Even in these worst months the news was not all bad, discreetly
managed to make the best of it. Frequently a Russian thrust countered the impact of Japanese advance. Thus on 7 January the NewZealand Herald’s single column ‘Push South still Continuing,
Malayan Fighting, New Landings made’ was quite eclipsed by its
large-lettered ‘Rapidity of Advance, Within Reach of Kharkov,
Progress in Crimea’. On 13 January, with ‘Balaclava Captured’, the
Japanese occupation of Kuala Lumpur looked less ominous; on 16
February when the fall of Singapore had central place on every cable
page, the Evening Post also drew attention to ‘Sweeping Advances,
Russians nearing old Polish Border’. Again, on 11 March, ‘Awful
Atrocities at Hongkong’ and ‘Australia’s Danger is Graver Daily’
(with the third Japanese landing in New Guinea) were balanced by
the headings, ‘Havoc in Ruhr, Intense RAF Raid’ and ‘Kharkov
Surrounded on Three Sides, More Russian Gains’.
Auckland Star, 11 Mar 42, p. 7
In war, besides giving information, the task of news media is to
maintain morale and hopefulness along with enough alarm and
urgency to induce lively effort. Bad news which was obviously fully
known to the enemy, like the sinking of the Prince of Wales and
Repulse, was promptly admitted; where such news was obscure, or
might give information to the enemy, its release was often officially
delayed,
See p. 361
as in the Java Sea battle, and would sometimes then
appear beside some more cheering reports. The balanced presentation
of good and bad, as instanced above, could preserve morale while
presenting sad facts, and by logical extension of this process good
news could be inflated by various means such as multiple reports,
optimism, and the plain difficulty of aircrew and seamen in knowing
how much damage was achieved. In some cases, inflation could
almost amount to invention. A notable example was the Battle of
Makassar Strait, which provided much-needed relief in the bad last
week of January 1942.
On 21 January about 16 Japanese transports were escorted from
Tarakan (on the north-east coast of Borneo, taken on 11 January)
south towards the oil port, Balikpapan. Dutch aircraft sank one in
the afternoon of the 23rd, and another the next day. Shortly before
dawn on the 24th four American destroyers, sent to make a night
attack, found the convoy anchored off Balikpapan, both silhouetted
and veiled by the burning oil field. The first torpedo fired by the
Americans confused the Japanese commander who took his destroyers out into the strait to search for submarines, leaving the transports
unguarded. The Americans sank four transports and a patrol boat
that night; three days later the aircraft tender Sanuki Maru, the most
valuable ship hit off Balikpapan, was severely damaged by
bombers.
Morison, vol III, p. 290. That destruction was not greater was probably due to many
torpedoes being faulty, as they proved to be elsewhere at that time, and to others not
running true in the shallow water, plus the high speed of the destroyers, the close range
and the confusion of night attack.
Strategically, the Japanese claim that their advance was not halted
for even a day was correct, but it was a gallant and skilful effort,
the first United States naval surface strike in the Pacific, and it was
very warmly received by a nation hungry for news of action and
victory.
Ibid.; Kirby, S. Woodburn, The War Against Japan, vol I, p. 297
America was not alone in this hunger. In New Zealand,
overseas communiqués and foreign correspondents’ reports raised a
lofty edifice of destruction, buttressed by appreciative editorials.
On 28 January the New Zealand Herald proclaimed ‘Greatest Sea
Victory of the War, Over 50 Ships Sent to the Bottom’, some being
ocean liners each probably carrying 3000 men. The Auckland Star
editorial said that the over-confident Japanese, in sending their convoy into the Strait, had made perhaps the biggest blunder of the
war. The Press was heartened by the first considerable offset to the
depressing talk of Japanese success, showing that American ships
and aircraft were out in the Pacific and capable of vigorous offensive
action. Most papers on 30 January quoted the statement by the
Batavian correspondent of the Daily Mail that the battle was emerging as the greatest sea action since Jutland, against an armada bent
on the invasion of Java. Makassar Strait was soon dropped from the
headlines thereafter but small references maintained the idea of success. Thus on 14 February most papers reported Lord Halifax
Wood, Edward Frederick Lindley, 1st Earl of Halifax (’44), 3rd Viscount Halifax
(1881–1959): British statesman; Viceroy India 1926–31; Sec State Foreign Aff
1938–40; Ambassador Washington 1941–6
at
Washington saying, ‘What happened at Macassar foreshadows what
the Allies will be able to do when their air and naval strength is
built up, and that is coming as surely as night follows day.’ The
Dominion’s ‘Background of the War’ column on 2 March spoke of
such actions ‘draining away the life blood of Japan’s striking power’.
The theme of naval success was sustained on 2 February by Admiral Halsey’s
Halsey, Fleet Admiral William Frederick, USN (1882–1959): cmdr Allied Naval Forces
South Pacific 1942–4, US 3rd Fleet, Pacific1944–5
surprise attacks on the Marshall Islands, bombing
and shelling Japanese installations, aircraft and shipping, for the loss
of 11 aircraft. Initial reports were brief, but they built up the idea
of United States naval activity and of checks to Japan. Thus the
Auckland Star on 3 February saw ‘a gleam in the darkness; up to
the battle of Macassar Strait the Japanese did all the harrying in the
Pacific. They received their first serious check there, and during the
week-end they have had another.’ The New Zealand Herald said
that naval initiative, far more important than any tally of material
loss inflicted, was no longer with the enemy; the American Pacific
Fleet had begun to assert itself. In mid-February under headings
such as ‘Bases razed’, ‘Devastating raid’, more details were released
by Washington, naming the islands and listing the destruction of
38 aircraft, four radio stations and 16 ships, including a 17 000 ton
converted aircraft-carrier, two large submarines and a modern cruiser.
Post-war reckoning showed that actual damage was slight, but
American naval historian S. E. Morison wrote: ‘It would not be fair
to judge this raid by the meager material results’; it provided valuable combat experience, the over-optimistic reports of damage helped
morale, and the audacity of Halsey in striking at Japanese territory
gave his country its first naval hero of the war.
Morison, vol III, pp. 264–5; Kirby, vol II, p. 224
In the New Zealand
press, too, there were repeated references to the brilliance of the
Marshall Islands action. Scholefield’s private diary on 13 February
1942 noted the balance of news. ‘The story from B.B.C. today discloses the success of the American fleet’s cruise across the Pacific,
and comes just in time to be a counterpoise to the depression about
the fate of Singapore and the sticky condition of Libya. Washington
released its story of smashing visits to Pacific groups just about the
time when B.B.C. told us about the dash of the heavy ships from
Brest.’
On the other hand, Allied sources and New Zealand newspapers
fully admitted their worst sea loss at this period when, between 27
February and 1 March, the Allied fleet was almost wiped out in the
Java Sea, while the Japanese, with air support, more cohesion and
better use of torpedoes, did not lose a fighting ship, though some
were damaged and four transports sunk.
Morison, vol III, pp. 357–8
On Saturday 28 February, evening papers said that a big battle was raging. By Monday
reports were confused: one claimed an Allied victory but said that
details were lacking; others suggested substantial losses by both sides.
In most papers headlines announced multiple landings on Java and
some, such as Dunedin’s Evening Star, published Tokyo’s ‘familiar
exorbitant claims’ to have ‘virtually annihilated’ the Allied fleet,
including five cruisers and six destroyers. Not much more was heard
about this battle till 16 March when all papers carried the Admiralty
communiqué listing 13 Allied warships sunk—five cruisers, seven
destroyers and a sloop—complete with names, guns and tonnages.
Editorial comment varied. ‘Battle lost, prestige redeemed’, stated
the Evening Post.
Evening Post, 16 Mar 42
The Auckland Star paid tribute to gallant men
but found the situation ominous. Japan’s naval supremacy in the
whole area must now be overwhelming and unless American and
British ships were speedily transferred to the Pacific, Japan would
have alarming freedom of movement. Australia’s Prime Minister had
lately renewed appeals to the United States for weapons, and it was
hoped that Fraser was doing likewise.
Auckland Star, 16 Mar 42
The Press squarely acknowledged a disaster: the squadron had failed in its desperate attempt
to break up the Java invasion force and was itself trapped; if Japan
should immediately invade Australia there would be little naval
opposition. But this heavy loss should be viewed against the total
losses of the Japanese war: American experts believed that half of
Japan’s total cruiser strength had been sunk or put out of action.
Press, 16 Mar 42
The theme of Japanese naval losses, with special mention of cruisers, had been popular, especially between 14 and 16 February and
21 and 23 February, and it was sustained in later reports.
Dominion, 2 Mar 42, p. 5; Evening Star, 21 Mar 42, p. 7; Evening Post, 23 May 42, p. 5
Post-war reckonings were different. Japan’s victories up to mid-April were
‘accomplished without the loss of a single major warship; except for
4 destroyers the Japanese fleet remained intact. It was an astonishing
achievement.’
Kirby, vol II, p. 226
On 8 March the Japanese easily landed in New Guinea, at Lae
and Salamaua. The American carriers Yorktown and Lexington were
in the area, intending an attack on Rabaul, but Admiral Brown
Brown, Vice-Admiral Wilson, USN (1882–1957): cmdr Scouting Force Pacific Fleet
1941; aide to Pres Roosevelt 1943
decided to strike instead at the new landings before they were
consolidated. On 10 March, from the Gulf of Papua, 104 aircraft
took off, crossed the Owen Stanley Range at a 7500 ft pass, found
plenty of shipping off Lae and Salamaua, and ‘the aviators had a
field day “remembering Pearl”,’ with only one aircraft lost.
Morison, vol III, pp. 388–9
As
they left, Army aircraft from Townsville struck again. This double
blow provided the most stimulating day yet in Allied air operations
rooms and Roosevelt, in a message to Churchill, called it the most
cheering thing in the Pacific so far.
Gillison, Douglas, The Royal Australian Air Force 1939–42, p. 456
According to Morison, the
usual over-optimistic reports of ships sunk or damaged were discounted at naval headquarters because Army Liberator aircraft from
Townsville next day found everything still afloat; ‘but a check-up
after the war showed that the carrier planes had sunk a large minesweeper, a 6000-ton freighter and a 8600-ton converted light
cruiser.’
Morison, vol III, p. 389
This knowledge was for much later. On 19 March, hard after the
desolating news of the Java Sea, came a United States naval communiqué, without any dates, announcing that American and Australian aircraft had smashed a Japanese invasion fleet, concentrated
near Lae and Salamaua, with 12 warships, two of them heavy cruisers, among the 23 sunk or damaged. The naval losses off Java had
been offset in a dramatic manner.
Dominion, 20 Mar 42, p. 5
Editors rejoiced.
There were frequent reports of growing Allied air power, battering
at Rabaul, the main southern base, at Gasmata, Lae, Salamaua, and
Timor centres, and destroying Japanese aircraft, while the defenders
of Darwin, Wyndham and Port Moresby greeted their attackers with
fierce salvoes. ‘It might not be long before the Allies’ aerial offensive
north of Australia becomes an aerial crusade to drive the enemy
from his scattered holdings in the Pacific islands’, the Auckland Star
on 9 April quoted from the Sydney Morning Herald; Allied air power
was increasing daily, while the enemy’s was shrinking; in a month
at least 157 Japanese aircraft had been destroyed or seriously damaged between Timor and New Britain. ‘Don’t be over-depressed by
news from outside,’ advised the Allied air chief, Lieutenant-General
G. Brett,
Brett, Lieutenant-General George H. (1886–1963): USAF from 1915; Dep Supreme
Cmdr SW Pacific Jan–Mar 1942; cmdr all US troops in AustraliaMar 1942; C-in-C
Allied Air Forces in Australia1942
in the news of 11 April. ‘In the air we are belting the
Jap and belting him hard.’
Auckland Star, 11 Apr 42, p. 7
On 20 April 1942 bold headlines—‘Bombs on Japanese Cities’,
‘Tokyo Admits Air Raid’—hailed Japanese reports of bombs on
schools and hospitals in Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya and Kōbe.
American silence was rightly taken as evidence that the raiders came
from carriers. This was confirmed by Washington on 11 May, with
accounts of damage, such as some fires burning for two days. On
21 May, when the raid commander, Brigadier-General J. H. Doolittle,
Doolittle, Lieutenant-General James Harold, Hon KCB(’45) (1896–): cmdr US 12th
Air Force North Africa 1942–3, 15th Air Force Mediterranean 1943–4, 8th Air ForceFar East1944–5
was decorated for a brilliant success, its effect on targets was
retold, though there was still silence about the aircrafts’ take-off and
landing. In fact, the strike was a riposte for Pearl Harbour: 16 long-range Army aircraft left the carrier Hornet about 650 miles from
Japan, made their havoc and consternation without being hit, and
flew on west. One crew, landing at Vladivostok, was interned and
later escaped to Persia; the rest crash-landed or baled out over China
and were saved by peasants, only eight of the 80 fliers losing their
lives; three of them were executed by the Japanese for bombing
non-military targets. Savage reprisals were taken against any Chinese
thought to have helped them.
Morton, L., The United States Army in World War II, Strategy and Command: TheFirst Two Years, pp. 269–73
In post-war British evaluation, ‘The
effects of the raid were out of all proportion to the damage inflicted.
It was no more than a nuisance raid but it was spectacular and
daring. It caught the public imagination and gave a tremendous
fillip to American morale which had had little encouragement during
the four previous months.’ In Japan it created alarm for the safety
of the homeland and contributed to determination to attack Midway
Island and draw the American fleet to a show-down.
Kirby, vol II, p. 225
All this, of course, was unknown to New Zealand in April 1942,
but there was firmly grounded feeling that America was coming up
to expectations, had shown skill and strength. In the pause while
Japan concentrated for the invasion of Port Moresby early in May,
Allied aircraft raided Japanese holdings north of Australia and reports
of Japanese air and sea losses continued; correspondents began to
use vague but comfortable phrases about the Allies having wrested
the initiative from Japan. The optimistic General Brett, who stated
‘Everything is now on the up-and-up’, was widely quoted.
NZ Herald, 22 Apr 42, p. 7; Evening Star, 23 Apr 42, p. 7
The battle of the Coral Sea, 5–9 May 1942, was the first check
to Japan’s southward advance. On 3 May the Japanese had landed
unopposed on Tulagi, in the central Solomons, and two days later
seized Deboyne Island off south-east Papua, to gain shore-based air
cover for the invasion of Port Moresby, timed for 10 May. The
Americans were expecting a major move and Admiral Fletcher
Fletcher, Admiral Frank Jack, USN (1885–1973): cmdr Task Forces at battles of Coral
Sea, Midway; cmdr North Pacific Forces, US Fleet 1943–5
heard of the Tulagi landing while his two-carrier force was refuelling
about 500 miles to the south. The carrier Yorktown hurried north,
arriving after the Japanese covering force had withdrawn, and at
Tulagi its aircraft could only cripple a destroyer and sink some small
boats while believing that they had done much more substantial
damage.
A Washington communiqué in mid-June claimed that these aircraft caught the Japanese
forces by surprise and all but annihilated them. A few ships managed to get to sea but
most were severely crippled and some were beached to prevent sinking. This engagement
sank or destroyed 12 Japanese vessels and 6 Japanese aircraft. NZ Herald, 15 Jun 42,
p. 3. At the same time pilots reported by a press correspondent at Honolulu said that
they certainly sank two heavy cruisers, three light cruisers and two destroyers, while
transports and numerous small craft were among possible sinkings. Ibid.
Thereafter the main Japanese and American forces in the
Coral Sea sought each other for two days, during which a United
States tanker and destroyer were sunk. On the morning of 8 May
the opposing carriers, more than 200 miles apart, launched their
aircraft at each other in the first sea battle fought in the air, the
ships themselves not exchanging a shot. Both Yorktown and Lex-ington were hit, the latter more severely, but were still serviceable;
the main Japanese losses were a light carrier sunk, a heavier carrier
damaged and more than 60 of their 100 aircraft destroyed. This left
insufficient air power for the attack on Port Moresby, which was
given up, the Japanese withdrawing northwards. Some hours after
the fight, exploding petrol fumes caused the more damaged Lex-ington to be abandoned in flames, though her men were saved. The
Americans thus had both the heavier shipping loss and the strategic
victory.
Morton, pp. 274–8; Kirby, vol II, p. 228
Ironically, this effective success was received in New Zealand with
more reserve than the papery triumphs of Makassar Strait or Lae.
On Friday 8 May evening papers announced ‘very excellent news’:
eight Japanese ships had been sunk near the Solomon Islands for
the loss of three aircraft. They also told of the fall to Japan of
Corregidor, last fortress of the Philippines, while most of an Arctic
convoy had reached Russia and another had returned to Britain at
the cost of the 10000-ton cruiser HMS Edinburgh.
Evening Post, 8 May 42, p. 5
The Post
reminded that Russian success offered the best hope for an early end
to the war in Europe, and that in the Pacific ‘we must be patient,
we must be prepared to endure. The activity of the United States
navy on the flank of the southward-bound Japanese, as they move
from island to island, and American submarine activity in Asiatic
waters, may cheer us but must not hoodwink us concerning dangers
ahead.’
Ibid., p. 4
Next day, reports of the second stage of the sea battle
added a Japanese aircraft-carrier and a heavy cruiser to those sunk,
with another carrier believed a total loss and a second cruiser badly
damaged. Tokyo was claiming to have sunk two American aircraft-carriers and a battleship, and to have crippled an Australian cruiser
and a British cruiser of the Warspite-class. It seemed, said the NewZealand Herald in a familiar phrase, the greatest naval battle since
Jutland. The American navy had again lessened Japan’s long-range
strength, though an offensive from the Solomons could still be
launched. ‘The Japanese, as they showed in the battle of Macassar
Straits, do not mind suffering heavy initial losses provided they can
achieve ultimate success. On the final outcome of the present engagement may depend the immunity of Australia and New Zealand from
invasion.’
NZ Herald, 9 May 42
The Press remarked on 11 May that neither Canberra nor Washington assumed that the battle was a decisive victory, or that the
threat to Australia and New Zealand and their communications with
the United States had sensibly diminished.
Press, 11 May 42
The Star–Sun, the OtagoDaily Times and the Auckland Star, also on 11 May, believed that
the Japanese had been checked but until it was known what they
had intended, and their real losses, it would be prudent to regard
the battle as indecisive. On 15 and 16 May, in several papers, an
article pointed out that the size of the Japanese force showed the
strength of their outward drive. ‘The enemy’s long arm was not
severed, nor, indeed, paralysed, but the clutching hand was badly
mauled and forced to withdraw. It may well be that the arm will
be strengthened for another blow, but most assuredly the Allied
strength in those waters will be reinforced to meet it.’
Star–Sun, 15 May 42, p. 3, ‘specially written for the NZ Press Association’; also EveningPost, 15 May 42, p. 6, Auckland Star, 15 May 42, p. 5
A week later, the Auckland Star remarked on the impression,
fairly common in New Zealand, that the threat to the whole south-west Pacific was reduced by the Coral Sea battle,
Auckland Star, 21 May 42; Press, 16 May 42, p. 6
but itself maintained a wary note in both news and comment. During May there
was speculation on Japan’s next move. Would the southern drive
continue? Would Japan concentrate on China? Or press through India
to meet the Axis? American intelligence was, correctly, expecting
action in the north Pacific but, to encourage Allied attention elsewhere, late in the month Japanese submarines, carrying four midget
submarines and a reconnaissance aircraft, entered the Tasman. On
the night of 31 May 1942 midgets attacked ships in Sydney harbour,
missing important targets but blowing up a depot vessel on which
about 20 seamen were asleep. Two two-man submarines, destroyed
or scuttled, were recovered from the harbour. Japanese headquarters
claimed, inaccurately but with suitable rejoicings, that HMS War-spite had been destroyed.
Morison, vol IV, pp. 66–8; details in Gill, G. H., Royal Australian Navy 1942–1945,
pp. 61–74
This ‘completely unsuccessful’ raid, which proved that ‘it can
happen here’, made large headlines in New Zealand. During the
next week there were reports of several cargo ships attacked in the
Tasman, two being sunk. Finally, on the night of 8 June 1942,
shells fired from submarines damaged a few houses in both Sydney
and Newcastle. If these actions had not been eclipsed by much
stronger tidings from Midway Island they would doubtless have
raised lively alarm, but in their context they merely showed up the
likelihood of nuisance raiding and caused blackouts to be sharply
intensified. Commenting on this relative calm, the Auckland Star
said that as most people had gained sufficient experience in the ways
of war to judge fairly accurately the significance of enemy actions,
they regarded the shelling of Newcastle and Sydney as ‘curious rather
than important’. The submarines had achieved little beyond showing
their presence and quickening Australian vigilance. The Star thought
that most New Zealanders were mentally prepared for some kind
of attack, if only of the tip-and-run variety, though many others
were still trying to convince themselves that Japan had bigger fish
to fry elsewhere.
Auckland Star, 9 Jun 42
In the first week or so of June, besides submarines in the Tasman,
there was powerful news from several battle theatres. The Royal Air
Force was making its first ‘thousand bomber’ raids, on Cologne and
Essen; in Russia’s black summer of 1942 disaster was striking at
Kharkov and the last agony of heroic Sevastopol was beginning;
Rommel had broken out from Gazala in the attack that was to take
Tobruk on 21 June and reach Alamein a few days later; Friday 5
June had small reports of Japanese attacks on Dutch Harbour in
the Aleutians and on Midway Island.
Admiral Yamamoto
Yamamoto, Admiral Isoruku (1884–1943): Japanese naval officer; C-in-C Combined
Fleet 1941–3; devised plans for Pearl Harbour attack; killed in action over Solomons
had planned to seize Midway Island,
threatening Hawaii, and thereby force a show-down with the American fleet before it recovered from Pearl Harbour. On 3 June a
massive Japanese fleet attacking Midway Island was surprised by a
smaller American force. The battle of Midway lasted till 6 June.
American losses included the carrier Yorktown and many aircraft,
but the Japanese, losing four carriers, 250 aircraft and the pick of
their naval air pilots, with one heavy cruiser sunk and another damaged, had to retreat. It was, writes the official British historian,
the turning point in the war against Japan. The battle of the
Coral Sea checked for the first time the Japanese advance. Midway
put a stop to it. Though his fleet was still greatly superior to
Admiral Nimitz’s
Nimitz, Fleet Admiral Chester W., Hon GCB(’45), USN (1885–1966): C-in-C US
Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Area1941–5; Chief Naval Ops US 1945–7; Special Asst
Sec Navy 1947–9
in battleship strength, without his carriers
Admiral Yamamoto no longer dared risk a fleet action in waters
outside the range of his land-based aircraft. Japan’s attempt to
expand her already over-stretched perimeter proved an irretrievable mistake. In reaching for the shadow of further conquests she
lost the bone of naval supremacy, without which she could not
hold the vast area she had already won.
Kirby, vol II, p. 233
By 8 June newspapers were relishing the communiqué in which
Nimitz said that a great victory was in the making and that while
Pearl Harbour would not be avenged until Japanese seapower was
impotent, they could claim to be ‘about midway to our objective’.
He reported two, possibly three, Japanese carriers destroyed, with
all their aircraft, and one or two other carriers damaged, along with
three battleships and four cruisers, while one American carrier had
been hit and some aircraft lost. Here was the longed-for sound of
victory, and Coral Sea caution was brushed aside in exuberant headlines, though several papers in their comment showed slight reserve.
The New Zealand Herald, the Evening Post and the Evening Star all
perceived that the United States was holding to the essential Nelson
principle of ‘the fleet in being’, while the Japanese navy, frittering
away its strength in ‘buccaneering expeditions’, was ceasing to be.
The Press on 8 June thought that Japan’s Midway action was
primarily defensive and that its southward drive was continuing,
recent Allied bombing of Tulagi being evidence that the Japanese
had established a base in the Solomon Islands. The Dominion rated
Midway as an episode in a struggle over a wide area and expected
more tentacles. The Auckland Star on 8 June said that reports of
earlier Pacific naval action had been too optimistic. It mentioned
the Makassar exaggerations and noted that after the first news of
the Coral Sea battle Australian authorities had been at pains to ‘play
down’ the success achieved there. Bearing in mind the difficulties of
accurately determining damage, first reports of Midway should be
met with some reserve, but it seemed certain that the United States
navy had won success greater than could have been hoped for at
this stage.
After a few days of Midway news details, a Washington communiqué revived Coral Sea publicity, making a glorious pair of
victories. Previous withholding of Coral Sea information, it was
claimed, had assured success at Midway and the loss of the Lexington
could now be made known. Enemy losses, especially of aircraft-carriers, were tallied with much satisfaction.
Later, there was wide reporting of Brigadier-General Hurley’s
Hurley, Major-General Patrick Jay (1883–1963): US Min NZ 1942; personal rep
Roosevelt in Egypt, Middle East, Russia, India, China, 1943–4; Amb China 1944–5
warning on 17 June 1942 at an RSA meeting against the current
wave of optimism as people talked of the Coral Sea, Midway and
the RAF’s great raids. The Dominion also cautioned that much recent
comment was more optimistic than known facts warranted: the enemy’s spearhead at sea had been blunted, especially in carrier losses;
the immediate threat to supply lines had been removed and vital
time gained, but it was too soon to claim that the initiative was
passing from the Japanese; that would happen only when the United
Nations began to attack enemy strongholds.
Dominion, 17 Jun 42
Militarily, it was proper to release details of engagements well
after they happened, so that they could not add usefully to enemy
knowledge, but it was also necessary, for long-term public morale,
that official sources should reveal losses. It often happened that losses,
announced late, would be balanced by more comfortable news.
After the mid-June rejoicings, further Coral Sea and Midway stories
and photographs gradually emerged, cheerful in the prevailing gloom.
On 30 June, ‘analysis of reports’ gave the names of the four Japanese
carriers sunk, plus two cruisers (though actually only one was sunk,
the other badly damaged). In mid-July the United States navy
released more Midway details: of the 80 Japanese ships engaged,
nine, including four aircraft-carriers and two heavy cruisers, had been
sunk, and as many other ships damaged, with 275 aircraft destroyed
and 4800 men killed, while one United States destroyer had been
sunk, the carrier Yorktown ‘put out of action’, 92 officers and 215
men killed; American aircraft losses were not disclosed. Late in
August, when the Guadalcanal action was in a bad way, American
papers refreshed memories of the Coral Sea
Evening Post, 27 Aug 42
while in September,
when Guadalcanal was no better, ‘US Navy Communiqué No 97’
was issued,
Auckland Star, 10–12 Sep 42
giving more information on the preliminaries and action
at Midway. However, not till 17 September (New Zealand time)
was the loss of Yorktown made known, Washington explaining that
it was not announced earlier because there was reason to believe that
the Japanese did not know of it.
In the post-war account Yorktown, abandoned after being hit by bombs and torpedoes,
remained afloat for two days. Finally, while the destroyer Hammann was trying to take
her in tow, a Japanese submarine put a torpedo into the destroyer so that she sank
within four minutes, and another torpedo finished Yorktown. Three other destroyers
hunted the submarine in vain. Morison, vol IV, p. 156
Thus, although the main outlines of actions were known promptly,
the almost inevitable inflation of success and prudent delaying and
cushioning of bad news made public awareness of the tides and toll
of war neither exact nor immediate. News of an action came out
piecemeal, over long periods, and careful, sustained reading was
needed to evaluate mixed fact and fancy. The broad facts of who
advanced and who retreated were fairly clear, but their cost was hazy.
The Coral Sea and Midway battles were no exceptions.
After Midway many New Zealanders, along with Australians and
Americans, felt that since things had started to go better they should
go on improving and waited, with varying impatience, for the Allies’
offensive in the Pacific to begin. To strike while the iron was hot
seemed the obvious course; ‘more aid for MacArthur’ was the cry
from Australia. If MacArthur had 2000 more aircraft at once, he
could probably retake everything between Torres Strait and Manila.
Auckland Star, 11 Jun 42, p. 5
Meanwhile, since mid-May, the Germans had turned and were gaining alarmingly in Russia, and at the end of June, Rommel had
begun his drive into Egypt, to be held in July at the Alamein line,
where at the Kaponga Box, Ruweisat Ridge and El Mreir, the New
Zealand Division had some of its hardest fighting.
It was clear that the war in these places demanded all possible
support, though New Zealanders, like Australians, were disturbed
that nothing was being done to follow up the Coral Sea–Midway
successes. The New Zealand Herald on 17 July commented on the
uneasy quiet of the Pacific, in contrast to current ferocity in Russia
and in Egypt. Were the Pacific allies to await Japan’s next blow,
or try to regain the East Indies? In Russia’s extremity, attack by
Japan on Siberia was likely, could be fatal, and could be prevented
by a United Nations offensive in the Pacific.
Again, on 31 July, the Herald foreboded attack on Siberia. According to some Washington sources this was Japan’s real intention, southern activities being merely feints to
conceal it. Auckland Star, 4 Aug 42
The Press also, on
9 July, had forecast attack on Siberia, which would require less
shipping than other possible moves by Japan, though it ‘would not
altogether exclude simultaneous attack on Australia and New
Zealand’.
Australian impatience was heightened after 21 July when the
Japanese, who since Midway could not risk another sea attack on
Port Moresby, landed easily at Buna on the northern coast of Papua
and started along the 120-mile track leading them to Port Moresby.
By 6 August, having seized Kokoda village with its airstrip, they
had begun to cross the Owen Stanley Range through very tough
jungle. Despite Australian resistance, the miles between the invaders
and Port Moresby lessened steadily, while bombing raids on Darwin,
Townsville and other north Australian targets increased.
In London, Nash said that it was a huge mistake to imagine that
Japan’s drive had finished and that therefore it would be wise to
do nothing at present: ‘We must find a way of doing something
that will be most harmful to Japan.’
Ibid., 28 Jul 42, p. 5
Fraser, visiting Australia,
said that a large and determined offensive in the south-west Pacific
was imperative before the United Nations could win,
Ibid., 25 Jul 42, p. 5
and that in
Australia as in New Zealand both government and public opinion
definitely wanted Allied aggression.
NZ Herald, 4 Aug 42, p. 2. The Press and other papers pined for the counter-offensive
‘which can provide the only real defence against extension of Japanese conquest in the
South-west Pacific’. Press, 25 Jul 42
On the other hand, it was realised that to attack the Japanese
efficiently under their land-based air umbrellas would require
immense shipping and air power, for aircraft-carriers were clearly
vulnerable. Presumably America did not yet have this strength and
shipping was needed elsewhere. With Rostov falling, the whole Don
basin in German hands and the Caucasian oil wells almost within
their grasp, clamour for a second front in Europe daily sounded more
justified. Russia’s need was clearly desperate, a Pacific offensive not
the most direct way to relieve it.
Although the enemy was now much closer than when Singapore
was threatened, there was much more calm in New Zealand. It was
due in part to awareness of local mobilisation and preparations, in
part to the arrival of large numbers of Americans,
See chap 14
to feeling that
Coral Sea and Midway had at least taken the edge off the Japanese
advance, and simply to being accustomed to the nearer war. This,
plus the Russian crisis, lessened impatience for Pacific action. To the
New Zealand Herald on 27 July 1942 the Buna landing showed
that in the south-west Pacific the initiative was still with the enemy,
and it doubted that Washington planned an early offensive. A very
large convoy of American troops had lately landed in Britain. ‘Russia’s
need of a diversion is palpably the greatest’, and perforce the Allies
must remain on the defensive. Again on 4 August this paper said
that if a second front was imperative for the relief of Russia, the
Pacific must wait, though it was clear that the Japanese were working like beavers extending their hold in the Solomons Islands. If
the Allies did not make a move this year, the Japanese would. The
Auckland Star on 7 August, considering the disquiet in Australia
following the Buna landing, advised that the fighting record of
MacArthur should be trusted: ‘he will do all that he has the force
to do’, but while Japan had command of the sea he was constantly
at a disadvantage.
The significance of Coral Sea and Midway, clear to postwar sight, was not then so
obvious.
The most disturbing feature was not the local
Japanese gains but the improbability that MacArthur’s resources
would be greatly or quickly increased. In Washington and London
all eyes were on Russia and the Middle East; Pacific needs must
seem much less pressing, and an Allied offensive in the Pacific was
likely to fade into the future. ‘It may be that both in Australia and
New Zealand we must content ourselves, albeit unwillingly, with
the role of “hanging on” to every position we hold, and think ourselves lucky if we lose no more’, concentrating, as Australia’s Prime
Minister had put it, on doing the right thing ‘with what we have’,
which did not yet include command of the sea.
Remote from public knowledge, the supreme commanders fought
out their global and service priorities for aircraft and ships and men
and weapons. The well-established ‘beat-Hitler-first’ policy which
kept the Pacific basically on lean rations during the first part of the
war did not preclude offensive action within a certain range when
opportunity offered, as it obviously did after Midway. As stated by
the official American historian of Pacific strategy, ‘The problem was
to settle on an operation that could be undertaken by the limited
forces available and within the strategic concept for the Pacific but
which would produce more enduring results than the earlier raids
and strikes.’
Morton, p. 289
This was not very far from the views of Curtin and
the Auckland Star. Clearly the Solomon Islands was the area to strike
but preparation was delayed by debate on who should command.
MacArthur wanted to head the attack that would recapture Rabaul
and the Bismarck archipelago; Admiral King,
King, Fleet Admiral Ernest Joseph, Hon GCB(’46) (1878–1956): C-in-C Atlantic Fleet
1941, US Fleet & Chief Naval Ops 1942–5
Commander-in-Chief
United States Fleet, and the Navy men saw the operation as primarily naval and amphibious.
Morton, pp. 296–300
Debate on command and related
problems delayed the follow-through from Midway; meanwhile the
Japanese were digging in on Guadalcanal.
At Tulagi in the Solomons, quietly taken from Australian control
on 3 May 1942, the Japanese, despite occasional Allied bombings,
had established themselves and were building an airfield on nearby
Guadalcanal, to be the forward base for attacking New Caledonia,
Fiji, and Samoa. On 2 August, a communiqué from MacArthur’s
headquarters said that this construction had become evident about
six weeks earlier and that reinforcements had since arrived. The Press
deplored that the Allies had not driven on after Midway: opportunity had been missed, Japan had strengthened its bases and got
new ones. The struggle for advanced bases had become the determining factor in the Pacific, and at present Japan was winning that
struggle.
Press, 3 Aug 42
A week later, headlines gladly hailed the launching in
the Solomons of a long-awaited American offensive. It was, said the
Dominion’s commentator on 10 August, the most welcome news of
the past few months.
Having decided on the roles of the several services, the Americans
had struck at Guadalcanal before the Japanese airfield could come
into use. Early on 7 August, 11 000 marines made a surprise landing, and by next afternoon had seized both the partially completed
airfield and the main camp of the 2000 Japanese, mainly labour
troops, who retired rapidly. At Tulagi harbour, used as a seaplane
base, opposition was stronger, but it too was taken by the night of
8 August, along with the small neighbouring islands of Gavutu and
Tanambogo.
After this most promising start came disastrous setbacks, and 26
weeks’ hard fighting to secure what had been occupied in little more
than that number of hours. From Rabaul a Japanese force of five
heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and a destroyer had already hurried
south to intercept the Allies; in a night attack lasting 32 minutes
very early on 9 August, through an amazing series of Allied confusions and wrong decisions Admiral Mikawa, naval commander at
Rabaul, sank off Savo Island the Australian heavy cruiser Canberra,
three American cruisers, Vincennes, Astoria and Quincy, and a
destroyer, taking very little damage himself.
‘One side was all but annihilated and the other escaped virtually unscathed’. Morison,
vol V, p. 61
Then, fearing attack
by American aircraft, the Japanese withdrew. The American transports hurriedly completed unloading their supplies for the Marines
and, with the remnants of their covering force, retreated to Noumea,
leaving them on their own, with not much firepower, and food for
37 days.
During the next three months, both sides reinforced and supplied
their men on Guadalcanal, where grim, tight jungle fighting
developed, punctuated by major attacks; for the Americans the lowest point in the whole campaign was in mid-October. There were
also, besides stray sinkings, four big naval battles. The first of these,
on 24 August, between carrier aircraft, was more or less a draw, the
Japanese losing a light carrier and damaging but not sinking the
carrier Enterprise. On the night of 11–12 October, the heavy cruiser
San Francisco beat off a Japanese cruiser force, enabling reinforcements drawn from New Caledonia to land on Guadalcanal in time
to face a night bombardment from battleships and to withstand a
major attempt to recapture the airfield, 23–6 October. On 26 October, off the Santa Cruz islands, an indecisive action against a large
Japanese force sank the carrier Hornet and damaged both the carrier
Enterprise and the battleship South Dakota, while a Japanese heavy
cruiser, two destroyers and two carriers were damaged, with serious
losses in aircraft and pilots. The Japanese fleet withdrew, leaving a
badly crippled American fleet guarding an island on which American
troops precariously held a battered, pock-marked airfield.
Morton, p. 345
By the
first week of November Japanese reinforcements outnumbered the
Americans, but a great sea battle between 12–15 November with
American aircraft flying from Guadalcanal’s crucial airfield, proved
decisive though expensive. The Americans lost two cruisers, six
destroyers and two rear-admirals, and took heavy damage besides;
the Japanese lost two battleships, along with several lesser warships
and laden transports, and retreated. This was their last major attempt
to recapture Guadalcanal, but the slow grind against the tenacious
Japanese ground troops continued till the remnants were evacuated
early in February 1943.
Obviously these events, especially the heavy naval losses of 9
August, could not be told to the world. The loss of HMAS Canberra
was published on 21 August, but news of the three sunken American
cruisers was not given till 12 October.
Morison, vol V, p. 61n; Auckland Star, 21 Aug. 14 Oct 42, pp. 5, 3
The initial success, plus
news that the Americans had also counter-attacked in the Aleutians,
gave welcome assurance that a genuine and effective offensive was
under way. From Sydney came the man-in-the-street view, ‘It’s about
time’.
‘The scope, purpose and the degree of success of these enterprises
are unannounced at the time of writing,’ said the Auckland Star on
10 August, ‘but the bare announcement of them lifts the spirit’,
adding that it was one thing to harass the enemy with destructive
raids, as in the Marshall Islands, it was quite another to take a
strongly held position and keep it. News continued to be veiled and
changeable, but generally cheerful: naval battles ‘raged’, there were
mopping-up operations and bitter land fighting, and aircraft were
active. Reports quoted from American and Australian sources provided a variety of headlines, such as ‘Allies now Control Third of
Solomons’,
Auckland Star, 18 Aug 42, p. 5
‘Long Grim Fight in South-West Pacific Area’,
Ibid., 19 Aug 42, p. 5
‘Resistance Overcome, Japanese taken by Surprise, Enemy Naval
Force Driven off’.
NZ Herald, 19 Aug 42, p. 3
On 31 August (alongside news of the Japanese landing at Milne
Bay, Papua) papers published, with varying completeness, a ‘US
Navy communique’ which stated that American troops on Tulagi
and Guadalcanal were sufficiently well established to warrant the
release of details of the action in the Solomons. These details were
mainly of the successful landing on 7–8 August, with some skilful
skating over later events. ‘This is a report to rejoice over,’ declared
the Auckland Star. After much speculation on few facts, the course
of American operations in the Solomons had been made reasonably
clear. Although there had been no hint of withdrawal, official reticence and unofficial warnings about over-optimism had created the
impression that the attackers were holding on precariously, their fate
in the balance. Now, since they were well established in six islands
and operating the airport, there seemed firm grounds for confidence
that they could maintain their position.
Auckland Star, 31 Aug 42
During September interest concentrated on the Japanese advance
in Papua, the German drive on Stalingrad, the recalcitrance of Waikato miners.
See p. 407
The gap between public confidence, grown from
reports of a secure front on Guadalcanal, and the actual uncertainty
was measured by the public’s growing impatience with fire watching,
and government’s seemingly unreasonable insistence on its continuance, even its extension. Ministers gave direct warnings. Sullivan,
on 13 September, said that it was madness of the very craziest kind
for people to talk as though the danger for New Zealand had passed;
the Japanese would make a great effort to recover what they had
lost in recent defeats and if they should win New Zealanders might
have to fight for their country.
Dominion, 14 Sep 42, p. 4
Such warnings, long linked to
appeals for more devotion to the war effort, fell on ears dulled by
custom.
Within three weeks the tone of news and comment had grown
distinctly less cheerful. The New Zealand Herald said on 17 September that the heavy Japanese offensive under way should chasten
those who a few weeks earlier were too ready to assume that the
tide had turned. Next day it pointed out that the struggle in the
Solomons, though important for Australia and New Zealand, was
not regarded in London, Washington or Moscow as determining the
war. Allied eyes were on Stalingrad. Again, on 21 September, this
paper wrote, ‘The Allied High Command may or may not underestimate Japan, but certainly they … are attempting to defeat Germany first. Comparatively light forces are being devoted to holding
Japan.’ The Auckland Star on the same day said that so far news
had been scant and speculation plentiful. American comment, in
which a few weeks ago there had been keen anticipation of further
islands being recaptured, now emphasised the strength of the enemy
and the strain on the Marines to retain what they held, one commentator saying that unless the Marines were reinforced the Japanese
might seize the vital airfield. The Star, while rejecting such extreme
pessimism, foresaw stalemate, with the Japanese unable to recapture
the southern islands and the Americans unable to advance. American
emphasis on reinforcements obviously alarmed New Zealand. Coates
on 28 August had spoken of New Zealand troops going to other
theatres if needed, and on 8 September Major-General Barrowclough,
Barrowclough, Major-General Rt Hon Sir Harold, PC, KCMG(’54), CB, DSO and bar,
MC, ED, MC(Greek), Legion of Merit(US), Croix de Guerre(Fr) (1894–1972): 1NZEF
1915–19; cmdr 7 NZ Inf Bde UK 1940, 6 NZ Inf Bde Middle East 1940–2; GOC
3 NZ Div and 2NZEF in Pacific1942–4; Chief Justice NZ 1953–66
inspecting a ‘new military formation of which he has just
taken over the command’, said ‘The war cannot be won by sitting
here in New Zealand so we have to … be able to go away at very
short notice.’
Auckland Star, 8 Sep 42, p. 4
Newspapers began to speak of New Zealanders going
to the Solomons, urging that their training and equipment should
be suitable.
Ibid., 8, 21 Sep 42; NZ Herald, 22 Sep 42. The ‘new military formation’ was the 3rd
Division which, after topping off its training with a 5-day bush exercise in the Kaimai
ranges late in October, went off in several sections between early November and January
1943 to garrison New Caledonia.
The news on 22 September had stated that the see-saw Solomons
battle had so far proved indecisive because neither side had an overwhelming superiority. During October the see-saw continued: sometimes the landing of Japanese troops was reported, sometimes the
Marines were reinforced, and a vital battle was always impending.
Meanwhile the news concentrated on Stalingrad, then in its second
month of siege, and on the Australian advance in Papua where the
Japanese, having got within striking distance of Port Moresby, were
mysteriously retreating. In fact, their reinforcements had been diverted
to the Solomons, but this was not known at the time. Then, in the
last week of October, came the longed-for but anxiety-fraught news
that the Eighth Army had broken out from Alamein with the New
Zealand Division in the lead. The Auckland Star remarked that
while the thoughts of many New Zealanders were in Egypt, the
Solomons campaign was at a critical stage: the earlier high hopes
for a large-scale offensive had faded and even the current foothold
was uncertain. The difficulties of landing reinforcements were shown
by the sinking of the American aircraft-carrier Wasp on 15 September 1942, news of which had just been released; the Star again
suggested that New Zealanders might soon be in the Pacific fight.
Auckland Star, 28 Oct 42
A few days later, the Star pointed out that New Zealanders were
conditioned by their news sources to take a detached view of some
direct and immediate interests. Nine times a day they could hear
reports from the BBC in which the Pacific was far away, with Stalingrad, the Middle East and British ministers in the foreground;
many American commentators stood mentally with their backs to
the Pacific. To these observers the significance of the Solomons battle
was that it had held the Japanese off Siberia or India.
Ibid., 31 Oct 42
On 8
November Allied armies under Eisenhower
Eisenhower, General Dwight David (1890–1969): asst military adviser to Philippines
1935–40; cmdg gen European Theatre 1942; C-in-C Allied Forces Nth Africa
1942–3; Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Forces Western Europe 1943–5;
COS US Army 1945–8; Supreme Allied Commander Europe 1950–2; President USA
1953–61
landed in Morocco.
In July this would have been welcomed by the Star as the second
front to relieve Russia; now it saw that the very great strength of
the forces sent to the Mediterranean meant that there were less for
the Pacific.
Auckland Star, 14 Nov 42
In mid-October the American public had been perturbed to learn
that, on the night of 8–9 August, as well as the Australian Canberra,
loss of which had been acknowledged on 21 August, three United
States cruisers had been sunk. The delay was criticised by some
American papers,
Ibid., 16 Oct 42, p. 3
notably the New York Times, whose correspondent further disclosed that these ships had been surprised ‘like sitting
ducks, and unable to get off more than a few ineffective salvoes’,
and that American naval losses during August and September had
been far heavier than Japan’s.
Press, 26, 29 Oct 42, pp. 5, 5
In a wave of leadership criticism,
Ghormley
Ghormley, Vice-Admiral Robert Lee, USN (1883–1958): cmdr Sth Pacific Force & Sth
Pacific Area 1942, Hawaiian Sea Frontier & commandant 14th Naval District
1943–4, US Naval Forces in Germany1944–5; chmn General Bd Navy Dept Washington 1946
was replaced late in October by the more battle-worthy
Halsey, while Australian commentators joined those of America in
uneasiness about the withholding of disagreeable information. ‘No
true and balanced picture of the Solomons scene can be obtained if
minor successes are promptly stressed while serious losses are not
acknowledged for weeks or months afterwards.’
Sydney Morning Herald, quoted by Press, 3 Nov 42, p. 5
At almost the same time as the Alamein break-through, the
Japanese had made a three-day attack on the airfield of Guadalcanal,
without success, and this was quickly followed by the indecisive
naval action off Santa Cruz.
See p. 366
These actions were reported fairly
quietly: the loss of an unnamed American carrier was acknowledged,
while it was stated that the Japanese had taken a heavy beating.
Press, 3 Nov 42, p. 5
On 2 November Sullivan warned machinery and munition workers
that New Zealand’s danger was never greater.
Auckland Star, 2 Nov 42, p. 4
But suddenly, in mid-November, the long winter of failure seemed
everywhere to be ending. The tattered remnants of the Africa Corps
were in retreat, pursued by the leap-frogging Eighth Army, while
British and American troops were pressing east towards Tunis. Stalingrad was still holding; in Papua the Australians were closing in
on the enemy’s coastal bases at Buna and Gona, and on 17–18
November success widened when headlines proclaimed a smashing
naval victory in the Solomons. Japan’s largest attempt to regain
Guadalcanal had been driven off on the night of 12–13 November
with, claimed early communiques, the loss of 23 assorted ships,
including a battleship and laden transports, in the greatest naval
battle of the war, while the United States had lost only eight vessels.
Although Colonel Knox warned that the Japanese would return, and
though the Press pointed out that the battleship sunk was one of
the oldest anywhere while Japan’s main battlefleet was still scarcely
damaged,
Press, 18 Nov 42
there was widespread feeling that a nagging threat had
at last been removed.
There was both public impatience to be done with EPS works
and, among its authorities, reluctance to see its structure and powers
diminished. ‘The Japs are as dead as Julius Caesar’, declared a member of Auckland’s Hospital Board, amazed at a proposed move to
spend £800 on more shelters for patients, but chairman A. J. Moody
did not believe in ‘this business of ringing bells and throwing your
hat up too soon.’ The Board decided to proceed with the shelters,
subject to the approval of the Minister of Health.
Auckland Star, 24 Nov 42, p. 5
When a Mt
Eden borough councillor on 24 November advocated suspension of
all EPS activities and restrictions in order to divert energy to more
constructive efforts, it was decided to defer decision till the next
meeting.
Ibid., 25 Nov 42. p. 4
It had been clear for a long time that command of the sea decided
which side could receive reinforcements. America now had this
advantage, narrowly, but the Japanese did not give up easily: there
were two minor naval battles, countless patrols and ground actions
before 1 February 1943 when they began leaving Guadalcanal at
night. A week later America could claim total victory.
Meanwhile New Zealand’s Third Division had gone forth to garrison New Caledonia, Norfolk Island, Tonga and Fiji. At home there
was thankfulness for its present safety and expectation that it would
move on to fighting islands. Anxiety and pride remained concentrated on Tunisia.
CHAPTER 11
The Challenge is Accepted
IN the sharpened demands of the new war, employers felt that the
nonsense of the 40-hour week must at last be thrown out, along
with undue devotion to workers’ rights and conditions. Workers,
while aware of heightened danger and need, felt that the old enemies, the bosses, were using the crisis to whittle away strong points
won by years of union struggle.
The first skirmish occurred at the Dobson coal mine, Greymouth,
in the week of Pearl Harbour. Towards the end of 1941 minor
stoppages in Westland mines had increased in number, and on 5
December Webb, the Minister of Mines, had said that there must
be no go-slow policy, and no stopwork meetings, without permission
of management. On the afternoon of Friday 12 December, the Dobson union president asked for a stopwork meeting at 3 pm, a normal
hour for such events, to discuss domestic union matters—there was
no dispute with management. When this was refused, he called the
men out of the mine at 2 o’clock, whereon the mine manager dismissed him and three other union officials for obstructing work.
This was done to draw matters to a head. I didn’t expect the men to work when the
executive officers were dismissed,’ said the manager, J. Quinn, in court. According to the
men, while union officials next day stated their case he ignored them, reading a newspaper.
Star–Sun, 6, 7 Feb 42, pp. 6, 8
The miners decided not to work until the dismissals were withdrawn, and the backshift did not work on Friday night. During the
weekend, after several deputations had failed to change the manager’s mind, the Minister ordered that the four men should be reinstated, work resumed, and the miners prosecuted. Summonses were
issued for 22 December, but as it was plainly unsuitable, in the
Christmas coal crisis, to impose a day’s idleness in court, the hearing
was postponed. On 6 February, the prosecution explained that the
charges were laid as a warning that stoppages would not be tolerated
in the mines. The magistrate, G. G. Chisholm,
Chisholm, George Galloway (1882–1962): former solicitor, Supreme Court, 17 years
registrar, clerk, to Magistrate’s Court & Official Assignee Napier; SM from 1938
found that a breach
of the regulations was proved, the men having left work without
permission, but they had felt that their business justified a meeting,
for which they had never previously been refused leave. Management
was not free from blame: there was no reason why the trouble should
have arisen, nor should it have been allowed to go as far as it did.
More than a hundred miners were convicted and ordered to come
up for sentence if called within twelve months.
Star–Sun, 6, 7 Feb 42, pp. 6, 8; Evening Post, 7 Feb 42, p. 8
Government had maintained that hours exceeding 40 per week
must be paid for at award rates of overtime, except where the Industrial Emergency Council, having been shown that a war-needed
industry could not carry such payments, adjusted rates and lengthened hours through labour legislation suspension orders, of which
a number had been made. Many existing awards, framed to induce
full employment rather than bursts of overtime, provided time-and-a-half rates for the first three hours (or, in some awards, four hours)
of overtime in any one week and thereafter double rates, while work
on holidays won triple rates. But, with labour scarce and growing
scarcer, the government realised that but for these heavy payments,
more overtime could be worked. A regulation on 17 December 1941
extended the hours at time-and-a-half, where these had been three
in a week, to three in any one day or 12 in any one week. In awards
which had previously had four hours’ weekly overtime at time-and-a-half rates, this was extended to four hours in any day or 16 in a
week. Time worked on any holiday would earn double the ordinary
rate. The waterfront and the dairying, gold dredging and shearing
industries, which were already working more than 44 hours, were
excluded.
Overtime and Holidays Labour Legislation Suspension Order 1941/241
To lessen, and where necessary to avoid, the break of routine
holidays in the midst of the December crisis, another regulation
Holidays Labour Legislation Modification Order 1941/240, and See p. 320
provided that no holidays would start till Christmas Day, that all
work would resume not later than Monday 5 January and that
employers would decide whether any statutory or special holidays,
including annual leave, should be kept as such, postponed for up
to six months or worked at the full ordinary rate plus holiday pay.
To assist in the distribution of goods, in shops where overtime previously was restricted to 60 hours a year, another order (1941/238)
allowed up to 120 hours worked otherwise than on the sale of goods.
The overtime and holiday suspension orders pleased employers;
they were, said the secretary of an employers’ association, ‘a short
step in easing award conditions. What we really want now is a
general extension of the ordinary hours of work from 40 to 44 or
48 hours, in all industries at ordinary rates of pay for the duration.’
Auckland Star, 22 Dec 41, p. 6
Applied blanket-fashion over all but a few industries, however, the
regulations produced anomalies. Thus on Christmas and Boxing Days,
cool store men at Auckland refused to handle, at double-time rates,
the same produce that wharfies were loading at triple rates; they
would, said their spokesman, have worked at ordinary, let alone
double, pay, but they objected to the discrimination.
NZ Herald, 26, 27 Dec 41, pp. 4, 6
Further, in
some industries, fixed prices already allowed for certain double and
triple time days, and workers were quick to perceive that they were
losing extra pay directly to the employers.
Evening Post, 23 Jan 42, p. 7
Freezing workers at Longburn refused to work on New Year’s Day unless the employers paid
a day’s wages into the War Expenses Account, which they refused
to do;
Labour Dept’s MS Register of Strikes
at Makarewa, the men protested against the Minister’s interference with awards and declared that the order did not increase
production but every holiday worked made a gift of £9,000 to the
freezing companies from the workers’ wages.
NZ Herald, 6 Jan 42, p. 6
Those at Kaiapoi also
protested, adding that they would not have done so if the money
saved went to Treasury for the war effort or if the order applied to
all workers.
Evening Post, 16 Jan 42, p. 4
The Auckland Harbour Board Employees Union called
it an unjust penalty on the workers, who had a right to know where
the cancelled pay was going.
Auckland Star, 17 Jan 42, p. 6
Several other Auckland unions, for
example, drivers, boilermakers and glassworkers,
Ibid., 26 Jan 42, p. 6; Evening Post, 27, 28 Jan 42, pp. 4, 6
and the Auckland
Trades Council
Auckland Star, 22, 27, 28 Jan 42, pp. 6, 6, 6; NZ Herald, 23 Jan 42, p. 8
protested against abrogation of their awards and
declared their intention not to work on Anniversary Day, 29 January,
except at full award rates. Webb replied that they would be deregistered if they took this stand; there would be no let-up and no
compromise; there were proper channels for grievances but work
must go on. He also said that men causing trouble would be removed
from their industries for the duration, notwithstanding any resolutions passed by local federations dominated by political opponents
of the government.
Auckland Star, 27 Jan 42, p. 6
However, on 28 January, on the advice of the
Industrial Emergency Council, Webb also said that anomalies had
been foreseen and would be considered sympathetically; the Auckland unions, after an hour-long address by him, reversed their decision
about working on Anniversary Day.
Ibid., 29 Jan 42, p. 8
By 2 February it was stated
By F. G. Young, a trade union leader, after discussions with the Industrial Emergency
Council. Auckland Star, 2 Feb 42, p. 6
that though the order would not be withdrawn, it would be
administered with due regard to varying conditions, and that the
government was unlikely to issue any more blanket orders. Before
the end of the month, the Auckland Employers Association urged
that the government should make up its mind, speak clearly and
insist on obedience, for unions were whittling away the order: drivers, electrical workers, linesmen, radio workers, switch-board and
sub-station operators, tramway employees and boilermakers were
applying for exemption.
Evening Post, 24 Feb 42, p. 7
Workers in the Wellington City Council’s
milk department, for instance, had already been exempted retrospectively.
Ibid., 20 Feb 42, p. 4
In March it was decreed that all men on defence works
and all firms supplying essential goods or goods for military purposes, including cement, rubber, woollen goods, leather, sugar, service
biscuits, tinned fruit and pickles, should work over the Easter holidays at the rates given by their various awards.
Press, 21 Mar 42, p. 4
At the Federation
of Labour’s Easter conference it was said that the holiday and overtime suspension order had created widespread confusion, and the
president, A. McLagan,
McLagan, Hon Angus (1891–1956): b Scotland, to NZ 1911; MLC 1942–6; MP (Lab)
Riccarton from 1946; Sec Miners Fed 1927, 1935–46; member FoL from formation
1937–46, Economic Stabilisation Cmte, War Council 1940–5; Min Nat Service & Industrial Manpower 1942–6; Leader Legislative Council 1944–6; Min Employment, Labour,
Mines, Immigration 1946–9
attributed this to hasty and badly worded
orders made in the rush of Japan’s entry, the Crown Law Office not
having been properly instructed by the Labour Department; if
aggrieved unions had contacted the Federation’s national executive,
explanations and exemptions could have been made more quickly.
Standard, 9 Apr 42, p. 6
By late 1942 the order was not generally applicable, about 60 awards
having been exempted from it.
Hare, Labour in New Zealand 1942, p. 25
Meanwhile, on 14 January the government tackled the chaos that
was growing as labour sought out the best-paid jobs. Industries concerned with the war effort or services necessary to the community
were declared essential; workers could not leave such jobs without
consent of the District Manpower Officer and, except in dismissals
for serious misconduct, both workers and employers must give seven
days’ notice of wishing to terminate employment. To control the
inflow of labour, the Minister of Labour could specify less essential
industries, in which employers had to have Manpower’s consent before
engaging any worker. Further, the Minister could require any specified class of workers, such as those with certain skills or in certain
age groups, to register, and these persons could be directed into any
job or training. Among the industries first declared essential were
those of defence construction, munitions, coal mining, dairy factories,
footwear, woollen, knitting and rubber mills, gas and electricity supplies, railways, hospitals, freezing works, flax and linen-flax mills
and the timber industry. The list was extended from time to time
to include firms engaged even partially on military orders, such as
J. J. Melhuish and Co., picklemakers,
Press, 13 Mar 42, p. 6
and other industries necessary to the public.
See p. 664
As the Auckland Star remarked, this was a single giant stride
towards the regimentation of people’s lives. The manufacturers joined
the unions in complaining that they had not been consulted in the
framing of these regulations, which probably, said the Press, explained
the suspicious and resentful reaction they produced; the purpose was
thoroughly justified, but faults and oversights in drafting made the
impact more jarring than was necessary.
Press, 27 Jan 42
To the workers, these arrangements seemed heavily weighted in
the employers’ favour. The Makarewa freezing workers called for the
immediate conscription of wealth, claiming that workers, now fully
conscripted, were facing sacrifices and hardship while the dividends
of manufacturing and processing concerns had risen to new records.
Ibid., 30 Jan 42, p. 4
The workers’ fundamental right to sell their labour to the highest
bidder had been swept aside, and it was feared that industries now
paying above award rates to secure labour would contrive to reduce
pay to award rates. And again there were anomalies: in certain clothing factories which, because they were making uniforms, were
declared essential, some of the girls were sewing civilian suits, frocks
and underclothing, yet they were anchored to these jobs whereas
those doing similar work in factories without war contracts were free
to move. The regulations, declared John Roberts,
Roberts, John (d 1962aet 76): to NZ 1908; Sec Canty Clothing Workers Union, then
Nat Union to 1959; Pres Canty Trades Council of FoL 1939–50
secretary of the
Clothing Workers Union, were reminiscent of the Middle Ages when
farm labour was tied to the job.
Press, 24 Jan 42, p. 6
The Auckland Trades Council
declared that it would take no part in carrying out these coercive
regulations, more likely to produce disunity than co-operation. It
advocated the use of production committees and local works councils
similar to those in the United States, with labour and management
equally represented under a government chairman.
NZ Herald, 23 Jan 42, p. 8; Auckland Star, 27 Jan 42, p. 6
In short, these regulations, plus December’s holidays and overtime
orders and the powers taken by the Attorney-General in September
1940 to exclude from industry and unions persons likely to cause
dissent, pressed against rights regarded as basic by organised labour.
The men felt that the government had given them over to the bosses
in the name of the war; if they could neither strike nor leave the
job, every grievance could be ignored.
With this background of resentment, there began immediately
the first of three strikes in the meatworks of Auckland. The petrol
restrictions of December 1941 had caused the transport company
serving the Westfield area, where transport was already over-loaded,
to lay off four of the twelve petrol buses used at peak hours, while
those men who previously had gone to work in groups by car now
lengthened the bus queues. Freezing workers started very early in
the morning, many in gangs where the lateness of one man upset
the rest, and they finished at varying hours in the afternoon. Some
men who knocked off at about 4.30 pm claimed they were not
getting home till 7. Representations had been made since 17 December to the local traffic licensing authority, which had recommended
to headquarters at Wellington that unless the train service could be
altered to fit Westfield needs, something would have to be done,
including the granting of petrol to private cars for group transport
of men living beyond the ordinary service routes.
But nothing had been done by noon on Thursday 15 January
1942, when more than 100 mutton slaughtermen at the Westfield
works ceased killing and said that they would not start again till
transport was improved. The bus company’s petrol was at once
restored, making some improvement, and work was resumed on 16
January, but there was loud outcry from some quarters. This stoppage, declared the New Zealand Herald of 16 January, was an
immediate test of the essential industry regulations brought in barely
two days earlier. Would they be enforced or would the government
weakly follow its past practice of overlooking industrial offences
committed by workers? ‘It must enforce industrial discipline as strictly
as military discipline—or abdicate.’ The Herald deplored that the
government had begun with appeasement, meekly increasing petrol
for buses and talking of petrol for workers’ cars. Holland telegraphed
Fraser that the Auckland province was seething with indignation.
When farmers and townspeople had met with extreme inconvenience
and financial loss from lack of petrol, to give in to illegal strikers
was to put a premium on lawlessness and a penalty on patriotism.
Fraser should hasten to Auckland and tell the lawbreakers once and
for all that the government and not the freezing workers was going
to run New Zealand.
NZ Herald, 17 Jan 42, p. 6
Webb, as Minister of Labour, announced that legal proceedings
would be taken against those in the hold-up, that if their union
supported them it would be de-registered, and that unless the men
resumed normal work they would be excluded from the industry
for the duration.
Ibid., p. 8
Letters in the Herald explained that slaughter
work was arduous and unpleasant; others pointed out that a soldier’s
job was arduous, unpleasant and long, a soldier never got home to
dinner, and killing Germans was much more dangerous than killing
lambs. Transport was still inadequate, and the Westfield men said
that if it could not be improved they would have to cease work
daily at an earlier hour; this, they said, was not a threat or an
ultimatum, and would not be rushed into.
Ibid., 20 Jan 42, p. 6
On 16 January Scholefield, journalist and historian, recorded his
bewildered reactions to militant unionism in wartime crises:
With the best will in the world towards my own class, the workers, I find it hard to understand how any body of men who know
anything of the history of the working class movement can use
the war to behave as many of them are doing. To-day there is
another strike at the Westfield freezing works, on account, it is
said, of the overcrowding of buses in which the men are taken
to and from work. They surely cannot be ignorant of the overcrowding of trams and buses in which working girls in the towns
and people of all classes are now travelling every day of their life.
If there is a better explanation of their conduct they should urgently
state their case before the public, otherwise labour will not have
a friend left outside the trades unionists when the war is over.
Immediately following this strike, slaughtermen in the Auckland
city abattoirs struck for higher wages for abattoir assistants and
labourers.
That the malady is not universal is evident from the output
of coal in 1941…. The public should be fully informed of what
labour is doing and what hours are being worked.
Scholefield Diary, Dec 41 to Dec 42
At the same time, another stoppage was not reported in the papers
or recorded in the Labour Department’s MS Register of Strikes, but
appeared later in the annual report of the Department of Labour.
Boners of the Westfield Freezing Company ceased work on 16 January alleging that carcases were not thawed sufficiently. Court proceedings against 14 men were begun but withdrawn ‘as the employer
had apparently not made it clear to the workers that they were
expected to continue with the work.’
A to J1942, H–11, p. 8. On 9 March 18 boners at Hellaby’s, making the same complaint, ceased work for five hours. In this case, ‘Workers’ demands wholly conceded.
Employers agreed that in future men would be called back on Sunday evening to take
the meat from the freezer to enable it to be sufficiently thawed for the men to work on
Monday morning.’ Labour Departmen’s MS Register of Strikes
Also on 16 January, butchers at the Auckland city abattoirs ceased
work, alleging that, because the City Council refused to pay abattoir
labourers above the award rate of 2s 7d an hour, they could not get
sufficient men to avoid excessive overtime and strain on the labourers
whose cleaning work necessarily continued some hours after slaughtering ceased. For the first three days of the next week the butchers
did not kill after 2.30 pm, but on Thursday, when asked again by
management, promised normal work. Immediately, seven labourers
gave one hour’s notice, as they were entitled to do, meat killing for
local use not being an essential industry. Management, saying that
the situation was farcical, closed the abattoirs at 11 am, and they
remained closed on Friday. Over the weekend, the National Service
Department ordered the men to return to work and they did so.
The abattoir section of the union was de-registered and the work
declared essential.
NZ Herald, 17, 29 Jan 42, pp. 6, 8. In an appeal three months later for a labourer
called to the Army it was explained that the output of the abattoirs had increased by
1 867 704lb during the last year, and Army demands were still growing; currently labourers were 29 where 35 were needed. Ibid., 1 May 42, p. 6
Webb at Westfield on 27 January spoke strongly of New Zealand’s
danger, of slavery under Japanese tyrants and children learning a
foreign language at school. Extolling Russia’s fight, he said that the
half-baked Communists who were denouncing the government were
‘just wreckers and ratbags’ who would not last 24 hours in Russia
and whose real work for the Labour movement could be written on
a tram ticket. No stupid action would be allowed to jeopardise the
Labour government, which had done so much for the workers. For
the transport problem, a main complaint, Webb promised remedy;
other speakers however berated the government for listening to the
national executive of the Federation of Labour, not to the rank and
file, for having two Hotel Workers Union members on the Industrial
Emergency Council but none from the freezing industry, and for
abrogating industrial awards by reducing holiday pay, seen as a gift
to employers. On this last point, when asked what happened to the
wages lost, and whether employers were required to hand the money
over to the government, Webb was reported as saying, ‘It may go
to help pay old age pensions and other social benefits we have given
to the people’. After loud cries of dissent had subsided he said that
he was against any employer making money out of the war but the
question was not so simple of solution as some people seemed to
think.
Evening Post, 28 Jan 42, p. 6
It was hardly an agile reply, and the Evening Post helpfully
sought to improve it by explaining that ending penal overtime rates
checked inflation.
On 27 January, Amendment No 1 to the Strike and Lockout
Emergency Regulations 1939 provided that any person who had
offended or should hereafter offend could be imprisoned for up to
three months or fined up to £50 or, if a body corporate, up to £200.
Next day, with the stated purpose of upholding the law and the
regulations, 43 men from the Auckland abattoirs were prosecuted
for partial discontinuance work. The magistrate, J. H. Luxford, said
that certain peacetime rights had to be thrown overboard, including
the right to sell one’s labour to the highest bidder, for in the present
labour shortage adherence to this principle became exploitation.
Having regard to the sudden change into a state of emergency, he
would not fine or imprison; the defendants were ordered to come
up for sentence if called within 12 months; they would not be called
if they worked in a proper spirit and manner, but any more breaches
would mean prison.
NZ Herald, 29 Jan 42, p. 8
Next day, 29 January, 63 mutton slaughtermen from Westfield
met the same charge and the same penalty, as did a further 53 a
few days later. Luxford said, however, that with men working long
hours and living over a wide area, transport was of utmost importance in running an essential industry. ‘The sudden imposition of
blanket petrol restrictions without making proper provision for the
essential workers seems to me to show that some restrictions are
being brought in without full appreciation of the situation’; but the
men had spoilt an unanswerable case by taking direct action.
Ibid., 30 Jan, 4 Feb 42, pp. 6, 8
The men might have said that only direct action had brought
their unanswerable case to light. Even as they were in court, a committee was looking into the complex problem of Westfield transport,
which Sir Ernest Davis, the former Mayor of Auckland, said was an
absolute scandal, utterly unfair to the workers. Westfield was an
industrial area, without nearby houses, and its industries were
expanding much faster than was transport. At the Westfield Freezing
Works alone there were 1850 men, fifty per cent more than in the
previous year, and a further increase to 2400 was expected.
Ibid., 23 Jan 42, p. 6; Auckland Star, 29 Jan 42, p. 8
In March, W. T. Anderton,
Anderton, Hon William Theophilus (1889–1966): b UK; MP (Lab) Eden 1935–46,
Auck Central 1946–61; Min Int Aff 1957–61
a slightly leftist Labour member of
Parliament, criticising lack of co-operation and co-ordination between
certain departments and ministers, said that such a lack between the
departments of Transport and of Labour had caused the first Westfield strike, which would never have happened if the Transport
Department had acted before, rather than after, the strike.
Press, 23 Mar 42, p. 6; NZPD, vol 261, p. 147
It was
decided to make the railway timetable more useful, two transport
companies offered to lend extra buses for the rush hours, and a
permanent committee would arrange details and watch for future
problems.
Auckland Star, 23, 29, 30 Jan 42, pp. 3, 8, 6
That problems persisted was evidenced by a later court case. On
5 March a wearied Westfield cannery worker, when denied entrance
to three successive buses, struck the driver and used indecent language. She was fined 10s on each count and 13s 4d costs, though
the magistrate, J. Morling, bore in mind that she ‘was working for
her livelihood and had lost her head.’
NZ Herald, 21 Apr 42, p. 6
During February and early March, the Labour Department’s MS
Register of Strikes recorded several minor stoppages at Auckland
meatworks. On 5 February, 15 men ceased work for one and three-quarter hours over inadequate means of sending out boned meat,
and better methods were adopted; on 20 February, the lunch interval
of 162 men was prolonged three-quarters of an hour over ‘several
matters in dispute’, on which no concession was made; on 6 and
12 March, 100 men stopped for one and one-and-a-half hours, discussing grievances over the manning of the mutton killing floor; on
13 March, 13 labourers in the pig killing area made similar objecttions for three hours, to all of which no concessions were made. At
Hellaby’s, on 28 February, 47 slaughtermen ceased work for four
hours because they were not supplied with knives to which they
were entitled but which were hard to obtain, and on 9 March, 18
boners struck for five hours over too cold meat.
But in mid-March Westfield discontent produced a more formidable strike. At Hellaby’s, which worked mainly for the retail
trade, there had been since 1933 a small union covering workers
engaged in preserving meat.
Its full title was R. & W. Hellaby Limited, Westfield, Meat-preserving Workers, Slaughter-house Assistants, and Freezing Chamber Hands’ Industrial Union of Workers.
The much larger Auckland Freezing
Workers Union,
Its full name was Auckland Abattoir Assistants and United Freezing Works Employees’
Industrial Union of Workers.
to which 350 of Hellaby’s male staff belonged,
regarded it as a bosses’ union, had tried to have it de-registered,
and was currently suing the firm for arrears of wages due under the
freezing workers award.
Hare, Labour in New Zealand 1942, p. 31
In February, the canning department at
Hellaby’s was extended and women were hired to work on service
contracts. These women were told by management that they must
join a union and the appropriate one was Hellaby’s. Hearing of this,
officials of the larger union asked the company for a lunch-time
meeting with the women to suggest that they should instead join
the Auckland Freezing Workers Union. The company, not wanting
the women to be disturbed by contact with a troublesome union,
refused. Thereupon 329 of Hellaby’s members of the Auckland
Union held a meeting and, claiming that the company was interfering with the rights of workers to run union affairs and decide
which union they would join, ceased work on the afternoon of Thursday 12 March.
Auckland Star, 13 Mar 42, p. 6; NZ Herald, 14, 25, 27 Mar 42, pp. 6, 4, 4
The strike spread to 2320 men. On Monday afternoon 16 March,
1595 members of the Auckland Freezing Workers Union employed
at the Westfield Freezing Company ceased work in support of Hellaby’s men; they were joined on the 17th by 307 men at the Southdown works of the Auckland Farmers Freezing Company, 73 men
from this Company’s cool store at Kings Wharf, and on the 18th
by 16 bacon-workers at Hellaby’s.
These figures are from the report of the Department of Labour, A to J1942, H–11,
p. 8, and the Labour Department’s MS Register of Strikes. They differ from those in the
papers, eg, Auckland Star, 17 Mar 42, p. 6, which give 1540 men from Westfield, 450
from the Southdown works and 140 from Kings Wharf.
In the generally expressed view, this was selfish action on a trivial
matter when the war situation called for national effort, unity and
sacrifice. Webb said immediately that it was unpardonable and treasonable, there would be legal action against those responsible and
they might also be expelled from the industry. Indignation rose
rapidly. The Mayor of Dunedin said it made one hang one’s head
in shame.
Press, 14 Mar 42, p. 6
The Press spoke of wantonness and said that Webb
should put his hat on and take his gloves off.
Ibid.
The New Zealand
Herald said that the merits of the original dispute had become irrelevant to the main issue, which was a challenge to the government
and all authority, a stab in the back of the country which was entitled
in the present crisis to the services of all citizens without conditions
or thought of self. ‘It is for the Government to step in to show by
firm decisive action that this form of national sabotage must end.
It has the power. Let it be used.’
NZ Herald, 17 Mar 42
The Evening Post said that the
government could prevent the strikers from obtaining other work
and expel trouble-makers from the industry and would have the
united support of the country in doing so.
Evening Post, 17 Mar 42
Hawke’s Bay farmers
declared that ‘the offenders should be drafted automatically into the
military forces for suitable duties, where they would be subject to
military discipline and pay.’
Ibid., 19 Mar 42, p. 8
The Dominion wanted to know what
‘proceedings’ Webb proposed against the strikers: ‘Are they, or their
ring leaders, to be fined a pound or two, and then invited or drafted
into other work? If not—if at long last there is to be an end to
meaningless finger-wagging and humiliating “appeals” to aggressive
and irresponsible agitators—why does Mr Webb … not say plainly
what is in store for the men he accuses of treason, and follow the
word by the deed?’
Dominion, 18 Mar 42
The Prime Minister on 17 March called for volunteers, both men
and women, to cope with the thousands of animals already at the
works or en route, and to continue canning for overseas orders. This
was a step far from automatic for a leader risen from Labour ranks
where ‘scab’ was a very dirty word. Several hundred men came forward, to be organised and led by the freezing companies’ office staffs
augmented from other works. Some were farmers,
For example, on the evening of 17 March, 14 farmers arrived from Whakatane and Te
Puke, expecting to be strongly reinforced next day. NZ Herald, 18 Mar 42, p. 4
but many came
from the city, their hands showing that they were not usually manual
workers; the majority were middle-aged, ‘and a number were
undoubtedly emerging from retirement’.
Ibid., 19 Mar 42, p. 8
Most of Hellaby’s cannery girls, the occasion if not the cause of
all the tumult, were still working,
Ibid., 20 Mar 42, p. 4; Auckland Star, 19 Mar 42, p. 8
but Westfield had a much larger
cannery, working on overseas orders, and 150 volunteer women were
engaged there on 18 March.
NZ Herald, 19 Mar 42, p. 8; Auckland Star, 17 Mar 42, p. 6
Although youth and modernity were
attested by a number arriving in slacks, the majority were middle-aged, obviously housewives in comfortable circumstances, most from
Remuera, St Heliers, Epsom and Parnell, reported the Auckland
Star. Many were well known in the city, having served on patriotic
bodies and the committees of such organisations as the Victoria League and the Plunket Society; one such declared she would ‘stick it’
no matter what she had to do.
Auckland Star, 18 Mar 42, p. 8. The next week, Minhinnick in ‘Westfield Aftermath’
showed a cook holding a leg of mutton and an irate lady on the telephone: ‘What’s
more, don’t you try to tell me it’s wether mutton, butcher—it’s off a scrubby old ewe.
Perhaps you don’t know that I have had hundreds of sheep though my hands in my
time….’ NZ Herald, 23 Mar 42, Evening Star, 26 Mar 42
More than 20 of the regular girls
and about 30 men who disagreed with the strike showed the newcomers what to do.
Auckland Star, 18 Mar 42, p. 8
On the afternoon of 18 March the strike was declared over: the
men would resume work while the Federation of Labour would
bring the issue at Hellaby’s before a tribunal. Next day work went
smoothly at the cool stores and the Southdown works, where there
was stock available, but at Hellaby’s and at Westfield men were
told that as stock supplies were interrupted and volunteers were on
the job, they could not all be taken on at once, and it was made
clear that some, including union officials, would never be taken on.
Claiming that this was victimisation, some 1700 men remained on
strike.
On Friday 20 March, more than 80 Westfield men who had
already received suspended sentences for the earlier disturbance and
who had also taken part in the stop-work meeting of 6 March, were
sent to prison for a month, while six who had merely taken part in
the meeting were fined £2 and costs.
A to J1942, H–11, p. 8
Their counsel, W. R. Tuck,
anxious to put their case fairly while avoiding statements likely to
be provocative or to cause bitterness, explained that in the present
issue two unionist principles were involved: firstly, the workers’ right
to choose and develop their own union organisation free from the
employers’ influence; secondly, if any members were penalised for
union activity their fellow-workers considered themselves equally
concerned and equally liable. They were not merely supporting comrades; ‘The union was the union of all the workers in all the works
and the principle involved was one of equal importance to all the
workers. That, sir, is the explanation of the action taken.’
Auckland Star, 21 Mar 42, p. 5
Luxford,
imposing sentence, told the men that in defying the law, the government and public opinion, they were running against an impenetrable
barrier, nor should they flatter themselves that there was safety in
numbers, that a real penalty could not be enforced. He also stated,
as a fundamental principle, which should be understood by every
citizen, that the government must see that workers in essential industries got a ‘fair go’; an employer would not be allowed to exploit
the Strike and Lockout Emergency Regulations of 1939; the controller of an essential industry was now a trustee for the whole community, and must subordinate all other considerations.
Ibid.
Fraser, informed of this sentence in the House, said, ‘I do not
want to see men punished; but I would sooner punish any number
of men than betray the country, at the present moment’. Referring
also to watersiders who had stopped loading a ship that morning
in weather merely damp, he said that this sort of thing was stabbing
the country in the back and he could endure no more of it. He
called on every decent-thinking person to support the government
in whatever action it took; ‘If the Government cannot take strong
enough action by the ordinary process of the Civil law, then other
methods may have to be contemplated’. Also, if as Prime Minister
he could not get better support from the industrial workers, it was
his clear duty to step down altogether. He would not endeavour to
form a government behind the backs or opposed to the wishes of
those with whom he had been associated; he would step down and
‘let those who can carry on, do so.’
NZPD, vol 261, pp. 177–8. ‘That is the best and strongest thing that has been said for
a very long time,’ commented S. G. Holland upon the instant.
This was not to be Fraser’s last threat of resignation, but it was
the first, and it had considerable impact. The Press, however, looked
into the whole statement coolly. ‘Admiration and sympathy for the
Prime Minister, and relief that some member of the Government is
at last being honest about a situation that has most New Zealanders
badly worried, must not obscure the fact that what he said leaves
the situation much as it was.’ The force of his threat of ‘other
methods’ was weakened by his further threat to resign. ‘To tell the
industrial workers at one moment that he may use force to bring
discipline into industry and at another that he will resign if he does
not get their support is to be dangerously inconsistent. The industrial
workers may well feel that the outcome of another strike may be
nothing worse than Mr Fraser’s resignation and the formation of
another Labour Government.’ Mr Fraser, concluded the Press, ‘is the
coolest and wisest man in New Zealand political life and the best
informed about the war situation. If he could speak and act according to his convictions the few dissenting voices would be drowned
by the approval of a nation which in frustration and bewilderment
has waited long enough for a leader.’
Press, 23 Mar 42
On Monday 23 March there were ‘unprecedented scenes’ in the
concert chamber of Auckland’s Town Hall: the day-long mass trial
of more than 300 Hellaby strikers. Appearing for most of them
Tuck, although somewhat apologetic, submitted that an intransigent
employer had peremptorily and unnecessarily rebuffed the workers.
He pleaded again the vital union principle that workers’ unions
should be free of employers’ influence and brought out that management at both Hellaby’s and Westfield intended to exclude some
men permanently. Luxford remarked that, without adjudication by
the Manpower authorities, the last would offend against essential
industry regulations, and was surprised that machinery for quick
settlement of disputes did not exist or had not been pressed into
action. He found that the employers had kept within the law while
the workers had gone outside it, and said that while listening to
counsel a paraphrase of a passage from Holy Writ went through his
mind: ‘What does it matter if we lose every principle for which
trade unionism has fought if we lose the war while doing so?’ New
Zealand, with all its legislation for social justice, in the hour of direct
threat was distracted by a serious dispute ‘which has caused the
Prime Minister to make the unprecedented, I might say terrible,
intimation that, if the civil law does not function, another law will.
Are we to be the first unit of the British Commonwealth to say that
our civil law is unable to function?’
Evening Post, 24 Mar 42, p. 6; NZ Herald, 24 Mar 42, p. 6
The Crown prosecutor, late in proceedings, had announced that
he had just received instructions from the Crown: the men realised
the gravity of their action, they would not repeat it, and a severe
penalty was not called for. Behind these instructions one may sense
the conversations of ministers who foresaw the awkwardness of having more than 300 essential workers in prison, but the magistrate
had no such misgivings: he declared that his duty was clear and it
would be performed fearlessly. Charges against 116 men had been
withdrawn or adjourned, about 30 who had returned to work were
fined £2, and 213 were sentenced to a month in prison.
It was then 4 o’clock, and the men were told to wait. In the hall,
stuffy with its blackout devices and the big crowd, there were cries
for air and water. Some men with pencils and paper hastily supplied
by the union secretary wrote letters to their families, which were
sent off, even by taxi. At about 6 o’clock a police officer announced
that as it was not possible to accommodate them all in prison that
night they should go to their homes, pledged to present themselves
to work out their sentences when called on. In groups of seven they
signed this pledge and were despatched homeward in all available
conveyances, again including taxis. Thus in something like a burlesque the unprecedented scenes ended, at about 7 o’clock.
NZ Herald, 24 Mar 42, pp. 4, 6; Evening Post, 24 Mar 42, p. 6
Meanwhile 1700 men were still on strike.
Hearty good humour in both prisoners and police marked the
next act, two days later, when those sentenced assembled at the
central police station, and police vans, plus a couple of postal vans,
carried them off to prison in batches of 10, each cheered by those
remaining, the process taking several hours.
Auckland Star, 25 Mar 42, p. 8
That same day, 25 March, the strike was ended, with the employers agreeing to take on all the men without discrimination within
a fortnight as stock came forward and volunters diminished. Meanwhile the Federation of Labour pointed out, and the employers confirmed, the impossibility of full production minus many skilled men.
With the strike thus settled, the men were ready, said Tuck, to
return to work and faithfully discharge their duties to the industry.
The Department of Justice considered use of the Royal Prerogative,
but on Luxford’s advice it was decided to re-consider the sentences
by way of rehearing. The men, including the 80 imprisoned earlier,
were released, to come up for sentence if called within a year.
Ibid., 27 Mar 42, p. 6
‘They marched the strikers into gaol and marched them out again.
So ends an incident that savours not a little of comic opera’,
Ibid., 30 Mar 42, p. 4
wrote
R. M. Algie,
Algie, Rt Hon Sir Ronald Macmillan, Kt(’64) (1884–1978): Prof Law Auckland
1919–37; MP (Nat) Remuera 1943–66; Min Education 1949–57, Speaker HoR
1961–6
and many agreed with him. Less prominent, and less
comic from the unionist viewpoint, was the striking out or dismissal
of more than 100 appeals for Auckland freezing workers against
Territorial service.
Auckland Star, 24 Mar 42, p. 3
But while many heads were shaken over government softness to militant unions, the workers took another view. A
few union resolutions appeared,
eg, abattoir section of Palmerston North Freezing Workers Union, in Wanganui Herald,
23 Mar 42, p. 2, and Woburn branch ASRS in Press, 27 Mar 42, p. 4
charging the government with
harshness to the freezing workers, and the conference of the Federation of Labour criticised the government’s handling of the dispute. One speaker, F. G. Young MLC,
Young, Hon Frederick George (d 1962aet 73): Sec Auck Hotel Workers Fed from
1930, Nat Sec 1932; Pres Auck Trades Council 1940s; MLC 1941–50; former member
Alliance Lab, Pres Auck LRC, Auck rep on Nat Council FoL, Pres breakaway Trade
Union Congress 1950 before return to FoL; member Tourist Hotel Corp 1959, Dir from
1960
said that the Auckland
Trades Council believed that had the government been firmer at the
start there would have been no need for volunteer labour or court
action. If the government put the boot into workers, it should also
put the boot into employers when they deserved it; the employers,
placed in a strong position, had abused their strength. ‘It is felt in
Auckland that the Government is loath to tackle the big employers’,
and had let the workers down.
Press, 10 Apr 42, p. 6
The workers, however, with government support, prevailed in one area: very quietly, at the end of June,
Hellaby’s union, the last of the company unions, applied for deregistration and was gazetted out of existence.
Evening Post, 30 Jun 42, p. 4
Something of the hostility shown towards those who worked
during the strike was revealed at a Manpower appeal in May. The
Westfield manager said that lockers were broken into, clothes damaged or destroyed, and meat was thrown at these men, while others
jeered. This was dangerous as men with sharp knives in their hands
could cut themselves, and there was risk of hot tempers leading to
serious incidents. Some men thus persecuted had sought to leave
the works, but the trouble was now much diminished.
NZ Herald, 16 May 42, p. 8
The perplexity of an alert observer amid these conflicts was set
forth by the editor of the New Zealand Woman’s Weekly:
I do not hold a brief for any of the parties concerned, Government, employers or strikers. I know too little of the inside story,
of what had gone on behind the scenes. Can it be a tussle between
Labour bosses and the Government? Is it a skirmish for power,
or for true principles of democracy…. ‘Depriving our boys overseas of food’ and such-like statements did not cut ice as far as I
was concerned, for … I found simultaneously with the accusations against the strikers, statements about the problem of surplus
meat…. We want a united nation, want it more than anything
else, not class struggle. In order to create this unity we want clear
facts for cool, unbiassed and reasoned judgment. We want both
sides of the story. Much better reasons could be found to explain
why strikes could and should not be tolerated in these days than
the reasons given.
The writer pondered on overseas pressures: ‘We need supplies. We
need to be included in the general defence programme. In order to
be included we have to do our bit and do it well. This Government
must see that things are run to time-table, that ships are not delayed.
We are only a small pawn in a great game.’ People who wrote to
the papers saying that the 40-hour week must go did not know
what they were talking about, continued this vigorous lady. To many
workers the 40-hour week was becoming nominal, and many were
on piece-work. ‘Girls in factories could enlighten the public on this
subject. They claim that the “song of the shirt” is coming into its
own again. Piece-work, of course, speeds up production, but it is a
wrong system and saps the vitality of all workers’; generations had
fought against it. For such reasons workers became suspicious, began
to doubt whether the war was worth fighting. ‘It is all very complicated and very confusing.’
NZ Woman’s Weekly, 2 Apr 42, p. 1
Twice more in March the government took legal action against
strikers. On 20 March, at the height of the Westfield affair, there
was very minor newspaper interest in a strike trial at Hamilton. On
3 March, 38 carpenters working on a cool store at Horotiu, objecting
to a man they disliked being made foreman, left in a body. They
were paid off, their employment terminated,
Labour Department’s MS Register of Strikes
and were away nearly
two weeks. Their counsel, T. Henry,
Henry, Sir Trevor, Kt(’70): practised Auck, Vice-Pres Auck District Law Soc 1955; Judge
Supreme Court 1955; Judge Fiji Court Appeal 1973
said that they had not realised
they were breaking the regulations, they had returned to the job
and, with the cause of the dispute removed, were working harmoniously. They were convicted and ordered to come up for sentence
if called within a year.
Auckland Star, 18, 20 Mar 42, pp. 6, 2
Another strike threat which had a background conflict with the
Minister of Labour was finally cancelled. Early in February a committee was appointed to examine a dispute at Borthwick’s Belfast
establishment, concerning the re-employment of one man and pay-
mentpayment of chain workers. The workers’ representatives were John Henry,
Thomas Martin and R. A. Brookes.
NZ Gazette, 5 Feb 42, p. 457
On 25, 26 and 27 February
1942, 76 butchers had prolonged stop-work meetings on these
topics, and on 5 March another meeting refused to promise the
Minister of Labour that there would be no further stoppages.
Star–Sun, 11 Mar 42, p. 3; A to J1942, H–11, p. 7
That
same day Webb reduced the dispute committee to two representatives from each side and changed the workers’ representatives to
A. McLagan and F. P. Walsh, both powerful union men close to
the government. Rapid Supreme Court action produced a writ of
prohibition against this new tribunal, preventing it from sitting, but
a meeting of Walsh and McLagan with the employers’ representatives reached agreement.
Press, 10 Mar 42, p. 4
Immediately Webb instructed that the
76 butchers should be prosecuted for illegal strikes during the meetings of 25, 26 and 27 February.
Star–Sun, 11 Mar 42, p. 3
The charges were to be heard on
25 March, but on the 24th, just after the Westfield trial comedy,
it was known that the Crown would withdraw the charges,
Evening Post, 25 Mar 42, p. 6
and
they were withdrawn without comment the next day.
In the first quarter of 1942 there were 37 industrial disputes,
losing 28 068 working days. This was far more than in the same
period of 1941 (8851 days lost) when the war situation had been
much less ominous. Only in two cases (at the Auckland cool stores
and at Longburn on New Year’s Day) were strikes in direct response
to the emergency regulations of December and January. The reasons
listed in the Labour Department’s MS Register of Strikes were as
various as usual.
eg, dispute over suspension of some men for knocking off early, one day, by 300 coal
miners at Ohau on 21 January; dispute over refusal of 3 men to join union, ½ hour,
by 123 freezing workers at Waingawa on 21 January; protests over payment of chain
workers, ¾ day, by 54 Kaiapoi freezing workers on 24 February; dispute over re-instatement and payment of a trucker, one day, by Huntly miners on 24 February.
There was broad acceptance of less pay, more work and loss of
freedom to move from job to job. Grumbles were silenced in people’s
minds, in talk and in public places, by awareness that such sacrifices
were little against what the boys overseas were giving and taking.
Essential work restrictions, which so closely resembled conscription,
met less overt resistance than did the regulations reducing holiday
overtime rates. There was also awareness that the enemies were at
the gate: the Japanese were uncomfortably close, while Russia desperately needed all help of any sort in the common struggle; the
Communist party, normally an automatic supporter of industrial
strife, now opposed it, constantly advocating works councils and
efficiency committees instead.
On the other hand, the resistance to the cheapening of overtime,
the protest, albeit modest, at the immobilising of essential labour,
It must be remembered that both official censorship and the competition of news in
shrunken papers would reduce the visibility of grumbling.
and such incidents as Webb’s reception at Westfield
See pp. 379–80
indicate a
ground swell of resentment that the government had seemingly sold
the Labour pass, given the advantage to the employers. This
strengthened both rigid union loyalty and union resolution to assert
its strength against the encroachments of war-backed bosses, workers
being fully aware of the heightened value of their labour. Strikes
are rarely planned; they happen, often from tangential pressures, in
a maelstrom of conflicting reactions, personalities, interests and loyalties, in which ‘striking it out’ often seems the only course. It was
almost predictable that the impact of restrictive labour regulations
in December–January 1941–2
See p. 373
would be marked by some industrial clash. The meatworks, traditionally a fighting edge of unionism,
were a likely place for it, especially as the job itself, always unpleasant, was made worse by pressure of work and expanding work-forces,
and, particularly at Westfield, irritated by bad transport.
Of the 28 068 days lost from 1 January to 31 March 1942, the
20 strikes at freezing works accounted for 25 366 days. In the mines,
nine disputes cost 1502 days; ships and the waterfront lost 929 days,
largely in one half-day strike by 1789Wellington watersiders, and
271 lost days were shared by sawmillers and builders.
Between April and June industrial disputes were few: the meatworkers added a mere 46 lost work-days, and five mine disputes
cost 1718 work days, together making 1764 lost during that quarter,
and 29 832 in all during the half-year. Through the next three
months, apart from the massive 20 826 days lost in the coal mines,
mainly during September in the Waikato, only 60 working days
were lost over the whole industrial field, making the sum for nine
months 50 718 work-days. In the last quarter, seven scattered minor
strikes added 718 days, making the year’s total 51 436 work-days
lost.
Figures in these last two paragraphs are taken from the Monthly Abstract of Statistics for
1942. In the tables for 1943 the quarterly totals of days lost in 1942 are slightly revised,
except for January to March, thus: 29 864 to the end of June, 50 345 to the end of
September, and 51 189 to the end of the year, ie, 247 less than the figure first given.
In the Yearbook, 51 189 is adopted. There is no indication of the industries wherein
these reductions were made. As Dr Hare complained in Labour in New Zealand 1943,
p. 35, ‘such revisions make accurate statements impossible’.
After the meatworks explosion early in 1942 there was industrial
quiet for several months, while the Japanese pushed into New Guinea
and the Solomon Islands, and Manpower authorities tried to meet
the needs of essential industry and services by directing men and
women into jobs. But in the coal mines another area of turbulence
was arising, produced by many factors, not least of which was chronic
ill-will between men and management.
Coal supplies were short. There were some 140 mines widespread
about New Zealand, some producing thousands of tons annually,
some only a few score; fewer than 40 were sizeable. Most were privately operated, some on freehold land, some on land leased from
the Crown. On a State coal reserve near Greymouth some 150 to
170 men worked about 19 small co-operative mines, with government blessing and technical advice, in all producing less than 90 000
tons annually. There were, by 1942, six State mines; three of them,
the James, Liverpool and Strongman in the Grey valley, had from
their starts been developed by the State, which had also taken over
several mines when these became unprofitable for their owners to
operate: Mangapehi and Tatu in the North Island during 1940 and,
in July 1941, Blackball in the Grey area. Two other South Island
mines, Dobson and Wallsend, were taken over in February 1943.
A to J1943, C–2, pp. 2, 5; statement by Webb, Auckland Star, 24 Sep 42, p. 6
By the end of the war 11 underground and 8 opencast mines were
operated by the State.
Baker, p. 412
For stabilisation purposes, coal production was subsidised. In May
1940, to meet increased wages and other costs, the government
granted mine owners a subsidy of 1s 6d a ton, and two years later
further subsidies were awarded, ranging from 6d to 2s 7d a ton,
according to situation and costs of production.
Yearbook 1947–49, p. 353
Imports of bituminous, gas-producing coal from Australia were
reduced from 111 537 tons in 1939 to 37 352 in 1943 and nil in
1944 and 1945. Locomotives, which preferred bituminous coals,
needed more of the brown and lignite types. Railway traffic had
increased: apart from moving troops and their supplies, railways were
carrying passengers and goods that formerly went by road, and were
making extra hauls so that ships need call at fewer ports. Locomotives consumed 484 423 tons in 1939, 492 456 in 1940, 528 552
in 1941, 537 732 in 1942, 611 841 in 1943, 634 007 in 1944
and 576 926 in 1945.
A to J1945, D–2, p. 7
Expanding industries used more coal, and there were particular
difficulties over gas-making, as many retorts were designed for bituminous coal and could not use the lower grades that were abundant
locally. Pre-war, railways were using about 500 000 tons of coal,
coastal shipping 100 000, gas-works about 250 000, factories
700 000 and households 850 000 tons.
Baker, p. 409
In the 1939–40 year,
885 022 tons of coal were used in factory industries: gas making
took 27 per cent of this total, with dairy products, meat freezing,
lime and cement making, the three main industries, taking 41 per
cent. Wartime increases may be tabulated from Yearbook figures,
allowing for some gaps where classifications change:
Yearbook1942, p. 402, 1943, p. 316, 1944, p. 270, 1945, p. 288, 1946, p. 352,
1947–49, p. 369; War History Narrative, ‘Mines Department’, p. 10
Two steam electricity generating stations, one at Evans Bay, Wellington, one at Kings Wharf, Auckland, were working hard to meet
extra demands for electricity. Military camps were using large quantities of coal. In houses and in schools open fires were still the most
usual form of heating and coal stoves were not uncommon, while
shortage of wood cutters had made firewood scarce. The prudent
householder tried to buy in advance of need, thus spreading demand:
for example, deliveries of domestic coal from Wellington and Christchurch depots rose from 6486 tons in January–April 1939 to 12 581
tons during those months in 1940.
Mining Controller to Min Supply, 3 Jun 40, file 14/17, WHN, ‘Mines Department’,
p. 12
During the winter of 1942, domestic coal was acutely short, particularly in the Auckland area, with some householders burning every
available fruitbox and bit of timber and boiling the wash-copper
with old magazines and newspapers.
NZ Herald, 20 Apr 42, p. 4; Press, 22 Jul 42, p. 4; Auckland Star, 27 Aug, 4 Sep 42,
pp. 4, 2
Anyone faced with a cold
grate, or even the threat of it, was ready to criticise recalcitrant
miners, immune from military service, who withheld their labour
on trivial pretexts, depriving citizens of a basic comfort besides damaging the war effort, industry and all those dependent on rail
transport.
Although mining was more or less a reserved occupation, there
were not enough miners. They increased during the war by only a
few hundred, with few additions underground. In 1942, 3659
underground men produced a peak 717 tons per man, whereas 3542
had produced 648 tons per man in 1939; in 1945, when opencast
mining had substantially increased, there were 3932 men underground and a total of 5592 employed in mines, whereas the total
for 1939 was 4762 and 4997 in 1942. By May 1940, 167 had left
as volunteers
Under-Sec Mines to Min, 22 May 40, M.PC 61, WHN, ‘Mines Department’, p. 25
and though thereafter underground workers were
appealed for, the Mining Controller
Set up by the Mining Emergency Regulations 1939 to ensure adequate supplies of labour
and equipment for the industry and to control distribution of mines’ products. A to J1941, C–2, p. 11
remarked early in 1941 that
military service was the principal reason for the shortage of miners,
and ‘the idea that men would rush mining jobs to escape military
service was proved to be a bogey.’
Mining Controller to Dir Nat Service, 14 Feb 41, WHN, ‘Mines Department’, p. 25
Others left for more congenial
jobs
Otago Daily Times, 25 Nov 41, p. 6
before mining was declared an essential industry in January
1942. At the end of March 1942 Webb spoke of withdrawing 300
miners from the Army but, though War Cabinet’s approval was
announced in mid-June,
NZ Herald, 16 Jun 42, p. 4
soldiers were not actually released till
more than a month later.
Press, 17 Jul (editorial), 15 Aug 42, p. 4
Meanwhile the manager of Brunner
Collieries told an appeal board, ‘Twenty men want to go, and two
of them are trying to loaf their way into the Army.’
Ibid., 17 Jul 42, p. 4
Mines were
not favoured as funk-holes.
Coal miners had a sustained reputation for strikes. Of 1939’s 66
industrial disputes, costing 53 801 working days, there were 29
strikes and 21 439 days lost in the mines; shipping and cargo-working followed closely, with 20 864 days lost during 9 strikes. In
1940, when all strikes were reduced to 56, with only 28 097 days
lost, coal miners led the field with 13 strikes costing 11 375 days.
As mentioned earlier, official strike figures are sometimes revised between first and later
appearances; for instance, it may be decided not to count a short or partial stoppage;
opinions may change about, say, prolonged stop-work meetings, perhaps on domestic
concerns and involving no quarrel with management. In the Monthly Abstract of Statistics,
which gives 3-monthly strike figures for separate trades, a year’s total is often changed,
when it re-appears in comparison with the following year’s total. The Yearbooks sometimes have the original or revised figures of the Monthly Abstract, sometimes they show
distinct further revision, which is adopted here. The Yearbook’s industrial groupings are
not identical with those of the Monthly Abstract but the leading trades can be followed.
In 1941, out of 89 strikes totalling 26 237 days (that is, 1860 fewer
than in 1940) miners lost 11 569 days in 43 strikes. In 1942, out
of 65 strikes costing 51 189 days, miners in 24 strikes contributed
24 450 lost days, second only to freezing workers, who in their 24
strikes lost 25 227 days.
Yearbook1941, p. 769, 1942, p. 723, 1943, p. 598, 1944, p. 555, 1945, pp. 580,
582–3
Behind these figures lay the work itself, dark, dirty, dangerous,
breeding a separateness within the general community, and intensely
cohesive unionism, fed by awareness that every advance in wages
and conditions had been won by union pressure. This awareness
reached out in time and distance, from dingy Durham and the bitter
valleys of Wales, and from New Zealand’s own Depression when
1500 men were driven from the industry, although miners themselves had been willing to share the job with their mates, working
day and week about at no extra cost to the employers.
Evening Post, 22 Jun 39, p. 8; statement by Angus McLagan, who continued, ‘Mr Davis
[C. C. Davis, president of the Coal Mine Owners Association] locked out the men at
the Dobson mine for five months because they wanted to share work. After being starved
into submission, half of them were dismissed to look for non-existent jobs or eat grass,
for all Mr Davis seemed to care. Most other coal owners did the same thing in 1931
and 1932, honourable exceptions being the State Collieries and the Stockton Company.
It was not by accident that the first dismissals were of men active in union affairs,
regardless of ability, service, or family responsibilities. Mass dismissals continued up to
1938.’
The attitude of British miners grew from long experience of class
warfare, ‘conducted in most areas in geographical isolation from less
strenuous industries and blander ways of life…. Against the crudest
exploitation known in British industry the miners had erected unions
of legendary solidarity.’
Calder, p. 433
Many New Zealand miners or their fathers had begun work in British pits, they brought traditional attitudes
with them and they continued to live in isolated grim little towns
whose sole reason for existence was the mine. The feeling that they
had enemies far closer than Hitler or Tojo
Tojo, General Hideki (1884–1948): Jap War Min 1940–4; PM 1941–4; executed as
war criminal 1948
was widespread. The
preamble of the rules and constitution of the United Mine Workers
of New Zealand read:
We hold that there is a class struggle in society and that the
struggle is caused by the capitalist class owning the means of
production to which the working class must have access in order
to live. The working class produces all value. The greater the
share the capitalist class appropriates, the less remains for the
working class; therefore, the interests of these two classes are in
constant conflict.
There can be no peace so long as want and hunger are found
among millions of working people whilst the minority who constitute the employing class have all the good things of life. Between
these two classes the struggle must continue until capitalism is
abolished and is replaced by a system of social ownership of the
means of production, distribution and exchange. Long experience
has proved the futility of those political and industrial methods
which aim only at mending and rendering tolerable, and thereby
perpetuating, capitalism, instead of ending it….
Rules and regulations of the United Mine Workers of New Zealand, reprinted 1 Dec
43, p. 1
Since the start of the war, miners had been under fire. Editorials
and reports on stoppages not infrequently referred to past as well as
to current errors, strengthening the troublesome image; notably an
article in the New Zealand Herald, 18 June 1941, repeated in other
papers, summarised nearly 50 stoppages since the war’s start, concluding, ‘Such facts speak for themselves and indicate how wide is
the opportunity for greater production by eliminating frivolous and
irresponsible stoppages of work.’ ‘Mine Idle’ was a frequent heading,
though the actual news might be of flooding
NZ Herald, 15 Apr 42, p. 4; Press, 14, 16 Jul 42, pp. 4, 4
or safety measures
NZ Herald, 16 Apr 40, p. 6, 11 Jun 41, p. 6, 18, 22 Apr 42, pp. 6, 4; Press, 13, 15
Aug, 25 Sep, 18 Oct 41, pp. 8, 8, 6, 8, 20 Mar 42, p. 6, 27 Nov 43, p. 4; Auckland
Star, 27 Aug 42, p. 6
or of full bins and delays in shipping.
Press, 2 Oct 41, p. 4, 21 Feb, 20 Mar 42, pp. 6, 6; NZ Herald, 4 Apr 42, p. 6
Often, the reports were of
strikes over the suspension or dismissal of one or two men;
Press, 2–6 Jul 40, all p. 6, 9 May, 21 Oct 41, pp. 10, 6, 21 Jan, 16 Jul 42, pp. 6, 4
over
transport;
NZ Herald, 18 Feb, 3 Apr, 27, 28 May 41, pp. 6, 8, 6, 8, 21 Apr, 17 Jun 42,
pp. 4, 2; Press, 14 Feb 41, p. 6
over pay claims for heat,
NZ Herald, 25 Feb 41, p. 6; Press, 25 Sep 41, p. 6
or for distance of the coalface
from the mine mouth;
Press, 19 Jun 41, p. 8; NZ Herald, 2 Jul 41, p. 6
for machine-cut coal;
Auckland Star, 28 Apr 41, p. 8. Machine cutting of coal, not widely practised, was
more dangerous in New Zealand’s gaseous coal than was hand cutting, but the yield
per time unit was greater and so the payment therefor was less.
over cavils (the
miners’ three-monthly ballots for working places) and mistakes in
them
NZ Herald, 16, 24 Apr, 24 Oct 41, pp. 6, 8, 6, 17 Apr 42, p. 4
or because miners would not walk a quarter-mile in rain
from the bath-house to the mine
Ibid., 11 Jun 41, p. 6; Press, 22 Oct 41, p. 8
or because the clothes of a few
rope boys were wet because the bath-house was too cold to dry
them.
NZ Herald, 2 Jul 41, p. 6
Idle Coal Mines, More Time Lost’ deplored the New Zealand
Herald and other papers on 6 December 1941, listing reasons why
more than 600 men in five Grey district mines had lost a Friday’s
work: at the Liverpool and Blackball mines the bins were full; the
Wallsend miners, after a normal stop-work meeting, left for the
funeral of a drowned trucker; at the Dobson, some men who had
‘gone slow’ for the past month were refused lamps (ie, suspended)
and all the men returned home in sympathy; at the Paparoa, a pair
of miners complained about the condition of a working place, the
men discussed the dispute and they all went home.
Such multiple idleness was unusual; more often it involved only
one or two mines at a time, and quite often work stopped for only
one day. For instance, the State Mines Union had a resolution on
its books that if there were no transport home for the wet-time men
(who worked a 6-hour shift finishing about 2 pm), the mine would
not work the following day. On 26 May 1941, when the Railways
did not provide the usual train, 38 wet-time men from the Liverpool
mine waited in heavy rain for the general mine train at 4.35 pm in
a small unheated room and empty railway carriages. Next day, the
Strongman, James and Liverpool miners, 500 of them, did not work,
the Union stating that direct action was the method most likely to
get grievances rectified as other means did not bring satisfaction.
Ibid., 27, 28 May 41, pp. 6, 8
That statement touches the crux: strikes brought the miners into
disrepute, but they got results, from a railway train to a pay adjustment. Mere complaints frequently brought nothing at all, and negotiations with work proceeding could take a long time, for why should
management hasten towards any concession while production continued? This is the point usually invisible to the public and tediously
clear to the workers. As an instance: on 28 April 1941, while the
New Zealand Division was ending its rearguard action in Greece,
198 men at the MacDonald mine, Huntly, demanding 6d a ton
more for machine-cut coal, ceased work. They had given 14 days’
notice of this intention but there had been no discussions between
their representatives and the owners.
Ibid., 29 Apr, 2 May 41, pp. 6, 6
The strike lasted six days,
producing a crop of indignant editorials against the miners, the
government, and Webb. ‘For this intolerable position the Government is directly to blame…. This is no time to discuss the merits
of the present case. The men may have some justification for their
claims…. The one primary consideration, however, is that production should proceed without interruption.’
Ibid., 29 Apr 41; also Auckland Star, 28 Apr, 5 May 41, Otago Daily Times,
30 Apr 41
At length the men
went back to work and the dispute to a committee which awarded
them 4¼d a ton more in bords and 2d a ton in headings.
A to J1942, H–11, p. 7. ‘Bords’ are working passages, cut at right angles, in a grid
pattern, leaving pillars of coal often about a chain square to support the area. Headings
are access ways.
Annual reports from the State mines listing the possible working
days which were not worked give a more solid account of mining
interruptions than the newspaper reports achieve, though the latter
had more influence on public opinion. As a sample, in the year
ending 31 March 1943, the Liverpool mine worked 235 days while
possible working days, including 13 back Saturdays, numbered 274.
There were 11 days of holiday: Good Friday, Easter Monday, Labour
Day and eight days at Christmas. Four days were lost in three disputes, over horse-drivers, late trains and ‘preference of men going
on coal’. Shortage of transport lost five days, a slip on the roperoad, one day; slips on the railway, 11 days; wind damage, one day;
heavy rain, four days; power failure, one day and the funeral of a
man killed in the mine, one day.
Ibid., 1943, C–2A, p. 1
The Strongman mine, in the
year ending 31 March 1944, worked 256 days out of the possible
278, which included 16 ‘back’ Saturdays. Apart from two days off
at Easter and eight at Christmas, there were two days lost over wages,
one for the bath-house being cold, four in four disputes regarding
miners, truckers, a shotfirer and stoppage of lamps. One day was
given over to a funeral and four days were lost in protest at the
recall to camp of men who had worked in the mines while on
military furlough.
Ibid., 1944, C–2A, p. 3
Miners’ negotiations were many-tiered. First, the secretary of the
local union, with a member of the committee from the mine where
the dispute occurred, would interview management, and if this failed
ask for a local disputes committee to be convened. This would have
three representatives of each side; neither the manager nor a union
representative of the particular mine would be included, although
they could give evidence. If this committee could not reach a settlement, the next step was the appointment of an independent chairman, which was more difficult than it sounds. Each side could
nominate one, but it was hard to find a man with practical knowledge of mines not biased to one side or the other, and from experience miners were doubtful that a chairman acceptable to the other
side would grasp their arguments and the intricate conditions of
mine working.
Auckland Star, 10, 14 Sep 42, pp. 6, 4
If a chairman could not be found, the dispute
would go to a national disputes committee, with three representatives of the coal owners and three of the national miners organisation, and if they could not agree on an independent chairman, the
government would appoint one. Finally, there was the Coal Mines
Council set up by emergency regulations in mid-1940 to maintain
steady output, with wide powers over plant, methods, transport,
housing, terms of employment and disputes arising from all these
things. In practice the Council became a tribunal entirely devoted
to trying to secure the rapid settlement of disputes, travelling from
coalfield to coalfield and giving decisions on local disagreements.
Hare, A. E. C., Report on Industrial Relations in New Zealand (hereinafter Industrial
Relations), p. 233
Its current members were T. O. Bishop, formerly a mining inspector
and now secretary of the Coal Mine Owners Association, C. J.
Strongman,
Strongman, Charles James, OBE(’53) (1885–1967): Inspector Coal Mines 1923–6,
1928–36; local mngr Millerton Mines 1926–8; Superint State Coal Mines 1936–50;
Coal Research Board DSIR; Coal Mines Council1940–8
superintendent of the State mines, and A. V. Prendiville, of the Nightcaps Union, who had lately replaced McLagan as
national secretary. In all these channels, unless a settlement was really
wanted by both sides, a dispute could wander for a long time.
Mining arrangements were obscure to the general public; almost
inevitably strikes appeared selfish and frivolous, holding the country
to ransom over trifles. Union solidarity seemed automatic and perverse, for dismissals which the miners contested had publicity while
nothing was heard of those which they accepted.
In mid-1940 a West Coast union, while disputing the dismissal of a trucker, stated
that it had taken no action about six men recently dismissed on reasonable grounds
from the State mines. Press, 6 Jul 40, p. 10
When, as often
happened, the cause of a minor stoppage was a new issue not dealt
with in the award or agreements, it was outside the range of the
disputes committee.
Woods, N. S., Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration in New Zealand, p. 167
It was not generally known that physical conditions varied greatly from mine to mine and from place to place
within each mine (hence the importance of cavils), or that agreements which attempted to meet such variations were necessarily
complicated, bristling with opportunities for men and management
to get at odds in interpretation. Often it was not readily apparent
that complaints were long standing or recurrent.
Perhaps the height of the seeming unreason was reached when,
as Java fell in March 1942, 149 men at the Millerton mine, Westport, had a three-day strike claiming wet-time payments for two
horse-drivers when it rained during their weekly half-hour drive
from the mine mouth to the settlement and back, the drivers having
already been allowed 1s 3d a week to buy oilskins. It was stated,
not conspicuously, that the claim had been made previously to a
local disputes committee without being settled, and had got no further.
Dominion, 4 Mar 42, p. 5. The amount paid in 1941 for oilskins was £2 18s a man.
The statement by the union that 17 pairs of miners at Millerton were producing a record 500 tons of coal a day, 90 per cent
of it cut in the open under a 50 foot roof, producing cheap coal for
the company while in danger of death or maiming,
Press, 6 Mar 42, p. 4
seemed
strangely inconsistent with such a fuss over a wetting. The committee
hearing the dispute decided that the drivers should be paid wet-time money for the days when they got wet.
A to J1942, H–11, p. 7
It was easy to forget that, despite increased precautions, mining
was still a relatively dangerous job; small notices appeared from time
to time, saying, for instance, that Jack Stephens, 42, with wife and
daughter, was killed at Denniston by a fall of coal when he was
removing a prop, the handle of a pick piercing his chest;
Evening Post, 13 Jan 42, p. 4
that
Robert Glen, 39, married, died in a few hours of injuries to chest
and spine from a fall of stone at the Dobson mine;
Otago Daily Times, 13 Jun 42, p. 4
that George
Wilson, aged 58, died in hospital of injuries received that morning
in the Wairaki mine.
Evening Star, 15 Sep 42, p. 2
Between 1940 and 1945, the number of
men employed in mines ranged roughly between 5000 and 5600.
In 1940, eight were killed and 23 seriously injured; in 1941, four
were killed, 20 seriously injured; in 1944, 12 were killed, 36 seriously injured,
A to J1941, C–2, p. 12, 1942, C–2, p. 6, 1945, C–2, p. 8
and each year there were more than 2000 lesser
injuries. Awareness of such risks heightened grievance and brought
blood-eloquence into miner–boss relations.
Miners’ pay varied; some were on contract, some on wages, some
were paid differing tonnage rates, while there were sundry allowances
and deductions. It was widely thought that they were well paid;
H. G. Dickie,
National MP, said in October 1942: ‘I would rather
lose money in a mine than work in it. I admit that coal-mining is
an unpleasant, wet, dirty job; but the men earn jolly good wages.’
NZPD, vol 261, p. 716
The research of Dr A. E. C. Hare
Hare, Dr Anthony Edward Christian: Research Fellow Social Relations in Industry, VUC
1942–7
qualified this belief: he found
that while between 1914 and 1939 coal miners’ wages rose 68 per
cent, the general average increase for other industries was 77 per
cent, miners falling from fourth to tenth on the pay-rate list, with
an average weekly wage of £8 15s 2d in 1939. This rose to
£10 9s 10d in 1942, and £11 11s 2d in 1944, but this increase, by
about a third between 1939 and 1944, was no more than that
received by a number of factory workers.
Hare, Industrial Relations, pp. 112, 118
In April 1945 Prendiville, president of the United Mine Workers Federation, said that
except for the two wartime five per cent cost of living bonuses, coal
hewers were then working for the same rates that applied in 1931,
‘before the coal owners smashed the agreements.’ These rates were
3s 6¼d a ton in Waikato mines, 3s 2¾d on the West Coast.
Evening Post, 24 Apr 45, p. 4
The
Coal Mine Owners Association, in reply, pointed out that during
the war miners’ average daily earnings were 30s 6d in 1939, 39s 4d
in 1942 and 45s 10d in 1944; at the Renown mine they were 31s 6d
in 1939, 38s 11d in 1942, 48s in 1944. At Denniston average earnings were 40s 5½d, 42s 2½d and 43s 9½d in the respective years;
at the Strongman State mine 32s in 1940, 40s 2d in 1942 and
42s 2d in 1944.
Ibid., 27 Apr 45, p. 9
The New Zealand Herald on 10 September 1942 summarised a
‘typical’ wages sheet for a pair of Waikato miners; many, it was
stated, showed higher totals, particularly where extra shifts were
worked, and others considerably lower. These two men in a fortnight
hewed 113 tons 17 hundredweight of coal at 3s 6¼d a ton and 113
tons 18 hundredweight at 3s 10½d a ton, making a total of
£42 2s 3d, the different tonnage rates being due to differences in the
width and height of the face, or other working conditions. Several
extras, 13s 9d for stone, £1 4s 2d for doing their own trucking, 12s 6d
for breaking away a new face, £1 5s 6d for setting timber, with 10
per cent added according to their agreement, brought the total up
to £50 10s. From this was deducted £4 9s 7d for explosives, 6s for
check weighing the company’s figures, 5s 3d for tools, 2s for the
doctor, 1s for the ambulance, reducing it to £45 6s 2d, or about
£11 6s 6d a week for each man.
On this taxes were due at 2s 6d in the £, being 1s for Social Security and 1s 6d for
National Security, ie, £1 8s 4d weekly, making the net pay £9 18s 2d. Yearbook
1947–49, p. 428; Baker, p. 261
These details indicate the complexity of mining pay calculations. The Herald stated that the minimum wage for Waikato coalhewers was 26s 8d a day and if through
no fault of their own they could not average this over a fortnight
the difference was made up by management. In the report of the
Pukemiro inquiry
See p. 422
the minimum daily rate was given as 25s 4d;
the report is more authoritative than the Herald article.
Other examples of pay figures come from annual reports of State
mines. In 1942–3, at the Strongman, 52 men and 11 boys worked
on the surface, while underground 79 deputies, shiftmen and truckers, and 52 coalhewers, produced 94 170 tons of coal. Each coalhewer’s average daily output was 7½ tons, and his daily earnings
£2 9s 9d gross, or £2 4s 7d after paying for explosive, while a total
of £71 1s 11d was paid out over the year to make up the minimum
wage. At the Liverpool mine, where 67 men and 13 boys on the
surface and 236 workers underground produced 165 837 tons, the
86 coalhewers each averaged 9 tons 1 hundredweight a day, earning
£2 12s 1d gross, or £2 8s 6d net, with £3 10s 3d paid out to make
up minimum wage deficiencies. At Blackball, taken over in difficulties in July 1941, 34 527 tons were produced by 23 men and 4
boys working on the surface, 33 truckers and 27 coalhewers who
each cut 7 tons 11 hundredweight a day, for £2 8s 7d gross or
£2 4s 7d net, with no deficiency payments required. From Tatu, near
Ohura, came 29 619 tons, produced by 88 workers, 24 of them
coalhewers each averaging 6 tons 4 hundredweight daily for £2 2s 6d
net, with no minimum wage payments.
A to J1943, C–2A, pp. 1–2, 3, 4, 7–8
Newspaper letters give a few other glimpses. To a suggestion that
miners were unaware of the war and that some might well spend a
week in camp or be taken on aerial patrols or minesweepers in rough
weather,
NZ Herald, 4 Jun 42, p. 2
‘A miner’s wife’ replied that the fighting lads at least
had fresh air and could see the sky, but a miner had no sky or fresh
air nor could he wash his hands to eat his lunch. ‘The miners are
doing their own job and minding their own business. They are not
telling others to do better. They have enough to do to knock out
a wage. I was charged 6s 4d in town for a bag of coal.
Before October 1943, a bag of coal weighed 186lb. Thereafter, in response to the
Auckland Drivers Union, it was reduced to 140lb, 16 bags to a ton. Press, 2 Oct 43,
p. 4
My husband
gets 3s 6d a ton to cut the coal. Out of that he has to pay for light,
tools, powder, boots, clothes and tax.’
NZ Herald, 6 Jun 42, p. 6
Another letter spoke of
boots lasting eight weeks, trousers and shirts six, of sore eyes,
scratched faces, arms and legs, of muscles aching from pick work
in cramped quarters, ‘some of the “places” being only 2 ft high’,
and then Home Guard on Sundays.
Ibid., 13 Jun 42, p. 6
A miner, stung by a farmer
saying to an appeal board that miners were down the mine for only
five and a half hours a day, finishing at 3 pm, with no work on
Saturdays, wrote that all the 55 men in his mine left the pit top
by 8 each morning and emerged between 3.15 and 3.30 pm. ‘I work
at least six and three-quarter hours daily—I am allowed one hour
travelling time on top of this—so my day’s work is nearly as long
as the man who works outside in the sunshine, and I can safely say
this goes for the majority of mine employees.’ Many did not work
on Saturday, but many others did so.
Ibid., 31 Aug 42, p. 2
There were frequent complaints about absenteeism, some from
the miners’ champion, P. C. Webb,
eg, Press, 22 Oct 41, p. 8; NZ Herald, 25 Jul 42, p. 8
as well as from management.
Poor attendances on the alternate ‘back’ Saturdays which, because
of the coal shortage, miners were asked and agreed to work from
April to September each year of the war, had special and often
critical mention,
NZ Herald, 29 Apr, 27 May, 8 Jun, 22 Aug 42, pp. 4, 4, 3, 8
but not till May 1943 were pay rates for Saturday
work raised to time-and-a-half—when men worked more than 11
shifts in a fortnight;
Evening Post, 11 May 43, p. 4
a year later all Saturday work was at time-and-a-half.
Minutes of United Mine Workers National Council meetings, 30 Nov 43, p. 125,
10 May 44, p. 134
Miners also, at government request, worked on such
holidays as May Day, King’s Birthday and Labour Day, and back
Saturdays in some Decembers.
eg, Auckland Star, 5, 7 Jun, 22 Oct 42, pp.6, 2, 4; Press, 26 Nov 42, p. 4,
22 Oct 43, p. 4
The Northern Miners Union claimed
in July 1942 that there was ‘no great unjustifiable absenteeism’,
union tallies showing a rate of 4 per cent.
NZ Herald, 25 Jul 42, p. 8
This was not very
different from the 5.2 per cent of unjustifiable absences recorded at
Huntly during a fortnight in May 1943 by the Mines Department.
WHN, ‘Mines Department’, p. 27
Again, in May 1944, Webb stated that during the past 48 weeks,
at 25 principal collieries, on the coalface voluntary absenteeism
amounted to 4.9 per cent of man-shifts, with justified absences taking another 9.3 per cent. Comparative British figures were 6.1 and
9.6 per cent respectively. Among New Zealand mine workers not
on the coalface, voluntary absenteeism was 3.5 per cent, and justified
absences 6.8 per cent, with comparative British figures 4.9 and 7.5
per cent.
Evening Post, 30 May 44, p. 6
Dr Hare in 1943 wrote that the rate of absenteeism
among miners ‘is much lower than public discussion might suggest’.
Official records recently instituted at the main mines showed that
10.8 per cent of the total shifts which could have been worked
during the four winter months May–August 1943 were lost through
absence, but sickness, accidents, etc, accounted for 7.6 per cent, leaving only 3.2 per cent of unexplained absenteeism.
Hare, Labour in New Zealand 1943, p. 30
In human terms it was not strange that, despite the war, some
miners dodged work on very slender pretexts or none at all to, say,
stay in bed, garden, go whitebaiting or go to the pub,
In the Press of 8 Oct 42, p. 6, a man wrote that after 30 years on the West Coast, 14
alongside the coal miners at Runanga, and much thought about their almost periodical
stoppages of work, he was firmly convinced that their chief reason was the inexorable
demand of man’s nature for daylight and sunshine. ‘In winter months the miners leave
home in the dark, work all day in the bowels of the earth, and return home in darkness.
The craving for sunlight must be terrible.’ Such craving could also account for much
absenteeism.
now that
fear of losing the job was removed. For all the talk of sending lazy
or difficult miners into the Army, miners held power and they knew
it. The miner’s working day was supposed to be of eight hours,
from when he entered the mine until he left it, including the time
taken to walk to his working place. Several Huntly managers in
1940 told a Manpower committee that the men were in fact observing a 7-hour day, and had whittled down their actual working time,
exclusive of meal and travelling times, to about 5 or 5½ hours daily;
output was falling while miners averaged 34s a day and truckers
21s 1d; owners were powerless to enforce full working hours and
absenteeism was a problem.
NZ Herald, 23 Nov 40, p. 13
Tom Hall, secretary of the Northern
Miners Union, spoke of miners receiving 26s 1d a day, not 34s,
claimed that they were working harder than others in the community
and explained that men knocked off early to get cleaned up at
inadequate bath houses before the train left, while young men walked
out more quickly than the older ones. But he also said, ‘I was
whipped to do things seven years ago which I am not whipped to
do today.’
Ibid.
George Lawson, secretary of the Pukemiro union, pointed out that
to earn 34s a day in an average pick place at the average tonnage
rate of 3s 6¼d per ton, the miner must dig 10 tons or more, as
the extras allowed for setting timber, etc, did not meet the cost of
his explosives. He wanted a full inquiry into the industry from
producer to consumer, with attention to middleman costs. ‘Let the
public remember, when next they pay £3 and upwards for a ton of
coal, that the miner who risks his life daily for the princely sum of
34s and often much less, receives 3s 6¼d for digging that ton of
coal.’ He appealed to readers not to take everything they saw printed
about coal miners as absolutely authentic.
Ibid., 28 Nov 40, p. 13
Little public attention was given to the miserable housing of most
miners, nor was this generally associated with their grudging attitudes. The Depression years had checked all house building at mining settlements, and at the privately-owned mines there had been
no worthwhile move to close the gap between what existed and what
was needed. Few miners could afford to build decent houses, and
mine owners had a very limited sense of responsibility in this area.
When Webb on 7 July 1942 said in the House that some hovels
at Burnett’s Face were a disgrace to New Zealand, the Westport
Coal Company replied that these were the property of the miners
themselves, and though their external appearance might be unpretentious, ‘the furnishings internally are exceedingly good and would
compare more than favourably with most workmen’s homes in New
Zealand.’ At Denniston, however, the company, at capital cost of
£20,000, had built 39 houses for its employees, 10 of three rooms,
18 of four rooms, seven of five rooms, the rest of six to eight rooms;
five small houses were then vacant.
Evening Post, 8, 13 Jul 42, pp. 4, 7
Denniston, clinging to its bare
rock, was probably the most desolate mining township but, though
the locale of others might be less harsh, they were all generally
meagre and dreary. Those in the Waikato were no exceptions; in
April 1941 Webb and the Waikato owners, aiming at increased
production, had discussed the acute housing shortage in the Huntly
area, where single men could not get board and a number were
living in tents and roughly made baches near the mines.
Ibid., 5 Apr 41, p. 12
With coal a national necessity, mine owners felt that it was
government’s responsibility to build workers’ houses at private
mines,
Controller of Employment to Mining Controller, 28 Nov 41, file 14/9, WHN, ‘Mines
Department’, p. 25
and they were not alone in this view. The Press, for instance,
stated: ‘It may as reasonably be argued that the State should provide
miners’ houses as that the companies should. Miners’ earnings put
them in as good a position as other workers to build or buy their
own homes. Those who prefer to rent houses have as strong a claim
as other workers to be assisted through the State’s housing programme.’
Press, 31 Jul 42
The government, while accepting the need to build
modestly at its own mines, was very guarded about doing this where
it would assist mine owners. In July–August 1942, the government
began building 40 houses in the Grey district, half at Dunollie for
State miners and half near the Dobson and Wallsend mines, both
taken over some six months later,
See p. 392 for State mines in 1942–3
while announcing that houses
would soon be provided in the Waikato, subject to negotiations with
the mine owners.
NZ Herald, 10 Jul, p. 2; Press, 5 Aug 42, p. 2
The State had by 1942 spent £100,000 on housing for its Liverpool, James and Strongman mines and, since 1940, £12,000 at
Tatu. At the Mangapehi mines near Te Kuiti, also taken over in
1940, £70,000 had been spent on houses and a hostel; the new
settlement, named Benneydale, with its hospital, town water supply,
sewerage system and co-operative store was called a model mining
village.
Statement by Webb in Auckland Star, 24 Sep 42, p. 6; Press, 22 Nov 43, p. 6. See
also p. 810
In April 1942, a Glen Massey miner wrote that the excellent
housing described in a recent broadcast applied only to State mines
and was entirely lacking on the private fields of Huntly. Here many
employees, unable to get family housing, had to keep two homes
going. ‘Surely it is time the State took over all these mines so that
the northern miners may also reap the benefit of its humanitarian
principles.’
NZ Herald, 9 Apr 42, p. 4
On 24 July 1942, at a conference of Waikato owners’ and miners’
representatives, Webb warned that miners who would not work
would be replaced by men from the Army, and also declared that
Waikato production was lagging because the owners had not hastened with housing as they had promised. They would get on with
this at once or he would have no hesitation in asking the government
to take over all the mines and rush up the required housing. The
owners had asked for 300 more workers and the Army was ready
to release 300 men with mining experience, but without housing
they could not be taken on. Unionists told of men living in washhouses, garages and hovels, or in hotels at £4 a week. Most of the
owners fully admitted that housing was inadequate, but pleaded
their difficulties: the extreme demand for coal had arisen only since
the war with Japan, and it would ease when the war was ended;
building materials were short, and the plans first proposed by the
owners had been rejected as non-permanent. Glen Afton’s management, denying inactivity, said that it had bought two houses, built
four, prefabricated, and proposed 20 more, but the cheapest builder
could do only one at a time. To the miners, Webb again inveighed
against absenteeism, saying that any who did not work fairly would
go into the Army, whence 1000 former miners could replace them.
Auckland Star, 24 Jul 42, p. 6; NZ Herald, 25 Jul 42, p. 8
A few days later, the government undertook to protect owners against
capital loss on providing houses, and to assist miners to buy the
houses. Owners promised fullest co-operation, miners approved and
the conference proceeded to arrange a production council and pit
committees.
NZ Herald, 29 Jul 42, p. 4
Minhinnick, on 27 July, cartooned Webb jumping
on the conference table (and his hat) while both owners and miners
cowered before him.
Meanwhile, Webb could claim that while the last year’s 2 639 507
tons of coal was a record, output for the first six months of 1942,
despite heavy floods on the West Coast,
Some mines were out of production for more than two weeks from 7 April; some in
the Ten Mile area had to be re-opened in new places and restoration would take months.
Under-Sec Mines in ibid., 15 Apr 42, p. 4
was 1 312 099 tons,
being 33 000 tons or five per cent more than in those months of
1941, and with 127 fewer men in the mines. The Waikato had
contributed substantially to the increase and, apart from minor troubles at Pukemiro, there had been no hold-ups for months past.
Ibid., 29 Apr, 16 Sep 42, pp. 4, 2; Auckland Star, 24 Jul 42, p. 6
In the six months to the end of June there had been 16 coal disputes,
involving 2771 workers and losing 3220 days,
Monthly Abstract of Statistics, Jul 1942
but during July
and August there were only three one-day stoppages, involving in
all 764 miners.
Labour Department’s MS Register of Strikes; two were in State mines on the West
Coast, one at Pukemiro
On 27 August, Webb announced that in the past
few weeks railway coal stocks had increased by 1400 tons weekly,
so that an additional 1200 tons a week from Waikato could be
released for household use, and 800 tons in the South Island.
NZ Herald, 28 Aug 42, p. 2
This was the relatively tranquil background against which the
Huntly strike of September 1942, with all its political repercussions,
broke forth in the Waikato. By agreement, if miners working on
tonnage rates could not, through no fault of their own, average 25s
4d a shift over a fortnight, management would make up the difference for the shifts worked. At the Pukemiro mine management,
claiming that 10 men had been going slow, refused their deficiency
payment, and 190 miners, claiming that the minimum wage principle was at stake, struck on Thursday, 3 September.
Webb said immediately that the strike was totally unjustifiable,
the miners were breaking their agreement, the rules of their federation, and the law; the law would be upheld. The executive of the
Northern Miners Union recommended strongly that the Pukemiro
men should resume work, referring the matter to a disputes committee, and pit-head meetings at the several mines on Friday morning endorsed this.
The voting was 792:209 according to the Auckland Star, 9 Sep 42, p. 4; the NZ Herald,
15 Sep 42, p. 2, reporting Webb, gave 779:209, and Holland likewise, NZPD,
vol 261, p. 632
The Pukemiro men refused, unless the money
at issue, totalling about £16, was paid while the dispute was being
considered; they claimed that their agreement’s insistence that work
should go on in ‘all respects as before’ during negotiations included
payment.
Auckland Star, 30 Sep 42, p. 2
Meanwhile on Tuesday, 8 September, after stop-work
meetings, the men at the Glen Afton, Renown, MacDonald, Alison
and Rotowaro mines, saying that previously they had not had all
the facts, decided almost unanimously to strike in sympathy; when
the Wilton mine joined them next day about 1300 miners, normally
producing nearly 3000 tons a day, were idle.
On 9 September, the Auckland Star’s strike news included a small
paragraph headed ‘Government Should Take Over’: the Mayor of
Ngaruawahia had raised a new aspect, saying that in his opinion
‘there would never be peace on the coalfields until the Government
took over the mines. From other sources it seems that this opinion
is generally held among the men, and there may be in the action
taken a suggestion that the Government’s hand is being forced in
this regard.’
Ibid., 9 Sep 42, p. 4
Management claimed to have figures showing that men on the
disputed coalface, a few weeks earlier, were able to make up to 35s
a day, but in the last pay fortnight the earnings had dropped to
between 12 and 22 shillings a day, which, taken with knowledge
of the coalface, showed that they were breaking the spirit of the
agreement; their earnings were short of the minimum wage through
their own fault, and therefore did not have to be made up.
Ibid., 16 Sep 42, p. 4; NZ Herald, 10 Sep 42, p. 2
The men contended that no miner liked being on the minimum
wage which, with deductions, gave him less than £10 a fortnight
to take home; that only those actually working a face knew how
much coal could be cut and filled there, and that conditions had
changed. Previously, the face had been narrow, and workers there
had received an additional yardage rate; now that it had been widened, this did not apply; more blasting (a charge on the miners)
was required and there was more stone in the coal. Further, previously the men had done their own trucking for which each pair
of miners was paid 26s 7d a shift.
Auckland Star, 11 Sep, 5 Oct 42, pp. 4, 4 (report of the disputes committee)
Webb explained that lately
men emerging from the Army had taken over the trucking, releasing
miners for full-time work on the face, and production should have
increased, but it had dropped. The Coal Mines Council had discussed the matter when visiting the Waikato the week before the
strike, but the miners had not prepared their case and though the
union secretary had promised to forward details he had not done
so.
Press, 9 Sep 42, p. 2 (telephone interview); NZ Herald, 15 Sep 42, p. 2
It seems regrettable that the Coal Mines Council had not pursued
these inquiries, but presumably they did not seem urgent. Fraser
was away in America, due to return on 17 September. Webb deplored
that despite all the improvements that Labour had achieved for miners a few irresponsible wreckers were spoiling the fine effort of the
majority; their challenge would be accepted and all the powers of
the State used to maintain production.
Auckland Star, 9 Sep 42, p. 4
On 8 September, the
government had decided to prosecute the Pukemiro miners and on
the 10th it was announced that they would be called to court on
the 17th. Semple, warning of drastic cuts in North Island rail services,
was amazed at the miners’ sudden defection and 100 per cent behind
his colleague in accepting their challenge.
Ibid., 10 Sep 42, p. 6
The press approved these
condemnations: Webb and Semple, said the Evening Star, had been
practical miners and ‘if there had been any justification for the action
of the men they as Labour stalwarts would have seen it.’
Evening Star, 10 Sep 42
Editors
hungered for strong action, declaring that the public was less
interested in the cause of the stoppage than in its effects,
Ibid., 9 Sep 42; Evening Post, 10 Sep 42
and that
the miners’ defiance, their feeling that they could be a law unto
themselves, came from Webb’s former bluster and weakness. Almost
alone, the Auckland Star’s reports set forth, without advocacy, the
miners’ view: they pooh-poohed the go-slow suggestion, and saw
instead an actual breach of the agreement and an attack on the
minimum wage which must be fought to a finish, not only for
miners but for the whole industrial side of which they were the
champions. ‘To them the industrial struggle is a much older struggle
than the war’, though their recent response to a production drive
showed that they were willing to respond to war appeals; in the
Waikato, where conditions were good, some had been producing 15
tons a day, and the average had been about nine tons.
Auckland Star, 11, 16 Sep 42, pp. 4, 4
At the
same time, the Star’s editorials condemned the strike as heartily as
did any other paper: ‘It is appalling that on so flimsy a pretext the
whole production of the lower Waikato mines should be stopped.’
Ibid., 14 Sep 42
Webb, Minister of Labour and of Mines, and heavily criticised
for his handling of other disputes, did not go to the Waikato. Instead,
there came Angus McLagan, for 15 years secretary of the United
Mine Workers of New Zealand, president of the Federation of Labour
since 1937 and, since 1 July, Minister of Industrial Manpower. He
had started work, aged 14, in a British pit, but had been nearly 30
years in the mines and unions of New Zealand, mainly on the West
Coast.
NZ Herald, 1 Jul 42, p. 2
Two months previously he had reluctantly accepted a place
in the Upper House, the necessary constitutional step to the War
Cabinet, as a Labour leader of proved and puritan worth. Though
honest, able and hard-working, with a widely informed grasp of
issues, McLagan was not an easy or tactful manipulator, ready at
the right moment to take or seem to take others into his confidence.
This was the first major dispute in which he was not acting as the
miners’ man. He was uneasy and uncommunicative, ‘frankly hostile’
to the press,
Auckland Star, 1 Oct 42, p. 4
and he made no immediate approach to the men at
large.
After he had met the Northern Miners Union executive, it was
decided to hold a secret ballot on whether to resume work while a
disputes committee settled the minimum wage issue or to continue
the stoppage till the amount involved was paid. The Auckland Star’s
reporter commented that in this union as in other bodies there were
inactive members, and particularly at pit-head meetings good talkers
were liable to sway proceedings without enough debate by those
holding contrary views, who were awed by what seemed majority
opinion.
Ibid., 11 Sep 42, p 4
Three-fifths of the votes cast were needed for a clear
decision and McLagan, saying that this was the most important
decision ever before them, urged all miners to vote at the 13 polling
places open on Friday 11 September; but he did not call or address
any public meetings before the ballot. With McLagan was J. Devlin,
who had just been re-elected president of the United Mine Workers,
heavily defeating Lawson of Pukemiro.
Press, 9 Sep 42, p. 2; NZ Herald, 14 Sep 42, p. 2
That a Minister of the Crown should take a vote for or against
the continuance of an illegal strike was remarkable in itself. The
result was highly embarrassing: 619 for continuing the strike and
484 for going back to work.
Figures given by Holland, NZPD, vol 261, p. 632, on 14 Oct 42
A 60 per cent majority was needed
to continue the strike, and though this was only 56 per cent it was
not the decisive vote the authorities wanted. The margin was so
narrow that it was not disclosed. Instead, late on Saturday, a notice
was posted at Huntly, and given over the air, that the proposal for
continuance of the stoppage had failed to secure the required majority; union members were advised to resume work on the Monday
when a report would be given at the mines. This attempt to muffle
the vote was worse than a failure: after pit-head meetings on the
Monday the miners went home again; withholding the keenly awaited
figures led to much guesswork, suspicion and intrigue.
For instance, an informant ‘whose credibility could not be checked’ said that out of
1340 miners, 949 cast votes, 480 for continuing the strike and 469 for returning to
work. Auckland Star, 15 Sep 42, p. 4. ‘It has since been learned and checked from
several sources, none of them official’ that the figures were 643 for continuation, and
484 for return to work. Ibid., 21 Sep 42, p. 4
On Monday 14 September, when it became clear that the ballot
had failed to end the strike, the situation grew more rancorous. In
the late afternoon and evening, summonses were delivered to the
Pukemiro men for trial on the 17th.
Ibid., 15 Sep 42, p. 4
North Island railway services
were cut, with timetables thinned and goods classified, while distances for ordinary passengers, who since July could travel only 100
miles without a permit, were reduced to 50 miles. Gas works, dairy
factories, meat works, bakeries and other industries anxiously watched
their dwindling coal, making all possible economies. Editors and
politicians grew more irate.
Cartoonists, contrasting miners with soldiers and prisoners-of-war,
ridiculed Webb and McLagan.
Minhinnick in NZ Herald, 11, 15, 16, 22, 25, 30 Sep 42; J. C. H. in Auckland Star,
9 Sep 42; W. H. Bennett in NZ Herald, 18 Sep 42
Editors repeatedly censured miners,
ministers and the government, and called anew for strong action.
For example: ‘Not all the merits of the dispute are on the side of
the employers, but whether the action of the employers in paying
reduced wages was right or wrong, it is clear that the action of the
miners is absolutely wrong…. The Government cuts a sorry figure
… the men are trading on the known weakness of the Government
which has given way to them in practically every serious industrial
argument that has arisen…. If the State has the right to order a
man into the Army, it has the right to order a man into a mine
and make him work.’
Star–Sun, 15 Sep 42
The New Zealand Herald wanted non-union
workers: no large labour force would be required, there would be
no insuperable difficulties in showing the miners that they were not,
as they comfortably believed, indispensable. ‘The Government could
and should prove to the miners … that the country can get on—
can get coal—without them. The lesson would be sharp and salutary, saving trouble in the future and averting the industrial and
transport crisis’; morale and war effort would be boosted if the
government turned from wheedling and threatening to acting and
producing.
NZ Herald, 21 Sep 42
The great question today is whether a democracy is prepared to
use a firm hand against those who sabotage its war industry….
If the only way to bring them [miners] to their senses is to call
for volunteer labour, that step must be taken, for subject to certain
safeguards, such labour can work the mine.
Ibid., 22 Sep 42
In post-strike debate, Holland claimed that the leaders should have
been ‘arrested and incarcerated’ and the men given 48 hours to
return to the mine or go into camp where he believed the soldiers
would have taken good care of them.
NZPD, vol 261, pp. 634–5
It is also probable that such
toughness would have brought forth the battle-cry ‘Victimisation’,
with support from other miners and even other industries, apart from
such practical difficulties as finding the leaders or coping with recalcitrant miners over or under military age. The strikers were not
worried lest men from the Army take over. ‘You might get a few
to work but you won’t get a thousand ex-miners to turn down their
mates’ was their feeling, and some of those on strike were themselves
lately released from the Army.
Auckland Star, 14 Sep 42, p. 4
If experienced volunteers could not
be obtained, inexperienced men would be a danger to themselves
and everyone else. Routines, slowly evolved and enforced by mining
inspectors and deputies, would have become hazards, and the dangers for ‘scabs’ underground would have been obvious to anyone
whose situation in life made him a possible volunteer.
On 15 September, Sullivan, Acting Prime Minister, likened refusal
to produce coal to the Japanese sinking New Zealand supply ships,
adding that the public reaction was as if the sinking had been done
by a ‘New Zealand bomber with a fifth column crew’; lack of coal
was paralysing the fighting effort; strong steps would be taken; people
would endure any deprivation involved rather than submit to the
internal or external aggressor.
NZ Herald, 16 Sep 42, p. 3
Semple spoke of the strikers, led
by a few wreckers, declaring civil war on the community and playing
into the hands of the Japanese.
Evening Post, 15 Sep 42, p. 3
Holland, deputy-chairman of the
War Cabinet, committed himself: ‘This is a time for the strongest
action. I want to assure the public that the law will be observed
and that those who break it will be dealt with fearlessly and firmly.
There can be no thought of any arrangement that interferes with the
processes of the law…. The question of who is to rule this country
must be settled once and for all.’
Dominion, 16 Sep 42, p. 4
Meanwhile, on Monday night 14 September, McLagan had left
for Wellington, along with Hall, secretary of the Northern Miners
Union. At Huntly, affairs stagnated and criticism grew about the
handling of the strike. There was wide recognition that work must
resume, there was the usual necessity to ‘save face’, and there was
union in-fighting, with strong conflict between executives and younger
‘irresponsibles’. Antagonisms were heightened when a meeting,
arranged by the strike committee of the MacDonald mine at a theatre for the afternoon of Tuesday 15th, was banned by the police in
the interests of public safety. The arrival that day of 30 additional
police did not sweeten the mood of Huntly, seething with talk and
divided opinions, but with no hint of violence.
NZ Herald, 16 Sep 42, p. 3
‘Well-informed
observers’ stated that had this theatre meeting been held much confusion might have been dispelled, and it would have been no surprise had the men decided to abrogate the ballot and other decisions
and vote for an immediate return to work.
Ibid.; Press, 16 Sep 42, p. 4; the Auckland Star report of 16 Sep was less optimistic
but thought ‘It might, however, have cleared the air to some extent’.
On 16 September, G. Smith,
Smith, George (d 1963aet 88): b UK, to NZ 1905; Mayor Huntly 12½ years
the Mayor of Huntly, and A. F.
Moncur MP,
Moncur, Alexander Francis: b Aust 1888, to NZ 1906; chmn Auck RSA 1919–21;
MP (Lab) Rotorua 1935–43; Mayor Auck 1947–53
who had lately toured the mines on a production
drive, tried to negotiate with the owners and to arrange a mass
meeting, but as the police would allow only these two as speakers,
the union executive would not have it.
Press, 17 Sep 42, p. 4; Auckland Star, 1 Oct 42, p. 4. Reporters of the Auckland Star
were told that banning the meeting had become a major issue; had the meeting been
held the men would have been back at work soon after.
The Federation of Labour
(of which McLagan was president) declared that however justifiable
a stoppage might be normally, to slow up the war effort was against
trade union policy and its effect was comparable to the Japanese
bombing the railways. The United Mine Workers (of which McLagan
was secretary) also urged ending a strike disastrous for miners and
the whole Labour movement. The Auckland Trades Council ‘while
fully realising the justice of the miners’ case’ entreated them to resume
in the interests of the struggle against the Axis,
In Print, 23 Sep 42; the meeting was on 17 September
and the communist-minded In Print declared itself, despite the mine owners’
‘provocative and truculent’ action, against the strike method at the
present time.
Ibid., 16 Sep 42
Only the Auckland watersiders proffered support,
sending £249 as strike relief.
NZ Herald, 18 Sep 42, p. 2; Auckland Star, 1 Oct 42, p. 4
Any support for the strike was unlikely to appear in print, for
J. T. Paul,
Paul, Hon John Thomas, CBE(’58) (1874–1964): b Aust, to NZ 1899; founder, Pres
(1917–20) NZ Labour party; ed Otago Labour paper 1905–6; Otago Witness
1924–32; printing, then literary staff Otago Daily Times1932–9; Director Publicity
1939–45; MLC 1907–19, 1946–50; JP 1906
Director of Censorship and Publicity, had instructed
newspaper editors that there must be ‘no publication of reports of
meetings, resolutions or statements in support of the unlawful strike,
or any statement supporting or condemning the strikers without
reference to the Director of Publicity.’
Auckland Star, 16 Oct 42, p. 2. This instruction had at least one unexpected result.
Semple, addressing a Tauranga meeting, ‘was tremendous’ on the Huntly strikers,
according to Doidge, National MP for Tauranga, but the local paper’s long report had
no word of Semple’s attack, and the editor, when taxed, claimed that he was prohibited
from mentioning the strike. NZPD, vol 261, p. 685
On 17 September Fraser returned from America, and at Huntly
the trial of the Pukemiro men began. All of them, even those absent
or on compensation for injury, pleaded guilty to taking part in an
illegal strike, while denying full responsibility for it,
Auckland Star, 1 Oct 42, p. 4
though the
prosecution agreed to exclude 14 boys of 17 years or less who would
have been swayed by others. The magistrate, W. H. Freeman, after
twice adjourning the Court to facilitate negotiations before penalties
should harden attitudes still further, on 18 September sentenced 182
men to a month in prison. There was, however, no move to carry
them off, and Fraser later claimed full responsibility for this delay.
NZPD, vol 261, p. 643
Meanwhile, the strike persisted.
On Saturday the 19th McLagan and Hall, back in Huntly after
seeing Fraser, proposed to address next day four meetings there and
at the mine settlements, refusing still to have a general meeting,
demand for which was growing stronger: four delegates—half the
Northern Miners executive—walked out of an executive meeting on
this decision.
Auckland Star, 21 Sep 42, p. 4; NZ Herald, 21 Sep 42, p. 2
When the first meeting was due to start at Huntly on Sunday
morning, there were only about 30 men in the hall, though about
350 were in the street outside. McLagan coming out of the footpath
towards a group of 60 began to speak: ‘Men of the Northern Miners
Union—’, but they turned from him, walking out of hearing, while
a few voices asked who had called the meeting. McLagan approached
another large group, trying to persuade them to come into the hall,
but again there was pointed, silent dispersal. Eventually he there
addressed a small and restless group of about 40. The afternoon
meetings at Glen Afton, Renown and Glen Massey were abandoned,
as was a mass meeting arranged for Monday at Huntly. McLagan,
with almost 30 years of union work behind him, was bluntly rejected
by the militants, who had grown in strength during the two weeks
of rumour and intrigue. There were widespread jibes about the spectacle of a Minister of the Crown forced to pursue a parley in the
streets.
About 600 finally met at Huntly on 21 September. Reporters
were not present, but it was ‘learned unofficially’ that while McLagan
was speaking early in the meeting ‘the suggestion arose’ that the
men should return to work forthwith on condition that the government took over the mines. This was approved 440:130, there was
an adjournment for McLagan to telephone Wellington, and a hard
line proposal to continue striking for the minimum wage was rejected.
This meeting was not fully representative, particularly of the original
strikers, who wanted the minimum wage issue settled first, and the
government did not officially reply. McLagan battled with the Pukemiro men again next morning, and later that day a union notice
posted at Huntly said that the mass meeting favoured return to work
under State control, that the government had decided to take control, and that members should resume work next day.
NZ Herald, 23 Sep 42, p. 2
This anticipated by a night Webb’s announcement on 23 September of State
control for the duration of the war, with the owners retaining possession. Still the strike was not ended, but there were now two issues
before the miners, the original dispute and State control. The second
distracted adherents from the first,
There was, however, no reference to State control on the ballot forms. Ibid., 26 Sep 42,
p. 6, and statement by H. G. R. Mason, Dominion, 3 Oct 42, p. 8
and finally after more meetings
another ballot on Friday 25 September voted conclusively, 715:428,
to resume work with the original dispute going before a committee.
Work started on Monday 28th, and next day it was announced that
the sentences on the Pukemiro men were suspended, provided they
worked diligently and took no part in strikes for the duration.
There were precedents under non-Labour governments for such
remissions, and Fraser claimed that the law had been upheld, a
major industrial disaster averted and coal production resumed, while
the rights of the coal owners would be fully protected. Coates tried
to quieten alarm raised by the dread words ‘socialisation’ and
‘nationalisation’, saying, ‘I personally believe that there is a distinct
difference between socialisation and the form of control it is proposed
to adopt.’
NZ Herald, 24 Sep 42, p. 2
But a chorus of disapproval arose from the press, Chambers of Commerce, manufacturers’ associations and other bodies of
conservative thought.
Holland and his followers claimed that the State control proposal
came from Waikato, that the mine owners
Including hard-working dairy farmers, for the New Zealand Co-operative Dairy Company owned Glen Afton and leased the MacDonald mine from the Crown. Auckland
Star, 22 Sep 42, p. 2
had been deprived of
their rights at the dictation of striking miners. Fraser explained that
Coates had previously
Typescript notes, obviously Fraser’s, outlining moves after his return from the USA on
Thursday 17 September, have: ‘Mr Coates on Saturday evening and Sunday in discussion
with mine owners’.
held discreet exploratory discussions with
the mine owners at Auckland and the matter was under consideration by the government when it was spoken of at the meeting at
Huntly, ‘an occurrence that I regret very much.’
NZPD, vol 261, p. 642
The New Zealand
Herald, in its first comment on the proposal, understood ‘from a
reliable report’ that nationalisation had been under consideration by
the government for some days.
NZ Herald, 22 Sep 42
Webb, on the 23rd, said that
regulations for State control had been drafted (without reference to
the owners) a week before the Huntly meeting on the 21st, and
held in readiness for enactment in the last resort if the strike lasted
long.
Ibid., 24 Sep 42, p. 2
It is likely that he was improvising in his zeal to deny both
that the miners instigated the move and that the government was
eagerly awaiting opportunities to nationalise. Coates said that in his
two preliminary discussions the owners were quite friendly and helpful but they opposed the few headings offered, ‘for no regulations
had then been set out’, claiming that they had done no wrong and
not seeing why they should be picked out for special treatment.
NZPD, vol 261, pp. 682–3
In any case, the idea of the State running the mines was broadly
current. The State could spend more than private enterprise could
both on mine developments that were commercially unprofitable but
vital in obtaining coal and on amenities such as housing. Since mid-1940 it had already taken over three mines that were in difficulties.
The minutes of the United Mine Workers council on 11 April 1941
briefly record that a remit for nationalisation, moved by Hall of the
Northern Mines, was carried. In Britain the nationalisation of coal
resources, enacted in 1938, became effective on 1 July 1942. Webb’s
statement on 24 July that unless mine owners co-operated over housing he would recommend State take-over for the duration should
be remembered, as should the opinion of the Mayor of Ngaruawahia,
See p. 408
given on 9 September, that there would not be peace on
the coalfield till the government took over. The New Zealand Herald
report, on 22 September, said that the widening of the dispute to
the broad and controversial issue of State control ‘is said to be the
expression of many latent beliefs held by the miners. There has been
practically no previous mention of the subject at the many informal
gatherings during the 18 days of the stoppage, but it is recognised
that, in the minds of many miners, the questions of mine management and State control are inextricably linked.’ Alongside this, a
letter from Tauranga, presumably written several days earlier, mentioned that the miners had ‘made it evident that they want the
nationalisation of all coal mines.’
NZ Herald, 22 Sep 42, p. 2
Meanwhile, the strike front had shifted to the War Administration.
See Wood, pp. 235–7. On p. 232 he explains the War Administration: on 29 May
1942 direct talks between the party leaders began, and on 24 June the caucuses of both
parties agreed on yet another addition to the structure of New Zealand’s wartime government. The war effort was to be the responsibility of a War Administration of seven
Government members (Fraser, Jones, Sullivan, Semple, Paikea, McLagan, Nordmeyer)
and six Opposition (Holland, Coates, Hamilton, Polson, Bodkin, Broadfoot). The War
Cabinet (which Holland joined and of which he became deputy chairman) was to act
as the ‘executive’ of the War Administration in matters not dealt with by the full body.
Full details were given in Evening Post, 1 Jul 42
On the evening of 21 September a meeting of Cabinet and
War Administration members decided, as the only way out of the
impasse, to make the Waikato mines a controlled industry and it
was anticipated that the miners’ sentences would be suspended. Holland objected and withdrew; the other Nationalists present (Coates,
Hamilton, Polson and Broadfoot) did not dissent in this unanimous
decision, but next day Polson and Broadfoot, with Bodkin
Bodkin, Hon Sir William, KCVO(’54) (1883–1964): barrister & solicitor 1909, MP
(United) Otago Central 1928ff; Min Civil Defence, War Admin; Min Internal Aff from
1949
who
had not been present, joined Holland in protest against the triumph
of lawlessness and a policy leading to complete economic chaos. The
National party caucus on 29 September withdrew its members from
the War Cabinet and War Administration, saying that there should
be a general election as soon as the war situation allowed, which
Holland said should be in about three months.
NZ Herald, 5 Oct 42, p. 2
Approval for the National party actions was not wholesale, even
in normally conservative areas. The press was divided. The three
metropolitan Stars, while consistently condemning the strike and the
way it was handled, disapproved of Holland’s group forsaking their
posts and the attempt at unity, and did not favour an early election.
The Star–Sun was not moved by Holland’s scruples at the government’s compromise: ‘What did he think they would do? They have
compromised in every serious labour trouble that has occurred since
the war started and it is certain that they will compromise to the
end of the chapter, because it is their nature to do so’,
Star–Sun, 23 Sep 42
and it
thought that Holland showed poor appreciation of the government’s
dilemma and the dangers facing the country when the magistrate
‘slammed the door’ on conciliation by imposing gaol sentences.
Ibid., 30 Sep 42
The Auckland Star, after saying that the government had got itself
out of a bad situation by establishing a bad precedent, risked a
prophecy:
In the long run the country will be better off with a real and
active Opposition … than with an Administration based on a
political truce which in Mr Holland’s view has become fictitious.
But if the Dominion now enjoys a period of industrial peace, and
if, in particular, the new control of the Waikato coal mines works
smoothly, Mr Holland and his colleagues may before long wonder
whose interests have been served by their resignations.
Auckland Star, 30 Sep 42
In a cartoon by J. C. H., Holland trundled along Politics Lane a
bundle out of which stuck three pairs of feet, while a miner advised,
‘Don’t let walking out of the War Cabinet worry you Syd—you’re
not an essential industry’.
Ibid., 1 Oct 42
A few provincial papers also were dubious. The Napier Daily
Telegraph of 30 September, while sympathising with Holland,
thought that he might have been wiser to have protested but continued his Administration work; the Timaru Herald said ‘This is a
hasty and regrettable decision’.
Timaru Herald, 1 Oct 42
The Otago Daily Times of 1 October viewed the resignations with ‘mingled approval and regret’. The
Dominion saw them as a ‘logical and proper course’, setting an
example greatly needed where ‘so grave an abandonment of both
policy and principle called for drastic protest.’
Dominion, 1 Oct 42
The Press was particularly concerned at Holland being let down.
Two days before the trial Holland, deputy chairman of the War
Cabinet, had given an assurance that lawbreakers would be dealt
with fearlessly and firmly, with no such interference; ‘by going back
on that statement, the Government has brought itself into contempt
and has shaken public confidence in the impartiality of the administration of justice.’ Nor did it think that the War Administration
was worth saving.
Press, 25 Sep, 1 Oct 42
But neither the Press nor the Otago Daily Times
wanted a hasty election.
The New Zealand Herald and the Evening Post went all the way
with Holland. The Post held that withdrawal by the Nationalists
was inevitable, otherwise they would have become parties to an abject
surrender; the country must shortly face the turmoil of an election.
Evening Post, 30 Sep 42
The Herald declared: ‘The Government…. showed itself unable
and therefore unfit to govern. It suffered one of its Ministers to be
ignored and itself to be defied and mocked … Mr Holland could
not do otherwise than dissociate himself from such pusillanimous
proceedings…. Huntly follows on Westfield. None can believe that
the sequence will end at Huntly.’ The situation demanded an all-in national cabinet or an early election.
NZ Herald, 1 Oct 42
Within the parliamentary National party, there was some division.
See Wood, p. 237
Coates and Hamilton, resigning from the party, accepted
Fraser’s invitation to rejoin War Cabinet as individuals, issuing on
5 October a dignified statement tuned to the realities of the situation
and the prime necessity of getting coal. In a no-confidence debate
moved by Holland in mid-October, two others, H. S. S. Kyle
Kyle, Herbert Seton Stewart (1873–1955): MP (Nat) Riccarton 1925–43
of
Riccarton and J. N. Massey
Massey, John Norman (1885–1964): son W. F. Massey; MP (Nat) Franklin 1928–35,
1938–57
of Franklin, stood with them, saying
that the government had taken the only practical course. Coates said
that it was easier to talk of punishing ringleaders than to discover
accurately who they were, and that those who talked of shooting
them should point out who would do the shooting. ‘We do not
want Hitlerism in this country.’
NZPD, vol 261, p. 681
Several other non-Labour members regretted that the magistrate had imposed gaol sentences. ‘I do
not agree with gaoling strikers,’ said H. G. Dickie, National, of
Patea, ‘They should be given a stiff fine and the strike treated as a
continuing offence.’
Wilkinson, Charles Anderson, CBE(’51) (1868–1956): MP (Ref) Egmont 1912–19,
(Indep) 1928–43; Mayor Eltham 6½ years
(Independent, Egmont) had similar views
NZPD, vol 261, pp. 707, 709
and Hamilton said that the magistrate’s decision had caused a good
deal of the difficulty, whereas a fine would have been practicable no
matter how many were involved.
Ibid., p. 712
Holland himself, though early
in the debate he had declared that the miners’ leaders should have
been incarcerated and the rest given 48 hours to get back to the
mine or into camp,
Ibid., p. 634
later adopted this view. In reply to a newspaper correspondent’s direct question whether he would have gaoled
the strikers for a month, Holland wrote: ‘If I had been in the Prime
Minister’s position, I would not have allowed a law to remain on
the Statute Book that could not be enforced. To throw hundreds of
men into prison merely makes martyrs of them, but if the men had
been fined that was punishment that would have had the required
results and the ends of justice would have been adequately served.’
Press, 22 Dec 42, p. 6
Meanwhile the news from the Solomons was poor, with the
Americans holding, but only holding, Guadalcanal’s airfield and
other places seized early in August. “The next six months will be
the period of greatest danger in the south-west Pacific,’ pronounced
the Press on 28 September. By mid-October, when Holland and
Doidge in the House were urging an election, the long-expected
counter-attack was developing and, as the Auckland Star said, ‘There
is only one fight that the Dominion can afford now.’
Auckland Star, 16 Oct 42. The cable headline was ‘Big Battle Raging in the Solomons’
What had
made the strike specially reprehensible also made an election
untimely.
The National Disputes Committee,
J. Devlin, A. Prendiville and F. Crook of the United Mine Workers, and C. C. Davis,
T. O. Bishop and F. Carson of the Coal Mine Owners Association, under chairman
J. Dowgray, a senior working-class figure who had represented the miners in a commission on a disaster at Huntly in 1914 and was chairman of the Coal Mines Council1945–7
which examined Pukemiro’s problems on 3 to 4 October found, as so often in trade union
disputes, that the cause lay well behind the point of outbreak. It
was shown that in the first fortnight of August, five pairs of men
working in the places concerned had averaged 14, 11, 9.8, 12.6 and
17.2 tons per shift, besides doing their own trucking, at 26s 7d a
day to each pair. When the trucking was cancelled in the last fortnight of August, an average of only 7.2 tons per shift was cut and
filled. At first the miners’ advocate, G. Lawson, maintained that the
reduction was the result of change in the nature of the coal, but
later ‘admitted frankly’ that the miners had not produced all they
could because they thought that even by working hard they could
not earn satisfactory wages; when the trucking arrangement was
ended, they deliberately reduced their daily output. Management
therefore was justified in refusing to make up their earnings. However, the committee judged that only two of the eight places seen
were good, at two it would be difficult for even a skilled miner to
earn the minimum wage and the others were borderline cases. In
the mine manager’s opinion, fair production from this section would
be 15 tons per pair a shift, which would average the minimum
wage of 25s 4d a day, whereas the general mine average was more
than 40s. Ever since this section had first been opened, its tonnage
rate had caused dissatisfaction, being based on that of earlier workings 12 feet high, while currently height was restricted to 9 feet.
But for the trucking arrangement, which had raised the miners’
earnings substantially, trouble would have come to a head earlier.
Instead of approaching the question
by proper and well established methods, the Pukemiro union
attempted to use the minimum wage provision to force it to a
conclusion; hence the whole of the recent trouble. There was no
justification at any time for the union’s action, but there remains
still to be settled the important matter of the tonnage rates for
the Taupiri section of the mine and the parties should without
delay proceed to deal with it by proper methods.
Report of the committee, Auckland Star, 5 Oct 42, p. 4; NZ Herald, 6 Oct 42, p. 2
These methods duly raised the tonnage rates in that section by 9d
a ton, removing or at least lessening the original grievance.
Hare, Labour in New Zealand 1943, p. 39
Except at Auckland, the main dailies were content to publish the
committee’s finding that the strike was not justified; they did not
give its report in full, notably omitting its recommendations on the
tonnage rate.
eg, Dominion, Evening Post, Press, Star-Sun, Otago Daily Times
The Auckland Star, however, after drawing attention
to long-standing dissatisfaction with the tonnage rate, continued: ‘As
so often in the past … once men resort to “direct action” … the
original grievance is submerged. In this case the question, so far as
it was commonly understood, was whether or not the men had been
“going slow.” Now, after so much else has happened, the committee
has detected and defined the original grievance—the apparent cause
of the “go-slow”—and has strongly urged that it be investigated
and settled by proper methods and without delay’. The Star also
commented on the secrecy that had confused the dispute:
It has been left to the committee … to reveal that although the
mine manager rightly refused to pay the minimum wage to the
ten men who were going slow he continued to make up the earnings of other miners when necessary. There was therefore no question of an ‘attack on the principle of the minimum wage.’ Both
these important matters should have been elucidated, publicly,
at an early stage, but mine owners and union alike refused to
take advantage of the opportunity to make their cases public. The
reason often given for secrecy in such areas is that publicity ‘will
not help’; but it would be very hard to say whose interests were
served by the secrecy with which the recent dispute was surrounded—certainly not the interests of the public.
Auckland Star, 6 Oct 42
On 10 October, emergency regulation 1942/293 established a Board
to control the five mines concerned in all aspects—such as methods
of working, plant, equipment, workers’ housing, hiring and firing—
for the duration of the war, while the owners were to receive each
year an amount equal to the profits averaged over the last three
years. The Board was dominated by the Minister, who chaired it,
with a casting vote, and appointed all the members, four from the
owners, two from the miners and one other. Webb found the field
immediately transformed by goodwill and zeal for production, which
within a month rose by more than a thousand tons a week. Pit
committees were interviewing absentees, there was co-operative
trucking, machines were splitting coal pillars, a practice the Union
had previously prohibited, and alternate Saturdays were worked.
Auckland Star, 12, 29, 30 Oct, 7 Nov 42, pp. 4, 6, 4, 6; NZ Herald, 2 Nov 42
(cartoon)
Three hundred miners would be released from the Army as soon as
there were houses for them; 20 houses were to be built at Mangapehi, 20 at Tatu and 40 in the Huntly area. Of the last, 20 at Glen
Afton were to be finished by about the end of November, when
another 20 were to be started at Rotowaro. They were ‘being built
by the companies under an arrangement with the State which had
given priorities with men and materials’, and James Fletcher, Commissioner of Defence Construction, had given his powerful attention
to the matter.
NZ Herald, 13 Oct 42, p. 2; Auckland Star, 30 Oct 42, p. 4
The housing spurt was short. The 1943 report of the Mines
Department recalled that since 1935, under Labour, £270,000 had
built 370 miners’ homes, £245,000 at State or State controlled mines.
Since the war’s start, 186 houses costing £117,788 had been built
at State mines, and in addition 55 at the Waikato collieries since
October 1942. The report added that there was statutory obligation
(Section 151, Coal Mines Act 1925) on colliery owners to provide
satisfactory housing, and in view of the government’s financial assistance there was now no excuse for failure to build homes where
necessary ‘as speedily as possible under existing conditions’.
A to J1943, C–2, p. 5
This
was not very speedy; there were great and growing demands for all
kinds of construction, for defence, industry, farm housing and,
increasingly after 1943, homes for returning servicemen, while
materials were acutely short. Later mines reports told of scarce builders and materials preventing the provision of miners’ homes and
thereby the employment of more miners, though camps for single
men were established at the Renown and Wilton mines in the Waikato, using army huts plus cooking and other facilities. In 1946,
houses were still hoped for, and hostels were being considered.
Ibid., 1944, C–2, p. 6, 1946, C–2, p. 21
Nor were the defects of existing houses rapidly set right. In October
1943, the Raglan County Council, stirred to investigate by the Health
Department, had never seen such filthy, insanitary conditions as those
at Glen Afton and other mining towns in the district, and decided
that mine owners, the Mines Department and local ratepayers in
each town should confer to improve household drainage.
Press, 18 Oct 43, p. 4
At first, production in the Waikato mines improved. It was estimated that the strike had lost well over 50 000 tons of coal. In
January 1943 Webb, announcing that during 1942 the northern
district mines had yielded 929 063 tons compared with 921 747
tons the previous year, claimed that strike losses had been made
up.
Auckland Star, 8 Jan 43, p. 4
In the Waikato mines, during the first eight months of State
control, output exceeded that of a similar previous period by 42 125
tons or 8.37 per cent,
A to J1943, C–2, p. 2
reached its peak in 1943, the first full year
of control, and thereafter waned. One mine, Wilton Collieries (1934)
Ltd, was fully sold to the government in October 1944. The other
four, Pukemiro, Glen Afton, Taupiri and Renown, which had
together produced 688 172 tons in 1941 and 689 853 in 1942,
yielded 741 856 tons in 1943, 693 346 in 1944, 631 645 in 1945
and 593 767 in 1946.
Ibid., 1947, C–2, p. 12; Baker, p. 412
Meanwhile, payments guaranteed to the
owners, assessment of which proved difficult, in all cost the War
Expenses Account £241,895 by March 1945. Government, however,
claimed that appeals to the managing board, representing both owners and workers, prevented any prolonged stoppages at these mines,
apart from four days in sympathy with railway strikers in January
1945.
A to J1946, C–2, p. 13; WHN, ‘Mines Department’, pp. 46–8
Elsewhere, when development became uneconomic for owners,
government bought out several mines, to sustain production either
by conventional methods or by opencasting. Wallsend and Dobson
were thus taken over in February 1943, Stockton in June 1944,
Mossbank and Wilton in October 1944, Ohai and Wairaki in January 1945. The press generally disapproved of such nationalisation
at the taxpayers’ expense, but remits passed at council meetings of
the United Mine Workers repeatedly advocated that all mines should
be nationalised.
Minutes of United Mineworkers 1932–49, 30 Nov 43, 30 Apr, 10 May, 29 Oct 44,
20 Apr, 2 Nov 45
The basic principle that coal reserves, a national
asset, would be more soundly developed by the State than by profit-minded interests, finally led to the Coal Act of 1948, vesting in the
Crown all private rights to coal and compensating owners with lump
sums.
Total coal production continued to rise: the record 2 639 507 tons
of 1941 became 2 680 041 in 1942, 2 787 868 in 1943, 2 805 970
in 1944, 2 833 576 in 1945 and 2 793 870 in 1946. From underground mines output diminished: 1943’s 2 725 831 tons dropped
to 2 609 516 tons in 1944, 2 380 896 in 1945 and 2 265 170 in
1946.
One underground mine, the James, ceased from exhaustion in July 1943; several others,
notably Stockton on the West Coast and mines at Ohai and Wairaki, became mainly
opencast.
The decrease was more than balanced by the government’s
new opencast mines, where production per man was about three
times more than by underground methods, and where quite small
deposits could be economically exhausted. Even though for several
years earth-moving machinery was scarce, opencasting was practicable where the overlay was not too thick and in 1945, when some
large machines specially designed for such work were imported, production rose steeply. Opencast coal in 1940 had totalled 50 763
tons, produced by 36 men; 55 774 tons in 1942 and 62 037 tons
in 1943. In 1944, it rose to 196 454 tons, using 242 men. In 1945,
51 such mines, large and small, operated by 332 men, yielded
452 680 tons, more than one seventh of total production.
A to J1946, C–2, pp. 4, 6
But demand continued to exceed supply. There were recurring
gas shortages, basically due to gas equipment being designed for
imported bituminous coal, but sharpened by shipping delays in the
bar harbours of the West Coast. On the railways restrictions fluctuated but were always present, with long queues at booking offices.
Supplies of domestic coal continued uncertain, with customers often
limited to one or two bags at a time, while from the start of October
1943 bags were reduced in weight. In the recurring winter crises,
and in several Decembers, miners worked on ‘back’ Saturdays and
also on some public holidays.
See p. 403
Miners themselves were still scarce; some hundreds were released
from the Army, but others were ageing. There continued to be disputes. In 1942, in 24 disputes, miners lost 24 450 work-days out
of the year’s industrial total of 65 strikes costing 51 189 work-days.
During 1943, in 33 disputes, miners lost 8901 work-days in the
year’s total of 69 strikes and 14 687 work-days lost. In 1944, there
were 66 coalmine strikes involving 18 470 work-days in the total
149 disputes and 52 602 work-days. In 1945, 75 mine strikes cost
25 253 work-days out of the 66 629 lost in 154 disputes.
Yearbook1944, p. 555, 1945, p. 583, 1946, p. 675, 1947–49, pp. 720, 722
Most
of them lasted only a day or less—as when after a normal stopwork
meeting no more work was done that day
A to J1946, H-11, p. 10
—and a few of the
longer ones did not involve a quarrel with management but were
for such causes as sympathy in several mines when the appeal against
mobilisation of a soldier who had worked in a mine while on furlough in 1943 was dismissed.
Ibid., 1944, H–11, p. 1
Others resulted from sympathy
with railway workers, or because there was no doctor in the district.
Ibid., 1945, H–11, p. 6
New Zealand’s strikes during the first four years of the war, in
relation to those in other countries, were tabulated by the Labour
Department in 1947 thus:
Ibid., 1947, H–11, p. 24
DAYS LOST PER 1000 PERSONS IN MINING, INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT
YearNZAustraliaCanadaGreat BritainUSA19381641351951364571939237445167132957194011814821888833019411088972949710961942214335296138170194363865677162478
(The totals are, in descending order, Australia 5375, USA 3488,
Canada1717, New Zealand 904, Great Britain 753.)
Two examples, taken at random from reports on State mines for the
year ending March 1945, give sharper, if narrower, focus on miners’
withholding of labour. The Strongman mine, employing 241 men
and 9 boys worked 244 days with a gross output of 107 114 tons,
being 12 days fewer and 1413 tons more than in 1944. Possible
working days, including Good Friday, Easter Sunday (1944) and
18 ‘back’ Saturdays, numbered 278. Those not worked were: Easter
Monday and Anzac Day; two days for a breakdown; one day in
dispute re truckers’ turn on coal; three days over power failure; two
days because the bath house was cold; two days for funerals of
employees;
These were not from accidents in the mine.
two days’ dispute over waiting time; 10 days for
Christmas holidays; two days as additional Christmas holidays taken
by men; four days in dispute re pay; two days because of fire in
mine; one day in dispute re transfer of a carpenter, and Good Friday
1945. At Mangapehi, 119 men and two boys, who produced 60 860
tons gross, worked 240 days 2 hours (¼ day) out of a possible 265
days, taking off: two extra days with their Christmas holidays, two
days for no apparent reason; three days, fire in mine; nine days,
union meetings; one civil day; three and a quarter days, miscellaneous breakdowns; four and a half days, disputes etc.
A to J1945, C–2A, pp. 2–3, 8–9
Webb, the Minister of Mines, while regularly pointing to increased
output, complained of disloyalty to the government and frivolous
stoppages and stop-work meetings.
eg, Evening Post, 6 Mar 45, p. 4
The coalmine owners pointed
out that but for the new opencast mines the shortage would have
been very grave indeed, adding that it was not generally known that
much of the increase was of inferior quality coal which would not
be saleable in normal times. ‘From our own knowledge of what has
been happening over the past six years we are convinced that the
principal reason why output of so many of the old-established collieries had been so disappointing is to be found in the mishandling
of the industrial situation which has led to and permitted short-time work, innumerable petty stoppages and marked absenteeism
throughout the industry.’ Concessions forced in existing awards and
substantial rises in miners’ earnings—from 5s to 10s a day for miners, 10s a day for truckers—were further objections.
Dominion, 20 Apr 45, p. 6; Evening Post, 20 Apr 45, p. 8
As well as shortage due to additional demands and reduced
imports, there could be technical reasons for fluctuations in a mine’s
output, such as development work, size and accessibility of the seams,
or whether or not pillars were taken out, but both public and press,
when chilly or in travel difficulties, blamed the miners. Thus the
Auckland Star on 26 February 1945, commenting on the desperate
shortage of railway coal, with severe restrictions in both passenger
and freight services, recalled that from the outset Webb had been
billed as a practical man who knew the industry inside out and, in
particular, how to deal with coal miners. ‘The experience of nine
years suggests rather that the coal miners know how to deal with
Mr Webb. They observe his hat-raising performances with derisive
amusement and they are unmoved by his rare and apologetic rebukes.
They produce coal when they want to do so, and when they don’t
want to do so, they don’t.’
Complicated and obscure factors often lie behind strike figures,
confounding conclusions, but a few broad lines show through the
war years. In 1939, there were 66 disputes, costing 53 801 work
days; in 1940, 56 disputes cost 28 097 days and in 1941, 89 disputes took 26 237 days. In 1942, when danger was nearer to New
Zealand, 51 189 work-days were lost in 65 strikes. It seems likely
that the impact of labour regimentation prompted a rash of strikes.
In 1943, when victory was assured but distant, there was the lowest
tally: 14 687 days lost, in 69 strikes. Perhaps full awareness of the
war sank in after the worst of the event; also, workers had become
used to Manpower regulations, finding them less feudal than they
had feared; Stabilisation was in its most promising phase and there
was abundant overtime; there was, further, the strong possibility that
a strike-exasperated public might install the National party in that
year’s election. All these factors could have contributed to the industrial steadiness of 1943. In 1944, and still more in 1945, war urgency
was fading, leaving room for sectional interests. Lower paid workers
were increasingly restive as despite the apparent steadiness of the
price index, living costs rose and belief in stabilisation was eroded,
while overtime was reduced or seemed likely soon to be reduced;
the National party had been safely exiled for another term. In these
years over a wider range of industries and firms, strikes increased;
52 602 work days were lost during 148 strikes in 1944, and 66 629
in the 154 of 1945. (In 1946, another election year, only 30 393
days were to be lost in 96 strikes.)
Yearbook 1947–49, p. 720
The watersiders, who since
1941 had been quiet under large overtime payments and the quick
settlement procedures of the Waterfront Commission,
See p. 430
again came
into prominence with stoppages, but many normally more docile
workers, such as bus-drivers, railway, gas, dairy factory workers,
timber-workers and engineers added their quota of working days
lost.
Waterside workers, traditionally a highly militant section of the
work force, did not have major strikes during the war. Because their
industry was so crucial, the government stepped in early and
appointed the Waterfront Control Commission to speed up work,
lessen friction and settle disputes quickly.
The start of the war found watersiders restive. Their award had
expired in June 1938; both sides manoeuvred, delaying negotiations
for various purposes. Their Union distrusted the Court of Arbitration
from which it had in the past obtained less satisfaction than it had
through agreements with the employers, the shipowners, but meanwhile the basic pay rate was falling behind those of other work
groups.
A to J1941, H–45, p. 2; NZWW (New Zealand Waterside Workers) Union secretary’s
annual report, 2 Dec 41, p. 2, Roberts Papers, B43/21—‘never during the history of
the waterside workers has the Court of Arbitration conceded one single condition….’
After the war’s start, fewer ships came and work, paid by
the hour, was done more slowly. Against this background, in the
first months, there were stoppages and go-slow tactics which outraged public opinion and drew widespread criticism. The Overseas
Shipowners Allotment Committee wrote of the waterfront in New
Zealand being notorious for inefficiency and expense.
War History Narrative, ‘The Waterfront Control Commission’ (hereinafter ‘The Waterfront’), p. 20; Baker, p. 395
James Roberts, secretary of the Union, in March 1940 amid a chorus of dissent
told a meeting: ‘This is the only country in the world where the
winches do not work continuously during the war…. In Great
Britain today ships are worked continuously and the same thing
applies to the United States and to Australia. I am not saying that
I agree with it. I do not want to have to work two shifts.’
Report of meeting, 15 Mar 40, of National Executive NZWW Union, attended by
rank and file members from Auckland and Wellington, Roberts Papers, B58/2, p. 13
He
and others on the Union’s national executive opposed industrial action
lest it embarrass the Labour government. Said one: ‘The Labour
Party … is not perfect. But with all its faults we are immeasurably
better off than we would be under the rule of Adam Hamilton.
Had the old government been in power we would have been working on the wharves by this time under a licensing system.’
Ibid., p. 8
After some months’ research and amid growing unrest, the
government in April 1940 set up the Waterfront Control Commission with wide powers to ensure expedition in the loading,
unloading and storage of cargo.
Waterfront Control Commission (WCC) Emergency Regulations, 1940/59
It had three members, on £1,250
a year,
NZ Herald, 28 Jun 40, p. 6
then a handsome salary. The chairman was Captain R. E.
Price,
Price, Captain Richard Everett, OBE(’46) (1891–1960): b UK, to NZ 1904; 25 years
in sail and steam from deck boy to master; 1NZEF 1916–17, Lt RNR 1917–19; Labour
Dept Inspector of Scaffolding, of Weights & Measures and Factories Awards; Conciliation
Cmssnr Auck 1936; chmn Fish Export Advisory Cmte 1937, Navy Pay & Conditions
Cmssn 1939, WCC 1940–6
who had served in the navy during the previous war and
as ship’s master on the New Zealand coast until 1926: he had since
worked as inspector of scaffolding for the Department of Labour and
as a Conciliation Commissioner in the industrial arbitration system.
NZ Herald, 28 Jun 40, p. 6; Press
, 12 Mar 40, p. 8; Hare, Industrial Relations, p. 234
James Roberts, secretary not only of the Waterside Workers
Union but also of the Alliance of Labour throughout its life from
1919–36, braved charges of deserting to serve the bosses, because
he believed that he could and should help to reconcile waterfront
interests and the needs of war. The third member was initially
H. A. McLeod,
McLeod, Hugh Andrew (b 1896): sea experience in British, American, Nova Scotian
sailing ships for 8 years, officer Union Steam Ship Co NZ 1903–6, then 10 years ashore
with same company; head stevedore, Shaw, Savill Auck 1916; joined firm of stevedoring
contractors 1921, later Dir; WCC 1940
managing director of a stevedoring company, but
he resigned from the Commission early in May 1941, and was
replaced in January 1942 by Captain T. H. Bowling,
Bowling, Captain Thomas Henry (d 1964aet 80): b at sea in Shaw, Savill clipper
Akaroa; served time in sail and steam; joined Union Steam Ship Co 1912, 1st cmnd
1925; Asst Wharf Superint Dunedin 1927; Wharf Superint Lyttelton 1929, Wgrn
1934; seconded Wgtn Co-operative Labour and Employment Assn (later Waterfront
Industry Cmssn) 1939–40, WCC 1942–6
late Marine
Superintendent of the Union Steamship Company at Wellington.
Evening Post, 22 Jan 42, p. 8; WCC ‘Report on Organisation and Activities as at 31
March 1944’, p. 1, Roberts Papers, B260
Price and Roberts had worked alone until December 1941 when
the waterfront employers began actions challenging the legality of
the Commission’s orders and decisions made without the third
member. As the Solicitor-General advised that these proceedings
would undoubtedly succeed, Price and Roberts filed consent to judgment that the orders and decisions in question should be quashed.
The shipping companies and the Union required some to be reheard and the rest were re-enacted by the full Commission in a
blanket order.
Evening Post, 1 Apr 42, p. 6; WHN, ‘The Waterfront’, pp. 249–50
To ensure speedy handling of cargo, the Commission was given
power to control all wharves and equipment; to employ all waterside
workers, directing or varying existing methods of engaging labour,
and taking over control of offices and staff. It could introduce any
new method of employing labour or handling cargo, prescribe conditions upon which any person was employed, and exclude or suspend from the wharves any persons, including watersiders, whose
presence was prejudicial to the quick despatch of shipping. From
the shipowners it was to recover all moneys expended on wages or
other purposes connected with loading, unloading or storing cargo,
and it could impose levies on them for its administrative expenses
and for special purposes.
As a first step towards improving workers’ co-operation and morale,
the Commission in June 1940 raised their pay by 2d an hour to
2s 10d, the rise being that awarded to other trades under a standard
wage pronouncement by the Court of Arbitration in September 1937;
watersiders had been excluded from it on account of their average
hours being fewer than 40 per week. From October 1940 the general
5 per cent cost of living bonus, reckoned at 2d an hour, was added
and from May 1942 another at the same rate raised the basic pay
of watersiders to 3s 2d an hour.
The cost of living 4d was not included in overtime reckonings, so that the normal
overtime rate, time-and-a-half, was 4s 7d, and Saturday mornings, at time-and-a-quarter,
3s 10½d an hour.
Later, in March 1945 the Court
of Arbitration pronounced that the standard wage rates fixed in September 1937 should increase by 3½d an hour, and this, with a pro
rata increase for overtime, was built into watersiders’ pay from
9 July 1945.
WHN, ‘The Waterfront’, pp. 166, 172
In June 1940 the Commission hoped to extend the ‘bureau system’ for engaging labour, already established at Auckland, Wellington, Lyttelton, Wanganui, New Plymouth and Napier, to other
ports of any size. This system replaced the old ‘auction block’ method,
whereby employers directly selected men as they crowded around
the labour stool in a scramble for place and favour, with its possibilities of bribery, victimisation and discrimination.
Ibid., pp. 25–6
Each bureau
was run by a board on which both union and employers were represented. Men were graded according to the kind of work they said
that they would do and all received a share in the work available
over four-weekly periods. Grade B men through age or infirmity
did light work only, and many were on Scheme 13 work
See p. 41
or Social
Security benefits when light waterfront jobs were scarce. Grade A
men performed the heavier and more demanding tasks. At Auckland, Wellington and Lyttelton Grade A men, provided that they
kept listed rules, were guaranteed wages, or in any case payment,
of at least £3 a week (raised in June 1940 from £2 10s a week).
In practice, when few ships came, Grade A men were given all the
work, reducing the need for supplementary payments. At Wellington between 1937–8 and 1944–5 only £345 7s 3d was paid out in
this way.
WHN, ‘The Waterfront’, p. 59
At the start of the Commission’s rule many watersiders
hoped that the guaranteed wage would be extended to less busy
ports but this would have meant considerable outlay to men doing
nothing in weeks between ships, and extension did not happen during
the war, causing a good deal of disappointment. Not till February
1947, under the re-organised Waterfront Industry Commission, were
weekly minimum payments established.
Ibid., p. 60
Meanwhile, in 1940
existing bureaus, along with pay offices, were taken over by the
Commission.
Payment for wharf work, chequered and complicated by its very
nature, its complications multiplied by concessions whittled out in
agreements or calcified by custom, was a problem spawning endless
disputes within the industry and much criticism outside it. For 20
years the idea of co-operative stevedoring had been discussed along
the waterfront and by 1939 many were looking to it as the magic
panacea.
WHN, ‘The Waterfront’, p. 3
The Commission devised a new system to replace the
hourly payments whereby maximum return came from minimum
effort and slowest pace. The idea of piece-work was anathema to
the Union and full co-operative stevedoring proved too difficult to
organise. Roberts said bluntly: ‘First and foremost, we did not have
the gear and experience to operate.’
NZWW Union Secretary’s report, 2 Dec 41, p. 14, Roberts Papers, B43/21
The president of the Union,
J. Flood,
Flood, John: d 1968aet 90; for many years Sec and later Pres Lyttelton Watersiders
Union; Sec, then Pres, NZWW Union, exec member Lab Party, FoL, LRC
explained in April 1941 that previously they had thought
that it would not be difficult to supplant the stevedoring contractors
but ‘it was found that practically all the ship-owners were interested
in stevedoring firms themselves, and were virtually the contractors,
and naturally they had no desire to go out of business.’
Report to special conference, Apr 41, p. 4, Roberts Papers, B44
The Commission steered a middle course and evolved its own cooperative contracting system which it hoped would create incentive
and job interest. The Commission made contracts with the shipping
companies, setting out rates, minimum payments, etc, and received
money from the companies. The Commission paid the men at hourly
rates for the cargo worked and any profits made on contract price
by speedier work was distributed to them. There were variations in
payment methods: at Wellington, profits were distributed on a ship
basis but at other ports they were pooled over three-month periods.
Baker, pp. 396–7; WHN, ‘The Waterfront’, p. 114
Up to 31 March 1945 a total of £667,272 was distributed; this
averaged 8.79d per ‘winch’ hour, that is time when cargo was actually
being moved.
A to J1945, H–45, pp. 5, 66
Co-operative contracting began at Wellington on 3
June 1940 on overseas vessels and by March 1941 had been extended
to most ports and to local ships of more than 350 tons.
The Commission claimed that results justified the new system. In
1941 it estimated an average saving of three days by overseas ships
due to this factor, while admitting that there was ample room for
improvement as appreciation of the new way grew.
Ibid., 1941, H–45, p. 4
In 1945 it
claimed that over the war years speedier work under co-operative
contracting had made an average saving of five days per vessel; continuous work had contributed a further seven days and reduction in
ports of call six days.
Ibid., 1945, H–45, p. 74
Employers held that these two latter factors,
rather than co-operative contracting, had hastened the turn-round of
ships.
WHN, ‘The Waterfront’, p. 144
As Roberts himself stated, the new system meant complete reversal of the watersider’s traditional position—the longer the job takes,
the more the pay—and deep—rooted attitudes did not change
quickly.
NZWW Union Secretary’s report, 2 Dec 41, p. 7, Roberts Papers, B43/21
The Commission in 1945 pointed out that work was
slowed by several factors; night shifts under artificial lighting required
greater caution; there was congestion because deliveries to and from
the wharves did not keep pace with round-the-clock work on ships;
cargoes, in relation to their bulk, were heavier than they had been
pre-war; watersiders were older and more tired.
See p. 440, fn 348
The results were
‘as a whole, quite gratifying’ but ‘Co-operative contracting, as the
name implies, requires the full co-operation of every member of the
union…. Workers must realise that to obtain a share in the management of industry they must first show that they are capable of
accepting the responsibility that goes with it.’
A to J1945, H–45, pp. 4–5
In most small ports responsibility was accepted more readily than
it was in the main ones. This was reflected in profits distributed
which, over the five war years, averaged 6d per ‘winch’ hour at
Auckland, 8.27d at Wellington, 1s 1.39d at Lyttelton, 2s 1.83d at
Port Chalmers, 1s 1.81d at Napier, 1s 6.85d at Nelson.
Ibid., pp. 65–6
Hare,
taking Nelson as a favourable example, described administration
where the secretary of the Union was also the Commission’s agent.
He is responsible for the engagement, dismissal and organisation of the labour force of the port, consisting normally of about
75 workers, though in the busy season this may increase considerably. When a ship is to be unloaded, the shipping company
informs the union secretary of the work to be carried out, and
the company’s wharf representative acts in co-operation with the
union secretary to see that the work is performed to the company’s
satisfaction. Beyond this, however, the company has no power of
supervision or control of the discipline of the labour force. The
men are engaged, organised and the work directed by the branch
secretary, in consultation with the President of the union and the
committee members. On the testimony of the manager of the
chief shipping company concerned, the work is carried out very
rapidly and efficiently…. many sources of friction between the
employer and worker are eliminated since questions of discipline
can only arise between a worker and his own union officials.
Hare, Industrial Relations, p. 238
There were proposals for complete co-operative stevedoring by the
Union at Auckland and Bluff, but in face of inherent difficulties,
steadfast opposition by the shipowners and official feeling that the
necessary thought and energy was not available in war time, they
came to nothing.
WHN, ‘The Waterfront’, pp. 133–4, 137–8
Lack of enthusiasm resulted mainly from the scheme being a
watered-down version of earlier hopes and from its pay additions
being too remote for incentive purposes. Co-operative contracting
amounted to working cargo at an hourly rate plus a despatch bonus
varying with rates of work. Unionists had nothing to do with the
contract-making, and some felt that the bonus was akin to piece-work. They could not follow the intricate computations and though
the facts and figures were open to inspection even Union executives
were hazy about rates of contract; in general, everyone let the Commission clerical staff wrestle with the system, accepting any profits
that emerged. The scheme, while benefiting watersiders, gave them
no part in its organisation; control belonged to the Commission and
the wide sense of involvement which the Commission had hoped
for did not develop.
Ibid., pp. 114–5
Further, the Commission, aiming to rouse enthusiasm for the system, over-sold it.
Captain Price in particular made definite promises pointing the
way to a waterside Utopia in easy stages. He promised the watersiders in Auckland, for instance, that three months after the inauguration of co-operative contracting there would not be a foreman
on the wharf and the men would be running their own jobs. At
the end of the stated period no advance had been made. The men
therefore lost confidence in the Commission. When confronted by
the men with his own words he would retract what he had said
by saying he had expressed his own personal views and perhaps
the Commission did not agree with him entirely. Mr Roberts was
also guilty of creating the same expectant attitude although more
by inference as he never said anything definite that could be quoted
back at him later.
Ibid., p. 262n
Expectations were also raised and disappointed further down the line
of authority. At Wellington there were complaints that the Controller and superintendents gave interpretations which they were not
entitled to give and which later were not endorsed by Commission
rulings. The superintendents told the men that they would, or should,
get certain rates per hour, but when the jobs were finished they did
not receive the rates expected; disputes followed, with decisions going
against them.
Ibid., p. 34
By 1945 the Commission, aware that contracts based on ‘winch’
time did not provide incentive for workers to reduce delays and petty
disputes over dirt-money etc, looked towards substituting ‘all-in’ or
‘overall’ contracts. The rate would include all delays, removal and
replacement of hatches, re-stowing and shifting cargo, special cargo,
dirt money, minimum periods, etc. There was also talk of more
worker responsibility,
A to J1945, H–45, p. 16
But the war and the Commission both ended
without these changes being effected.
The Commission appointed controllers at the main ports, with
wharf superintendents under them, delegating wide powers. Controllers were necessarily men of much experience on the waterfront,
as master mariners, stevedores or waterside leaders; the task of each
was to maintain order in his port through direct and indirect use
of his power, maintaining authority without appearing autocratic,
adjusting matters between opposed interests through persuasion and
co-operation.
WHN, ‘The Waterfront’, p. 33
Their work was difficult. They had first of all to contend with
the employers; but they soon found, when the Commission was
established, without sweeping changes and large benefits to the
watersiders, that the men and their union officials were not cooperative.
‘It was difficult enough to fight the employers, but we found at the same time some
opposition to the Commission from the waterside workers…. The Commission was
told … on several occasions that the waterside workers had openly expressed their
hostility to it and that they did not want the co-operating contract system; in fact, the
Auckland Branch carried a resolution asking the Commission to withdraw it.’ Roberts
in NZWW Union Secretary’s annual report, 2 Dec 41, p. 8, Roberts Papers, B43/21
The clashes grew in number and magnitude and in
Auckland, especially in May 1943, occasions for disagreement
seemed deliberately contrived. Men loitered at their work, held
up jobs, abused wet weather clauses and ‘spelled’ unduly, ignoring
the protests of foremen until a controller or wharf superintendent
appeared. These officers tried to cover all the ships but they could
not prevent delays. The commonest form of slowing down work
was limiting the number of bags, bales, baulks of timber, etc.,
in the sling until told by the Superintendent the number to be
worked.
WHN, ‘The Waterfront’, pp. 38–9
The Commission could penalise recalcitrant workers but rarely used
its powers—especially that of exclusion from the wharf—being
reluctant to antagonise the main body. By mid-1943, the Union
officials in both Auckland and Wellington were attacking the Controllers for their ‘dictatorial’ methods, while Controllers complained
of growing hostility from the Union which prevented good results
and good relationships. Despite such friction, the Controllers achieved
much in organisation and at the smaller ports unionists and Commission officials worked well together.
Ibid., pp. 39, 41
Wharf superintendents, in continual close contact with the men,
had to be acceptable to them. When two were needed, one was a
Union man, the other by training and background inclined to the
employers’ viewpoint.
As work increased, four superintendents were appointed at both Auckland and Wellington.
Where only one superintendent (or in
smaller ports, Commission’s representative) was appointed he was
from the Union.
In practice the appointment of Union officials to permanent, paid
positions did not achieve the desired industrial harmony. The majority group in a Union, deprived thus of its leaders, was soon swamped
by new men with new policy who rose to fill the executive. The
original executive members lost prestige when they were no longer
the direct representatives of the men. They were regarded, particularly at Auckland, with some suspicion which became active when
they did not always uphold a Union case but judged matters on
merit; they were then accused of ‘selling out’ the Union for a good
soft job.
WHN, ‘The Waterfront’, pp. 30–1
The Auckland Branch in February 1944 called for reconstruction
of the Commission, saying that while eight out of 14 senior officers
were former members of the Union there was no provision for electing a Union nominee.
NZ Herald, 19 Feb 44, p. 6
Work hours lengthened. Until March 1941, waterfront hours
Monday to Friday were 8 am to 10 pm (or till midnight to finish
a ship), less two meal-hour breaks; Saturday mornings, 8 am to
noon, were ordinary hours, but at time-and-a-quarter rate; 1 pm to
5 pm was overtime. Thus the total time which could be worked in
a week was 44 ordinary hours and 24 overtime hours.
A to J1949, H–45, p. 8
From the
end of March 1941 the winches began to work around the clock
on overseas ships: extended hours
‘… hours were extended to 11 p.m. and to 2 a.m. when a vessel was finishing.’ NZWW
Union Secretary’s report, 2 Dec 41, p. 13, Roberts Papers, B43/21
were replaced by a shift system.
By tradition, night work was deeply opposed by watersiders who
‘had fought for a quarter of a century for the 10 o’clock knock-off
and mid-night when a vessel was finishing.’
Ibid.
Even in 1916 they
had insisted that work after 10 pm should be optional.
WHN, ‘The Waterfront’, pp. 105–6
Besides
the fatigue of very long hours, the social dislocation of shifts and
increased danger under artificial lights, a regular shift system would
require a larger union work force, and this, given the uneven flow
of cargo work, would mean periods when there was not enough
work for all.
Outside the normal eight hours, 8 am to 5 pm at 3s 2d, pay rates
were high. Overtime from 6 pm to 10 pm was 4s 7d an hour. Monday to Friday night shifts, from 11 pm to 7 am, received 6s an hour
plus a free hot meal, and Saturday afternoon drew the same rate.
On Saturday after 6 pm and on Sunday the rate was 7s 4d, so that
a man putting in 12 hours at the weekend could earn £4 8s. The
employers had proposed 6s for the weekly night shift, the Union
having asked for 7s, and they agreed to the weekend rate (7s and
hour plus 4d cost of living bonus).
WCC ‘Activities of the Waterfront Commission for year ended 31 March 1943’, p. 6,
Hare Papers, Watersiders folder. This explains that waterside pay in Australia, the United
States and Britain was generally higher than in New Zealand. Australia’s basic rate was
3s 8½d an hour, 9s 3¼d on Sundays and special holidays. In the United States the basic
rate was $1.00 an hour for a 6-hour day, and thereafter overtime at $1.50, with high
rates for special cargoes.
Overseas shipowners’ objections were lightened because the increased cost was sanctioned and
paid for by the British Ministry of War Transport. After further
negotiations New Zealand shipowners, when obliged by the needs
of overseas vessels to work their ships in shifts, recovered the
additional cost from the War Expenses Account.
WHN, ‘The Waterfront’, p. 106
From June 1942,
under pressure to keep up with overseas trans-shipments and coastal
cargoes, local vessels of more than 350 tons were worked
continuously.
A to J1945, H–45, p. 3
The Commission’s chairman, Captain Price, explaining that as
cargo working was not a continuous process a regular shift system
as in a factory was not possible, said that it was
both a modified and irregular form of shift work, which is continually being started and broken up, varying in length with each
ship. The Commission, by making a day shift extend into overtime hours and the night shift work at a high hourly rate, enables
men at the main ports to secure a financial return that suffices to
tide over unpaid periods of waiting for a job.
Evening Post, 8 Apr 43, p. 3
Cargo was concentrated at main ports at the request of the British
Ministry of War Transport in conjunction with the British headquarters of the shipping companies. The Ministry supplied two small
freezer vessels to move refrigerated cargo and accepted the cost of
railing and coasting cargo to the main ports. This reduced the average number of ports of call per vessel from the 6.13 of pre-war days
to 2.16 in the year ending 31 March 1944; the following year saw
a slight increase, 2.50 ports. Over the war years, the Commission
estimated an average saving, by centralisation, of six days in each
turn-around time.
A to J1945, H–45, pp. 3, 74; See p. 433
From small ports, where the centralisation policy meant few ships
and scant pay, some unionists were moved to other ports at rush
times.
WHN, ‘The Waterfront’, p. 91
There were difficulties in meeting the demand for labour,
especially at Wellington, and men were not sent to Auckland, where
civil servants and others were used on night shifts and non-union
labour was registered for shift work, but transfers from such places
as Oamaru and Timaru to Lyttelton, Dunedin and Port Chalmers,
from Wanganui to New Plymouth, worked smoothly.
Ibid., pp. 94–100
The costs,
£27,272, involved in nearly 5000 transfers between June 1941 and
March 1945 were borne by the War Expenses Account.
A to J1945, H–45, pp. 6, 88
Besides pay for hours actually worked, there was an established
system of minimum payments, whereby men were paid for a shift
or part thereof if the work to which they were ordered could not
be done for a reasonable cause, such as breakdown of machinery, or
if it were finished sooner than expected. There was plenty of scope
for delaying or stretching out work so that overtime or a night shift
would be called for and would then finish early.
The basic gospel, the Order of the Waterfront Control Commission
June 6th 1940, Section 14, set forth a number of situations in which
men received three or four hours’ pay whether they worked that
time or less or not at all. The place of such minimum payments in
watersiders’ aspirations may be gauged from the comment of J. Flood,
as acting-secretary of the Union, in April 1941:
It will be remembered that at previous conferences when a four-hour minimum was advocated by the General Secretary (Mr
J. Roberts) and other delegates for the men who commenced work
at 8 a.m. or at any time during the day, and for the men who
were ordered back at 6 p.m., this provision was looked upon as
something that might be achieved in the dim and distant future;
yet it is an established fact today, and I believe that it gives greater
security to the waterside workers than any other condition we have
obtained for a number of years past.
When this Organisation was resuscitated in 1915, we had a
two-hour minimum on the waterfronts, and if we were ordered
back in the afternoon or at night there was no minimum. Today
if a waterside worker starts work, he is entitled to approximately
12s, a sum greater than he received for a full day’s work at the
time of the 1913 strike….
… the cost of living is higher, and living standards have been
raised, but I am firmly of opinion that we have made more
advancement than any other Organisation in this country insofar
as wages and conditions of employment are concerned, and I
believe that the honest-thinking waterside worker will agree that
the waterfront is a fairly good place to earn a living for himself
and his dependants.
Report to special conference, Apr 41, p. 3, Roberts Papers, B44
There was also the practice of ‘spelling’
WHN, ‘The Waterfront’, p. 190; it was well described by the NZ Herald, 22 May 43,
p. 8
whereby part of a gang
rested for varying periods while the others worked. This was not
new; it had legitimate beginnings in freezer work where there was
a long-term benefit in men taking turns to get relief from the cold.
There was also advantage in some cramped hold areas, such as near
the square of the hatch, where long carries were not needed and
where, if all the men in a gang tried to work at once they would
get in each other’s way, while it was claimed that with men resting
in rotation a faster pace overall was achieved. It must also be remembered that many watersiders were getting on in years;
The Commission in 1945 estimated that the average age was something over 50 years.
A to J1945, H–45, p. 6. A Union deputation to the PM on 18 December 1943 stated
that of 1800 Union members at Wellington only 80 were less than 40 years old and
that in the 6000 watersiders employed before the war only 400 Grade I men remained.
WHN, ‘The Waterfront’, p. 189
they could
not maintain the pace of the younger men and worked better with
short rests. But though there was sometimes reason or excuse for
‘spelling’, the practice, already over-used before the war, was badly
stretched and abused in the war years, becoming a rooted custom
where there was no occasion for it. It was deplored by the Commission and there were many attempts to combat it, but improvements usually faded after a time.
A to J1945, H–45, p. 6; WHN, ‘The Waterfront’, pp. 190–7
One way and another, it was not rare for passers-by to see much
slackness or apparent slackness on the wharves, while the nation was
exhorted to maximum effort. Feeling was sharpened because it was
known that troops overseas in ports such as Benghazi and Tripoli
worked at high speed unloading ships, often with the risk of air
attack hanging over them, for 7s 6d a day. Watersiders’ earnings
were regularly published in the press, with the peaks highlighted.
Thus the Evening Post on 18 December 1941 reported that for three
weeks in November A-class (or grade) men at Wellington had averaged £10 14s and B-class men £6 18s 6d a week. Again at Wellington in the 14 weeks before 6 October 1942 A-class watersiders
averaged £11 7s 8d, the highest weekly average being £14 10s, the
lowest £8 10s; while for B-class the corresponding figures were
£7 11s 6d, £11 19s and £4 12s.
Star–Sun, 31 Oct 42, p. 4
At Auckland (where a large proportion of work was for Americans, at an extra shilling an hour), in the year ending 31 March
1944, among 1810 unionists 504 earned varying amounts under
£400, 200 gained between £400 and £500, 318 between £500 and
£600, 306 between £600 and £700, 310 between £700 and £800,
139 between £800 and £900; 13 exceeded £900. At Wellington
(1868 unionists), 569 earned up to £400, 346 between £400 and
£500, 468 between £500 and £600, 434 between £600 and £700,
49 between £700 and £800 and two gained just over £800 each,
the top figure.
A to J1945, H–45, p. 73
A report publicising the top earnings at Auckland,
where one man received £940, said that the amount of overtime
could be gauged from the fact that 40 hours at ordinary rates would
give about £6 a week, or £8 if work was for Americans.
Press, 24 May 44, p. 6
Earnings
were notably highest at these two ports. At Lyttelton (633 unionists)
the three top men averaged just over £700 each, 150 between £600
and £700, 199 between £500 and £600, 103 between £400 and
£500. At smaller ports numbers and earnings tapered down
steadily.
A to J1945, H–45, p. 73
A return of average total earnings (ordinary and overtime, and
profit distribution) of the unionists with the highest earnings in the
year ending 31 March 1944 showed that 100 men at Auckland
averaged £861 each, for which during 50 weeks they worked on
average 1148 hours at ordinary time and 1704 hours at overtime
rates, including 45 Sundays and holidays, their average total weekly
hours being 57. At Wellington, 100 men in 51 weeks averaged
£707 12s, working 1350 ordinary hours and 1360 overtime hours,
including 35 Sundays and holidays, their weekly average being 53
hours in all. At Lyttelton, 50 men averaged £663 6s, working 1287
ordinary hours and 1200 hours overtime, including 22 Sundays and
holidays, with a weekly average of 48 hours. At New Plymouth,
50 men in 48 weeks averaged £487 5s, working 793 ordinary and
833 overtime hours, including 21 Sundays, their weekly average
being 34 hours. At Bluff the 50 highest paid men averaged
£465 4s 6d for which they worked 835 ordinary and 875 overtime
hours, including 24 Sundays and holidays, averaging 43 hours a
week.
Ibid., p. 74
These wages refer to unionists only. The waterside workers had
a closed union, roughly 6000 strong, and they were not keen to
open their ranks. Its young, fit men were liable for military service;
appeals for them were likely to be made by the Commission, and
to succeed, in proportion to the general shortage of their work-fellows. The Commission’s policy was to appeal only for steady and
regular workers and only for postponement for about three months,
the Union branch concerned meanwhile opening its ranks to suitable
and efficient applicants. By the end of the postponement period, if
the Union had not found such men, it would ask for the appeals
to be adjourned sine die; if new men were then within the Union,
or if the Union had failed or refused to admit them, the appeals
should be dismissed.
WHN, ‘The Waterfront’, pp. 178–9, 181
There were difficulties. The Commission wanted its officers to
approve applicants for Union membership, the Union combatted
this intrusion on its rights. The Commission wished to appeal for
each man on merit, the Union wanted appeals en bloc, claiming that
there was industrial discrimination in the selection of men for appeal.
By September 1942 it was agreed that these decisions should be
made by a selection committee of two Union representatives and
two Commission officials, and also that new admissions were to be
for the duration of the war only.
Ibid., p. 183
Although there were many applicants, admissions were limited. The Manpower Office rejected about
half of them as being already in essential industry, the selection
committees rejected many others, usually on Union opinion, and of
those finally submitted for enrolment the Union itself rejected many
as ‘unsuitable’. An advertisement inserted by the Controller in the
Auckland papers in October 1942 produced 1500 applicants, only
320 of whom were sanctioned by the Manpower Office and 93 finally
accepted into the Union. At Wellington, in the year ended July
1943, 224 were admitted from 810 applicants.
Ibid., p. 186; NZ Herald, 3 Jun 43, p. 2
Briefly, appeals
of watersiders were refused consideration because sufficient new men
were not admitted, but with such new members there would be no
grounds for appeal as the men called up could be replaced. The
Union strove to keep its ranks closed, hoping that its standards of
suitability would be accepted by appeal boards.
WHN, ‘The Waterfront’, pp. 187–8
Like a bridge between a labour supply limited by adamantine
unionism and the irregular demands of urgent work on wartime
waterfronts were the ‘seagulls’, non-union men traditionally employed on the wharves when there was more work than unionists
could handle. By mid-1942 when cargo work increased sharply, the
Services had taken many regular seagulls or Manpower authorities
had directed them into essential industry. In February 1942 the
government decided that men already working in essential jobs could
work on the wharves during crisis weekends. On 3 April (Good
Friday) from several hundred civil servants who had registered for
such work in Wellington about 100 were called to action and found
that patriotism paid. They received the same pay as watersiders, then
seven shillings an hour,
The rate rose to 7s 4d later when the cost of living bonus was added.
making, as many worked for 12 hours,
£4 4s for a day’s work.
Evening Post, 4 Apr 42, p. 8
This figure received a good deal of publicity, ranged against the fact that other civil servants in the Home
Guard were doing Army duty at 7s a day.
Sidney Holland promptly telegraphed the Prime Minister about
the intense dissatisfaction felt by thousands at such inequality. Rather
than have such ‘absurd costs’ added to the national debt, he sought
permission to organise an emergency group at each port to help load
cargo for Britain at rush times, without pay. Fraser replied that he
would be very pleased to discuss the proposal with Holland, the
Waterfront Control Commission and the Minister of Labour. ‘Please
submit details as soon as possible.’
Ibid., 6 Apr 42, p. 6
Holland replied: ‘… there
are no conditions attaching to my offer. I am prepared to organise
groups of volunteers to do this work as a war effort and am prepared
to be the first volunteer myself. I should like to have the use of the
radio service to launch the scheme.’
Otago Daily Times, 13 Apr 42, p. 2
The president of the Union,
J. Flood, telegraphed Holland that 7s an hour was paid on holidays
by agreement with the shipowners. He added: ‘Challenge you to
work on the waterfront with myself for soldier’s pay for the duration
of the war, all other sources of income to both parties to be given
to the State as our war effort.’
Evening Post, 6 Apr 42, p. 6
No volunteer companies appeared
on the wharves under Holland’s blue banner, but at Auckland civil
servants soon followed Wellington in forming a pool for wharf labour
when needed.
NZ Herald, 13 Jun 42, p. 6
Civil servants were not the only volunteers. The New Zealand
Federation of Local Bodies’ Employees, Builders, Contractors and
General Labourers Industrial Association of Workers and its Wellington Union
These two bodies shared an active secretary, P. M. Butler.
negotiated with the Commission and the Wellington Waterside Union to the effect that the Local Bodies’ Employees
Union members were asked by their Union to register as auxiliary
waterside workers. By arrangement with the National Service
Department they would be released from other work when waterfront need arose and would have preference when the Waterside
Union was admitting members in the ordinary way, ‘other considerations being equal.’
Report of meeting with NZWW Union and Wellington Builders and General Labourers, 12 Jun 42, Labourers Union Papers, 8.41.1, Carton 12
The Commission undertook to pay auxiliary
workers for a minimum of eight hours on days when they were
temporarily released from their normal 8 am to 5 pm employment,
adding that in most cases the time worked would be much greater.
For men required during overtime hours, night shifts and weekends,
payment would be the same as for waterside unionists. Would-be
auxiliary workers at ports other than Wellington should make
arrangements with local waterside union branches and with Commission representatives.
J. Roberts to P. M. Butler, 17 Jul 42, ibid.
Initially, 35 Wellington men volunteered,
on coupons printed in the newspapers, and were listed with the times
at which they were available—most at weekends or for night shifts,
but a few ‘at all times’. On 17 November 1942, letters signed by
Wellington’s Waterfront Controller went to each man thanking him
for his offer and saying that his services would be used when need
arose.
Ibid.
Particularly at Auckland and Wellington, ‘seagulls’ did not merely
register and wait to be asked: they watched the ships, used telephones, and went to the wharves in droves, many trying to pick the
lucrative overtime and shift jobs. The rush was strongest at Auckland, the main American base, with its extra shilling an hour for
work on United States Army and Navy vessels.
See p. 637
Quite frequently,
stated the Commission, more than 2000 non-unionists were employed
each day, placing a great strain on its central pay office,
A to J1945, H-45, p. 6
and the
Port Controller on 7 November 1942 told a military service appeal
board that in the current week his pay sheets showed that more than
4000 men had been employed.
Auckland Star, 7 Nov 42, p. 6
The New Zealand Herald in April
1943 reported that civil servants were a majority among the spare-time workers, who included bank clerks, chemists, drapers, City
Council employees, truck drivers, barmen, salesmen, clerks, seamen,
a golf professional, a lawyer (who acted as tally clerk), shopkeepers,
butchers and men on leave from the Services. Baths at the tepid
pool were well patronised by men who spruced up after a night on
the wharf, changed into good clothes and went off to their normal
work. Regular non-unionists were bitter about the ’40-hour weekers’
who competed for jobs. There was concern over the waste of manpower in non-unionists waiting about the wharves when not urgently
needed. Hiring hours were between 8 and 10 am and 4 and 5 pm;
frequently 200 or more men were turned away but pay rates made
it worth while to wait around for crumbs from the unionists’ table,
as only three or four shifts a week provided a living wage. ‘Most
spare time workers’, continued the Herald report, ‘are family men.
Few of them are making a great deal of money, but what they have
earned on the wharves is giving them a good start. Many new banking accounts have been opened and mortgages on homes have been
reduced.’
NZ Herald, 27 Apr 43, p. 2
The prompt settlement of disputes was a major purpose of the
Commission regime and procedures were modified by the pressure
of events. Under the establishing Order of 6 June 1940 the existing
Local and National Disputes Committees continued, with the Commission supplanting the Court of Arbitration as the final authority.
More work was done by local committees, the National Committee
often being in effect a channel taking disputes to the Commission.
WHN, ‘The Waterfront’, p. 76
Local committees had three representatives of the workers and three
of the employers; the decision of the majority was to prevail and if
no decision was reached questions went to the National Disputes
Committee.
Local committees dealt with anything which dissatisfied the men
and threatened to hold up work; they were supposed to settle questions of fact and matters of local importance, sending on to the
National Committe only those which concerned general or national
practice and policy. In practice, many trivial disputes were sent on
only to be referred back to the local committees.
Ibid., p. 83
In the interest
of speed the role of Port Controllers was extended. Initially, in cases
of extra dirty work or exceptional circumstances not covered by the
Order, the matter was to be decided by an employer and a representative of the union, and if they did not agree, be referred to the
local Disputes Committee; if this did not produce a decision, the
Controller was empowered to settle the dispute.
Ibid., p. 74
This all proved
too slow; the powers of the Controller were strengthened to make
a decision quickly and later his authority in dirt disputes was extended
to a wider field.
Ibid., pp. 74, 77
The Commission knew that a multiplicity of disputes was characteristic of the industry.
WCC ‘Report on Organisation and Activities as at 31 March 1944’, p. 5
Ships of various shapes and their cargoes
provided much variety in loading and unloading problems. Some
cargoes, such as plaster, sulphur, phosphates, and dusty coal, irritated throats and noses; some, such as basic slag, guano, wet hides,
were unpleasant; others, such as corrosive acids, oxides, kerosene,
naptha, explosives, were dangerous; frozen products in refrigerated
holds made for hard and chilling work; it was difficult to make up
safe slings of heavy, bulky and unwieldy components. Set rules for
payment might not apply when cargoes deteriorated more than the
average for that type; conditions in the holds might vary, causing
claims for stoop money. The Order of June 1940 covered the working of the majority of cargoes but it recognised that exceptional
circumstances would occur and cases continually arose requiring new
interpretation. Most disputes concerned claims for extra money based
on interpretations of rules in circumstances which inevitably varied.
Vigilance and experience perceived opportunities for payments in
changed directions, in the use of non-union labour when unionists
were available, in demarcation issues such as whether only watersiders could drive tractors on wharves, in lighting and safety matters,
in the transport of watersiders, in wet or boisterous weather.
WHN, ‘The Waterfront’, pp. 81–3
There
were disputes over the meals provided for overtime workers.
Dominion, 16 Mar 44, p. 4
In
1944 a 6-day hold-up, the longest of the war years, costing 96 000
man-hours, occurred in Auckland over the safety of a gangway which
did not reach down to the wharf.
A to J1945, H–45, p. 6; NZ Herald, 12–19 Feb 44
Throughout the war the Commission claimed that the machinery
it provided settled disputes quickly, preventing the spread of trouble
and stoppage of work. In the four years prior to Commission control,
233 656 man-hours had been lost, against an estimated total of
29 147 977 man-hours worked, an average loss over the four years
of 0.80 per cent. For the five years March 1940–5, 212 080 manhours were lost against the estimated total of 51 819 632 man-hours
worked, an average yearly loss of 0.41 per cent, with two disputes
in 1944 contributing 150 000 of the man-hours lost. In 1945–6,
11 779 129 man-hours were worked and 109 880, or 0.93 per cent,
lost.
A to J1945, H–45, pp. 6, 75, where the main disputes are briefly listed, 1946,
H–45, p. 61
The Commission complained that it received too many disputes
which should have been settled by Local and National Committees.
To the end of 1945 it had heard 448 disputes; employers had made
23 of these claims, workers 425; 64 were referred back or decisions
were reserved; employers succeeded in 206 cases; workers withdrew
37 claims and 141 decisions were in their favour.
Ibid., 1946, H–45, p. 62
The Commission also claimed in February 1944 that its machinery had been
used successfully in more than 1000 disputes.
Dominion, 18 Feb 44, p. 4; Press, 18 Feb 44, p. 4. NZ Herald, 18 Feb 44, p. 2, gave
the number as ‘well over 1500 disputes’.
Besides this substantial reckoning there were many minor disputes which were not
counted, being settled between wharf superintendents and employees
before they reached full official channels.
WHN, ‘The Waterfront’, p. 84n
As the war moved to its end the Commission, regarding the short
list of strikes and stoppages, was sure that, for the waterfront, having
one central authority was a great improvement on the diffuse and
long-drawn-out handling of disputes in earlier times. Employers and
the Union both agreed that a central authority was needed, but both
were dissatisfied with the existing Commission, which in any case
had been set up for the war period only.
Employers complained about the Commission’s excessive aggrandisement of powers, administrative, contractual and judicial.
Evening Post, 4 Jul 45, p. 5 (in a court case taken as a test); WHN, ‘The Waterfront’,
p. 266
In
February 1944 the Union’s new president
In mid-February 1944 the moderate veteran J. Flood of Lyttelton was narrowly replaced
by the more militant H. Barnes of Auckland.
complained of many
‘provocative acts’ by the Commission and said that a public inquiry
into its activities was long overdue.
NZ Herald, 12 Feb 44, p. 8
The Union wanted direct representatives under its control on the Commission, feeling that union
men appointed to paid jobs soon became mere agents of the government. In November 1945 the Union debated and passed a motion
‘that the Waterfront Control Commission be reconstituted on the
basis of a National Commission and Local Commissions of three
Union representatives and three employers’ representatives with an
independent chairman appointed by agreement of the parties and
the Government.’
Report of biennial conference of NZWW Union, 27 Nov 45, pp. 12–19, Roberts Papers
B42
Newspapers had little doubt that the watersiders were up to no
good, that they were lazy and overpaid. The government was too
weak to correct them, and the Commission, its creation, working in
privacy,
An official report was published in 1941 and another in 1945; for the years between,
publication of reports was prohibited by the Director of Publicity, at the request of the
Navy Office, lest they give information to the enemy.
was merely a device for acceding to their demands. Thus
the Auckland Star on 23 January 1942:
Mr Webb knows what is mainly wrong on the waterfront. What
is mainly wrong is:—(1) That the atmosphere and the pace of
work there are infected and dominated by a minority of loafers
and malcontents; and (2) that the Government and its Minister
of Labour haven’t had the guts to remove them.
The Otago Daily Times on 13 September 1945 expressed the same
theme:
The reports that have received circulation … have created the
impression that a selfish regard for their own concern has been
the motive that has most generally influenced the waterside workers. A costly Waterfront Commission has been set up which seems
to regard it as its main business to support the workers in whatever demands they make. It has yet to be discovered that this
Commission performs any service to the public of a character that
justifies its existence.
Many stock charges and defences were repeated in Parliament on 27
July 1943.
NZPD, vol 263, pp. 337–54
The independent student of industrial relations, wrote
Dr Hare in 1943, must be perturbed by the attitude of the press
towards industrial unrest. In particular the press had for years campaigned against waterside workers. He cited recent headlines, chosen
at random, which with their articles presented the whole body of
them in the worst light. Publicity was constantly given to watersiders’ work, hours, conditions and wages, all to show them as inefficient, overpaid or otherwise delinquent. If there were justification
for these public attacks, there was none for the form of them, week
after week, over years; if there were abuses on the waterfront, there
should be an official enquiry into them, in the House or out of it.
Hare, Labour in New Zealand 1943, pp. 47–8
Such counsel fell on deaf ears. Meanwhile, as the war ended the
waterfront situation was changing. The boom years, in which mainly
through work outside the daily eight-hour, five-day week, watersiders had experienced good times, were over. Watersiders were
wearied with the long hours. By December 1943 they demanded
that the day shift should end at 9 pm and that 5 pm should be the
finishing time at weekends and holidays, and that meal hours should
not be worked unless necessary to finish a ship. The Commission
agreed to these hours on 3 January 1944.
A to J1945, H–45, p. 3; Evening Post, 9 Dec 43, p. 6; Dominion, 4 Jan 44, p. 4;
WHN, ‘The Waterfront’, pp. 107–8
From July 1945, after further pressure from the men, at the four
main ports night shifts, Sundays and holidays were worked only on
overseas vessels carrying food or military supplies, on feeder vessels
and ships discharging coal. As from 8 September 1945 all night
shift work was cancelled. From the same time at the four main ports
there was no work on Sundays, holidays or Saturday afternoons
(except where a ship could finish by 5 pm on Saturday) and from
26 November this applied to smaller ports, except for ships carrying
coal and timber, for which need was acute.
A to J1946, H–45, p. 3, 1947, H–45, p. 70
Despite the 3½d an hour rise in the basic rate, from 1 April
1945, waterfront earnings were reduced while hours worked remained
much the same. For the year ending 31 March 1946 the average
hours per week for main and secondary ports were 41¾ (28¼ ordinary time, 13½ overtime) as against 41¼ (22¾ ordinary time,
18½ overtime) for the previous year. At Auckland in the year ending 31 March 1945, out of 1862 unionists 588 earned more than
£600, but in the following year with 1916 unionists, only 123 did
so. At Wellington, more than £600 was earned in 1945 by 161
men and in 1946 by 279, but there the number of unionists had
dropped from 1822 to 1729.
Ibid., 1945, H–45, pp. 72–3, 1946, H–45, pp. 5–6, 57–8
The outside hours harvest was over
and, with the cost of living in its post-war rise, the battle of wage
rates was on.
In July 1946 the Waterfront Control Commission of the war
period was replaced by the Waterfront Industry Commission which
in the next five years was to face conflict producing lengthening
stoppages on the wharves, resignations and removals of its own
members, and several forms of constitution. Strikes in 1949 and
1950 led, on 19 February 1951, into 151 days of the bitterest industrial confrontation since 1913. The war years on the waterfront may
be seen as part of the background leading towards the 1951 strike,
but that is another story.
CHAPTER 12
Defence by the People
ON 20 May 1940, amid the rising agitation, the government
announced that the Territorials and the National Military
Reserve would be trained more intensively. The latter would supplement Territorial fortress troops in defence of ports, while the
Territorials themselves, 16 000 just before the war but depleted by
enlistment into the Expeditionary Force, would be increased, though
the numbers intended were not stated. The rate of training quickened, beginning with officers and NCOs who attended district schools
of instruction while living at home,
NZ Herald, 20 May 40, p. 6; Evening Post, 17 Jul 40, p. 13
and tented camps were rapidly
prepared or extended, notably at Waiouru but also at Ngaruawahia
and at several racecourses, where Territorials would train for three
months in warmer weather. On 3 October, Jones, Minister of
Defence, gave figures: by the end of March 1941 the Territorials,
numbering 25 985, would have had three months’ training in camp,
so with 9572 men in additional units and 8491 in the National
Military Reserve, there would be a ‘splendid Defence Force’ of just
over 44 000;
NZPD, vol 258, p. 88
on 3 April 1941 he claimed that this objective was
nearing achievement.
The Defence Department’s report in May 41 gave the number of trained Territorials as
24 266, with 8200 in the National Military Reserve. A to J1941, H–19, p. 2
This was orderly expansion and, in view of the equipment required,
all that could be managed while sending substantial reinforcements
overseas.
4th Reinforcements, more than 7500, sailed between 8 November 1940 and 1 February
1941; 5th Reinforcements, 6288, on 7 April 1941. Kay, Chronology, pp. 16–19, 22
During 1940–1, fighting was in North Africa, Greece,
Crete and Syria; Britain, not New Zealand, was threatened with
invasion. But in the mood of mid-1940 the home defence programme then sketched by the government seemed insufficient and
too slow. The general imprecise clamour for conscription included
home defence, while the practical do-it-yourself traditions of many
New Zealanders suggested immediate and active steps.
In England a few days after the invasion of the Low Countries
on 10 May, a Home Guard was called for and sprang up literally
overnight, with a quarter million volunteers in 24 hours, little previous planning, much zeal and a good deal of chaos at the start.
Obviously there was no comparable urgency in New Zealand, but
with France falling so fast, with invasion lowering at Britain, and
Churchill saying that we would fight on, if necessary from the
Dominions beyond the sea, attack suddenly seemed not impossible.
Also it was soon clear that German victories had increased Japan’s
inclination towards the Axis; Japan was finding reasons for moving
south, pressing against those valuable and vulnerable ex-colonies,
French Indo–China and the Netherlands East Indies, and talking of
her proper destiny in South-East Asia and the South Seas.
Pressure grew for a citizen army to defend hearth and home, for
a rural militia to guard the coast. Writers to newspapers, singly and
in batches, wanted to prepare for an emergency.
eg, NZ Herald, 1, 6, 9, 11, 14, 15, 16 May, 5, 20 Jun, 3, 4, 6, 9, 11, 12, 15 Jul,
2 Aug 40; Evening Post, 10, 18, 21 May, 3, 20, 24 Jun 40; Press, 28 Apr, 1, 2, 3, 4,
6, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 22 May 40; Otago Daily Times, 5 Jul 40; Southland Times,
15 Aug 40; Hawke’s Bay Daily Mail, 11 Jul 40
Ex-Territorials and
returned soldiers, farmers whose production responsibilities held them
to the land, deer-stalkers and rifle clubs
Deer-stalkers and rifle club members felt that they already had the skill, ability and
equipment to be highly useful, and needed only some training and organisation. ‘What
better equipped men than we to stalk a wily Hun instead of a stag?’ asked a writer to
the Southland Times, 10 Jul 40; ibid., 27 Jul 40; Evening Post, 10, 18 May, 24 Jun 40;
Wanganui Herald, 11 Sep 40
urged home defence much
on the lines that were eventually taken: fit men of 18–55 years not
eligible for overseas or Territorial service, unpaid, trained in weekends and evenings by returned men, armed and organised by the
government, ready to repel any invasion, but probably deterring any
such attempt by their very preparedness.
Some even proposed forces almost independent of the government. In Canterbury during May, a colonel offered to raise 1000
men as a special military reserve and to counter Fifth Column work
Greymouth Evening Star, 22 May 40, p. 7
and in June the Canterbury Territorial Association devised a scheme
for training Class III men (those with no soldiering experience) without calling on the permanent staff.
Press, 18 Jun 40, p. 8
At least one local organisation,
the New Plymouth National Service Corps, was formed ‘with the
approval of the Government’ to raise a body of fit men available
for any emergency or to further the war effort, with activities ranging
from military drill and route marching to fund raising and gardening
for soldiers’ wives, until it should be absorbed into any wider
government scheme.
Taranaki Daily News, 21, 26 Jun 40, pp. 6, 6
Earlier, in March 1940, a local home defence
impulse at Tirau and Matamata, mainly among RSA members who
began enrolments and training, had met assurances that the government would provide adequately against any possible enemy action;
Tirau’s desire to assist was greatly appreciated but the acceptance of
all such offers would involve training, arming and equipping the
greater portion of men between 17 and 60, some 500 000 in all,
which was neither necessary nor practical; they would render most
service by joining the Territorials or the National Military Reserve.
NZ Herald, 18 Jun 42, p. 5
Prominent in agitation was the Auckland Farmers’ Union. Although assured in June by the Prime Minister and the Minister of
Defence
Ibid., 20 Jun, 9 Jul 40, pp. 2, 10
that there were adequate plans for any possible hostility
and that the government would increase its forces, if necessary, within
the framework of the armed services, this body led the Dominion
Farmers’ Union Conference to send a deputation to the Prime Minister
on 17 July, offering the services of the Union to the Defence Department. Local Farmers’ Union branches, they proposed, would appoint
officers and NCOs of experience, and consider methods of defending
stretches of coast, guarding bridges, roads and so on. They recognised
that it must be under military control, not be an independent Farmers’ Union force, which would not be favoured by the public.
Evening Post, 17 Jul 40, p. 9
It
was, commented the Hawke’s Bay Daily Mail of 19 July, a splendid
gesture by patriotic citizens with no suggestion of usurping the powers
or duties of military authority.
Clearly, all this energy had to be directed into government-run
channels. Already, one grass-roots defence movement had been
accepted. On 4 July, when an Opposition member complained that
hundreds of mounted men offering themselves for local defence had
been refused, D. G. McMillan replied that they could not pick their
own jobs; no government could run a war with ‘Portuguese armies’,
letting every Tom, Dick and Harry form himself into a group and
decide what he would do.
NZPD, vol 257, p. 358
But on 16 July the government, recognising the fervour to be up and doing, called for nine independent
regional mounted rifle squadrons to assist the Territorials in hilly
country, especially as snipers and mounted scouts. The training
required was 40 days a year, which could be done mainly at weekends, and they need not attend camps like Territorials. At the end
of August Army officers, on tour to select leaders and make arrangements, reported over-many volunteers in some districts.
Wanganui Herald, 31 Aug 40, p. 6; Otago Daily Times, 17 Jul 40, p. 7
On 18 July the Prime Minister told the Farmers’ Union deputation that the matter was in hand, that a committee was meeting
that very evening to discuss how such abilities and zeal could be
used.
War History Narrative, ‘Home Guard in New Zealand’ (hereinafter WHN, ‘Home
Guard’), pp. 2–5, referring to Nat Service Dept (hereinafter NS) file 13/3/1
This committee, headed by National Service Department
chiefs, decided that to satisfy the widespread desire to serve the
country and to avoid setting up independent overlapping groups,
there should be a voluntary, government-run, locally organised, non-military force, reasonably trained and fit, to do anything from coast-watching while at their daily work to assisting the police or serving
with the Army in emergency. Organisation and scope of training
were also outlined. These proposals went to War Cabinet on 23
July.
Ibid., referring to NS file 13/2/3
Major-General Duigan,
Duigan, Major-General Sir John, KBE(’40), CB, DSO (1882–1950): Chief of Staff
Northern Cmd 1919, OC 1930; CGS and First Military Member NZ Army Bd
1937–41
Chief of the General Staff, had
explained to the committee on 18 July that the Army was fully
occupied. Besides the Expeditionary Force it was training the Territorial Force, which at war establishment would number 29 000; also
the nine new squadrons of mounted rifles and 5000 men in the
National Reserve, guarding ports.
WHN, ‘Home Guard’, p. 4
Army headquarters on 31 July
made it clear to the National Service Department that it expected
only very limited assistance from the proposed body, and could do
very little for it.
No uniforms, arms or ammunition would be issued unless or until
any unit was taken over by the Army, and meanwhile, though the
Army might train a few instructors and lend a few Territorial NCOs,
the use of arms and range practice was opposed. ‘While the Army
may and probably will be able to make considerable use of the
organisation in an emergency, it is felt that any suggestion that it
is wholly or principally a military organisation should be studiously
avoided…. The Army has its hands full and further burdens are
undesirable at the present time’.
Ibid., p. 7, quoting a memorandum Army HQ to Dir Nat Service, 31 Jul 40
On 28 July the Minister of Defence broadcast that a new home
defence force would be produced soon. It was outlined to the RSA,
which was asked to nominate suitable men as district and area leaders.
Otago Daily Times, 2 Aug 40, p. 8; Hawke’s Bay, Daily Mail, 7 Aug 40, p. 8
War Cabinet finally approved the Home Guard on 2 August
1940, and on 17 August the Emergency Reserve Corps Regulations
were gazetted, linking three organisations under the National Service
Department, with Semple its Minister. The Women’s War Service
Auxiliary was to carry on;
See p. 1068ff
local authorities were required to prepare
emergency precautions schemes to cope with natural disasters or with
war, tasks which many had already done, or at least started, under
earlier direction from the Department of Internal Affairs; the Home
Guard was a new creation.
The Home Guard was to be a semi-military body, with a Dominion commander, three Military District commanders, and 16 area
officers appointed by the government from those nominated by the
RSA. Local authorities would organise details and foster growth
through committees—existing EPS committees, it was thought, could
be utilised, linking the two organisations; leaders below area commanders would be chosen by these committees. Individual units
would be based on communities rather than geographical boundaries, with schools and public halls as the usual meeting places. The
Home Guard would be voluntary, unpaid, open to all males over
16 not already in the armed forces, and it would work in the evenings and at weekends. It would give physical and military training
based on Army manuals, and would provide pickets, patrols and
sentries as needed. It would be trained to co-operate with the armed
forces and in emergency could by proclamation be incorporated into
these forces. Ultimately rifles and ammunition would be issued for
training, and there would be uniforms, but at present there were
only armbands and no rifles. Robert Semple, the Minister, and his
lieutenant, David Wilson,
Wilson, Hon David (1880–1977): b Scotland; Nat Sec NZ Lab party; MLC from 1937,
Leader 1939–40, 1947–9; Min Manpower, Immigration, Broadcasting, Civil Def during
WWII; member War Council; NZHC Canada1944–7
with the newly appointed Dominion
commander, Major-General Robert Young,
Young, Major-General Robert, CB(’16), CMG(’18) (1877–1953): b UK; GOC NZ
Military Forces 1925–31
would tour the country
to meet local authorities and explain details.
Evening Post, 19 Aug 40, p. 4
Generally newspapers approved, often with a better-late-than-never
note; they also expressed wariness of overlapping by Home Guard
and Emergency Precautions Services, and hoped that arms and military supervision would appear quickly—‘a weekly course of physical
culture is not an essential contribution to national defence’, remarked
the Southland Times on 19 August. There was widespread feeling
that the energetic Semple had much to explain. Semple spoke of
giving 300 000 men excluded from other military duty a useful part
in defence, especially those in rural areas, over 46 years of age, who
were wanting an immediate outlet for their feelings and energy—
‘frothing to do some hard useful work without thought of payment’—wanting only the satisfaction of making themselves ready to
defend their country, of practising with their mates. They could train
in their own communities, meeting once a week, with about 30 men
making a unit, four units a company, and four companies a group.
‘Getting fit’ was the keynote of the idea, said Semple, and in fact
physical exercises were the only activities that could be started at
once without equipment and with minimum organisation. But succeeding stages were also indicated, leading through semaphore,
signalling, rifle drill, patrol and picket work and camping out at
night, to company drill, entrenchments, field exercises and the blocking and clearing of roads. ‘Ultimately’ there would be rifles and
ammunition; the government would issue armbands, and units ‘might
provide themselves with clothes or suits of one type for special occasions.’ He also mentioned the checking of rumours and taking the
oath of allegiance.
Ibid., 20, 21 Aug 40, pp. 13, 11; Press, 22 Aug 40, p. 8. These purposes were reported
with more or less detail from other centres during the next month, though allegiance
and rumour-checking got little space. Wilson’s explanations, eg, Hawke’s Bay Daily
Mail, 24 Aug 40, p. 7, had rather less froth and perhaps more facts.
Objectives were set before local authorities rather more succinctly.
The Mayor of Timaru, candidly aiming to clear up misapprehension,
published much of a circular he had received from the Director of
National Service which set forth the Home Guard’s purposes as:
(1) to have the available manpower organised to deal with any
national emergency such as earthquake, flood, invasion, air raid or
attack, in conjunction with the EPS organisations; (2) to have a
reasonably trained and fully organised body of men immediately
available and ready to support the armed forces; (3) to provide an
outlet for the latent energy and urge to do something physical and
tangible in the war effort; (4) to exercise effective government control, and to avoid the growth of sporadic and irresponsible organisations; (5) to exercise an effective and wholesome restraint upon the
starting or spreading of rumours or canards.
Timaru Herald, 11 Oct 40, p. 6
By the time Semple and Wilson had made their tour and the
enrolment forms were ready in late September, the mood of excitement was beginning to ebb. The crisis in Britain was steadying, with
invasion seeming less imminent. London, having withstood the massive daylight raids of August to mid-September, was solidly enduring its nightly bombings, and reports of RAF raids on Germany
territory matched in exaggeration those of Luftwaffe losses. Although
Japan on 27 September had signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, newspapers treated this quietly and there was no
immediate widespread apprehension.
Pressure for the Home Guard had come largely from country
areas, and generally early recruiting there was more enthusiastic than
in the towns.
Otago Daily Times, 16 Nov 40, p. 10, 24 Feb 41, p. 4; Evening Post, 4 Dec 40, p. 5,
25 Mar 41, p. 9; Palmerston NorthTimes, 13 Feb 41, p. 4; Press, 21 Nov 40, p. 10,
26 Feb 41, p. 10
Farmers were aware of their open lonely coasts, and
they did not have the comfortable sight, familiar in cities, of soldiers
in uniform; the urge to defend their own acres was strong, and they
felt that they themselves must come forward before they could expect
men on wages to do so. Some, sensitive about the sneer that farms
were ‘funk-holes’, welcomed the chance to be active in defence as
well as in production. Enthusiasm depended a good deal on local
leadership and varied widely; for instance, a Taranaki officer marvelled why Patea with a population of 1500 could parade 320 men,
while Hawera, population 5 000, could muster only 180.
Taranaki Daily News, 18 Feb 41, p. 9
Cities were slower. By mid-October Wellington leaders were complaining of apathy, and their complaints continued for several
months.
Evening Post, 16 Oct, 17 Dec 40, pp. 10, 6, 31 Jan 41, p. 6
At Auckland, despite vigorous advertising
‘Answer the Call/Back up the Fighting Forces/Join the Home Guard/“Sunk off coast
…400 miles from Dominion”/Smash the Invader/Auckland is in the Danger Zone/We
must Defend our City. Only trained men can do this. Don’t wait until it happens…’
NZ Herald, 5 Dec 40, p. 12
the Mayor
spoke of poor response and inexplicable apathy when only 1400 had
enrolled by 12 December. ‘Response by Dunedin men has been
disappointing in the extreme’ reported the Otago Daily Times on 24
January; some keen units had been formed, but there were only
1200 enlistments from a population of 80 000. When, on a wet
March night at a Hamilton suburb only 40 men, many already
enrolled, turned up to form a unit, the Mayor spoke disgustedly of
‘a bomb or two’ being needed to waken people in the town to their
obligations.
Evening Post, 21 Mar 41, p. 8
Lack of accident insurance was an objection made frequently, and,
although scornfully dismissed by Semple,
Ibid., 17, 22 Oct 40, pp. 12, 10
this was amended by a
new enrolment form early in November.
Press, 5 Nov 40, p. 3
Another source of doubt
was the rumour that the Home Guard might be used for strike-
breakingstrikebreaking. The suggestion came from the Communist party, and
Semple complained of a subversive document distributed all over
the country by persons sneaking about like thieves in the night
Evening Post, 22 Oct 40, p. 10
but it had more effect than most communist utterances.
The People’s Voice of 27 August warned: ‘The whole idea is to build up an organisation
parallel in structure to the Army, to be partly controlled by the Army and in times of
“crisis” to be handed over completely to military control. It aims at introducing the
Nazi fashion of civilians having physical drill in the parks. It aims at building up a
Gestapo to combat the “spreading of rumours” and to provide free (“scab”) labour
under the pretext of ensuring effective use of the country’s manpower. The official personnel
will not be elected but appointed and the local body authorities are to be used to give a
semblance of democracy to the scheme at its inception, but after that they will obviously
have no control over the function of the Home Guard.’
For instance,
the Christchurch enlistment sub-committee discussed workers having
such fears and criticised the government for not making clear the
objects of the Home Guard, thus weakening confidence; so did the
Manawatu Trades Council, and the Mayor of Palmerston North
remarked that the regulations spoke of its military use in an emergency but left the government to decide what was an emergency.
Press, 16 Nov 40, p. 10; Star–Sun, 12 Nov 40, p. 9
Certainly the opening clauses of the Regulations were wide: ‘For
the purpose of assisting in preparation and operation of plans for
securing the public safety, the defence of New Zealand and the
prosecution of any war in which His Majesty may be engaged, and
of plans for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of
the community….’ The final clause also, which provided for calling
up the Home Guard, or any section of it, as part of the Army, when
considered necessary by the Governor-General against enemy action
or the threat of it, could be viewed askance by the doubtful. Further,
a formidable new Regulation (1940/259) on 30 September had
given the Attorney-General power, in the interests of public safety,
the war effort, or maintaining essential industries, to have anyone
dismissed from employment or a union, not only for acts done but
also for acts anticipated. With this in the immediate background,
the possibility of Massey-like
At the beginning of 1914 a widespread strike originating with shipwrights and watersiders jeopardised the export of primary produce and Massey authorised the enrolment
of special constables to enforce order until the strike ended.
handling of strikes could well seem
far from remote.
Semple, as a Minister, did not speak openly of possible attack by
Japan, though this was a theme favoured by less public advocates
of enlistment such as trade union speakers, not reported in the papers,
and factory workers were puzzled by the apparent conflict between
these speeches
A. B. Grant, a trade union secretary, said that no Minister could say straight out that
New Zealand could expect invasion from a certain country; that would be asking for
trouble. Another said, ‘If the appeal for recruits has failed so far, then it is because while
our speakers are able to go to the factories and tell the people that the Home Guard is
being formed to counter a possible invasion, their statements are not backed up by
statements from Ministers, who say something else.’ Press, 13 Nov 40, p. 12
and Semple’s utterances such as: ‘we can meet the
external danger only if we are organised; and we can look after the
internal traitor too, if we are organised’
Ibid., 22 Oct 40, p. 8
or ‘I do not want to create
a panic … I say definitely that this country is in danger. … It
would not do if everyone was permitted to yell out what had happened. That might lead to panic. We cannot tell the people all that
we know as it might be used against us. Every country has its Fifth
Column and we have it here in New Zealand also.’
Evening Post, 18 Sep 40, p. 13; Otago Daily Times, 30 Nov 40, p. 16; NZ Herald, 29 Nov 40
Indeed, Semple’s fervour against the Fifth Column, and his tendency to see all
pacifists and Communists as active agents of it, contributed both to
alarm and to reluctance. Thus the Oamaru branch of the Labour
party protested against his ‘outrageous utterances’, saying that while
the term ‘Fifth Column’ remained vague, such incitements to summary violent actions were too like those a Fascist leader might give
his storm troopers, and introduced trends quite foreign to democratic
justice.
Evening Post, 17 Oct 40, p. 13
That the Farmers’ Union praised Semple’s efforts in the
Home Guard, while pointing out that its formation was first proposed by itself,
Point Blank, 14 Dec 40, p. 5
did not increase working class faith in either Semple or the Home Guard. Some, particularly older men, found it
hard to forget that Semple and other leaders now urging everyone
to defend the country had opposed the last war, in gaol.
Chairman Horowhenua County Council, Evening Post, 13 Jan 41, p. 6
Many forces combatted apathy. Trade union organisers and employers tackled the workers;
Press, 6, 26 Nov 40, pp. 10, 10
in the Public Service every controlling
officer was asked to act as a recruiting agent;
Ibid., 5 Dec 40, p. 8
there were Home
Guard parades and route marches through suburbs; local government officials spoke for it on every possible occasion. The government refrained as much as possible from talk of attack by Japan,
Thus in March 1941 a Wellington city councillor said that the uninformative nature of
public statements was the root of failure to respond; surely something definite could be
said ‘without antagonising other people’. The idea of raiders coming was absurd; British
people hated hints and wanted plain speaking. Evening Post, 13 Mar 41, p. 6
yet even Fraser in October 1940 spoke of the tide of war rolling
up near New Zealand’s own shores,
Ibid., 24 Oct 40, p. 13
and Major-General Young on
27 November said that whereas in the last war New Zealand did
not have to worry about defence, now a power in the East had said
that the British were going to lose the war and was backing the
enemy.
NZ Herald, 28 Nov 40, p. 10
In February 1941War Cabinet member Gordon Coates
spoke of Japan, armed to the teeth with the latest weapons, coming
into the fray.
Evening Post, 8 Feb 41, p. 8
Plainly, if unofficially, the idea was about that Japan
was the enemy likely to invade the beaches.
Truth attributed apathy to lack of information or training. Appeals
about the urgency of the war situation were not enough, men wanted
to know that they would learn something useful in modern mechanised warfare, not merely spend evenings at physical jerks and army
drill, plus an occasional route march. It spoke of the British being
trained to move without being seen, in street fighting, road-block
making, of smoke-bombs made from cow-dung and anti-tank bombs
from bottles, and called for publicity on what the Home Guard was
actually doing.
Truth, 30 Oct, 27 Nov 40, pp. 28, 7
This of course bore on the first difficulty. What could the Home
Guard do, starting from scratch, with no immediate help from the
Army? Despite a general instruction for co-operation, the Army
declared itself unable to lend rifles, etc, or to provide instruction
until about the end of March 1941.
Home Guard Circular No 1, 12 Nov 40, quoted in WHN, ‘Home Guard’,
pp. 11–12
Early parades were often a
nightmare to those responsible. With no equipment and few qualified instructors it was hard to keep the rank and file from standing
about feeling bored and futile.
Ibid.,
Each unit had to work out its own
salvation, using emergent leadership, acquiring instructors from the
Territorials and the National Reserve, often with NCOs learning at
mid-week classes what they taught their men in the weekend. Those
who had rifles brought them to meetings for teaching purposes; some
zealous units acquired poles of rifle weight for arms drill, while
stoutly denying ‘broomstick army’ rumours.
Evening Post, 11 Dec 40, p. 5
In December 1940 the Physical Welfare Branch of Internal Affairs
began training Home Guard leaders in non-military, recreation-type
exercises,
Ibid., 19 Dec 40, p. 9, 24 Jan 41, p. 5
but even this took time to spread. For instance, at the
end of February the commander of the Wellington area remarked
that arrangements were nearly complete for physical training on
modern lines. However, by the end of April in three large districts
(Auckland, central North Island and Wellington) there were only
400 trained instructors.
Ibid., 24 Feb, 30 Apr 41, pp. 9, 7
In November the tasks in which the Home Guard would assist
the Army had been listed
Home Guard Circular No 1, 12 Nov 40, quoted in WHN, ‘Home Guard’, pp. 11–12
and on 2 December Semple announced
them. It would watch stretches of coast not covered by fortress troops
or by independent squadrons, and prepare sketch maps of coastal
areas not included in the Army mapping plan;
The Lands and Survey maps then current did not show relief or ground cover.
oppose enemy landings until the Army arrived; construct movable obstacles to delay
the enemy; under Army direction, assist with demolition work and
with permanent obstacles; provide guards for internment camps and
for any vital points handed over by the Army (which on 14 February
decided that docks, oil tanks, radio and cable stations should forthwith be in Home Guard care and in emergency, railway tunnels and
bridges).
WHN, ‘Home Guard’, pp. 16, 34
In January and February 1941 the Army made its first
real contribution to Home Guard training, admitting unit commanders to week-long courses in Army schools on such topics as
rifle drill, section leading, map-work, reconnaissance reports, camouflage and siting of trenches.
Evening Post, 2 Dec 40, p. 9, 16 Jan 41, p. 11; Otago Daily Times, 14 Jan 41, p. 7;
NZ Herald, 11, 24 Jan 41, pp. 11, 9
By December 1940 newspapers were peppered with modest but
persistent reports of Home Guard units, in centres both large and
small, though there were still complaints of apathy. The Dominion
total rose from 16 667 men on 20 November to 37 701 on 7 December
Evening Post, 17 Dec 40, p. 9
to 65 927 on 31 January, 86 508 on 28 February and 98 656
on 31 March.
WHN, ‘Home Guard’, App IX, p. 118
home guard enrolments
Figures for 20 Nov & 7 Dec 40 in Evening Post, 17 Dec 40, p. 9; for 31 Jan & 28 Feb
41 in ibid., 25 Mar 41, p. 8. Figures for all five dates are in WHN, ‘Home Guard’,
App IX. The total for 7 Dec 40 should read 37 703.
A proposal in February 1941 by the Stratford Borough Council
that it should be compulsory to join the Home Guard drew only
modest support,
Evening Post, 19 Feb 41, p. 8
though it was also advanced by the Auckland
Farmers’ Union and the NZRSA.
Dominion, 23, 31 May 41, pp. 8, 10
Semple declared that there was
no need for conscription
Evening Post, 6 Mar 41, p. 5
but the Minister of National Service could
direct anyone to join the Home Guard and by an amendment in
March such direction automatically made such a person a member.
Ibid., 12 Mar 41, p. 10
It became usual for armed forces appeal boards, in granting exemptions or postponements of service, to direct these men to join the
Home Guard, if not the Territorials.
Of course enrolment numbers were no indication of attendance
at parades, and on a dirty night less than half the proper number
might turn up.
Ibid., 22 Mar 41, p. 8
This was one of the weaknesses discussed in some
newspaper letters;
Ibid., 22, 25 Feb, 1 Mar 41, pp. 8, 8, 8
straggling attendances and too few parades meant
that some units after training for several months had learnt little
but the fringes of elementary parade drill; without uniforms and
weapons they could not feel genuine. If the Home Guard really was
a useful cog in the defence machine the Army would take some
interest in it. There was need for guidance, by visiting officers or by
an official syllabus, in successive steps of training. Home Guard
committees were not representative of active guardsmen.
Other critics said that too much time was given to squad drill,
not enough to practical improvisation. There should be on-the-beach
training, with each unit practising on the area it would defend. Many
units had men whom quarrying, road contracting, and other jobs
had made expert with explosives, who could teach the use of gelignite, fuses and detonators as needed in road-blocks work; others
skilled in fencing could devise barbed wire obstacles. Baden-Powell’s
Scouting for Boys and Tom Wintringham’s New Ways of War would
be more useful than infantry manuals. ‘The circumstances which
would demand the service of the Home Guard would also demand
improvising all along the line…. those shaping the Home Guard
seem to be relying on squad drill and rifle exercises. Could futility
go further?’
NZ Herald, 23, 25, 31 Jan, 12 Feb 41, pp. 6, 11, 10, 12; Otago Daily Times,
13 Mar 41
But squad drill also had its defenders, who held that
it was the basis of discipline, without which a body of men might
become a rabble.
NZ Herald, 24, 28, 29 Jan 41, pp. 9, 9, 10
Actually there was much improvisation and use
of civilian skills, varying from place to place according to the people
concerned; some districts were noticeably keener and more ingenious
than others.
Engineering sections practised knots and lashings and trestle-bridge
building, earthworks and obstacles, map and compass reading. Signals sections devised lamps, using camera tripods and reflectors from
car and motor-cycle headlights, even treacle tins, and their hill-top
blinkings roused a number of spy-scares; in May, Napier and Mohaka
units exchanged messages over 31 miles, which was reckoned a long
hop.
Wanganui Herald, 20 May 41, p. 4; Press, 7 Feb 41, p. 8; Evening Post, 22 Jul 41, p. 8;
WHN, ‘Home Guard’, pp. 16–17
There was a lack of large-scale maps showing details relevant
to military purposes, for the Lands and Survey Department’s mile/
inch series was just beginning. But county engineers, surveyors and
draughtsmen mapped some areas very creditably.
WHN, ‘Home Guard’, p. 17 and App XX
The lack of training manuals was met by some Hawke’s Bay Territorial officers who
in April 1941, with the approval of Home Guard headquarters,
produced The New Zealand Home Guard Manual, which outlined
training from squad drill to tank hunting, and included instructions
for the use of automatic weapons that the Guard was yet very far
from possessing.
Ibid., p. 15
Civilians skilled with explosives showed how to use gelignite and
detonators for blowing trees across roads and for making other obstacles. They made grenades from jam tins filled with metal scraps and
a central core of gelignite, or from lengths of iron piping segmented
by filing and turning on a lathe and filled with explosive. They
made booby traps of many sorts, often igniting fuses with .22 cartridges, the bullets being removed and the caps being struck by
assorted springs such as from rat traps. ‘Molotov cocktails’, bottles
filled with equal parts of tar, kerosene and petrol, with a wick soaked
in kerosene at the neck, were thrown at rocks, etc, representing tanks,
and were very popular.
Ibid., pp. 17–20; Wanganui Herald, 13 May 41, p. 9; NZ Herald, 21 Apr 41, p. 8;
Press, 6, 18 Jun 41, pp. 6, 4
The Waverley unit that practised throwing
with smooth stones the weight of Mills bombs from a nearby river
was praised by a headquarters officer.
The Home Guardsman, 28 Jun 41, p. 4
Waipukurau men adapted
shotgun cartridges to fire heavy lead slugs with accuracy over a limited range and demonstrated on the carcases of sheep.
NZ Herald, 15 Apr 41, p. 6
Training in tactics could be attempted with little equipment if
there was plenty of zest and imagination. Though some town areas
were very lively in field training,
For instance, by mid-March the Karori Battalion was getting familiar with the Makara
area, using improvised equipment of various sorts, with transport, signals, ambulance,
mortar and machine gun platoons, as well as infantry companies. Evening Post,
15 Mar 41, p. 11
country areas obviously could
come at it more readily. The comparable street fighting was not
attempted: it would hold up traffic, alarm people, and no one was
experienced in it. So, for instance, Taranaki units at a weekend had
a route march plus field work combining instruction with actual
procedure and covering more in ‘one full day than in six evening
parades’; manoeuvred, with lupin-covered hats, in sandhills; worked
through blackberry patches and swamp to attack occupied positions.
Taranaki Daily News, 17 Feb 41, p. 6; Wanganui Herald, 1 May 41, p. 11
The Sheffield company ambushed a tank with Molotov cocktails, were out-flanked by an armoured column, and after lunch with
other units rounded up the ‘parachutists’ of Glentunnel in hill country, ‘a “soldiers battle” in which the rank and file displayed particular enthusiasm and initiative.’
Press, 18 Jun 41, p. 4
A sense of reality emerges from some of the reports, as for example
the problem posed to 60 company and platoon commanders and
NCOs of a Taranaki battalion attending a two-day course at Pihama:
An invasion barge carrying a tank and 18 infantrymen—a laggard
from a larger enemy force attempting a landing on the black sands
at Opunake—comes churning into the cove at Papakaka, where
the Puneheu Stream once entered the sea.
A quarter of an hour before it touches the shingle it is sighted,
and a platoon of the Home Guard armed with rifles and gelignite,
is ordered to prevent the landing or annihilate the invading unit
as it leaves the water.
On Saturday these men were given rifle instruction and a talk by
the county engineer on field sketching and reports, followed by practical work on a piece of coast. Sunday included a lecture on field
craft, on taking cover from fire and on selecting positions for firing
and for advance; another lecture on obstacles, road blocks and wiring, again by the engineer; it wound up with the landing problems
set forth above.
Taranaki Daily News, 11 Feb 41, p. 8
On this occasion a women’s committee was thanked
for providing tea; one hopes that other women were thanked for
milking the cows.
Various devices were used to give almost unarmed men a sense
of battle. Sometimes an aeroplane would ‘bomb’ their trucks, or fly
over ground on which they were taking cover. In an attack on golf-links near Christchurch, watched by Major-General Young, paper
packets of flour were thrown as grenades and machine-gun sounds
were contrived from tin rattles ‘in which the turning of a ratchet
made an effective noise.’
Press, 26 May 41, p. 6
Rifles, though promised often, were slow to appear apart from
those owned by an élite minority. In January 1941 some elderly
rifles were issued for training purposes, though not certified fit for
firing.
Otago Daily Times, 14 Jan 41, p. 7
A few weeks later the Prime Minister appealed for the loan
of .303 rifles, promising to make good all deterioration or loss, but
the response was slight: more than two weeks later only 30 had been
handed in throughout the Auckland police district from Wellsford
to Huntly, only two from Auckland city.
NZ Herald, 7 Mar 41, p. 6
At the end of April an
impressment order was gazetted, requiring all rifles or parts thereof
to be handed in immediately, but this did not produce a flood, and
shortage of rifles remained a sore point till well into 1942.
The more that guardsmen took to the hills, dug trenches or worked
with wire, the more they wanted uniforms and boots. With the
Depression not far behind, many had few serviceable old clothes,
and costs of clothing and footwear were rising. They were promised
the old style uniforms of the Territorials when these could be replaced
with battledress, but the Territorials were constantly being increased,
and all through 1941 the promises moved on. Meanwhile a few
units acquired makeshift uniforms: those of the Otorohanga area
decided as early as November 1940 to have grey shirts and trousers
and glengarry caps;
Ibid., 10 Apr 41, p. 13
those of Lower Hutt acquired 400 khaki boiler
suits, at 15s each;
Evening Post, 17 Apr 41, p. 4
One Tree Hill men appeared in drill blouses
and trousers with glengarry caps, cost £1.
Ibid., 7 Mar 41, p. 6; NZ Herald, 7 Apr 41, p. 6
The importance of maintaining communications in a war emergency produced, during 1941, several special Home Guard groups.
In the Post and Telegraph Department, linesmen, technicians,
exchange operators, telegraphists and other experts covered the whole
country in a many-branched organisation totalling nearly 2000 at
full strength. In the Railways about 600 men were set to maintain
lines, signals, telephones and electricity for electric engines, and at
the last to deny resources to the enemy. Both these groups did some
ordinary Home Guard training, especially in the use of weapons,
and their officers attended Army schools.
WHN, ‘Home Guard’, pp. 61–3 and App VII
Within the carrying
industry, a Home Guard motor transport organisation, spread over
the country in 32 companies, was prepared to carry supplies, ammunition and petrol for the Army in a crisis. Each full company comprised 79 three-ton lorries, 4 cars, 8 motor-cycles and 155 men.
Ibid., pp. 64–5 and App XII
Petrol was stored all over the country, sealed in the spare tanks of
retailers, tanks which because of petrol restrictions were not in trade
use. From 11 February 1941 each of 1821 petrol stations had its
guards, totalling 5548 in March 1943. They were usually older and
less fit men, with the owner or manager in charge, under instructions
from the Oil Fuel Controller.
Ibid., pp. 22, 29, 34 and App XII
Thus there were during 1941, outside the would-be fighting men, more than 7000 Guardsmen who
had special tasks, linked with their normal work. Another such group
was the Traffic Control Corps. Early in 1941, mindful of the tragic
errors in France, the EPS organised emergency traffic police who
would keep country roads clear if needed for military traffic, and
control any civilian evacuation. The Transport Department’s 61 traffic
inspectors were the nucleus of this group, which numbered 2000
when Japan entered the war. It was then transferred to the Home
Guard, and by March 1943 its members would total nearly 4500.
Its head was the Oil Fuel Controller, also in charge of the petrol
guards, and these two groups were further linked at roadside level.
Ibid., p. 68 and App XII; Otago Daily Times, 8 Feb 41, p. 5
Expenses of transport, hire of halls and so on were at first necessarily and reluctantly borne by local bodies, assisted by sums raised
through street appeals, entertainments and raffles. In mid-March 1941
the government, pressed by these bodies, announced that it would
pay administration costs down to and including area commands,
plus a capitation grant of 2s a man up to 31 December and thereafter
1s a quarter for each man attending 80 per cent of parades.
Press, 18 Mar 41, p. 8
It was,
of course, not enough, but it was felt by many that local fundraising efforts were part of the total community activity.
Despite enthusiasm and makeshift, as months passed dissatisfaction grew. Hill-scrambling was all very well in summer, but unit
commanders wondered how to cope with winter evening parades
without losing interest and men. Government apathy and lack of
Army interest, it was said, were killing the Home Guard. Newspaper letters
eg, Dominion, 2 May 41, reprinted in the Home Guardsman, May 41, p. 26
continued to call for equipment and positive direction,
for a co-ordinated Dominion-wide training programme, instead of
units doing various things, largely reflecting the views of their
immediate officers, some seeing the Home Guard as a guerrilla force
of freelance nuisances to the invader, others regarding it as an emergency reserve for the regular forces and therefore needing elementary
orthodox training. Closer co-operation with the Army and maintenance by the government was urged by the Southland Times on 29
April and by the NZRSA on 30 May, while several local bodies
and Home Guard committees made similar suggestions.
NZ Herald, 20 Feb, 14, 22 Mar 41, pp. 9, 9, 11; Press, 7 Jun 41, p. 3; Evening Post,
21 Jun 41, p. 8
In mid-June a deputation of mayors from all the cities and big towns, asking
Nash, as Acting Prime Minister, for a clear statement, said that if
the Guard were indeed a front line of defence, as it had so often
been told, it should be under military control.
Press, 16 Jun 41, p. 4
Nash replied that
Sir Guy Williams,
Williams, General Sir Guy (1881–1959): C-in-C Eastern Command 1938–41; Military
Adviser NZ govt 1941
a home defence expert from Britain touring the
country as military adviser to the government, would soon report;
a comprehensive plan and more equipment would emerge shortly,
and meanwhile 50 000 pairs of Home Guard boots were to be
ordered.
Press, 16 Jun. 41, p. 4; Evening Post, 24 Jun 41, p. 9
From Auckland pressure came strongly. The New ZealandHerald on 1 July said that New Zealand was in the Gilbertian
situation of having two separate land defence forces with War Cabinet as the only formal link between them and pointed out several
administrative anomalies. Auckland city’s Home Guard committee
pressed for information on government intentions concerning training and equipment: there had been many promises but so far they
had only armbands, and expenditure on the Home Guard in Auckland from its inception to the end of May totalled £686.
NZ Herald, 2 Jul 41, p. 8
This was
backed by a Herald editorial and letters next day, which Semple
angrily described as ‘based on political prejudice and hate rather
than on logical reasoning, tolerance and patience’.
Evening Post, 3 Jul 41, p. 6
On 23 July
Goosman repeated these criticisms in the House.
NZPD, vol 259, p. 488
Already during April and May War Cabinet, the National Service
Department and Army had been considering what to do with the
unwieldy Home Guard, now nominally more than 100 000 strong
and of widely ranging ages and fitness. At the end of July, assisted
by Williams’s reports,
WHN, ‘Home Guard’, pp. 26–30
the Home Guard was transferred to Army
control, with changes as slight as possible to existing machinery: the
four District Commanders became District Directors with the rank
of Colonel, the Area Commanders became Group Directors, with
the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, and a few clerical assistants were
appointed to each of the 28 Group headquarters. But elsewhere it
was considered important to preserve the voluntary spirit, and at
battalion level permanent administrative and training staff would
not be needed until there was equipment to handle and keep account
of. The capitation grant was increased from 4s to 15s a year, though
local fund-raising was still encouraged; those taking special courses
of instruction would receive Territorial pay.
It was now established
Ibid., App XVI, Home Guard Special NZ Army Order 261/1941
that the Home Guard’s task was to
provide static defence of localities, of vulnerable and key points such
as beaches, bridges, defiles and centres of communication, and to
give timely warning of enemy movement. Its value lay not with
individual action but in proper co-ordination with the superior military forces. The Home Guardsman was defined as a part-time infantry soldier, armed with rifle, machine-gun and bombs, who having
no government transport or supply must fight and feed near his own
home, his chief asset being close knowledge of the neighbourhood.
His task would be to impose loss and delay, defending localities
with temporary road blocks, covered with small arms fire, with a
reserve inside the locality ready to counter-attack; to acquire and
deliver news of the enemy; to continue to harass an occupying force,
under cover of darkness.
Ibid., App XIV, Operational Control of the Home Guard, D. 304/1/1/G, 11 Aug 41
A high standard of weapon training was
to be aimed at, with physical training for reasonable fitness, foot
and arms drill enough for pride of bearing and reasonably precise
movement; knowledge of the district (assisted by sand tables and
models), proficiency in observation, patrolling, message sending;
general development of night sense, doing operational tasks in darkness and getting away from drill hall training as much as possible.
Ibid., App XV, Training Directive, Home Guard, D. 305/1/26G, 9 Aug 41,
App XVI, Army Order 261/1941
The force would have no fixed number, but be in two divisions.
Division I, approximately 50 000, fit for combat duty, would be
trained and equipped as quickly as possible; Division II, reasonably
fit, would be a reserve for Division I, and have as much training as
possible with the equipment available; the less fit would be politely
invited to transfer to the EPS.
Ibid., App XVI, Army Order 261/1941, p. 4
Little of this, however, reached the schools and local halls where
a few men continued to turn up regularly and the majority much
less regularly. Changes to the existing machinery were so slight that
on 1 October Broadfoot was asking in the House why, since the
announcement on 31 July that the Home Guard was to be taken
over by the Army and put into two Divisions, Home Guardsmen
had received no explanation of the arrangement, and when would
the reorganisation of the Guard as a separate entity within the Army
be complete? Fraser replied that preparatory work was under way,
reorganisation, being wrapped up with the whole defence plan, proceeding as fast as circumstances would permit.
Dominion, 2 Oct 41, p. 9
On 28 October an article in the New Zealand Herald said that
compulsory parades seemed the only means towards efficiency;
attendances were often so poor that there was widespread discouragement and despondency. These Cinderellas of the defence forces
had trained almost blindfold, uncertain of their part in an emergency, ‘sparsely equipped and uniformed with promises’, so that ‘it
was a common statement among officers that every time an official
promise was made another half-dozen men failed to parade with
their units’. The three-month-old announcement of transfer to Army
control had roused hopes but progress in removing the long-standing
complaints was slow, and parade attendances were the fundamental
difficulty. Special courses had been held at district Army schools,
improving officers and NCOs, but they often had to resume elementary training because so many members had missed so much;
for instance, one platoon commander had one of his 36 men at one
parade and none at the next. Also, the idea of the Home Guard as
a guerrilla force had been replaced by the idea of static defence, close
to homes. This seemed a condition more suitable to closely settled
Britain than to New Zealand, with its widely separated towns, and
was a further cause of uneasiness.
NZ Herald, 28 Oct 41, p. 8
Within two days Army Order 261/1941 was issued to the press,
and summaries appeared.
Ibid., 31 Oct 41, p. 8; Evening Post, 30 Oct 41, p. 11
‘Not a moment too soon’ hailed the
New Zealand Herald’s editorial, claiming that the Home Guard now
had a definite place. But next day that paper printed a letter signed
‘Guardsman’ saying that this order had been read to all of them at
least four weeks ago, but ‘from that day to this the Home Guard
might have been in another world for all the interest taken in it by
the army authorities’. So much had been said and promised, so little
done, small wonder that attendances were poor. ‘Please do not take
this as an indictment against the army authorities. The Home Guard
was created in a wild burst of patriotic fervour by a political drummer boy, who having achieved a roll strength of 100 000, magnanimously hands this army over to the defence authorities with a
sigh of relief at having wormed himself out of the very embarrassing
position of having an army without an objective’.
NZ Herald, 1 Nov 41, p. 8
Minus the almost
Semple-like invective, this criticism was more or less echoed a few
weeks later by Lieutenant-Colonel W. Bell, Group Director at Invercargill, who said that the Home Guard had started with a flourish
of trumpets and large enrolments, but the numbers at parades had
since fallen and he could not blame the older men for losing enthusiasm when so many younger ones were doing nothing; there should
be conscription.
Press, 26 Nov 41, p. 8
At the start of November, papers reported both activity and dissatisfaction from Home Guard units. Thus Timaru’s battalion was
zealously contriving to obtain sandbags needed for trench and field
fortifications;
Ibid., 5 Nov 41, p. 6
the Onehunga battalion held a mock battle near
Mangere airfield, with flour bag bombs from an aircraft;
NZ Herald, 3 Nov 41, p. 9
the Kaikohe platoon’s smouldering dissatisfaction over lack of organisation
and equipment broke out in a decision to attend no more parades
till the authorities placed the Home Guard on a satisfactory footing.
Ibid., 7 Nov 41, p. 7
Then, about the middle of the month, reports of the arrival
of rifles and other equipment, including Lewis and Thomson
machine-guns, began to appear.
Ibid., 15 Nov 41, p. 10; Otago Daily Times, 17 Nov 41, p. 4
However, it was not until the following month that the policy
was really spelled out. Fraser on 11 December 1941 stated:
The task of the Home Guard is defensive and I cannot overstate
its importance. In the initial stages of an emergency it is intended
that forward static positions will be held by Territorial and
National Reserve units, with the Home Guard available to reinforce them if necessary, but as the gravity of the situation increases
the Home Guard will take over this duty from the Territorials
and the National Reserve who will then be withdrawn from their
positions in readiness to meet the main thrust of the enemy. This
plan is intended to provide the widest distribution of forces to
meet an initial attack and at the same time to permit the concentration of the more highly trained and mobile units to deal
with enemy concentrations wherever they may be found.
Evening Post, 12 Dec 41, p. 9
In mid-December thousands of Territorials and National Military
Reserve men were hurried into camps and fortress areas, their uniforms and equipment further delaying promised issues to the Home
Guard. The unpaid, part-time defenders of hearth and home were
not conspicuously called to duty. But on 31 December War Cabinet,
by authorising the payment of mobilised Home Guardsmen, provided machinery for using them as required on regular defence work,
a milestone on the road to recognition by the Army that for many
had value far above 7s a day. Further, at the beginning of February,
Army district officers were directed to use Home Guard volunteers
where necessary to supplement Territorial forces. Without pay, they
could do beach patrols, etc, on shifts of 24 hours or less, at weekends, which would not interfere with their normal work. They could
also serve paid shifts of 24 hours or more, again mainly at weekends,
coast watching, guarding vital points, relieving Territorial troops
going on leave, or helping them with defence works. They could
also be mobilised for a week or longer on such tasks, or to occupy
positions if other home troops were not available.
WHN, ‘Home Guard’, p. 36; Press, 6 Feb 42, p. 4
Although the Public Works Department and contractors with
machinery were used as much as possible on defence construction,
at the start much urgent spade work, wiring, etc, was needed on
beaches and places chosen for defence. In the early months of 1942
the Home Guard did a good deal of defence navvying, with the
result that works were completed quickly and regular troops could
concentrate on their training, while the Home Guard itself benefited
from close association with serving units. Procedure differed from
place to place, with little attendant publicity. At the end of January,
groups of Canterbury Home Guardsmen in turn began going into
camp for a week, and were photographed shouldering shovels, winding barbed wire and preparing brushwork for revetments.
Press, 22, 23, 27, 30 Jan, 7 Mar 42, pp. 6, 6, 8, 4, 6; Star–Sun, 7 Sep 42, p. 4
Similar
work was mentioned at Dunedin, where a Home Guardsman devised
a concertina style of wiring that produced a very tangled coil;
Evening Star, 22 Jan, 16, 27 Feb 42, pp. 6, 7, 2
the
Defence Minister referred to weekend patrols by Home Guardsmen
attached to Wellington fortress troops;
Press, 23 Jan 42, p. 6
at Auckland on 27 March
the Mayor called for Home Guard volunteers needed for both fulltime and part-time duty; inland units worked on road blocks and
dragged huge logs into position ready for dropping across roads.
WHN, ‘Home Guard’, p. 37
In short, the Home Guard helped to make possible landing beaches
prickly with barbed wire and gun posts and to make strategic roads
quickly defensible.
An article in the Listener in January, ‘Hawke’s Bay has an Army’,
described things not exclusive to Hawke’s Bay, The Home Guard
had been the starved younger child of the military forces, working
without almost everything that it officially needed. It had survived
being a hopeless idea, survived the stage of wooden rifles, survived
being funny, being derided by a nation which still ‘did not fully
realise that this is a shooting war.’ Few Home Guardsmen had uniforms and most of the lucky ones would not wear them until all
were so provided, but some could make themselves invisible in homemade camouflage. Not all had rifles or shotguns but they had a fine
collection of extemporised weapons, ranging from knives to homemade bombs. Some units had reconditioned machine-guns souvenired from the last war and partly remodelled by the Army armourers, and most had enough Tommy-guns to learn the use of them.
They had their home-made bombs
See p. 463
and were experimenting with
mortars to throw them. They had Molotov cocktails to hurl at tanks,
trip wires and rat traps would ignite the charges of booby traps. A
signalling system, with improvised gear, covered the province. Some
units could bridge streams in less than half an hour, using oil drums
soldered watertight, with boards and timber for bracing. In small
units, ingenuity had achieved much that would be impossible for
a big organisation.
NZ Listener, 23 Jan 42, pp. 6–7
Army connections were strengthened by increased intake to Army
schools of instruction, where Home Guardsmen took courses lasting
for a week to a month, and would thereafter instruct their units on
regular Army lines. By 31 March 1942, a total of 2118 officers and
2431 other ranks had been through such courses.
WHN ‘Home Guard’, App XXI, p. 181, Report by GOC on paper submitted by
Committee of Inquiry
There was not a great rush of recruits to the Home Guard.
NZ Herald, 20 Feb 42, p. 4
When, on 22 January 1942, enrolment in the EPS became compulsory for men 18 to 65 years inclusive not in the forces or in the
Home Guard, the majority, possibly through misunderstanding, chose
the less demanding EPS. This was probably no immediate disadvantage, for until more weapons appeared thronging recruits would
have multiplied frustration. Existing numbers were thinned by successive ballots, taking the younger and stronger men, who often
found that their Home Guard training hastened Army promotion.
On the other hand, in February, when some of the National Reserve
began to droop after being in camp for about six weeks, the more
vigorous were transferred to the Territorials, while the less fit went
to the Home Guard along with those of service age and fitness whom
Manpower committees, for public interest or because of hardship,
sent back to their civilian jobs.
Ibid., 7 Feb 42, p. 6
A survey of age groups in March
1942 showed that 48 per cent of the Home Guard were less than
35 years old, 35 per cent were of 36 to 50 and 17 per cent were
more than 50 years old.
WHN, ‘Home Guard’, pp. 40–1
Early 1942 saw a sharp increase in those earning capitation grants,
that is, attending at least 75 per cent of parades. In the September
quarter of 1941 they totalled 50 531, and were down to 48 343 in
December, the busy farming season. They rose to 63 344 in March
1942, when the nominal roll was 110 000, and to 70 772 in the
June quarter.
Ibid., pp. 33, 41. The capitation grant was paid to units, not to Guardsmen, for expenses.
Differing figures were given for March in the report
of 22 June 1942 signed by the Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant-General Puttick,
Ibid., App XXI, p. 181
which stated that the roll strength of the Guard
at the end of March was 96 000, of whom 62 890 had earned
capitation grants in the past three months. The conflict of these
March figures is less surprising when the many sub-divisions in the
Home Guard are remembered, along with the variety of its record-keeping methods; nor is the difference, 454, in the effective number
very significant.
In April 1942 it was decided that Home Guard numbers must
be increased by compulsion. All civilian men between 35 and 50
years had to enrol despite already being in the EPS. There were
certain exceptions: police, firemen, seamen, key members of EPS,
doctors, chemists, Maoris, magistrates, judges, ministers of religion,
also those disabled, blind, in hospital or in prison. Manpower officers
then eliminated those whose commitment to essential work would
make them poor Guardsmen, and the rest were interviewed by local
selection committees, representing Home Guard, EPS, and Manpower, who transferred suitable men from EPS to the Home Guard.
Division I, those over 18 years, physically fit, and in fighting units,
plus youths 16 to 18 years, would have 24 hours training a month;
Division II, those with non-operational roles such as petrol guard
and traffic control, would train for eight hours a month. Absence
from parades without leave could lead to prosecution in civil courts,
with fines of up to £25, or three months in prison.
NZ Herald, 11, 27 Apr, 1 May 42, pp. 6, 6, 4
These steps
produced 29 555 recruits.
WHN, ‘Home Guard’, p. 42
Boots were now coming more quickly, 46 550 pairs by mid-February, 77 228 by the end of May,
Ibid., p. 182
though still not enough to go
round: thus, at Foxton in February, 65 pairs were received for more
than 100 men, and in November a Pongaroa man lamented that
his company had received 12 pairs in all.
Dominion, 26 Feb 42, p. 8, Truth, 11 Nov 42, p. 9
Uniforms at last appeared, the Prime Minister stating early in
March 1942 that 11 260 had been issued,
Auckland Star, 6 Mar 42, p. 4
and this number had
risen to 43 782 by the end of May.
WHN, ‘Home Guard’, App XXI, p. 181
Some were ex-Territorial
service uniforms cleaned and repaired, some were battle-dress style,
new, but of woollen cloth not worsted.
Press, 16 May 42, p. 4; NZ Herald, 20 Nov 42, p. 2
By mid-February the Home Guard had received 12 106 Army
rifles, plus 66 heavy and 34 light machine-guns, 800 Thompson
sub-machine-guns and 2.5 million rounds of small arms ammunition,
WHN, ‘Home Guard’, App XXI, p. 182
though only a limited amount of this could be used for
practice shooting. By May, 24 500 American .300 rifles had arrived
and there was a re-shuffle. In the areas furthest from mobilised troops,
such as Southland, Nelson, Coromandel and Hawke’s Bay, all .303
rifles were withdrawn and redistributed to Home Guard units more
likely to be operating alongside the Territorials, the more remote
districts then receiving the American rifles. Thus with the 16 000
either self-owned or impressed, plus those from American and the
Army, the Home Guard mustered 52 648 rifles by the end of May.
Ibid., pp. 42, 182
After Singapore there was, especially in northern districts, some
anxiety to avoid a similar situation of military inadequacy and over-optimism. Some worried about the Army, and, though Army shortcomings were less visible to the public than were those of the Home
Guard, military silence led, wrote General Puttick, ‘to the obvious
deficiencies in the equipment of the Home Guard being accepted
by the public as an indication of the state of the Army as a whole’,
which was far from being the case.
A to J1942, H–19, p. 1
In February and March, a few
public bodies voiced concern: the Rotorua, Mt Eden and Takapuna
borough councils and the Auckland Chamber of Commerce urged
that the Home Guard should be strengthened, having first choice
of the men compulsorily enrolling for EPS, that it should be fully
militarised, and its equipment improved by local manufacturing.
NZ Herald, 25, 27 Feb 42, pp. 9, 7; Auckland Star, 12 Mar 42, p. 8
These ideas reached fullest and most forceful expression in the
‘Awake New Zealand’ campaign emanating from Major T. H. Melrose, commander of Hamilton’s Home Guard.
See p. 345
This movement
sought to kindle a widespread awareness of danger and the fighting
spirit to meet it. It urged self-help and self-defence, without waiting
for official steps, impatiently regarded as red tape. It thought that
there was too much emphasis on EPS measures, it called for compulsory Home Guard membership and for Home Guard weapons,
weapons for every man, to be improvised and produced by resourceful, handy men in every foundry and workshop.
NZ Herald, 23 Feb, 3, 12, 16 Mar 42, pp. 4, 6, 9, 6
The movement
spread rapidly, its ideas also infecting other organisations: for instance,
the Auckland Farmers’ Union offered its services to the government
to assist with the organisation of the Home Guard, the cultivation
of an offensive spirit and the collection of scrap metal for local manufacture into grenades.
Ibid., 16 Apr 42, p. 8
In many centres, money was given for Home Guard weapons and
equipment and handymen were called on to devise and produce
weapons. Already there were home-made grenades;
See p. 463
other devices
were now produced, notably trench mortars, originating in an Otahuhu workshop.
Auckland Star, 26 Feb, 12 Mar 42, pp. 8, 9; Press, 2 Mar 42, p. 4; NZ Herald,
25 Feb, 13 Apr 42, pp. 9, 6
The Army, however, was wary of most such
improvisations, preferring local production of approved weapons
WHN, ‘Home Guard’, App XXI, p. 184, comment by Lt-Gen Puttick
such as mortars made in the Hutt railway workshop. The Army’s
coolness to some proposals was probably judicious; as, for instance,
land-mines claimed to be simple and safe in construction, deadly in
action and capable of being made by the thousand and laid out in
a few hours on beaches and in vital areas.
Auckland Star, 2 Feb, 13 Mar 42, pp. 4, 5
However, if the ‘Awake’ campaigners could not get very far with
weapons, they usefully provided other equipment such as camping
gear, ground sheets, steel helmets and haversacks.
NZ Herald, 13, 14, 15 Apr 42, pp. 7, 7, 6; Truth, 22 Apr 42, p. 8
At Whangarei,
for instance, the campaign began on 1 May and closed four months
later, having raised £705, of which £452 was spent on Home Guard
equipment, including 400 ground sheets.
Auckland Star, 2 May, 2 Sep 42, pp. 8, 4
New urgency now beset Home Guardsmen as they defended and
counter-attacked beaches and hills, rehearsed the blocking of roads
and gorges, laid dummy mines and built emergency bridges. At
Easter 1942 for instance many battalions, as at Auckland, Hamilton,
Wellington and the Hutt, spent days preparing and defending posts
and road blocks, inventing and destroying paratroops and beach
invaders.
NZ Herald, 7 Apr 42, p. 4; Dominion, 6 Apr 42, p. 6
In both town and country, during weekends and some
evenings, men practised handling their weapons, practised moving
under cover, moving by night, on manoeuvres of defence and attack;
they learnt their districts thoroughly by going over them again and
again; some prepared maps that showed roads, trees, buildings, creeks,
swamps and firm ground. As before, enthusiasm and effectiveness
varied from unit to unit, depending on local leadership. Those who
combined determination and energy with military imagination and
skill in handling people achieved much, both in extracting the maximum from authority and in building up efficiency, co-operation and
ésprit de corps. There were many pitfalls for Home Guard commanders, from reluctance in paper work to the adoption of an imagined ‘military’ authority.
Otago Daily Times, 17 Jun 42, p. 6
Despite shortage of petrol and pressure of work, keenness was
conspicuous among farmers, perhaps from the sense of threat to their
own homes and acres, heightened by neighbourly regard and district
pride: a Home Guard drop-out was more conspicuous in the country
than in the comparative anonymity of towns. Transport included
horses and bicycles, while money for petrol for shared cars and other
minor expenses was still raised by such community efforts as dances
and euchre-evenings.
Dominion, 22 Jun 42, p. 4
Rural companies often mustered 30 strong
out of a roll of 40, over a radius of 10 miles; each had its own area
to defend, and knew it closely. They concentrated on guerrilla tactics,
using ‘British commando methods plus a few that are home-made—
and pretty tough.’
Ibid.
There were some special commando units, the so-called guide
platoons. In December, Army command considered that rugged terrains, often within striking distance of cities, and the rugged men
available—farmers, musterers, deer cullers, bushmen and timber
workers—favoured secret commando groups which in an invasion
would retire to hide-outs in bush and hills, emerging to harass the
enemy rear. After March, when weapons became available, more
than 100 such units each of about 17 men were developed. They
were specially devoted to night work and commando methods (to
account for their long spells in bush and bivouac training it was
given out that they were training to guide troops through unknown
and difficult country, and to be scouts and snipers). Their carefully
constructed lairs, equipped with radio, explosives, ammunition and
hard rations for a month, were left quite alone, while the men, to
mislead the curious, worked from dummy headquarters and caches.
WHN, ‘Home Guard’, pp. 51–2, 70, 99
Other Army-nurtured specialists, 344 in number, were in the
Bomb Disposal Group, formed in April 1942. They had training
at Trentham and received much information about enemy bombs.
The only live bombs available were those dropped on several occasions by the RNZAF, but they had more work (in conjunction with
the Navy) dealing with enemy and British mines which drifted on
to the west coasts of both islands, the Coromandel Peninsula and
the Bay of Islands. One such mine was bravely handled: it came
ashore at New Plymouth near the railway shed and hospital, in a
fairly heavy sea and could not be destroyed on the spot. Two men
of the local bomb section attached a rope to it, swam with the rope
to a launch and towed the mine to an empty beach.
Ibid., pp. 51, 66
Such groups knew they had specific tasks, as had the less
adventurous technical communications sections, and the guardians
of petrol stocks and of vital points. The ordinary infantryman’s belief
in his own usefulness was less certain. For some, both in the community and in the Home Guard, there was a strong sense of unreality, of playing at soldiers, scepticism that this semi-amateur effort
would be effective in the face of trained, well-equipped, hard-driving
attackers. Others, including the old soldiers, knew that a sense of
unreality could persist into the midst of action. Nevertheless, it was
better to prepare to do what one could than to wait inactive; the
fighting attitude of mind was more robust, less fearful, than one of
empty-handed default. Fathers as they farewelled sons going overseas
knew that if the young men could not stop the Japanese, the old
ones would not let the home places, the women and the children
go without a fight.
In March, when the issue of guns and gear had but lately got
under way amid organisational hitches, when the news was very bad
and the ‘Awake’ movement was seething out from the Waikato,
Sidney Holland after touring this area spoke of the Home Guard’s
‘very considerable discontent and apprehension’ that they were not
being properly treated or used to the best advantage, and asked for
a full committee of inquiry. The Prime Minister, agreeing to this,
said that Home Guard affairs had the anxious attention of War
Cabinet, which had instructed the Army that its training and issue
of equipment should be as speedy as circumstances would permit;
difficulties were being overcome, and much creditable uneasiness came
from not knowing fully what was being done.
NZ Herald, 27 Mar 42, p. 4
The Auckland Star commented that recognition at this late date
of the need for inquiry into the training, organisation and employment of the Home Guard would be an unpleasant shock to many.
The press had repeatedly drawn attention to the Cinderella of the
forces and how ‘the patriotic enthusiasm which infused its ranks
upon its formation was allowed to ooze away through a sieve of
broken promises’ of equipment, military clothing and adequately
trained command, criticism which was rebuked as giving information to the enemy. The Star doubted that the inquiry would now
achieve much. The equipping of the Home Guard had progressed
so quickly in the last few weeks that enthusiasm had rekindled, and
‘if the committee is in the mood for it, it will have no difficulty in
providing a report well camouflaged in whitewash’. Perhaps the most
important avenue for inquiry at the moment would be the fitness
of many of the leaders for their jobs: there were so many tales of
one company receiving splendid training while its next door neighbour had done only ‘parade ground stuff’.
Auckland Star, 27 Mar 42
The military affairs committee of the War Council, W. Perry of
the RSA, Major-General Andrew Russell
Russell, Sir Andrew Hamilton, KCB(’18), KCMG(’15) (1868–1960): GOC NZ Div
1915–19; Pres NZRSA 1920–4, 1927ff; Inspector-Gen NZ Military Forces, member
War Council 1940ff
and two members of
Parliament, L. G. Lowry
Lowry, Leonard George (1884–1947): b London, to NZ 1906; with 5th Reinforcements
World War I; MP (Lab) Otaki 1935–46
and E. T. Tirikatene,
Tirikatene, Hon Sir Eruera Tihema Teaika, KCMG(’60), JP (1895–1967): MP (Lab)
Southern Maori from 1932; Min representing Maori Race NZ Exec Council 1943–9,
of Forests, Maori Aff 1957–60; member War Council
inquired diligently into Home Guard complaints and circumstances. Their suggestions, plus the comments of Lieutenant-General Puttick and the
Army Department were tabled in the House on 14 October 1942.
A complete copy forms App XXI of WHN, ‘Home Guard’
By this time many grievances had been eased. Since May, compulsory recruitment had filled in the ranks, and the majority were no
longer empty-handed or in civilian garb. Battalions in the areas
immediately essential for defence had been given priority: here the
majority had rifles, and others formed sections with machine-guns,
tommy-guns and mortars. The Home Guard’s total strength in
October 1942 was 109 226; 75 000 uniforms had been issued, and
83 127 pairs of boots, with more coming. Ammunition was still
short, especially for the American rifles of which 40 000 now had
been imported.
WHN, ‘Home Guard’, p. 183
Home Guard units had to construct their own
rifle ranges on approved sites, as heavy demands from the Services
fully occupied the government work force. Proposals that the Guard
should be permitted to make its own wireless sets and improvise
weapons were not approved. Variety in wireless sets might imperil
security it was said, and Army headquarters had to approve all specifications in advance. Several hundred sets had been ordered and the
Army would give training in signals work. Puttick commented that
many improvised weapons were inefficient and dangerous to the users;
skilled men and explosives would be better used in regular production of approved types. Payment for attendance at parades was
not favoured, and there was only a small increase for out-of-pocket
expenses.
Ibid.; Auckland Star, 14 Oct 42, p. 2; NZ Herald, 15 Oct 42, p. 4
Though no marked change resulted from the inquiry at this stage,
it is probable that its existence had already helped to give Home
Guard requirements some priority amid the heavy competition of
1942. But while the condition of the Home Guard was improving,
its raison d’être was fading. On the day that the Parliamentary report
was published, the headlines told of six Japanese warships sunk in
the Solomons in the latest naval clash. There were thousands of
Americans in New Zealand, and the 3rd Division was leaving to
seek the enemy overseas. The accent was shifting from organisation
for defence to organisation for production; men from the home
defence forces were being released to industry in thousands; and
although there were many recent recruits in the Home Guard, many
of its veterans felt that they had learned all it could teach them.
There were complaints from farmers that 24 hours’ training per
month was misdirected effort;
Press, 26, 29 Sep, 9 Oct 42, pp. 6, 6, 4
in October miners were exempted,
NZ Herald, 1 Oct 42, p. 2; NZPD, vol 261, p. 708
and in November wharf workers.
Auckland Star, 13 Nov 42, p. 4
At the beginning of December,
at the same time that lighting restrictions were eased and fire watching ceased, training was reduced to eight hours a month for the busy
season. Ironically, at about the same time, the first prosecutions for
non-attendance came through the courts.
Ibid., 4, 13 Nov 42, pp. 4, 4
Training was restored to 16 hours a month in March. The Guard’s
organisation was now at its best, uniforms plentiful, equipment
mounting. In all, but excluding 4430 dubiously fit, it numbered
119 153.
WHN, ‘Home Guard’, App XII, p. 136, strength summary at 1 Mar 43
Its belief in itself had grown with official recognition,
and long association of members in common endeavour had bred
feelings of community and enterprise. A conspicuous example was
presented in the Hutt where, partly by voluntary work over the
period of reduced training, the local battalion had built 20 huts,
each about 50 feet by 20 feet, for eating and sleeping accommodation in the rear of its battle station, so that when longer training
resumed there could be comfortable weekends on duty. A mounted
troop had also built a large hut, plus horse lines and a chaff house.
It was anticipated that the huts would have a ‘useful post-war purpose’, and the battalion had also, through specialists in its ranks,
built several bridges on farms.
Dominion, 15 Mar 43, p. 6
Not all groups were so devoted, but there were mixed feelings
after 28 June 1943, when the Prime Minister announced a new
phase in defence. The Territorial force was to be cut to its bones—
to coast and anti-aircraft defence, care and maintenance of material,
and training cadres. The Home Guard was to go into reserve, with
quarterly muster parades. Minhinnick’s cartoon showed housewife
Fraser, peg in mouth, with a steaming copper labelled ‘Home Defence
Wash-up’ in the background, hanging up very shrunken Home
Guard trousers and Territorial jackets.
NZ Herald, 28 Jun 43
Though there was some
regret that what had been built up with so much effort was now
unneeded and dismissed, and the sense of belonging together ended,
many men now felt with pleasure that all their Sundays were again
their own; those doubtful of effectiveness were relieved that pretence
was over, and the vast difference that a year had made in the war
was clear reason for the energy given to the Guard being re-directed.
The ‘Dig for Victory’ campaign was under way, and Home Guardsmen could now contribute more with spades than with rifles. Many
now turned to their own neglected gardens, others in groups tackled
allotment gardens on public land. Finally on 13 December 1943,
it was announced that there would be no further parades at all for
the Home Guard; uniforms and all other items would be returned
to unit commands, but the hard-won boots were to be retained.
Companion to the Home Guard and in some respects its rival
was the Emergency Precautions Scheme (EPS) for coping with civilian needs in air raids or invasion. Its roots had been growing slowly
for several years.
For response to the entry of Japan, See p. 326ff
The Hawke’s Bay earthquake of 1931 had shown
the need for local organisation to be ready for acute local disaster,
and during the mid-Thirties fear of air attack with bombs and poison gas was so widespread that even New Zealand did not seem
quite immune, though only minor attacks were ever contemplated.
In August 1935 an Emergency Precautions Committee of the New
Zealand Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence was formed,
representing the departments of Internal Affairs, Police and Defence.
By July 1936 it thought that its three main problems were earthquakes, air raids and gas defence, that the Army should train a
selected core of civilians in gas decontamination and that the St John
Ambulance and Red Cross should be asked to help with casualties;
but it had done very little when in 1937 the starveling Committee
of Imperial Defence became the starveling Organisation for National
Security,
Wood, pp. 85–6
with Emergency Precautions again a sub-committee. In
June 1937 it widened its membership with representatives of the
Air, Census and Statistics and Labour departments; modest anti-gas
preparations began, with Army instructors and 1000 cheap respirators; general work and control, with £1,000 a year voted to it, was
through Internal Affairs, which would prepare a handbook to guide
local authorities.
War History Narrative, ‘Emergency Precautions Scheme’ (hereinafter WHN, ‘EPS’),
p. 8, referring to IA 178/1, pt 1, minutes of EP committee, 16 Jun 37
In 1938 anti-gas plans grew a little firmer: training was to start
in the four main centres, gradually extending to towns of 9000 to
10 000, with about 20 men to a class—six police, six municipal
staff, four firemen and four first-aid experts—and 1500 civilian gas
masks were to be stored at the three main Army depots.
Ibid., p. 9, minutes of EP committee, 18 Aug 38
In 1939, when the emergency precautions booklet was at last
distributed to local authorities by Internal Affairs, enemy action was
included among the hazards.
Meanwhile some local bodies had already planned how they would cope with other
dangers. The Mayor of Dunedin in March 1941 said that three years earlier Dunedin
began preparing a ‘wide and complete scheme’ for natural disasters; it was finished in
November 1939, and did not consider war. Otago Daily Times, 14 Mar 41, p. 4
Municipal departments formed the
framework, plus some government departments such as Police, Post
and Telegraph, and some extra sections. Each area would have a
controller and committee of supply, to provide, commandeer and
distribute food, clothes, bedding. The controller and committee of
works and public utilities would deal with water, electricity and gas
supplies, sewer repairs, street clearing and demolition, the general
labour needs of other sections, and anti-gas training by instructors
from the Army classes.
In June 1940, W. E. Parry, Min Int Aff, told the House that in the main centres 287
persons had been or were being trained and they in turn would instruct others. A to J1940, H–22B, pp. 4, 5; Dominion, 24 Jun 40, p. 9
There would also be controllers and committees of transport, fire-fighting, communications, law and order,
public health and medical services, harbour areas, accommodation
and evacuation, finance and records, and publicity and information.
A central committee of these controllers with the mayor as chairman
would be responsible for general policy, finance and dealings with
outside bodies including government. Taumarunui’s scheme was
established in outline at one public meeting;
Taumarunui Press, 7 Nov 40
31 local authorities
combined to prepare the scheme for Auckland’s metropolitan area.
NZ Herald, 22 Jun 40, p. 12
In the general alarm of May–June 1940, many towns pressed on
with their arrangements. Parry
Parry, Hon William Edward (1878–1952): b Aust, to NZ c. 1906; Pres Waihi Miners
Union 1913; Sec Coal Miners Fed 1918; MP (Lab) Auck Central from 1919, Min Int
Aff, Pensions 1935–49, Social Security 1946–9
told the House on 21 June that
local authorities were forming or had formed adequate organisations
to cope with any local emergencies that might arise, and he gave
Auckland honourable mention for the co-operation of its numerous
authorities.
A to J1940, H–22B, p. 2
The Auckland Star remarked that their elaborate plans
were so safely guarded that ordinary citizens did not know what to
do or whom to obey in a calamity.
Auckland Star, 22 Jun 40
Actually, a booklet was distributed early in July to 80 000 Auckland homes outlining the EPS
organisation and telling the householder what to do about fires,
sanitation, first-aid and so on; air-raid shelters and evacuation schemes
were declared unnecessary.
Ibid., 9 Jul 40, p. 6; NZ Herald, 18, 25 Jun, 23 Jul 40, pp. 8, 10, 10
Whangarei also announced that its
scheme would be printed,
NZ Herald, 2 Aug 40, p. 9
but such publications were not usual
at this stage, when EPS planners were unwilling to be publicly precise about details they could not foresee. But of 309 local authorities,
120 had drawn up schemes, at least in outline, when in August
1940 the Emergency Reserve Corps Regulations made these compulsory and Internal Affairs handed the matter over to the National
Service Department.
Ibid., 24 Aug 40, p. 12. When compulsory military service was introduced in June
1940, the National Service Department was established, consolidating and extending
earlier machinery for controlling manpower in order to maintain essential industry. This
function was strengthened in 1942 and 1944 by industrial manpower regulations and
the Department also dealt with military defaulters and conscientious objectors. Emergency Precautions Services, linked with fire-fighting, light restrictions and the provision
of air-raid shelters, were further concerns of the Department. A to J1943, H–11A,
pp. 2–4, 14–20
An enlistment drive then started. Men outside the range of military call-up, and women also, were urged to join: here there would
be opportunities matching every ability to assist the war effort. There
was great uncertainty about what to do and how to do it, and much
depended on the energy and tact of central civic figures. Meanwhile,
manpower needs multiplied, outstripping enlistments, and there were
repeated complaints of tardiness, apathy and the need for fit men
as well as veterans. The rival claims of the Home Guard also lessened recruitment.
In January 1941, with awareness of German raiders high after
shipping losses and the shelling of Nauru Island in December, the
National Service Department called an EPS conference from 18 major
towns. It accepted that the likely form of attack would be a hit-and-run bombardment from the sea, or a carrier-borne air raid,
Nat Service Circular No 9 of 14 March, quoted in Nash to Hislop, 6 Jun 41, IA 178/8
and this shaped all preparations during the next 10 months. It
decided on more rehearsals, and discussed such problems as warning
signals, air-raid shelters, anti-gas measures, protection of hospital
patients and school children, reduction and control of lighting, evacuation, auxiliary fire brigades, emergency communications and water
supplies, protection of vital points and relations with the Home
Guard.
Evening Post, 18 Jan 41, p. 8
At the start, for most non-technical volunteers the two
most obvious activities were fire-fighting and first-aid; there was also
elementary drill so that groups would move in orderly fashion both
on the job and on parade. But one thing led rapidly to another,
committees developed families of sub-committees and inter-committee relations, and there were more jobs than people. Talk of
compulsion, however, did not get very far.
Dominion, 8, 15 Feb, 6 Jun 41, pp. 10, 10, 6 (editorial); Evening Post, 19 Feb 41, p. 8
(Stratford Borough Council)
The chief links between the numerous repair services and the
public were the wardens, familiar figures in all accounts of Britain’s
Air Raid Precautions (ARP). They were selected by the central body
from the volunteers, as reliable active men who would know their
areas thoroughly and be competent to report damage accurately, so
that the appropriate service could be quickly sent. Central control
systems were set up for receiving such reports from district wardens
and arranging for repair. Should telephones be disrupted, messages
would be sent by car, motor-cycle, bicycle or on foot, with due
precautions against the intrusion of unauthorised persons.
Evening Post, 3 Apr 41, p. 7
Boy
Scouts were often ‘runners’ but many young women also proved
agile. Towns were divided and mapped in blocks or districts, each
with its chief warden and deputy warden and a clearly marked warden’s post, often at a school. These blocks were sub-divided into
sections (about 20 in Auckland), each under a team warden or subwarden. All wardens would have powers similar to those of special
constables. While remote inland towns would need merely a skeleton service that could be expanded quickly, in vulnerable places like
Auckland or Wellington the aim was to have one warden to about
50 people.
J. S. Hunter to EPS Taumarunui, 8 Oct 41, IA 178/6
Wardens needed, above all, detailed knowledge of their areas: of
the people, with their special abilities or infirmities, and possessions
which might be valuable to the organisation;
These things were learnt by house-to-house canvassing. Evening Post, 24 Feb 41, p. 9
the streets and short
cuts; the water mains and fire hydrants and telephones. They would
see that injured people were taken to the nearest first-aid post, give
information needed by the fire-fighting or works sections, and ensure
that damaged shops were protected from looting and that unexploded bombs were cordoned off.
The Works Section, concentrated in several depots, would be sent,
through headquarters, to do rescue and demolition work, to clear
streets, repair electricity, gas and water supplies and maintain sanitation. Municipal departments were the core of the various branches
of the Works Section, but these were thickened with skilled volunteers such as plumbers and electricians in the waterworks and
electrical branches.
The medical services, with hospital board direction plus help and
advice from doctors, selected first-aid posts and advanced dressing
stations in densely populated areas, the latter often in schools, industrial buildings or public halls, to which the injured would be brought
from outlying first-aid posts. Wellington for instance had 21
advanced dressing stations,
Ibid., 19 Feb 41, p. 8
and Dunedin, from Port Chalmers to
Mosgiel, had eight, surrounded by 36 smaller first-aid posts.
Otago Daily Times, 6 Mar 41, p. 6
Where
possible, a doctor or trained nurse would be at these stations, otherwise both they and the first-aid posts were run by the Red Cross
and the St John Ambulance Brigade, which for months past had
been training volunteers. All these places were largely equipped by
neighbouring households which arranged to lend, for practice and
for emergency, beds and other furniture, bedding, towels, buckets,
torches, bowls, hot-water bottles and various utensils. Medical supplies provided by hospital boards, and dressings and bandages prepared by EPS medical workers, were stored in locked cupboards at
the posts.
Ibid.; Dominion, 4 Dec 41, p. 8; Press, 7 Nov 41, p. 2
Thus at an Auckland rehearsal, the Birkenhead primary
school was converted into an advanced dressing station, with 20 beds
and an improvised theatre, the class-rooms being used as wards to
receive victims from the first-aid posts of Bayswater and Northcote.
NZ Herald, 14, 16 Jun 41, pp. 10, 9
Generally, a good deal of practised improvisation was needed
to adapt for medical purposes rooms ordinarily used for teaching or
for meetings but sometimes permanent readiness was possible. Thus,
again at Auckland, two old railway carriages in the Railway yards
were converted into first-aid posts, one placed near the locomotive
sheds, one near the passenger platforms, half of each being used as
a waiting room, while the other half was fitted up with stretchers
and first-aid needs.
Ibid., 24 Jun 41, p. 8
There was, in all these arrangements, great variation in zeal and
efficiency. By chance or through personalities preparedness could catch
on in a district, and be fed by its own growth, or it could wither
in a climate of ‘leave-it-to-others’ or ‘it-can’t-happen-here.’ For
example, by February 1941, at the Waverley Town Hall the women
of Waverley and Waitotara had organised an emergency hospital of
26 beds which could be in running order within a few hours. There
was a full staff of ex-nurses, VADs and domestics, plus a Home
Guard motor unit of 12 ambulance-lorries, with trained Red Cross
drivers. The ladies, assisted by Home Guard handymen with sanitation and hot water improvements, had practically completed their
arrangements before asking the blessing of the Patea Hospital
Board.
Dominion, 14 Feb 41, p. 4; Taranaki Daily News, 12, 25 Feb 41, pp. 10, 6
Without publicity, the Health Department and hospital boards
all over the country inspected buildings and earmarked many as
possible emergency hospitals. On 17 December 1941, Nordmeyer,
Minister of Health, explained that in extreme emergency 21 000
additional beds could be provided. Reserves of equipment and supplies were accumulated and stored. Medical teams were allocated,
some mobile; former nurses were listed, along with the 3000 voluntary aids, who after gaining Red Cross and St John certificates
had done 60 hours’ hospital training. The 42 hospital boards were
arranged in 10 groups, each under the senior officer of its largest
member, so that there would be ready assistance between them.
Statement by A. H. Nordmeyer, Dominion, 18 Dec 41, p. 8; WHN, ‘EPS’, Chap XV,
pp. 1–4
For some duties, notably fire fighting and police work, there was
special selection and training. In the main centres, several hundred
active men of suitable background volunteered or were drafted from
the general EPS body or the Home Guard for police training, to
control traffic and prevent pillage or panic.
Evening Post, 10 Jan 41, p. 8; NZ Herald, 27 Feb, 1, 4 Mar 41, pp. 8, 8, 11
Christchurch traffic
control men, smart in peaked caps and white raincoats, appeared on
public duty early in December.
Press, 3 Dec 41, p. 6
Ten days later, Auckland’s EPS
urgently appealed for 650 men needed for police and traffic work
between Helensville and Howick.
NZ Herald, 13 Dec 41, p. 13
In July 1942, the Wellington
Superintendent of Police stated that the Auckland Law and Order
unit had 830 men, while his had 550. Of these, 30 in the identification section were specially trained for work with the dead; the
rest, in emergency, would clear pedestrians and traffic from damaged
areas, and put cordons around unexploded bombs or places where
valuable property was exposed or where fire brigades or ambulances
were working.
C. W. Lopdell to Nat Service Dept, 23 Jul 42, IA 178/267
As fire would be the main danger almost all EPS workers were
taught how to deal with incendiary bombs and small fires, while
selected men were trained and equipped to cope with large fires, all
under the control of the regular experts.
WHN, ‘EPS’, chap VI, p. 2
In each town the fire
controller was the local brigade superintendent, and he appointed
to each warden’s district fire wardens and fire patrols. These worked
in their own cars, in pairs, wearing armbands and equipped with
wooden shovels, rakes, dry sand, bucket-pumps and hoses, choppers
and lanterns. They went to lectures at the central fire station, were
shown how to use their equipment, and visited each house in their
area giving advice and in particular telling people to make sure that
there was no rubbish between the ceiling and roof.
Dominion, 27 Jan, 5, 7, 8, 20 Feb 41, pp. 9, 11, 10, 9 (photo), 3; letters, photograph
and insignia sent by Mrs B. Dense of Moana, Westland, to author, Oct 69
During March 1941 the government established the Emergency
Fire Service as a special branch of the Emergency Reserve Corps. Its
Dominion Controller was the Inspector of Fire Brigades, and the
four District Controllers, the brigade superintendents of the main
cities, were in charge of training and organisation. Its members were
as permanent as possible, men with families or fit single men reserved
from overseas service, and it was an alternative to Territorial service.
They had uniforms, boots and steel helmets, Territorial pay and
accident insurance, and after 56 hours of training (four one-hour
drills weekly, plus a two-hour Saturday parade) had an hour’s drill
each week and six two-hour parades a year, with fines for absence.
Press, 7 Mar 41, p. 10; Evening Post, 4, 29 Apr 41, pp. 5, 11; Wanganui Herald,
13 May 41, p. 8
They were equipped with trailer pumps, delivering 400 gallons of
water a minute, towed by cars. These pumps, copies of the British
ARP model, were, except for the motors, made in New Zealand;
they would, it was claimed, do the same work as big fire engines
but were much cheaper to make.
Evening Post, 12 Aug 41, p. 8
At the start about 2000 EFS
men were required, the quota for Dunedin being 220, for Christchurch 275, and for Auckland and Wellington 450 each.
Ibid., 28 Jun 41, p. 11
Later,
quotas at Auckland and Wellington were increased, as these were
the anticipated sites for any major raid, in which the water supply
would probably be broken down, demanding many men to relay it
for some distance.
A year later, Wellington (including the Hutt area) had a trained
EFS of 485 men, alongside its 100 permanent fire brigadesmen, and
about 1000 in the fire sections of the EPS, but still more were
wanted.
Dominion, 21 May 42, p. 4
The EFS men did not wait for enemy action but turned
out if needed for normal fires, for it was extremely important to
prevent the loss of buildings and material irreplaceable during the
war.
Press, 12 Mar 41, p. 10
The Wellington control room, covering both permanent and
auxiliary groups, when fully manned needed a staff of 34; extras
could very quickly be summoned from a roster of 60 volunteer
women, who held rehearsals three nights a week.
Dominion, 21 May 42, p. 4
Besides all this,
volunteer works’ fire brigades were organised by management at
large industrial concerns, such as freezing works and railway shops.
What were the duties of citizens not active members of Home
Guard or EPS? They darkened their windows according to the lighting restrictions,
See p. 497ff
and they prepared to deal with incendiary bombs.
See p. 550
City councils provided dry sand cheaply, but citizens had to collect
it, and they were in no hurry to do so.
Evening Post, 11 May 41, p. 6; Press, 5 Jul 41, p. 1; NZ Herald, 30 Dec 41, pp. 6, 8
People were told that in
daylight raids on cities they could shelter under modern concrete
buildings or in basements; in the suburbs and at night they should
stay at home. Trenches in the garden were their own responsibility;
by the end of 1941 very few had them. Late in June the National
Service Department issued 400 000 copies of a householder circular
(printed in red, on good quality paper, to be hung in a conspicuous
place) giving instructions about cutting off gas, guarding fires, firefighting methods, incendiary bombs, sanitary arrangements, emergency food and first-aid equipment.
During 1941 many towns, large and small, held rehearsals involveing all branches of their emergency precautions services. Often a
circling aeroplane or two gave a touch of realism, and sometimes,
especially in the small towns, the Home Guard took part. Thus at
Kaiapoi
Population 1610, Yearbook1942, p. 53
on 19 April, some Home Guardsmen attacked from the
north side of the river; a circling aircraft had made the bridge ‘unsafe’,
but defenders crossed from the south on a temporary bridge; signallers semaphored messages and installed a telephone system from
the scene of action to headquarters. Meanwhile the fire services, both
regular and auxiliary, were busy with ‘incendiary bombs’, fires and
rescue work, the St John Ambulance Brigade gave first-aid to the
injured and trucked them to the main dressing station at a hall.
Traffic was controlled, and a loudspeaker announced proceedings.
Press, 14 Apr 41, p. 5
At Taumarunui’s
Population 2760, Yearbook1942, p. 52
first try-out in November, railway engines whistled for a mock air raid. Fires were reported and put out, dangerous
walls were demolished and a burst water main was repaired. The
Women’s War Service Auxiliary (WWSA) and cyclists of the Athletic
Club, and Post Office staff, carried messages, Boy Scouts were fire
spotters and Girl Guides were patients. The St John Ambulance
with its cadets and nursing division was busy at temporary hospitals
in the parish hall and domain grandstand, with injured brought in
by Red Cross transport.
Taumarunui Press, 27 Nov 41
Usually cities rehearsed one or two branches at a time—say, communications or works or medical services—and often only for certain
areas, not the whole city. For instance, during September in the
Wellington suburb of Karori, wardens, fire patrols, communications
and first-aid sections performed,
Evening Post, 8 Sep 41, p. 9
while the suburb of Ngaio practised repairing the damage of an air raid at night.
Ibid., 18 Sep 41, p. 10
At Auckland’s
railway yards in November aircraft dropped smoke bombs, fire
services put out real and imaginary fires and the traffic section dispersed engines and rolling stock while assuming that the signalling
system was damaged; on the same day, seven city first-aid posts and
the advanced dressing station at Seddon Memorial Technical College
held a ‘realistic’ rehearsal.
NZ Herald, 3 Nov 41, p. 9
At Pukekohe
Population 2690, Yearbook1942, p. 52
on 4 December the
Home Guard played enemy raiders, lighting two real fires in the
town, and a large number of children, ‘refugees from Auckland’,
were billeted.
Ibid., 5 Dec 41, p. 8
Like all voluntary associations, EPS was plagued by non-attendance. There were the faithful and the not-so-faithful. Lack of conviction about the necessity of it all, boredom, interest in other things,
disagreements between members, all tended to make impressive lists
of workers into paper tigers. Too many, it was felt, would not know
their tasks thoroughly in the real thing, but if irritated by pressure
they could disappear or resign. So on 12 November, to tauten such
slackness, new regulations decreed that for those who had already
signed on, service with the EPS must continue until discharge was
granted, though no others were obliged to join, and it was not made
clear how controlling officers were to assert their authority if challenged. The obvious unfairness of keeping the willing horse in the
shafts, while less public-spirited persons played games, was noticed
by cartoonist Minhinnick,
Ibid., 14 Nov 41, p. 8
by editorials and newspaper letters,
Ibid., 13, 14, 17 Nov 41, pp. 8, 4, 4
while the Director of National Service maintained that the EPS was
still voluntary.
Ibid., 15 Nov 41, p. 10
In June 1941, A. J. Baker,
Baker, Alfred James (1881–1961): Asst Engineer-in-chief, Public Works Department
1932–40
of Wellington’s works section, had
written a memorandum on things as they stood, which indicates
some of the details of just one section of a city EPS. There were
then 786 wardens, ‘nowhere near enough’; Newtown had only eight,
Miramar seven; some were good, some bad. They had been trained
in fire fighting, bandaging and live wire handling, had made a survey
of fire hydrants, and were going from house to house to find the
aged, crippled, etc, thinking of possible evacuation. Under city
authorities, the organisation of fire patrols and their telephone communications to fire headquarters, and the wardens’ communications
to headquarters, was moving satisfactorily. Existing city organisation
should suffice for repairs to roads, drains, water, gas and electricity
supplies. There was as yet no gas decontamination unit. The demolition squad had not begun training; it was very short of volunteers,
though master builders and contractors had offered their trucks, gear
and workmen, and the city engineer was preparing working models
and shoring diagrams. As for shelters, a competent committee was
surveying basements and ground floors, while the city engineer would
prefer, in Wellington, to use natural features rather than community
trenches. There was no regular system of control or compulsion,
people often coming to a few parades then dropping out.
Report of A. J. B[aker], nd[c.17 Jun 41], IA 178/8
During the latter half of 1941 membership of the EPS of Wellington, second to Auckland on the danger list, expanded thus:
At 8 May 1941
Ibid.
At 24 July
Evening Post, 24 Jul 41, p. 10
At 25 Nov
Ibid., 25 Nov 41, p. 8
Accommodation162169465Communications617852 + 69 Boy Scouts1 022 + 83 Boy ScoutsHarbour control59259 + 41 Boy Scouts588 + 16 Boy ScoutsFinance7066Headquarters117125 + 6 Boy Scouts202 + 6 Boy ScoutsInformation128168207Medical247552981 + 94 Boy ScoutsAdvanced dressing stations40 + 40 Boy ScoutsTraffic officers73Supplies323476670Police297380540Transport491556568Works1 5362 0491 415Wardens7861 3012 118Works fire patrol702Works fire brigade130NZ Railways unit574 (a new section)5 3667 55410 381
The difficulty of getting a city EPS organisation off the ground
was set forth by the ChristchurchPress on 11 June 1941:
The scheme exists only on paper. The personnel to carry it out
has not been trained or even enrolled, no move has yet been made
to obtain the necessary equipment; and in any case there is no
money to buy equipment. One reason for this inertia is that the
scheme is hopelessly top-heavy. To manage it there are enough
committees to govern an empire—an executive committee of six
members, 14 general committees each with from 16 to 20 members, about 20 sub-committees, and several committees of local
authorities which have schemes of their own within the main
scheme. This elaborate administrative mechanism seems immobilised by its own weight; it has done little in 21 months and
would probably do little in 21 years. A further source of difficulty
is that in the area covered by the scheme there are at least 12
local authorities each independent in its own sphere. They can
please themselves whether they co-operate in applying the scheme
and raising the necessary money. Some of them are now disposed
to argue that the Government ought to pay the whole or part of
the cost, and are accordingly waiting to see what happens. A third
source of difficulty is that no one knows what powers are vested
in the local organisation and where its responsibilities begin and
end. Already there have been several instances of its work overlapping with the work of State departments [in fire protection,
transport, a householders’ pamphlet, food supplies and evacuation] …. the local situation is not much worse than the situation
elsewhere. In Wellington … there is the same story of delay,
confusion and vacillation.
On 5 June Mayor Hislop had publicly complained of government delay in issuing a
circular to householders, lack of direction about shelters and of information about subsidies to local bodies, and muddled transport arrangements.
The Press concluded that responsibility for ending the ‘fantastic
muddle’ rested squarely with the government, which alone had full
power and information. Let the government appoint to each area an
organiser with powers of compulsion.
Press, 11 Jun 41, also 12 Jun 41, p. 6
The possibility of gas attack was not dismissed. In Britain gas
masks were prominent during the first two months of the war, they
were carried about in the bad days of June 1940 and again in the
bleak months of April–May 1941.
Calder, pp. 55, 66–7, 112, 243
In New Zealand by June 1940
some 287 persons had had Army-based instruction on gases. The
government view was that gas attack while not impossible was
improbable; hence there would be no gas masks for the public, who
could get away from this unlikely danger. Those who must fight
fires and rescue the injured should have masks and protective clothing, and there should be modest decontamination centres.
Semple to J. Williams, 12 Jun 41, IA 158/238/12
Accordingly, the government ordered 6500 masks for the main cities, most
of which would go to Auckland and Wellington, the quota for
Christchurch being only 600.
Press, 8 Nov 41, p. 8
Anti-gas classes continued, while
Army instructors, dentists, scientists of the DSIR and of Otago and
Canterbury universities worked to devise masks and protective clothing and to provide gas samples.
Ibid., 27 Jun 41, p. 10; See p. 564
Thus, in October 1941, on a
parents’ day the anti-gas squad of Otago Boys’ High School, in
masks and full anti-gas rig, showed how to tend a victim of mustard
gas and decontaminate the area.
Otago Daily Times, 13, 14 Oct 41, p. 7, photo
At Auckland in November it was
reported that 18 more members of the WWSA field unit had passed
examinations in anti-gas methods, while several members of the
original class had had further training and could now give lectures.
NZ Herald, 28 Nov 41, p. 2
Auckland acquired three decontamination units;
Press, 14 Apr 41, p. 4
Christchurch
relied on a mobile gas-testing unit and decontamination squads;
Ibid., 27 Jun 41, p. 10
Wellington, reluctant to spend money on a doubtful need, bought
some gas masks and protective clothing but merely planned a decontamination centre.
Dominion, 13 Jun 41, p. 8
Bombardment from the sea or a carrier-borne raid with incendiary
bombs was the attack expected. Some small coastal towns like Patea
prepared for wholesale retreat inland, with transport and a receiving
place allotted to each family,
Wanganui Herald, 22 May 41, p. 6; J. S. Hunter, Dir Nat Service, to Min,
30 Oct 41, IA 178/259
but generally plans were for the
relief of badly hit small areas. As a first step, local schools or public
halls would be rest centres, providing shelter and food, and from
them accommodation arrangements would take the homeless to billets (preferably with friends) in undamaged suburbs, as near as possible to the breadwinner’s work-place, though children with their
mothers, and old people, might be sent off to friends in the country.
Private arrangements would serve wherever possible; there was no
enthusiasm for the large-scale placing of children with strangers, as
was necessary in England.
In 1941Wellington
The city population was 120 700; total, with Hutt, etc, 160 500. Yearbook1942, p. 50
planned, if the homeless could not be
accommodated in their own suburbs, to distribute them more widely,
and use halls selected in all districts. Plans were prepared, and
materials calculated, for camps, each housing 500, to be built hastily
on 11 park areas, for larger and longer use. If these were not enough,
assistance from outside boroughs would be sought. Given the
materials and labour, said the city engineer, these camps could be
rushed up in three weeks, for people who in the first emergency
might have been removed far from their work places, thereby further
disrupting civil life.
Evening Post, 24, 31 Jul 41, pp. 10, 10
These plans were on paper only, even in 1942,
but in some homely details more concrete preparations were made;
thus, from the waste metal collection, the city engineer picked 14
old-style washing coppers, and advertised for more. These were
reconditioned and made ready for fitting on to oil drum bases, for
use in emergency camps or rest centres.
Ibid., 7 Aug 41, p. 8
Christchurch, with about 135 000 people in its urban area, made
paper plans to accommodate 12 000 evacuees in five camps in outlying districts with existing buildings adapted by an assembly of
carpenters and listed materials somehow mustered at the sites.
Press, 4 Nov 41, p. 8
Dunedin (about 82 000) modestly expected that only small areas
would be damaged, and that people could simply be shifted to other
parts of the city. Forms were filled in, and billets in zones regarded
as safe were listed. Billets scattered as widely as possible would
provide ample selection, and it was thought that they would not be
needed for more than a few days.
Otago Daily Times, 17 Apr 41, p. 8
Auckland,
City population 106 800, in total urban area 223 700. Yearbook1942, p. 50
the most likely target, obviously had the most difficult evacuation problems, such as the possibility of the North Shore
being cut off or of a civilian exodus interfering with troop movements. In mid-1940 it was thought best to stay at home. In December 1940 there were no plans for advance evacuation; military
authorities would say whether any sections were to be moved and
transport would then be arranged ‘if the situation permits’.
Mayor Allum, NZ Herald, 19 Dec 41, p. 8
Schools posed special problems. Most of them, as State institutions, were outside the range of EPS organisation in general. Educational authorities therefore had to make arrangements for them.
Most such authorities were reluctant to disturb young minds with
shelters and trenches in school grounds; they also dreaded lost playing space, more rules and more mud. On the other hand there was
professional responsibility and there were anxious parents.
In January 1941, a national EPS conference debated the merits
of sand-bagged windows and trenches and shelters, deciding that
only schools in vulnerable areas, ie in the main centres and seaport
towns, and especially those near aerodromes, wharves, transport or
industrial targets, need consider such measures. In these areas EPS
organisation should include a special protection of school children
committee (three or four local headmasters plus a representative of
the Education Board), to decide what should be done at each school,
‘with a view not only to giving some means of protection to the
children, but also to giving confidence to parents that reasonable
measures are being taken.’
Report of EPS conference, 16 Jan 41, IA 178/247; Taranaki Daily News, 1 Mar 41,
p. 6, reporting from a Nat Service Dept circular
These committees duly surveyed vulnerable schools, noting brick
that might crumple, basements that might protect, and nearby natural cover that might harbour children who could not get to their
own homes quickly. Thus at Wellington and Lower Hutt
Surveys dated 15 and 26 August 1941 on IA 178/247
many
schools were advised to seek cover in handy gullies, scrubby hillsides,
or parks; in a good many cases slit trenches were suggested, or surface
trenches of sandbags, often in front of existing banks or walls. Before
any such shelters could be built, schools must consult the local EPS
authorities, who would make recommendations to the Education
Department which, if it approved, would arrange for payment.
Evening Post, 24 Apr 41, p. 10
At some Auckland schools, trenches recommended by the protection
committee at this stage were refused by higher authority.
Sec EPS Auckland to headmasters, 13 Dec 41, IA 178/247
During the first term of 1941 it was announced that though need
for trenches was not expected, the Education Department was preparing suitable plans; evacuating school-children, apart from any
general movement of an area, was not favoured; the Department
recommended drills for speedy exit and dispersal and also, for senior
pupils, training in first-aid and fire fighting.
Evening Post, 26 Mar, 24 Apr 41, pp. 6, 10
Again, on 26 June,
a departmental circular told all education boards and secondary
schools, both public and private, that headmasters should be wardens or sub-wardens in the EPS, maintaining close contact with
general local arrangements; that the chief function of the committees
for the protection of school children was returning children to their
homes as quickly as possible. For the present, shelter trenches or
other such measures were dismissed.
Circular, 26 Jun 41, IA 178/247
This policy was based on current British reports that till lately
no child in London had been injured by a bomb during school hours;
children should get home if there was enough warning, and if not,
lie under their desks.
Overton, Educ Dept, to Mulligan, Nat Service Dept, 10 Jun 41, IA 178/247/1
Besides being effective, quick dispersal to
homes was welcome because it was not alarming, being merely an
extension of normal fire and earthquake drills, and it did not clutter
school grounds.
So during 1941 schools organised quick home-going. In June
Dunedin was satisfied that children could be seen to their homes
within 30 minutes of an alarm sounding, those from more distant
streets going to temporary billets nearby,
Dominion, 17 Jun 41, p. 8
while Christchurch
arranged for cyclists to depart very rapidly.
Press, 6 May 41, p. 5
The Auckland Star,
on 16 August at the Dominion Road school (530 pupils), photographed children flattened under desks by an air-raid warning, and
at a further signal running in orderly fashion to the football field
and its planned slit trench. Port Chevalier school, following London
models and in expectation of five minutes’ warning, aimed to get
children, with teachers in charge, away and into houses within five
minutes of the school where they would stay until collected by parents
or could safely return to school. Only if there were no warning and
bombs were actually falling would children shelter under desks or
preferably take cover wherever possible outside.
Auckland Star, 15 Sep 41, p. 5
Quick homing
routines were soon adopted all over the country, causing mothers to
remark, ‘If you can get home in five minutes during an air-raid
warning, why not all the time.’
Letter from Mrs R. G. Spooner, Opotiki, to author, 15 Sep 69
The blackout of coastal areas concerned more people than did any
other EPS arrangement in 1941, for it was not limited to volunteers.
The shelling of Nauru Island late in December 1940 suggested to
both the government and public that coastal towns might be surprised by a sudden salvo. For instance, the Waitara Borough Council
called government attention to its exposed position and suggested a
blackout, while at Napier the lights of the Marine Parade were
shaded on the seaward side.
Taranaki Daily News, 11 Jan 41, p. 8
The Prime Minister said that there was no need for alarm, only
for precautions that would reduce to a minimum the guide to enemy
navigation and gunnery provided by the lights of coastal towns,
Evening Post, 3 Feb 41, p. 9
In mid-February 1941 were gazetted the first of a series of lighting
restrictions that progressively dimmed streets, shops and offices,
houses, vehicles and public buildings. These restrictions came into
force early in March, and were, it was firmly stated, not temporary
experiments, but for the duration, and they carried substantial penalties.
Imprisonment of up to three months and fines of up to £50 for individuals, with a
maximum fine of £200 for a stubborn company.
The National Service Department appointed a Dominion
Lighting Controller, F. T. M. Kissel,
Kissel, Frederick Templeton Manheim, ISO(’49) (1881–1962): Gen Manager Hydroelectricity Dept 1945–8
already Controller of Electricity, and a technical committee at Wellington to advise and correlate the work of local authorities. At each centre the Department
appointed a lighting controller, a man already holding a responsible
electrical job, who with the local EPS executive selected other qualified men as a committee, to obtain locally the reduction of lights
required. Wardens appointed in the general EPS arrangements would
patrol their areas, advising people of their duties and their errors
and, where necessary, ordering compliance. Lighting restrictions
became and remained the wardens’ main concern.
The immediate aim was not a blackout but reduced lighting: to
obscure all seaward lights and to prevent sky glow, from concentrated lighting, that might assist a raider either in checking its navigation or in selecting a target. Advertising signs and flood lights
were disconnected, shop-window and verandah lights shrouded. Street
lights were reduced in strength, and those visible from the sea were
occasionally extinguished but more often painted or enclosed in lighttrap canisters, which dimmed them so much that some city councillors and others urged turning them off altogether.
Evening Post, 21, 22 Mar 41, pp. 6, 8; NZ Herald, 4 Apr 41, p.6
The Lighting
Controller of Wellington explained that their glimmer was ‘worthwhile’ as a guide along the streets and psychologically. It had been
proposed to cut off all street lighting at one or two in the morning,
but protests came in immediately, for a surprising number of people
moved about Wellington in the early morning to and from work.
Evening Post, 1 Jul 41, p. 8
When Oamaru switched off half its street lights and screened the
rest, the Assistant Dominion Lighting Controller said that it was a
good effort but over-done, too dark; the lights should be reduced
in strength but not in numbers.
Auckland Star, 5 Jul 41, p. 6
All shop and house lights had to be screened, though only those
showing to seaward had to be completely hidden, so there was much
buying of dark blinds and curtains. Some people at once bought
heavy permanent curtains, but at the start most made shift with
inexpensive materials, waiting to see what would prove necessary.
Thick paper, cardboard, plywood and dark paint were much used,
especially for fan-lights and awkwardly placed windows. In many
small suburban shops ordinary pendant lamps were shrouded with
opaque shades or coloured tissue paper.
NZ Herald, 13, 22 Mar 41, pp. 10, 10; Wanganui Herald, 21 May 41, p. 4
Wellington’s Lighting
Controller gave homely advice, such as painting round the edges of
windows; fastening cloth to laths which could be hooked over windows at night; attaching pieces of cardboard to battens at top and
bottom to fit neatly into a window, and adding several thicknesses
of brown paper to the window side of lamp shades.
Dominion, 14 Mar 41, p. 5
A woman
told how she had made moveable covers for seven casements, costing
in all less than £1.
Evening Post, 23 May 41, p. 14
There were advertisements: ‘Be prepared’,
urged a quarter-page advertisement in the Dominion: ‘Screen all glare
from home, office, shop, factory and warehouse windows… for
only 1/- per sq yard.’ Sisalkraft, a paper and fibre compound used
throughout Britain, came in widths of 36, 48 and 60 inches. Diagrams showed it attached to tension rollers controlled by cords,
screening factory sky-lights or, with rollers and tapes, covering the
widest windows.
Dominion, 28 Feb 41, p. 9
‘Temporary methods are no solution to the
blackout problem. Solve it now with Black-out Felt….Inexpensive, easy to install and above all, it is a permanent insurance against
the escape of light glare. Priced from Is a yard. Directions given
with purchase’,
Evening Post, 20 Mar 41, p. 17
or: ‘Subdue your indoor lights with 11-inch Dark
Green Empire Shades, cone-shaped in heavy parchment, with dark
green outside, cream lined…5s 6d’.
NZ Herald, 15 Mar 41, supplement, p. 6
Other advertisements added
white road paint for steps, kerbs and paths to their blackout
material.
Ibid., 15 Mar 41, p. 6
Sky glow, from light reflected off pavements and walls, proved
stubborn and shopkeepers, reluctant to lose all window displays at
sunset, used lights of blue, green or orange, deep friezes of opaque
paper or paint, or heavily veiled lights. By degrees the light permitted was lessened, and pressure about restrictions increased. Shops
were further dimmed in mid-March
Evening Post, 14 Mar 41, p. 8
and by regulations at the end
of May no one light in a window could be of more than 60 watts,
with a total of five watts per lineal foot of window frontage, all
lights being shielded, while light from doorways had to be dimmed
or screened.
Ibid., 26 May 41, p. 8
By mid-June the window wattage had been cut by
half, to 25 watts per 10 lineal feet.
Ibid., 16 Jun 41, p. 9
Clearly it would be too expensive to cover all the windows of
large buildings, nor would there be enough material to go round.
Those concerned were advised (as were householders) to black out
the rooms needed for essential work and turn off other lights. There
were special difficulties with large windows of buildings used at
night, such as Wellington’s Central Library and the Technical College. Most coverings also excluded fresh air, so that rooms with 30
to 40 students soon became foul.
Ibid., 24 Jun 41, p. 6
Wellington’s university had to
pay £50 for one large library window facing the harbour.
Ibid., 19 Dec 41, p. 4
Factories
with skylights had very difficult problems. Deep conical metal shades,
it was held, gave good illumination directly beneath them, without
spreading light around, while floors and machinery reflected little.
But such devices must have added to the weariness of overtime or
shift work. Manufacturers, recoiling from the large expense of total
blackout, tended to do what seemed reasonable and wait for further
direction.
NZ Herald, 18 Mar 41, p. 8
Many people accepted the blackout readily, impressed by the idea
of raiders over the horizon and feeling perhaps some sense of danger
and importance, of sharing in the trials of England, while the gradual stiffening of restrictions made them easier to take. And who
should grumble about blackout while our boys were fighting and
dying in Greece and Crete? Some, however, felt that life was being
pointlessly disrupted.
Ibid., 25 Mar, 4 Jul 41, pp. 9, 4
The New Zealand Herald published articles
explaining that ‘light camouflage’ was more confusing to the enemy,
while the blackout was inefficient and contradictory: an aircraft navigator could locate Auckland by the wave emanations from any one
of its four broadcasting stations, be ‘guided in perhaps by sweet
music or a dissertation on the Nazis by Mr Semple’; no worthwhile
sea-captain needed to steer by sky glow which was created in any
case by the search-light beam covering the harbour entrance. And
were the lights marking the harbour entrance to be put out only
when bombardment began? Meanwhile women were prisoners in
their homes.
Ibid., 27 Mar, 3 Apr 41, pp. 6, 10
Similar doubts were expressed by writers to the Press,
who added, ‘A raider would also wait until break of day, so that
it could spot the fall of shot. Why waste time and brown paper on
the kitchen windows?’
Press, 7, 8 Jul 41, pp. 9, 10
A Woman’s Weekly editorial remarked on
the stuffiness of living rooms with windows closed on a warm evening, on the depressing effect of dark paper shades over lights, on
the dark borders round windows that lessened light in daytime so
that ‘in many houses it seems the household has gone into mourning’, while the unexplained inconsistency of public lights and private
dimness induced a sense of mental blackout also.
NZ Woman’s Weekly, 17 Apr 41, p. 1
The irritation
of some householders, harassed by dutiful wardens while street and
other public lamps were still showing, was voiced by one who wrote:
‘There are now men who go about in the evenings threatening to
report those householders who have not pulled down their blinds
… some people can never resist an opportunity to give orders.’ He
attacked absurd beliefs in sky glow and dismissed the claim that
street lights could be switched off at the first broadside by saying
that after the first broadside cities were, in the RAF phrase, self-illuminating targets.
Press, 14 Aug 41, p. 8, also 30 Jun 41, p. 8
Other sceptics talked about the flood-lighting
effect of a full moon. An irate warden replied that in Paris lights
were used in patterns to guide bombers.
Ibid., 16 Aug 41, p. 5
Some did not take the restrictions at face value because of the
shortage of electric power. Householders were urged to turn off
radiators, water heaters, etc, where possible, and the summer half
hour of daylight saving was extended to ease peak loading and get
many workers home in daylight.
Evening Post, 22, 23 May 41, pp. 10, 8
Hydro-electric development had
been checked by the war, while the demands of industry were
increasing; some power plants used coal and coal supplies were then
low.
NZ Herald, 7 Apr, 14 May 41, pp. 9, 8; Evening Post, 22, 23 May 41, pp. 10, 8
Suspicion was not lessened when inland towns, such as Rotorua and towns in the Wairarapa, required by the Controller of Electricity to reduce their consumption of power, cut off advertising
lights and reduced street lights;
Evening Post, 30 May 41, p. 6; NZ Herald, 16 Jun 41, p. 6
Hamilton’s Council voluntarily
took these steps.
NZ Herald, 3 Apr 41, p. 10
Power Board officials and others, explaining that
street lighting was a very minor use of electricity, stoutly denied that
it was all a plan to save power.
Ibid., 18 Mar 41, p. 8; Evening Post, 21 Mar, 23 May, 17 Jul 41, pp. 8, 8, 10
This suggestion, said the Prime
Minister, was ‘simply silly’; possible raider attacks must be kept in
mind, and temporary inconvenience was a small price for bringing
risks to a minimum.
NZ Herald, 20 Mar 41, p. 12
He also said that the regulations were inducing the habit of being prepared.
Evening Post, 1 Apr 41, p. 9
An Auckland manufacturer,
dubious about installing factory blackouts, thought that the real
purpose of light restrictions might be to arouse the public from
apathy.
NZ Herald, 18 Mar 41, p. 8
At Christchurch (where in mid-April sky glow was visible
34 miles out to sea
Southland Times, 16 Apr 41, p. 4
) the Lighting Controller, replying to a suggestion that it would be time enough to take measures when there
was real evidence of danger, was realistic. He saw an ‘unbelievable
time-lag’ between the issuing of instructions and compliance with
them.
Press, 26 Jun 41, p. 6
Inconsistency undermined enthusiasm. For instance, wardens in
Auckland suburbs early complained that the city centre was relatively undimmed, warning that unless the authorities and leading
citizens observed the blackout, the drift against it would be very
hard to arrest.
NZ Herald, 22, 25 Mar 41, pp. 8, 10
Returning Aucklanders spoke of brilliant lighting
at Wellington and other southern towns, of Australia’s coast being
ablaze, with Sydney’s harbour bridge showing miles out to sea.
Ibid., 2, 9 Apr, 27 May 41, pp. 12, 10, 6; Auckland Star, 22 Sep 41, p. 6
Others challenged the government’s insistence on the blackout while
it did nothing about air-raid shelters.
NZ Herald, 1, 9 Apr, 41, pp. 10, 13; Report of Wellington Buildings Survey Committee, 29 Aug 41, IA 178/8
A frequent complaint was that government departments and public concerns, such as railway yards, wharves and aerodromes, which
were prime targets, were still brightly lit, while houses and shops
were darkened. Officials answered that necessary work was going on
at those places, work which would be dangerous or impossible in
the dark, that steps to shade these difficult lights were being taken,
and that meanwhile they could be instantly extinguished in an
emergency.
NZ Herald, 28 Mar, 3 May 41, pp. 9, 8; Evening Post, 12 Mar 41, p. 13; Press,
28 Jun 41, p. 10
It was not merely chagrined householders or shopkeepers who
questioned the need for the darkness that was dampening commercial and social life and worrying both motorists and pedestrians. In
April the Mayor of Auckland asked Semple whether, now that
arrangements were well rehearsed, there could be some relaxation.
NZ Herald, 4 Apr 41, p. 7
Dunedin’s City Council said bluntly that the blackout was not of
its making, that it was only carrying out government instructions.
Ibid., 8 Apr 41, p. 6
An errant Labour member of Parliament, W. E. Barnard, wondered
why Napier should be darker than Sydney or Cairo,
Ibid., 12 Apr 41, p. 8
and Napier’s
Council pleaded that business was waning, social life ended, and
people were leaving the town.
Ibid., 5 Apr 41, p. 8
In July the Press editorially complained that the government had not fully presented the reasons for
the blackout, but merely declared that it was to guard against helping a raider identify his landfall and was imposed on the advice of
the Services. ‘Unfortunately, the first argument is open to a number
of objections and the second, which is weakened by association with
it, is a plea for the sort of uncritical trust which no democratic
government should expect and no democracy should give.’
Press, 8 Jul 41
Wellington’s city councillors called on the government to state clearly
why the present ineffective system of lighting reduction was necessary. Sydney and Singapore had trials and rehearsals of complete
blackouts, with normal lighting in between; the argument about
guiding a ship was ridiculous and Gilbertian.
Evening Post, 17 Jul 41, p. 10
Government speakers steadfastly replied that its steps had been taken on the advice
of Service chiefs.
Ibid. (Nash); NZ Herald, 26 Mar, 7, 21 Apr 41, pp. 7, 6, 6 (Semple)
The Auckland EPS executive, after conversations with these chiefs
on 18 August, declared itself satisfied that the precautions were
necessary. ‘What twelve months ago was a possibility is now a probability,’ said Mayor Allum. At about the same time—that is, after
Japan had entered Saigon at the end of July, and the Western powers
had applied their trade embargoes—the Press published a statement
by Christchurch’s Lighting Controller, E. Hitchcock,
Hitchcock, Edward (1883–1966): Gen Manager MED Chch 1920–49
that Service
authorities considered a hit-and-run raid the most likely form of
attack, more likely by raider than by aircraft and at night than
during the day; invasion was possible but remote. Hitchcock claimed
that the restrictions were a prudent middle course between no action
and a full blackout; they would not give immunity from attack but
would make it slower and more difficult, which was worthwhile. It
was for the public to comply with, rather than analyse and assess,
the regulations, for lacking the information on which the authorities
acted wise and prudent criticism was difficult. Apparent inconsistencies were more often in the understanding or conscience of those
who responded or failed to respond; irritation was apt to be vocal,
giving a wrong impression of the degree of opposition, while cooperation was quieter.
Press, 14 Aug 41, p. 4
As well as producing much debate and some ingenuity, the blackout darkened the interiors of houses: people used weaker lights and
heavier shades, especially in halls, while fan-lights covered with cardboard often stayed covered night and day. Friday night shopping
was lessened to some extent, but goods that people seriously wanted
were bought at other times. The shops which felt the blackout most
were the small suburban confectionery and ice cream establishments,
reported the New Zealand Herald on 2 April 1941, explaining that
normally these were meeting places for young people, ‘but dimmed
lights and the general gloom make them much less attractive’.
Women were unwilling to go out alone, and some women’s
organisations changed their meetings from evenings to afternoons,
as did some churches.
NZ Herald, 24 Mar 4, p. 9
The Auckland Chamber of Commerce
pointed out that during the winter women workers would be increaseingly reluctant about jobs which brought them home after dark.
Ibid., 1 Apr 41, p. 6
The Westfield meat works usually employed girls in its cannery but
when a second shift, ending at midnight, was established in May
1941, 80 men were engaged.
Ibid., 1 May 41, p. 8
Theatre attendances were noticeably
higher when the moon was full, and at least one repertory society
fixed its production for a full moon period.
Ibid., 30 Jun 41, p. 6
Torches became regular and prominent equipment. There was no marked increase in
crime—crime rates fell heavily during the war and this was noticeable in 1941. Potential criminals were in the Army; wardens were
abroad, the police increased their patrols, courts were protective,
A judge, sentencing a man to two years in prison for assaulting a woman on a Ponsonby
street, said that it was the court’s duty to protect women in the blackout. Auckland Star, 24 Jul 41, p. 4
and both bag-snatching and assaults were isolated.
NZ Herald, 23 Jun 41, p. 6
The Roman Catholic weekly Zealandia hoped that the blackout
might restore home life: of late people had lived less in their homes
and ceased to entertain themselves, relying on the ‘cinema, the radio,
and an utterly excessive indulgence in dancing.’ Also, though educationists had largely abolished homework, for senior pupils homework should be restored. ‘At the least it would have its uses as a
discipline and as an approvable interest for the child.’
Zealandia, 20 Mar 41, p. 4
The lights of vehicles were not immune from control. From mid-March 1941, carriage blinds on the seaward side of trains near the
coast had to be drawn.
Evening Post, 12 Mar 41, p. 13
Restrictions on car lights were officially
gazetted well before they were applied, to let people become accustomed to the idea. The first order was that parked cars must show
parking lights, for in darkened streets they were dangerous to other
cars and to pedestrians and cyclists.
Late in June, regulations—and large road signs—divided a broad
coastal belt into headlight restriction areas and parking-light areas.
In the former, covering most roads, only one head-lamp, on the lefthand or near side and in a steeply dipped position, with a parking
or sidelight on the right or off side and a tail-light, were to be used.
In the parking light areas, that is, seaward-facing streets within three
miles of the coast, no headlights at all would appear—only parking
and tail-lights, of seven watts at most; the speed limit was 20 miles
an hour and, when parked, cars must be right off the road, with no
lights at all. In these parking light areas, cyclists’ headlamps could
be no stronger than a car’s parking light, and a red tail-lamp had
to be shown. In an emergency, that is a raid or a test, all cars were
to use only their parking and rear lights, covered with two layers
of newspaper, and they must carry the screening material at all
times.
Press, 19 Jun 41, p. 6; NZ Herald, 31 May 41, p. 8
Meanwhile, trams were acquiring shades to confine light where it
was needed by the conductor, and shutter devices to reduce headlight
glare on seaward runs.
Press, 18 Jun 41, p. 8
Old buggy lamps proved useful and were
in keen demand for trams.
Auckland Star, 27 Sep 41, p. 4 (photo)
Obviously these restrictions increased driving strain and accident
risk, and would have been impossibly difficult to apply if petrol
rationing had not already greatly reduced traffic. Drivers of taxis,
trams and buses all complained of strain and danger. The Auckland
Drivers Union protested, asking for two dipped headlights.
NZ Herald, 4 Jul 41, p. 6
Nor
were Wellington drivers happy, though their streets were not so
severely darkened as Auckland’s, and they wanted a 20 mile an
hour speed limit throughout the city and suburbs.
Evening Post, 9, 11, 15 Jul 41, pp. 8, 6, 8
Senior traffic
officials agreed: there had been several serious accidents, some fatal,
and many minor ones, in which reduced lighting was certainly a
factor, ‘the difference between death or months in hospital, and
bruises and a fright being a split second and a trifle of luck.’
Ibid., 7 Jul 41, p. 9
The
20-mile speed limit for buses was established and the drivers accepted
the lights.
Ibid., 9 Jul 41, p. 8
In emergencies all vehicles, except fire engines, ambulances and
cars carrying police or soldiers, might use only their parking and
rear lights, dimmed with double newspaper; consequently even those
on other EPS business had to drive very slowly. The awkwardness
of this was instanced in Wellington when a mechanical mischance
at central control left some street lights on during a blackout test.
Operators sent to switch them off could not drive with the prescribed
lights, and were repeatedly stopped by wardens when they tried a
headlight.
Ibid., 12, 25 Nov 41, pp. 8, 8
There were not many prosecutions for lighting errors during 1941.
Householders whose measures were inadequate or who inadvertently
exposed light were not defiant and generally a warden’s warning
sufficed. The most numerous offenders were shopkeepers with window lighting in excess of that permitted, and many were told to
disconnect the lights until they were properly shielded. In the courts,
a few paid costs or small fines and there were warnings of heavier
penalties in store; motorists had similiar treatment. A few stubborn
or abusive offenders met rather heavier fines and on 5 December
1941 Luxford SM, imposing a £20 fine, said that in future such
offenders would go to gaol.
NZ Herald, 6 Dec 41, p. 13
In the last quarter of 1941 there was less of the ‘what’s it all
for?’ attitude, more sober acceptance. Early in October, further regulations sharpened precautions about doorways, and insisted that all
lights—such as those left on in shop windows—must be immediately blacked out or switched off in an emergency.
Ibid., 8 Oct 41, p. 6
Without protest, fireworks and bonfires on 5 November were banned (in any
case there were very few fireworks available). There was renewed
drive in window screening. Thick curtains were too expensive and
most blinds inadequate, but heavy tarred paper and black cardboard
and sisalkraft had proved themselves.
Auckland’s first trial total blackout on 12 October was preceded
by large advertisements warning that enemy attack was probable,
and that measures against it must be tested thoroughly; if all windows and doors could not be screened, householders should concentrate on one room and turn off other lights.
Ibid., 4 Oct 41, p. 8
After the trial
many people, including shopkeepers, were told that their devices
were insufficient, and the authorities thought that many had sat in
the dark, gone to bed, or gone out to see the test for themselves in
the main streets and on vantage points such as roofs and Mt Eden.
Ibid., 13, 14 Oct 41, pp. 9, 8
In the second test, on 9 November, though the majority had complied, a circling plane reported ‘lights all over the place’, a few street
lights stayed on, and a few humorists waved torches. The Mayor
was disappointed: there would, he said, be no more warnings but
instead prosecutions.
Ibid., 10, 11 Nov 41, pp. 6, 6
Two letters in the Herald convey domestic attitudes and arrangements. A citizen, ‘Black Mark’, who had gone forth to EPS duties
leaving a back room lit, but with dark blinds pressed to the sashes,
fan-lights covered with cardboard and all closed, was chagrined to
receive a notice about excess light: ‘I do not know how a warden
could see the least bit of light without going to the back of the
house.’
Ibid., 20 Nov 41, p. 6
With virtuous asperity, ‘Thorough’ answered that he should
know that even nigger-brown blinds, plus a deep shade on the light,
let through a warm, light-brown glow. ‘He deserves no sympathy.
I can sit in my well-lit sitting room and show no glow at all, because
I did the job properly in one room as we were plainly told to do.
Also, does “Black Mark” think only front windows count? Of course
the wardens inspected the back.’
Ibid., 21 Nov 41, p. 4
Auckland’s third rehearsal was on 10 December, two days after
Pearl Harbour. It was, reported the pilot who flew over, ‘a very
good effort and a vast improvement on previous occasions.’
Ibid., 11 Dec 41, p. 8
On 9 November, Wellington had its first complete blackout; it
was generally rated good, though three out of 36 street lighting
circuits failed to go off. There were a few ‘idiots’, such as a motor
cyclist who roared so fast through the main streets with his lights
on that the wardens could not check him, and too many people just
switched lights off and sat it out.
Evening Post, 10 Nov 41, p. 8
At the start of December Mayor Hislop complained that, despite
the alarming news, houses and particularly shops were relaxing their
blackout.
Ibid., 4 Dec 41, p. 10
But within three weeks the windows of Wellington’s
exposed hillside houses had almost exhausted supplies of blackout
materials. One shop alone had in a few days sold five tons of heavy
cardboard (2160 sheets to a ton), more than 100 000 yards of builders’ black lining paper, plus gallons of black paint; bulk stocks of
black calcimine (a water-mixed powder-paint) were completely sold
out.
Press, 22 Dec 41, p. 8
On 17 December, with the EPS out in full force, the circling
pilot reported that the blackout test was ‘pretty effective’, except for
five bright lights about Johnsonville, a few car lights and the red
glow of the city rubbish dump burning at Moa Point.
Report of pilot, 17 Dec 41, at 2120–2145 hours, IA 178/8
Air-raid shelters were a vexed problem, for they would be massively expensive and they might not be needed. Local bodies held
back: it was for the government to decide whether they should be
built and to design and pay for them, as in England, where 90 percent of ARP expenditure was found by Treasury.
Evening Post, 5 Jun 41, p. 8
The government,
however, was unwilling to embark on large works using labour and
materials needed by other sections of the war effort. The firm belief
of the Emergency Precautions conference of January 1941
See p. 483
that any
attack would be a hit-and-run air raid or a short naval bombardment
precluded heavy expenditure on air-raid shelters. In the larger towns
reasonably effective shelter could be provided by EPS arrangements
to use tunnels, subways, underground garages and the basements
and lower floors of modern ferro-concrete buildings, with the ground
floor windows sand-bagged against shrapnel and blast.
Semple to E. Davis, 4 Mar 41, IA 158/238/12, citing the consensus of the conference
This did not quite satisfy the War Cabinet which, while approving these conclusions, considered that the ‘question of extending
precautions and safety provisions further than those suggested in the
report should be examined and further entered into.’
Fraser to Semple, 8 Mar 41, IA 178/259, pt 1
It did not
quite reassure the Mayor of Auckland, who in February asked Semple if large air-raid shelters were still deemed unnecessary.
E. Davis to Semple, 18 Feb 41, IA 158/238/12
Semple
replied that there had been no change in policy, and a complete
survey by EPS would probably disclose many places suitable as temporary shelters, which were all that would be needed.
Semple to Davis, 4 Mar 41, ibid.
The Mayor
of Wellington, while publishing in February the conference conclusions on shelters, emphasised the danger of attack by telling householders that a circular would show them how to dig shelters, 7 feet
deep and about 3½ feet wide, well roofed and drained, in their own
gardens.
Evening Post, 19 Feb 41, p. 8
Experts immediately warned against ‘light-hearted digging into Wellington hillsides’ which could cause slips, cavings-in
and undermining of steep faces, boundary walls and even houses,
while drainage would be very difficult.
Ibid., 20 Feb 41, p. 8; Dominion, 20 Feb 41, p. 9
When on 5 June 1941
Hislop complained publicly of government indecision on shelters,
Nash replied by quoting the January conference conclusions which
had been issued as a circular to EPS heads on 14 March.
Nash to Hislop, 6 Jun 41, IA 178/8
All through the year the government maintained this no-public-shelters policy against various anxious pressures, particularly from
Auckland. A few Labour bodies wrote fraternally to ministers asking
for shelters.
Auckland Suburbs LRC to F. Jones, 25 May 41, IA 178/3/6; Westmere Labour Party
Branch to Nash, 19 May 41, and NZ Locomotive Engineers, Firemen and Cleaners
Association to Nash, 29 May 41, both IA 178/259, pt 1
The New Zealand Institute of Engineers stressed the
need to plan ahead, as even the simplest shelters would need labour,
materials and, above all, time.
NZ Institute of Engineers to Nash, 28 May 41, IA 178/259, pt 1
In Mt Eden, the use of caves was
discussed.
Auckland Star, 27 Aug 41, p. 5
Newspapers printed plaintive letters,
Ibid., 1 May 41, p. 6; NZ Herald, 1, 7, 9, 16 Apr 41, pp. 10, 10, 13, 10
while Truth
nagged steadily, declaring on 5 November that people were uneasy
and alarmed at the lack of shelters; property was well protected,
More regulations in late October caused property owners in vulnerable areas to install
bucket pumps and to train people occupying buildings in their use.
but lives might be lost through government indecision and baulking
at cost.
The public was used to the idea of Londoners sheltering from the
Blitz. They were less familiar with actual developments in Britain
where it had been found that, for some people, deep shelters had
a most demoralising effect, and where after the first few weeks factory
workers and clerks carried on with their jobs in daylight raids while
at night the majority slept at home. In December 1940 the British
Ministry of Health reported that only 5 per cent of London’s population used public shelters, 19 per cent slept in domestic or communal shelters, while the rest, realising the value of dispersal,
preferred to take the strain in their own homes.
Evening Post, 8 Jan 41, p. 9
Moreover, the
alert householder on the spot could cope with an incendiary bomb,
whereas he might emerge from a shelter to find his home a heap
of ashes.
The Director of National Service, J. S. Hunter, reviewed the situation at the end of October in a departmental memorandum.
Improvements in air reconnaissance and coastal defence would discourage the expected hit-and-run raid at some main ports, while for
many undefended ports quick withdrawal and dispersal was the logical procedure, and some coastal EPS organisations were fully prepared for this. Incendiary bombs would be more effective than limited
use of the high explosive sort, and therefore were more likely. The
possibility of serious attack by a heavily escorted expedition with
aircraft-carriers must be considered, ‘remote though it may be at
present’. The enemy would need command of the sea, and would
first tackle targets nearer and more valuable, ‘but it is to meet such
an attack that the Dominion is putting itself into a state of defence.’
Trenches in suburbs could be left to individuals, with professional
guidance, but municipalities should be directed to survey buildings
for the blast and splinter-proof shelters that their basements and
lower floors might afford. Only Auckland and Wellington had begun
such surveys. So far, Auckland had found 37 buildings, out of 332
examined, which could be adapted to shelter about 20 000 (including their own normal population of 8500), while the peak daytime
population of the densest commercial area was about 50 000. Much
strengthening and protective work would be necessary, with alternative exits and sanitary arrangements, all needing much preliminary
planning; the whole would be a ‘Very big major job.’
Hunter Report to Semple, 30 Oct 41, IA 178/259, pt 1
Wellington,
where a committee of professional men were making a part-time
voluntary survey, was in a very similar position.
An interim report of the Wellington committee said that of 1558 buildings, from the
Railway Station to Abel Smith Street and Buckle Street, only 13.5% would be of any
value, and in the main would protect only their own occupants. If Japan entered the
war, which could happen at any moment, there would be immediate demand for adequate protection and a frantic rush to achieve in a few weeks results which must necessarily occupy months; no data would be available for designing, and labour and materials
would be hopelessly inadequate. Report of Wellington committee, 29 Aug 41,
IA 178/8
Protection against
blast and splinters would be relatively easy, but a shelter must be
strong enough to withstand masses of falling debris should the
building itself be largely destroyed. General experience abroad and
local professional opinion did not rate basement shelter highly.
Statutory authority for the provision of shelters would be necessary, and it should be drafted immediately, in case it should be
required in a hurry. But Hunter did not propose launching a large
scheme yet. To plan and construct shelters for daytime city populations would be a ‘stupendous job’, taking men and material from
all other construction work in the country. If a start were made
anywhere, all areas would press for shelters, regardless of relative
needs. Undue regard must not be given to sentiment and clamour;
Service appraisals, the labour and materials available, the total war
effort and the huge demand of shelters, must be considered
together.
J. S. Hunter to Semple, 30 Oct 41, IA 178/259, pt 1
On 13 November, after Service and EPS chiefs had met, Fraser
repeated the hit-and-run theme, with slight variations: the probable
attack would be ‘neither severe nor prolonged’, but one aircraft could
carry 1000 incendiary bombs. Therefore property owners had been
ordered to install fire-fighting equipment such as bucket pumps,
sand, rakes and shovels, and occupiers would act as fire guards. As
for costly, difficult shelters, it was essential to maintain a due sense
of proportion; the government was watching the situation constantly
and would act as need arose. A week later he added that this did
not mean acting when the enemy was at the door but ‘when the
likelihood of developments other than those now thought possible
emerged.’
NZ Herald, 21 Nov 41, p. 6
So matters stood when the bombs fell on Pearl Harbour.
EPS quickened almost convulsively. A city engineers’ conference
was due on 11 December to discuss the use of basements as air raid
shelters.
Press, 6 Dec 41, p. 4
Instead they outlined an entire shelter programme, which
was adopted by a concurrent emergency conference of 25 mayors
from main centres and seaport towns. A central technical body would
be set up to guide local authorities who, besides planning dispersals
to such features as tunnels, gullies, hillsides or quarries, would
immediately as temporary shelter dig slit trenches in parks and any
open city spaces, the trenches to be roofed and strengthened as soon
as possible. Owners of buildings must provide shelter for their staffs.
In suitable buildings, space could also be taken over and adapted
for public shelters. The State, added the mayors, should help pay
for construction and for owners’ compensation. They also realised
that their EPS organisations were short of 15 000 workers, and they
returned to their towns to recruit, plan dispersals, dig trenches,
impress vehicles, improve sirens, tighten blackouts and conduct comprehensive tests in daylight and in darkness. Citizens, said the mayors, must forget conditions that existed last week, and must respond
vigorously to the demands of the new situation; in their own gardens
they should dig shelters for their families following directions published in newspapers, and they should also assist municipal workmen
in digging public shelters.
Report dated 13 Dec 41, of EPS conference, IA 178/259; Evening Post, 12 Dec 41,
p. 6; NZ Herald, 13 Dec 41, p. 10; Press, 13 Dec 41, p. 10
The government hastened to set all this
in order with new regulations.
Auckland was active with the shovel. In Albert Park digging
began at 8 am on Saturday 13 December. Meanwhile, in suburban
gardens household trenches were appearing. An official EPS design
proposed an excavation 3 feet wide, 3½ feet deep, and 2 feet long
per person, with scoria drainage at the bottom and a timber frame
for steadiness; the dug earth should form a mound covered over
with turf eighteen inches from the edge of the trench.
NZ Herald, 13 Dec 41, p. 13
City Council
labourers, their normal work set aside, did much of the public digging aided by a mechanical excavator; by Christmas Eve they had
dug 10 000 feet of trenches, nearly two miles, of which 9000 feet
were then timbered.
Ibid., 24 Dec 41, p. 6
Some of the public helped, such as members
of the local Women’s National Service Corps who tackled hard clay
in Myers Park,
Ibid., 15 Dec 41, p. 8
while several Chinese volunteers skilled with spades
joined the city workmen.
Ibid., p. 6
Railway employees trenched near the
station, and Harbour Board workers on an open site in Quay Street.
By the first week of January some 16 300 feet of community slit
trenches had been provided.
J. Tyler, City Engineer, to J. S. Hunter, Dir Nat Service, 8 Jan 42, IA 178/3/6
In the suburbs, and at some schools, volunteers turned to, often
with their own garden tools. Between the demands of the Army and
new government defence works, labour was suddenly scarce; for
instance, 50 subsidised labourers of Mt Eden borough were requisitioned by the government on 16 December, leaving the trenches
they had started to be finished by volunteers. Some EPS and Home
Guard members dug shelters for the wives of servicemen overseas,
for the sick, and the old. Where wet or rocky ground precluded
ordinary trenches, other shelters were devised. About Mt Eden, caves
long closed against adventuring children were opened up and more
were tunnelled out,
NZ Herald, 15, 16 Dec 41, pp. 8, 16, 26 Jan 42, p. 6
while shallow trenches were carefully dug where
stony ground had already been broken for drains.
Ibid., 31 Dec 41, p. 6
At Birkenhead, tunnels 20 feet long, 9 feet wide and 7 feet high
were made in the cliff face near the ferry wharf;
Ibid., 17 Jan 42, p. 6
the old Parnell
tunnel, superseded 20 years before, was opened, cleared and lighted,
with baffle walls at each portal.
Ibid., 6 Jan 42, p. 4
A few sandbag shelters appeared
in areas with drainage problems, while some important utilities, such
as the Electric Power Board building and the Central Fire Station,
protected their ground floors with sandbags.
Ibid., 20, 23, 31 Dec 41, pp. 13, 6, 6, 15 Jan 42, p. 9 (photo)
A large map was published on 16 December showing how those
in various areas should hasten to trenches or natural cover, but a
dispersal test on the 18th was taken coolly: the streets were cleared
very quickly, but many people did not leave the buildings; an EPS
worker remarked that if all the women and children and soldiers
and sailors who suddenly re-appeared in Queen Street at the all-clear had come from the dispersal areas, they must have broken
records for distance running.
Wellington, relying much on its hills and gullies, its cuttings and
tunnels, decided to provide only a ‘certain number’ of trenches in
the inner area for those who could not get away in good time; the
public in general was told not to use these trenches but to disperse
to natural cover, following the plan published, as was its Auckland
counterpart, on 16 December. Nature however needed improvement, such as clearing scrub, blackberry, gorse and general debris,
and cutting access tracks. On Tuesday 16 December, citizens were
asked to dig or to clear at assorted sites,
These were at an old timber yard in Taranaki Street, Newtown Park, Basin Reserve,
Salamanca Road, Grant Road quarry, Hobson Street gully, Aotea and Thorndon quays,
Majoribanks Street and the National Art Gallery. Dominion, 22 Dec 41, p. 7
bringing axes and slashers,
spades, shovels, picks and mugs. But at 11.30 am there were only
six volunteers, most men being at their normal work. The mayoress
called for women to join her at the working posts, and at the Mayor’s
request Saturday tennis, cricket and other sports were cancelled. Several hundred volunteers, including women and boys, dug and
chopped and blistered their hands on 20 December, but afterwards
it was announced that communal digging and clearing would cease
pending the laying out of further areas and fresh consideration.
Ibid., 23 Dec 41, p. 4
There was some criticism of the trenches being constructed too long,
too wide and not deep enough, making them ideal strafing targets
and giving poor protection from blast.
Ibid., p. 6; Truth, 31 Dec 41, p. 7
After this first scurry, citizen volunteers were not again set to digging, though civic authorities
pleaded for regular labourers. The general difficulties of keeping
trenches a safe distance from buildings (20 feet per storey), from
retaining walls and from foundations were heightened in Wellington, where engineers also warned against digging near high banks,
on steep slopes, or deeper than 3 feet in wet or sandy soil unless
with proper supports, all beyond general experience and skill.
NZ Herald, 15 Dec 41, p. 8; Evening Post, 20 Dec 41, p. 5
On 20 December a large-scale trench plan was published, with
directions, and the public was urged to provide for itself in the
domestic area, with 28 expert advisers on call. Little immediate use
was made of them; by the end of the month they had received only
57 enquiries.
Dominion, 27 Dec 41, p. 6
Suburban groups that worked on communal trenches
rather than individual slit trenches on their own sections were firmly
discouraged by Mayor Hislop. Wide dispersal was the best protection in residential areas, he advised, and homes should not be left
without someone on firewatch; if people left their sections to gather
in communal trenches, homes might be lost for want of someone
on the spot to tackle small fires at their start.
Evening Post, 13 Jan 42, p. 6
The city engineer of Christchurch warned against any southern
sense of remoteness: ‘Personally I cannot see that we are one whit
safer here than in Wellington or Auckland.’
Press, 13 Dec 41, p. 10
On 12 December
300 local body workers began digging in the central squares, on the
city banks of the Avon, and in various open spaces. ‘Temporary
shelters first, improvements to them later, and permanent shelters
later still, if time permits’ was the programme.
Ibid., 16 Dec 41, p. 8
The water-table
being often close to the surface, parapets were needed and the Mayor
called for thousands of sandbags. The traffic staff was set to making
a rough count, block by block, of employees and the likely numbers
of customers and clients in buildings, of which very few had basements suitable for shelters. By the evening of Monday 15 December,
about 2500 feet of trenches, protection for more than 2000 people,
had been fully or partly dug in the central areas, and timbering had
begun.
In mid-January, with most excavating and side timbering finished, roofing was started. In open places roofs were light, but near
buildings they were of heavy materials, such as 6-inch rough pine
logs covered with earth and rubble.
Evening Post, 20 Jan 42, p. 4
This work, on trenches now
sufficient for 12 000 people at six persons per 10 feet, proceeded
more slowly, while a few business houses began to strengthen their
basements.
NZ Herald, 14 Feb 42, p. 6
Wall cards issued at the end of January directed all Christchurch
householders to dig slit trenches at least two feet deep. They also
advised sending old folk and invalids to friends inland, the removal
of all clutter material between roofs and ceilings, reserves of food
for at least 24 hours, and staying quietly at home in any emergency,
blacked out and off the telephone; even if poisonous gas were used,
an upper storey would be relatively safe.
Press, 29 Jan 42, p. 9
Like Wellington, Dunedin rejoiced in the natural protection of
gullies and stands of trees, and did not embark on extensive digging.
A few trenches, begun on 15 December, appeared in the Octagon,
and the old Caversham tunnel, with lighting and sanitation, would
shelter about 2000 people. Citizens were urged to think for themselves, to decide on dispersal areas, to dig trenches if their sections
were suitable or build up earth walls where water was too near the
surface. Small trenches were less likely to collapse, so they should
be of two-person size, 2 feet wide, 3 feet deep and not more than
6 feet long.
Otago Daily Times, 15, 16, 30 Dec 41, pp. 4, 6, 4
Smaller centres did not feel that the four cities had a monopoly
of danger, though preparations varied, probably reflecting the attitudes of leading citizens. At Hamilton the borough council staff was
set to trenching in the business centre on 13 December, and on 22
January the Mayor, H. D. Caro,
NZ Herald, 22, 27 Jan 42, pp. 6, 4
asked sports bodies to encourage
volunteer digging on Saturday afternoons by postponing their competitions. It was remarked that citizen diggers were mainly middle
aged, from shops, offices and the professions.
Ibid., 20 Dec 41, p. 13
In a test alarm on
19 December Hamilton’s public was ‘most apathetic’; shops were
not cleared or their staffs released, buses and cars continued to run,
and only some one per cent of the people about sought cover in the
new trenches or along the river bank. ‘We are not doing this for
fun,’ said Mayor Caro, promising further tests in which, if premises
were not cleared in five minutes, those responsible, along with laggard pedestrians, would be prosecuted.
Ibid., 17 Dec 41, p. 8
At Tauranga, normal borough work was promptly suspended in
favour of trench digging, and at the Monmouth Redoubt trenches
made in the New Zealand wars of the 1860s were cleared and
timbered for public use. For old people, and for soldier’s wives who
could not pay for building, the borough would provide domestic
shelters at cost or free.
Wanganui Herald, 7 Jan 42, p. 2
On 7 January Wanganui, which had embarked on public trenches
for 5000 people, regretted that only one-sixth was as yet available,
because of the bad weather and volunteers falling off to one or two
daily, leaving the task to council workmen.
Caro, Harold David, JP, OBE(’50): b 1887; Mayor Hamilton 1938–53; chmn Waikato
Patriotic Fund Bd 1939–54, Hospital Bd 1948–53
Invercargill took its trenching briskly, with about 60 sportsmen,
mainly cricketers and anglers, prominent in weekend digging. Before
6 January public trenches measured more than a mile and a second
mile was planned, while in back yards householders were busy,
sometimes several sharing in a convenient section, while many business firms with vacant ground were also providing shelters.
Ibid., 6 Jan 42, p. 8
By 13 January Gisborne had more than a mile of slit trenches,
accommodating 1800 people, using all available space near the business area.
Evening Post, 13 Jan 42, p. 4
Oamaru reported good progress with its trenches, notably at schools;
Press, 10 Jan 42, p. 5
nearby Waimate, not regarded as a likely target,
dug no trenches, though a survey showed that there was room for
several hundred persons in the cellars of all four hotels, two large
stores and the silo of the flourmill.
Ibid., 14 Jan 42, p. 3
Trenches, it was often said, were immediate and temporary protection against blast and splinters; they were not effective against a
direct hit or the machine-guns of low-flying aircraft; many people
would not be able to reach them quickly, nor could they possibly
contain a city’s daytime population, while thoughts of winter made
them less and less attractive. In cities likely to be targets for heavy
bombing, reinforced shelters in the ground floors and basements of
suitable buildings, and covered shelters on patches of open ground,
were the next step.
Regulations early in January 1942, in logical sequence to the local
authorities agreement of December,
See pp. 510–11
gave local authorities power
to take over buildings or land for shelters or for access, and to require
owners of business premises where 30 or more people worked to
provide approved shelters for them. Owners and the local council
would each pay 25 per cent of the cost and the Crown 50 per cent,
though where members of the public were included the Crown paid
more in proportion. For public shelters and access ways, local bodies
paid 25 per cent and the Crown the rest.
Sheaves of such directions were sent out during January and succeeding months. For some firms, basement and storage space was
already cleared because supplies of goods were smaller; other firms
made changes.
‘To make provision for an air-raid shelter and the consequent reorganisation of floor
space it has been decided to close the DIC Tearoom temporarily on Sat., February 21
…. When danger no longer looms so close to these shores and times become more
normal, the DIC will, with confidence, re-open their Tearoom.’ Dominion, 16 Feb 42,
p. 3. ‘Atwaters urgently require their basement for an air raid shelter and have to remove
over 100 pianos … each heavily reduced. This sacrifice is your gain’. NZ Herald,
31 Jan 42, p. 2, repeated until 12 Mar 42
Much co-operation was called for all round, as in
Christchurch where the Council, issuing 150 notices, said that in
some of the buildings shelters could not be constructed, but their
owners might be induced to work in with the owners of suitable
buildings.
Press, 10 Mar 42, p. 4
Generally, exterior walls would be strengthened and
window spaces filled in; there would be protected entrances, interior
partitions, ventilation, sanitation and lighting, while water and sewer
pipes that could cause flooding would be re-sited.
NZ Herald, 8 Jan 42, p. 6
At the end of March, across a rising welter of requisitions, excavations and plans fell an embarrassing reversal of policy, the edict
of James Fletcher, newly-appointed Commissioner of Defence Construction: cement and brickwork must be reserved for main defence
jobs; their use was prohibited in private building and industry, but
in shelters current stages of work could be completed. Sawn timber
also was to be used as little as possible. Designs must be adapted
to use other materials, such as bulkhead walls of sapling logs, the
interstices filled with sand, earth or rubble, with floors of gravel
topped by duckboards.
Cmssnr of Def Construction to Dir Nat Service, 23 Mar 42, IA 178/259, pt I; Dominion,
27 Mar 42, p. 4
From the end of April cement supplies
gradually eased,
Dominion, 23 Apr 42, p. 4
but labour and materials generally remained short;
for several months, except for tunnelling and timber work with
unsawn logs, EPS constructions were substantially checked, and
meanwhile their urgency became more doubtful. The Wairarapa
earthquakes of June and August 1942 made fresh demands on labour,
and experts became concerned about the ability of shelters to withstand earthquakes. It was decided that various types should be tested
against both bomb blast and earthshock and meanwhile EPS controllers were told, in strictest confidence, that no more shelters should
be undertaken.
Dir Nat Service to Controller of Works, EPS, Auckland, 13 Nov 42, IA 178/3/6
Thereafter the threat of danger steadily receded,
and with it the need for shelters. Towards the end of March 1943,
War Cabinet finally decided that all work on shelters should cease.
Dir Nat Service to Asst Under-Sec PWD, 2 Apr 43, ibid., pt 2
Only in the four main centres were shelters other than trenches
much developed, and the four courses taken differed so widely that
they need separate description. In Auckland, where the estimated
daytime population of the high risk business area was 70 000, 35
modern buildings were in January 1942 considered to have suitable
basements, which would provide shelter for 18 000.
NZ Herald, 8 Jan 42, p. 6; see also p. 509
Actual work
on the first shelter started in mid-February and a month later the
Dilworth and Dingwall buildings had accommodation for 300, while
in several other buildings constructions were under way.
NZ Herald, 18 Feb 3, 13 Mar 42, pp. 6, 4, 4; Auckland Star, 10 Mar 42, p. 3 (photo)
By April
there was shelter for about 20 000 people in central Auckland: 4000
in buildings, 3000 in the old Parnell tunnel, 2000 dispersed in the
Domain and Grafton Gully and 11 000 in trenches that were being
roofed.
NZ Herald, 8 Apr 42, p. 4
British experience promised a large measure of protection by such
means, but less than from deep underground shelters, which could
withstand a direct hit. A plan for linked tunnels under Albert Park,
which rose steeply in the midst of the commercial area, was devised
by James Tyler,
Tyler, James (d 1952, aet 75): Auckland City Engineer 1930–44
the city engineer. These tunnels, with about a
dozen entrances, ventilation, sanitation and electric light, would connect with a subway from Victoria Street to Gittos Street under Constitution Hill,
NZ Herald, 20 Jan 42, p. 4
and would protect about 20 000. The estimated
cost was £119,700, about £6 per head, of which the government
would pay 75 per cent and Auckland 25 percent; by working three
shifts seven days a week it might be finished in four to six months.
City Engineer to District Engineer PWD, 27 Jan 42, IA 178/3/6
The Public Works Department approved, remarking that it would
probably take nine to twelve months and cost up to £40,000 more
than estimated.
Engineer in Chief PWD to Dir Nat Service, 2 Feb 42, ibid.
On 5 February National Service told Auckland
to go ahead on the tunnels but at the same time to press on with
shelters in buildings, reminding that military authorities advised
taking shelter in any building if a raid started.
Dir Nat Service to Auck EPS, 5 Feb 42, ibid.; NZ Herald, 5 Feb 42, p. 6
With this approval
given, more details were published: there would be a group of galleries, large enough for a wooden bench on each side plus standing
room between them, in gridiron fashion under Albert Park and
Bowen Reserve, with cross galleries at intervals so that there would
be no dead ends. The work would take about four months, but it
should be possible to start using the tunnels at a fairly early stage.
Preparatory work began on 12 February. Mechanical excavators could
be used only at the portals, of which there were nine, and as but
few men could work on each tunnel face, these faces were multiplied
by sinking eight shafts from the surface to where the galleries would
intersect, shafts that would later be used for ventilation.
NZ Herald, 12, 19, 26 Feb 42, pp. 8, 9, 6; Auckland Star, 12, 24 Feb, 17 Mar 42,
pp. 8, 3 (photo), 6
With contracts let on a co-operative system, up to 300 men in
gangs worked three shifts a day six days a week, through loose
volcanic rock, hard sandstone and papa. On 12 August the last few
feet of rock in the middle of the 2000 foot main tunnel were blasted
through. With 9 entrances,
Six between Wellesley and Bacon Streets; three at the intersection of Churchill Street
and Black Road.
the arched access tunnels, 9 feet high
and 15 feet wide, totalled 3700 feet in length; there were 6000 feet
of accommodation tunnels, 7 feet square, and all were lined with
timber. Engineers, surveyors and labourers had toiled ungrudgingly,
and all the drives met truly. Carpentry and plumbing were still to
be done, but it was thought that the cost would not exceed
£120,000.
Auckland Star, 11 Aug, 9 Jun, 4 Jul 42, pp. 6, 4, 3 (photo); NZ Herald, 17 Apr,
12 May, 1 Jul 42, pp. 4, 5 (photo), 4; Evening Post, 11 Apr 42, p. 6
Two months later, one and a half million feet of squared
timber and a large quantity of pine trunks were lining and propping
the tunnels, the floor was covered with scoria, fans provided ventilation; a diesel power plant, formerly used in a meatworks, would
provide auxiliary lighting if the city power failed, and seats were
being built.
NZ Herald, 22 Oct 42, p. 4
By the end of September about 58 000 Aucklanders could be
sheltered: 20 000 in the Albert Park tunnels, 10 000 in 30 city
buildings, 3500 in government buildings, 11 000 in covered and
slit trenches, 3000 in the old Parnell Tunnel and 7800 in covered
trenches in the outer parts of the metropolitan area, while dispersal
areas would provide for 2000–3000. Nine more city buildings were
being prepared, and more than 20 others were under survey.
Auckland Star, 25 Sep 42, p. 4
Meanwhile winter rains had tested both public and private trenches
and some, dug in clay and in low-lying places, were filled with
water. Private shelters varied greatly: some were timbered, covered
with corrugated iron plus a protective mound of earth, and snug
within; some were quite elaborate, while others were dank holes that
‘one would enter only under the compulsion of immediate danger.’
Ibid., 9 Jun 42, p. 4
In Wellington on a busy day there could be 30 000 people between
Cuba Street and the wooden Government Building in Lambton
Quay.
Evening Post, 29 Jan 42, p. 8
On the east lay Lambton Harbour, to the west a few steep
streets and access ways climbed to The Terrace, then almost entirely
a street of houses, with a long sheltering gully (later to become a
motorway) behind it. By 3 February 1942, 200 requisitions had
been issued, ensuring public right of way from Lambton Quay and
Willis Street to The Terrace and through its gardens to the gully
and beyond. Before the end of the month there were paths and steps
and notices.
Dominion, 3, 5, 23 Feb 42, pp. 4 & 6, 6, 6
Meanwhile about 100 owners were instructed to provide shelter for those occupying their city buildings, though only
about 50 could be made suitable even after costly alterations.
Evening Post, 29 Jan 42, p. 8; Dominion, 3 Feb 42, p. 6. Among the first buildings so
notified, on 20 January, were the AMP in Customhouse Quay, Brandon House and
New Zealand Insurance in Featherston Street, the Hotel Waterloo, James Smith’s and
Kirkcaldie & Stains. IA 178/8/1
By
11 February plans for 23 basement shelters for about 4000 people
at an estimated cost of £24,000 had been forwarded to the Public
Works Department.
Dominion, 12 Feb 42, p. 8
The Chamber of Commerce advanced the proposals of two prominent architects, F. de J. Clere
Clere, Frederick de Jersey (1856–1952): b UK; architect; Wgtn Diocesan architect 1883,
to Wanganui Education Board 1883–8; member Institute of Structural Engineering
London
and E. Anscombe,
Anscombe, Edmund (1874–1948): architect; to OU Council and for Dunedin city buildings, designer Centennial Exhibition buildings
for driving a
tunnel, or temporarily disconnected lengths of tunnel, under The
Terrace. This, they claimed, would in peace time be a city asset, as
public garages or to relieve traffic on Lambton Quay and Willis
Street, and meanwhile would protect, well away from heat and fire
and smoke, many more people than could the proposed shelters in
buildings; tunnels could be built with less expense and as rapidly
as such shelters, which would be worse than useless after the war
and expensive to remove. Alternatively, the business men suggested
surface shelters on vacant lots which would be infinitely superior to
shelters in buildings: they would be accessible to the public, and
could be built in concrete without steel, economising on materials,
skill, manpower and time. Also, public shelters, whether surface or
tunnels, would be paid for by the Crown and the city, whereas some
firms would be faced with a total expenditure of £3,000, although
after subsidies they would pay only 25 per cent and could recover
this through increased rents.
Dominion, 3 Feb 42, p. 6; Evening Post, 29 Jan, 4 Feb 42, pp. 8, 8
The Automobile Association backed The Terrace tunnel, and the
Building Trades Federation, which was communist-led,
The Communist party held that deep bomb-proof shelters were the right of the people.
urged
tunnels there and at other necessary points; their ‘experienced tunnellers’ stated that progress could be made, with eight foot drives,
at 80 feet a day from each set of two faces.
Evening Post, 5, 11 Feb 42, pp. 8, 4
Semple airily promised
to find the labour.
Dominion, 5 Feb 42, p. 6
At a public meeting called by the Chamber
of Commerce on 11 February, which advocated immediate tunnelling, a seismologist, Dr L. Bastings,
Bastings, Dr Lyndon (1893–1968): Senior Physicist Dom Physical Lab, DSIR; Research
Dir Building Research Bureau of NZ; Wgtn EPS 1942–4
said that The Terrace was
one of the areas most liable to suffer considerable slips from mild
earth tremors, and though a safe tunnel would be possible it would
take much longer than was proposed. A city spokesman, R. H.
Nimmo, replied that he would take the rare chance of an earth
tremor rather than be buried under tons of masonry.
In the Evening Post, 17 Feb 42, p. 4, a letter signed ‘Geologists’ challenged Bastings’s
view and accepted Nimmo’s odds.
Against all this, Mayor Hislop pointed to the danger of running
through streets in a raid to get to a tunnel instead of going down
to the basement of one’s building. The strengthening of city buildings must go on, he said, with the City Corporation leading the
way. At the same time, a new type of easily constructed, concrete,
communal shelter would be placed on all suitable sites, even in the
streets; the city engineer would examine the possibilities of short
tunnels. The foundations of the demolished ‘Dominion’ building
near Plimmers Steps would for about £4,500 provide a very strong,
well-placed shelter for 1000 people, and needed only roofs, flooring,
sanitation and entrances.
Dominion, 12 Feb 42, p. 8; Evening Post, 12 Feb 42, p. 4
Two days later, as Singapore fell, Hislop announced that work
on both surface and underground public shelters would proceed at
once, if labour and material could be obtained. There would be
three timber-lined tunnels, at Hobson Street gully (for 2000 people),
near the Carillon (1500 people) and off Hospital Road, Newtown
(1500 people); shelters, mainly of concrete blocks, would be started
at such populous places as Miramar, Evans Bay, Kilbirnie, Courtenay
Place, Kent and Cambridge Terraces and Te Aro Flat. In city buildings 26 shelter plans, for about 5000 people, had been already submitted to the Public Works Department.
Evening Post, 14 Feb 42, p. 8
By 20 February, 92
labourers, eight carpenters and seven tunnellers were working on
public shelters. Two tunnels had been started in the sides of Hobson
Street gully, and there were large excavations for semi-surface shelters
in front of the Public Library, in Parliament grounds and in Sydney
Street near the Waterloo Hotel, in the reserve at the corner of Wakefield Street and Jervois Quay, in Kent Terrace, at the Carillon and
other places.
Ibid., 20 Feb 42, p. 6
The grounds of Parliament were much disturbed, for
besides three ordinary public shelters they concealed a massively
strong underground room where the War Cabinet and Service chiefs
could continue their work under heavy bombing.
Press, 6 Feb 42, p. 4. ‘Parliament grounds now look like Gallipoli or a relief map of
New Guinea, almost completely turned up by machinery into a succession of hills and
gullies for construction of shelters for the public in case of raids. The engineers have
been considerate enough to spare the pohutukawa trees which have been a feature of
the grounds for many years, and the statues of Seddon and Ballance.’ Scholefield, Diary,
30 Mar 42. On the 24th, Scholefield had remarked that owing to the demand for
cement for aviation runways at Ohakea, these shelters were to have very much lighter
roofs than intended.
Vacant sections
or open spaces in industrial areas became shelter sites, such as the
parking grounds of a motor firm in Taranaki Street where six big
trenches were dug in the current style: their floors were five and a
half feet below the surface, they were roofed and boarded with timber
and packed over with about two feet of soil.
Dominion, 11 Mar 42, p. 6
A long row of
municipally-owned garages under Bowen Street became shelters.
Evening Post, 18 Apr 42, p. 8
It was, however, firmly pointed out that in both city and suburbs
dispersal would be the principal protection; even in the city proper
it was not intended that everyone would make for a constructed
shelter.
Dominion, 23 Feb 42, p. 6
Dispersal routes were worked out, mapped and rehearsed,
from buildings, from blocks, and from larger areas, using the
additional exits to The Terrace gully and the Town Belt.
Ibid., 5 Feb 42, p. 6; Evening Post, 11, 13, 19 Feb, 3, 16 Mar 42, pp. 4, 6, 8, 6, 4
Directed
by wardens and by numerous signs, people in the streets moved
away first, followed by those in the buildings; they went obediently,
but without any Boy Scout or Tom Wintringham-type realism, many
treating such excursions as a joke. On 17 March, although 15 000
moved in 15 minutes from the city between Bunny Street and Plimmers Steps towards The Terrace gully, Bolton Street cemetery and
the Botanic Gardens, the Post remarked that the ambling crowds
would have been good targets for machine-guns.
The shortage of concrete checked and changed the semi-surface
shelters,
Evening Post, 23 Mar 42, p. 7
but by 18 April it was claimed that 42 of them were so
well advanced they would already afford some protection. By the
end of June 1942 60 were completed in the city area, including 13
on the waterfront, each seating 50 but taking twice as many at a
pinch. They had concrete floors, ventilation, sanitation and candle
light, and their doors were locked against larrikins, with all nearby
wardens carrying keys. In large buildings there were basement shelters for several thousand people.
Ibid., 23 Jun 42, p. 5; Dominion, 30 Jun 42, p. 3
Meanwhile concrete economy had
produced the log-cabin shelter, the first appearing in the centre of
lower Taranaki Street, made of radiata pine logs 8 inches thick and
9 feet high, upright in the ground.
NZ Herald, 22 Apr 42, p. 4
Others of this type were built
along the wharves and in other central places.
Ibid., 23 Sep 42, p. 2; Dominion, 30 Jun 42, p. 3; Evening Post, 12 Sep 42, p. 8
Tunnelling was not halted for materials, and at the Hobson Street
gully 30 to 40 men working till midnight in two shifts had, by the
end of April, driven two tunnels running north and south, each
about 75 yards long, 12 feet wide and 9 feet high, through fairly
yielding ground, the whole being timbered with three rows of stout
pine logs from Rotorua. On one side to the gully the soil was dry,
but the other proved so wet and puggy that extensive concrete lining
was needed.
Dominion, 3 Mar, 28 Apr 42, pp. 4, 4, 19 Aug 43; Evening Post, 23 Jun 42, p. 3
In June, the commandeer of men and materials for camps and
airfields relaxed slightly. The conversion of the old foundations near
Plimmers Steps into a many-compartmented shelter, now expected
to hold up to 2000 people behind brick walls 3 feet thick, under
12 inches of reinforced concrete, was completed, and in Thorndon
work began for a similar shelter in the foundations of the Social
Security building burnt down in 1938.
Evening Post, 23 Jun 42, p. 3
At this stage, on the night of 24 June 1942, a severe earthquake
centred in the Wairarapa caused widespread havoc, without loss of
life. In Wellington thousands of chimneys were wrecked and scores
of buildings suffered major structural damage. This cut across shelter
work, but the EPS men had plenty of demolition practice, mostly
on the chimneys, and all possible labour was directed to repairing
the damage. Six weeks later, on the night of 2 August, a second
earthquake brought down most of the newly built chimneys over a
wide area. In Wellington buildings the effect was cumulative: minor
cracks became gaps, weakened brickwork collapsed, some heavy parapets crashed down and others showed alarming breaks; the Chief
Post Office, the Town Hall and many other buildings were partly
disabled; the main part of the Porirua mental hospital had to be
emptied of patients. Demolition of parapets and towers that were
dangerous, or might become so in another shake, was now an urgent
task; engineers and architects, with steel ties and girders and reinforced concrete, repaired and anticipated damage; labourers, bricklayers, carpenters, plasterers and plumbers were brought in; shelters
paused.
As the Post explained in September, the shelter programme for
various reasons had been interrupted and delayed, but work had
never wholly stopped and Wellington had shelter for 25 000 of the
public, apart from that provided for business staffs, schools and
hospitals, the waterfront and Service headquarters. What happened
in the Pacific during the next few weeks would decide whether construction would be taken up with a rush, mark time, or be
abandoned.
Ibid., 12 Sep 42, p. 8
For the first three months of the Pacific war Christchurch concentrated on its trenches, which would hold 12 000 people. Early
in March the City Council decided that the owners of 150 buildings,
in each of which more than 30 people worked, should be told to
provide shelters. Only 40 such notices had been issued when the
cement ban deferred action.
Press, 10, 11, 25 Mar 42, pp. 4, 4, 4
The Council then planned surface
shelters in the streets, using timber and rubble, anything but concrete: they would not, remarked Mayor Andrews,
Andrews, Sir Ernest, Kt(’50), CBE(’46), JP (1873–1961): Chch city councillor
1918–50 including mayoralty; various Education Board appointments, including NZ
Council of Education; local body posts, including founder & 1st Pres Sth Island Local
Bodies Assn; District Controller EPS WWII
be very sightly.
Star-Sun, 31 Mar 42, p. 3
As winter approached, the open trenches in parks and squares were
roofed and made as water-free as possible, sufficient for about 5000
people being thus treated by the end of May.
Press, 12, 26, 27 May 42, pp. 4, 4
Meanwhile engineers
and architects hastened to devise shelters within buildings, using
substitute materials and a little necessary concrete, of which a small
quantity was now available, remarking that in some cases substitute
materials would actually be better, because permanence was not
wanted. Thus a wooden floor over a basement could be made fire
resistant by covering it with eight inches of shingle or six inches of
brick, supported by understrutting; basements were strengthened by
timber partitions filled with shingle.
Ibid., 10, 21 Apr 42, pp. 4, 4; Star-Sun, 10, 22 Apr 42, pp. 3, 6
By 16 June, Public Works
had approved plans for 26 such shelters, and 58, accommodating
5250 people, were completed by September.
Press, 12, 13, 26 May, 16 Jun, 18 Aug 42, pp. 4, 4, 4, 4, 4; Star-Sun, 25 May,
8 Sep 42, pp. 3 (photo), 2
Many of the older
buildings, however, were not suitable for shelter development. By
November the programme was lagging,
Press, 7 Oct 42, p. 2; NZ Herald, 14 Nov 42, p. 6
and as need receded, it
quietly faded out.
Dunedin’s first places of refuge were the Caversham tunnel, estimated to provide for 3000 people, and in the Town Belt, where
fireplaces and sanitation were arranged, but the City Council was
also prompt in prescribing public shelters under suitable buildings,
beginning with the Town Hall (750 people) and a new brewery
(1000 people), while in a rock face behind the Electricity Department a tunnel shelter was made for the staff. About 250 buildings
had 30 or more employees; 50 were served shelter-notices at the
start,
Evening Star, 20 Jan 42, p. 8
but a month later shelters for more than 7000 people were
being planned in 140 buildings.
Ibid., 24 Feb 42, p. 4
At this stage, Dunedin adopted
a new shelter idea: locally made concrete pipes, five feet and six feet
in diameter, were set in specially prepared beds, with concrete walls
protecting each end to stop blast, wooden seats built along each side
and duckboards down the middle.
Evening Post, 5 Mar 42, p. 6; Press, 9 Oct 42, p. 6
The city engineer took an elaborate census to discover population densities in various areas at different times of day and night, and placed the pipes accordingly, in
streets, public squares, church grounds and the basements of modern
buildings.
Evening Star, 3, 16 Jul 42, pp. 3, 4
In August, W. A. Bodkin, Minister of Civil Defence,
was loud in praise of Dunedin’s system which he did not think was
bettered anywhere in the country; experts held that the pipes would
be thoroughly safe in a blitz, they were well placed, efficient and
economical.
Press, 12 Aug 42, p. 2
By September more than 3000 feet of pipes, which
would accommodate nearly 5000 people, had been delivered by the
manufacturers and were being installed, with more on order to protect a further 3000 people.
Evening Star, 11 Sep 42, p. 2
The four main cities were reckoned the first targets, but towards
the end of January, the National Service Department warned 18
secondary centres
to start digging in their business areas. The most
likely attack, they were reminded, would be by shelling and a few
bombs from ship-borne aircraft, directed against shipping, wharves,
stores of oil and primary products. They should examine their natural cover for quick dispersal purposes, and see if their buildings
could produce up-to-standard shelters. Slit trenches required constant maintenance, but there were standard plans for converting them
to covered shelters. These towns, however, should remember that
they were less liable to attack than the main cities and modify their
schemes accordingly.
Nat Service Circular to EPS, No 48, 26 Jan 42; PWD Engineer in Chief to district
engineers, 2 Mar 42, enclosing typical plans of a covered public shelter, constructed of
timber, found satisfactory in Wellington. IA 178/259
Some centres had already prepared shelters, others followed: thus,
Palmerston North dug trenches for 1000 people in the Square;
Wanganui Herald, 5 Feb 42, p. 4
Lower Hutt and Petone prepared both slit trenches and covered
shelters, while shops and factories dug their own trenches;
Evening Post, 17, 19 Feb, 3 Mar 42, pp. 4, 6, 4
Greymouth tackled its shelters late in March.
Star-Sun, 21 Mar 42, p. 3
Schools, congregations of children, raised anxiety. Quick dispersal
to homes in an alarm was established policy, well rehearsed before
December 1941
See p. 495
and remained so. But it was eroded by visions
of bunched children on roads being targets for machine-guns, of
stray children lost and panic-stricken, of parents, disobeying orders,
hurrying out to look for them. Immediately after Pearl Harbour
there was an impulse to dig. An EPS notice in Auckland papers on
15 December asked school committees to organise volunteer labour
for slit trenches in school grounds where EPS could not and did not
intrude; generally, however, word from education authorities was
awaited and the summer holidays passed.
On 23 January 1942 the Education Department told boards that
protection works should be considered only for schools in specially
vulnerable areas, though not all of these would get them; boards
should confer with the Public Works Department over each school;
the government would pay but volunteer labour was to be used
wherever possible.
Circular memo for education boards, secondary school boards, etc from Education Dept,
23 Jan 42, IA 178/247. The Department of Education controls the syllabuses and
operation of secondary schools, each of which has an elected Board of Governors to
supervise the administration of its school; primary schools are under the control of local
Education Boards, with parents forming School Committees for individual administration.
When voluntary labour was available the Works
Department could authorise spending of up to 12s 6d per child on
material for approved plans.
Dir Educ in Dominion, 27 Feb 42, p. 8
The Auckland Education Board asked its schools to seek every
means for dispersal. It did not favour trenches which would concentrate large numbers, usually in full view, and when without head
cover were only a temporary expedient; some warning could be
expected; most schools needed all their playing space.
Auckland Star, 31 Jan 42, p. 6
But in the
disasters of February uneasiness grew, especially in Auckland. Headmasters were worried about the lack of under-surface shelters and
about the uncertainties of dispersal.
Telegram to Min Def from Headmasters’ Assn, Auck, 17 Feb 42, IA 178/247; NZ
Herald, 20 Feb 42, p. 6
Auckland’s EPS said that
headmasters and wardens should consult, and gave guidance: if there
were prior warning of an attack children should stay home or go
home; if the alarm and the enemy action coincided children should
shelter in the buildings, in trenches or nearby cover; if an alarm
sounded before actual enemy action every effort should be made to
get the children home or to friends nearby.
Chief Warden to district wardens Auck, 24 Feb 42, IA 178/247; NZ Herald,
25 Feb 42, p. 9
But many children
lived at least 15 minutes away from school and Darwin on 19 February had had two minutes’ warning of its first raid.
At each school the shelter programme varied according to the
kind of ground, the space and labour available, the cover nearby.
There would be trenches at Mt Albert and Takapuna Grammar
schools, where the soil was suitable, and trenches for Auckland Girls
in Western Park, but pupils at Auckland Boys’ Grammar and Epsom
Girls’ Grammar, which schools stood on rock, must disperse.
NZ Herald, 31 Jan, 26 Feb 42, pp. 6, 9
The
boys of King’s College and of many other secondary schools dug
their own trenches.
Ibid., 31 Jan, 3 Feb 42, pp.6, 4; 9 Mar 42, p. 4 (Hamilton); Evening Post,
19 Feb 42, p. 8 (Rongotai)
A few examples illustrate shelter-building in
Auckland primary schools. The Auckland Education Board erected
its first surface shelters at Devonport: 9 units each to hold 50 children, 40 feet long, 5 feet high, 4½ feet wide, either of concrete
building blocks set in cement to give a thickness of 16 inches, or
of massed concrete 14 inches thick, roofed with reinforced concrete
5 inches thick, the reinforcing steel tied to steel rods in the concrete
blocks at 5 foot intervals. Schools at Stanley Bay, Vauxhall, Napier
Street and Parnell had similar shelters. They were specially suited
to inner city schools as they could be close to buildings and so took
little playground space.
NZ Herald, 7 Mar, 15 Apr 42, pp. 8, 2 (photo); Auckland Star, 13 Mar 42, p. 3
(photo)
They also took a great deal of concrete
which from the end of March was reserved mainly for military works.
At St Heliers 90 parents and EPS and Home Guard members
dug and trenched eight covered shelters, each 31½ feet long, 5½
feet wide and nearly 6 feet deep, to hold 40 children. The Education
Department supplied the design and material worth £200; they
looked like railway carriages partly sunk in the ground and topped
with earth.
Auckland Star, 3 Mar 42, p. 3
At Orakei a borrowed mechanical shovel dug eight
trenches about 30 feet long, 5½ wide and 4½ deep. They were
timbered by 80 parents and EPS men, working 10 hours a day over
a weekend, and the shovel piled the earth back.
Ibid., 16 Mar 42, p. 3; NZ Herald, 16 Mar 42, p. 3 (photo)
At Gladstone
School, Mt Albert, trenches for 500 children were dug in one day:
150 men including a clergyman, lawyers, accountants, bankers, the
school staff and committee, Home Guard and EPS members, dug
six slit trenches each 31 feet long, 3 feet wide, 3½ feet deep, and
six deeper trenches, to be timbered and covered later. Local women
supplied teas and a mid-day meal, with a large surplus going to
Mt Albert Orphanage.
NZ Herald, 23 Mar 42, p. 4
By mid-April 21 schools in Auckland’s metropolitan area had
shelters for 7000 children.
Auckland Star, 17 Apr 42, p. 4
In May the Commissioner of Defence
Construction ordered that there should be no further contracts for
school shelters until he could advise that more labour was available,
though with volunteer labour for shelters approved by Public Works
engineers, school committees could obtain up to 20s per child for
materials.
Dir Educ to Nat Service, 21 Aug 42, IA 178/3/6
By August the Education Department had decided that
it would not erect any more shelters or give money for their construction; Auckland school committees argued that although most
schools in the danger area had shelters, all should have them. They
made parents at work feel happier, while making everyone aware
that there was a grim war in the Pacific.
Auckland Star, 5 Aug 42, p. 6
At Wellington dispersal resources seemed less adequate than they
had during 1941 but official action barely preceded a flare of public
anxiety for shelters in mid-February. This was led by a district warden in the Hutt Valley, where schools, amid military and industrial
targets, had no protection and teachers were told to shepherd children into ‘natural shelter’ which did not exist. He knew that substantial shelters were proposed but there should be temporary trenches
immediately.
Dominion, 12 Feb 42, p. 8; Evening Post, 17 Feb 42, p. 6
Headmasters complained that for some city schools
dispersal routes lay through dangerous areas, that fire-fighting equipment and instruction had not been given and that even tin cans for
water were scarce; 28 school committees called for prompt action.
Evening Post, 23 Feb 42, p. 7; Dominion, 9 Mar 42, p. 6
The Wellington Education Board and the Public Works Department had various plans ready: for large concrete shelters, for covered,
timbered trenches, for reinforced concrete pipe shelters and for another
type which later could be converted into a swimming pool; but it
was hard to get materials and labour.
Dominion, 27 Feb 42, p. 8; Evening Post, 24 Feb 42, p. 6
In mid-February contracts
were made for concrete shelters at five schools—Randwick, Gracefield, Petone Central, Miramar South and Miramar Central.
Dominion, 19, 21 Feb 42, pp. 8, 6
By
early March shelters were authorised at 12 other schools, £37,000
was involved and official procedures were hastened.
Evening Post, 7, 10, 19 Mar 42, pp. 8, 6, 6
But much lay
between authorisation and completion: of the eight shelters intended
for Hutt Central School (infants) and the Technical College, only
one was partially completed when work was suspended in mid-June.
Ibid., 16 Jun 42, p. 4
At a few Wellington primary schools parents were active, notably
at Lyall Bay, where they first built ramps to speed dispersal and
began a series of short slit trenches which later could be converted
into an underground shelter.
Dominion, 9 Mar 42, p. 6
Parents also dug at Wellington South
and did what they could in very limited space at Newtown.
At Christchurch shelter designs and ways and means were being
studied early in February and the Canterbury Education Board considered whether five-year-olds at vulnerable schools should stay at
home till danger from enemy action was past.
Evening Post, 9, 12 Mar 42, pp. 6, 6
Dispersal to homes
was the basic policy but the many schools and colleges near Hagley
Park practised running to it and later shallow trenches were dug
under the trees.
Ibid., 27 Feb, 20 Jun 42, pp. 4, 6 (photo)
In general the Board undertook provision of shelters at its schools for children who could not get home within seven
minutes, beginning with the most vulnerable, steadily excavating
and timbering its earth-covered shelters or building in concrete or
brick against retaining walls; the first completed were at Lyttelton.
Press, 19 Mar, 28 Jul 42, pp. 7, 4; Star–Sun, 14 Apr 42, p. 6
By mid-July, there were shelters costing £7,300 for 3910 children
at 20 schools, whose rolls totalled 6076, including several at Timaru
and on the West Coast. Work was in hand at 10 other schools to
shelter 2131 of their 3808 pupils, at an estimated cost of £2,500;
23 more schools were listed for shelters estimated at £9,000 to
receive 3216 of their 7861 children.
Star–Sun, 18 Jul 42, p. 6
This methodical progress was
questioned on 28 and 30 July by the Press, which was concerned
that so many schools were still quite without shelters and thought
that a measure of protection should be provided in shallow, open
trenches that could be dug quickly by volunteers and completed
later. There might not be enough time to get children home,
immediate danger, including defensive fire, might coincide with the
first warning. ‘To disperse children in the hope that they will escape
or survive these risks is not a precaution but an incredible folly.’
Press, 30 Jul 42
Here the Press implied criticism of the division into home goers
and shelter stayers. More directly, parents at Greymouth took this
question up with the Education Department, whose Director consulted National Service, receiving the awkward answer that ‘in the
view of this Department’ shelters at a school in a vulnerable area
should be for all pupils, not only for those living more than seven
minutes away from home.
Dir Educ Dept to Dir Nat Service Dept, and reply, 6 Aug 42, IA 178/247/1
There was, however, no public statement from the Canterbury Board reversing its policy of division.
Dunedin held to dispersal. The Otago Education Board in February 1942 adopted a ‘very fine, commonsense report’ from its architect: school grounds were too small to have open trenches well clear
of buildings for all the children and it was unwise to shelter only
some of them; surface shelters again would take too much space
and cost £100–150. Since some schools had been taken over by the
Army they could be military targets, and would parents remain at
home in an alarm, with their children congregated in a school shelter? It was better to rely on quick dispersal.
Evening Star, 18 Feb 42, p. 7
In March, again
considering shelters, the Board took comfort from the Mayor’s promise to share any preliminary alert, whereon children would be sent
home and the schools closed for a few days.
Ibid., 18 Mar 42, p. 7
The Board held to
this policy in mid-April: vulnerable schools would be closed as soon
as the authorities advised that daylight raids without warning were
possible and the Board would ‘err on the side of safety even if loss
of some schooling may result.’
Ibid., 15 Apr 42, p. 4
In smaller centres, some of which were classed as secondary vulnerable areas,
See p. 525
there was a wide range of activity. In February at
Greymouth, where parents demanded that their Education Board
should at once provide trenches, proposing to keep children below
Standard III at home in the meantime, trenches were rapidly constructed.
Press, 3, 5 Feb 42, pp. 6, 6
At Pahautahanui, early in March an EPS working bee
dug slit trenches.
Dominion, 10 Mar 42, p. 6
At Whangarei’s primary school the Home Guard
dug,
Auckland Star, 10 Mar 42, p. 4; NZ Herald, 24 Mar 42, p. 4
but three months later the High School Board of Governors,
advised by the Northern Area military commander, decided against
trenches since for a large daylight raid there would be warning
enough.
NZ Herald, 3 Jul 42, p. 2
At Hamilton, again on military advice, it was decided
that children should be sent home in two stages: at an alarm, children would spread over as wide an area as possible near the school,
in trenches, gullies and under trees. From there, during breaks in
the attack, they would make for home a few at a time, under the
care of wardens or trained senior pupils. Where cover was too scanty,
it was decided to dig trenches in school grounds and a large number
of parents did so, guided by a lieutenant-colonel and the borough
engineer.
Auckland Star, 6 Mar 42, p. 3; NZ Herald, 9 Mar 42, p. 4
Gisborne, in April, decided that its High Schools’ 600
yards of slit trenches should not be covered in; the money would
be better spent on weapons.
NZ Herald, 17 Apr 42, p. 4
Hawera’s High School had trenches and pupils practised getting
into them, preceded by hedgehog-removing monitors.
Information from Frances Porter of Wellington
At Titirangi, parent labour cut a crescent-shaped tunnel 205 feet long, 7
feet high and 5 feet wide, into cliffs of volcanic ash below the school.
It was timbered and had seats as in Auckland’s Albert Park tunnel.
Auckland Star, 13 Aug 42, p. 3
Local zeal, fired to protect its children, could see danger in some
quite remote areas.
As fears of Japanese invasion spread interest in evacuation, which
had been very slight, increased in some areas and among some people.
In cities, some who had saved petrol kept food and clothing packed
ready, planning, if attack came, to make for the back country. EPS
authorities warned that such French-style flight, impeding roads and
damaging morale, would be turned back by wardens in the towns
and by traffic guards on the main roads;
Ibid., 31 Dec 41, p. 8; NZ Herald, 19 Feb 42, p. 6; Evening Post, 28 Feb 42, p. 8
they favoured children
and old people being sent well before an emergency from danger
areas to friends inland, thereby reducing problems.
In December 1941, Auckland’s EPS, with War Cabinet approval,
declared that it had no plans for advance evacuation though it would
be ready to shift sections of the community as directed by the military.
NZ Herald, 19, 27 Dec 41, pp. 8, 6; See p. 495
But nervousness grew, starting in North Shore suburbs which
could see themselves being cut off. On 5 January, C. J. Lovegrove
Lovegrove, Claude James, OBE(’54) (1897–1977): member Auck City Council 6 years,
Electric Power Board 18 years (chmn 1948–51); Pres Electric Supply Authorities Assn
1951–5
was made Auckland’s controller of evacuation. He promptly travelled south as far as Rotorua and Taumarunui, inquiring where and
how Auckland’s women and children could be absorbed. He found
people highly responsive and glad that the problem was being tackled early, country districts being specially willing to accept evacuees.
Eighteen districts together offered to take in 46 120, mainly in rural
areas, though some would be in towns and some, for a time at least,
housed in halls. Priorities and transport would be worked out, possibly with launches, tugs and barges taking an all-water route from
Onehunga to Cambridge. Refugees would bring their own bedding,
but reserves of basic foods could be built up in the reception areas,
and billet charges would have to be discussed.
Lovegrove to Allum, 16 Jan 42, IA 178/3/3; NZ Herald, 6, 14, 20 Jan 42, pp. 4,
6, 6
Some further attitudes of country people to the possible invasion
were expressed in a letter by a woman:
In this country district lists of people willing to take children
have been compiled. In many cases, mothers of several young
children and who milk, have offered to take, perhaps, two children. Their hearts never fail them where children are concerned.
Our homes are already overcrowded, and we work all day and
half the night. In our district are several big homes, an occasional
empty house, etc.—a good hall may be in some districts.
I suggest, humbly, that these homes and other available buildings be equipped, provisioned, staffed by some of those pretty
city girls in uniforms, the children sent in groups and well cared
for….A heavy burden cannot be thrown onto the already overburdened country mothers, although, be assured, little ones, that
while we have the strength you shall always have what refuge we
can give you.
NZ Herald, 23 Feb 42, p. 2
Lovegrove urged that the government should authorise voluntary,
or even compulsory, advance evacuation from some danger zones,
notably the North Shore, with assistance to those who could not
meet the cost.
Lovegrove to Allum, 26 Jan 42, IA 178/3/3
Meanwhile, the Auckland Committee for the Protection of School
Children advised obtaining, through schools, the names of friends
and relations to whom children could go; this would be a step
towards billet-placing and bring before parents the prospect of evacuation.
Ibid., Report of Cmte
In mid-February parents were asked if they would allow
their children, in an emergency, to be taken by teachers to country
reception areas, the idea being to keep schools and classes together
as much as possible so that each child would meet familiar faces in
unfamiliar surroundings. Generally the idea was not accepted: some
of the discussion meetings called by headmasters in 64 schools were
well attended, but in others there was very little interest. Parents in
the most vulnerable areas did not by their voting show particular
concern. In some schools the vote was 90 per cent against removal,
and nowhere did the vote for it reach 50 per cent.
NZ Herald, 18 Feb, 2 Mar 42, pp. 8, 4
The government, shrinking from panic, expense and disruption,
held to the policy of evacuation only on military orders, and avoided
other decisions. When pressed by the Waikato County Council about
billeting allowances, David Wilson, Associate Minister of National
Service, replied that some evacuees might pay for themselves, some
hosts might refuse payment, and others could lodge claims with
local authorities.
Ibid., 12 Feb 42, p. 6
The Waikato Council, backed by the New
Zealand Herald, said that this was unsatisfactory; Lovegrove had
gone as far as he could, and government indecision was halting vital
preparations.
Ibid.
The mayors of Cambridge and Te Awamutu
explained their anxieties at the prospect of impoverished refugees in
thousands, each costing at least 10s a week in upkeep.
Ibid., 23 Feb 42, p. 6
Lovegrove
repeatedly urged comprehensive regulations that would define priorities and set a scale of billeting fees. Those who could not pay should
have government assistance and there should be power to impress
accommodation and control evacuees. The chief warden of Auckland
as regional Commissioner should be able, in given circumstances, to
order evacuation. If this decision was to remain with the military
authorities, they should indicate the conditions in which they would
order it. Public opinion in Auckland, he claimed, was that the order
should not await the emergency.
Ibid., 3 Mar 42, p. 4
The New Zealand Herald declared that this was so sound as to
be unanswerable,
Ibid.
but the Prime Minister on 3 March 1942 replied
firmly that, as no one could say where or when attack would come,
it was most unwise to disrupt community life by evacuating selected
areas in advance; essential work must continue unimpeded, and wives
could help by staying with their husbands. If any area had to be
evacuated, its essential workers would be moved as short a distance
as possible, but it might be necessary to move women and children
to more distant localities when danger threatened. EPS could arrange
accommodation lists in advance, but the Army would decide if evacuation were required. Meanwhile shelters and trenches should be
made ready.
Auckland Star, 3 Mar 42, p. 6
The Press approved: belief that evacuation was essential grew from false analogies with vastly more crowded cities, and
plans must be based on carefully calculated probabilities rather than
on the worst, but unlikely, possibilities.
Press, 5 Mar 42
The Evening Star also
approved: ‘Mr Fraser’s advice was neither thoughtless nor heartless.’
Evening Star, 7 Mar 42
The Herald, however, held that panic evacuation overseas
had been due to military delay and inaction, while Lovegrove’s main
points, notably those on finance, had been avoided.
NZ Herald, 4 Mar 42
Lovegrove’s proposals were also supported by the 2NZEF Association, some members claiming to have seen disasters resulting from
unpreparedness, and seeing no reason why muddle-headed optimism
should make war more dreadful than necessary.
Auckland Star, 7 Mar 42, p. 5
A public meeting
on 15 March, at which Lovegrove reiterated his views, declared itself
gravely perturbed by the conflict between him and the government,
and wanted his plans adopted; so did both Auckland papers and
the local Chamber of Commerce.
Auck Chamber of Commerce to Min Def, 17 Mar 42, IA 178/3/3
Regulations that finally emerged towards the end of April left
compulsory evacuation fully in military hands, and guarded the
government purse by making the local authorities which would
receive people pay the billeting charges, recovering them from the
local authority of a refugee’s home area, which in turn could recover
them from the family breadwinner.
NZ Herald, 24 Apr 42, p. 6
Neither Lovegrove nor the
Herald were at all contented, the latter pointing out that a local
authority under enemy attack would have to pay for its evacuated
women and children until it could recover their upkeep from fathers
who might be in no condition to pay. The Minister of National
Service explained that under existing policy any bad debts would,
like other EPS expenditure, receive government’s 75 per cent subsidy. If the government accepted financial responsibility for evacuees
in the first instance, the work, staff and delay involved would inevitably be greater than for a decentralised local body.
Min Nat Service to Sec EPS Auckland, 7 May 42, IA 178/3/3
On 19 May
some compromise on the civilian–military control issue was achieved:
three colonels were seconded to the National Service Department as
regional commissioners for areas corresponding to the northern, central and southern military commands, to make liaison between military and civil defence.
The government’s ‘stay put’ policy avoided the many-faceted disturbances in living and feeling that could have snowballed, affecting
other centres besides Auckland,
See letter quoted on p. 536 as an example of nervousness in the South Island
if pre-emergency evacuation had
been made financially easier. In June 1942 news of the Coral Sea
and Midway battles restored faith in the United States navy and
lessened anxiety. Late in August when, unknown to the public, the
Guadalcanal campaign was going badly, Bodkin, Minister of Civil
Defence since 26 June, said that, with the advice of the Services,
areas to be compulsorily evacuated had been agreed upon, but no
good purpose would be served by proclaiming these in advance of
the emergency. People in other areas would stay put, and there would
be no voluntary evacuation.
NZ Herald, 24 Aug 42, p. 4
Meanwhile Lovegrove and Auckland’s EPS turned their energy to
nearer fields. Wardens made a house-to-house survey of the metropolitan district and Manukau and Waitemata counties, noting floor
space, the number of rooms, the adults and children in each dwelling, so that if it became necessary to move people, the authorities
would know how many were involved, how much house-room there
was to absorb them, and how much transport would be needed.
Ibid., 11 Sep 42, p. 2
No such heat developed at Wellington, where the EPS had plans
for moving stricken individuals or groups from one suburb to another,
with 25 nearby rest centres organised for temporary accommodation.
Evening Post, 23 Apr 42, p. 8
There were also plans for moving women and children further afield, notably to the Wairarapa which was reported ready to
receive thousands in selected buildings and private homes, billets
for 8500 in homes being listed by the end of February.
Dominion, 31 Jan, 24, 26 Feb 42, pp. 6, 4, 4
Decision
to evacuate women and children was to be a matter for the government, acting on military advice. As February’s anxious days passed,
there was some restlessness. The Wellington Ratepayers’ Association
respectfully suggested to the government the wisdom of giving
evacuation plans early and serious thought.
Evening Post, 17 Feb 42, p. 6
The EPS authorities,
after special discussions, said that they had made arrangements for
minor scale evacuation and the government had plans for larger
movements, but meanwhile it was desirable that all the women and
children, the old and the ailing who could leave Wellington to stay
with friends or relatives in safer areas should do so, thereby easing
the work of those responsible for their safety.
Dominion, 25 Feb 42, p. 4
The Prime Minister’s ‘stay put’ direction on 3 March, playing
down the likelihood of large-scale evacuation, was accepted without
any public opposition in Wellington, where two further official statements during the month moved progressively away from the exodus
theme. On 11 March, Mayor Hislop said that although no great
publicity had been given to EPS evacuation plans, their foundations
were laid well in advance and they were now ready, with the final
points on transport, billets, the maintenance of billeting centres and
food supplies being settled with the Wairarapa authorities. Brigadier
A. Greene,
Greene, Brigadier Alfred, JP (1872–1950): b Aust; Salvation Army Chaplain NZEF
1914–20
of the Salvation Army, schooled in the Napier
earthquake and now in charge of Wellington’s evacuation unit, on
20 March clearly envisaged not invasion but a tip-and-run raid or
bombardment. He touched very lightly on movement from Wellington and dwelt on the local arrangements that would deal with
scattered damage, on the lines of British mid-war routines. He said
that the Wellington unit had been preparing for a long time, and
had lately been enlarged to 1000 workers. There were 26 district
rest centres in churches, halls and schools, each with tank water,
portable boilers, emergency rations and clothing, and a Plunket nurse,
but clients should bring their own blankets. Thence they would be
directed to temporary billets, preferably near their homes; if necessary emergency buildings would be quickly erected in parks, and
the overflow would go to accommodation outside Wellington.
Brigadier Greene repeated these assurances in April, adding that
there were plans for camps at 10 suitable sites around Wellington
and preliminary arrangements for railing some thousands of evacuees
to the Wairarapa.
Dominion, 10 Apr 42, p. 4; Evening Post, 23 Apr 42, p. 8
The earthquake on the night of 24 June 1942
See p. 523
brought some
of Wellington’s accommodation plans into action. More than 70
people were moved from damaged houses, notably in streets off
Cambridge and Kent terraces. At the start many were quartered in
nearby St Mark’s schoolroom, ‘due to the absence of the billeting
list’, with hot meals provided at the Brougham Street rest centre.
Within two days most had been placed in houses or rooms, and for
the remainder EPS commandeered two large empty houses in the
area. Meanwhile a mobile canteen helped to feed the hundreds of
workers hastily mustered to repair the damage.
Evening Post, 26 Jun 42, p. 3; Dominion, 27, 29 Jun 42, pp. 8, 6
At Christchurch, with its well-spread suburbs, there were paper
plans at the end of 1941 for adapting some large buildings in the
Kirwee–West Melton area, to house several thousand people temporarily,
Press, 4 Nov 41, p. 8
but there soon appeared some agitation for organised retreat,
especially for children. A letter to Semple, dated 1 January 1942,
combined the liveliest fears of invasion with apparent belief that the
Japanese would not go far inland:
Why have the school children not been evacuated to the country?
There are large empty hotels and boarding houses all over the
country….
I read recently in the American Readers Digest that the Japanese send their men to search the countryside and take any girls
they can lay hands on….
I do not always agree with your policy or your utterances but
one thing I have come to expect from you, Mr Semple, is getting
things done. This is a crying problem and we have very little
time to do it in—can’t we mothers look to you to do something
in this respect.
…. personally I am of the opinion that Japan will endeavour
to take New Zealand before she attacks Australia, as Australia
will then be surrounded, and if our daughters are left at the mercy
of the Japs what a—well, words fail me. You can’t beg this
question, and you, if you have any conscience, can’t delay dealing
with it…. If I had a gun, I’d shoot my children myself before
I’d let the Japs touch them.
Mrs O. Gill, Moncks Spur, Christchurch, to Min Nat Service, 1 Jan 42, IA 178/247
This letter was minuted by J. S. Hunter, Director of National Service:
‘For carefully drafted reply. This fear can easily spread and a bare
statement that action is not considered necessary will not allay simple
fear of the [sic] kind…. The best line to take with such correspondents I think is to say that the danger is fully realised and
should the war situation be such as to make action necessary and
desirable, the present organisation is being designed to cope with
it.’
In the Press, some anxious mothers suggested taking children to
the hills, complaining also of insufficient trenches and orders to die
on their doorsteps.
Press, 20, 23, 29 Jan, 6, 14 Feb 42, letters
EPS spokesmen replied that they could take
themselves off at once or even when ‘an alert’ was sounded, which
would probably be well in advance of ‘an alarm’ when such movement would not be permitted; hysterical talk about dying on doorsteps did not help.
Ibid., 20, 29 Jan 42, pp. 8, 8
A retired lieutenant-colonel also reproved the
nervous, and classed Christchurch as a reception area rather than as
one to be vacated.
Ibid., 30 Jan 42, p. 8
On 6 March the Christchurch Star–Sun advocated that discussion
of moving women and children from Lyttelton, from near the aerodrome, perhaps from near industrial plants, should be completed,
and the public should know about arrangements for transport and
billeting. Large-scale evacuation was not possible, however, and shelter building should be hurried. Later in the month when some women’s organisations, introduced by Mabel Howard, city councillor,
proposed evacuating about 30 000 women, children and old people,
the Mayor thought that such people would suffer more in damp,
improvised camps with doubtful sanitation than in any probable
attack, and said that most people had no wish for extensive
preparations.
E. H. Andrews to M. Howard, 25 Mar 42, IA 178/2/4
It was recognised, however, that about 8000 people lived in four
small coastal areas—Sumner, Redcliffs, Mt Pleasant and New Brighton—which would be exposed to attack and which the Army might
want cleared at very short notice. Nearly half could go to friends
inland, and billets were arranged for the rest, aided by 1000 two-decked bunks which the EPS made at 20s 6d each, plus a large
number of stretcher beds, also made by EPS, and stored in the
country. Transport was arranged by some 600 to 700 private cars,
plus trams, trucks and buses, to Christchurch, and thence by train
to inland towns. People were told to have their basic necessary possessions wrapped in blanket bundles of about 561b each. Mattresses
should have strong labels of name and billet address tied on, as they
might be collected later, and keys could be left with wardens. There
were identification cards giving names, original addresses and destinations; there were even arrangements with the Post Office and
Social Security to send on mail and pensions.
Ibid., EPS Bulletin No 2, Apr 42; Press, 19 Mar 42, p. 3
Dunedin did not make special preparations for flight. Many coastal
towns which had some evacuation plans on paper as part of their
EPS programme before Japan entered the war, now made detailed
arrangements to send away the aged and infirm, the women and
children, leaving the men free to fight off the invaders. The extent
of such preparations varied according to the zeal and imagination
of organisers. Wanganui, for example, was highly prepared, with
billets arranged in woolshed camps and other inland accommodation; cars were allotted, collection points fixed, baggage prescribed.
Cards were issued, to give directions and to serve as evacuation passports.
Wanganui Herald, 4, 5, 19 Mar 42, pp. 2, 4, 4; letter and card to author from Mrs
G. Barry of Nixon Street, Wanganui, Sep 69
Local pride helped to make people see such towns as
Wanganui, Patea, Gisborne or Westport as important to the enemy,
either as invasion points or because of valuable industries such as
mines or meatworks. Some EPS authorities, taking their responsibilities very earnestly, felt that planning must be all-embracing. Thus
at Rangiora one man said that Rangiora was a place for receiving
refugees; if the Japanese landed they would concentrate on Christchurch. Another argued that there might be a landing at Waikuku
or Leithfield and, as an EPS executive in a danger zone, said they
should plan for evacuation.
Press, 10 Mar 42, p. 3
There were also sturdy souls, like Mulholland of the Farmers’
Union, who would meet the enemy at all points with weapons to
hand, and wanted no talk of running away. But some argued that
fighters could fight better untroubled by non-combatants, who should
withdraw from homes near military targets.
Evening Star, 26 Mar 42
The Communist party,
pointing to street-by-street fighting in Russia, claimed that such
evacuation, plus deep shelters, did not lead to defeatism.
Otago Daily Times, 8 Apr 40, p. 6
There was no sustained popular drive for evacuation. Children in
England had been sent from their homes in thousands, and only the
more cheerful or touching aspects had had much publicity, but
everyone knew that English conditions were very different; England
also had a ‘stay put’ policy. Few New Zealand parents, except those
with very close friends or relatives in the country, thought actively
of parting with their children. Mass movements were too unwieldy
and expensive without government help, and the government, risking reproaches for possible lost lives, kept preparations in the listmaking stage, leaving further decisions to military experts. Nervousness waned as Japan’s advance slowed. The idea of dispersal,
always present, came to dominate that of evacuation. On 9 September Bodkin, Minister of Civil Defence, said that although evacuation
of any area was a remote possibility, the authorities were ready for
any emergency. Both evacuation and dispersal would be carried out
only on military orders: dispersal was a temporary measure, while
evacuation was the definite removal of people in whole areas from
their homes to temporary quarters elsewhere. Country towns or rural
areas would be liable, not to removal, but to receive people.
That these orders were never necessary perhaps avoided exacerbation of the deep-seated resentment felt by many country people
for town-dwelling ‘softies’, their easy lives upborne by farmers’ efforts,
if a letter that appeared in the Press on 4 May 1942 voiced more
than a solitary opinion:
I look forward to the day when townswomen get evacuated to
the country to learn to understand what country women have to
put up with—no means of transport except cars in most cases
and the same petrol ration as townswomen with trams and buses
at their doors almost, no cake shops to run to when out of sugar
or too tired to bake; no pictures, concerts, war charity parties or
dances, or any form of recreation except heavy farm work to break
the deadly monotony of the housework; not even a chance to meet
other women at service club teas or camouflage net making etc.;
just an endless lonely routine with men out all day and to all
hours at night.
While most people remained at home in the alarms of early 1942,
many library and art treasures, especially at Auckland, were sent
into country places or stowed away. The Dominion reported on 7
April that pictures from the National Art Gallery had been ‘placed
in what is hoped will be safety in an inland town’, while others
were cased and stored underground in dry cellars. Its best pictures,
then worth about £25,000, removed from their frames and packed
in 16 cases, were stored in a concrete room at Hastings until late
in 1945.
Dominion, 4 May 46, p. 8
Wellington was not entirely deprived of its art collection
for all that time. Most of the Gallery building being taken over by
the Services, some pictures from the national collection were displayed in an improvised gallery, the tearooms of a central department store, the DIC, with special groupings shown periodically. The
seasonal shows of the New Zealand Academy of Fine Arts were also
held there.
From the Supreme Court in Wellington five oil paintings of
deceased judges were rusticated to safety, along with volumes of
English law reports which would be hard to replace.
Ibid., 12 Jan 42, p. 6
From the
Alexander Turnbull Library 30 000 of its 80 000 holdings, manuscripts, books and pictures,
Ibid., 27 May 42, p. 4
along with material from the General
Assembly Library and the infant Archives section,
‘9 Jan 1942. To Dannevirke to inspect depository for storage of books and manuscripts
….
10 Jan 1942 (Saturday). Packing books for removal; also considerable quantity of manuscripts belonging to the Archives, notably the New Zealand Company’s papers and what
we have of provincial records.
20 Jan…. Packing of books for safe custody finished.’
Scholefield, Diary
were sent inland.
Ironically, some of this material was stored in Masterton. The Parliamentary librarian and archivist, G. H. Scholefield, inspecting the
repository on 25 June 1942 after the previous night’s earthquake,
wrote:
25 June (Thursday). Visited Masterton to inspect book repository.
Found building just standing, having lost a length of parapet in
Chapel Street and a broken cistern pipe freeing water near the
door. All the book cases prostrate against eastern wall, but most
of the books hanging to shelves. Turnbull collection in Public
Trust Office in much the same condition, but books are more
likely to suffer from sun than anything else.
From Auckland’s Public Library rare books of the Grey and Shaw
collections, other important New Zealand books and some old and
precious English volumes were sent to safety. The Art Gallery sent
away its best pictures; historic municipal records left the Town Hall;
the Manukau Road statue of John Logan Campbell,
Campbell, Sir John Logan (1817–1912): b Scotland, to NZ 1840; prominent in Auckland’s commercial, educational, cultural life, Superintendent Auckland Province 1856
father of
Auckland, was buried in a nearby reserve, along with that of a Maori
chief which had previously stood atop One Tree Hill.
NZ Herald, 16 May 42, pp. 6, 4 (photo)
In the
Auckland Museum the Maori section, under skylights, was specially
vulnerable. Many exhibits were removed to safety. The inflammable
thatch of the meeting house was removed; a canoe 107 years old
and the only authentic large one of its kind was too long to be
removed entirely, but its prow and stern posts were taken away and
over the remainder was placed a structure of large cones of 3-ply
wood covered with sandbags.
Ibid., 18 Dec 41, p. 6, 30 Apr 42, p. 6
Dunedin, though more remote from likely attack, also took precautions. In a large vault beneath the Museum, Maori and Easter
Island carvings were stored, along with takahe and moa material, a
collection of Attic pottery, and manuscripts from the Hocken
Library.
Otago Daily Times, 16 Apr 42, p. 4
In Britain fear of losing records had stimulated methods of duplication of which three were available in New Zealand. A document
or drawing could be photographed directly on to sensitised paper,
or a new application of the reflex method could be used. Both these
processes gave copies of the same size as the originals and could be
done by junior workers after brief instruction, on apparatus which
could be installed in offices. The third method, photo-copying on
small film, needed special apparatus and skilled operators.
Evening Star, 22 Jan 42, p. 4
In the
business world and in some government departments especially at
Auckland but also in Wellington and Christchurch, there was much
photo-copying of key records. Banks and the larger insurance companies photographed ledger books and other documents; one large
company was reported to have compressed its records on to films
which could fit into an envelope box, stored safely miles away from
the city.
Auckland Star, 7 Mar 42, p. 5; NZ Herald, 7 Jan 42, p. 6; Press, 27 Jan 42, p. 4
Other firms pinned their faith to fireproof and bomb-proof cabinets similar to those proved effective in London.
Auckland Star, 7 Mar 42, p. 5
In the
Press, on 21 March 1942, a large advertisement read: ‘Are your
valuables safe? The Public Trustee has available for leasing specially
built, self-contained steel lockers in fire and thief resisting vaults
….’
At the same time, emergency food reserves were arranged. Late
in November 1941, at Auckland, an EPS supply committee had
plans for reserves of wheat and flour, and advised householders to
have baking powder and at least 25lb of flour on hand lest bakeries
should be temporarily out of action.
NZ Herald, 29 Nov 41, p. 10
In mid-December the WWSA
listed staple foods, such as oatmeal, wholemeal flour, dried milk
and fruits, beans, biscuits, sugar, cocoa, tea, tinned meats and fish,
which prudent housewives should keep.
Ibid., 18 Dec 41, p. 3
Early in February 1942
a Dominion Controller of Supplies and four regional EPS controllers
were appointed with authority over all local controllers of food supplies and other commodities such as building timber, transport and
electricity,
Evening Star, 6, 7 Feb 42, pp. 6, 6
and by March good progress was reported in decentralising supplies of essential foods.
Auckland Star, 7 Mar 42, p. 5
Meanwhile, lest a breakdown
of normal yeast supplies should disrupt bread making, the Wheat
Research Institute advised bakers about alternative yeasts.
Press, 24 Apr 42, p. 4
Lighting restrictions increased. New regulations coming into force
on 12 December 1941 required light escaping from houses, shops,
factories and offices to be drastically reduced. All decorative lighting
in shop windows was prohibited; no light could be left on anywhere
unless there was someone on hand to turn it off if need be; even in
areas not visible from the sea, windows must be fully screened in
every room in which a light could appear; all windows in seaside
baches must be thoroughly darkened; parked cars visible from the
sea must not show any parking lights; officers of the Electricity
Department and the EPS had authority to visit, inspect, advise and
insist on precautions.
Evening Post, 11 Dec 41, p. 10
A few days later the order to black out at
least one room totally in any house or commercial building was
repeated and extended, to ensure that there was enough blacked-out space to accommodate all persons likely to be on the premises
after dark.
NZ Herald, 19 Dec 41, p. 6
The restrictions now applied to towns as far inland as Rotorua,
Ibid., 2 Jan 42, p. 4
and all over the country blackout trials were held, often combined
with EPS exercises, as at Feilding on 18 December, when bridges
were supposedly bombed, buildings on fire and families homeless.
Press, 20 Dec 41, p. 5
Auckland and Wellington had already darkened their nights and
held tests during October and November.
See pp. 497, 506–7
Now the southern cities
followed quickly. Christchurch’s first trial on 14 December was thoroughly black, as the many who had not shrouded their windows
merely turned off their lights, and some made the most of the new
experience. ‘Big numbers in Cathedral Square made the night almost
as noisy as it was black,’ remarked the Press, and larrikins shone
torches.
Press, 15, 16 Dec 41, pp. 4, 8
The local lighting controller gave detailed advice about
pasting dark paper round the edges of windows, on varieties of
movable screens, the handiness of blackout curtains run on rings and
wires over the whole window, and devices such as loops or rings
sewn to any heavy dark cloth, rugs, old table covers, even large
pieces of clothing, to be hung up quickly on nails or hooks over
architraves.
Ibid., 14 Jan 42, p. 6
Blackout materials were prominently advertised.
Ibid., 12 Feb 42, p. 4: paper for pasting on windows, etc, cost 6d a yard; heavy quality
paper for rolling up, 1s 1d a yard; stiff board, removable in the daytime, 6s a sheet 6ft
by 3ft
In
a test on 18 January, again the electricity load dropped remarkably,
but an aircraft overhead reported many house lights;
Ibid., 19, 21 Jan 42, pp. 4, 6
the next test
on 18 February, showed some improvement and room for more,
which the authorities ensured by cutting off the lights for one week
in 81 offending houses, prosecuting 18 firms, and issuing more than
1000 warnings.
Ibid., 24 Feb, 12 Mar 42, pp. 6, 6
There were now 1500 wardens active, indeed,
according to some press letters, revelling in activity.
Ibid., 12 Mar, 8 Oct 42, pp. 6, 3
After a further
test on 29 April, there were only some 500 warnings, 13 prosecutions, and 39 houses darkened, this time for a fortnight.
NZ Herald, 20 May 42, p. 4; Press, 8 Oct 42, p. 5
Timaru
was even sterner, cutting off all electricity in 30 offending premises.
Press, 27 Feb 42, p. 4
Dunedin’s first trial on 21 December was far from perfect, and
its second, on 18 January, little better: apart from the ‘direct gibe’
of a bonfire on Signal Hill, many blinds were not dark enough,
many fan-lights uncovered and many lights merely switched off.
Evening Star, 19 Jan 42, p. 4
Viewed from the air, Port Chalmers was well blacked out, but in
all other areas the trial was declared a failure of the first magnitude;
the city was visible from 15 miles off.
Ibid., 22 Jan 42, p. 6
‘If it was’na weel bobbit,
weel bobbit, weel bobbit, If it was’na weel bobbit, we’ll bob it
again’, said the Evening Star, quoting a Scottish song.
Ibid., 23 Jan 42, p. 2
The next
attempt, on a darker evening late in March, was more satisfactory,
though in two suburbs where the alarm sounded too soon there was
confusion, with street lights still on; a coloured signal lamp betrayed
the railway station.
Ibid., 25 Mar 42, p. 4
There were now official blind-drawing times, which grew earlier
as summer passed into autumn and winter, published in newspapers.
Evening Post, 21 Jan 42, p. 6; till the end of January it would be 8.15 pm
Places with big windows, such as technical colleges and
universities, reduced the number of rooms in use and faced up to
the expense of blacking out the remainder.
Press, 7 Feb 42, p. 6; Evening Post, 24, 27 Feb 42, pp. 4, 4
Skylights in factories
and workshops were difficult; lighter grades of sisalkraft were used
in some cases,
Press, 14 Jan 42, p. 4
and in others cowlings were fitted over the lights
or they were brought down to near the machinery and away from
the skylights; sometimes the skylights were painted over, making
them useless in daytime.
Auckland Star, 23 Jun 42, p. 4
Apart from sky glow and lights visible
from the sea, total factory darkness was not demanded. The Dominion Lighting Controller ruled that factories working at night had to
provide sufficient blacked out space for those who in emergency had
to remain at work, with the rest dispersing and switching off their
lights; if the whole plant had to continue working then complete
blackout screens must be provided.
Press, 28 Feb 42, p. 8
Wellington’s third test on 23 February, combined with a practice
by the fire services, was its best yet, although car lights, even on
EPS cars, remained a problem. Many householders were told that
their screenings left straying chinks, and Army headquarters was a
conspicuous and high-handed offender. Many people went outside
to view the effect, and among several hundred gathered about the
Manners Street–Willis Street corner there was singing.
Evening Post, 24 Feb 42, p. 6; Dominion, 24 Feb 42, p. 6
Acceptance of the blackout settled firmly, aided by prosecutions.
These were fairly widespread. Seven Aucklanders were prosecuted
on 23 January, with fines ranging from £2 to £6, and seven more
a week later. The first prison sentence was given on 6 February 1942,
with a repeated offender jailed for the weekend until 7 am on Monday, in time for his work on the waterfront.
NZ Herald, 7 Feb 42, p. 9
Hundreds of householders found wardens on their doorsteps, complaining of errant
gleams or of windows forgotten in little-used rooms. As in England,
wardens came to be known as blackout wardens; some were understanding, some officious; there was mounting worry if one’s name
were taken, for future slips could mean trouble.
Car light restrictions were a persisting difficulty. Apart from only
parking lights being allowed in sea-facing areas, regulations required
that one headlight must not exceed seven watts, and that the other
should be tilted downwards eight inches for every ten feet of beam
(adjustments which tended to wear off). Non-compliance was rated
dangerous because, apart from any possible enemy, all eyes in the
prevailing darkness were very sensitive to glare and accident risk was
high. Although there was much less driving, traffic authorities at
Auckland, for instance, commented that motorists were prosecuted
every week for lighting faults.
Ibid., 22 May 42, p. 6
In July, of 61 traffic cases heard
by an Auckland magistrate, more than 40 concerned lights, with
fines of from 20s to 30s; the magistrate warned that these would
rise if offences continued.
Auckland Star, 29 Jul 42, p. 6
Japanese submarine action in the Tasman, raiding Sydney
See p. 359
and
sinking several ships in the first week or so of June 1942, intensified
lighting restrictions and renewed vigilance from wardens. Service
authorities, particularly anxious to avoid ships being silhouetted
against a lighted background, insisted on coastal city street lights
being turned off. As this involved all lights on certain wiring circuits,
some areas not visible from the sea were lightless. While inconsistency was heightened by the wharves themselves where work was
going on at all hours continuing to be brightly lit, harbour boards
claiming that they could be darkened instantly in emergency. The
cities were full of soldiers, home forces, now at top mobilisation,
being augmented by thousands of Americans; darkness promoted
unaccustomed candour in both amatory behaviour and excretion.
Molestation and bag-snatching were further risks to worry women
whose work did not begin or end in daylight.
The Evening Post, while dismissing the repeated complaint that
the darkness was a device to save electricity, pointed to anomalies
and hazards: ‘Such streets as Manners Street and Cuba Street are
dead black, filled with voices and footfalls, until cars and trams
come along and break the blackness, and suburban roads—some
with paths and a lot without—need a torch or extraordinary circumspection’. Round the hills house lights were as bright as ever
behind thin blinds and the headlamps of cars could be seen for
miles, while what sky reflection had been saved from street lights
had been multiplied several times by new wharf lights. Accidents
had been few because pedestrians knew that they could take no
chances, and that if they did not have to be out it was wiser to stay
at home. Street behaviour had been good, but the streets in the
morning were ‘not as clean as they used to be, by a long run’. Some
pavement lighting in the centre of the town would be the cheapest
police force and discourage unpleasantness likely to increase.
Evening Post, 13 Jul 42, p. 6
Civic
authorities and tram men pleaded with Service chiefs for more
light,
Ibid., 16, 18 Jul 42, pp. 6, 4
but on 23 July the Minister of Civil Defence said that
circuits must remain switched off till the lights which would offend
could be more heavily screened, which would take some time. A
few days later, however, the simpler method of removing such lights
from their sockets and switching on the remainder was under way.
Dominion, 27 Jul 42, p. 4
Pre-Sydney-raid visibility was soon restored to about 80 per cent of
Wellington’s streets, though areas verging the port and hill suburbs
overlooking it remained in Stygian gloom;
Evening Post, 27 Jul 42, p. 6
Auckland took a like
course.
These steps presaged the beginning of the dawn. It was announced
on 29 July 1942 that the War Cabinet had decided that, to lessen
the total blackout burden, inland areas could revert to pre-war lighting, provided that their sky glow was not visible ten miles out to
sea; in a coastal strip, three to twelve miles wide according to topography, lights visible from sea and harbours had to be blacked out
or screened. More sky glow would be permitted, allowing some
increase in street and exterior lighting. New regulations were gazetted on 20 August. Coastal towns were still firmly darkened: for
instance, at Whangarei the borough council, disturbed by nuisances
in telephone boxes and happenings in doorways and recesses in the
main street, proposed under-verandah lights, but the Dominion
Lighting Controller would not allow this; instead civilian and military police were increased.
Auckland Star, 2 Sep, 7 Oct 42, pp. 4, 4
With no more Tasman raids and the news permitting more optimism about the Solomons than events there really justified until
mid-November, impatience with the coastal blackout grew. This was
heightened at the start of November by the New South Wales
Minister for National Emergency, R. J. Heffron,
Heffron, Hon Robert James (1890–1978): b NZ, to Aust 1921; MLA New South
Wales 1930–68, Min Nat Emergency Service 1941–4, Education 1944–60, Premier
1959–64
who declared
that the brownout was the brain-child of brass hats who had refused
to admit the error of their ways, but he intended to fight unceasingly
for a relaxation ‘of the present intolerable darkness that hinders
instead of helps, the vigorous prosecution of the war.’
Auckland Star, 12 Nov 42; NZ Herald, 4 Nov 42
Public
response to the blackout demands was flagging.
Evening Post, 3 Sep 42, p. 3; Dominion, 7 Nov 42, p. 6
The Auckland
Star, on 12 November, wrote of the widely held belief that the
continuous brownout could now be relaxed. Already wardens had
been advised that, in areas not facing the sea, less strictness was
needed, but some entirely disregarded this suggestion. They said
outright that having secured a close observance by drawing attention
to every infraction, they would not permit the slightest relaxation.
Meanwhile more open-minded wardens, noting the current of the
war, interpreted their instructions with some liberality. The result
was a ‘patchwork of dark and twilight all over the city’. The restrictions, pronounced the Star, had become ‘an inconvenience to everyone who stays at home, a danger to everyone who goes abroad at
night, and they serve no apparent useful purpose.’
There were complaints of officious wardens and refusal to admit
futility.
NZ Herald, 20, 24 Nov 42, pp. 2, 2; Auckland Star 17, 20 Nov 42, pp. 2, 2
Also, although these did not get much publicity at the
time, there had been many minor accidents, and some not minor,
through tram passengers alighting too soon, unable to see whether
the tram had actually stopped.
NZ Herald, 17 Nov 42, p. 2; Press, 2 Jan 43, p. 4
Auckland’s coroner was to say on
8 February 1943 that the brownout had taken a fairly heavy toll
of life, and so many minor accidents had been caused by falls and
collisions in darkened streets that even a hit-and-run raid by an
aircraft might have caused less personal injury.
Auckland Star, 8 Feb 43
On 8 December 1942War Cabinet announced that, except at
Auckland and Wellington where the degree of relaxation had yet
to be determined, lighting restrictions, along with firewatching, would
be suspended, to be reimposed if the Pacific situation worsened.
Regulations at the end of December confirmed that, except in certain
areas in Auckland and Wellington visible from the harbours, windows could be uncovered and lights returned to normal, provided
that there was someone at hand to turn them off if necessary; likewise
car lights were restricted only within certain harbour and sea commanding areas.
Christchurch began taking the shields from street lights at once,
beginning in Cathedral Square,
Press, 12 Dec 42, p. 4
but other cities and towns were
more cautious: shrouding might be reimposed, and no one wanted
to remove paint or shields only to replace them. Auckland’s transport board, on its own initiative, at once restored normal lights on
trams, and their glowing windows on New Year’s Eve gave an air
of pageantry in the still darkened streets.
Auckland Star, 2 Jan 43, p. 3
By mid-February 1943 most of Auckland’s street lights, except
those in harbour areas, had been restored,
Ibid., 16 Feb 43, p. 4
but in Wellington,
although neon signs in commercial buildings made flashing inroads
on the gloom, shrouds had not been taken from street or tram lamps,
though in some trams interior shades had unofficially disappeared;
Dominion, 19 Feb 43, p. 3
shortage of labour for careful removal contributed largely to the
delay.
Ibid., 8 Mar 43, p. 6
Meanwhile Dunedin authorities, warning against discarding
blackout materials, held a trial on 23 March and promised more.
Evening Star, 20, 24 Mar 43, pp. 4, 2
By the end of May, further regulations brightened even Auckland
and Wellington, though it was repeated that attack was still possible: lights must not be left unattended and people must be prepared to black out if the sirens sounded. Said the Auckland Star.
Of the dim-out itself nothing remains but a prohibition on lights
which cannot be switched off in a moment, and unhappy memories of darkened streets, of increased traffic dangers, and of better
cover by night for the lawless. The traffic dangers involved were
considerable; the restrictions were in no small measure responsible
for the fact that while petrol restrictions reduced street traffic to
a skeleton, there was no proportionate decrease in the actual number of accidents.
Auckland Star, 31 May 43
Fire was obviously a main hazard. Incendiary bombs could start
many small fires which might grow rapidly into a conflagration. City
commercial and industrial areas had many buildings of wood, or of
brick with wooden floors, and they were largely deserted at night:
Auckland’s commercial area, for instance, had fewer than five persons
to the acre.
Mayor Allum in NZ Herald, 3 Feb 42, p. 6
Regulations in October 1941 had directed owners of
city buildings to install fire-fighting equipment, and occupiers to
serve as fire guards. On 13 December this came into force more
urgently: owners must provide for each floor at least two 20lb bags
of sand (costing 9d each) and a bucket pump (£3 to £6) with a
hose and spray nozzle. Such pumps were made locally but were at
first very scarce and people were told to improvise with any sort of
garden pump. Inflammable clutter that might hinder access to a
bomb should be cleared from attics and upper floors. Occupiers must
arrange to have fire guards, of three men per bucket pump, living
within 15 minutes’ walk of their building, ready to report there
when an alarm sounded. There should be one man or more, according to the size of the building, on firewatching duty 24 hours of
the day, which effectively meant during all non-working hours. Each
of the watchers would do about 12 hours a week, without pay;
management would provide sleeping accommodation and refreshments.
NZ Herald, 13, 15, 19, 23, 24 Dec 41, pp. 10, 9, 8, 6, 6
In the four main cities, EPS authorities appointed firewatching
committees and organisers whose arrangements varied from place to
place. Generally, however, in each building or group of small buildings, a staff member was appointed fire organiser, arranging rosters
and sending his lists to the central body. For male staff not in the
Home Guard or in key EPS work, fire duty was compulsory, and
there were penalties for non-performance, a fine of up to £50 or
three months in prison. Women were invited to volunteer.
An incendiary bomb could be extinguished easily in its first two
minutes of burning. Therefore it was originally prescribed that
watchers should be able to patrol their whole area every two minutes
where floors and ceilings were fire resistant, while where they were
of wood this two-minute patrol should include ceiling space; there
should be one extra person for the top floor of every building with
a ground floor of more than 2000 square feet. Clearly this would
require much organisation and many firewatchers. Auckland’s
Organiser hesitated to lay down hard and fast rules,
Ibid., 23 Dec 41, p. 6
but elaborately detailed instructions along these lines appeared in Dunedin
and Wellington.
Evening Star, 10 Jan 42, p. 3; Dominion, 24 Jan 42, p. 8; Evening Post, 27 Jan 42, p. 7
The patrol system would operate only in actual
emergency, hence the condition that reinforcing fire guards must live
within 15 minutes’ foot travel,
NZ Herald, 23, 24 Dec 41, pp. 6, 6
while on the site one man, or
more, according to the size of the building, was supposed to be
awake at all times, ready if need be to arouse the others and admit
reinforcements.
Ibid., 15, 24 Dec 41, pp. 9, 6
There was considerable lethargy about embarking on this ocean
of organisation and lost sleep. By the start of February, in Wellington, the first step of appointing an organiser had been taken in
only about 500 of the 3000 buildings concerned,
Evening Post, 6 Feb 42, p. 6
but on 20 February, after the fall of Singapore, local regulations obliged these
organisers to arrange for continuous watches at two-minute patrol
strength during an alarm; on 17 March a skeleton service began.
Ibid., 10 Mar 42, p. 6
By mid-April, Wellington’s grand total of watchers, including
women, was 11 875, in 549 buildings or groups of buildings, with
1319 on duty each night;
Dominion, 17 Apr 42, p. 4
and by the end of the month weekly
instead of nightly duty was being adopted to stretch manpower.
Evening Post, 27 Apr 42, p. 4
Three months later V. E. Hampson-Tindale,
Hampson-Tindale, V. E. (d 1964aet 55): specialist in fire protection engineering; Fire
Protection Organiser Wgtn EPS, chief exec officer nat EPS
Wellington’s organiser, made a realistic appraisal: 50 per cent of the buildings concerned had a first-class service, 30 per cent were more or less
satisfactory, 20 per cent ranged down towards gross negligence. The
system was still ‘as full of holes as a colander’, but having all buildings manned was safer than block or post watches. There was talk
of the futility of sleeping guards, but men who worked must sleep,
and they would be alert if danger were imminent. Watching was
futile or valuable according to the attitudes of the watchers themselves; they needed not detailed regulations but common sense, initiative, and willingness to make the scheme efficient.
Evening Post, 30 Jul 42, p. 6
On 7 February, Auckland’s Mayor, exasperated by inaction,
ordered services to be fully organised by the 19th, when inspection
by block wardens would begin. The continuous watch was to be
strong enough, with an equal number of reinforcements arriving in
an alarm, for two-minute patrols; compulsory duty would not be
more than 12 hours a week, or one week in 11;
NZ Herald, 7 Feb 42, p. 6
businessmen were
encouraged to devise group firewatching schemes among themselves.
Ibid., 20 Feb 42, p. 6
As more men were drawn into the forces and the Home
Guard, fewer were available for firewatching. It was clear that, lacking transport, extra men could not in an attack arrive within 15
minutes. In June it was decreed that firewatchers should spend the
nights of one week in four on their work premises, doing other EPS
duties in the rest of their time.
Ibid., 10, 19 Jun 42, pp. 4, 2
In some buildings, especially those
staffed mainly by women, the shortage of manpower was acute: the
Auckland Star of 1 July instanced a four-floored building which by
the rule needed 32 men but had only three available. It was possible
to apply for outsiders, but businessmen were reluctant. One wrote
that in small stores, stock and cash ‘will for 112 hours a week be
at the mercy of complete strangers. When will the authorities work
on practical lines?’
Auckland Star, 9 Feb 42, p. 4
Access remained a problem throughout firewatching. Keys were supposed to be given to building organisers in
sealed packets, to be opened in an emergency, but this did not fully
reassure proprietors, and in a real raid the watch would have had
to work in unfamiliar places.
Dominion, 6 Mar. 29 Apr 42, pp. 6, 6; Evening Post, 28 Apr 42, p. 3; Star-Sun,
29 Apr 42, p. 6
In some buildings women helped notably to fill the rosters. Initially they were supposed to do daylight weekend duty and the early
evening shift between 5.30 to 9 pm in buildings where the fire risk
was low.
Dominion, 6 Mar 42, p. 6; Evening Post, 31 Jan 42, p. 8; Evening Star, 4 Feb 42, p. 4
Some dressed for the part, like the girls at Ballantyne’s,
Christchurch, in battle-dress style blouses and roomy slacks.
Press, 23 Mar 42, p. 3 (photo)
In
practice, many women took their turn at all-night duty. Dr Scholefield recorded on 31 January that at Wellington’s Public Library
women firewatchers in groups of four were sleeping-in, one being
constantly alert.
was one of four girls in the
Listener office who played bridge and stayed the night. ‘It was rather
a giggle, but we were there, waiting for bombs’, she recalled in
1970. Some groups were zealous; there were 70 volunteers from the
DIC building, and girls from the dental clinic took charge of three
buildings entirely and one partially.
Dominion, 6 Mar 42, p. 6
In other places response was
poor, resulting in long shifts at short intervals, as complained one
woman who served from 9 am to 6 pm on frequent Sundays.
Evening Post, 20 Apr 42, p. 4
As it was clearly advisable that normal life should be disrupted
as little as possible, the government agreed to the Federation of
Labour’s demand for a two-hour break, time to go home for a meal,
between knocking off work and starting firewatch.
Ibid., 8 Apr 42, p. 4
It was also
clearly necessary, for the sake of their normal work, that watchers
should sleep as much as possible. Folding beds and stretchers were
rapidly devised and advertised,
Dominion, 26 Feb 42, p. 8; Evening Post, 5 Mar 42, p. 4
along with such other comforts as
a ‘good used radio’,
Evening Post, 23 Mar 42, pp. 8, 3
and small electric cookers for the toast and
soup and sausages that would contribute to vigilance, comfort and
morale.
Press, 5 Jun 42, p. 3
At first it was proposed that the night would be divided
into shifts of, say, two hours, during which one or two would remain
awake patrolling the building hourly, while the others slept,
Dominion, 28 Feb 42, p. 8
but
such demands soon subsided. Even at Auckland, supposedly most
vulnerable, it was officially stated early in March that the patrol
system was not necessary as yet: watchers would take their rest at
their work places, on hand in case of emergency, but if things grew
worse patrols might be needed.
Auckland Star, 6 Mar 42, p. 6; Dominion, 6 Mar 42, p. 6
By July the general practice was
for all members of a team, having familiarised themselves with their
post, to make up their beds and go to sleep.
Truth, 22 Jul 42, p. 13
The Wellington
Organiser explained that until raiding started, a continuous watch
would benefit only the insurance companies; the purpose was to have
enough fire fighters immediately available inside familiar city buildings if bombs fell.
Ibid., 29 Jul 42, p. 13
Although firewatching might be taken as lightly as possible, over
months it added a good deal to fatigue. At least one doctor regarded
it ‘as one of the chief causes of sickness and absence among a certain
class of workers’.
Dominion, 12 Aug 42, p. 8
Apart from the tedium of extra travelling, of
evenings and weekend days spent in offices and factories, of improvised beds, of lonely wives and children, there were also some complaints about workers being required to guard city property, unpaid,
while their own houses and families might be in danger, and while
owners merely provided equipment.
In Print, 21 Jan 42; Auckland Star, 9, 13 Feb 42, pp. 6, 6; NZ Herald, 13 Feb 42,
p. 6; Press, 17 Feb 42, p. 8
On the other hand, some EPS
organisers at Whangarei complained that firewatching was an overpopular ‘racket’ for avoiding other duties.
NZ Herald, 15 Apr 43, p. 4
There were a few warning prosecutions for refusal. At Wellington,
for instance, two men who refused roster changes at Easter were fined
£5;
Ibid., 5 Jun 42, p. 2
the magistrate who fined the first three at Auckland £2 10s
said that if there were many such charges the fines would rise
steeply.
Ibid., 20 Jun 42, p. 4
Auckland University arranged to fine shirking students
itself.
Ibid., 16 Jun 42, p. 2
There were also a few reports of normal fires quickly reported
or quenched by firewatchers and through buckets of water being
handy.
Press, 9 Feb, 8 Oct 42, pp. 6, 6; Evening Post, 29 May 42, p. 4; Auckland Star,
15 Aug 42, p. 6
Only at Auckland and Wellington were buildings attended nightly
and at weekends for most of one year. Small towns installed equipment, allocated watchers and waited to go into action when instructed
by the government. Christchurch and Dunedin decided that once
equipment was ready and rosters arranged, occasional musters to
stations and practice in handling the gear would suffice; actual
watching would not be needed till the authorities saw danger looming more closely. At the end of January, Mayor Andrews of Christchurch said clearly that the original proposal for a permanent patrol
had been abandoned; equipment and rosters should be prepared,
and fire fighters trained, but he expected a warning period of at least
some hours in which the guard could mobilise.
Press, 27 Jan 42, p. 6; Star–Sun, 30 Jan 42, p. 6
On 4 March, as Java fell, Christchurch businessmen were reminded
that they had to have equipment ready, rosters posted, buildings
cleared of waste material and arrangements made for sleeping and
refreshments. Within the EPS, fire guards for the commercial parts
of the city had been appointed, with five area organisers and 130
section officers, who were visiting every business block to advise and
check that all was in order, including sleep-in arrangements.
Press, 5 Mar 42, p. 4
A
three-day trial, ending with an EPS test and blackout, took place
at the end of April. Most firms had acquired bedding, but the rest
could not then buy blankets and asked watchers to bring their own.
In each group a single watcher stayed awake for a three-to-four hour
shift, while others slept, most firms giving time off to compensate.
In general there was satisfaction with arrangements.
Ibid., 27 Apr 42, p. 4; Star–Sun, 28, 29 Apr 42, pp. 6, 6
The Star–Sun
on 25 May noted that some of Christchurch’s fire precautions could
be seen from the top of a high building: buckets and large containers
of water were everywhere, along with hoses; ladders had been placed
to give easy access all over roofs and many firewatchers’ look-outs
had been constructed.
Dunedin, between Frederick and Market streets and east to the
waterfront, was at first divided into 84 blocks, each of one large
building or groups of smaller ones, and with fire brigade advice it
was decided how many watchers and what equipment would be
needed.
Evening Star, 4 Feb 42, p. 4
The first trial, lasting five days, began on 7 June, as news
came of victory at Midway. By then the city area was organised in
150 groups of one or more business houses, with 24 firewatchers
attached to each (making 3600) and 150 more men on premises
outside the main area from Port Chalmers to Mosgiel. In each group
of 24, a senior man was appointed to arrange rosters and pass on
to the team what the fire brigade had taught him, while firemen
checked equipment. During the trial four or more from each group
were on duty nightly, sleeping on the premises or close by: some
employers, unable to muster bedding, had to put up watchers at
nearby hotels. The trial was rated satisfactory, with minor failings.
Otago Daily Times, 8, 17 Jun 42, pp. 4, 4
In the lull that followed the Coral Sea and Midway battles, only
the vigilant or well informed were aware that Japan was extending
its hold on the Solomons, until 3 August when it was made public
that for some weeks past Japan had been building bases at Tulagi
and Guadalcanal. A few days earlier the National Service Department, through the Dominion Fire Controller, ordered that Christchurch and Dunedin should begin regular nightly watches. There
was consternation and resistance in the southern cities. With firmness
Mayor Andrews stated: ‘We are not having a continuous fire watching service in Christchurch, at least for the present. It can’t be done.
We simply have not got the personnel.’ Christchurch, he said, differed from other centres in having residential areas close to the heart
of the city, so that firewatchers could be at their posts within the
few minutes’ warning that the authorities had always promised; the
general system was very efficient and many of the large firms already
maintained a continuous service.
Press, 31 Jul 42, p. 4
At Dunedin, a resentful group of business men arranged a meeting to propose that the cost of bedding should be shared between
owners and tenants, or preferably be borne by the government, and
that there should be paid auxiliary firemen instead of voluntary firewatchers. The meeting was prohibited by the police: it was an offence
to attempt to interfere with any instruction given by the National
Service Department or its agents.
Ibid., 30 Jul 42, p. 4
On account of an influenza outbreak, the night watch programme was postponed till 17 August;
and the Mayor, A. H. Allan,
Allan, Hon Andrew Henson, CBE(’46), JP (1877–1963): Mayor Dunedin 1938–44
recollecting that the regulations
required him, as chief warden of his city, to introduce a continuous
firewatch if so directed by the Minister, decided to wait for such a
direction.
Evening Star, 12 Aug 42, p. 4
The Minister decided to postpone decisions over Christchurch and Dunedin until two visiting British experts could visit
those cities and advise.
Press, 13 Aug 42, p. 4
Christchurch promptly had another trial, calling on all concerned
to make it a success, lest permanent watching ensue.
Ibid., 14 Aug 42, p. 6
This trial
showed that some owners still had not supplied the necessary gear,
and that there was some carelessness such as hoses not being attached
to taps and buckets not filled, but arrangements were declared as
good as they could be under non-emergency conditions.
Ibid., 28 Aug, 11 Sep 42, pp. 6, 4
On 22
October it was announced that the position disclosed was so satisfactory that the continuous firewatching trial proposed for that month
was not necessary.
Ibid., 22 Oct 42, p. 4
In Wellington opposition to firewatching was growing. In August,
Harbour Board employees questioned its value and spoke of
fatigue.
Evening Post, 14 Aug 42, p. 4
A letter in the Dominion of 12 August expressed some of
the discontent: the Pacific situation did not warrant continuing the
‘present farce of top-heavy over-organisation’; to meet the present
small threat of bombing, a street-by-street patrol would suffice.
One plain fact is that unless the enemy seizes New Caledonia and
Fiji, northern New Zealand, and still less Wellington, is not within
a coo-ee of his land-based bombers. Another is that the Jap is
hardly fool enough to waste what remains of his diminished carrier strength on tip-and-run errands of doubtful military value
….If the war develops badly down here we shall have warning
enough. Meanwhile the new Minister of Civil Defence would perform a public service if he ordered the modification of a fire watch
that has outlived its plausibility.
Dominion, 12 Aug 42, p. 6
A deputation from a Town Hall meeting told the Minister of Civil
Defence that in the changed Pacific situation the present system was
unnecessary, besides being inefficient, with watchers not properly
trained and regulations and equipment circumvented.
Evening Post, 18 Aug 42, p. 4
Bodkin
replied with ‘confidential information’;
Ibid. The US attack on Guadalcanal, after a good start, had suffered a sharp reverse
with four cruisers lost on the night of 8–9 August, but this was not publicly known.
he spoke of careful planning with Service chiefs and of intended improvements; he said that
the prevention of even normal fires was in the public interest as
goods lost could not now be replaced, and stressed that the fundamental purpose was to have people actually in buildings if bombs
fell.
Perhaps Bodkin’s ‘confidential information’ was too discreet; the
critics were not persuaded that the war situation had deteriorated
from that indicated earlier by Service chiefs. Another meeting on 7
September held that current firewatching was no longer necessary,
was a social and economic burden and, further, ‘we feel that our
legs are being pulled and that we are just acting in an unpaid,
unofficial capacity for the insurance companies’.
Ibid., 8 Sep 42, p. 4
Another argument
was that if bombs fell on some of the old wooden buildings while
watchers were asleep in them, they would be lucky to save their
lives, never mind putting the fire out.
Ibid., 24 Jul 42, p. 4
The charges of equipment
evasion were endorsed by the Wellington Organiser, who said that
recent inspections had shown watchers had good reason for complaint when they were called to buildings which did not have the
prescribed tools; some owners had done very well, others had taken
the least possible action: this could not and would not continue.
Safety measures had lately been improved by putting in knotted
rope escapes, and ladders or duckwalks over roofs. Many complaints
about quarters could be met by watchers themselves sweeping floors
daily and mopping them at weekends.
Ibid., 10, 19 Sep 42, pp. 3, 9
A long article in the Evening Post on 29 August said that while firewatching designed to meet
a British-style Blitz had been necessary earlier, such an attack in the
greatly improved situation was now a manifest impossibility, and
that the war would be won not by effort fruitlessly expended on
purely defensive measures in New Zealand, but by increased striking
power: sending forth more soldiers, working munition plants 24
hours a day, salvaging scrap material, growing vegetables.
Ibid., 29 Aug 42, p. 9
In Auckland also the months of waiting for something that did
not happen had produced feeling that firewatching was unnecessary,
ineffective and a farce. ‘I go on duty at 7 p.m. of an evening and
sleep on the premises till the caretaker calls me next morning,’ wrote
one watcher. Some watchers merely kept a farcical appointment with
the caretaker in the morning.
NZ Herald, 14 Sep 42, p. 2
Late in October, Auckland businessmen and EPS organisers, aware that the existing scheme
demanded too much manpower and was not practised in many
buildings where it was required, tried to arrange for fewer watchers
to be inside buildings; apart from tackling fires themselves, they
would open doors to mobile patrols that would report to EPS blocks
in a raid alarm.
Ibid., 23 Oct 42, p. 4
Meanwhile, as another Evening Post article stated
on 25 October, watchers continued to turn up, thousands of them,
every night, all day on Sundays, and on Labour Day, bored till
bedtime and grumbling, but more about farce and futility than
attendance.
During November complaints continued to come from sources
such as the Auckland Chamber of Commerce
Auckland Star, 19 Nov 42, p. 6
and the Mayor of
Wellington who argued that continuous firewatching by tired men
was unnecessary because the organisation had reached efficiency.
Dominion, 9 Dec 42, p. 6
The southern cities maintained their resistance to continuous watching though National Service officials visiting them in mid-November
insisted that it was necessary. Dunedin manufacturers stated that
already production was falling because men were physically and
mentally exhausted;
Press, 18 Nov 42
the Press said that though the reasons given
by the Minister (mainly the value of having people on the spot to
put out bomb fires immediately) were in themselves good, ‘the
Government has proved many times, and lamentably, that it is easier
to see one need and pursue it than to see needs in relation and to
give them their relative place in policy.’
Ibid.
Mayor Andrews declared
again that the Christchurch organisation, involving 5570 watchers,
had been tested repeatedly and proved 85 per cent effective, while
continuous watching since the previous January would have bred
staleness and inefficiency. The people of Christchurch resented interference from Wellington officials and a resentful team was never
efficient. ‘However, we regard obedience to the law… as essential,’
he continued, ‘and to maintain this must at times pay the price of
obeying arbitrary, irksome, and unnecessary regulations.’
Ibid., 7 Nov 42, p. 4
The Canterbury General Labourers Union strongly protested against men of
advanced years and poor health being expected to sleep in vermin-infested buildings.
Ibid., 26 Nov 42, p. 4
At length Dunedin, amid scepticism, protest and resentment, began
nightly watching on 23 November 1942.
Evening Star, 24 Nov 42, p. 2
At Christchurch, where
the issue was complicated by the resignation of many top EPS officials,
the Mayor said on 26 November that the government’s order had
ruined the firewatching system that Christchurch had and put nothing in its place; many people were saying that they would take the
consequences of refusing continuous watch in all buildings. ‘They
are as rebellious and resentful as they can be.’
Press, 27 Nov 42, p. 4
Meanwhile, a few
days earlier, the United States navy had at last won decisively in
the Solomons. On 8 December, a government order that firewatching was to cease met general joy. The only mourners were ‘the many
elderly men’ who had been quietly installed as paid watchers and
who were sorry to lose a welcome source of income just before
Christmas.
NZ Herald, 9 Dec 42, p. 2
In addition to the large new items of shelters, firewatching and
evacuation plans, all established EPS activities strongly increased after
Japan’s assault. Thousands volunteered, and on 23 January 1942
enrolment in the Emergency Defence Corps, of which the EPS, the
Emergency Fire Service and the Home Guard were branches, became
compulsory for every male of between 16 and 66 who was not an
invalid or in prison, etc, or in the military forces; judges, magistrates,
clergymen, police and seamen were also exempt. Women were asked
to volunteer, and once enrolled they could not resign at will. In the
months that followed, as successive thousands of men were called
into the forces, there was a vast amount of re-allocating of postings
and training. For instance, by June, Auckland was facing the prospect of most warden’s work being done by women.
Ibid., 2 Jun 42, p. 4
Wardens came out of obscurity. There was a ‘get to know your
warden’ movement: notices were nailed on gates, names were published in papers, districts published reports on the progress and
imperfections of their various services.
Star–Sun, 6, 25, 26, 27 Feb 42, pp. 6 (photo), 6, 8, 6; Press, 19 Mar 42, p. 7; Dominion,
3, 7, 28 Feb 42, pp. 4, 6, 10; Evening Post, 10 Feb, 19 May 42, pp. 4, 4
Auckland adopted a new
mass training system for wardens, hoping for more uniformity.
NZ Herald, 9 Feb, 22 Jul 42, pp. 6, 4
There were also complaints of inadequacy, confusion, frustration and
lack of practical detail.
Evening Post, 22 Jan 42, p. 6; Press, 24 Feb, 10 Mar 42, pp. 6, 8; Star–Sun,
16 Apr 42, p. 4; NZ Herald, 6, 10, 14, 16, 27 Jul 42, pp. 4, 2, 2, 2, 2
In newspapers, especially during April,
series of official air-raid hints or EPS notices appeared, giving detailed
information on every aspect of protection and EPS arrangements. For
instance, the New Zealand Herald of 1 April advised that any house
gave some protection against high explosives, much depending on
its construction and where one chose to shelter: the more walls and
the less window the better; one should sit or lie under a table or a
bed with plenty of bedding, screened against glass by sofas etc. The
Press, 15–28 April, explained about wardens and siren signals, shelters, first-aid, fire precautions, reduced lighting and total blackout,
dispersal and evacuation. Revised instructions on incendiary bombs
were also given on a wall sheet issued by the government to all
householders.
Press, 22 Apr 42, p. 4
All over the country, in cities and in small towns, tests were held,
of both total EPS organisations and sections thereof. Group members
rushed to their posts, the by-standing public was sent to dispersal
areas or trenches; children ran home or to their appointed shelter
places; make-believe fires were put out, mains mended, the wounded
bandaged and borne on stretchers, dangerous areas cordoned. Full
scale tests were too disrupting to be frequent. After Auckland’s third,
early in March, the Mayor announced that there would be no more:
the organisation would work if the real thing happened, it was not
100 per cent effective, but scores of full-scale tests would not make
it so, and there were private, less expensive ways of improvement.
NZ Herald, 10 Mar 42, p. 6
To add realism in major tests, aircraft often flew low over cities,
as in Dunedin’s first trial, lasting 90 minutes, on 12 April. This
rated a full column of description in the Otago Daily Times, which
may be quoted as being more or less typical of many others:
The peace of a beautiful autumn morning, with the city waking
under a soft cloak of smoke and haze, was shattered by the wailing of sirens… and long before the drone of approaching aircraft
could be detected, EPS workers were hurrying to perform their
allotted tasks.
Medical aid posts were manned, EPS headquarters staff and fire
services were standing to, wardens, ‘the eyes and ears of the scheme’,
were patrolling the streets, as were traffic and law and order officers,
transport was ready, and all the other sections likewise.
The drone of the planes grew louder, and less than twenty
minutes after the sounding of the alarm they were ‘in action’ over
the heart of the city….Diving, banking, and climbing steeply
the planes kept up incessant ‘attacks’ on targets scattered all over
the area. It was the most spectacular exhibition of flying the people
of Dunedin have witnessed, and it must have brought a clear
realisation to many of the horrors and effectiveness of air attacks
….
The scene in the chief warden’s office was typical of the smoothness and efficiency of the whole scheme. Messages from wardens
were transmitted by telephone or runner to the control room. An
unexploded bomb had fallen in Wilkinson Street, Liberton, and
the aid post was out of action. Immediately the transport, medical, law and order, works and evacuation sections were advised.
The aid post had to be shifted, the danger area guarded, the
people evacuated, and the unexploded bomb had to be removed.
This information was posted up in simple form on a large hoarding, and on a large map of the area coloured pins were used to
show the EPS sections operating at the bombed locality.
Similar reports of damage followed….A high explosive bomb
had struck the Ross Creek Reservoir and the Leith Valley was
flooded; the Caversham tunnel had been hit and 2000 people
were trapped; a plane had crashed at 10 Mayfield Avenue, Wakari, blocking a street, setting fire to a house, and wrecking vital
power lines; the city gas works and the Rugby Hotel had been
set on fire; Onslow House had been wrecked and its inhabitants
had to be evacuated….At one stage the telephone exchange was
supposed to have been hit and messages had to be transmitted
by runner, but not once did a hold-up or a ‘bottle-neck’ occur.
… Casualties were presumed to have occurred at each of the
41 aid posts scattered… from Port Chalmers to Mosgiel. Several
hundred casualties were dealt with, and the more serious cases
taken by ambulance to the Public Hospital.
Even gas attack was included. A gas bomb had exploded near the
south-east corner of the Queen’s Gardens, and the anti-gas squad
in masks and special oil-skin uniforms hurried to meet ‘clouds of
noxious-smelling fumes, representing mustard gas and Lewisite’; they
decontaminated twelve gas casualties and the ground affected. The
ambulance that took the casualties to hospital, with its workers and
gear, was also decontaminated, and further precautions were taken
in hospital. Other gas reports were investigated, and an aid station
that became contaminated had to be closed down.
Five ‘fires’ in the city area were put out, the fire brigades and the
EFS co-operating most effectively. Firewatchers did not man the
buildings but remained outside to show that their organisation was
complete. ‘Although this part of the major scheme has been in operation only a few months, it was obvious that the area is well covered.’
All other sections, transport, public works supplies, evacuation,
accommodation, communications, law and order, publicity and records, were involved. The authorities were pleased at the general
success and the experience gained; the organisation was not perfect,
but further work would eliminate faults.
Otago Daily Times, 13 Apr 42, p. 2
A not infrequent complaint was that the public did not treat EPS
trials seriously. Thus, in a full rehearsal at Wellington on 29 April
there was a ‘tendency to take the whole thing as a joke’, and efforts
to get people into shelter were resented by some, especially by girls
who obeyed instructors and then saw others strolling along uninterrupted because they were escorted by soldiers. Some drivers refused
to stop when ordered: ‘some drove with determination to theoretical
death in spite of being told that the Kelburn Viaduct had been
destroyed; others went too fast to be told.’
Evening Post, 30 Apr 42, p. 6
A stern line was taken
with a few of the disrespectful: thus at Te Aroha a man who was
walking along a street when the alarm sounded and who refused to
take cover, though twice spoken to by law and order officials, was
fined £2 and costs;
NZ Herald, 1 May 42, p. 4
so was a Wellington woman who likewise
disobeyed repeated orders on 20 June 1942;
Auckland Star, 24 Aug 42, p. 4
a Wanganui man,
who continued loading furniture bound for a train during a dispersal
trial on 9 October, was fined costs.
Wanganui Herald, 30 Nov 42, p. 2
Transport was difficult. Apart from local body vehicles, the EPS
depended on private cars or trucks that were lent or impressed. They
were used for training and trials only, being returned to their owners
at other times. In many cases owners drove their own cars and trucks
on fire patrols, communications and other services, sometimes as
volunteers, sometimes by impressment: for instance, Auckland’s taxis
with their drivers were impressed to convey key personnel from the
city to their posts in the suburbs if an emergency occurred in working
hours.
NZ Herald, 27 Dec 41, p. 6
Readiness to lend cars was increased by the scarcity of petrol
which was entirely denied to private cars from mid-December 1941
till March 1942, and thereafter was limited to one or two gallons
a month, depending on the car’s size. EPS vehicles received a gallon
of petrol in February, to keep them mobile,
Press, 23 Feb 42, p. 6
and free battery charging services were arranged.
Ibid., 7 Feb 42, p. 8
Sealed two-gallon tins of petrol were
delivered to the owners of these vehicles, for use in an emergency,
and they had special coupons for further supplies at such times.
Evening Post, 23 Jan 42, p. 6
Fire fighting was recognised as the most necessary emergency
service.
W. A. Bodkin, Min Civil Defence, NZ Herald, 5 Aug 42, p. 4
District fire patrols, of volunteer car owners with helpers
and lightweight fire gear, were increased, as were the truck squads,
equipped to work from street hydrants. The government-run EFS,
trained for larger fires and using heavy pumps on trailers mainly
towed by taxis, was made more professional, with a 24 hour roster
and weekly billeting. During working hours these men were rostered
to action stations near their places of work. At night, for one week
in three, groups in rotation were billeted in boarding houses on the
fringe of the business area, with their equipment at hand, ready to
turn out as quickly as regular firemen. Those not in billets were
allotted in an alarm to suburban duty points near their homes.
Auckland Star, 13 Feb 42 (photo); Evening Post, 27 Feb 42, p. 6; Press, 6, 12 Mar 42,
pp. 6, 6; Evening Star, 4 Mar 42, p. 4
To increase their skill and experience, those in billets were called
out to all fires in their districts along with the regular fire brigades.
Evening Star, 25 Mar 42, p. 4; Evening Post, 4 May 42, p. 7
Fire services were always hungry for workers: by May the EFS in
Wellington and the Hutt was 485 strong, while EPS units mustered
1000, but 600 and 1300, respectively, were wanted.
Dominion, 21 May 42, p. 4
In June the
Christchurch EFS was still 77 short of its required 400 men.
Press, 24 Jun 42, p. 4
As damage to water mains was expected, independent supplies
were arranged. At Auckland, following London models, several semi-sunken tanks were built, about eight feet deep, of double timber
with waterproof material between, bottomed with concrete or puddled clay and with mains leading to fire plugs in city streets. The
first, at the corner of Albert and Cook streets, held 60 000 gallons;
there was one behind the Supreme Court, and another in Albert
Park held 100 000 gallons.
NZ Herald, 12 Feb, 3 Mar, 13 Apr 42, pp. 6, 4, 2 (photo); Evening Post, 11 Apr 42,
p. 6
Similar reservoir cisterns were later
built at Hamilton.
Auckland Star, 18 Nov 42, p. 6
At Wellington any large private tanks were
sought out,
Dominion, 18 May 42, p. 6
and some 300 000 gallons, ponded in abandoned
building foundations in Bowen Street, were increased to 1 million
gallons, providing a spectacular reservoir for EFS trailer pumps.
Ibid., 25 May 42, p. 4
Through fire hose leads into salt water mains (‘risers’) from Jervois
Quay, high-powered pumps drew many streams of sea water into
canvas reservoirs, whence it was drawn out again by pumps and
hoses fanning out over Wellington’s business area.
Ibid.
Similar use
was made of the Avon River at Christchurch;
Star–Sun, 15 Apr 42, p. 4; Press, 15 Jul 42, p. 4
in the streets of
Wanganui steel pipes with quickly fitted couplings lay ready to
bring water gushing from the river.
NZ Herald, 5 Aug 42, p. 4
Steps were also taken to provide emergency drinking water. Thus in Wellington some 130 tanks,
each holding about 400 gallons, were placed around the city and
suburbs. They were filled by tankers with chlorinated water, changed
as necessary, under the supervision of a committee of chemists; while
nearby streams, at the back of Karori and in Happy Valley, were
tested for purity in advance.
Evening Post, 26 Mar 42, p. 6; Dominion, 12 May 42, p. 4
Films and photographs had made the helmets of British ARP
workers familiar, and New Zealanders wanted them. The era of hard
hats on construction sites was many years in the future, the Army’s
helmets were imported, and there were none for civilian defenders.
At Auckland an engineer, H. J. Butcher, acquired steel plate sufficient for several thousand, found a luggage manufacturer to supply
linings, and was soon turning out helmets ‘ninety per cent effective’.
NZ Herald, 19 Feb, 4, 10 Apr 42, pp. 6, 4 (photo), 2 (photo); Auckland Star,
28 Feb 42, p. 5 (photos)
Wellington followed, three firms co-operating to make about
2000 a week: the metal was stamped out in a factory that had
formerly made radios; linings were made at a slipper factory; painting and assembly done with machinery that was previously used on
washing machines.
NZ Herald, 5 Jun 42, p. 2
Some of these steel shapes went to Christchurch, where they were painted and lined.
Press, 28 Apr 42, p. 4
On 10 May 1942, Churchill promised reprisal in kind if gas were
used against Russia,
Eade, The End of the Beginning, pp. 104–5; Evening Post, 11 May 42, p. 5
and there were occasional reports of the
Japanese using it
eg, Dominion, 17, 21 Jan 42, pp. 7, 7; Otago Daily Times, 23 Apr 42, p. 5
and of the Germans being about to do so.
Press, 16 Mar, 27 Oct 42, pp. 5, 3
Though New Zealand authorities considered gas attack unlikely,
government, industrial and university chemists, especially at Auckland and Christchurch, worked to extend knowledge and recognition
of gases, and training was extended at all main centres.
NZ Herald, 15 Jan 42, p. 8; Press, 17 Jan 42, p. 8; Evening Star, 13 Mar 42, p. 2
During
March 1942 a Christchurch rubber firm began work on a government order for 250 000 masks for civilians. These had a fitted rubber face piece, celluloid windows, a canister with a filter of raw
cotton and cotton wool plus government-supplied activated charcoal
made from coconut shell, treated so that it absorbed poisonous gases;
a valve prevented exhalation through the canister.
Press, 14 Mar 42, p. 3 (photos)
Timaru wanted
to make its own masks at 5s each, and when told by the National
Service Department to wait for its share of tested and approved
respirators, complained of yet another instance of the smaller communities being badly treated: ‘we will probably have to wait until
the cities have been supplied.’
Ibid., 24 Mar 42, p. 4
By June, rubber was desperately
short and the official view that gas attack was remote checked the
issue of masks to any but front line sections of EPS.
NZ Herald, 17 Jun 42, p. 2; Evening Post, 25 Jul 42, p. 6
Late in 1942, as the Pacific crisis began to wane, thousands of
gas masks were sent to vulnerable centres. Some centres briskly issued
them to EPS workers, as at Timaru;
Press, 23 Sep 42, p. 2
others, such as Wellington
and Christchurch, decided to store most of them in depots in the
meantime.
Ibid., 24 Nov 42, p. 4; Dominion, 25 Nov 42, p. 4
Auckland began issuing, then paused;
Auckland Star, 17 Nov, 11 Dec 42, pp. 4, 4
by March, it
had received 60 000 respirators and issued 25 000 of them.
Ibid., 25 Mar 43, p. 4
The
National Service Department issued a handbook, War Gases, Decon-tamination and Protection Measures, in August 1942.
The main centres had early decided that, in emergency, all medical care would be arranged through the EPS. There would be no
private calls for doctors, even for such civilian needs as heart attack
or childbirth. Walking patients would go to the nearest first-aid
post, usually in a school or public hall, where there would be a
doctor and trained nurses. If a person could not leave the house, a
large white sheet should be hung at the gate or a front window, to
attract the notice of passing wardens, who would arrange for medical
attention.
Otago Daily Times, 16 Dec 41, p. 4, 6 Jun 42, p. 6; Press, 27 Dec 41, p. 6,
29 Jan 42, p. 9; Dominion, 9 Jan 42, p. 4
In many places the public had been sluggish in producing equipment for first-aid posts and advanced dressing stations;
NZ Herald, 26 Dec 41, p. 7
now this
was readily provided. A notable example was Kelburn’s post, the
vacant tea rooms near the top of the cable car at Wellington, which
was inadequately stocked in December.
Dominion, 4 Dec 41, p. 8
By the end of January
1942 it was considered ready for anything short of a major operation,
with 28 beds and matching supplies, blood donors and transfusion
apparatus, a well supplied kitchen and abundant VADs.
Ibid., 15 Dec 41, p. 6; Evening Post, 31 Jan 42, p. 9
In Dunedin by mid-1942, schools and halls could, in half an hour or so,
be transformed into medical posts, each with 10 to 25 beds made
up, plus screens, hot water bottles, kerosene heaters and lamps,
medical equipment, sterilisers, stretcher-bearers with improvised
ambulances, doctors, nurses and various assistants.
Otago Daily Times, 6 Jun 42, p. 6
At the main hospitals it was arranged that patients not seriously
ill would be moved to temporary hospitals to make room for raid
casualties. For this purpose, and also to expose fewer people to bomb
risk, admissions were reduced at Wellington’s public hospitals, where
only urgent cases were taken in, and only 440 operations were performed during January compared with 1189 in January 1941. Non-urgent cases were advised to apply to provincial hospitals.
Dominion, 27 Feb 42, p. 6
Shelters
were built in hospital grounds and basements, the moving out of
patients was practised, operating theatres were protected against blast,
there were emergency supplies of water and of electricity.
Press, 23, 27 Mar 42, pp. 3 (photo), 4
At
Auckland two upper wards that were grave fire risks were cleared,
patients from three others moved into the corridors, and much glass
was covered with protective fabric.
NZ Herald, 14 Apr, 11 Aug 42, pp. 6, 4
Buildings suitable as emergency hospitals were sought out, beds
and equipment and medical supplies stored there, and sometimes
minor alterations made. Schools were favoured, but they were not
generally taken over, carrying on with their normal work meanwhile.
Evening Post, 27 Mar 42, p. 6 (Hutt Valley High School); NZ Herald, 21 Jul 42, p. 2
(Kaitaia District High School); Star–Sun, 20 Jun 42, p. 6 (Westport Technical High
School)
Kelburn’s now well-equipped first-aid post in the tea rooms
was taken over as a standing emergency hospital, Kelburn EPS workers having to transfer to the nearby Teachers’ Training College.
Dominion, 11 May 42, p. 4
Some hospital centralisation was arranged at both Auckland and
Wellington: many old people were moved from Wellington to the
Otaki Health Camp, which made visiting difficult,
Truth, 29 Jul 42, p. 5; Evening Post, 27 Mar, 23 Apr 42, pp. 4, 6
while at Auckland St John’s College and St Stephen’s College, Bombay, were used
for like purposes. The crippled children from the Wilson Home at
Takapuna, considered a danger zone, were transferred to the new
Onehunga school. Ellerslie racecourse buildings, in partial use from
time to time as a military hospital, could take up to 450 beds.
NZ Herald, 19 May 42, p. 2
Appeals for blood donors were strengthened by awareness, gained
from British air raids, of the wide usefulness of blood transfusions.
Ibid., 13 Dec 41, p. 12, 6 Apr 42, p. 6; Press, 15 Jan 42, p. 6; Evening Post,
10 Mar 42, p. 8
Many transfusions were then given directly, but hospitals’ supplies
of blood, which could be refrigerated for two weeks, and serum,
which could be preserved for some months, was built up and donor
lists lengthened. At Wellington, the 519 calls on donors of 1940
rose to 942 in the year ended March 1942, and by July there were
1148 donors on call.
NZ Herald, 17 Apr 42, p. 4; Evening Post, 15 Jul 42, p. 4
Dunedin’s blood donors increased from 290
in 1940 to 777 in 1941–2, and a further 253 were available for
emergency, making more than 1000.
Evening Star, 21 May 42, p. 3
Many EPS medical posts
had transfusion equipment, and known blood group supplies were
available ‘on the hoof’ from EPS workers.
Identification discs, widely worn in Britain, now became an item
of worry for New Zealanders. Some Plunket and school authorities
alarmingly advised mothers to sew labels into their children’s clothing.
NZ Herald, 24 Feb 42, p. 2
The Mayor of Auckland, hearing that expensive discs were
being sold (at 10s 6d) and believing that they would soon be compulsory, arranged for silver-plated discs of sheet copper, with inscriptions reproduced from typewriting by a photo-etching process, to be
retailed at 1s each.
Ibid., 24, 27 Feb 42, pp. 4, 4; Allum to Dir Nat Service, 2 Mar 42, IA 178/273
Army authorities and the 2NZEF Association
wanted soldiers’ next-of-kin to wear some identification, so that if
they became casualties soldiers could be notified.
Dominion, 5 Jun 42, p. 6
War Cabinet
finally decided against imposing identification discs by regulation,
preferring that the Prime Minister should appeal for them to be
worn as a commonsense precaution.
Memo from Nat Service Dept to Min, 6 May 42, and note by J. S. Hunter, 20 May
42, IA 178/273
By mid-July more than 20 000
had been sold at Auckland, but in Wellington they did not catch
on: in four months James Smith’s sold 1850 and Woolworth’s, after
selling 2500, withdrew them as sales did not justify the accounting
work.
Note, 15 Jul 42, IA 178/273
The wearing of identification tags was widespread though
not compulsory in schools and various sorts were devised, such as
a slim wooden label, about two inches by one inch, neatly printed
and varnished.
Item sent to author by Mrs V. G. Grant of Balclutha in October 1969: it was worn
on the belt holder of her gym frock and was ‘compulsory’ at a Timaru school.
As 1942 wore on EPS reached full, almost blousy, development
while retaining some youthful imperfections. Its sections and subsections increased. Several government emergency schemes had been
developed to ensure the continuance of vital services such as railways,
road services, post and telegraph, electricity and broadcasting. By
mid-1942 there were about 6 technical units, quite separate from
the municipal organisations,
NZ Herald, 2 Jun 42, p. 4
while within the latter subdivisions
had proliferated. Throughout, EPS was bedevilled by changing
membership: thousands were moved into the Home Guard and, as
the ballots ploughed on through the 30 to 40-year-olds, many of
the most competent disappeared into the forces. This involved tangled chains of re-allocation and replacement, while at team level
there was much repetitive training for the benefit of newcomers.
There were criticisms, such as:
We are an almost unlimited number of units, each incompetently (with a few exceptions) taught our one special job—police,
ambulance, fire patrol, and a score of other jobs, all useful, but
only a small proportion likely to be needed. Train all these specials,
I say, but also train every member to do every job when necessary.
I am a fire patrol, but am heartily sick of the whole thing. I have
been taught or shown nothing, and meetings are a waste of time.
We should all learn first-aid, fire fighting, traffic control, etc. Suppose I, a fire patrol, find an injured man. Is it not better that I
administer first aid than run off to find an ambulanceman?
Press, 19 Jun 42, p. 6
In Auckland a warden who had served in Glasgow and the Midlands
spoke of conflicting orders from headquarters, of changing membership, scanty training of wardens, and a lack of preparedness in
civilians that was shocking by British standards; he also spoke of
seeming emphasis on saving property rather than lives, with wardens’ posts unprotected, of EPS workers in an alarm hurrying to
their posts regardless of danger, and of ‘serious casualties’ bandaged
and splinted in the open.
NZ Herald, 6 Jul 42, p. 4, 10, 14 Jul 42, pp. 2, 2
There were complaints of wardens’ lectures being heavy but without practical details, and of administrative
complications.
Ibid., 16, 27 Jul 42, pp. 2, 2
Tests continued modestly. In cities usually only some EPS sections
were involved: thus Petone called out its wardens, firemen, works
and medical units to deal with unexploded bombs and damage to
gas mains, water pipes and people.
Evening Post, 21 Aug 42, p. 3
Suburbs such as Mt Eden or
Grey Lynn would have a local blackout, with wardens, fire patrols
and law and order men out, and medical posts at the ready.
Auckland Star, 21, 26 Sep 42, pp. 4, 6
Sometimes realism was induced by bonfires or sound effects, as at Wellington’s Eastern Bays where heavy planks dropped from a height
gave a mild imitation of bombs exploding, and hosepipe on a lathe
turning rapidly against an empty tin simulated machine-gun fire;
Dominion, 25 Nov 42, p. 4
smoke bombs were placed on city buildings, to give point to the
actions of fire services.
Evening Post, 27 Jul 42, p. 6
Sometimes exercises were comprehensive,
as when Hamilton’s business was completely suspended for an hour-and-a-half while under a light drizzle EPS units dealt with supposed
bomb damage, fires and casualties, and citizens were thankful that
they were not required actually to enter trenches ‘on account of the
water and mud in them’.
NZ Herald, 13 Aug 42, p. 2
Christchurch services were challenged by a hundred unrehearsed
incidents when lorries moving through the night announced by gunshots the dropping of white sacks containing descriptions of damage,
to be picked up and acted upon; some controllers took 18 minutes
to issue instructions, some two minutes, and the average was 5.95
minutes, with experienced men well ahead of late comers.
Press, 24 Aug, 3 Sep 42, pp. 4, 4
To avoid interrupting production, tests were usually in the evenings or weekends, while ordinary traffic was not halted, or people
hustled into shelters or ‘evacuated’ from buildings or areas. Such
dislocation would have been irksome, but lack of it, and of large-scale trials, worried some critics who lamented wasted early energy
and growing apathy: it was ‘drilling everyone but the troops. The
sergeants have done wonderfully well to maintain their own interest
in the theory of helping the public and the practice of giving their
time and energy, and some of them their money, but they know
that the public is not being instructed’.
Evening Post, 24 Oct 42, p. 8
The Dominion on 27 October said that some district groups had not assembled, let alone practised, for months past, and hundreds of EPS members were in danger
of forgetting what little they had learned.
The early stimulus of fear had waned: the shock of Japan’s attack
had worn off, people were used to the nearer war. In April–May it
had seemed that the main drive was turning towards Burma and
India; in June the Coral Sea and Midway victories made for comfortable talk about the tide turning and, in the lull that followed,
people were not sharply alarmed that Japan was thrusting deeper
into New Guinea and more quietly occupying obscure islands in the
little-known Solomon chain. On 10 August came the news of America’s attack on Guadalcanal and though it was soon clear that this
was a slow-moving fight there was little awareness of the narrow
American hold. Meanwhile British forces were barely holding the
Nazi panzers in Egypt, and Germans were pushing towards Stalingrad, but who could argue that New Zealand’s EPS activities would
help the Russians or the Eighth Army? Leaders demanding effort in
the name of urgency and danger were flogging a dead horse as long
as the news gave no more than accustomed discomfort, especially
with the presence of thousands of Americans giving both assurance
and pre-occupation.
In mid-November, when air and naval success at Guadalcanal
had achieved what the ill-informed majority had prematurely taken
for granted, a few long-intended EPS tests proved a rather tame
finale. Auckland’s fourth full-scale effort, with districts from Mercer
to North Cape also participating, was held between 6 and 7.15 am
on 27 November, with cloud and rain precluding the excitement of
bombers overhead; it affected few but its well-warned EPS personnel,
who scurried to their posts in thousands. Indeed, the Auckland Star’s
‘first and outstanding impression’ was that almost every adult male
in the city, many women and a large number of boys had some EPS
right to be on the streets, and in a real raid too many would have
been exposed to injury. The usual incidents with imaginary fire and
bomb damage were staged, and more than 400 hospital beds were
vacated by shifting suitable patients into temporary quarters in the
museum.
Auckland Star, 27 Nov 42, p. 4; NZ Herald, 28 Nov 42, p. 8
After a blackout on 9 November, the Evening Post said that Wellington would have been easy to find and that EPS traffic had been
immobilised. After three years, regulations still required urgent traffic,
in an alarm, to drive behind parking lights covered with two thicknesses of newspaper—‘Given a sufficiently long war, this problem
will undoubtedly be solved, but until it is, EPS transport at night
will be a farce.’ Before a general trial at Wellington in mid-December it was announced that the public would take cover, but as very
few were abroad between 7 and 9 on a Sunday morning, shelters
were empty; some wardens ‘moved with alacrity, others strolled
along’, and one called it all a ‘complete farce’.
Dominion, 14 Dec 42, p. 4
Dunedin was more
steadfast: according to the Evening Star, 10 000 willing EPS workers
went into action at 6.20 am on Saturday 29 May 1943 and, although
the all clear sounded 20 minutes later, it was nearly 9 o’clock before
all the incidents were cleared up. On the other hand, Hamilton’s
EPS, which had been zealous, streamlined itself in mid-November,
reducing its 4200 members to 1557.
NZ Herald, 14 Nov 42, p. 6
With lighting restrictions eased and nightly firewatching called
off shortly before Christmas 1942, there was widespread feeling that
the EPS was finished. In the New Year it was given new direction
and its name changed to Civil Defence, and schools of instruction
were set up in Wellington to give three weeks’ intensive training in
a revised general personnel course to groups of about 30, drawn
from the principal towns. These, armed with the latest gospel on
fire fighting, first-aid, resuscitation, unexploded bombs, protection
from high explosives, hygiene, stretcher bearing, crowd dispersal and
chemical warfare, were to begin training their fellows uniformly
throughout the country.
Dominion, 16 Jan 43, p. 4; Auckland Star, 20 Feb 43, p. 6
On 27 February a new policy was
announced. For the 25 vulnerable centres there would henceforth be
fixed civil defence establishments. Auckland would have 7500 members, Wellington 5250, Christchurch 3750, Dunedin 3000, New
Plymouth, Wanganui and Napier 1200 each, Hamilton, Palmerston
North and Lower Hutt 1050, Whangarei, Timaru, and Invercargill
900, Westport and Masterton 600, and so on, nearly 35 000 in all.
They would be allotted to six first-line sections in each centre, wardens, fire, works and medical units each claiming 20 per cent, law
and order and communications 10 per cent apiece.
In addition, at the four main centres and the secondary ports,
there would be mobile squads, 10 per cent of the establishment
numbers, which would train alongside established units and reinforce any of them in a crisis. They would have 30 hours’ training
in the revised general course, spread over six months. All other EPS
members would remain, on paper, in their old units, liable to occasional parades;
Evening Post, 27 Feb, 8 Apr 43, pp. 6, 3
but in effect they were retired.
In April there was a specialist rescue course, highly technical,
involving lifting gear and tackle, rescue methods, ladder, rope and
stretcher work, shoring of damaged buildings, demolition, and
removal of the dead. This was followed in May by a short specialist
course in law and order.
Note on IA 178/243; Evening Star, 13 Apr 43, p. 4
Such training would, apart from enemy
action, be of value in destructive earthquakes etc, but there was
widespread desire to reduce unnecessary service, releasing energy and
money for more productive use. In July, War Cabinet decided that
the new training programme was no longer necessary and that the
front line units should be cut back by about 64 per cent, to between
12 000 and 13 000 volunteers in all. These would attend one parade
a month in respect of their own particular unit.
Evening Star, 10 Jul 43, p. 4; Evening Post, 9 Aug 43, p. 4
Meanwhile some school grounds, parks and open spaces were disfigured by overgrown, waterlogged trenches, open or covered; other
school grounds, the basements of buildings and vacant sections were
cumbered with shelters. By August 1943 the Pacific war seemed
safely distant, and short-lived hopes that the war in Europe might
be soon over heightened impatience with these encumbrances. But
there was no sudden demolition; their position and sturdiness largely
determined how long they lasted. Labour urgently needed for productive work could not be spent on their removal, except where they
were dangerous or expensive to maintain.
Dir Civil Defence to Dir Educ, 18 Oct 43, IA 178/247/1
Open trenches were the
first to go, some quite early in 1943: for instance, those in the
gardens of Parliament Buildings, in certain play areas, and some,
overgrown and crumbling, that pitted the wasteland of Albert Park,
once Auckland’s pride;
Dominion, 19 Jan 43, p. 2; Auckland Star, 20 Mar 43, p. 5
most household trenches were already
replaced by vegetables or grass.
During the first part of 1943 authority, advised by Chiefs of Staff,
required the retention ‘of all necessary Air Raid Shelters in a full
state of efficiency’,
Dir Nat Service to Asst Under-Sec PWD, 2 Apr 43, IA 178/247/1
especially in the port areas of Auckland and
Wellington. Thus, the Wellington Harbour Board’s request to
demolish shelters occupying much needed space near the wharves
was refused in March, again in August, and not granted till December 1943.
Secretary, Wgtn Harbour Board to Dir Nat Service, and replies, 19, 25 Mar, 27 Aug,
7 Dec 43, IA 178/8/6
Notwithstanding this caution, Air Commodore R. V.
Goddard, as early as December 1942, had asked that the protective
pinex partitions in Air Headquarters, Stout Street, Wellington, should
be replaced with glass, to give more well-lit space, stating: ‘there is
no doubt whatever that the possibility of enemy action against the
Dominion has become more remote, and accordingly the precautions
which were taken originally are not now warranted.’ This was minuted: ‘As he is in a better position than PWD to assess the danger
of using glass, let him decide.’
CAS to Dir Nat Service, 4 Dec 42, IA 178/8/6
By October, shelters were officially rated no longer necessary and
removal was sanctioned,
Evening Post, 16 Oct 43, p. 6
but labour shortage was the main factor
retaining them. They disappeared piecemeal over the next 18 months.
An example of the delay was provided by the log cabin surface
shelter in lower Taranaki Street, Wellington, which occupied about
one third of the roadway: in December 1943, with grass three feet
high growing round it, it was booked for early removal; at the end
of April 1944, gorse bushes were in full bloom on its roof; in June
1944 the timbering was coming apart, releasing the rubble filling.
Auckland Star, 4 Dec 43, p. 4; Dominion, 27 Apr 44, p. 4; Evening Post, 13 Jun 44,
p. 6
Meanwhile, brickwork protecting windows and doorways in some
public buildings was removed, restoring much-needed light and air,
as in the outpatients’ department at Wellington Public Hospital.
Dominion, 22 Oct 43, p. 4
By slow degrees the laboriously built impedimenta were whittled
away: most of Albert Park was regrassed in the autumn of 1944,
NZ Herald, 12 Feb 44, p. 6
trench shelters in the small reserve at Wellington’s Jervois Quay–
Wakefield Street junction were levelled during April 1944, and in
Kent Terrace a month later.
Dominion, 27 Apr 44, p. 4; Evening Post, 13 Jun 44, p. 6
In June 1944 at Auckland the
Symonds Street–Wakefield Street reserve was restored, soon to be
followed by others.
Auckland Star, 20, 21 Jun 44, pp. 4, 4
Emergency water tanks disappeared at about
the end of the year.
Ibid., 1 Dec 44, p. 3
In the Albert Park tunnel, pride of New
Zealand’s deep shelters, the timbers were beginning to falter by the
end of 1943, and as conversion to a traffic way or a parking area
would cost more money and labour than could be spared, tenders
for filling it in were, after much debate, sought in February 1945.
NZ Herald, 9, 10 Mar 44, pp. 6, 4; Auckland Star, 11 Oct, 17 Nov 43, pp. 2, 6,
14 Jul 44, p. 3, 5 Feb 45, p. 4
At about the same time, the solid public shelters in Parliament
grounds were unearthed and removed, the power shovel providing
lunchtime entertainment for many civil servants.
Evening Post, 6 Feb 45, p. 6
The deep bunker
for War Cabinet, built nearby under the main roadway, was to
remain, however, till excavated for the carpark in 1970.
Ibid., 1 Oct 70, p. 9
CHAPTER 13Russia and the War
AT the start of June 1941 it was thought that Hitler’s next target
would be Suez, menaced now from Libya, Crete and Vichy-held
Syria, where German infiltration was reported. To forestall this, on
9 June Free French and British troops entered Syria and Lebanon,
advanced steadily against mild resistance and on 23 June took
Damascus.
Meanwhile there was speculation about relations between Russia
and Germany. The Russo–Japanese neutrality pact in mid-April 1941
was seen as Russia’s effort to secure its eastern borders in apprehension of trouble from the west, and Churchill in a speech on 9 April
Eade, Charles, The Unrelenting Struggle, p. 102
suggested that Hitler might suddenly turn from the Balkans to seize
the Ukraine granary and the Caucasian oil fields. A good many
newspapers
Southland Times, 12 Apr, 11 Jun 41; NZ Herald, 15, 17 Apr, 10 May, 11, 13, 16 Jun
41, pp. 7, 9, 9, 7, 8, editorial; Press, 17 Apr, 4, 16 Jun 41, pp. 7, 6, editorial; Dominion,
10 Mar, 15 Apr, 12 May, 16, 17 Jun 41, pp. 7, editorial, 7, 7, 6 & 9; Otago Daily
Times, 31 May, 4, 14, 16, 17, 19, 21 Jun 41, pp. 9, editorial, 9, 4, 5, 7, 9; Auckland
Star, 14, 16 Jun 41, pp. 7, 6; Evening Post, 12, 16 Jun 41, pp. 8, 7
had reports and comments on German and Russian
activity, such as troop movements and diplomatic coolnesses, with
Russian inscrutability mentioned fairly often. There were also suggestions that it might all be a German screen for a sudden strike
elsewhere. The Auckland Star on 14 June warned that the apparent
inactivity of Germany in relation to Syria was suspicious: where the
Germans were not obviously active they were sometimes most dangerous. As the Southland Times of 11 June remarked, these were
difficult days for newspaper readers, with facts, rumours and propaganda jostling together on the cable pages. The New Zealand Herald
of 16 June, commenting on a new flood of speculation, said: ‘Very
wisely, people are no longer inclined to jump to the conclusion that
the two thieves of East Europe are about to fall out…. people have
reached the stage where only seeing is believing’. There was no suggestion that the USSR could be an ally useful to Britain; rather, its
vulnerable resources were a danger. ‘The only sort of eastern war
that could possibly help the Allies is a long-drawn-out campaign’,
said the Press on 16 June, ‘and then it is quite obvious, it would
be Russia, not the west, that would be in need of support. A Russia,
master in its own house and immobilising many units of the German
Army, may well be the best Great Britain can hope for in the east.’
On 22 June 1941, when the German lightning was loosed against
Russia, New Zealand was probably less surprised than the Russians,
caught unmobilised, their aircraft destroyed on the ground.
The greater part of the Russian air force was wiped out in the first few days; the Russians
lost thousands of tanks; hundreds of thousands of, perhaps as many as a million, Russian
soldiers were taken prisoner in a series of spectacular encirclements during the first fortnight, and by the second week of July some German generals thought the war as good
as won. Werth, Alexander, Russia at War 1941–1945, p. 137
Moscow
reported Russian withdrawals and heavy German losses. These disasters were, of course, not explicit: Britain and the Commonwealth
for a year had stood almost alone, losing heavily in the air, in the
Atlantic, lately in Cyrenaica, Greece and Crete; any diversion, any
respite, was heaven-sent. With little outside sympathy going to either
Russia or Germany, John Gunther
Gunther, John (1901–70): writer, journalist, war correspondent; b USA; war correspondent London1941; with General Eisenhower’s HQ, to British Eighth Army and invasion
of Sicily1943
could broadcast from New York
that this was probably the most popular war in history.
NZ Herald, 23 Jun 41
New Zealand
papers generally agreed that little could be expected of Russia militarily, and that Germany had attacked because it needed Russian
resources for the decisive battle against Britain. Thereafter they differed in the details considered and in tone, ranging from an almost
benign tolerance in the Evening Post to sharp scolding in the Auckland Star. Treaty-breaking, territory-grabbing Russia, said the Star,
could now complain only that Germany had got its blow in first.
Germany’s large-scale expenditure of men and resources would help
Britain,
but it would be in the highest degree imprudent to pin faith on
Russia, which has a poor record as an ally, and would, if victorious, spread the Communist plague throughout Europe. The
best to be hoped for from the Russian–German conflict is that it
will last long enough to exhaust them both.
The New Zealand Herald said that there could be no sympathy when
thieves fell out and double-dealers came to blows. It was the British
navy’s blockade that had forced Germany to this colossal gamble
which would give Britain well-earned and welcome respite. While
Russia was in no sense Britain’s ally, London and Moscow were
joined in defence against the same aggressor; it was in Britain’s interest
to give the Soviet all possible support and German attempts to confuse the issue by talk of saving the world from Bolshevism should
be rejected.
The Press had little sympathy for the present rulers of Russia
whose short-sighted opportunism had brought this disaster on themselves, but ‘a mad dog is not less dangerous because he bites someone who deserves to be bitten’, and Hitler’s efforts to switch the
war to a crusade against Bolshevism would be resisted. He had
entered this new conflict to make use of his vast inactive army (260
divisions), to wrest from Russia sufficient booty to match the American supplies, in arms and materials, that could ultimately give Britain superiority. Meanwhile Russia’s full engagement in the west
would leave Japan with greater freedom in south-east Asia.
The Otago Daily Times wrote of Russia as a notoriously perfidious
nation, doubting the worth of its enormous but ill-equipped forces;
wrote of Hitler’s idle armies, his need of resources, his need of quick
success if this mid-summer adventure were not to turn, like Napoleon’s, to dismal winter rout. Most observers, the Southland Times
stated, believed that the Russian economy could not stand a war of
endurance, but possibly the Red Army could be supported in a brief
conflict, or could hold out long enough to deprive Hitler of the
quick victory essential to his purpose. It speculated about Hess’s
Hess, Rudolph (1894–): Deputy Leader of the Nazi Party 1933–41; flew Scotland1941,
interned, sentenced life imprisonment for war crimes 1946
journey to Scotland in April 1941 to ‘switch’ the war against Russia
and saw Britain’s reply in the Royal Air Force’s massive raids of the
last 11 days. British people were not likely to regard the Russians
as their allies in a war of liberation, and it was ironic that the
admirable Finns were now ranged with Germany against the nation
that had basely attacked their freedom.
Apart from stock generalities, the Dominion thought the new conflict ‘a very valuable interposition in this most critical year’, and that
the possibilities were not easily calculable. The Evening Post on 23
June, warning that Hitler’s chances against Britain in the next two
years would be immensely improved by Russian supplies, said: ‘that
automatically converts Russia into Britain’s co-operator. Hitler himself has driven Russia and Britain together. Even if they were at
opposite ends of the Socialist–Capitalist scale—which they are not,
since Britain today is classless—these two countries would still find
themselves aiming at the same immediate goal, national freedom,
and therefore compelled to help each other…. The paramount fact
is that Britain and Russia must pull together.’ Hitler’s double
somersault was aimed at the sympathies of anti-Communists in the
British Empire and the United States, but ‘in this stark fight,
anti-Communists and Communists should both forget yesterday
and tomorrow; they should strike today.’
The Post’s editorial was the only one among the main dailies on
that Monday, 23 June to reflect Churchill’s broadcast made on the
night of 22 June. He had opposed Communism for 25 years, and
would take back no word of it now, but he spoke, in his own heavy
but moving way, of homely, hard-working people in 10 000 Russian
villages threatened by the hideous onslaught of the German war
machine, ‘the dull, grim, docile, brutish masses of the Hun soldiery
pouring on like a swarm of crawling locusts’, under a sky full of
German aircraft. He declared:
Any man or State who fights against Nazidom will have our aid.
Any man or State who marches with Hitler is our foe…. It
follows, therefore, that we shall give whatever help we can to
Russia and the Russian people.
Evening Post, 23 Jun 41, p. 7
By 24 June, most New Zealand papers were approving Churchill’s
lead. His ‘prompt and realistic’ statement should clarify the issues,
said the Southland Times; it was probably his most sagacious utterance, said the Dominion. His qualities as statesman and orator were
never more clearly revealed, said the Press, explaining that in view
of Russia’s past attacks on Finland and the Baltic states it was hardly
surprising that some British papers and semi-official statements had
at first assumed that Britain would be detached from the new conflict; but Churchill had grasped the essential reality, that ‘any State
or man who fights against National Socialism is Great Britain’s ally.’
Hitler’s claim that he was the champion of Europe and civilisation
against Bolshevism had served him in the past, but he should not
be allowed to use the trick again. The Evening Post repeated the
warning against anti-communist propaganda, while the New ZealandHerald attacked Bernard Shaw’s rash statement that Britain and
America could sit back and smile while Stalin smashed Germany;
NZ Herald, 24 Jun 41, p. 7
the British could not count on stubborn Russian resistance, could
not relax, but must seize the opportunity to increase their own attacks.
This ‘no slackening’ note was also sounded by the Otago Daily Times,
the Evening Post and the Press. The Otago Daily Times accepted
Churchill’s principle: ‘any man or state that fought against Hitler
was our ally, while those that fought for Hitlerism were our foes.
Expediency in this hour of crisis would sanction no other approach
to the task of ridding mankind of the evil that is rooted in Germany.’
The Auckland Star, however, was not pleased with Churchill.
Recalling that he was reported to have said, ‘To save England, I’d
pact with the Devil’, the Star suggested that either his sense of the
dramatic had for once played him false, or he was contemplating
such a pact. If Mr Churchill wished to evoke sympathy for the
Russian people he should have pointed out that they
are unhappy beyond all other peoples in that they have to suffer
the hideous onslaught of the Nazis after having suffered for a
generation the hideous onslaughts of the Communists. There is,
in fact, little in the way of hardship, deprivation and oppression
that the Nazis could impose on the Russian masses that they—
all except the members of the privileged bureaucracy—have not
already experienced at the hands of their own tyrannical gangsters.
Auckland Star, 24 Jun 41
Britain and Russia were both fighting Nazi Germany, but this was
all that they had in common. It would be exceedingly dangerous
to British unity and to resistance in occupied countries to allow the
false impression that there was anything else. Next day the Star
continued its attack. Churchill had not consulted the Dominions
before making his declaration, nor had Fraser or Menzies
Menzies, Rt Hon Sir Robert, Kt(’63), PC(’57), CH(’51) (1894–1978): member Aust
HoR 1934–66, PM 1939–41, 1949–66, Min External Aff 1960–1
consulted
their Parliaments before endorsing it.
Fraser, in England at the time, said that within two minutes of Churchill’s broadcast he
cabled his government, asking it to endorse this policy, and in a few hours received a
pledge of full support. NZ Herald, 27 Jun 41, p. 8
New Zealand’s Parliament
and people should be fully consulted before any commitment which
could involve their forces, and if there were any question of an
alliance with Soviet Russia New Zealand’s answer should be an
emphatic ‘No’. Russia was now fighting for the preservation of the
Stalin regime, Britain and the Dominions had no obligations to the
Soviet and its shifty policies; there was need for the utmost caution
in Britain’s dealings with the Kremlin.
Auckland Star, 25 Jun 41
With these editorial presentations it is useful to consider the directions that the press had received through the Director of Publicity.
On 16 June, the British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs gave
the Dominion governments confidential information already issued
to the press in Britain. In the event of war between Germany and
Russia, hopes should not be raised of effective Soviet resistance,
though Germany’s long-term difficulties in trying to hold even part
of Russia should be stressed. In no circumstances should Russia be
called an ally, but merely another country attacked by Hitler despite
treaty obligations, with which therefore Britain had a common interest
against the aggressor. Any support for the USSR would be on account
of that common interest, in no way implying ideological affinity.
This advice was sent to editors on 18 June.
WHN, ‘Censorship of the Press’, chap V, p. 1, quoting SSDA to UKHC, 16 Jun 41,
D14
Whatever subtleties and withholdings there were in official counsels in Whitehall and Wellington on the degree of co-operation that
should exist between Britain and Russia—whether they were allies
or merely shared an enemy—these fine distinctions were not grasped
by most New Zealand readers of newspapers. They read, on 25 and
28 June, of Roosevelt pledging all possible aid to Russia and of
British military and economic missions going to Moscow to ‘coordinate the common war effort’.
Evening Post, 25, 28 Jun 41, pp. 7, 9
They read of Hugh Dalton
Dalton, Edward Hugh John Neale, Baron Dalton (’60), Forest and Frith, Co. Paletine
of Durham (1887–1962): barrister, economist, Cabinet Minister, author; MP (Lab)
1924–31, 1935–59; barrister, war service, university posts in economics 1914–31; chmn
National Exec Lab party 1936–7; Min Economic Warfare 1940–2, Pres Bd Trade
1942–5, other ministerial posts to 1950s
saying that the British Labour party opposed communism but ‘today
the Red Army and the Red Air Force are our comrades in arms,
they and we are out on the same errand—to crush the German war
machine….’
Evening Post, 30 Jun 41, p. 7
As noted already, the term ‘ally’ had been used by
the Press and the Otago Daily Times on 24 June; the Press, examining
the inner conflict of the situation, repeated it on 26 June:
Fear and detestation of Communism on social and religious
grounds are deep rooted in the democracies—far more deep rooted
than fear and detestation of Fascism, National Socialism and their
variants.
For example: On the morning of Monday 23 June 1941 in the Railway Department a
fellow-clerk asked the author ‘What do you think of the news?’ Thinking it quite trite
and obvious that having anyone else in the fight on our side was a gain, I said that it
seemed the best for months. He replied ‘It’s terrible! I’d rather go to prison than fight
with them. They’re not Christians.’
For this reason and also because Russia, since the outbreak of war, has been guilty of numerous acts of unprovoked
aggression, the democracies are embarrassed by their new ally….
[They] must remain resolute, cool and realistic. To deny that the
situation… involves them in a conflict of ideas and loyalties
would be foolish. But … this is the dilemma the German
Government sought to create and will exploit ruthlessly. It is
necessary to lay hold of one all-important truth, which is that a
swift German victory over Russia will be a military and economic
disaster to the democracies. By the iron logic of war, Russia is
our ally and must be enabled to hold out.
Two days later the same paper, discussing the political difficulties
inherent in the ‘involuntary alliance’, could see that Russian attacks
on German bases in Finland during the past few days were self-defence of the same order as was the British attack on Syria. Deploring that Britain should be at war with Finland, lately so heroic, the
leader added ‘Russia’s departure in 1939 and 1940 from her previous policy of non-aggression was the result, not of a revival of
Russian imperialism, but of fear of Germany and a desire to improve
her strategic frontiers.’
Press, 28 Jun 41
The idea that although sharing an enemy Britain and Russia were
not allies was officially ended by the Anglo–Soviet agreement of 12
July 1941, for mutual assistance of all kinds in the war and for no
separate peace. Nash, as Acting Prime Minister, welcomed it, saying
that New Zealand had been consulted in the arrangement and that
at this stage any obstacle to making common cause against the
aggressor would be absurd; Hitler had succeeded by isolating his
victims, striking them down singly in a series of victories that would
have been impossible in the face of a collective peace system. Now
other threatened nations might be encouraged to band together with
Russia and the British Commonwealth.
Evening Post, 14 Jul 41, p. 8
The treaty had no immediate relevance for New Zealand, though
a few local Russophiles advocated establishing trade and diplomatic
connections with Russia. It was the logical development of Churchill’s declaration on 22 June. The New Zealand Herald, repeating his
‘any man or State who fights against Nazism [sic] will have our
aid’, said that the treaty put on Britain no more obligation than
was already freely assumed without asking any return by Churchill,
and was overwhelmingly endorsed by the Empire. Opposition to
Communism was no barrier to helping Russia against the common
enemy. As a precedent, in 1914 most people repudiated the principles of Tsarist autocracy and loathed the system by which it was
maintained, yet Britain and Russia fought as allies. Now, with an
equally great difference in beliefs, they had combined in something
less than a formal alliance against Hitler’s Germany; to have done
anything else would have cleared the way for Nazi world
domination.
NZ Herald, 15 Jul 41
The Press explained that the pact had little practical significance
for distance and lack of surpluses made material assistance impractical; at present there could be only diplomatic and technical collaboration. Its real importance was that ‘finally and unequivocally, it
proclaims Britain and Russia to be allies, thereby removing the excuse
for fruitless and dangerous controversy over the propriety of aiding
a country which is nominally Communistic in political and economic
structure.’ The real obstacle to closer relations was not political creeds
but Russia’s aggression against Poland: if Russia would recognise
the right of Poland to self-determination, the front against Hitlerism
would acquire a unity it did not then possess.
Press, 15 Jul 41
The Evening Post
was much warmer. The pact was an event to be heavily underlined,
‘an object lesson on a tremendous scale of how two opposed “ideologies” act when confronted with the common danger of extinction.’
Self-preservation was imperative, with qualities of immediacy above
all other laws: ‘different peoples with different ideas now fight the
same fight for freedom.’
Evening Post, 14 Jul 41
The critical Auckland Star, pointing to the treaty’s limited scope,
was thankful for the absence of pretence and high-sounding preamble about long-standing friendship, fundamental identity of purpose,
and joining hands to build a better world. It added, that until three
weeks ago the Soviet was far more friendly with Germany than with
Britain. The Star suggested raising volunteer forces, to fight in Russia,
from those in Britain and the Dominions who had long professed
keenness to help the Soviet; some in New Zealand had told military
service appeal boards that they would take up arms only for such
a purpose. The government might well consider helping them on
their way. ‘As a gesture it would not be without value and the
financial commitment would be small. It might turn out to be nil,
for local Communist bellicosity is usually most impressive on paper.’
Auckland Star, 14 Jul 41
New Zealanders also read news from overseas. The cable news in
the Auckland Star on 21 July included a Sydney item in which
Federal Attorney-General W. M. Hughes, a strong anti-Communist,
gave ‘stinging rebuke to people who would sooner be beaten by
Hitler than saved by Russia’. Mr Hughes said:
A small section mainly composed of ‘the nicest people’ view the
pact between Russia and Britain with grave concern. They see in
Russia the menacing shape of Communism, and, gathering their
robes about them, hasten to pass by on the other side. In their
eyes it is better that Nazi-ism should win the war than that the
Soviet armies should help to save us…. God save us from such
narrow-minded, futile and treacherous counsels. I welcome an alliance with this great Power. I hail it with unbounded satisfaction.
After Greece and Crete, Germany, as all the world knows, was
preparing to attack Suez, the gateway to India, Australia and the
Far East. The battle for Suez was to be the signal for an assault
on Singapore by the other partner in the Axis. Then Germany
swung her mighty war machine against Russia. We must make
a supreme effort to take the utmost advantage of this Heaven-sent opportunity to strike at Germany…. If we let this chance
slip, we may not get another.
Ibid., 21 Jul 41, p. 8
At the end of July a treaty was signed which attempted to unite
the USSR and the Polish government-in-exile against Germany. It
did not define borders but the USSR recognised that the territorial
changes of 1939 had lost validity, while the Poles repudiated any
agreement with a third power directed against Russia. The two
governments established diplomatic relations and agreed to aid each
other in the war. New Zealand papers approved, some even seeing
post-war value in it, but the Auckland Star reminded that pacts had
become as cheap as tram tickets.
Auckland Star, 2 Aug 41
Only New Zealand’s Russophiles had even brief hopes that the
Red Army would hurl back the invaders. The majority, though dismayed, were scarcely surprised by the swiftness of the German
advance, smashing to the Baltic, to Leningrad, across the Ukraine,
and towards Moscow. Reports asserted that these gains were won
against very heavy German losses, and made much of Russia’s
‘scorched earth’ policy. Meanwhile the nightly bombings of Britain
had eased, while reverses in Libya early in June heightened thankfulness that Russia was draining off pressure. Russia, absorbing the
enemy, causing heavy losses and denying resources, obviously at
enormous cost, became admirable. Moreover, it was rightly realised
that Hitler wanted Russian supplies, notably of grain and oil, to
achieve the conquest of Britain; Russia’s survival became vital. Stories
and pictures of Russians burning the harvest, slaughtering cattle and
horses, destroying industrial plants and blowing up their much-valued great dam on the Dnieper, roused grateful respect, even in
those who normally regarded Russia with suspicion and hostility.
‘If the Russian armies are destroyed in the present campaign—
an outcome which is not wildly improbable … the Axis and its
partners will be supreme from the coast of France to Behring Strait’,
said the Press gloomily on 2 July, adding: ‘Only the Russian armies,
and behind those armies the dogged patriotism of the Russian people
stand between Hitler and conquests on a scale which would make
the conquests of Caesar and Jenghis Khan and Napoleon seem relatively insignificant.’ ‘Today it is the Russians who say of the Germans: “They shall not pass”’, wrote the Evening Post on 11 July.
‘No opinions about Russia’s yesterday, and no dread of Russia’s
tomorrow, need prevent the sincere wishes of freedom-lovers going
forth to the Russia of today, standing like a giant dam against the
surging might of the German flood.’ Faith rather than calculation
inspired hope that somehow Russian suppleness would defeat the
German thrusts and that Russia would fill the military role vacated
by France.
Smolensk, Kiev, Odessa: their battles lasted long enough for their
names to become familiar. After six weeks of war, the Press stated
that from the fog of claims and counter-claims one undisputed fact
emerged: on every important sector of their front Russian armies
were counter-attacking. Also, Hitler’s propaganda offensive, his anti-communist crusade, had failed. In Whitehall and in the United
States some reactionaries and isolationists had tried to separate their
interests from Russia’s, and some Catholics had threatened the alliance with the wrath of God, but these were ‘only the sputters of a
damp squib’.
Press, 4 Aug 41
Its news-versifier, Whim-Wham (Allan Curnow),
Curnow, Thomas Allan Munro (1911–): poet, university lecturer, playwright, literary
journalist
wrote:
The Blitz hangs fire, the Armoured Cars and TanksThat should have spedTo Moscow halt before a Traffic Sign,The Sign that said:“Road closed. No Fascist Vermin past this Line!”The Light shows Red.
Press, 9 Aug 41, p. 8
Towards the end of August, when Russian forces retreated across
the Dnieper, leaving, it was claimed, most of the Ukraine ‘a desert’,
The Times was quoted as saying that Russia was now bearing the
main weight of the war, making voluntary sacrifices for the common
cause of a type almost unknown in history. The scorched earth policy
meant desolation over tens of thousands of square miles, homelessness and misery for hundreds of thousands of souls, inconceivable
immolation of stored wealth and the fruits of painfully won progress.
‘Though our own lot has been hard, we have not yet been called
on to make such sacrifices. It must be our aim to repay them by
every means in our power.’ Russia’s resistance was more tenacious
than anything achieved in land warfare during the past two years.
‘Her cause is our own. She can count on the undivided sympathy
of the whole British people in the dark and dangerous period through
which she is passing. This sympathy must be expressed in deeds,
not words. We must afford her support in every field in which she
stands in need.’
Quoted by Evening Post, 23 Aug 41, p. 9
When, early in September, the Germans struck at Leningrad,
threatening to turn it into rubble, the New Zealand Herald threw
away all reserve in praising the start of that remarkable siege:
Paris, a city not as populous as Leningrad, shrank back from the
ordeal and opened its gates … the former Slav capital of Russia
is not shrinking at becoming Golgotha…. Once again the world
is enrapt at Russian resolution, Russian determination, Russian
doggedness. First they throw in that altar to industry … the
Dnieper dam. Now they stake their ‘city of light’, all the social
and cultural advances so painfully made, and the shrine and home
of Lenin’s revolution—Leningrad.
NZ Herald, 5 Sep 41
A little later, on 22 September, the Herald recalled that at the
beginning of the war it was widely thought that if Stalin could hold
out for three months he would have conferred inestimable benefit
on the Allied cause. Now,
although buffeted and bruised the Red armies have not been broken…. Their dogged spirit has earned the gratitude and admiration of the whole world…. But admiration and gratitude are
not enough. In Britain and America, public opinion demands that
the Red Armies be given more material support…. Apart from
any higher motives, simple self-interest dictates ‘all aid to the
Soviet’.
Here the Herald, like many British newspapers and speakers, especially from August onwards, mingled its salutation to Russian
doggedness with pleas for assistance to maintain it. From the start,
Stalin and Maisky,
Maisky, Ivan Michaelovich (1884–1975): diplomatic service London1925–7, Tokyo1927–9, Finland 1929–32; Amb Britain 1932–43; Asst Commissar Foreign Aff
1943–6
the ambassador in London, had urged Britain
to open a second front.
Nicolson, p. 188: ‘I go to see Maisky at the Soviet Embassy…. He is worried at our
inability to help. We have sent thirty-six aeroplanes and pilots. What is that? In July
Stalin wrote to Churchill asking for a diversion in France. In September he wrote again
saying that if we did not draw off some of the German divisions, Russia would be in
a bad way. He begged us to give him 25 to 30 divisions either at Murmansk or in
Caucasus. We had refused. We were now reconsidering our refusal.’
The Auckland Star, its tone cooler than the Herald’s but without
the hostility of two months before, counselled against such importunings. Hitler’s progress in three months was impressive; without
deprecating Russia’s resistance to date or discounting the probability
that it would continue, all British people must wonder where the
Nazis would be in another three months, for the Russian campaign
was but a means towards destruction of the British Empire. It was
natural to ask why Britain did not do more to help Russia in this
extremity and in London there were public demands that the government should act to lighten the pressure on Russia. This advocacy
overlooked the enormous demand for weapons from Britain’s own
forces, nor was there shipping enough for a landing in Europe. Britain’s fight, to be effective, must be in North Africa. The recapture
of Cyrenaica and the occupation of Tripoli would be far from Russia
but would have far-reaching consequences.
Auckland Star, 20 Sep 41
Norway, Dunkirk, Greece: these could not be risked again. But
air raids were intensified; a Royal Air Force wing, with a few New
Zealanders in it, went to Russia
Press, 17 Sep 41, p. 7; NZ Herald, 12 Nov 41, p. 9; Dominion, 26 Nov 41, p. 5 (photo)
and British munitions, plus some
from America, were sent both through the Persian Gulf and Iran
and in convoys beset by ice and the Norway-based enemy to Archangel and Murmansk. There were public assurances, such as September’s ‘tank week’ when all tanks made went to Russia, that all
possible aid was being given but, as the Press said on 3 October:
‘the obvious facts of the situation are against any optimistic view of
the extent to which Russia can be helped with vital war supplies in
the near future.’ The initial difficulty was in transport; as well,
American production was only beginning, and Britain needed all its
own tanks.
It was hardly a substitute that, late in July, the ‘V for Victory’
campaign had been launched to quicken fighting hearts in enemy
countries, to check collaboration and to worry garrison troops. ‘V’s
were scrawled on walls and the morse signal, … –, splendidly presented in Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, was tapped and whistled. Said
Churchill on 19 July: ‘The V sign is a symbol of the unconquerable
will of the occupied territories and a portent of the fate awaiting
Nazi tyranny. As long as the people of Europe continue to refuse
all collaboration with the invader it is certain that his cause will
perish and that Europe will be liberated.’
Press, 21 Jul 41, p. 6
Goebbels promptly
adopted the ‘V’ as a sign of belief in German victory.
Ibid., 22 Jul 41, p. 7
In New
Zealand it was just another slogan, appearing on cars, on official
desks, in advertisements and offices, and Truth complained of
‘Beethovenish fatuity while Russia staggers’.
Truth, 23 Jul 41, p. 1
As German forces struck deeper, British opinion grew restless over
Russia’s bearing the brunt alone. This was particularly sharp among
working-class voices. There was agitation against some members of
the British government suspected of being so clouded by anti-Russian prejudice that they could not bring themselves to help Russia
enough to keep her in the fight as a serviceable ally, men such as
Lieutenant-Colonel Moore-Brabazon,
Moore-Brabazon, John Theodore Cuthbert, 1st Baron Brabazon of Tara (’42), of Sandwich, PC, GBE, MC (1884–1964): pioneer motorist & aviator, with innumerable positions in these fields; Min Transport 1940–1, Aircraft Production 1941–2
Minister of Aircraft Production, who had hoped that the German and Russian armies would
exterminate each other.
Press, 4 Sep 41, p. 5, reporting the UKDaily Herald
In general, New Zealand papers, while noting this uneasiness,
Ibid., 26 Aug 41, p. 7; Evening Post, 20 Sep 41, p. 8; NZ Herald, 13 Oct 41, p. 8;
Truth, 24 Sep, 8 Nov 41, pp. 2, 31
saw the importance of Russia as a fighting ally, but accepted the
restraints of distance; a second front was impossible.
Evening Post, 19 Aug, 10 Oct 41; Press, 12 Sep, 14, 28 Oct 41; NZ Herald,
25 Oct 41; Otago Daily Times, 8 Nov 41
The likelihood
of Russian reverses setting Japan off on further adventures was not
forgotten.
Auckland Star, 27 Sep 41; Standard, 27 Nov 41, p. 1
The New Zealand correspondent of September’s Round
Table said that expectation that a major Russian defeat would send
Japan grabbing for spoils had caused New Zealand to draw closer
to America.
It is generally recognised that the fate of peace in the Pacific area
may be decided by the battles raging for Leningrad, Moscow and
the Ukraine. Indeed, with the local press filled with news from
the Nazi–Soviet war and also with news of the ‘Far Eastern’ situation, it is significant that the vast majority of readers seem primarily interested in the war news from the Russian front.
Consciously or unconsciously New Zealanders seem to have a good
grasp of the factors which may ultimately govern the issue of
peace or war in the Pacific area, and the maximum aid to Russia
is strongly supported by nearly all sections of the community.
Round Table, vol 32, p. 190
Apart from newspapers, what reaction was there to Russia’s entry?
The executives of several trade union bodies passed resolutions of
support for Russia, while pledging full co-operation with their own
government. The Wellington Trades and Labour Council also called
on the workers of Germany and Italy to make common cause with
workers in all other countries for the overthrow of the German and
Italian dictators.
Evening Post, 26 Jun 41, p. 10
Longburn freezing workers, solemnly endorsing
the utterances of Winston Churchill, sought all possible help for
Russia, whose defeat would bring dire consequences to the working
people of the whole world.
Ibid., 27 Jun 41, p. 8
A few unions, such as the Canterbury
Clothing Workers’, whose president, John Roberts, was an ardent
non-communist supporter of aid to Russia, sent fraternal greetings
to their Russian counterparts and received replies.
Standard, 9 Oct 41, p. 6
The Canterbury
Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants proposed diplomatic and
trade relations, and declared solidarity with Russian workers.
Press, 30 Jul 41, p. 6
Wellington university students in an annual meeting carried with acclaim
an expression of solidarity with the Soviet Union in its titanic struggle, and sent a telegram of salutation to heroic Leningrad and its
student defenders. Leningrad University expressed deepest gratitude
for this solidarity and confidence in victory.
Evening Post, 5 Jul 41, p. 8; Press, 10 Sep 41, p. 6
The Communist party, of course, found the whole situation transformed. Overnight, the imperialist war became a holy war. ‘This is
the decisive moment in world history,’ declared the national secretariat on 23 June. Since defeat of Russia would mean the triumph
of capitalist barbarism, while Russian success would mean a new era
of socialism, speedy Russian victory was now the primary aim.
Despite confidence in the USSR’s mighty forces and the solidarity
of workers everywhere, including Germany, there must be no complacency or inactivity. Communists should no longer oppose military
measures for the defeat of Germany; they should also demand a full
military alliance with the Soviet; they should maintain a resolute
and vigilant struggle against the pro-Nazis and capitulators of the
imperialist camp, who might still try to switch the war, and they
should demand an end to prosecutions, the release of political prisoners and return of the People’s Voice.
See p. 62
New Zealand Communists now turned from what the Standard
of 24 June had dubbed their ‘senseless activities’, and called for
unstinted effort on all sides, for production committees throughout
industry to improve efficiency,
In Print, 12 Nov 41, 15 Apr 42
and for collaboration between the
party and the New Zealand Labour movement. Production committees increased, not solely in response to comradely pressure,
achieving useful low-key improvement, but did not become a salient
feature of industry; collaboration proposals were firmly rebuffed.
A joint declaration by the national executives of the Labour party
and the Federation of Labour in October
Standard, 23 Oct 41, p. 1, and leaflet, nd
called for redoubled efforts
in field, factory and workshop as the only way to give maximum
assistance to Russia in its magnificent fight against Hitlerism.
We unhesitatingly extend the same measure of assistance to the
people of Soviet Russia as to the other nations that have been
attacked by Hitler….
We are convinced that the most effective way to help Russia is
by assisting to the maximum the New Zealand Government’s
war effort…. The whole resources of the British Commonwealth
are pooled to defeat Nazism.
Assistance to Russia or to any other country can only be achieved
by co-ordinated effort on the part of the fighting forces plus the
efforts of the workers in field, factory and workshop….
We endorse the statement made to the British Trade Union representative by M. Maisky, Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom, and also the message from the Moscow Women’s Conference
that the best way to help Soviet Russia is to work harder and
produce more in every sphere of economic activity.
The only way to assist Soviet Russia is to help to build up and
fully equip our New Zealand forces, to increase the production
of goods and services in New Zealand; and to do everything in
our power to bring the country’s war effort up to the highest
possible level.
New Zealanders could help Soviet Russia, Great Britain, the other
Dominions and themselves by working harder at their everyday jobs,
to produce more food, more wool, coal and timber, ‘more of all
kinds of useful commodities’, and make more use of ships by turning them round more quickly.
All this was directing pro-Russian fervour into existing channels,
making help to Russia part of broadly increased effort, not a new
and special target. Official Labour went on to stress that its approval
of Russia’s fighting valour did not extend to local Communists.
Suggestions for common action with the New Zealand Communist
party had been carefully considered but rejected. For two years the
British Commonwealth had borne the brunt of a titanic struggle,
all sections working together with the sole exception of the Communist party. In September 1939 that party had declared resistance
to Hitlerism; a little later, without consulting the rank and file, it
had declared the war ‘imperialist’, thereafter using every means to
obstruct and weaken the war effort, unmoved by the sufferings of
the British people. When Russia was attacked, this policy was
reversed, again without consulting the rank and file. The Communist
party had thus shown ‘its irresponsible and unstable character’, while,
unlike the Labour movement, its policy was not determined by democratic methods or with reference to the needs and purposes of the
people of New Zealand. The Labour movement concluded that no
useful purpose could be served by collaboration or association in any
way with the Communist party or its subsidiary organisations.
The statement has been quoted fully because it explains clearly
the distinction held right through New Zealand between goodwill
towards fighting Russia and distaste both for the Stalin regime and
for local Communists in their new-found zeal for the war, distaste
expressed with equal force by a trade union leader such as Arthur
Cook,
Cook, Hon Arthur, MLC: Gen Sec NZ Workers Union 18 years to retirement 1942;
elected by FoL to be its rep at Trade Union Congress in UK1943, presumed lost when
ship taking him there was torpedoed off the Azores
and a Presbyterian such as the Rev Gladstone Hughes.
Standard, 12 Feb 42, p. 12; Auckland Star, 3 Jul 41, p. 9
Although the Trades Council of Auckland, followed by those of
Gisborne and New Plymouth, disapproved of the Labour statement,
In Print, 26 Nov, 3, 17 Dec 41, pp. 1, 5, 2
the statement was confirmed strongly by the Federation of
Labour’s conference in April 1942 where Angus McLagan said to
local Communists ‘Get into the war effort and show us that you
are sincere, and after you have shown us we might take up a different
attitude towards you.’
Standard, 16 Apr 42, p. 2
Despite these snubs, the New Zealand Communist party did its
best to associate itself with Labour at large in the war effort. In
November 1941 it advocated a united Labour movement, full support of the Anglo–Russian alliance, and the uniting of Pacific peoples
against aggression; real intensification of New Zealand’s war effort,
with an end to inefficiency and waste in production, plus fullest
democratic rights for the people, democracy within the armed forces
and maintenance of the best possible living standards for workers
and farmers.
In Print, 12 Nov 41
In May 1942, an enlarged session of the National
Committee again resolved to stiffen the war effort by strengthening
the labour movement. The working class should establish fraternal
relations with other working people, particularly the farmers, wholehearted support going to their demands for higher guaranteed prices,
along with increasing effort to win the support of trade unionists.
Success for Labour in the coming election was a prominent aim, to
provide the most favourable conditions for the growth of a wide
people’s movement, for working class unity and political understanding, and acceleration of a total war effort.
Otago Daily Times, 13 May 42, p. 2
Enthusiasm for Russia’s resistance caused a number of non-Communists to join the new Society for Closer Relations with Russia.
At its inaugural meeting on 22 July 1941 in Wellington, chaired
by W. E. Barnard, the Speaker of the House and president of the
New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, representatives of
cultural groups and business and professional people were addressed
by H. Atmore,
Atmore, Hon Harry (1870–1946): MP (Lib, Indep) Nelson 1911–14, 1922–; Min Educ
1923–31
Independent member for Nelson, who had taken
a leading part in its formation. A provisional executive was set up,
comprising, besides Atmore and Barnard, Mrs C. Stewart,
Stewart, Mrs Catherine Campbell Sword: b Scotland1881, to NZ 1921; MP (Lab)
Wgtn West 1938–43
Mrs
J. H. Stables,
Stables, Mrs Margaret May, JP (1873–1957): b Ireland, to NZ 1874; lifelong social
worker, Save-the-Children Fund of London since 1921, kitchen named after her in Saratov (USSR) for work done; member London Council, Pres Fund, Wgtn; Dom chmn
CORSO; 1st woman in NZ to sit on bench in court 1948
Rev P. Paris, Rev W. S. Rollings
Rollings, Rev William Swift (d 1944aet 73): b Aust, to NZ 1913; Pres Baptist Union
1922–3
and C. G. Scrimgeour.
Scrimgeour, Colin Graham (1903–): Methodist Min from 1923; began broadcasting
1930, Director 1ZB 1934–6, Controller Commercial Broadcasting 1936–44; TV, radio
administrator Aust, China, 1945–59; ret NZ 1968, TV consultant from 1969
It was to organise other branches into a country-wide body,
publicising various aspects of Russian affairs, improving morale and
widening support for the Anglo–Russian alliance through the promotion of cultural, diplomatic and economic relations. A letter to
Nash as Acting Prime Minister suggested diplomatic relations and
trade with Russia, and the offer of any surplus goods not needed
by Britain or the Commonwealth.
Dominion, 23 Jul 41, p. 8
That sympathetic interest in Russia now extended far beyond the
usual dedicated supporters was made clear by the Society’s reception.
Early in August 1941, with Smolensk and Kiev still holding out,
Wellington’s Town Hall was filled for its first public meeting. The
Red Flag was unfurled, the Internationale was played on the grand
organ, after the National Anthem, and the meeting sent its greetings
and admiration to the people of Russia in their magnificent struggle.
A Professor of Education, W. H. Gould, spoke of the need to offset Hitler’s anti-Bolshevik crusade, Percy Paris denied that Russians
were godless, claiming rather that they were deeply and incurably
religious and were now saying to the so-called religious nations. ‘You
show me your faith and I will show you my works’. Scrimgeour
said that Russia was Britain’s greatest ally, without whom thousands
more New Zealanders might already have been killed or captured.
Atmore criticised criticism based on ignorance, and suggested that
in the work of the Society, as in other social fields, New Zealand
might lead the world.
Evening Post, 7 Aug 41, p. 11
At Christchurch on 20 August the Civic Theatre was so crammed
that an overflow meeting was arranged in the adjacent Council
Chambers. The Mayor presided over speeches from Atmore, John
Roberts, the local union leader who had visited Russia in 1939, and
Winston Rhodes,
Rhodes, Harold Winston (1905–): b Aust; lecturer then Prof English CUC 1933–70;
Nat Pres NZ–USSR Soc
a leftist university lecturer. Greetings and admiration were sent to Russia, and the New Zealand government was
asked to initiate diplomatic and trade relations.
Evening Post, 21 Aug 41, p. 11
On 8 September
in Dunedin the new gospel was received by an enthusiastic meeting
of about 2000.
Ibid., 9 Sep 41, p. 6
New Zealand was not, however, swept off its feet. At Auckland,
an Aid to Russia Committee which sprang up at the end of June
was denied access to halls. At the same time the Rationalist Society,
which for years had held Sunday evening lectures and discussions
in the Strand Theatre, was turned from this meeting place on City
Council instructions.
Auckland Star, 11, 12 Jul 41, pp. 3, 6; Evening Post, 30 Jul 41, p. 11; In Print,
17 Sep 41
The decision of the Mayor and town clerk in
refusing the Town Hall to the Aid to Russia Committee was
dubiously upheld in a Council meeting, the Mayor using his casting
vote after a councillor who had spoken for granting it had left early.
Truth, 20 Aug 41, p. 23
The protests of the groups concerned were reinforced by the New
Zealand Freedom Association. Its president, R. M. Algie, said that
he found himself identified with people whose views he regularly
opposed, but his Association fought consistently for free speech, not
only for itself but for anyone prepared to exercise it within the law,
as an inalienable British right.
Auckland Star, 1 Aug 41, p. 2
The Auckland Star, though far from
Russophile, also reproved: ‘It would appear that the hall was refused
because half the council disapproved of what they believed the
speakers intended to say. That can scarcely be defended.’
Ibid., 12 Aug 41
On Sunday 24 August, in the Domain, some 3000–4000 people heard Aid
to Russia speakers from Labour organisations and the Communist
party, plus John A. Lee, speaking in front of the Red Flag, flanked
by the Union Jack and the New Zealand Ensign.
Evening Post, 25 Aug 41, p. 7
Meanwhile it
was decided that the Aid to Russia Committee would again apply
for the Town Hall, under the auspices of the more acceptable national
Society for Closer Relations with Russia.
Auckland Star, 21 Aug 41, p. 8
On 4 September, while
fighting flared at Leningrad, 3000 Aucklanders met in the Town
Hall. They heard Professor W. A. Sewell
Sewell, Professor William Arthur (1903–72): b UK; senior lecturer Cape Town Univ
1926–32, Prof English Auck 1934–46; chairs of English in Greece, Turkey, Lebanon
1946ff; 1st Prof English Waikato Univ 1965–9
read Maisky’s thanks for
the message from Wellington’s meeting, then point out that while
Churchill welcomed Russia as an ally, there were those to whom
victory for Bolshevism was worse than victory for Nazism, those
who hoped that Germany and Russia would destroy each other, and
others who grudgingly accepted Russia’s aid. He himself believed
that while Russia lacked democratic traditions, it had organisations
and human qualities making for a future with a creative ideal, and
he hoped that New Zealand and Russia, despite imperfections on
both sides, could help each other towards a better social order. Atmore
explained Russia’s course since 1917; Dr Alexander Hodge, a prominent Baptist, and Rev Percy Paris explained that there was much
religion in Russia: Roy Stanley,
Stanley, Roy (d 1964aet 65): former Sec Auck & NZ Carpenters Unions
unionist and Communist, explained
that the purges of 1937 had got rid of the Fifth Column in Russia
and urged that the truth about Russia should be spread, that there
should be closer trade and diplomatic relations and a definite western
front. Contributions for expenses totalled £111.
Auckland Star, 5 Sep 41, p. 2
Branches of the Society for Closer Relations with Russia were
established in many centres, large and small, including places such
as Karapiro, Waihi, Seacliff, Gisborne and Te Aroha,
In Print, 5, 12 Nov 41; Otago Daily Times, 10 Nov 41, p. 10
and some
sustained their activity. After the first enthusiasm, meetings were
much smaller; they were not rallies, but routine lectures and discussions on various aspects of Russian life.
eg, Press, 4 Mar 42, p. 7
By March 1942, in
Hastings and its district there were 60 members; on 19 February,
30 people, despite heavy rain, came to a lecture and discussions on
the constitution of the USSR, and on 2 March ‘a fair number’ heard
the headmaster of Havelock North school speak on education in
Russia, while the chairman of the Town Board presided.
In Print, 18 Mar 42
The Society
also produced pamphlets: for instance, How the Soviet People Live
and Work by Margaret Jordan, a Lancashire mill girl who had spent
eight years in Russia during the Thirties. This pamphlet, its 16 pages
introduced by ‘Uncle Scrim’, was the third ‘and most informative’
up to mid-October 1941.
Ibid., 15 Oct 41
Although the Society for Closer Relations with Russia included
a number of respected citizens, besides its more notorious intellectuals and unionists, it was eyed askance by the establishment. For
instance, the Wellington City Council turned down a request by the
Thorndon branch to show a Russian film at a theatre on the evening
of Sunday 12 October 1941. Councillor W. Appleton
Appleton, Sir William, Kt(’50) (1889–1958): accountant and company director; Wgtn
Hospital Board 1923–9, Harbour Board 1938–50 (& chmn), City Council 1931–44;
Mayor of Wellington 1944–50
thought that
the Russian film (which none of the Council had seen) was being
used for propaganda. The Society could have the hall for lecture
purposes, but propaganda was another matter. Though Russia was
Britain’s friend today, they had to look further ahead: he was also
against the showing of pictures on Sunday. Councillor R. A. Wright
Wright, Hon Robert Alexander (d 1947aet 84): printer & publisher; MP (Nat) Wgtn
1908–11, Wgtn Suburbs 1914–38, Min Education 1926–8; Wgtn City Council from
1913; Mayor of Wellington1921–5
agreed with him.
What is this society? Who are these people? Russia today is our
ally and we are in sympathy with the fight Russia is making, but
there is an element in the community that seems to be using the
fact that Russia is our ally for other purposes altogether, and they
have to be watched very closely…. Let them run the picture in
the ordinary way and if it is a good picture people will go to see
it. We want to be extremely cautious in what we are doing. We
know nothing about the picture and nothing about the people
who are running the organisation.
Here the signatories to the letter were named, and Councillor Wright
conceded that one, a well known Justice of the Peace, seemed to be
all right. Councillor J. D. Sievwright
Sievwright, James Dickson, JP (d 1947aet 85): b Scotland, to NZ 1870; former journalist; Wgtn City Council from 1941
objected to pictures on Sunday but said, ‘I am in favour of Russia. Russia has turned over;
Russia is capitalistic. They are paying the working man in Russia
today according to the quality of his work.’ Councillor R. H. Nimmo’s suggestion of a preview was not taken up, and in the end it
was decided that a ‘March of Time’ film could be shown. The voting
was 7:7, and the Mayor gave his casting vote for showing it.
Evening Post, 7 Oct 41, p. 8
It
would take the American invasion to bring New Zealand to any
general acceptance of films on Sunday.
The trade unionist Aid to Russia Committee which aroused the
free speech issue at Auckland had counterparts in Wellington and
a few other places, but John Roberts of Canterbury, who proposed
such committees in about 16 districts, was disappointed by the
response, save among the miners of the West Coast.
Standard, 16 Apr 42, p. 2
In November
1941 the Federation of Labour appealed for money to provide an
ambulance in Russia, but contributions were modest: by the end of
March 1942 they totalled only £277 2s.
Ibid., 2 Apr 42, p. 11
The Catholic Church’s hostility to the new alliance matched Communist party enthusiasm. Catholic pages had held many attacks on
the villainy and duplicity of godless Russia and the fatuity or worse
of those insufficiently aware thereof, such as the British government.
eg, Zealandia, 12 Dec 40, p. 1, 9 Jan, 20 Feb, 24 Apr, 1 May 41, pp. 4, 4, 4, 1; NZ
Tablet, 28 May, 18 Jun 41, pp. 9, 3–4 & 11
Zealandia, on 3 July 1941, could not allow the ugly facts
of past years to be forgotten in Churchill’s flights of rhetoric. The
Church agreed with all forms of government and all civil institutions
‘provided that they safeguard the rights of God and the Christian
conscience’, but Russia for 24 years had sought to root out religion
of every kind and all emotions and traditions in which human hearts
had hitherto and everywhere found inspiration; ‘the immense driving
energy of the State is used to kill the soul of freedom and make
man an animal and a slave.’ The late Holy Father Pius XI had
stressed in 1936 that ‘The first peril, the greatest and the most
general, is certainly Communism in all its forms.’ Russian people
were in fact more to be pitied than damned, because they had endured
a terrorism beside which the infamies of Ivan the Terrible paled into
insignificance.
If then our political spokesmen have it in mind so to aid Russia
in its combat as to place this tyranny firmer in the saddle, then
we deserve and shall receive the censure of future generations. To
aid Soviet Russia even against our common foe is to invite the
curse of God upon ourselves.
To those who say that Germany’s victory over Russia would
mean our defeat, we would reply that it is better to go down in
honour because of our allegiance to God than to stand victorious
in the world after selling ourselves to the devil.
Zealandia, 3 Jul 41, p. 4
A further article said: ‘the lies, perfidy and persecution of the Nazis
should in no wise blind us to the greater crimes of Bolshevist Russia.
… What virtue is to be denied Hitler and bestowed on the bloodthirsty Georgian bandit who loved the Russian peasantry so intensely
as to put to death over 800 000 of them and starve by deliberate
famine another 3 000 000? How can any wise leader forget these
things? How shall we? Why should we?’
Ibid.
Other pages in the same issue described the wretched lives of
Russian women, denied the consolations of religion, the security of
permanent marriage, the joy of caring for their own children, ‘forced
to pass their lives in the monotonous grind of a factory where the
constant beat, beat, beat of machinery can spell madness to those
temperamentally unsuited for it.’ Abortions were common and children were often abandoned to the cold charity of the State, or to the
streets, where for crimes such as robbery 12-year-olds met the same
punishments, even death, as hardened criminals.
Ibid., p. 6
On 10 July and
again on 21 August, Zealandia exposed the ‘loyalty’ of Communists
in Britain and New Zealand, which was not to their own country
but to the Comintern: those who for two years had opposed and
jeopardised the war effort now cried aloud for aid to Russia.
There was strong Catholic disapproval of the Society for Closer
Relations with Russia, whose respectable members increased the
danger of its propaganda. Behind this sudden cultural enthusiasm,
Zealandia perceived the building of a wider communist front, using
four sorts of people: Communists, small in number, but in key
control; fellow-travellers, usually middle-class intellectuals such as
professors, clergymen, politicians and in general people susceptible
to public acclaim, who followed directions unquestioningly; ‘stooges’,
whose names had publicity value, used as decoys and to tone down
extremists; innocents providing, for various misinformed reasons, the
mass of support and on whom the other three classes exerted a
proselytising influence.
Ibid., 28 Aug 41, p. 4
The New Zealand Tablet was equally critical. On 30 July it
allowed that stark realism might demand that the Russian people
be afforded all reasonable aid in their fight. That, however, did not
make it necessary for politicians or press to whitewash the unspeakable tyranny which had dominated Russia for 24 years, or to ignore
the openly professed aims of the godless system that sought to extend
its sway over the whole earth. As for the newly formed Society for
Closer Relations with Russia, there was nothing in cultural, diplomatic or economic fields to be learned from Russia. ‘Do we need
further instruction in the art of State-slavery by studying the Red
brand of trade unionism, social security or new education?’ What
need was there to know about a system which had an OGPU station
in every factory, more political prisoners than in the rest of the world
put together, rigid censorship, purges and mass arrests as part of
daily life? What had New Zealand to learn from a country which
boasted that it was moving from agrarianism to industrialism? ‘One
of the most glaring weaknesses of Labour Party politicians in this
country is that they are industrially-minded. They look to Russia
for inspiration when they should be looking to Portugal and Eire.’
The Tablet recalled a warning it had given in December 1938: so
long as Russia was dominated by a poisonous social system, just so
long would the counter-poisons of totalitarianism continue to penetrate further into the world. It concluded:
Today what we need is not a blind acceptance of the stupid idea
that all is well with Russia and that her Government is one with
which we can and should ally ourselves, but that while being
thankful that Hitler’s preoccupation with Russia is giving us a
much needed breathing space, we should work and pray for the
liberation of the Russian people from the physical degeneration
and moral putrefaction which the Red regime had imposed upon
them.
NZ Tablet, 30 Jul 41, p. 5
On 6 August the Tablet claimed that British Catholic sources were
speaking in the same vein, though the phrases quoted were much
milder, and on 27 August 1941, in an article called ‘The Other
Foe’, assailed the wave of sentimental propaganda deceiving hundreds
of ordinary people whose lack of judgment resulted from their so-called education. The Nazi attack on Russia, while advantageous
militarily, had almost unnoticed created a serious new danger to
New Zealand: people were being hoodwinked as to the ultimate
aims of atheistic Russian communism, which included the overthrow, through accredited agents waiting for the right moment, of
the government of the country, replacing it with a government submissive in all things to Moscow. No Catholic could view without
uneasiness the facilities being given to such advance guards of Moscow as the Society for Closer Relations with Russia.
Ibid., 27 Aug 41, p. 5
The Rev D. N. H. Gascoigne,
Gascoigne, Dr Noel Hamlyn (1910–80): Roman Catholic educ specialist; ordained 1935,
Dir Catholic Educ (NZ) 1939; Port Chaplain Wgtn from 1939; on scholarship to Catholic Univ Washington USA 1950; curate Palmerston North1952–4; Seatoun Presbytery
Wgtn 1954–68
a leading figure in Roman Catholic education, drew firm distinction between military aid to Russia,
which was proper, and any acceptance of Russian materialism.
Materialism, denial of the supernatural, was the supreme evil; in its
womb was conceived Nazism and Communism and no man could
say what other fantastic ‘isms’ it would produce; the mere crushing
of one form of it would not help mankind out of the present clogging morass, and it must have no place at the peace tables. Materialism had seeped into education and its infiltration into the minds of
sincere men who would claim to be Christians had been clearly
shown during the last few weeks, in the spectacle of men in responsible positions advocating closer relations with the country which
more than any other had exiled God and Christianity. Lest it might
sound unpatriotic to speak anything against Russia, he firmly linked
himself with the unchallengeable Churchill who would unsay no
word of 25 years’ opposition to Communism. It was right, however,
at the present moment, to expend all energies in crushing the monster, Nazism.
Evening Post, 22 Aug 41, p. 7
In reply, W. E. Barnard, supported by several others whose letters
were not printed, wrote that without Russian aid the war would
probably not be won, and the general gratitude which the mass of
New Zealand people was showing towards the Russian people was
well deserved. ‘It has nothing to do with materialism; it has much
to do with the saving of the lives of thousands of New Zealand
boys, and of our country and nation as a whole’; victory, which
probably could not be won without the might of Russia, would
incidentally save the Catholic Church. This was not a time for criticism, but rather for words of good cheer, which British, if not New
Zealand, leaders did not hesitate to give. ‘In common with other
members of the Society for Closer Relations with Russia, I take off
my hat to the Russian people as they fight for their country—and
for ours.’
Ibid., 26 Aug 41, p. 6
Though there was no public government comment on this Catholic criticism, the Director of Publicity on 8 July warned Zealandia
that phrases such as ‘bloodthirsty Georgian bandit’ must not be
applied to Stalin; and on 4 September he also warned the editor of
the New Zealand Tablet.
C & P 3/5, vol 3, pp. 2–3
Several Labour bodies wrote to the
government in protest,
Ibid.
while the West Coast Trades Council drew
the attention of the Federation of Labour to ‘these seditious and
subversive press statements’, and called on the government to apply
the laws relating to such offences evenly or else repeal such laws
altogether, pointing out that other men were serving lengthy prison
sentences for saying or printing a great deal less.
Grey River Argus, 20 Aug 41
These admonitions by no means silenced official Catholic hostility,
but though articles highly critical of Russia continued to appear,
their tone was quieter, and there appeared a few statements from
overseas leaders who did not feel that they compromised their Church
by accepting the alliance. Thus Zealandia on 18 September gave
the views of the Rev Dr John C. Heenan,
Heenan, His Eminence Cardinal John Carmel (1905–75): Archbishop Westminster from
1963
broadcasting to the
United States: it was absurd to talk of Christian civilisation as though
its fruits could be enjoyed only by practising Christians; already the
Allies were pledged to help China, which was not a Christian country. The moral code of Christianity was of universal application; all
should work out their own salvation, and as some devils were exorcised by suffering, so it was possible that the sufferings of war would
restore to Russia the Christian inheritance once its proud possession.
Two months later, the Archbishop of Liverpool
Downey, Richard (1881–1953): b Ireland; vice-rector Liverpool Catholic Seminary;
Archbishop Liverpool from 1928
declared that while
opposition to Communism must be rigidly uncompromising, Britain
and Russia were fighting to end the terrorism darkening the globe;
Russia was its latest victim, and were Nazism to triumph all knew
the fate that would befall Christian churches and schools.
Zealandia, 20 Nov 41, p. 1
However, there was still strong criticism of Russia and Communism, much of it drawn from overseas publications. For instance,
the Tablet on 22 April 1942 quoted Britain’s Catholic Times as
accepting the Russian alliance as a political and unpalatable fact and
aid to Russia as a military necessity, but regretting the hypocrisy of
whitewashing ‘one of the greatest aggressors and bloodiest dictatorships in the world.’ Again, on 13 May 1942, extracts from the
LondonCatholic Herald warned admirers of Bolshevism that they
were building a huge concentration camp in which they and their
children would be imprisoned, in the service of despotism and the
machine. ‘We must be opposed to Bolshevism as it is, because Bolshevism as it is is the crown of the post-Reformation errors, as is
also Nazism…. Of course, we pay tribute to the courage of the
Russian people and… acknowledge the truth that the Bolshevik
ideal is more soundly based than some of us had supposed.’
NZ Tablet, 13 May 42, p. 17
New Zealand’s government was fairly circumspect in praise of the
Russian resistance. On 6 August 1941, Atmore asked Nash, as Acting Prime Minister, to consider sending from the people of New
Zealand a message of good will and hearty congratulations to the
people of Russia on the magnificently promising fight that they were
making. Such a message would be a ‘timely gesture of recognition’
of the tremendous value of Russia’s sacrifice of lives and resources
in its co-operation in the battle for freedom, co-operation which
must save the lives of young men of New Zealand, Britain and the
Allies generally, and which was saving Britain from heavier bombing. Nash replied that the government associated itself with the
Prime Minister and people of Great Britain in appreciating the magnificent fight being made by the Russian armies and would, on an
appropriate occasion, send a suitable message.
NZPD, vol 259, p. 737
Later in the same session J. A. Lee asked the Prime Minister
‘Whether he considers the time is now appropriate for the House
to express to the people of the U.S.S.R. its high appreciation of the
valiant struggle which the people of Soviet Russia are making against
Fascism.’ Lee added that the House of Commons recently had cheered
a reference by Churchill to the Russian resistance. Fraser answered
that it was proposed to ask the House by appropriate resolution to
express appreciation of the part played by all the Allies, including
Russia, ‘the people of which are so heroically facing such tremendous
odds.’
Ibid., vol 260, p. 1251. The date of this exchange is not obvious, as it is recorded,
undated, in ‘Addendum’. It must have been after 13 September 1941 when Fraser
returned from abroad. The session closed on 17 October and Parliament was prorogued
on 29 October.
The sending of such a message is not indexed in the ParliamentaryDebates, but on 9 July 1942 Sullivan reminded the House that, on
the motion of the Prime Minister, a resolution had been adopted
and forwarded to the proper quarter, expressing the appreciation of
New Zealand at the magnificent achievements and heroism of the
Russian people in the mighty struggle for world freedom.
Ibid., vol 261, p. 526
As the weeks and months passed, besides day-by-day news from
the Russian front and comment thereon, newspapers were sprinkled
with information about Russia, some of local origin, some from
overseas. In general, Russia’s fighting spirit was highly praised, there
was guarded approval of some aspects of its regime and re-appraisal
of some past misdeeds. Notably, the 1939 pact with Germany, previously so villainous, was now seen as a device to gain much-needed
time and as the result of British suspicions and go-slow policy in
negotiating a defence agreement; seizures in Poland and the Baltic
states were justifiable defence moves.
Auckland Star, 23 Jul, 14 Aug 41, pp. 8, 11
Churchmen, led by Dr Lang,
the Archbishop of Canterbury, found a new spirit of religious toleration in hitherto godless Russia, and elements of effective Christianity in Communism.
Dominion, 8 Oct 41, p. 8
Joseph Davies,
Davies, Joseph Edward (1876–1958): US diplomat; Amb Russia 1936–8, Belgium &
Min Luxembourg 1938–9; special envoy of Roosevelt with rank of ambassador to confer
with Marshal Stalin May–June 1943, and of Truman to confer with Churchill June
1945; special adviser to President and Sec State, with rank of ambassador, at Potsdam
Conference 1945
former American Ambassador in Russia, as quoted in an American periodical, declared that
the purges and treason trials of 1937–8, which had horrified the
world, had in fact removed potential quislings, the present absence
of betrayals proving Stalin’s amazing foresight.
Press, 1 Nov 41, p. 9
Articles on Russia’s
young fighting generals began to appear from overseas sources.
eg, ibid., 22 Jul 41, p. 6
Notable among the enthusiastic reports and widely published were
several by Ralph Ingersoll,
Ingersoll, Ralph McArthur (1900–): journalist and press mngr; Vice-Pres, Gen Mngr
Time Inc1935–8; overseas service 1943–5 on staffs Field Marshal Montgomery, Gen
Bradley
editor of the New YorkPM, who had
recently visited Russia.
NZ Herald, Evening Post, Otago Daily Times, 3–11 Nov 41, passim
These described such features as the defence
of Moscow; Soviet strategy (giving ground in order to preserve its
army and to keep on inflicting casualties); the scorched earth policy;
transportation of industry away from war zones; the need for supplies
from the Western Allies; Russian morale and discipline (for example,
no roads clogged with refugees); some Russian virtues (notably racial
tolerance) and Russian limitations, such as ignorance about the rest
of the world. The reliability or otherwise of Russian communiques
was assessed, and there was an hour-long interview with ‘straightforward’ Stalin. Russia’s deep-rooted distrust of Britain and America
was examined, with the conclusion that the Soviet government
believed that those countries wanted to defeat Hitler, but only after
the Soviet had been destroyed. There were statements which many
were glad to hear: ‘There will be a Russian army intact in the field
and under present management a year from today.’
NZ Herald, 5 Nov 41, p. 9; Evening Post, 4 Nov 41, p. 6
Or, ‘Russia
has long since given up the idea of revolutionising the world over
night. There is universal scorn in Russia for the recent activities of
the American and British Communist parties which, the Russians
feel, made asses of themselves for years.’
Evening Post, 8 Nov 41, p. 6; NZ Herald, 11 Nov 41, p. 9
Another Ingersoll article
explained that Russian society was by no means classless, but privilege was based on ability, with engineers as the new aristocrats, and
that the revolution had set free scores of millions for the hundreds
of thousands whose opportunities were curtailed.
NZ Herald, 29 Nov 41, p. 15
Repeatedly it
was stated that the past was past, it was the present and the future
that mattered. The resistance of the Russian armies and people was
itself a justification: if their system was as objectionable as had been
believed, would they fight so hard for it?
This argument persisted. For instance, R. M. Macfarlane, Labour member for Christchurch South, said in March 1944: ‘we must realise that the Russians have something
to fight for. There must be something in the material improvement of society in Russia
to cause the Russians to wage such a magnificent fight.’ NZPD, vol 264, p. 327
There were also hopes
that Russia, purged by suffering and benignly influenced by wartime
contact with the democracies, might emerge from the conflict liberalised and mellowed.
Dominion, 29 Nov 41, p. 10
The worth of Russia’s fight was confirmed by statements such as
that of New Zealand’s new air chief, Commodore R. V. Goddard,
early in December that, with the German air force busy in Russia,
British factories could speed up production unhampered, so that
Britain’s air force at least equalled and probably exceeded that of
Germany considerably earlier than could have been expected but for
the fighting in Russia.
Evening Post, 3 Dec 41, p. 11
Perhaps the seal of respectability was a
cable to Maisky in London that the Dominion Council of the RSA
‘records its profound admiration for the magnificent resistance of our
Russian ally to the onslaught of the common enemy, and confidently
looks forward with all our Allies to a crowning victory.’
NZ Herald, 1 Nov 41, p. 10
Despite all the talk of German losses, the Russian retreat was
obvious, and New Zealanders drew what comfort they could from
remembering Napoleon. When on 21 July 1941 the Germans
claimed Smolensk, about 200 miles west of Moscow, the Press said
that it must be assumed that the fall of Moscow was on the cards,
adding that Moscow had no strategic value, it was only a city in
the middle of a great plain; if Russian morale and transport and
administration could survive the loss of the capital, ‘the story of
1812 will be repeated in its essentials’. In fact, the lines east of
Smolensk held, and during August the main German drive was
towards Leningrad, and across the Crimea and Ukraine. Between
20–2 September, New Zealanders read that Kiev was ‘occupied’ or
‘evacuated’ with no immediate mention of several hundred thousand
Russians encircled there.
Werth, p. 203, says that the Germans claimed 665 000 prisoners, while Russian statistics reduce them to 175 000; ‘One cannot help suspecting that the truth must lie
somewhere half way between the Russian and German figures.’
Early in October the drive on Moscow
was resumed. Minhinnick showed punter Hitler proffering a swastika-decked shirt to bookmaker Mars: ‘“Moscow Push” for der
Vin—und I poot der shirt on it’, with ‘Russian winter’ already
darkening one corner of the cartoon.
NZ Herald, 8 Oct 41, p. 8
News of attack and counterattack swayed on through November, while in the south Kharkov
was taken late in October and Rostov on 19 November.
On 27 November the New Zealand Herald summarised the moves
on Moscow: at the start the German commander von Bock
Bock, Field Marshal Fedor von (1880–1945): commanded German Army Group Centre
June–December 1941, April–July 1942 after replacement, then dismissed
had
covered 400 miles in a few weeks, then was held for more than two
months by Marshal Timoshenko
Timoshenko, Marshal Semyon Konstantinovich (1895–1970): Russian army officer;
C-in-C Western (Central) Front July–November 1941; in charge operations South-western
& Southern fronts 1941–2, Northern 1943, 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian 1944
around Smolensk in one continuous and bloody battle. On 2 October, Bock drove afresh, gaining
another 150 miles, then bogging down still 60 to 100 miles short
of Moscow; now he was trying again, but with lessening returns.
‘The miracle in all this has been the maintenance of Russian morale.
Surely few armies could have endured so much and still be capable
of resistance, and—more than resistance—of fighting back.’ Now
that the Russian winter had arrived there might be a comparative
pause while reinforcements and supplies were building up, aided by
aircraft and tanks and motor vehicles from Britain and America.
Three days later, mounting American–Japanese tension was shouldered from the headlines with news that Rostov, ‘gateway to the
Caucasus’, was recaptured. Russia had not waited for the spring,
German armies were falling back through the Ukraine, withdrawing
from Moscow. From 8 December when war burst into the Pacific
with a succession of disasters, the Russian counter-attack, coupled
with the British drive across North Africa to reach Benghazi on
Christmas Eve, gave comforting balance. On 22 December the Press,
while pointing out that in comparison to the huge area overrun by
the invasion the territorial gains of the Russians were insignificant,
stated that the retreat of German armies along the whole front was
‘the most important recent development in the war situation’, relieving vital areas and restoring unity to the Russian armies. The German High Command, said the Press, had in its over-belated assault
on Moscow made its first real blunder in the war.
By the end of January 1942, only the Russian news gave comfort.
Rommel had struck back, retaking Benghazi on 28 January, and
New Zealanders had to balance Russia’s gains against Japan’s. The
former lost nothing in presentation, so much so that there was criticism of Russia for not tackling Japan as well. The New ZealandHerald said on 9 December that since Britain, at the Soviet’s request,
had declared war on Finland, Hungary and Romania, it would be
strange indeed if Russia did not repay the obligation. When
Litvinoff
Litvinoff, Maxim Maximovitch (1876–1951): Russian diplomat; Foreign Office Russia
from 1918; Foreign Min 1930–9; Ambassador USA, Min Cuba 1941–3; Deputy Commissar Foreign Affairs 1943–6
thereafter declared that Russia would concentrate on Germany, the Auckland Star on 18 December thought that being fully
engaged with Germany, the fundamental Russian enemy, was probably the decisive reason for Russia’s inactivity in the Pacific, though
air and submarine support would be particularly helpful at this time.
The Press noted disappointment in Britain and the United States.
Russia alone could strike at Japan itself, and with Russian help the
democracies could probably bring Japan to its knees in months. But
the decision was not unexpected: Russian losses had been appalling,
and Britain’s unwillingness to open a second front in Europe must
affect Russia’s reaction to suggestions that Japan should be compelled to fight in Siberia.
Press, 15 Dec 41
The Evening Post thought that Russia
might have good military reasons for avoiding a further war and
must be the judge of her own ability to fight on two fronts: any
New Zealanders who wished for a Russian diversion to save themselves from possible Japanese bombs should remember the bomb-stricken lives of Russians within Hitler’s reach. But a few days later,
as Japan’s attack widened, the Post reflected hopefully on Japanese
vulnerability, and the chance of further surprises.
Evening Post, 15, 19 Dec 41
The Otago DailyTimes considered the Soviet’s refusal of new commitments, because
of traditional suspicion of the West and recent preoccupation with
Germany, to be shortsighted in the strategic sense. It thought that
in time Russia would be persuaded to recognise this; meanwhile it
should be remembered that so far Russia was fighting not in a
disinterested cause, but in its own defence.
Otago Daily Times, 13 Dec 41
Previously, only workers and leftists had looked to Russia as a
model. Now Churchill, warning against disunity after Singapore,
pointed to Russia which in dire straits had kept its unity, kept its
leaders and struck back. He was echoed by the Evening Post—‘In
the one country, Russia, where he found no quislings or defeatists,
Hitler has been beaten back.’
Evening Post, 16 Feb 42
An article likened Stalin’s order to
attack, when the Germans were battering at the gates of Moscow,
to Foch at the Marne;
Ibid., p. 4. Foch, commander-in-chief of the Allied Forces in France, in 1918 at the
Marne in a precarious position, ordered advance. A corps commander protested that his
men were tired out. Foch replied, ‘So are the Germans. Attack!’
Fraser said that the Russians’ tenacious and
indomitable fight was a stimulus to all.
Over-confidence in the strength of Russia probably reached its
extreme expression in the Evening Post on 28 February: ‘The only
war front on which the Allies can look with any satisfaction is also
the only front whose results could liquidate Hitlerism within the
limits of the present year… on the Russian front the European
war could be won outright between now and December.’ The Auckland on 5 March was more realistic. Soviet forces had shown
a ‘recuperative ability and a fighting spirit which compel a wondering admiration’, but though they had had the initiative for many
weeks Kharkov, Kursk, Smolensk and Novgorod were still in enemy
hands, Leningrad was still besieged. The Press a month later summed
up the winter’s achievements: the Russians had kept the Germans
fully extended, and had made deep salients in the front, which meant
that the Germans also held forward strong points. The magnification
in the public mind of Russian gains, and the widespread impression
that the Germans were on the run, were in part wishful thinking,
but some news reports, notably by the BBC had been over-emphatic,
including recent talk of imaginary pincer movements and cities about
to fall. In plain fact, while the Russians had greatly improved their
December positions, every advance had been costly and at no stage
had German withdrawal hinted at a rout. The Russian inability to
take Rzhev, Orel, Kharkov and Taganrog, all of whose impending
fall had been constantly suggested for the last two months, showed
clearly that they had not enough men or material to attempt more
than slow attrition.
Press, 7 Apr 42
April 1942 passed with reports of hard fighting for at best small
gains, the Germans still holding the key positions, Smolensk, Kharkov and most of the Crimea, springboards for the offensive that was
already rumbling. Early in May, as the expected thrust began, the
New Zealand Herald sang its last panegyric over the winter campaign: the phrase ‘Russia’s glory’ was not Churchillian extravagance
but a title justly conferred and honourably earned, that would never
wither or grow old. From 22 June till December, the raw Red Army
had withstood the assault of the mightiest military machine and
given ground, given hundreds of miles, but kept cohesion, kept its
lines unbroken. The first electric sign of its swift recuperation was
on 28 November when Timoshenko’s columns recaptured Rostov,
lost a week earlier. There, German troops for the first time since
1918 were forced into disorderly retreat; and on 7 December, in the
approaches to Moscow, they gave up the vast battle begun two
months earlier. The push continued, slowly; the German line was
twisted and in places bitten into for as much as 150 miles. The
Germans had been repulsed on the grand scale, with losses that
would contribute much to their final undoing. ‘Let that proud Russian record be remembered in the great trial of strength now impending. It is an assurance and a guarantee. It is Russia’s glory.’
NZ Herald, 13 May 42
Now in the black summer of 1942, the Russians were forced
back from the Kharkov approaches, from the Kerch peninsula, from
the Don bend; gallant Sevastopol fell at the end of June, Rostov
on 28 July, opening the way to the Caucasus, and the Germans
pressed on to Stalingrad. Rommel drove the 8th Army back into
Egypt, British losses there and in Singapore precluding the second
front urgently requested by Russia. In the Pacific there was no good
news until the Coral Sea and Midway battles of May and June.
Amid these disasters, on 12 June the signing of a 20-year Anglo–
Russian Alliance was announced, renewing pledges against a separate
peace, promising co-operation after the war, and claiming ‘full
understanding’ on the urgent task of creating a second front in Europe
in 1942.
The Evening Post on 12 June 1942 remarked that 19 out of 20 readers would assume
that this meant large-scale landings in Europe within the year, but it could also mean
1000-bomber raids or a series of commando attacks
Leading papers welcomed the treaty mainly as a sign of
improvement in Allied relations with Russia, which they noted had
been cooler in recent months with complaints of idle armies on one
hand, and of secretiveness on the other. If Russian impatience for a
second front had eased, clamour in Britain and New Zealand for
hasty Anglo–American intervention was unnecessary. Post-war cooperation, though an admirable intention, was far away and beset
with difficulties. What mattered were the short-term aspects of the
treaty: good understanding between fighting allies.
Press, 13 Jun 42; NZ Herald, 13 Jun 42; Auckland Star, 12 Jun 42; Otago Daily Times,
13 Jun 42
On 22 June, with the Russian war a year old, the New ZealandHerald wrote:
The United Nations salute Russia today with admiration and
gratitude for the magnificent fight the Soviet has made against
the main Axis forces for 12 months past. It is not too much to
say that the dour defence of the Red Armies last summer and
autumn, and their counter-offensive sustained all through the
rigours of winter on the steppes, saved the Allied cause.
Recalling the outlines of the war, the Herald praised Timoshenko
and the triumph of Russian morale, and continued:
M. Stalin personifies that morale. He is the Joffre or Haig
French and British commanders-in-chief, France, 1915–16
of
this war, imperturbable, unshaken by retreat and seeming disaster,
a man of cool brain and iron nerve…. All the world owes the
Russian soldiers and workers a great debt…. Somehow that debt
must be paid and it must be paid now…. The Allies… have
undertaken to open a second front in Europe this year. The hope
and prayer is that they will be able to move in time and in
sufficient force.
The other main dailies did not produce such salutations on this
anniversary, but in Auckland, Wellington and Dunedin the Society
for Closer Relations with Russia held well supported and well
reported public rallies, those on the platforms including Labour
members, representatives of churches and of unions, and Communist
party members.
The need for a second front before Russia was crushed out of the
battle continued, as the summer campaign mounted, to be anxiously
considered by papers, such as the Evening Star on 24 June: ‘Can we
do more to help the Russians? Dare we let them struggle much
longer without affording the untold relief… {of} a second front in
Europe?’ Always there was awareness that the second front must be
sound, there could be no more Norways or Dunkirks, but too much
delay could be fatal. ‘The possibility that the Soviet forces, so stubbornly enduring, will yet wear the Germans down, remains, but
there is now less ground for hoping for it’, wrote the Auckland Star
on 15 July. The desirability of a second front had never been doubted,
the Allies were committed to it. ‘It is a question of when and where.
The need for it now is extreme. Will the United Nations make the
attempt? They have to weigh its cost, under present conditions, against
the cost of the indefinitely long war which would probably be the
consequence of a German victory over Russia.’ Ten days later the
Star stated that the situation in Russia had deteriorated ‘in a shocking degree’, and again on 27 and 31 July urged strongly that unless
Russia were soon relieved the war must last much longer. Meanwhile
the Press, discussing various attitudes towards a second front, quoted
an apposite and deadly Chinese newspaper comment: ‘There’s plenty
of noise on the staircase but nobody comes down’, and warned that
if events did not soon dispel the present bewilderment of the Allied
peoples, they would face a major crisis in morale.
Press, 16 Jul 42
The New Zealand
Herald on 23 July said that there was too much talk about limitless
Russian manpower and resources. German advances were depriving
Russia of food, of industry, and were threatening oil. ‘The Allies
may not be fully ready, they may have to risk paying a high price,
but some substantial attempt should be made to divert a considerable part of the deadly Axis concentration at present directed against
Russia…. They must throw everything they can muster into the
balance to prevent it tipping further.’ A week later, the Herald
described ‘Russia at Bay’ with a warmth that a year earlier could
have come only from a communist pen. It recalled the response to
Stalin’s broadcast of 3 July 1941,
In this speech Stalin told of large territories lost under Germany’s surprise attack, claiming that Germany had paid heavily for them and promising that this invader, like
Napoleon and Kaiser Wilhelm, would be defeated. He stressed that this was a life and
death national struggle, a war for the fatherland, against enslavement, to which everything must be subordinated; all effort must be put forth and everything of use removed
or destroyed in the path of the enemy. It gave the bewildered Russian people a great
sense of direction and purpose.
which response confounded the
expectations of those who thought that the terrible rigours of the
Soviet experiment, the miseries attendant on collectivisation, the
ruthless purges of the Red Army and the Communist party, would
cause the regime to dissolve under invasion. The Russians had rallied
to their leader; the upsurge of national spirit, inspired by the passionate belief of a new generation in their revolutionary experiment,
had been proof against terrible losses and retreats, even those caused
by the blunders of Russian generals. Traditionally, the humble folk
of Russia had always fought invaders with almost religious fervour.
Now ruler and people appeared identified. In spite of their past
hatred of collectivisation the peasants gave no help to Hitler, though
they left most of the earth-scorching to the Army. The Red Army
had fought a dogged retreat—its men were the best rear-guard fighters in the world—and in their extremity they expected help from
the West. There would be heavy hearts in the Red Army if the
difficulties of a second front in 1942 proved insuperable. Keeping
Hitler from the Caucasus would keep him from the Persian Gulf
and prevent the Middle East, bridgeway between two continents,
from falling to the enemy of civilisation.
NZ Herald, 1 Aug 42
The experimental Dieppe raid of 19 August 1942, though its
failure was minimised at the time, lessened the calls for a second
front. The Germans drove on. Headlines on 12 August said that
Maikop oilfield was a blazing inferno; Baku was threatened, Stalingrad was expected to fall. In Stalingrad, explained the New ZealandHerald on 28 August, political, moral and industrial forces were
combined in a symbol which the indomitable spirit of Russia was
fighting passionately to uphold. A fortnight later the Herald, looking
forward eagerly to the respite of winter, said that it was now too
late for a major offensive against Moscow or against Baku, while
Rommel in the desert had probably been short of reinforcements
because of heavy demands by von Bock; ‘For all this, the Allies have
to thank the dour defenders of Stalingrad.’
Ibid., 11 Sep 42
Stalingrad news became
the first that very many New Zealanders looked at when they opened
their newspapers. Fighting in the streets was reported about 21 September, with comment from New York that one of the war’s great
climaxes was ending, that Stalingrad’s fall would be as important
and as dismal a milestone as the fall of France.
Ibid., 21 Sep 42, p. 3
But a month later,
headlines were proclaiming, ‘Stalingrad Still Stands’. The closer the
Germans approached the city, the tougher became the resistance of
the Russian army and workers, wrote the Auckland Star: their spirit
and their sacrifice in this war’s ‘Verdun’ had so far enabled the city
to stand, despite the German’s overwhelming superiority in aircraft
and tanks that should have enabled them to drive into the city by
sheer weight of equipment. In the greatest battle of the war to date
the Russians had confounded German expectations of a decisive victory; Russia’s heavy losses, however, would mean that ‘the brunt of
the fighting must in future be borne by Britain and the United
States’.
Auckland Star, 21 Oct 42
Apart from cable news and comment, which was plentiful and
which stressed that Russians were inspired by deep rooted patriotism, much older than Communism, overseas articles appeared on
various aspects of Russian life, such as one from a Daily Herald
correspondent that included a sympathetic portrayal of Red Army
commissars. Puzzled Englishmen, amid tales of Russian heroism,
were asking if these stories were mere propaganda, or, if true, were
Russians ordinary people, or mechanical supermen or slaves, careless
of death because of an anthill discipline that regulated every reaction? The answer given was that, despite a few bad patches as in all
armies, the general level of courage was amazingly high. Russians
were the most human of human beings, full of vitality and candour
and loving a joke, but like Oliver Cromwell’s Ironsides, they knew
what they fought for and loved what they knew. ‘And if they don’t
it is the fault of the Army Political Department and there is likely
to be a devil of a row about it.’ Army commissars in all ranks, part
chaplains, part welfare officers, part pep-talk men, who went over
the top with the rest, could inspire waverers to become heroes, not
insensible to danger but in Plato’s sense of knowing when and when
not to be afraid. This was in curious contrast to the haphazard system
of pep-boosting in the British Army but was by no means alien to
British long-term tradition and character.
Ibid., 29 Oct 42, p. 4
Other articles, such as one from the The Times quoted by the
Press on 23 December 1942, said also that Red Army soldiers fought
with greater spirit because they knew of the great material progress
their country had made in the last 15 years. Such references are
merely indicative of the mass of information and misinformation on
Russia passed about in print and conversation, making it easy for
many willing New Zealanders to think that a valuable ally in a
tight place was less black than formerly painted.
In this climate, it was not surprising that in 1942Russia’s national
day, 7 November, was saluted in various ways. There were editorials
in many newspapers, Russian flags were flown on public buildings
along with the New Zealand Ensign, and some even appeared on
business premises.
Press, 9 Nov 42, p. 6; Otago Daily Times, 9 Nov 42, p. 2
Auckland’s Mayor presided over a meeting of
2000 called by the Society for Closer Relations with Russia, with
speakers from all the political parties.
Auckland Star, 9 Nov 42, p. 4
In Wellington, at a governmental morning tea attended by consuls, legislators, civic and
military leaders, the Prime Minister expressed New Zealand’s high
appreciation of the tremendous sacrifices and fighting spirit of the
USSR, with special mention of grim determination and desperate
valour shown at Stalingrad. He added that from his own knowledge
of Churchill and Roosevelt he was certain of their strong determination to strike in support of Russia. He announced that £25,000
from New Zealand’s patriotic funds was going to Russia for medical
assistance.
Evening Post, 7 Nov 42, p. 8
From 23 October Alamein and Rommel’s retreat, plus United
States troops landing in North Africa on 9 November, captured the
headlines, but a few weeks later came the astounding news that the
Russians had again turned from defence to attack, both north-west
and south-west of Stalingrad, and that the Germans were retreating
‘helter-skelter’. On 26 November newspapers told that the Red Army
was within sight of the greatest victory of the war: Stalingrad had
been relieved after three months’ siege, and Russian pincers, more
than 100 miles west of the city, were closing in on about 300 000
Germans. On 1 December, Minhinnick showed the exchange of
happy news: a beaming Stalin held a telegram, ‘Pommelled Rommel. Winston’, while a beaming Churchill held another, ‘Socked
Bock. Joe’.
NZ Herald, 1 Dec 42
By Christmas, the Russians were attacking from north of Moscow
to the Caucasus, the Eighth Army was again in Benghazi, the Japanese were effectively crushed in Guadalcanal, and in New Zealand
fire-watching was ended. A buoyant, confident spirit was abroad in
the crowds, commented the New Zealand Herald on 26 December,
in marked contrast to the atmosphere of last Christmas. Newspapers,
in end-of-the-year summaries and forecasts, gave their highest tributes to Russia. Thus the Press on 31 December 1942:
… it is safe to say that public opinion has been cheered and
inspired by nothing else as it has been by the long, resourceful,
obdurate resistance at Stalingrad… and by the series of counter-offensives which now threaten [the enemy]… with immense
losses and, perhaps, irreparable defeat…. The time for the United
Nations to strike home has come.
As Russian advances continued early in 1943, editors and others
began to look afresh at the problems inherent in post-war collaboration with Russia. At a large meeting called by the Society for
Closer Relations with Russia in Christchurch, W. E. Barnard said,
‘It is not enough to treat the Soviet Union as a good, brave and
faithful ally in time of war, to be dropped in peace. It must become
a permanent friend of the British Empire.’
Press, 14 Jan 43, p. 4
But, as the New Zealand
Herald explained on 5 February, despite the 20-year treaty and
assurances by statesmen that in the post-war world collaboration
with Russia would be essential, there were in the British Empire
and the United States people who feared the consequences of Russian
victory in Europe, and there were Russians who feared that some
interests among the Allies hoped for a permanent weakening of both
Germany and Russia. Misunderstandings with Russia were not new,
but Germany could be held in check only by military alliance: failure to achieve this in 1939 had led to the attack on Poland. Good
relations depended on an understanding, free from bias, of Russian
problems and achievements. ‘An eventual Russian invasion of Germany may have certain undesirable consequences’, but both Britain
and Russia were mainly concerned to prevent any future attack by
Germany on the peace of the world. There would, however, be
difficulties over Poland, the Baltic states and Soviet influence in the
Balkans, which would require the Allies to consult fully with Russia
and Russia to abandon suspicion of the West.
This from the Herald, which had been the most warmly pro-Russian daily paper for eighteen months, indicated that the old-established cracks were waiting to re-open. The 25th anniversary of
the Red Army’s foundation (23 February 1943) was marked on
Sunday 21 February by mayor-presided meetings of the Society for
Closer Relations with Russia and by a broadcast from the Prime
Minister. This blended the now familiar tributes to dauntless Russians with references to Britain as the rock fortress after Dunkirk,
and to New Zealanders in Greece, Crete, Libya and Tripoli, concluding with phrases on post-war friendship and a peace settlement
worthy of all who fought for it.
Dominion, 22 Feb 43, p. 4
In March–May 1943 hard fighting in Tunisia competed with the
Russian theatre where, as in the spring of 1942, the Russian drive
waned before heightened German pressure. Kharkov, lately repossessed, was lost again by 16 March and there was renewed protest
from Moscow on the absence of a second front. The Russians, said
the New Zealand Herald on 12 March, argued not unreasonably
that, ‘the latest German counter stroke could not have been made
if the Allies had been actively engaging the enemy in the west.’ A
few days later, this paper also remarked that the demand within the
British Empire for a second front varied with the fortunes of war
on the steppes: Russia’s difficulties had to be patent and present to
produce sympathetic reaction; ‘only when the danger is clearly marked
on military maps does the demand for a second front go up.’
NZ Herald, 16 Mar 43
The
Auckland Star also, having pointed out that Axis forces were vastly
larger in Russia than in Africa, said that the latest developments
again emphasised the great need to relieve Russia by diverting part
of those forces.
Auckland Star, 12 Mar 43
On the other hand, optimistic if vague hopes that the war might
be over before very long awakened old anxieties about Poland. It
was said not infrequently that things would be very bad after the
war unless real understanding with Russia were reached under the
binding pressure of a common enemy; and there were warnings
against the Allies being diverted into quarrelling while Hitler was
undefeated. America’s Vice-President was reported on 9 March 1943
as saying that a third world war appeared to be inevitable unless
the Western democracies and Russia reached a satisfactory understanding before the present conflict ended. The Evening Post, commenting on this, urged that there should be no diversion from the
war itself: everywhere the friends of Nazism hoped for the breakup of the Anglo–American–Russian confederacy: Russia’s accusation
that the Western Allies did not do enough to take off the weight
of German attack, and their retort that the Russian press did not
sufficiently acknowledge Allied material help, stood ready-made for
manipulation by Axis mischief-makers.
Evening Post, 10 Mar 43
The Evening Star also
deplored premature American concern over attitudes that Russia
might take at the peace tables, plus fears that Britain might concede
the Baltic states and Bessarabia to Russia. The Evening Star held
that if Russia insisted on control of these territories neither Britain
nor America could prevent it, so that the question was, in essence,
academic. ‘The Allies have enough troubles to go on with without
making new ones now…. There has been too much mutual distrust
in the past.’
Evening Star, 22 Mar 43
Russian–Polish distrust, from various causes, was simmering early
in 1943, but it was brought to an overflow boil in April by Goebbels’s revelation of mass graves in the Katyn forest near Smolensk
allegedly of thousands of Polish officers taken prisoner by the Russians in September 1939. They had been retained in camps when
the ordinary Polish soldiers were freed, and had since disappeared.
Russia refused proposals to have these graves, in German-held territory, investigated by the Red Cross, and relations between Russia
and the Polish government in London were broken off. Pro-Russians
and others could see Goebbels trying to split the Allies, while Moscow, dismissing the charges as fabrication by the hangmen of Berlin,
at no time gave fully satisfactory explanations.
Werth, pp. 584–8, 598–604. In June 1945 New Zealand papers quoted a Stockholm
paper, which claimed Schellenberg, a lieutenant of Himmler, as its source, saying that
the Katyn graves were a Nazi fake: bodies from German concentration camps were
dressed in Polish uniforms and taken there. Auckland Star, 28 Jun 45, p. 5. However
the findings of a German investigation in April 1943, that the bodies were indeed those
of Polish officers, were generally accepted. Michel, Henri, The Second World War, p. 482.
Thus the Evening Post on 26 April 1980 (p. 8) reported that two solemn requiem masses
in Wellington on 27 April would mark the 40th Anniversary of the Katyn Forest
massacre of 14 500 Polish prisoners-of-war by Soviet forces.
New Zealand newspapers looked at both sides but were mainly
concerned that the breach should be closed; dissension must not
weaken the Allied war effort, or complicate post-war problems. The
New Zealand Herald said that the source of the allegations was
tainted and the breach must at all costs be healed; the process would
call for wisdom all round, plus moderation from the Poles and patience and understanding from Russia, which must remember that
the rights of small countries were among the first things for which
the war was being fought.
NZ Herald, 28 Apr 43
The Press held that it was futile to
defer tackling Russo–Polish problems till the war had been won;
the spirit of wartime collaboration could make easier solutions essential to an equitable conclusion of the war.
Press, 30 Apr 43
Fears that Russia would ride rough-shod over Poland were to
persist, darkening with the abortive Warsaw rising in August 1944,
See p. 1219
darkening still more after the falling-away from agreement at Yalta
early in 1945.
See p. 1245
At the world’s end New Zealand papers from time
to time pleaded for reason, wisdom and dexterity in the war’s leaders. Meanwhile, Western relations with Russia were eased when on
22 May 1943 the Communist International, with its target of world
revolution, dissolved itself as out of date; a dissolution that Roosevelt and Churchill had wanted, which Stalin now called timely and
which the West welcomed as evidence of Russian good will.
Early in July 1943 the Germans launched their summer offensive
where it was expected, in the Kursk salient north of Kharkov. It
failed, and within a few days the Russians were moving west, taking
Orel, Belgorod, Kharkov, Taganrog, the Donbas area and Smolensk
before the end of September. On 10 July the Allies landed in Sicily,
and on 3 September were to invade Italy. These Mediterranean moves
captured the news columns, but the New Zealand Herald on 21
July reminded that:
Successes in Italy should not be allowed to obscure the fact
that a far weightier contest is proceeding in Russia…. This summer for the first time the Russian pack has been able to hold the
German forwards. More than that, it is now pushing them back
over their own line.
In mid-August the Herald, without referring to Polish problems but
remarking Russia’s absence from the current Quebec conference, said
that it had been clear for some time that the Soviet and the democracies were not working in full accord. The main cause of this
coolness was the latter’s failure to open a substantial second front,
for which the military case was undeniable. The Russians could
hardly be blamed for thinking that their allies should do more, but
Britain and America would not withhold their fire a moment longer
than necessary. Churchill had said that it was always difficult for
the elephant to understand the manoeuvres of the whale: the Soviet
did not sufficiently realise the huge expenditure of power in the
never-ending battle of the Atlantic, did not sufficiently acknowledge
the mighty in-flow of Anglo–American material, and undervalued
bombing attacks on Europe. Further, while requiring the democracies to declare war on all its enemies, Russia persisted in neutrality
with Japan, though if American bombers could work from its eastern territories they could soon crush Japan’s flimsy cities. ‘In fact’,
concluded Russia’s New Zealand champion, ‘the Russians have at
least as much need to show understanding as the democracies.’ These
had made ‘the fullest and frankest disclosures of their plans to their
great fighting ally; are they not entitled in return to the removal of
Russian secretiveness and suspicion?’
NZ Herald, 16 Aug 43: it repeated some of these arguments on 2 Sep 43
At the same time the Otago
Daily Times claimed that the Russians, although ‘in their present
mood of sacrificial exaltation’ they might not recognise it, had been
greatly helped by the Allies, not only with material but by the
German fear of impending invasion which ‘must have been a potent
and perhaps the predominant force in hastening the German
withdrawals.’
Otago Daily Times, 25 Aug 43. Werth, pp. 672–4, says that Stalin told Eden in October
1943 that he did not ignore the fact that the threat of a second front had in the summer
of 1943 pinned down some 25 German divisions in France besides the 10 or 12 tied
up in Italy. After crushing the German offensive at Kursk in July 1943 the Soviet no
longer regarded the second front as vital to its survival.
A few days before the foreign ministers of the three powers at
last met together in Moscow in October 1943, the Auckland Star
discussed the conflict presented by Russian affairs. It praised the
glowing achievements of the Soviet armies, won at colossal cost; the
Russians were fighting for themselves, but the direct consequence of
their struggle was that Britain and the United States had gained
priceless time in which to bring their forces to bear. They would be
‘churlishly unimaginative if they did not feel a lively sense of gratitude’, and a marked change had come into people’s feeling: they
wanted to believe, as before they had not, that the barriers which
divided them from the Russian people were not substantial, that
they had been broken down, and that the way was clear for full
scale collaboration in peace. It was therefore chilling that Pravda
had dismissed as ‘absurd assumptions of chatterboxes’ suggestions
that Russia’s frontiers and the future of the Baltic states would be
discussed at the forthcoming conference. Clearly the Soviet meant
to have complete freedom of action in eastern Europe, rejecting the
principles of self-determination on which post-war collaboration with
Britain and America would have to be based. The Russians had
evidently made up their minds against collaboration that was not
on their own terms.
Auckland Star, 16 Oct 43
At about the same time, the New Zealand Herald again set out
the roots of difference. ‘Marshal Stalin keeps informing the democracies that, if they are to work together in the future, they must
fight together in the present.’ The demand for a second front powerful enough to divert 60 German divisions from Russia was kept
in the forefront by the Soviet, which grudged all force spent against
Japan, did not appreciate the cost and necessity of the Atlantic battle
and gave only modest value to the bombing and Mediterranean
campaigns. Exasperation at the stubbornness and blindness of this
continental outlook would be eased if the losses suffered by the
Soviet over 28 months were realised. Britain and America understandably wished to avoid the blood-baths of a 1914–18 onslaught,
preferring to expend money and machines. Russia, having no choice,
had to spend men as well as material—spend them ruinously.
Until the democracies prove their willingness to take up a larger
share of the land battle, Russian suspicion will remain—the cruel
and, as we know, unworthy suspicion that she is being left to
exhaust herself while the Anglo–Saxons conserve their strength
against the peace conference…. The Russians argue that if they
… are left to win the war they cannot be debarred from framing
the peace … to guarantee their security in single-handed defence.
The logic of this argument from the Russian viewpoint cannot
be gainsaid, even if it leaves out so much that is militarily and
politically relevant.
The Herald hoped that Eden
Eden, Robert Anthony, 1st Earl of Avon (’61), KG(’54), PC, MC (1897–1977): English
statesman; Sec State For Aff 1935–8, Dom Aff 1939–40, War 1940, For Aff
1940–5; Leader HoC 1942–5; Sec State For Aff & Deputy PM 1951–5; PM & 1st
Lord Treasury 1955–7
and Hull had brought the necessary
assurances to Moscow.
NZ Herald, 20 Oct 43
The conferences, firstly of foreign ministers in Moscow in October
1943, then of the Big Three leaders at Teheran a month later,
appeared reassuring. There was much cordiality; collaboration was
to be improved by consultative councils, strategy to be co-ordinated
and, most important for the public, it was stated from Teheran:
‘We reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of
operations that will be undertaken from the east, from the west and
from the south.’
Ibid., 7 Dec 43, p. 3
Polish problems apparently were shelved. It was
made known that relations between the USSR and the Polish
government in London had been resumed a little earlier, but there
was no public statement on Poland, and though in fact an agreement
of sorts was reached on the approximate future frontiers of Poland,
the question of Polish government was not tackled. There was in
New Zealand general satisfaction that co-operation extending into
peacetime was promised, but it was realised that agreement so far
was only on broad principles and would have to face the trials of
practical application. ‘The foundation has been laid. The structure
must now be erected’, said the New Zealand Herald on 7 December.
Many would think that there should have been more specific declarations on political questions, for if military victory was guaranteed,
the more reason to draft the shape of the peace. ‘Instead the world
is put off with fine sounding generalities. Principles are stated but
not their application.’
The Press, on 3 November, noted that after the enemy’s unconditional surrender, until a ‘system of general security’ to embrace
‘all peace-loving States’ could be established, the Allies promised to
consult with a view to joint action, and to use their military forces
only for organising international peace and security and only after
joint consultation, but not necessarily agreement. While approving
the heightened collaboration, the Press saw that the old problem of
sovereign rights, with a nation’s claim finally to judge what these
demand and warrant, was raised by the very formula designed to
solve it. After Teheran, this paper held that Russia’s absence from
Cairo a few days earlier, where Britain, the United States and China
had planned for the Pacific, showed that Russia did not intend to
enter the war against Japan, but it must be supposed that Russia
at Teheran was in agreement with Cairo discussions. Teheran therefore promised ‘total settlement, after total victory’.
Press, 6 Dec 43
Russia’s national day in 1943 was not celebrated with medical
funds or State morning tea, but a government message was sent to
Moscow of heartfelt admiration for the high courage and military
skill of the USSR, of pride in sharing this victory of free men, and
of belief that wartime unity must be extended and confirmed in
peace. Nash, as Deputy Prime Minister, also made a warm statement
about inspired people and leaders, who out of unparalleled hardship
turned what seemed certain defeat into certain victory; the great
example of Russia’s working people, who, on short commons, gave
their intelligence, muscles and spirit to save that which they prized,
had special mention, with hopes that New Zealand would do likewise in the difficult days of transition to peace.
Evening Post, 8 Nov 43, p. 5
At Auckland, the
Trades Council held a rally in the Town Hall that raised £1, 100
to buy sheepskins for Red Army winter clothing. Sir Ernest Davis,
who had already contributed 250 skins from his own farm, hoping
to encourage other sheepfarmers, gave £100. King Koroki
Koroki, Te Wherowhero (1912–66): 5th Maori King, hereditary high chief of Waikato
gave
£50, as did the Auckland Communist party and Waihi’s Society
for Closer Relations with Russia. Several Auckland trade unions each
gave £25.
Auckland Star, 5, 8 Nov 43, pp. 4, 4; NZ Herald, 8 Nov 43, p. 4
At Christchurch a public meeting in Sydenham Park, with trade
unionist John Roberts of the Society for Closer Relations with Russia
presiding, collected £27 and recorded its belief that the Soviet people,
who had marched from the bondage and misery of Tsarism to the
freedom and happiness of socialism, must after the war take the lead
in building a world where neither bondage nor war would have a
place.
Press, 8 Nov 43, p. 4
With guilt about the second front eased by the Teheran declaration and finally assuaged by the invasion of Normandy in June
1944, the newspapers continued to comment on Russian advances
and strategy, and occasionally to worry about Russia’s attitude
towards self-determination, the Balkan states and Poland. In mid-February Stalin soothed some uneasiness by saying that Russia had
no intention of expanding into central or western Europe but that
its strategic needs required territorial and political readjustments in
eastern Europe, on which it would insist. He spoke of readiness to
come to terms with Mikolajczyk’s
Mikolajczyk, Stanislaw (b 1901): acting Vice-Pres Polish National Council London to
1941; Deputy PM, Min Home Affairs 1941–3; PM 1943–4; Vice-Premier 1945–7;
Pres International Peasants Union 1948
Polish government and to hand
over administration of Polish territories west of the Curzon Line as
soon as they were free of the enemy.
Evening Post, 21 Feb 44, p. 5
This was warmly greeted by the Evening Post. The ‘Bolshevik
bogey’ invading western Europe, flaunted by Hitler and his henchmen, had no substance. Events of the last dozen years, which could
now be viewed in some historical perspective, confirmed that Stalin
and most present-day Russians were realists. They did not, like Trotsky,
Trotsky, Leon [Lev Davidovitch Bronshteyn] (1879–1940): Russian revolutionary; co-organiser with Lenin of 1917 November Revolution, Commissar for Foreign Affairs in
new govt; resigned after signing Treaty of Brest–Litovsk with Germany; Commissar
Military and Naval Affairs 1922ff, instrumental in organising Red Army and restoring
navy; ousted by Stalin from Politburo 1926; expelled from Russia1929; assassinated
in Mexico 1940
desire to impose the Russian system ‘willy-nilly on the rest
of the world’, but sought an independent Russia taking its proper
place. The need for military defence, the first essential of such a
policy, explained territorial adjustments secured in anticipation of
Hitler’s invasion. Readiness to come to terms with Mikolajczyk’s
government and to hand over liberated territory at least indicated
willingness to discuss the problem amicably. ‘Stalin’s “sense of realities” should not preclude a settlement satisfactory to both nations.’
Independence recently granted to the Soviet’s 16 republics, enabling
them to have their own army formations and to deal directly with
foreign powers,
Evening Post, 2 Feb 44, p. 6
was seen by the Post as reflecting Stalin’s perception that spiritual unity, the distinctive feature of the British Commonwealth, was more enduring than political unity imposed by force.
Other papers were silent on this occasion but the Post’s hopefulness
exemplified the anxiety, albeit fitful, of many New Zealanders to
believe that Russia would prove an ally not only strong in battle
but reasonable in victory.
As during the past two years a sprinkling of articles, mainly originating overseas, told of Soviet effort—for example, how half-starved
workers at Leningrad held on and won
Standard, 9 Mar 44, p. 3
— and of Soviet leaders,
several glorifying Stalin.
Ibid., 13 Jan 44, p. 7; NZ Herald, 10 Feb, 16 Mar 44, pp. 3, 3
There were a few articles and speeches
regretting world publicity given to reports of coolness and suspicion
between Russia and the Western Allies. For instance, in May, Frank
Milner,
Milner, Frank (1875–1944): Rector Waitaki BHS from 1906
Rector of Waitaki Boys’ High School, speaking of the
necessity for post-war friendship with Russia, disapproved of some
recent American utterances: such phrases as ‘the Russians are not
playing the game’ did not help international relations and he was
surprised at a great paper like the New York Times printing ‘such
piffle’. He reminded that German propaganda was trying to drive
a wedge between Russia and the West.
Press, 5 May 44, p. 6
There were also reminders,
giving the numbers of tanks, trucks, aircraft, etc, of the British and
United States aid that had helped Russia’s advances. Sidney Holland
spoke in these terms during April,
Ibid., 12 Apr 44, p. 2
and Churchill’s account of
Imperial aid, reported on 12 May, stimulated reports and comments
on both British and American aid.
Meanwhile the deep ground swell against Communism as such
persisted, expressed for instance in Straight Furrow: ‘Let us remember
that the stubborn resistance of the Russians no more justifies Communism than the stupendous assault of the Germans justifies
Nazism’.
Straight Furrow, 15 Apr 44, p. 33
In the event, on 13 April 1944 it was announced that New
Zealand was to exchange a ministerial representative with Russia,
being the last of the British Dominions and the last of Russia’s
allies to make this move.
National Executive NZ Society for Closer Relations with Russia, Evening Post,
22 Jul 44, p. 6
Behind the announcement lay nearly
three years of diplomatic manoeuvring, official delays and minor
public interest.
See War History Narrative, ‘NZ and Europe’, p. 38ff
On 22 April the name of the new minister to
Moscow was announced, C. W. Boswell, the 58-year-old former
schoolteacher and Labour member of Parliament for the Bay of
Islands from 1938–43. It was claimed that he was well fitted to
express New Zealand’s feelings of good will towards the government
of the USSR and to discuss social and economic subjects, with special
interest in educational and cultural matters.
Evening Post, 22 Apr 44, p. 8
The appointment was
greeted with some scepticism
eg, NZ Herald, 24 Apr 44; Evening Post, 24 Apr 44
and there was a flurry of interest
over the proposed scale of furnishings proposed for the legation
building—seen by Sidney Holland as ‘such a wicked waste of public
money’.
Press, 13 Jul 44, p. 4; Dominion, 15 Jul 44, p. 8
The mission in Moscow operated until 1950 when it was discontinued. Boswell, the first minister, reported fully on his impressions of Moscow and the aspects of Russian life in which as a longstanding Labour party member he had a special interest.
See WHN, ‘NZ and Europe’, pp. 49–50
Efforts
to initiate trade, particularly in primary products, were frustrated
largely because the little surplus from what was committed to the
United Kingdom was allocated through the International Emergency
Food Council to a group of countries that did not include Russia.
Ibid., pp. 65, 67, 70–3
Although, both in the House
NZPD, vol 268, p. 141
and out of it,
NZ Herald, 25 Jun 45
there were complaints that Boswell sent no useful information and served no worthwhile purpose, he in fact reported copiously on the Russian scene;
the Prime Minister, however, did not publicise his comments. It is
for a future diplomatic historian to assess the long-term significance
to New Zealand of this first, war-inspired, mission to Moscow.
CHAPTER 14
The American Invasion
FROM the start of the war New Zealand’s government had looked
to America as the bulwark against Japan, though some American
diplomacy had scarcely encouraged this attitude. The public, less
well informed, generally believed that Japanese aggression would be
met and held by American might. Both the public and the best
informed circles were astounded by the boldness and disaster of Pearl
Harbour, dismayed by the blitzkreig that followed and further dismayed by the slowness of America’s response.
See p. 330ff
At the end of January
1942, when there was news of American forces in Ireland, the Press
approved this both as attention to a notable danger-spot and evidence of far-flung strength,
Press, 30 Jan 42
but the New Zealand Herald fumed
that America, having provoked the Japanese war, was leaving the
Pacific peoples to stew in it.
NZ Herald, 29 Jan 42; See p. 334ff
On 12 February, under such headings as ‘Americans in New
Zealand—US Naval Force at Wellington’ and ‘Vanguard Arrives—
US Sailors in Wellington’, newspapers gave prominence to a London
paper’s feature despatch from a press correspondent with an American naval force that had come to Wellington. This correspondent
had been with the aircraft-carriers that had attacked Japanese installations in the Marshall and Gilbert islands, then in mid-Pacific had
transferred to another naval unit which had landed thousands of
men at various islands, ‘nailed down hard’ outposts of defence and
communication, and ‘had already won the battle of access to the
south-west Pacific’. Men who landed at Wellington from a United
States destroyer, the article went on, found it difficult to spend money:
hotels gave free meals and everywhere they went they were invited
into homes, while great relief was expressed that an American force
had arrived at the Antipodes to strengthen the Allied left wing in
the Pacific.
Press, 12 Feb 42, p. 5
This ship, however, was but a lone visitor. On 17 February, with
Singapore lost, the Prime Minister cabled to Britain, for transmission
to Roosevelt, strong strategic arguments for strengthening New
Zealand and Fiji:
If Fiji falls then New Zealand becomes even more essential. If
they both fall, the prospect of adequately conducting from the
United States effective operations in the Mid- and South-West
Pacific areas seems to us to become exceedingly thin…. We are
definitely of the opinion that it is essential for the successful prosecution of the war in the Pacific that New Zealand must become
a main base area and must be equipped and defended as such.
Documents Relating to New Zealand’s Participation in the Second World War (hereinafter
Documents), vol III, pp. 226–7
The obvious difficulty of bringing the New Zealand Division back,
plus standing acceptance of its task in the Middle East, checked
pressure for its return at both government and public levels. Churchill was very anxious to keep the New Zealanders, and accordingly
on 5 March asked Roosevelt to send a division to New Zealand,
on condition that the NZEF remained in Egypt.
Wood, p. 225
On 10 March
Fraser learned that this plea had been successful and that the United
States, besides sending two divisions to Australia, would send one
to New Zealand, leaving in the next two months, a move more
thrifty both in time and shipping than returning New Zealand’s
own men.
Documents, vol III, p. 235
This was warmly welcomed, though Fraser expressed
some fear lest such help be too little and too late, also that there
was both at home and in the Division a growing sense that their
place was now in the Pacific, a feeling which would increase when
it became known that Australia had retrieved many of its troops.
Ibid., pp. 242–5. This last factor was lessened by a press censorship direction on 8 April
to treat the Australian return quietly. Wood, p. 225
Roosevelt cabled on 24 March that ‘we are straining every effort’ to
send the forces at the earliest possible moment and efforts would be
made to increase both men and equipment.
Documents, vol III, p. 249
All this of course was completely hidden from the New Zealand
public, but known events and information built up awareness of
America’s limitations. Acceptance of the situation was summarised
by the Press on 11 March: ‘In spite of American mass production
and mass mobilisation, the United Nations have not enough men,
aeroplanes and munitions to stage war-winning offensives east and
west at once. The decision to concentrate on Germany and Italy was
not capricious or short-sighted but inevitable.’ At the same time a
less patient attitude towards American slowness was displayed by a
cartoon in the Auckland Star. ‘Living Statuary, or Straining at the
Leash’ showed a statue of two tortoises hitched to a chariot and
tightly reined in by Roosevelt in classic ungarb as a charioteer; the
plinth bore the words, ‘American aid to the Pacific’.
Auckland Star, 11 Mar 42, by J. C. H.
Beside it
appeared an account of horrors at Hong Kong.
At the end of April, the cabled report of a broadcast by Nash in
Washington was misinterpreted by Auckland papers to produce,
under the caption ‘the Yanks are Coming’, news that American aircraft, equipment and reinforcements were heading for New Zealand.
Ibid., 28 Apr 42, p. 3; WHN, ‘Censorship of the Press’, chap 7, pp. 6–7
During May, strange uniforms began gradually to appear in hotels
and streets at Auckland and Wellington, and anyone connected with
defence construction or the building trade knew that heavy concentrations of men and equipment were preparing new camps around
Auckland and up the coast from Wellington, work that in one phase
or another would continue for months. Apart from cookhouses, ablution blocks, mess rooms, recreation halls, staff and administration
buildings and assorted huts, basic amenities were needed: roads,
paths, sewers, water and electricity supplies, and vehicle parks. Most
of the men lived in tents brought from the United States but local
carpenters put in wooden floors and railings to which the ropes were
fastened.
Evening Post, 5 May 43, p. 4
In the Wellington area, on open coast land near Paekakariki, now
Queen Elizabeth Park, a large camp was rushed up in about six
weeks, and there was another at Pahautahanui. Between them these
could hold nearly 21 700 men, and there were smaller camps housing 4860 at the Hutt Racecourse, Kaiwharawhara Park, Anderson
and Central Parks. At Auckland, a scatter of camps at Mechanics
Bay, at Victoria, Cambria and Waikaraka parks, at Tamaki, Mangere Crossing and Western Springs, would accommodate 29 500 in
all. At Masterton, the only provincial centre that became a garrison
town, 2400 Marines from the Solomons would come to recuperate.
Hospitals were built, 19 in all, to take 9400 patients. In Auckland
at Cornwall Park a large military hospital appeared; at Avondale
and at Hobson Park there were naval mobile hospitals; at Silverstream, Wellington, a New Zealand Army convalescent home became
a major hospital.
War History Narrative, ‘Americans in New Zealand’, p. 5
Towards the end of May 1942, Vice-Admiral Ghormley’s Headquarters South Pacific were set up in Auckland, and the first substantial batch of American troops arrived there, to be quartered at
Papakura.
Wood, p. 243; Documents, vol III, pp. 261–2
On 14 June USS Wakefield brought several thousand
Marines to Wellington (an event of course not mentioned in the
press), and this came to be regarded locally as the beginning of the
‘invasion’. In his diary G. H. Scholefield had already, since 24 May,
noted increasing numbers of Americans, precursors of this arrival.
He also speculated about the impact they would have on social life
in such areas as feminine company, Sunday entertainment and a
foreign law being operated within New Zealand through the visitors’
military police. The Listener also, on 29 May, had reflected that
New Zealand would accommodate thousands of overseas troops and
that soldiers always lead unnatural lives, passing violently from
excitement to boredom, seldom escaping some friction with civilians.
Some friction could be expected in New Zealand.
… eighty per cent of the soldiers, sailors and airmen quartered
among us were, until the other day, civilians themselves. They
are ourselves, socially, whether they come from Canterbury, N.Z.,
or from Colorado, U.S.A…. they are still interested in most of
the things that we ourselves are interested in, and do not wish
to be regarded either as toughs or as innocents abroad. They are
not mercenaries or brigands, but patriot companies of ordinary
citizens called to the defence of their normal way of life.
NZ Listener, 29 May 42, p. 4
When the Listener canvassed views on Americanising Sunday entertainment, some thought that democratic Americans would be
unwilling to interfere with the customs of a host country, others
advised the provision of many activities—sports, concerts, lectures
and discussions besides mere entertainment—to make the visitors
really at home and to learn from them.
Ibid.
On 12 and 19 June the
Listener printed interviews with American nurses and other material
which made it clear that Americans were already frequenting Service
clubs and private homes. For these June issues prosecution was contemplated but not pursued,
WHN, ‘Censorship of the Press’, chap VII, p. 5
and the Listener ceased to mention
Americans, though recipes for lemon and pumpkin pies, waffles and
doughnuts appeared on 2 July.
Since April the Pacific Command had insisted that no mention
of American forces in New Zealand or the Pacific be published
Ibid., p. 1
and this ban was officially, if not effectively, upheld for five months
after the June arrivals. But though no announcements or welcomes
could be published, Americans were immediately noticed, with varied feelings in which curiosity, enthusiasm and excitement were
widespread. Many New Zealanders did not envisage New Zealand
being attacked by Japan and to them the American presence was
not so much a direct protective measure as part of Pacific strategy.
Many were merely unconcerned, and some, seeing a lot more troops
about, and foreign at that, felt a vague alarm. Others felt relief:
people anxiously aware of Japan’s momentum were comforted that
New Zealand was considered a base worth defending; they felt more
important, almost cherished. ‘The Americans are here’ were words
to ease the minds of parents, of old ladies, of anyone burdened with
imagination or information. The war was going badly: Sevastopol
was falling, so was Tobruk, with Rommel driving on to Egypt;
Burma was lost, the Japanese were working south through Papua,
and Sydney harbour had been raided at the beginning of June. Happier news was emerging on the extent of American success in the
Coral Sea during May and at Midway, just fought, news which
brightened the aura of the young men in green khaki.
The first public parade, though quite unadvertised, drew massive
crowds. America’s own flag-honouring day, 14 June, had by various
extensions become in 1942 ‘United Nations Day’, to be celebrated
with prayers and parades throughout Allied countries.
NZ Herald, 13 Jun 42, p. 6
Auckland’s
parade was a few days late, on 18 June. Vice-Admiral Ghormley
took the salute, a large group of Americans headed the march and
crowds in Queen Street were, it was said, larger than ever before
‘not excepting the last three visits of Royalty.’
Ibid., 19 Jun 42, p. 4; Auckland Star, 8 Sep 42, p. 4
There can be little
doubt what the thousands who streamed in by tram and bus and
train had come to see, though American troops were not mentioned
in the papers.
The young men had cheerful smiles (improved by good teeth),
their manners were courteous, some were ready to chat with men
and matrons as well as girls, and they were disarmingly ignorant.
Giving information often induces a disposition to give more, and a
polite street inquiry opened many a door, though a few nervous
ladies felt that an advance had been made if a Marine asked the
way to Karangahape Road or Courtenay Place.
The visitors could not be left standing in the streets, even if they
could not be mentioned in the newspapers. Enthusiasm, gratitude,
curiosity, friendliness, sex-hunger and lion-hunting impulses, guided
in part by the Friendship Group of the British and American Cooperation Society (founded in 1939), swept the first comers into a
surge of home hospitality.
Evening Post, 9 Sep 42, p. 4; Dominion, 22 Jun 42, p. 2
The Service clubs already operating gave
hearty welcomes—many extending their premises and activities.
Wellington’s ANA (Army, Navy, Air Force) club, for instance,
decided in mid-June to move its weekend dances to the Town Hall
where girls would grace the occasion with long dresses in place of
the short ones usual at soldiers’ dances.
Evening Post, 19 Jun 42, p. 6
New clubs also appeared.
The British and American Co-operation Society in Wellington, in
conjunction with patriotic authorities, had by mid-July transformed
a large restaurant
The Waldorf, then closed because of labour and other shortages, on the site of the present
Manners Street post office.
into the Allied Services Club. It welcomed all
Services, but was specially directed towards Americans, with its cafeteria stressing grills, salads, ice-cream, doughnuts and coffee. It ran
an information and home hospitality bureau which, besides providing local and travel information, invited the visitors to register, listing their interests, and tried to match these against the offers of
hospitality that came in from near and far. Many did not need
formal hospitality: they could find their own way, readily making
dates with girls whom they met in milk bars, restaurants, shops,
the clubs and through friendship chains.
Few New Zealanders knew much about America except what they
had acquired through films and magazines such as Life and Look,
a view neither precise nor balanced. In more earnest readers this was
augmented, mainly by Mark Twain, Sinclair Lewis, perhaps H. L.
Mencken, by Saroyan, Dos Passos, Steinbeck and Thomas Wolfe.
Americans knew even less about New Zealand; many thought it an
off-shore piece of Australia, full of grass-skirted natives, sheep and
geysers, and governed by Churchill. Some anxious to mend their
ignorance, asked their hosts embarrassing questions: what was the
population of Auckland or Wellington or Palmerston North, how
many sheep, how many cattle? How much timber was milled, how
much meat and butter exported? To make for ease and interest all
round, in September 1942 the Internal Affairs Department produced
50 000 copies of Meet New Zealand, a cheerful, 36-page booklet,
informal and informative,
It was drafted by Dr J. C. Beaglehole, at that time Historical Adviser to the Department
of Internal Affairs.
in which Yearbook statistics and the ethos
of New Zealand were related to things American; the mysteries of
tea, scones, money, drinking hours and customs, Maoris, Sundays,
Social Security, some slang, horse racing and road rules were briefly
revealed. For the more curious there was a booklist. Also, copies of
a current centennial publication, Making New Zealand, a well-produced pictorial series surveying many aspects of the past hundred
years, were sent to all United States camps.
WHN, ‘Americans in New Zealand’, p. 8. Stemming from Meet New Zealand, Internal
Affairs produced a more ambitious, well-illustrated book, Introduction to New Zealand,
directed towards middle-brow Americans in general rather than the GI. Many chapters
were contributed by experts, the whole edited by Dr Beaglehole and decorated with
drawings by the artists Mervyn Taylor and George Woods. It was drafted during 1943,
but as printing staff was severely depleted it was not finally issued till 1945. Meanwhile
in 1944 F. L. W. Wood’s Understanding New Zealand, a lively discussion angled towards
American enlightenment, had been published in New York.
The press silence was broken, or rather punctured, when Fraser,
broadcasting from Washington on 31 August, spoke of courteous
and well disciplined American forces in New Zealand solidifying
the already strong bonds between the two countries.
The Auckland Star on 1 Sep remarked that when our political leaders were abroad their
published utterances were often more informative and interesting than when they were
at home.
Fraser’s words
were followed on 3 September by a British official wireless message
that in New Zealand big camps had been specially built for American troops and two big base hospitals were being established. The
cat seeming to be out of the bag, newspapers began to print welcoming articles,
Dominion, 7 Sep 42, p. 4; Auckland Star, 8 Sep 42, p. 4; NZ Herald, 9 Sep 42, p. 5;
Evening Post, 7, 9, 11 Sep 42, pp. 4, 4, 4
but from Honolulu early in September came directions to Admiral Ghormley that no information on American forces
should be released by cable, mail or press before being passed by
Pearl Harbour
WHN, ‘Censorship of the Press’, chap VII, p. 7
and silence closed in again. The New Zealand Herald on 3 October explained the situation: ‘It is still not permitted
to make any reference in overseas letters to the presence in New
Zealand of visiting forces. When in Washington the Prime Minister,
Mr Fraser, referred to the presence of certain forces in New Zealand
and this was also referred to in a British official wireless message.
The prohibition on references in letters still exists, however, representations to this effect having been made by other authorities subsequent to the two announcements mentioned.’
The very next day the New Zealand Herald had an article on how
the flower-giving habit of visiting American servicemen was improving the trade of florists, while explanations of American insignia
appeared on 10 October. To newsmen the suppression must have
seemed even more pointless as they printed the statement of H. L.
Stimson,
Stimson, Henry Lewis (1867–1950): US Sec War 1911–13, 1940–5; Sec State
1929–33
the American Secretary for War, at a press conference in
mid-October, that American forces were in New Zealand.
See p. 649
At last,
on 20 November, the United States naval authorities advised the
Director of Publicity that information on the presence of their troops
could be published subject to censorship by the Chief Naval Censor
at Auckland.
WHN, ‘Censorship of the Press’, chap VII, pp. 10–11
This release was first given to the papers at Auckland,
where on the 21st one paper described an early disembarkation, and
the other had a column of folksy appreciation, plus photographs of
the earlier parade. Further south the papers took their new liberty
more coolly: accounts of Thanksgiving celebrations at the end of
November were their first use of it. Early December brought forth
several descriptive articles and interviews.
NZ Herald, 2 Dec 42, pp. 2, 4; Press, 5 Dec 42, p. 4
In general, all the early publicity approved quiet-spoken young
men, modest, inquiring, generous, lovers of home and peace, but
roused now to defend freedom and see the job through. They liked
almost everything about New Zealand, it appeared, except the coffee
and the shortage of night-life and of ‘Scotch’; they were confused
by ‘teas’ and licensing laws but the people were ‘nice folks’. Their
views on Sundays, eating-houses and mutton were not mentioned.
Naturally this publicity widened desire to welcome the visitors
and to meet them. From many towns, some in the South Island,
invitations were forwarded through local government and patriotic
committees to the hospitality bureaus: Silverstream hospital made
notable use of these offers, nearly 400 patients visiting private homes
over Christmas in 1942 and about 3000 during 1943.
WHN, ‘Americans in New Zealand’, pp. 9–10
Some
Americans travelled far, as private guests, guests of local patriotic
committees and as plain travellers. Christchurch received its first
party early in January; in June, Dunedin’s first group, 25 convalescent Marines, were reported overwhelmed with southern hospitality and more were to follow.
Star–Sun, 8 Jan 43, p. 4; Evening Star, 21 Jun 43, p. 2; Otago Daily Times, 16 Jul 43,
p. 2
Rotorua was popular, and mountain
resorts drew some visitors. Parties went to the Maori settlement at
Ngaruawahia run by Te Puea Herangi, who combined hospitality
with firm and skilful handling of race relations.
King, Michael, Te Puea, a biography, pp. 212–14
In holiday places
and in small towns, American uniforms and voices attracted curious
and willing attention. But relatively few moved from their North
Island stations.
The American Red Cross was much concerned with entertainment. Each camp had its hostess to arrange dances, bringing in parties of girls, carefully recruited, as partners. Red Cross officials, mainly
women, organised five American Red Cross clubs: two in Auckland,
one being for officers on rest leave, the other for United States
servicemen in general, in part of the Auckland Hotel; one at Warkworth, one at Masterton, and one in the Hotel Cecil near Wellington’s railway station which, because its premises were large, received
New Zealanders as well. These clubs offered lounges, breakfast, lunch,
dinner and snacks, sleeping billets, showers, and pressing and mending facilities. They were open for long hours, they had space for
games as well as the ubiquitous dances, and the food was Americanised. Their permanent staffs were helped by volunteer groups of
women enlisted through all kinds of organisations; for instance the
Hotel Cecil, open from 7 am till midnight, had 1872 women on
its rosters, for domestic work and canteen and dance duty.
Truth, 26 May 43, p. 17; NZ Herald, 16 Nov, 2, 5, 19 Dec 42, pp. 2, 2, 8, 6; Observer,
20 Jan 43, p. 15; Dominion, 6 Mar 43, p. 6; Evening Post, 4 Mar 43, p. 3
In spite of the information bureaus and hospitality offered through
them, the main channels for acquaintance with civilians, apart from
street and shop encounters, were the dances. In all the clubs, teams
of girls drawn in through all sorts of patriotic, cultural, sporting
and business associations, but always supposedly the ‘right type’,
were organised in groups as partners. It was a general rule that a
girl should not refuse any serviceman one dance—after one dance,
if she didn’t like him, she could make excuses.
NZ Listener, 19 Jun 42, p. 9
It was expected
that chosen strangers would be taken home to meet parents and
friends, leading to home hospitality, persisting friendships and decorous happiness all round.
At Auckland, American numbers fluctuated in a stream of arrivals
and departures,
WHN, ‘Americans in New Zealand’, p. 4
which heightened the troop-town atmosphere,
whereas many Marines were stationed near Wellington for several
months. Many of the latter found local friends, thus solving the
problem of what to do with liberty, others became drearily familiar
with the city’s resources, or lack of them. The earthquakes of June
and August 1942 made things worse, putting several thousand cinema seats out of use for months, while the Town Hall was not
restored till the end of 1943. For those who did not like dancing
there was little to do; one such man told a reporter there had been
no new films for weeks, he could not get a beer after 6 o’clock,
there was no vaudeville, no tepid baths and the only gymnasium
was hopelessly overcrowded.
Auckland Star, 25 May 43, p. 2
When the bars closed, apart from
getting a meal, going to the pictures or sitting around in a Service
club, there was, for the non-dancing man without local friends,
whether he came from Illinois or the King Country, nothing but
walking the streets. The need for a sizeable night-time sports centre,
attracting spectators as well as activists, New Zealanders as well as
Americans, was obvious and was discussed,
Evening Post, 11 May, 5 Jun 43, pp. 3, 4
but not till mid-1943,
in Wellington, was a start made towards converting an old Wakefield Street building, crammed with stores, into a miniature, all-Services sports stadium seating about 500, for basketball, boxing,
badminton, etc. This did not open till November, but next door to
it an old skating rink, re-floored, opened in September and proved
very popular.
Dominion, 11, 16, 23, 27 Sep, 22 Oct 43, pp. 6, 4, 6, 4, 4
The American invasion made at least a passing dint in the New
Zealand Sunday. Early in 1942 it could be said that, while only a
small number of New Zealanders spent much of Sunday in prayer
and many prayed not at all, there were very few counter-attractions.
There were no public sports, bars and restaurants were closed and
only an occasional milk-bar or grill-room offered any food; libraries
were closed, there were no films, and petrol restrictions cut back
outings and picnics. Churches and local councils, unmoved by the
boredom of New Zealand soldiers, had stood firmly against any
erosion of the righteous inactivity of Sunday, but during April reports
came from Australia of pressure for some relaxation, for a few films
and dance halls.
NZ Herald, 18, 29 Apr 42, pp. 7, 2
Allum, Mayor of Auckland, led the way on 13
May: the probable arrival of American soldiers and sailors some time
in the future made it necessary to overhaul existing arrangements
for Sunday entertainment of the armed forces; opportunities for
healthy recreation would be provided on Sunday afternoons and picture theatres would be open in the evening, outside church hours,
to servicemen.
Ibid., 14, 26 May 42, pp. 6, 2
One by one, the towns near camps arranged for
more grill-rooms and milk-bars to be open, and in the evenings one
or two cinemas to which each serviceman might take one civilian
companion. They were generally well filled and it was noticed that
even on a fine Sunday evening there were now few troops on their
seemingly endless and aimless promenade of the streets.
Ibid., 20 Jul 42, p. 2
Wellington soon had matinees as well, catering for those whose leave ended
early in the evening,
Ibid., 7 Nov 42, p. 6
but not till May 1943 did Auckland follow
suit.
Ibid., 17 May 43, p. 2
As time passed, some demobilised soldiers facing dreary Sundays felt aggrieved: why, asked ‘Middle East’ in April 1943, were
only current servicemen admitted to Sunday pictures?
Auckland Star, 21 Apr 43, p. 2
Some non-service activities were affected by the change in the sabbath climate:
several Hamilton bowling clubs decided to open their greens on
Sunday afternoons,
NZ Herald, 3 Jun 42, p. 2
and at Dunedin, students could play tennis on
the university courts.
Ibid., 9 Dec 42, p. 4
To the newcomers, prices were confusing and so was money: a
dollar was worth 6s 1d; 41 cents exchanged for half a crown, 16
cents for a shilling. They were used to tipping and many were in a
spend-easy mood. Their ignorance and affluence reinforced the view
that a fool and his money are soon parted and deserve to be. Probably most traders were honest, but among liquor vendors, taxi drivers, restaurateurs and shopkeepers there were many who sought more
than their due, ranging from heavy ‘takes’ for after-hours or adulterated liquor to a few cents on a pair of socks or changing a dollar
at the rate of 6s, less the penny. There were prosecutions for overcharging and shortchanging, but much would not be detected.
Some children set out to make what they could from the strangers.
Shoe-shining was unknown, but at the enquiries of Marines and
sailors, some barbers offered 6d shines in their chairs. Then, although
shoe polish was scarce, a crop of boys, mainly primary school age,
appeared on the streets, plying brushes and hoping for tips, ‘with
all the energy and cheekiness of modern youth.’
Dominion, 19 Jan 43, p. 4; Evening Post, 23 Dec 42, p. 3
At first there was
approval of this youthful enterprise,
Ibid., 12 Oct 42, p. 4
but it soon appeared less
industrious than predatory, described as ‘glorified cadging and a real
racket’ by the police who sometimes confiscated the gear, which
would later be returned to parents on the understanding that there
would be no more shoe-shining. Shortly before Christmas 1942, the
Wellington City Council decreed that the bootblacks must keep off
the public streets but could make arrangements in shops or on other
private property.
Evening Post, 25 Feb 43, p. 4
Some youngsters did not make even the pretence
of offering a service but pestered Americans outright for money,
‘souvenirs’, and some, hunting in groups, were cheeky and persistent.
Auckland Star, 20 Aug 42, p. 4; Dominion, 10 Dec 42, p. 6; NZ Herald, 14 Dec 42,
p. 2; Norman B. Harvey’s story Any Old Dollars, Mister tells of Yank-hunting by tough
but still likeable 1 1-year-olds.
Begging by adults, usually alcoholics, was firmly discouraged
by two or three months in prison.
Evening Post, 20 May 43, p. 6
Many taxi drivers, as well as accepting tips, found it only too
easy to overcharge Americans who were ignorant, fuddled or exuberant. After their first month Scholefield wrote: ‘At last a taxi driver
has been punished for shameless stin[g]ing of the American marines.
He charged £2 10s for a 16s drive. He was fined £10 and now has
his license cancelled by the City Council to the general public satisfaction.’
Scholefield, Diary, 14 Jul 42; NZ Herald, 17 Dec 42, p. 2; Evening Post, 8, 11 Sep 42,
pp. 4, 3
There were other prosecutions, and it may be assumed
that the abuse was widespread. To conserve petrol there were zoning
rules but for sufficient money these could be broken: in Auckland,
drivers taking servicemen to Warkworth charged £2 for the trip
there, £2 for the return, and £2 in case they were fined for going
outside their zoning area.
Auckland Star, 5 Jul 44, p. 4
New Zealanders frequently complained
that with Americans around they themselves had no chance of getting a taxi. On the other hand taxi men occasionally complained
that they were sometimes threatened and robbed by American fares,
some of whom, if refused, would dint a door, smash a window or
bash the driver.
Evening Post, 9, 10, 11 Aug 43, pp. 3, 3, 3; NZ Observer, 18 Aug 43, p. 9; Dominion,
22 Oct 43, p. 4
Americans in their quest for liquor were sold various brews at
high prices, or in some cases were defrauded with vinegar, water or
tea. All aspects of the sly grog trade—such as illicit distilling, overpriced after-hours sales of normal liquor by publicans, over-priced
drinking in unlicensed places, and furtive sales, by various means,
of dubious wines and spirits—were greatly increased by the American presence. The business of grubby apartment houses, with rooms
let by the hour, also increased, though checked by the attentions of
vice squads and military police.
See pp. 1035, 1049
The American presence added to the accommodation problem. In
both Auckland and Wellington several hotels were taken over as
residential quarters for military and naval staff, and other hotels were
more heavily booked than usual. Some officers, posted for weeks or
months, acquired flats, often used only at weekends, paying rents
that were beyond the means of New Zealanders, both civilians and
soldiers. This sharpened the housing shortage a little and anti-American feeling rather more.
Auckland Star, 26 Oct 43, p. 2
American demands created or stimulated various enterprises.
Laundry and dry-cleaning services, with while-you-wait pressing,
multiplied. Trinket jewellery sold as fast as it could be produced,
along with souvenirs using paua shell, native woods and so-called
Maori decorations.
Ibid., 9 Oct 43, p. 4; NZ Herald, 16 Jul 43, p. 2
More eating-places appeared, some attempting
the visitors’ style of coffee; popcorn, formerly sold only at fairs and
amusement parks, became common, making up for the disappearance of other sweets.
Dominion, 15 Jan 43, p. 4
The practice of giving flowers caused a florists’
boom and rising prices: roses were especially favoured
The song ‘Give me one dozen roses, Put my heart in beside them…’ was current.
and nurserymen reported a big increase in rose cultivation.
Auckland Star, 8 Aug 44, p. 6
Advertisers
applied the word ‘American’ liberally to cosmetics, jackets, coats,
shoes, neck-wear and other items, mainly for women: ‘New York’
and ‘California’ were also popular terms.
In all, during two years about 100 000 Americans were in New
Zealand,
WHN, ‘Americans in New Zealand’, p. 4
mostly centred on Auckland and Wellington, some for
a few days or weeks, some for several months. It was too long and
too many for the first enthusiasm to last. As with any troops, not
all were unassuming and decorous. Inevitably they had the arrogance
of a big nation towards a smaller, less sophisticated one. That arrogance was increased by their having more money to spend than had
most New Zealanders and their belief that they were saving New
Zealand from the Japanese. Feeling was not sweetened on the one
hand by those New Zealanders who seized any chance to make a
quick dollar, nor on the other by the sight of (and talk about) girls,
some already wives or fiancees, at the beck and call of the intruders.
Many New Zealanders found it difficult to stomach the idea that
America had saved them from the Japanese. They held that there
was only one war, and Britain and New Zealand and the rest of
the Commonwealth had been fighting it for two years previously;
that America came into the war when attacked by Japan and used
New Zealand as a base because this suited American strategy. Further, there need have been no talk of saving New Zealand if its own
Division had been brought back, as Australia’s three divisions were,
to defend the homeland,
For example, Hon J. Cumming MLC (1941–52) on 25 February 1943: ‘A lot of our
people do not seem to “cotton on” to the American servicemen here; they think that
we should have our own soldiers back here and that the other fellows should be sent
over to take their place. We know that at the present moment that cannot be done.’
NZPD, vol 262, p. 22
but both Roosevelt and Churchill wanted
it kept in a theatre where it had done extremely well.
When Nash late in February 1943 was reported to have said in
Washington that New Zealand was willing to grant the United
States permanent use of air and naval bases in New Zealand as part
of a mutual defence system in the Pacific, there was some indignation: New Zealand should have heard about this decision, which
affected every living and future New Zealander, before it was
announced by Nash from the States, said the Auckland Star. Was
the British government content that New Zealand should look to
the United States rather than Britain for defence? Such arrangements
would mean that New Zealand forces would be complementary to
American rather than British forces, and would have to be reorganised accordingly.
Auckland Star, 26 Feb 43
A spate of letters followed. One read: ‘… when I went overseas
…our object was to keep New Zealand for the New Zealanders’,
but Nash would fend off one set of foreign powers only to admit
in peace another foreign power to what would inevitably be suzerainty over our external policy and, by the inexorable march of
necessity, over our internal affairs as well.
Ibid., p. 2
Another was surprised
that a good neighbour who came to help in an emergency should
move in permanently.
Ibid., 27 Feb 43, p. 4
Another was sharper: ‘It seems that whatever
America wants in the Pacific is hers for the taking—and that before
she has delivered the goods, for we still have the Japanese menace
alarmingly entrenched after a year’s fighting…. their part in “saving New Zealand” is only incidental to United States defence and
development aims in this area.’
Ibid., 1 Mar 43, p. 2
One thought Nash too indiscreet
to be trusted to represent New Zealand abroad;
Ibid.
another wrote that
many American politicians saw in the war opportunity to spread
their country’s influence, even at the expense of their allies, and with
indecent haste were urging their government to acquire permanent
bases. ‘My brother… died so that we may remain British. All our
boys overseas are fighting for the same reason.’
Ibid., 3 Mar 43, p. 2
Another commended the Star for affording discussion ‘when in
other quarters all criticism is being suppressed’, and believed that
most New Zealanders and especially soldiers would welcome the
proposal. In fairness to those American guests whose behaviour and
modesty had commended them to us as friends, as well as to our
own forces and our kinsmen in Great Britain, ‘we cannot allow the
notion to be spread about that we feel ourselves to be urgently in
need of “protection” and that for this purpose we desire, or are even
willing, to accept a foreign suzerainty over our affairs.’ New Zealand
felt committed to assisting America in the event of its becoming
embroiled in war with Japan and to this end had supplied large
quantities of food, labour and building materials, suspending its own
urgent building programme, yet the impression seemed current that
indebtedness to America was increasing daily. It would be no less
than honest ‘if we demand to know what is going on and where
we stand today.’
Ibid.
There were voices on the other side. One declared that ‘thousands
of dinkum New Zealanders’ would welcome a permanent United
States naval base:… we are only a tiny people against Japan’s
teeming millions… Thank God for a friendly and powerful Uncle
Sam…. Without him we should be part of the “Co-prosperity
Sphere” today—no doubt about that.’
Ibid., 2 Mar 43, p. 2
‘Gratitude’ wrote: ‘In our
dire need we appealed to America for help, to which she most nobly
responded, by sending loads of equipment and many thousands of
her gallant sons, many of whom have paid the supreme sacrifice.
Where is our Christian spirit, our brotherhood of man, our gratitude, if after the war we begrudge a home to the men who have
so valiantly protected us. We cry out that our country needs a larger
population. Who are more entitled to live with us in New Zealand
than those who have saved us?’
Ibid.
Another held that it would be to
our benefit to have some Americans always with us: ‘I say “Thank
you America, and God bless you”’
Ibid., 3 Mar 43, p. 2
‘Travelled Britisher’ was
ashamed of local narrow-mindedness: ‘Many who really love New
Zealand would welcome here those whose slogan is progress, and
who would raise the standard of living in this very backward country, and teach us lessons in real freedom, efficiency, organisation,
loyalty and in manners, personal fastidiousness and culture.’
Ibid.
In the House on 8 March 1943, F. W. Doidge drew attention
to recent reports of an American senator saying that aerodromes in
New Zealand had been built using lend-lease funds and that the
United States should not relinquish them after the war. He pointed
out that many powerful American papers did not like New Zealand
and constantly attacked Britain, naming the Hearst press, Time and
Fortune, and the Chicago Tribune which had lately said that after
the war another star, representing New Zealand, would be added
to the Stars and Stripes. Although New Zealand had great regard
for the United States people and their President, and great appreciation of their assistance and was very glad to have America as an
ally, people must remember that ‘that country came into the war
because she had to when she was attacked.’ Britain would always
be the Motherland, and ‘we will never for one moment agree that
on New Zealand soil any flag shall fly other than our own and the
Union Jack.’
NZPD, vol 262, pp. 221–2
Sir Apirana Ngata also pressed the question of post-war use of Pacific bases and Fraser assured the House that no such
proposals had been made by the United States government.
Ibid., p. 235
On
10 March Fraser referred to statements by Sumner Welles
Welles, Sumner (1892–1961): Sec US Embassy Tokyo 1915–17; other diplomatic posts
to 1933; Asst Sec State 1933–7, Under-Sec State 1937–43; special rep President to report
on conditions Europe1940; State Dept rep American Red Cross 1941; accompanied
Roosevelt Atlantic Charter meeting 1941
and
Cordell Hull, published and broadcast that day, concerning belief
that means of international security should be adopted in future so
that the Pacific would be kept safe for all law-abiding and peaceful
nations. But Fraser said that there had been no conversations between
the United States and New Zealand about military or naval bases
in the Pacific. He believed that the President of the United States
was incapable of a mean action, or of fostering any arbitrary, unjust
or tyrannical policy. There had been in the American press certain
remarks that would have been better unsaid, notably by the ‘atrocious’ Chicago Tribune, but these had been effectively answered in
America. Nash, questioned in the United States by newspapers about
post-war bases, had said that New Zealand would be quite prepared
to discuss any matter of that kind on a reciprocal basis. ‘But the
idea of coming into New Zealand for the purpose of establishing a
base here has never crossed the minds of the American Government
or people.’
NZPD, vol 262, pp. 321–3
A month later, on returning from America, Nash in
an interview made it clear that no statement by him had committed
New Zealand to granting the permanent use of any of its bases to
the United States or any other power.
Evening Post, 7 Apr 43, p. 3
Mrs Eleanor Roosevelt’s week-long visit at the end of August
1943, when American troop numbers here were near their peak,
gave a timely boost to their morale. It also warmed New Zealand
feeling generally towards the great ally. Her plain, straightforward
bearing, her interest and warmth and her well-expressed regard for
New Zealand induced cordiality even in the disenchanted. She was
not a political power, her stress was always on the women’s area,
but she was the President’s Lady and a strong personality.
As New Zealand became an American base, administration grew
and material poured in as well as men. This meant taking over offices
and storage space, and building a great deal more of the latter,
mainly on the outskirts of Auckland and Wellington. It also required
labour, principally in Auckland, which was the main base. The
Americans offered higher pay, and jobs were keenly sought by typists
and office girls and women drivers on whom ‘working for the Americans’ conferred prestige as well as cash, and by watersiders, drivers,
storemen and labourers to whom the pay, with massive overtime at
mounting rates, was remarkable, let alone the chance of acquiring
a few goods as bounty.
At Auckland, waterside work for the Americans increased so much
that
it represented one-third of the rest of New Zealand, including
civilian vessels at Auckland. The shortage of labour at that port
was mainly overcome by the registration of non-union labour
through the Man-power authorities and the employment of Civil
Servants and other forty-hour-week workers during week-ends and
night shifts. The difficulty was further accentuated at that port
due to the requirements of labour for stores off the wharf controlled by the United States authorities. It was quite frequent for
over 2000 non-unionists to be employed each day in addition to
approximately 1800 unionists…. At other ports the shortage of
labour was not so acute….
A to J1945, H-45, p. 6 (Report of Waterfront Control Commission); See p. 442ff
To make sure of enough labour whenever it was needed, the American Army Transport Service, through direct negotiations with the
Auckland branch of the New Zealand Waterside Workers Union,
made an agreement, effective from 9 November 1942, to pay men
working on Army and Navy vessels an extra shilling an hour above
the normal rates. This applied only at Auckland
At Wellington for more than a year American Marines loaded and discharged American
ships. The main body of Marines left late in 1943 and from early 1944United States
vessels were worked smoothly by civilians. A to J1945, H-45, p. 8
and only to those
vessels, not to others under the control of the United States War
Shipping Administration.
WHN, ‘The Waterfront’, pp. 200–1, 206–7
This bonus subsumed various award
concessions such as 2d or 3d an hour more for handling explosives,
dirt money or work in freezers, and it provided that work should
continue in rain.
Ibid., pp. 206–7; Standard, 21 Oct 43, p. 6; Dominion, 2 Apr 43, p. 6, 11 Jan 44, p. 4
Cargo and stores work at ports, done in shifts, was better paid
than similar unskilled work elsewhere, especially for night shifts and
at weekends. Whereas an ordinary day on the wharves, 8 am to 5 pm
at 3s 2d an hour, would earn 25s 4d, a week-day night shift, 11 pm
to 7 am at 6s an hour, was worth 48s plus a hot meal, and all work
from 6 pm on Saturday night to 7 am on Monday morning was at
7s 4d an hour.
Standard, 21 Oct 43, p. 6; see also p. 437
From the wharf, goods were trucked to stores, maybe
miles away, and held there till needed, often in a hurry, at various
camps or hospitals, or on an island-bound ship. All this meant much
sorting and re-handling.
Regular members of the waterfront union were not involved as
much as were casuals in overlong hours, sometimes 20 hours on
end. Men in all kinds of jobs (for there were no able-bodied unemployed by June 1942) who at the outset volunteered to lend a helping, albeit well-paid, hand to the war effort with extra work soon
found that they were on to a very good thing. When they could
not induce Manpower officers to release them full time, many simply
ignored Manpower directions; others contrived to do night shifts
preceding days off or half days; others turned up at their normal
jobs so tired as to be useless. The New Zealand Herald reported that
these men included tramways employees, civil servants, freezing
workers, office staffs and men in practically all trades.
Police constables have formed a large section of the spare-time
workers in American stores. Action was taken by the police
authorities with a view to preventing the constables from sharing
in the wages paid by the Americans, but the men have continued.
This indicates that the inducement offered for men in regular
employment to work for the Americans is strong enough to overshadow preventive action by employers. Representations have been
made to official quarters to have the position rectified.
NZ Herald, 15 Oct 43, p. 4
Employers complained that ‘working for the Americans’ produced
widespread industrial troubles, ranging from absenteeism to restlessness and discontent.
Dominion, 14 Oct 43, p. 4; Auckland Star, 14 Oct 43, p. 6; NZ Herald, 15 Oct 43,
p. 4
The number of casual workers involved increased as 1943 wore
on, while officials worried over the effect both on stabilisation and
production. Dismay was heightened in June, when study of the
small print in the Lend-Lease Agreement signed 10 months earlier
revealed that, except for administrative personnel, these unruly wages
were not a hand-out from America’s cornucopia but were, under
reverse lend-lease, paid by New Zealand. The Secretary of Labour
wrote in July: ‘… had it been made known to the late Mr Coates
and myself when we visited Auckland last November that wage
costs were a charge against lease-lend, we would, I think, have been
in a different position and could have requested closer control over
the wages paid.’
Baker, p. 478
With an election in a few months, there was no
wish to draw general attention to this confusion. Not till January
1944, when the American withdrawal was beginning, was it made
public ‘in a reprint of a speech by Mr Nash’ that ‘instead of being
the bounty of a wealthy “Uncle Sam”, the payments have had the
effect of raising New Zealand war costs and are a burden on all
classes of the community.’
Dominion, 11 Jan 44, p. 4
The history of the Waterfront Control Commission comments
that the watersiders and most New Zealanders felt that Americans
were fools to pay so much. It was thought that the American ships
were a good thing and that as they would not last long the men
ought to get as much as possible out of them. The growth of this
attitude was due in the main to the actions of the Americans themselves. The lavish way in which money was squandered on unnecessary labour, top wages paid to sinecure holders, the employment
of incompetent men in responsible positions, was most unwise. Some
unreliable men were employed as foremen and any man sacked by
the Waterfront Control Commission could at once be employed at
higher pay; ‘In two cases men dismissed for drunkenness on the job
were taken over by the Americans.’ In such circumstances, slack
work was common, as was belief that all wharf workers were getting
tremendous wages all the time.
WHN, ‘Waterfront Control Commission’, pp. 208–10
In October 1943 there was a conference of the unions concerned,
the Federation of Labour, the Waterfront Control Commission and
the Labour Department, with the American authorities;
Auckland Star, 15 Oct 43, p. 6; Dominion, 14 Oct 43, p. 4; NZ Herald, 15, 18 Oct 43,
pp. 4, 4
as the
Dominion noted three months later, no official statement was made.
Dominion, 11 Jan 44, p. 4
Baker states that, after negotiations, ‘some improvement followed,
but the position was never completely satisfactory. The damage had
been done—existing employees were receiving the higher rates of
pay. Dissatisfaction somewhere was inevitable.’
Baker, p. 478
For casual labour,
negotiations achieved some cut-back in the application of overtime
rates. In April 1944 an Auckland Star article, amended by the American censor in consultation with the Labour Department, claimed
that the present policy of the United States authorities was to comply
with the rates and conditions of awards, and that the old days when
unskilled labourers could amass well over £20 a week were now a
memory, though work in capacities not covered by awards was paid
at agreed rates, accepted by New Zealand officials.
Auckland Star, 17 Apr 44, p. 5; Naval Censor to Dir Publicity, 15 Apr 44, PM 25/2/3
Some aspects of the situation were shown in an article written for
the New Zealand Herald on 3 March 1944 and suppressed by the
American censor, the Secretary of Labour and the Director of Publicity, in concert, as likely to affect industrial relations and impede
the war effort. By an agreement between the Labour Department,
the relevant unions, and the Americans on 2 February, effective from
25 February, workers called for casual night-time store jobs were to
be paid at ordinary shift rates, 3s 2d an hour, plus 3s bonus for the
night shift, not overtime rates at 6s 4d an hour. This was not understood by 300 men who answered a night call for stores work at
Sylvia Park. They arrived in trucks, found they were to receive about
half of what they expected, refused to work and were trucked back
to town; but on the next two nights the required number turned
up. An official of the Auckland Builders and General Labourers
Union said that the government’s intention to stop day workers in
essential industry also doing night work for the Americans at overtime rates while permanent labourers were on lower rates had much
to commend it. He added that ‘many office workers report for work
after hours at Sylvia Park, including some prominent manpower
officials who prosecute workers for absenteeism during the daytime
whilst at the same time endeavouring to conserve their energy for
another night’s work at remunerative pay for the Americans….’
Article dated 3 Mar 44 and related correspondence, PM 25/2/3
Shipbuilding was a field in which New Zealanders worked notably for Americans without attracting the public attention given to
unskilled casual labour on wharves, or even to well-paid typists.
Regulations, amended as needed, provided for the overtime and pay
rates of defence workers; Manpower decisions and transfers governed
who did what. This work is discussed among the other achievements
of the war-extended shipbuilding industry;
See p. 737
for security reasons it
had little publicity until late in 1944. Repairs to American vehicles
and machinery were other labours that were not publicised. In workshops among the buildings that sprawled over several acres on the
west bank of the Tamaki, Auckland, near the railway line, skilled
New Zealanders turned out a stream of renovated jeeps, trucks, tanks,
bulldozers, heavy and light machinery. Their work won the approval
of American technicians, stood the test of further Pacific service, and
saved much material.
Auckland Star, 20 Aug 45, p. 4
Not all Americans were courteous and inquiring. Some were so
simply sure that they were the top nation saving New Zealand that
it was easy to expect girls to welcome them with homage as heroes;
many girls unconcerned with strategy, for whom men were the
mainspring of life, were ready to comply. American public relations
authorities gave tactful but vague advice in a General Order posted
on all United States bulletin boards and published by many newspapers early in December 1942:
When organisations arrive in New Zealand they will find
themselves in a friendly and interesting country where preceding
units have established an enviable record for good conduct and
military bearing, which must be continued by all officers and men.
You will find the country depleted of its young men. They are
absent on military duty in the New Zealand Army, which has
proven itself on the field of battle in this and the first world war
as one of the “fightingest” organisations in the world. In Greece,
Crete, and in Egypt they fought and are fighting our battles in
our war, and not only as soldiers but as individuals they and their
people merit our highest respect and affection.
To the end that we may grow to understand better these admirable and generous-hearted people in this pleasing wholesome little
country, I ask that the officers and men under my command
endeavour to maintain in their relationship with New Zealanders
the highest and best traditions of our country and the Corps we
represent. Let us not be laggard in meeting and returning the
open-hearted hospitality tended to us on all sides, and resolve to
keep to the high standards which we in decency and honour are
expected to maintain.
Evening Post, 8 Dec 42, p. 3
Late in 1942 any young woman would have agreed that New Zealand
was depleted of its young men. The last large ballot of single men
had been taken in August 1941, and 21-year-olds were regularly
drained towards overseas service. Thousands of Grade II and III men
were in home service camps, plus the 18–20-year-olds; while among
the Air Force volunteers many under 21 were, with their parents’
consent, leaving to finish their training overseas. After March 1942
ballots sifted through married men with children, reaching the 40-year-olds by November. Between October 1942 and the following
March about 20 000 men in the Army alone left New Zealand for
the Middle East and the Pacific.
There were thousands of young girls without boy-friends, young
wives and fiancées whose men had been away for two years or even
three. There were many others attached, some firmly, some lightly,
to men tucked away in New Zealand camps, or relegated to industry, perhaps working long hours and lacking the glamour of uniform. At all levels, girls with well-appointed homes and indulgent
parents, girls earning £2 a week, were feeling the pinch: the lack of
fun, admiration, excitement and sex, let alone the yearning to love
and be loved. They were, especially the younger ones, in varying
degrees vulnerable.
On this man-denuded scene, made more grey by petrol and travel
restrictions, blackouts and shortages, came the well-garbed Americans in their thousands. ‘There were so many of them,’ sighed an
18-year-old redhead of 1942, 30 years later, recalling the sudden
wealth of escorts, the burst of warmth and vitality that flowed out
from Service clubs and street encounters into the suburbs. There was
immediate appreciation of American manners: they rose to their feet
as if on springs when a woman approached; hats were doffed, even
in lifts; seats were offered in trams, or skilfully pushed in at tables;
elbows were held protectively as streets were crossed. In talk they
were cheerful and easy; their agile ‘ma’ams’ and ‘sirs’ gratified the
elders, girls found them wittier and less serious than New Zealanders. The American habit of hyperbole helped the effect; troops
away from home often have a dash and verve that would surprise
their own folk, and even stock-in-trade conversation, if from Chicago
or Seattle or St Louis, seemed brighter for being unfamiliar.
These charms were augmented by money. American pay rates
were higher than New Zealanders’,
The Marine private’s basic pay was $50 a month, increased by 20% on foreign service,
so in New Zealand it was $60, ie £18 5s, whereas a New Zealand private, at 7s 6d a
day, drew £10 10s in four weeks. The American system of badges and bonuses for merit
in training courses considerably improved the pay of the more expert. Evening Post,
5 May 43, p. 5
and many coming from the
islands and due to return there had substantial amounts of back pay
and every intention of spending it. For a ‘date’, a posy of flowers
might be sent, the young man might bring sweets or chocolates, he
would certainly be lavish with cigarettes; a sheaf of roses or other
flowers might arrive a day or so after a pleasant evening or as a
‘thank-you’ to a hostess. There were meals at hotels, and rooms for
private entertainment; liquor was somehow acquired, there were taxis,
one went places. It was fun to dress up and be admired, fun to talk
with the girls at work about one’s American and his buddies, fun
to flourish cigarettes and gum, perhaps parade a slight accent. It
was exciting to be squired by men from far away, whose place back
home would lose nothing and possibly gain much in the telling.
With such largesse suddenly replacing Saturday nights at the pictures with the girl-friends, it was small wonder that some young
women were swept off their feet. The routine question ‘May I see
you home?’ was offered on the slightest pretext or none at all. Some
accepted brush-offs with cheerful nonchalance, others were persistent
or resentful.
Americans were responsible for a good many broken engagements
and understandings, and not a few marriages likewise. It was easy,
in the climate of war, for a girl intending merely casual friendship
to find herself in deep water emotionally, with the distant fiancé
seeming remote and unreal. Many a New Zealander in Italy or Egypt
or Canada or Waiouru waited for letters, then read the one that
told him all was over, or else heard obliquely that his girl was going
out with a Yank. Such news wounded and angered not only the
man himself, but his friends, and there was enough of it to cause
padres and officers some concern: it was bad for morale. On 14 June
1943 the heads of churches, on ‘official information’, made a united
appeal to wives and fiancées: if life was difficult for them, it was
still harder for their men, and getting bad news while powerless to
intervene could cause many a nervous collapse; women had the power,
by their faithful courage, to send their men into battle gallant and
high-hearted or to break their morale by callous forgetfulness; campaigns were being lost or won not only in the Middle East or the
Pacific but in New Zealand and in our own souls.
Evening Post, 14 Jun 43, p. 4
A student
newspaper, writing about returning New Zealanders who found allied
servicemen cozily ensconced, was severe: ‘Any married or engaged
woman who cannot wait till a man returns from overseas to settle
her emotional problems has about as much stability as a prostitute.’
Craccum, 28 Jul 43
Americans of course were not the only ones taking over the girls
at home; civilians reserved in essential industry had their share. Both
roused the ire of the long-service men who returned on furlough in
July 1943, some to meet coldness or requests for divorce, others to
be amazed at conduct that had grown commonplace. A weekly paper
that in March had remarked, ‘Daylight lovemaking in side-streets
is now a common spectacle in Auckland and Wellington’,
NZ Observer, 17 Mar 43, p. 4
was
less urbane in August:
Men returned to Auckland and Wellington have had their eyes
opened to sights they thought they had left behind in Cairo—
girls peddling their bodies from darkened doorways and cheap
dance halls; so-called “socialites” dining and drinking at fashionable hotels with visiting servicemen and displaying an unrefined technique veering from Dick Turpin banditry to Du Barry
harlotry.
Ibid., 4 Aug 43, p. 9
It would probably not be wrong to say that if some girls were tarty
little dollar-diggers, many more were recklessly enchanted into
uncritical acceptance of the lads from the big, rich, go-ahead nation;
most were in nowise affected. There were, of course, deep and enduring attachments: 1396 women married Americans in New Zealand,
Yearbook, 1947–49, p. 56
let alone the unknown others who in due course followed fiancés to
the States; though a proportion of these marriages foundered early,
they were not alone in this. Often there was no question of marriage,
but there was pleasure, sincerity and compassion in knowing men
lonely in heart and futureless in war. Despite all the ardour of words
and youth, many a girl, as the grey ships slid away, knew that
whether he lived or died she would never see that man again. From
the end of 1943 New Zealanders were beginning to return from
overseas and more were being released from home service. But there
are probably many mothers and grandmothers of New Zealanders
who still have a place in their hearts for Brad or Joe from California
or Illinois, fathers and grandfathers of Americans who remember a
girl gay or lovely at Wellington or Auckland or Whangarei, memories to balance those of crowded leave trains and grey coffee.
Inevitably there were fights. The troops of two nations, on leave,
were jammed into towns, overcrowding pubs, eating-houses and all
public places. There were genuine likings and friendships between
Yanks and Kiwis, there was cheerful badinage in bars, there were
no persisting feuds, as of gangs. Military police in various uniforms
constantly patrolled, alert to catch trouble in the bud; but confrontations could arise in a moment when small incidents touched off
deeper irritations.
The visitors were troops, numerous and transitory, looking for
pleasure and excitement between spells of boredom and danger, but
there was very little entertainment or activity for them. Apart from
the Australians in their corner, it was obvious that the Pacific war
was the Americans’ affair: it was easy for them to forget that New
Zealand’s Division was pulling its weight elsewhere and had done
so for three years, easy for New Zealanders to think that their Division was worth more than a great many big-mouthed Americans.
New Zealanders were irked by American affluence; the girls ‘crazy’
over Americans were far more conspicuous than the many whose
interest was friendly but decorous,
Planters Peanuts and Camel cigarettes sent in some Middle East parcels were often
enjoyed without qualm.
or the many who were not
involved at all; and ‘nigger’, uttered by a Southerner to or about a
Maori, could be a fighting word.
All these irritations were exacerbated by boredom and booze,
especially by bad booze. Turned from the bars at 6 o’clock, those
Americans and New Zealanders not absorbed by Service clubs, the
homes of friends, dance halls or the pictures, took to the streets
armed with assorted liquors and next morning the streets would be
littered with broken glass, ‘It is strong, fightable stuff, provocative
of trouble, and has caused trouble,’ stated the Evening Post.
Evening Post, 10 Apr 43, p. 4; cf p. 1014
This was saying as much as could be said of such trouble, for,
although there were reports from Australia of brawls between Australian and United States servicemen,
NZ Herald, 11 Dec 42, p. 4
New Zealand censorship suppressed such local reports as subversive statements likely to prejudice
relations between His Majesty’s subjects and those of a friendly foreign
state. Offences by New Zealand servicemen in which civilians were
not concerned were usually handled by military police and courts,
and on 8 April 1943 regulations granted American authorities exclusive jurisdiction in criminal charges against members of the American armed forces, although any offences against civilians would,
except for security reasons, be tried in open court.
Evening Post, 9 Apr 43, p. 3
Presumably
through an early censorship slip, the Press on 27 November 1942
revealed an Auckland coroner’s report that an American soldier, felled
by an unknown Maori in a drunken street brawl on 15 October,
died later of a fractured skull. On some other occasions reports of
trials of civilians involved in such clashes might briefly mention ‘a
disturbance’, ‘an affray’ or ‘a skirmish’ between New Zealanders and
visiting servicemen. An article in a weekly paper during February
1943 was not repeated by other papers. This ‘Shots in Shortland
Street’ stated that in the early hours of 10 February an altercation
in Auckland between New Zealand and American servicemen over
women flared into bottle throwing and ‘several scarcely playful bouts
of fisticuffs’, subsided for a few moments while reinforcements were
whistled up, then ‘according to an onlooker’ pistols were drawn and
it appeared that two men were wounded though on which side was
not clear.
NZ Observer, 17 Feb 43, p. 12
The most celebrated incident of this sort was Wellington’s ‘Battle
of Manners Street’ on Saturday 3 April 1943. It apparently began
with a confrontation between Southern Marines and Maoris, a crowd
gathered, largely from nearby Service clubs, and a general fracas
developed. Reports were that several men had been killed and more
sent to hospital.
eg, An Encyclopedia of New Zealand, A. H. McLintock (ed), vol III, p. 87, gives an eye
witness account of ‘the ugliest riot in New Zealand history’, a battle lasting four hours
with more than 1000 US and local troops plus civilians involved, two Americans killed
and many injured, all starting from Southern Marines refusing to let Maori servicemen
drink at the Allied Services club. It should be noted that Service clubs did not serve
liquor. Moreover, a more recent account, based on Army records in the National Archives,
denies Maori involvement. A few merchant seamen, drunk and bent on ‘cleaning up’
visiting servicemen, began a series of fights in which American marines and sailors,
local servicemen and seamen tangled, without deaths or serious injuries. Evening Post, 31 Dec 83, p. 6
This was denied by an Evening Post article on 8
April—‘no man is in hospital and none in worse condition’ —and
by the police next day. ‘There was certainly a bit of a skirmish’,
stated the Commissioner. It had started in a lane and was quickly
handled by the police and provosts from various Services. The crowd
was dispersed, but another gathered again and was in turn dispersed.
Later in the evening, a further little group started an argument and
was yet again dispersed. One New Zealand civilian was arrested and
dealt with by the court,
A young man was fined £2 for being drunk and disorderly; he had incited a crowd in
Cuba Street about 11.20 pm on Saturday 3 April ‘when a large crowd had congregated
and there was trouble with members of the armed forces.’ Ibid., 5 Apr 43, p. 3. This
was obviously after the main ‘action’.
one New Zealand serviceman was arrested
and dealt with by his own officers, no United States serviceman was
arrested or charged.
‘There was not a single person injured, much less taken to hospital
or killed, as rumour has it’, said the Police Commissioner, reproving
rumour-mongers. He warned that in future civilians who incited
servicemen to fight would be treated very firmly by the police,
regardless of age or sex, while similar firm action would be taken
by the Services against any of their own men concerned.
ibid., 10 Apr 43, p. 3. This report appeared in most papers.
The New Zealand Herald remarked that official suppression of
facts had bred grotesque rumours. If the eventual plain and straightforward account of what had actually happened had been made
public at the time there would have been no scope for the distorted
version. The Commissioner was probably not responsible for the
original suppression, for as an experienced police officer he would
realise the sterilising effect of plain truth and the contrary result of
denying publicity to facts which could not possibly affect national
security.
NZ Herald, 10 Apr 42
The New Zealand Observer on 14 April also disapproved
of ‘futile secrecy’.
Police at the time were concerned to keep the peace and, by
playing down excitement, avoid vendetta repetition. In post-war calm
a police sergeant remembers the ‘action’ as fierce: provost corps from
all Services turned out, together with the civil police. United States
Marine provosts had wagons into which they tossed anyone who had
been coshed. But the action was short and sharp: the police made
no reports and laid no charges; persons taken into custody were
servicemen and were delivered directly to the appropriate Service.
He remembered the cause of the trouble as a fracas between reinforcements for the Maori Battalion and Marines who had befriended
some Maori girls.
Author’s note of interview with Sergeant Franklyn, PRO Police HQ, 7 Sep 73
Several less publicised mělées were referred to in court reports.
For instance, on the afternoon of 26 April 1943 at a boxing tourney
in the Basin Reserve, Wellington, two New Zealand soldiers and
others started a general disturbance, stated the police. ‘The trouble
seemed to start with a little bit of jealousy between these men and
overseas servicemen.’ A general fight took place in which a policeman was knocked down and kicked, and plain clothes men helped
the constables. The two local soldiers were convicted of obstructing
the police.
Evening Post, 27 Apr 43, p. 3
There was a ‘serious affray’ in an amusement park in Auckland’s
Queen Street on the evening of 3 May 1943 between Maoris and
American sailors, in which a Maori and a Negro were both stabbed,
the latter seriously; a Maori who had incited others to fight was sent
to prison for two weeks.
Ibid., 5 May 43, p. 3
On 21 June at Wellington in two separate incidents, large crowds collected about two civilians who challenged passing Americans, calling on everyone to ‘come and fight
the Yanks’. Both men were fined, the magistrate warning of future
gaol sentences for an offence that was becoming far too common.
Evening Post, 22 Jun 43, p. 3
In Auckland a few months later, a reputable man with a deep-seated
matrimonial grudge against Americans was fined for similar action.
Auckland Star, 2 Nov 43, p. 4
A report in Truth on 13 October 1943, headlined ‘Battle Royal
with Police’, sounded like mere skylarking by a few American sailors
at Napier, but the next week’s issue told of four Marines ‘running
amok’ and breaking windows in Otaki before being overpowered
by Maoris. Presumably there were other such incidents which did
not reach the press.
Jury verdicts early in 1944 were further signs that the welcome
was cooling. Two Auckland killings in which Americans were
involved were dismissed as justifiable homicides: a 19-year-old New
Zealand soldier shot an American soldier with whom he had been
drinking and who had made a homosexual suggestion to him,
Ibid., 11 May 44, p. 6
and a man killed his wife with a hammer after she told him that
she loved an American and would go away with him.
Ibid., 18 May 44, p. 6
These unusual verdicts prompted several newspaper comments, some questioning the jury system,
Ibid., 29 May, 2, 3 Jun 44, pp. 4, 4, 4
another claiming that many people in
discussing the second case found the verdict ‘a just and proper one’.
Ibid., 26 May 44, p. 4
Considering how many Americans there were, newspaper references were scanty, for over them brooded the anxious, many-angled
censorship. To begin with, on 24 June 1942 Admiral Ghormley
proposed that all press copy, photographs and films on allied nations’
military activities in the South Pacific, including New Zealand,
should be censored at American Naval Headquarters, Auckland,
adding that this would not affect the general New Zealand censorship already established at Wellington.
WHN, ‘Censorship of the Press’, chap 7, p. 2, quoting Ghormley’s memorandum
This was an unacceptable
intrusion on sovereignty.
As the Solicitor-General later reminded the Director of Publicity ‘The United States
censor has no status as such in New Zealand. You can, if you choose, appoint him or
nominate him as a person acting on your behalf.’ Solicitor-Gen to Dir Publicity,
29 Oct 43, PM 25/2/2
The Director of Publicity, J. T. Paul,
answered that Wellington was the chief centre of activity, that the
censor in Wellington was the ‘final arbiter’, and that as the ‘closest
liaison’ was necessary between him and the American Naval Command’s censorship, it would be valuable to have a representative of
the latter in Wellington.
WHN, ‘Censorship of the Press’, chap VII, p. 4, quoting Dir Publicity to US Naval
Attaché, 26 Jun 42
As stated earlier,
See p. 624
the official press situation was maintained
somewhat imperfectly till 20 November 1942. On 17 October of
that year Paul summarised events in a memorandum:
Leaving aside the announcement which came from America many
months ago that the vanguard of an American force had arrived
in New Zealand, which in plain fact was the visit of an American
Cruiser [in February 1942],
See pp. 621–2
the most definite reference to United
States forces in New Zealand was contained in a broadcast from
the United States by the Prime Minister of New Zealand.
See p. 627
This was made with the full concurrence of the Office of Public
Relations United States Navy, and a copy of the following communication was addressed to the Publicity Officer, New Zealand
Legation, on August 28:—
This is to verify that there is no objection to the mention
of the fact that United States sailors and marines are present
in New Zealand, as this is a matter of common knowledge.
The United States Army Authorities on the other hand wish
no reference to be made to the presence of their troops.
It was then emphasised that there should be no publication beyond
general terms and no published reference to numbers of troops,
ships, units, or personnel.
Prior to Mr Fraser’s broadcast several published references had
been made in the American press to the presence of United States
troops in New Zealand. Many more have since been made, the
latest being yesterday when Mr Stimson, Secretary for War,
announced
See p. 628
that American forces are now stationed in New
Zealand. In addition to this Mr Stimson said that substantial
United States Army forces were now in the New Hebrides, Fiji,
and other points where their presence was undisclosed previously
…. In view of this, the task of preventing press publication in
New Zealand is not only impossible, but it borders on the absurd.
For a period of almost six months I have endeavoured … to
have the position in New Zealand clarified. I have urged that the
established and tested principles relating to publicity covering our
own troops should be applied in all material particulars to United
States troop movements. I have suggested that there should be
no published references whatever to the movements of United
States troops, to the numbers, to any ships, units, or to personnel,
without the concurrence of the United States Public Relations
Officer and Censor in Auckland. The invariable reply has been
that no authority for release can be given in New Zealand and
that everything has to be released on authority from Pearl Harbour. This reply was again reiterated yesterday by Lieutenant-Commander Gifford, Acting Public Relations Officer in Auckland, following the receipt of Mr Stimson’s references.
In view of these latest references, including the second cable in
the press this morning relating to the publication of a United
States edition of the booklet ‘Meet New Zealand’, it appears to
me unwise, unnecessary, and certainly most confusing, if not indeed
worse, to continue the endeavour to limit safe published references
within New Zealand. I therefore urge that with proper safeguards
the question of publishing general references to the presence of
American servicemen in New Zealand, including photographs,
should now be permitted.
Paul referred to articles in the WashingtonStar of 22 August and
in Newsweek of 31 August, describing New Zealand hospitality and
the building of camps for Americans, and concluded:
I most strongly urge that in view of the above facts the present
position cannot be allowed to continue. The press of New Zealand
should not be expected to accept an arrangement which prohibits
publication of events occurring within New Zealand and allows
newspapers outside the country full liberty of publication….
common sense demands an immediate reversal of the present
unsatisfactory and untenable position.
Paul Papers, Box 413
The United States Naval Censor at Auckland worried over transgressions and himself reproved some newspapers that had referred to
individuals of the forces in their social columns. These papers asked
the Director of Publicity if there were one or two censorships in
New Zealand, and the Director asked the Naval Censor to refer
evasions to him.
WHN, ‘Censorship of the Press’, chap VII, pp. 8–9
After 20 November, when information on United
States forces could be published, subject to United States naval censorship, the appointment of an assistant naval censor at Wellington
was completed, to speed up the release of domestic copy, but material
for overseas had to be cleared at Auckland and some had to be
referred to Pearl Harbour.
Ibid., p. 11. A year later, in November 1943, another assistant naval censor was appointed,
at Dunedin.
Basically, the American view was that all domestic copy mentioning Americans must be submitted to American censorship, each
case to be judged on its own merits. For many routine references
this seemed to newspaper men an irksome intrusion on their trade.
To an extent the Director of Publicity agreed with them, and he
tried continually to establish with the Americans a code of what
might and might not be released, with areas of editorial responsibility, conniving meanwhile at uncensored publication of obviously
innocent references, while such terms as ‘Allied’ or ‘visiting’ servicemen evaded the issue and were fully understood by readers. There
could, of course, be no mention of numbers, units, high ranking
officers, camp locations, arrivals or departures, equipment or training.
On 11 June 1943, South Pacific Command instructed that, due
to progress in the campaign and the increasing security of New
Zealand, censorship could be more liberal with a view to promoting
the interest and co-operation of the New Zealand public. As the
presence here of Marines was by then well known, they need no
longer be merely ‘US servicemen’, while photographs and news items
of the activities usually associated with the training of troops and
of general interest might appear, subject to the usual security limitation and ‘subject, of course, to censorship to prevent writers from
failing to observe proper security instructions.’
Commander South Pacific to CO Naval Operations Base, Auckland, 11 Jun 43,
PM 25/2/2
This liberalisation had in fact been anticipated. Even the Chief
Naval Censor at Auckland realised the impracticability, especially
after victory was assured at Guadalcanal, of pretending that thousands of interesting and visible visitors did not exist. In the New
Zealand Herald, not a rebellious paper, photographs and accounts
of Americans eating Thanksgiving dinners, inspecting Maori carvings
at Rotorua and entertaining orphans had appeared before New
Year.
NZ Herald, 27 Nov, 5, 26 Dec 42, pp. 5, 4, 7
There had been descriptions of the streamlined efficiency of
naval barracks on 10 December 1942, of an Army camp two days
later, of a naval hospital on the 29th; on 30 December, of the recent
Spartan experiences of a combat unit from the US Marine Corps on
an intensive training course, firing live ammunition over the rugged
country beyond New Zealand’s largest inland camp, sleeping in
bivouac tents thirty inches high, ‘small enough to be heated with
a candle’, and eating two meals a day. One suspects that this was
the sort of thing that South Pacific Command had in mind on 11
June 1943.
The Chief Naval Censor expected more publicity but still wanted
all copy mentioning United States troops in any way to be submitted
for censorship. Some newsmen dutifully complied, others, sure that
they themselves could avoid security pitfalls, did not proffer routine
minor references. Paul, a former journalist, saw the practical difficulties and in announcing the liberalisation of 11 June he had written: ‘In large measure the principle of editorial censorship within
the regulations and these directions will operate.’
Dir Publicity, memo to editors, 21 Jun 43, PM 25/2/2
Frequently, complaints of papers encroaching on and usurping United States authority
were made by the Chief Naval Censor to Paul, who with one hand
soothed the irate American and with the other shook a cautioning
finger at the careless editor, saying that security was not the only
consideration, it was also necessary to preserve good relations; but
very rarely did he find that these complaints justified a restraining
order obliging an editor to submit all such references to censorship.
It would, he explained to the Solicitor-General, ‘be impossible for
newspapers to conduct their business and give the necessary publicity
to United States troops in New Zealand if every item, social and
other, was to be submitted to United States censorship and later
released by my office.’
Dir Publicity to Solicitor-Gen, 6 Jul 43, ibid.
With this attitude the Naval Attaché in
Wellington agreed.
US Naval Attaché to CO Naval Operations Base, Auck, 28 Jun 43, ibid.
Occasionally outright mistakes occurred, as when the arrival of
an American major-general (in company with Lieutenant-General
Freyberg) was published in the New Zealand Herald,
NZ Herald, 21 Jun 43, pp. 2, 4
or when
Marines included their rank and units in lost property advertisements.
Auckland Star, 18 Jun 43, p. 1
But security as such was not the only angle. New Zealand’s
censorship concerning Americans was also dominated by a 1942
addition to the definition of a subversive statement: one intended
or likely to prejudice the relations between His Majesty’s subjects
and a friendly foreign state or the subjects of any such state.
This clause was in the original public safety regulations of 1939, omitted in the revised
version of February 1940 (1940/26) and reinstated on 4 March 1942 (1942/53)
The
zeal of J. T. Paul in administering this elastic-sided clause was heavily reinforced by the Chief Naval Censor at Auckland, whose
authority was guided by occasional directives from South Pacific
Command, and whose perception of his responsibility, both for
security and for publicity policy, was very wide. In the latter area,
there were clashes when United States servicemen, involved indirectly in court cases, were mentioned unfavourably. Newspapers held
that they had a right to publish what was said in open court, that
such publicity was part of the newspaper service and of the system
of justice. A few instances show the clash of values. Several of these
occurred before the liberalisation of June 1943, but already some
newspapers, and to some extent the Director of Publicity, had taken
the line that non-military references need not be referred to American
censors.
In March 1943 in a case of petty theft, it was stated that New
Zealanders working at a Marine Corps store had been given goods
and that Marines took goods away. The magistrate, J. H. Luxford,
referring to the allegedly loose system at these stores, said that he
would like to hear a sworn statement on it by a responsible officer
of the Corps, adding, ‘I cannot shut my eyes to the fact that so
many Auckland homes are using United States goods. It is a sort
of Uncle Sam’s largesse.’
Auckland Star, 9 Mar 43, p. 4
The Auckland Star’s chief reporter, when
taxed by the Naval Censor with this impropriety, said that his paper
would continue to print court proceedings unless expressly forbidden
by the Director of Publicity. The Chief Naval Censor then asked
Paul that all references to American forces, in court or elsewhere, be
submitted to censorship, New Zealand or American.
Chief Naval Censor to Dir Publicity, 10 Mar 43, PM 25/2/2
Paul replied
that in practice he allowed co-operative newspapers to use discretion:
United States troops were in so many parts of New Zealand from
time to time that it would not be possible to have every news mention of them censored before publication. He added that it would
be preferable to decide on definite directives to be observed with
mutual co-operation.
Dir Publicity to Chief Naval Censor, 24 Mar 43, ibid.
In June, reporting two suits for matrimonial
damages in which Marines were involved, Truth gave prominence
to a judge’s comment that no one could excuse a man who took
advantage of a serviceman’s absence to start a relationship with his
wife and commit adultery with her.
Truth, 2 Jun 43, p. 2
The Chief Naval Censor complained of ‘very flagrant violation’ in not submitting such stories for
censorship.
While it is not contended that such publicity should at present
be totally suppressed, the dictates of good judgement as well as
good taste demand that the prominence of such copy be minimized. This newspaper had no right whatever to mention the
names of Marines, the fact that the one in Auckland was a Shore
Patrol officer, or any of the sordid details which were apparently
published for the express purpose of creating ill will between our
peoples…. it is earnestly requested that the matter be severely
and summarily dealt with.
Chief Naval Censor to Dir Publicity, 7 Jun 43, PM 25/2/2
Paul replied with both firmness and sense: ‘I do not agree that the
names of Marines appearing in our Courts should be suppressed
unless there exists an ample security reason in any particular case
…. Personally I think the articles should have been submitted, but
if the result of such submission would have been to delete what is
described as “sordid details”, then I am afraid both the United
States censorship and the New Zealand censorship is [sic] heading
for trouble.’ Deletion by censorship of the judge’s comment ‘could
not be justified’. The only effective treatment would be suppression
of any reference to the case, but that again could not be contemplated.
The plain fact is that censorship of Supreme Court proceedings,
unless imperative for security reasons, would be highly improper
and contrary to public interest.
Looking at the whole question dispassionately, it is inconceivable that episodes of this character should not occur. Given similar
circumstances in any country, and with any troops—our own, of
course, included—irregularities of this character are unavoidable.
If this position were reversed and New Zealand troops were in
America, the general standard of conduct of those troops and
American women would be very similar. This must also be said—
if two similar cases, arising out of the circumstances described,
occurred in America, a certain class of American newspaper would
make much more of them than has been made by “N.Z.
Truth”.
Dir Publicity to US Naval Attaché, 11 Jun 43, ibid.
The Naval Censor replied that Paul’s views on Supreme Court censorship were most interesting and that in the main he agreed: ‘We
must always consider, however, that the demands of wartime censorship might conceivably be of greater importance to the war effort,
and therefore to the welfare of the United Nations and their peoples,
even than the statement of a Supreme Court Justice, if such a statement either compromised the security or jeopardized the amicable
relations of our allies and ourselves. To such extremes, even one
wearing the robes of judicial privilege should not be permitted to
go.’
Chief Naval Censor to Dir Publicity, 19 Jun 43, ibid.
The Censor’s anxious protection of America in all fields was further shown in his response to some cultural evaluations, headed
‘Nation or Colony?’, in the New Zealand Observer. After briefly
reporting a lecture in which a literary American officer had discussed
the need to develop a specifically New Zealand culture the editor,
R. B. Bell,
Bell, Robert Brown (1888–1969): 50 years’ newspaper work including parliamentary
press gallery, advertising mngr Dominion, Managing Dir Ashburton Guardian, Timaru
Post, Editor/Managing Dir New Zealand Observer, delegate to 4th Imperial Press Conf,
London1930, exec member NZ Newspaper Proprietors’ Assn 1927–30; exec member
NZRSA 1919–25, Canty provincial Pres 1922–5; Pres Sth Canty Chamber Commerce
1926–7
while agreeing, added that the problem was complex
and needed time. America faced the same difficulties and, though
older and much larger, ‘has not yet produced a writer, musician or
artist of the very first rank…. It has, of course, produced a number
of very good writers, musicians and artists. I mean simply that, in
the great hierarchy of the world’s imaginative geniuses, America does
not exist. Nor could anything else be expected.’
NZ Observer, 2 Jun 43, p. 5
The Observer’s editor regularly failed to submit copy for censorship. He had now added insult to injury, and the Naval Censor was
indignant: ‘As pointed out previously … Mr Bell is actually usurping the prerogative of American censorship, which is contrary to your regulations and to ours.’ Further, the article ‘contains statements
regarding American culture which appear to be both untrue and
uncalled for. After viewing with pride the bust of the poet Longfellow in Westminster Abbey, I could not help but feel pride in
the fact that England had recognised the attainments of a truly great
American poet. It was with equal pride that numerous pictures by
American artists were viewed in the National Gallery and Tate’s
Gallery in London. Courses in American literature are given at
Oxford, all of which seems to negative the statements of R.D.B.
[sic]’
Chief Naval Censor to Dir Publicity, 10 Jun 43, PM 25/2/2
Although a restraining order had already been placed on this editor obliging him to submit all copy concerning Americans to the
American censors, it was decided to take no action in this instance.
Later, in December, to the Chief Naval Censor’s great satisfaction,
he was convicted and fined for a breach of censorship in a brief
oracular statement on 27 October that an Auckland pilot might soon
bring the first Mosquito from England to New Zealand.
NZ Herald, 9, 16 Dec 43, pp. 2, 7; NZ Observer, 27 Oct 43, p. 4
On 24
December the Chief Naval Censor noted with satisfaction that the
Observer was now adopting a friendly policy.
Chief Naval Censor to J. T. Paul, 24 Dec 43, PM 25/2/3
Various issues continued, mainly over small matters. The Americans had long been reluctant to define what could or could not be
published but at length, with their agreement, the Director of Publicity on 3 November 1943 issued a list of topics which could not
be mentioned without clearance by the Director of Publicity or the
United States Censors acting on his behalf. Besides the obvious military silences—names, rank, movements of senior officers, strengths,
movements of units, equipment, casualties, malarial control—these
included letters or interviews with any United States serviceman;
proceedings before any United States courts or boards in New
Zealand; local court proceedings in which United States servicemen
were witnesses or parties, if evidence given by or concerning them
was reported or United States military matters mentioned. ‘The
important topic of right relationships’ was left to editorial judgment,
guided by public safety regulations, especially that of a subversive
statement being one intended or likely to prejudice relations between
New Zealanders and Americans; editors were earnestly requested to
submit any doubtful items to censorship.
Dir Publicity, memo to editors, 3 Nov 43, PM 25/2/3
The restriction on New Zealand court reporting drew protest from
A. G. Henderson,
editor of the Christchurch Star–Sun, as unwarranted interference with the established rights of the press, representing the public. ‘I do not believe’, he wrote, ‘that relations between
New Zealanders and Americans are prejudiced by publication of
evidence in the courts, but I am certain that relations are prejudiced
by the widespread belief that American offenders escape virtually
without punishment. As you know, a story that gets into circulation
by word of mouth loses nothing in the telling and the only counter
to exaggeration is the publication of the truth.’
Editor, Star–Sun to Dir Publicity, 4 Nov 43 (copy), PM 25/2/3
An Observer editorial remarked that some topics discussed overseas
did not appear in New Zealand, which apparently ‘allows itself to
be a convenient doormat for any autocratic jackboot that may come
along’, hinted at fresh restrictions, and concluded: ‘Why mention
the presence of United States forces at all? Now you see them, now
you don’t. It’s dangerous to talk. And the public isn’t nearly as
interested as it was.’
NZ Observer, 17 Nov 43, p. 4
This caused the Chief Naval Censor to wonder on 21 November whether censorship itself should not have been
among the prohibited subjects.
Predictably, Truth strongly objected to the court curbings. ‘Since
we are neither a subject people nor an enemy occupied country, and
we are not [are we not] entitled to expect that our American allies
will not invoke the power of censorship as a substitute for decent
democratic measures of discipline and control of their servicemen
and the inculcation of courtesy and consideration of our way of life’
Editor, Truth to Dir Publicity (copy), 30 Nov 43, PM 25/2/3
In December, when a magistrate dismissed two women who, after
misconduct with Americans, sought separation and maintenance
orders against their husbands, Truth’s headlines and details yielded
little to the November restrictions: ‘Sick soldier returns to find wife
gone crazy with American servicemen’ and ‘No help from this
Court—Wives who “kick up heels” with US servicemen’, etc.
Truth, 8, 22 Dec 43, pp. 13, 5
Apart from protest and prosecution, the Chief Naval Censor was
armed with ability to release news in favour of docile papers, a
weapon probably more telling in the long run. Thus the Auckland
Star, which had challenged censorship, complained that news was
consistently given first to the New Zealand Herald.
Dir Publicity, note for record, 5 May 43, PM 25/2/2
It may have
been this pressure which induced the Star to become ‘friendly and
co-operative’ so that the year closed with gift giving and high
cordiality.
Naval Censor to Dir Publicity, 8 Dec 43, Chief Reporter, Auckland Star to Naval
Censor, 24 Dec 43, PM 25/2/3
As the war moved north, and as from early 1944 the American
tide ebbed in New Zealand, censorship tensions relaxed. An incident
in March measured the gentler mood. The production of a play, ‘A
Yank in Remuera’ by Professor Sewell of Auckland University, was
amiably postponed after tactful suggestions (stemming from the Solicitor-General through Paul, who both remained in the background)
that if this play, presenting loose and irresponsible behaviour by
American soldiers, reached the States, it would distress many parents
who had lately lost sons at Tarawa and other places.
Dir Publicity to Naval Censor, 28 Mar, and reply 1 Apr 44, ibid.
While American authorities in New Zealand were perturbed by
reports on the less admirable though quite inevitable aspects of their
troops, and editors were irked by censorship with its blunting excisions and delays, New Zealand war correspondents and the Director
of Publicity joined the editors in frustration over the limitations and
delays that American security imposed on news about New Zealanders in the Pacific. In May 1944 the United States Command,
in refusing to employ the Royal New Zealand Air Force north of
the equator, spelled out clearly that New Zealand was not to acquire
a claim to any say in the Marshall and Caroline islands after the
war,
Lissington, P. M., New Zealand and the United States 1840–1944, p. 69
but some flattening of New Zealand’s fighting role was discerned a good deal earlier. Doubtless this was caused by military
expediency no less than political foresight: New Zealand’s forces
were too small on their own for anything but limited actions, and
it was awkward to fit them in with other units. In July 1942
Ghormley had decided that as America had sufficient amphibious
troops of its own, New Zealanders would garrison places already
held or captured.
Documents, vol III, p. 351
The government did not desire this sheltered
role
‘… it would be neither wise nor proper to allow the offensive against the Japanese in
the South Pacific to be conducted entirely by Americans without substantial British
collaboration,’ wrote Fraser on 4 December 1942 (ibid., vol II, p. 148), and on 7 May
1943, ‘I believe it to be of the greatest political importance that when the time comes
to start offensive operations against Japan, the British elements in the United Nations’
forces in the Pacific should be as strong as possible.’ (ibid., p. 196) Again, on 18 March
1943 he told Parliament: ‘It is important that our voice will carry weight both now
and in the future as far as the Pacific is concerned, and that we should win the right
to be heard with respect. We cannot do that if we scuttle out of our responsibilities in
the Pacific.’ NZPD, vol 262, p. 496
and the public, unaware of Ghormley’s decision, waited
between fear and hope for the Third Division to ‘get cracking’. It
remained safe and silent in New Caledonia and Tonga and Norfolk
Island till the latter part of 1943, and then was assigned only minor
operations.
Meanwhile a more active part was being taken by the RNZAF,
but correspondents had to clear their stories with American headquarters, and there was no gratifying harvest of quick-fire publicity.
Much of the earlier work was by bomber-reconnaissance aircraft,
scouting for ships and submarines, whose routine, monotonous,
necessary vigilance was effectively described from time to time.
eg, NZ Herald, 7 Dec 42, p. 2, 12 Jan 43, p. 5; Wanganui Herald, 9 Dec 42, p. 5;
Star–Sun, 14 Apr 43, p.-5; Evening Post, 8 May 43, p. 6; Dominion, 5 Feb 44, p. 6.
These reports have been noticed in several papers at about these dates
There were tributes to hard-working ground-crews, alert in both dust
and mud, and praise from Americans for reliability and navigation:
occasionally these aircraft were attacked by the Japanese, and occasionally they bombed a submarine, but there was little to mention
in communiqués and the chief enemy was boredom. Nor was it very
exciting when the Minister of Defence on 16 December 1942
announced: ‘This is an historical occasion…. I am at liberty to
disclose that the R.N.Z.A.F. has taken a further forward step in the
operational zone … and has recently been engaged in active operations against the Japanese.’
Evening Post, 17 Dec 42, p. 5
New Zealand fighters and fighter
bombers were active in the Solomons and shared for months in the
regular attacks that wore down the great base Rabaul between mid-June 1943 and February 1944, destroying in all 99 Japanese aircraft.
Kay, Chronology, p. 96
Their ‘bag’, always important in air-war publicity, was given
in sundry encounters, under such headings as ‘Furious Dog-fights’
or ‘Rabaul Pounded’, but these releases were isolated and, despite
issues of praise by American admirals, New Zealanders had little
general vision of the contribution some 15 000 of their total 55 000
airmen were making in the Pacific.
Ross, Squadron-Leader J. M. S., Royal New Zealand Air Force, p. vii
Similarly, although New Zealand corvettes and minesweepers were
active on patrol and convoy duty, and though there were reports on
both their strikes and losses, their work was in the main silently
accepted, and most of the public would have been surprised to hear
that there were 5000 New Zealand navy men in the Pacific.
Gillespie, O. A., The Pacific, p. 110
In June 1943, New Zealand fighter aircraft claimed their first
Zeros in several actions, on which some fairly meagre publicity was
released, with comments from the Prime Minister, on 17 June. But
a more detailed article and an interview, plus photograph, with four
of these pilots on their return soon after to New Zealand, published
in the Auckland Star of 22 and 24 June, which were not submitted
to American censorship, brought severe rebuke
Chief Naval Censor to Dir Publicity, 24 Jun 43, CO US Naval Base, Auck, to Dir
Publicity, 27 Jun 43, PM 25/2/3
to the Director of
Publicity. While admitting error, Paul pleaded almost wistfully that
it was excellent publicity and that it was necessary to emphasise the
exploits of our airmen, not omitting the glamour and thrills, in order
to attract potential pilots to the Air Force, where recruits were all
volunteers.
Dir Publicity to Chief Naval Censor, 25 Jun 43, ibid.
He also gave several instances where reports of New
Zealand activities in the South Pacific had emerged from headquarters censoring up to three months late and out of date.
Dir Publicity to CO US Naval Base, Auck, 7 Jul 43, ibid.
It
transpired that as the operational story behind the interview had
already been passed by Censorship in Noumea further American
censoring in New Zealand was not called for.
Memo, Lt F. E. Taplin to Naval Attaché, Wellington, 6 Jul 43, ibid.
The Observer hinted at newspaper gossip about this time in its
attack on ‘saw-dust Caesars whose morbid pleasure is to pollute the
Well of Truth, by arbitrarily and unnecessarily prohibiting the publication of facts…. the prohibitions imposed by both American and
New Zealand censors go beyond endurable limits. A case in point
is the current ham-stringing of the war correspondents in the South
Pacific’, who were said to be gnawing their nails.
NZ Observer, 7 Jul 43, p. 5
New Zealand’s first ground action in the Pacific was cloaked in
a lengthy news delay. At the end of August 1943 most of 3 NZ
Division moved from New Caledonia to Guadalcanal, then on in
mid-September to mopping-up work on Vella Lavella which American forces, by-passing heavily defended Kolombangara, had found
lightly defended and had attacked successfully on 15 August. Vella
Lavella was officially declared secure on 9 October, and the Japanese
had evacuated Kolombangara by 6 October. Not till 13 October
did a communiqué from Admiral Halsey authorise release of news
‘that New Zealand forces in Vella Lavella have been in contact with
the enemy and have played a major role in the taking of this island.’
Evening Post, 13 Oct 43, p. 6
The Dominion’s editorial on 12 October had hoped that an adequate official news service from the headquarters of New Zealand’s
Pacific Division would not be long delayed, pointing out that the
Prime Minister on 28 September had announced that New Zealand
troops had moved to a ‘forward area’, but the move to the Solomons
had already been told in letters home. ‘It seemed extraordinary that
the official announcement had to be delayed so long that private
letters were ahead of it.’ On 8 October, the Minister of Defence had
made it known that New Zealand troops had been in action against
the Japanese, suffering certain casualties, after which the ‘blanket
descended again, and, up to the moment of writing, no further
information is to hand. All that has been allowed to come direct to
the public from Guadalcanal are a few descriptive accounts, most
of them written some time ago, of special training for the move,
together with details of the landing operations and complimentary
references to our troops by Allied commanders. The public will expect
much more than this, and, within reasonable considerations of
security, much more should be given—and with much greater celerity. Australia is receiving a splendid official news service from New
Guinea, a service which undoubtedly has stirred and inspired the
public. The people of this country will look for similar enlightenment, and will not be satisfied with a series of colourless ministerial
announcements, which by their brevity and ambiguity, are calculated
to cause speculation and rumour.’
Dominion, 12 Oct 43
Next day Nash hinted that this reticence was imposed by America: while the government was willing and anxious to let everyone
know what our men were doing, the wishes of those in charge of
the operations must be considered.
Ibid., 13 Oct 43, p. 4
Later on the same day the
Prime Minister announced Halsey’s communiqué. The two subsequent actions by New Zealanders, in the Treasury Islands beginning
on 27 October and in the Green Islands on 15 February 1944, were
each announced within two or three days.
After the first month or so of 1944 it was clear to the man in
the pub, the woman in the street, that the Americans were leaving.
The retreat began from Wellington. Buildings were quickly diverted
to other purposes, easing some acute pressures. Silverstream Hospital, vacated in April, received many of Wellington’s long-term
patients, who had been rusticated in Otaki’s health camp.
Ibid., 17 Apr 44, p. 4
The
naval hospital at Avondale, whose architects had envisaged its future
use as a school, was snatched for this use amid Auckland’s mounting
school population.
Auckland Star, 8 Jun 44, p. 4
A rest camp at Western Springs became a transit
housing settlement, desperately needed.
Ibid., 26 Jun 44, p. 6
Six Rotorua guest houses
reverted to normal use.
Ibid., 20 Jun 44, p. 6
Camps and stores, said the Commissioner
of Defence Construction James Fletcher, were a reservoir of building
materials for the houses demanded by queues of ex-servicemen and
others. Camps were systematically demolished, beginning with Paekakariki, to provide quantities of re-planed seasoned timber, doors,
plumbing fitments, roofing, piping and electrical wiring. Small huts
could go to farmers, helping the production drive; large ones were
moved to become warehouses, school halls and classrooms.
Ibid., 27 May, 2, 26 Jun 44, pp. 6, 6, 2
Some
are still in service after 35 years.
Hotels, florists, milk bars, restaurants, jewellers and curio shops
found business slack; the overtime bonanza ended; the sly grog trade
and its associated evils declined;
NZ Herald, 17 Apr 44, p. 2
civilians found cinema seats and
taxis available. Many girls said, in effect, ‘That was fun, but New
Zealand boys are for real’, though some would remember the golden
years with the nostalgia of the long-gone; some treasured photographs, wrote letters, waited for mail. The 1396 brides waited for
transport to the States, and some waited in vain. Most of the men
were gone by mid-year, and the administration thinned out. Finally
on 26 October 1944 over the last bastion, the naval base at Auckland, the American flag was lowered. The invasion was over.
v. r. ward, government printer, wellington, new zealand—1986