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The New Zealand Medical Service in the Great War 1914-1918
In the published volumes of the General History of the Medical Services during the Great War of 1914-1918, limitations of time and space and other cogent considerations precluded detailed accounts being given of the work of individual medical units of divisions, corps and armies. The preparation and publication of the more detailed and individual records have accordingly become the task of the units of the Dominions and Territorial Forces that took part in the war. A volume containing the history of the New Zealand Medical Services has consequently definite historical importance and will be welcomed alongside the volumes of the General History as an essential portion of the history of the medical services as a whole.
A fact that is apt to be forgotten is that one of the first blows against the power of the enemy was dealt by a New Zealand Force in the capture of Samoa in August, 1914. New Zealand medical personnel had thus an experience of active service from the earliest days of the war. Subsequently the New Zealand Army Medical Corps took part in the operations in Egypt and Palestine, on the Gallipoli Peninsula, in Macedonia, in France and Belgium, and established hospitals in the Dominion's overseas base in England. Their units had thus a wide experience in many theatres of war. They shared, with Australians, the immortal fame and glorious record of the Anzac Corps during the operations at the Dardanelles in 1915. when they formed part of the combined Australian and New Zealand Division. When they were transferred to the Western Front in 1916 they were in a position to display their qualities in a still more distinctive manner as units of a homogeneous New Zealand Division. But wherever and, however, the officers and other ranks of the New Zealand Army Medical Corps were employed their efficiency was a matter of common knowledge, while their devotion to duty and their unwavering cheerfulness in the midst of difficulties, their enthusiasm and determination to give of their best excited the admiration of everyone who had in any degree administrative control over them.
The medical profession in New Zealand responded nobly to the Empire's call. Three hundred and eighty-five out of some seven hundred doctors embarked for service overseas as officers of the medical corps, together with 3,248 other ranks. There also embarked for service in the medical units 550 nursing sisters, one of the most poignant memories of whom is the loss by drowning of ten of their number when the transport conveying the New Zealand Stationary Hospital for Imperial Service in Macedonia was torpedoed in the Aegean Sea towards the end of 1915. This tragedy of the war was one of the greatest calamities from which the medical services suffered.
It was my privilege to have been in close administrative touch with the New Zealand Medical Services in Salonika, on the Western Front, and in the Southern Command in England; and I had thus ample opportunity of obesrving their efficiency and the excellent spirit and discipline of their personnel. The development of a high standard of organization as time went on was one of the features that attracted attention. During the battles of Messines and on the Ypres front in 1917, for example, the arrangements of the New Zealand Division for the collection and evacuation of wounded were regarded as historically instructive on account of the careful manner in which the details were prepared beforehand and the smoothness with which the work was carried on during the fighting.
In this brief introductory note, however, to the volume on their history during the war, no attempt has been made to emphasise or summarise the chief features of the work of the New Zealand Medical Services. It would be outside my province to do so; but it may be recorded without fear of contradiction that, while the grim realities of war brought out the salient qualities of the various elements of which the armies of the British Empire were composed, in the experience of one who saw much of the medical services of all of them in the field, on the lines of communication and in their base hospitals and depots none displayed more conspicuously than those of New Zealand the characteristics of all that is best in the British race. The facts recorded in this volume will, I feel sure, bear witness of the truth of this to all who read it.
Early in 1919 the work of collecting the necessary material for this volume was initiated at N.Z.E.F. Headquarters in London. By direction of the late
At the same time a Medical Research Committee was constituted —with
At the inception of the work much needed direction was given to us by the Australian War Records Section established some nine months previously: and particularly to
In the preliminary task of collating the records the compiler was ably assisted by the N.Z.M.C. staff which included
Our thanks are due to
The work of the Medical Research Committee and of the Medical War Records Section was prosecuted without interruption until the repatriation of the members at the close of 1919 when work was discontinued owing to the necessities of Demobilisation and Reconstruction in New Zealand; and it was not until three years had elapsed that it was found possible to undertake the writing of the history.
In March 1923, the Director-General of Medical Services,
The Regimental Committee agreed that our Medical History should take the form of a narrative of the operations of the N.Z.M.C. in the various campaigns of the Great War and that purely medical considerations should be subordinated to a general account of the activities of the medical units and formations in a military sense. It seemed to the committee that it was unnecessary to include the scientific papers prepared by our Medical Research Committee as the Official History of the War and the many post-war text-books already covered the ground in a superlative manner. But some of the published works of our officers and their contemporary contributions to medical literature are cited in the bibliography of this volume, and the valuable collections which they made for the war museum are preserved in the Medical School at Dunedin.
In conformity with the recommendations of the Committee, this volume, designed partly as a Regimental History of our corps, is addressed to the general reader and is not an official medical history of the N.Z.E.F., although based on the War Diaries, Dispatches, Reports, Military Correspondence, and State Documents, of the various periods outlined. It covers the whole of the campaigns of the Great War in which the N.Z.M.C. were engaged: in Samoa, in Egypt, at Gallipoli, on the Western Front, in Sinai and Palestine; and in a short introductory chapter traces the origins of the Corps, its early traditions, prewar organisation and training. Contemporary advances in war medicine and surgery are referred to
Special consideration has been given to the medical administrative problems of the home base. In 1914, as regards medical administrative formations, we were not prepared for war: with the exception of a small number of N.C.O. instructors there was no permanent N.Z.M.C. staff, the officers were territorials, a few only had specialised in medico-military science, a very small proportion had previous war service, the majority had little if any training in military duties.
The difficulties of the part-time D.M.S., the late
But the limitations of the Medical Administrative Staff in New Zealand were to as great an extent imposed upon the Military Administrative Departments: partly for lack of trained officers, but chiefly owing to the difficulties met with in improvising an Administrative Staff for War within a Defence Department devised for local territorial forces only. Much trial and error and many painstaking revisions were necessary: but ultimately, with a Minister of remarkable strength of character, the Hon.
The general reader will consult with advantage the New Zealand Official Histories relating to Gallipoli, Palestine and France in which the context, illustrations and maps will serve to supplement omissions in the present volume necessitated by limitations of space. The medical reader is directed to the British Official History of the Medical Services which is authoritative and comprehensive beyond all praise. Owing to a desire for simplicity foot-notes and references to medical literature have been avoided as much as possible in the narrative and the inclusion of maps and diagrams in the body of the text. The necessary references, when not acknowledged, are to be found in the Bibliography which includes a few notes that may serve as a guide to further investigations. The index has been systematised to facilitate the study of special problems in ambulance work, in the tactical employment of field medical units, and in medical administration generally.
To the committee of the N.Z.M.C. Regimental History the compiler desires to express his acknowledgment of valued assistance in reading and revising the manuscript and for much useful advice. Many points of critical importance have been reviewed in conference with the committee and attached officers of the N.Z.M.C., and at all stages of the recent work this co-operation has been a very real help.
Thanks are also due to the Hon. the Minister of Defence,
The type-script was read and approved on behalf of the General Regimental Histories Committee by
The official lists of the dead, wounded, honours and awards were compiled by the War Records Office as also a special nominal roll of all those who died by disease in the N.Z.E.F. from which the analysis of deaths by disease was extracted. For this laborious work we are indebted to Mr. Clemens and more especially to
To the many members of the Corps who assisted by conference, by narratives, or the loan of private diaries and to
In the introduction,
Page 36, 14th line from bottom, for E. O'Neil read E. J. O'Neill, and subsequent text.
Page 160, 9th line, for Lt.-Col. E. O'Neil, D.S.O., read E. J.
O'Neill, and subsequent text.
Page 266, 2nd line, for Mills, Lt.-Col. read T. Mill, and subsequent text.
The following is appended for the information of the non-military reader. The figures are approximate, the conditions, those existing in the New Zealand Division in 1916 and 1917.
A Battalion of Infantry: 34 officers, 896 rank and file; has 4 companies. Each battalion has a:—
Regimental Medical Detachment: 1 officer N.Z.M.C. the R.M.O.; 5 N.Z.M.C. for water purification duties; 2 orderlies, one of whom drives the Maltese cart carrying medical and surgical equipment; the battalion chiropodist. Each company of the battalion provides 4 stretcher bearers and a certain number of men for sanitary duties. In action the 16 regimental stretcher bearers may be increased in number to 32.
A Brigade of Infantry: 4 infantry battalions and a headquarters, commanded by a brigadier. To each brigade a field ambulance is attached—
A Field Ambulance: 10 officers (9 medical, 1 Q.M), 20 warrant or noncommissioned officers, 211 rank and file N.Z.M.C. An ambulance is divided into 3 sections, A, B, and C, each section comprises a tent-subdivision and a bearer subdivison.
A Bearer Subdivision: 1 officer, 1 sergeant, 1 bugler, and 36 bearers. Duties: to collect the wounded from the R.A.P. and carry them to the car collecting posts or to the advanced dressing station. The total bearer personnel of the field ambulance, 3 officers, 3 sergeants, and 108 bearers, with 4 men to the stretcher can carry 27 lying cases in one trip.
A Tent Subdivision: provides 2 medical officers with non-commissioned officers and orderlies acting as clerks, nurses, stewards and cooks and can shelter, tend and feed 50 patients. The 3 tent subdivisions provide accommodation for 150 patients in all; but by the use of buildings many more can be housed and tended for short periods. All essential surgical operations can be performed by the tent subdivisons if required.
Ambulance Transport: 7 motor ambulance cars to each field ambulance and 3 horsed ambulance waggons. Capacity: cars, 28 lying wounded, waggons, 12 lying or 36 sitting cases. The medical, surgical equipment, nursing appartus, tents and blankets are carried in general service waggons. The drivers are attached from the A.S.C. or the M.T.A.S.C.
Infantry Division (see Appendix B. IV.).
The medical personnel includes, the A.D.M.S., the D.A.D.M.S., the officer in charge Sanitary Section, 3 field ambulances and R.M.O.S., making 53 officers, 682 rank and file N.Z.M.C. total personnel with the division.
Infantry Corps: 2 or more divisions.
The origins of the New Zealand Army Medical Service may be traced back to the earliest days of organised settlement in New Zealand. Although the New Zealand Medical Corps, as constituted at the outbreak of the Great War, dates only from 1908, a Colonial Medical Corps pre-existed and was in being with unbroken succession from the time when a small body of devoted surgeons attached to militia and volunteer formations in 1845 formed the anlage from which our present Medical Corps has evolved.
From the initiation of the colonising schemes of the New Zealand Company some form of Colonial military forces existed in New Zealand in contemplation or in being. The warlike disposition and fighting qualities of the Maori race were known in England prior to Captain Cook's explorations, and at the time of the New Zealand Company's first emigrations in 1839 it was recommended by a select committee of the House of Commons that the New Zealand settlers should be enrolled in a militia. Prior to embarkation the prospective colonists were invited to sign an agreement that they would consent to be trained in a militia on arrival in the Colony, and by this undertaking all male emigrants became potential soldiers.
The Maoris, much devoted as they were to their ancestral lands, held in tribal communism, were lacking in a comprehension of the true nature of a land sale, and in many instances opposed in arms the settlement of the colonist on lands purchased by the
The long drawn out Taranaki-Waikato War of 1860-1870 had its roots in a much earlier period, and was founded in disputes concerning the sale of land in the Waitara District in 1840. At the inception of this war, in which Imperial troops were mainly concerned, It is on record that P.M.
Up to 1865 the Colonial troops, then about 1,500 strong had acted as auxiliaries to the Imperial troops, about 9,000 of all arms, but at this time a political movement was set on foot known as the policy of "Self Reliance," strongly supported by the Governor,
The New Zealand Medical Service was now under the control of Dr. Grace, an officer of the Imperial Army, then retired and settled in practice in Wellington. He had volunteered his services: he was appointed P.M.O. and was asked to inspect and
A period of reaction followed the war, the militia service became unpopular, the volunteer movement decadent. The causes were natural: laxity of commanding officers; general distaste for war amongst the volunteers who had been under arms for ten years; increasing prosperity of the Colony. A report of a committee set up to consider colonial defence in 1873 recommended a modified system of compulsory training, the number required to complete the strength of the volunteer corps to be filled by ballot. But volunteering was again stimulated in 1879 by fresh disturbances with the Natives: 1,500 men were under arms on the West Coast; the volunteer force numbered 8,032 with a medical staff of five surgeons, 19 assistant surgeons.
Again in October, 1881, the volunteers were called up for service at Parehaka. This campaign closed the period of Native wars and rebellions, and the years that followed saw no fighting in New Zealand, but the defence forces waxed and waned in strength in sympathy with European crises, the first of which was the war in Egypt in 1882. In this year a board of officers sat to consider the re-organisation of the Defence Forces. Amongst the recommendations made was the appointment of a Volunteer Surgeon General and the formation of "Ambulances"; there were at this time 46 surgeons and assistant surgeons in the Medical Corps. But it was not until five years later that the recommended appointment was made, when in 1887 the Hon.
Under volunteer regulations drafted in 1888 a general medical list was formed of officers appointed to the "General Medical Service" of the New Zealand Defence Forces. Rank as a surgeon in the volunteer force was honorary only, but after five years service in the volunteers a medical officer was eligible for enrolment in the army list. A battalion at this time had one surgeon-major and two surgeons; each senior officer was responsible that at least three men per battalion were trained and instructed in stretcher drill and field dressing. Men so instructed and approved by examination were to be selected as regimental stretcher bearers and were entitled to wear the Geneva Cross. The rates of pay were: for a Brigade Surgeon or S.M.O., 25/- per diem, with forage for one horse, 3/-; an S.M.O. Battalion 21/- and forage; a Surgeon 18/-; all when employed on military duty only. Promotion was by seniority: after twelve years' service to Surgeon-Major; after twenty years, to Brigade Surgeon; active service in the Maori War counted double towards promotion. There were four Brigade Surgeons on the Staff of the Surgeon General.
In succeeding years inspecting officers drew attention in their reports to the unsatisfactory state of the Medical Service. There was no medical equipment available, medical officers drew no capitation grant; the more zealous were obliged to provide the necessary drugs and dressings for camps and manoeuvres at their own expense. The medical officers, although discontented, were reported to be deserving of great praise for the efficient training of the "Ambulance" details attached to the corps. There was no provision for field hospitals nor base hospitals. Medical equipment was urgently required. In 1897
The outbreak of the South African war caused much temporary activity in the volunteer force. The number of men volunteering for active service was so great that there was no difficulty in
The summary of deaths in the New Zealand troops on service during this war is of interest, not only because it reflects the general sickness wastage of the British Army in South Africa, but because it demonstrates an unusual preponderance of deaths from pneumonia.
of the deaths by disease no less than 57 per cent. were from enteric and 25 per cent. by pneumonia; there were six deaths from dysentery, four attributed to C.S.M. and two to malaria. The bulk of the deaths from pneumonia were the result of a serious outbreak of measles on board a returning troopship, the Britannic, which embarked 1,080 officers and other ranks at Durban on the 5th of July, 1902. When 10 days out from port the first cases of measles were observed; the infection, it is stated, was brought on board by details of the 10th Contingent, drafted from a camp in which the disease was prevalent. At first sporadic cases were admitted to the ship's hospital, two deaths from pneumonia occurring at sea, but after calling at Melbourne measles became epidemic, with a marked incidence of pulmonary complications—on arrival in New Zealand 62 cases of pneumonia were disembarked, of which 20 terminated fatally after landing. The Principal Medical Officer of the transport,
The volunteer force doubled its strength during this war and was reorganised by collecting the various scattered companies into battalions. New regulations were framed dealing with the medical branch of the defence forces. All medical officers were appointed to the "General Medical List"; they could now earn capitation, the nominal service being six parades yearly and attendance on one Easter encampment in two years. The years following the South African War were a period of stagnation; interest in the defence forces failed in a very marked manner; the volunteer strength fell.
Colonel Skerman was appointed Surgeon-General in 1905. Regulations were amended; the chief medical amendment being the formation of the New Zealand Medical Corps. At this date there were two distinct, corps: the medical officers attached to Bearer Companies and the New Zealand "Defence Medical Staff" on the "General Medical List" of the Volunteer Regulations of 1900. Provision was now made for the formation of a corps of officers to be called the "New Zealand Medical Corps," with ranks as follows:—Surgeon-General; Surgeon Lieut.-Colonel; Surgeon-Major; and Surgeon-Captain. Hereafter all commissions were to be granted, all appointments and promotions made by the Surgeon-General. Up to this time medical officers attached to formations held honorary rank only, and were elected by the company or other
The same year it was decided by Parliament that a "Council of Defence" should take the place of the previous administration and control of the forces by a general officer commanding and his staff. The policy of the Defence Council was outlined in their first report. It was held that the volunteer system was on its last legs and that radical changes were required to give it a final chance before compulsory training was introduced as foreshadowed in the recommendations of the "Colonial Defence Committee" of 1873. Amongst the various matters to be arranged was the re-organisation of the medical corps which, although it furnished excellent bearer companies at each centre, was lacking in administrative organistion.
The Defence Regulations of 1905 were amended in 1908. the chief "Medical" amendments being: the reorganisation of the New Zealand Medical Corps, on R.A.M.C. lines; the formation of field ambulances; and the establishment of an Army Nursing Reserve. Prior to this the N.Z.M.C. was a corps of officers only. There were still volunteer medical officers, not members of the corps, holding appointments as regimental medical officers under the old regulations. The previous regulations were so amended that all officers, non-commissioned officers and men connected with the medical service of the permanent force, militia, and volunteer should be formed into a corps called the New Zealand Medical Corps. The command of this corps was entrusted to the Surgeon-General, on whose staff two medical officers were to be appointed: one a sanitary
The Defence Council of New Zealand shortly realised that without some form of compulsion the efficiency of the Defence forces, now admittedly much below requirements, could not be maintained. In 1909 the policy of compulsory military training was given effect to in the Defence Act which ensured that every male up to the age of 25 should be trained to defend his country. The Act constituted a force of 30,000 of all ranks, designated the "Territorial" force, and made training obligatory in the Junior and Senior Cadets from the ages of 12 to 18; and from 18 to 21 in the General Training Section. Voluntary enlistment was to be encouraged but the strength of the units was to be maintained from the General Training Section in case of need. Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener visited New Zealand in 1910 and inspected the old volunteer force in its last year of being; the Defence Council ceased to function; and General Godley became G.O.C. at the end of the year.
From the passing of the Defence Act of 1909 the years that followed were a fruitful preparation for War. The New Zealand
The registration of all youths available for service had been completed and the G.O.C. reported in 1911 the numbers registered as: Territorials, 21,838; senior cadets, 29,991; which was considered ample, after allowing for rejections at medical examination, for a total establishment of 30,000, the quota recommended by the Imperial General Staff. During the year 1911, 25,085 territorial recruits were medically examined almost entirely by the officers of the N.Z.M.C. Each P.M.O. was made responsible for examinations in his own military district: sub-centres were delimited in each area group with a medical officer in charge who had authority to employ civilian doctors where necessary. Much assistance was rendered by the officers and N.C.O.'s of the permanent staff in charge of area groups. The standard of fitness required was not a very high one as far as the cadets were concerned, as it was considered advantageous that all except those who would be harmed by the training should be accepted in as much as the training was expected to be beneficial. Only the absolutely unfit; therefore, were rejected. The medical examination of the recruits, youths over 18 years of age, was of a more searching character. Recruits were classified as: (a) absolutely fit, (b) sound and fit for the territorial force, (c) those fit only to serve in rifle clubs. Causes for total rejection were: any acute or chronic disease; deformities of bone; scoliosis, if marked; loss of limb; hernia; defective vision; loss of one eye. For service with the territorial force the recruit was required to be in good mental and physical health and free from any physical defect likely to interfere with the efficient performance of military duty. At 18, the standards of measurement were laid down as minimal at: 62 inches height; 111 lbs. weight; 34½ inches chest measurement, fully expanded. The results of the examinations, more especially of the cadets, showed that the standard of physique as compared with that of school boys of a like age in the United Kingdom, was a very high one, but there was evident an alarming percentage of defects of dentition. The country youths generally gave a higher proportion of fit than the town recruits, but dental defects were more noticeable amongst the country lads. Rejections for defective teeth equalled 120 per 1000. Of the 25,085 territorial force recruits, 657 were classed as temporarily unfit for one year; and 1,350 were rejected as medically unfit for service; equivalent
In the following year, 1912, 3,803 territorial recruits were medically examined, of these 9 per cent. were found permanently, and 3 per cent. temporarily unfit, the chief causes of rejection being similar to those already quoted. It was now agreed that further examination of the cadets under 18 was unnecessary as there were but few boys who would not derive benefit from the cadet training, and the unfit could be readily eliminated. In this year the first territorial camps of instruction were held. The field ambulances went into camp in their own district for company training only; medical equipment was not yet up to full establishment. 3,416 territorial recruits were examined in 1913 with 12 per cent. temporary or permanent unfitness. The Surgeon-General, Colonel Purdy, notes in his report a general improvement in the physical condition of cadets; that there was considerably less sickness in the camps and a marked general improvement in the case of the dental condition. The Adjutant-General also notes that the influence of military training "upon those who had been subjected to it, had been a matter of favourable comment on the part of employers and others in a position to judge." The discipline and conduct of troops in camps was all that could be desired.
The Territorial Force of New Zealand, the New Zealand Army, and first line of defence, was, in 1913, finally organised, fully armed and equipped as a field force of two infantry divisions and four mounted brigades with coastal defence troops and L. of C. troops on modern war establishments. Military training was compulsory for boys from 14 to 18 years in the cadets, and from 18 to 25 with the colours. Service in the reserve extended to the age of 30, but by existing legislation could be increased up to the age of 55 years in case of national emergency. The minimum amount of training required annually was: 31 drills; twelve halfday parades; and seven full days in camp with a prescribed course of musketry. The reserve were required to attend two half day parades or their equivalent with a territorial formation. Promotion to commissioned rank was by examination of N.C.O.'s only—from the ranks—and in the case of officers, by examination and selection.
The direction and training of the force was in the hands of the New Zealand Dominion section of the Imperial General Staff. Each military district provided a quarter of the total force, namely:—
Difficulties there were in plenty in acquiring experience of army requirements: the scattered distribution, more especially of the country units, when one section of field ambulance might be recruited over an area of 50 miles in extent; the limited time that could be made available by busy practitioners for military work; and above all the lack of a qualified, commissioned, whole time instructor from the R.A.M.C. who would have acted as staff officer to the D.M.S. and as an instructor to the officers of the N.Z.M.C. Such an appointment was under consideration. Again, District Medical Staff Officers—the P.M.O.'s—were granted only £50 per annum to cover the expenses of their department, while the D.M.S. had £120. It was felt that the pay drawn by territorial medical officers while in camp was insufficient to defray the cost of a locum tenens and that regimental medical officers were obliged to meet expenses and undergo a loss of time wholly disproportionate to the training benefits to be obtained in a battalion camp. These disabilities were not so keenly felt by medical officers attached to medical units, as most of them realised that the experience gained in instructing the men more than balanced the loss of time and money incurred.
In one way and another, by the use of army manuals, by contact with staff officers and by the effort required in the training of their units, without much encouragement or assistance, the N.Z.M.C. officers prepared themselves for war. A growing number presented themselves for the "C" examination—captain to major—but the number of officers so qualified was a very small percentage of the whole. Above all, the geographical distribution of officers in a sparsely populated country in which they were widely scattered, and the dearth of opportunities for personal communication and interchange of ideas, except in the larger centres, made progress in military knowledge most difficult to attain. There was certainly enthusiasm and a keen desire to carry out all duties assigned with whole hearted energy, but there was a regrettable lack of any effort to organise the N.Z.M.C. in its higher ranks for war purposes. There was no provision for adequate training of the higher commands; the administrative control was weak and inefficient. There were no officers trained for the important duties of direction such as would be required on the staff of the D.G.M.S. in case of war. There were no military hospitals; not even T.F. hospital cadres; there was no department of military hygiene, there were no military laboratories; nor was there any draft scheme to embody these units at the outbreak of war. As far as administration was concerned, New Zealand was not, from a medical point of view, prepared for war. In the words of Sir James Allen spoken in 1915: "No steps had been taken to provide a permanent army medical staff or to organise the medical department, owing to public outcry against excessive expenditure."
Such were the conditions of the New Zealand Medical Services at the outbreak of war in August, 1914, when the D.M.S., then Colonel Will, V.D., who succeeded Colonel F. R. Purdy, T.D., in June, found himself in the necessity of manning and equipping a medical service for expeditionary forces. At that time the strength and distribution of the N.Z.M.C. officers was as follows:—At headquarters, the D.M.S. only, he had no assistant; in districts: four P.M.O.'s, but no sanitary officers as yet gazetted; with 12 mounted rifle regiments, 11 N.Z.M.C. officers attached; to the 16 infantry battalions 19 R.M.O.'s attached; 8 field artillery brigades with 6 medical officers; 8 garrison artillery companies with 7 medical officers attached. The medical units, four mounted field ambulances, and four field ambulances had in all 38 officers. On the army list was shown a total of 153 N.Z.M.C. officers: of these 86 were attached to units; unattached, 67; and there were 3 quartermasters, and, say, 750 N.C.O.'s and other ranks. The present total authorised
A telegram received on August 4th, 1914, by our Governor, Lord Liverpool, from the Imperial Secretary of State, intimated that the occupation of the German Wireless Station at Samoa was an urgent Imperial Service. It was decided by the New Zealand Government to send a force to Samoa consisting of: one battalion of infantry; one company of engineers; two fifteen pounders, two six pounders; with signal, medical and army service corps details in two transports: a total force of 1,383. One section of a field ambulance was detailed for this force, with an establishment of four medical officers, two dental surgeons and 67 N.C.O.'s and men; the Senior Officer, Major Mathew Holmes, N.Z.M.C., of the 4th Wellington Field Ambulance, was appointed P.M.O. on the 7th August. To these medical details were added six nursing sisters of the N.Z.A.N.S. It will be seen that the principle of attaching dental surgeons to field ambulances was recognised in the earliest movements of New Zealand troops. There was little difficulty in assembling and equipping the men, even at short notice, as they were drawn from various sections of the 4th Field Ambulance in the Wellington District. Telegrams were despatched to the various Area Groups on the 9th and more than the required number of men had arrived in Wellington the following day. A surplus of N.C.O.'s was enlisted, but they were quite willing to forego rank and pay and joined as privates. A certain amount of extra medical stores was shipped for the purpose of equipping a small base hospital, also material for making first field dressings of which there was no large stock at that time in New Zealand. The equipment consisted of New Zealand pattern medicine chests and surgical haversacks.
The Force, commanded by Col. R. Psyche, Philomel and Pyramus, and later the H.M.S. Australia and Melbourne, and the French warship, Montcalm, which met the convoy at Noumea, New Caledonia, on the 21st. They landed at Apia unopposed on August 29th, and a proclamation was made that day by the officer commanding announcing the occupation of Samoa by New Zealand.
The health of the troops, on the transports was satisfactory. One inoculation of typhoid vaccine was given during the voyage, but owing to the military situation it was found impossible to administer the second dose until some weeks later. Typhoid was not prevalent in Samoa. Only two men made any objection to the prophylactic inoculation and as they persisted in refusing they were returned to New Zealand without landing. When the transports touched at Fiji, the Chief Medical Officer, the
After making his necessary dispositions for medical attention to the troops, the P.M.O. visited and inspected the public hospital at Apia, a well-built structure situated in extensive grounds on an excellent site about one mile from the waterfront. The German civilian staff of the hospital consisted of a chief medical officer, an eye specialist, three nurses, a steward, three Samoan and Chinese dressers with a complement of native servants. There were several departments: a Samoan hospital comprising four native huts; a Chinese ward for 20 patients; and an out-patient and administrative block. The operating section was detached. It was arranged that an empty ward somewhat isolated from the others should be appropriated to the use of New Zealand troops. At first the arrangements between the New Zealand military medical staff and the German civil hospital staff appeared to work smoothly enough. But early in September a severe form of conjunctivitis, endemic in Samoa, broke out amongst the troops; it spread rapidly, it is said by fly contamination, and by the 10th 72 cases had been or were under treatment. On the following day Dr. Schwesinger, Acting-Health Officer, informed the P.M.O. that the whole German hospital staff had decided to cease work and that at 9 a.m. the next morning they would vacate the hospital, which meant that at sixteen hours' notice the N.Z.M.C. would be compelled to take over the whole of the civil as well as the military work. The P.M.O. says in his diary, "one point worthy of notice was that the eye specialist, Dr. Glantz, also refused work and, as some form of eye disease is almost universal amongst the natives of Samoa, we had to anticipate a large amount of extra work, as some 50 cases attended daily as outpatients." Every effort was made to retain the services of the staff, temporarily at least, until an eye specialist could be obtained from New Zealand. The salaries of the staff were
This controversy introduced consideration of a nice point in the law of the Usages of War as sanctioned by the Hague and other Conventions. It is quite clear, from the original instructions issued to the New Zealand Government by the Secretary of State, that the functions of the New Zealand expedition to Samoa were: (1) To seize the German wireless station; (2) to Occupy Samoa pending ultimate settlement. The agreement upon which the Laws and Usages of War on land are based make a very sharp distinction between "Occupation" of enemy country and "Annexation." Obedience to the "Occupant" is one of the implied conditions of the special position of the peaceful enemy inhabitants. Enemy surgeons, physicians, and pharmacists, may be called upon to render service in connection with their ordinary vocations provided that they are not compelled to take part in the operations of war, and it is agreed that such specialists should remain on duty to carry on their civil functions for the safety of life and the cause of humanity until duly relieved. The sudden withdrawal of medical and sanitary officials could not but inflict hardship upon the inhabitants of the occupied territory, and it is recognised that such functionaries "best fulfil their moral duty towards their own people if they continue in office in the presence of the Invader." (Laws and Usages of War, para. 395). The P.M.O. says that the vacation of the hospital by the remainder of the staff was rather an advantage, but it necessitated the carrying on of the civil work of the hospital: Samoan in and out patients; Chinese patients; the whole of the civil medical work including the duties of Port Health Officer, the Leper Station, and the town sanitary work. To fill the vacancy in the eye department Major Kendall, N.Z.M.C., Opthalmologist, was despatched from New Zealand and took up his duties on the 27th September.
Improvements in sanitary conditions were carried out as rapidly as possible; war was waged on the flies, prevalent in extraordinary numbers; existing houses were prepared for occupation by the troops during the oncoming rainy season; the floors of Samoan huts were dug up and replaced by concrete. Incineration of excreta was not found to be practicable owing to excessive rains, but by improving existing latrines with concrete floors and instituting a pan removal system operated by Chinese labour a sound conservancy
On the 25th November, 1914, the P.M.O., Major Holmes, was relieved by Major Dawson, N.Z.M.C., and by the s.s. Navua, which sailed for Auckland on the 26th, several staff officers including the late P.M.O. returned to New Zealand. In December, 1914, in consequence of the destruction of the German fleet in the Pacific, the garrison of Samoa was reduced. The original Force of Occupation returned to New Zealand, when a relief force of men over the age limit for active service arrived to replace them.
The New Zealand Government's offer of an Expeditionary Force for service overseas was accepted on August 12th 1914. Preliminary arrangements were made as early as July 30th for the preparation I of such a force as had already been agreed upon by the Army Council in 1913. The composition of the force, afterwards called the "Main Body,"—to distinguish it from the Samoan Expedition the "Advance Party"—was as follows:—
Headquarters.
Preliminary notices were despatched, confidentially, to officers commanding districts explaining the system under which volunteers would be accepted, the quota to be furnished by each district, and the conditions of service. Volunteers were to be territorials or men with previous war experience between the ages of 25 and 35 years; the duration of service abroad: the duration of the war, and for so long after as might be required for repatriation. The medical examinations by N.Z.M.C. officers were to be carried out locally at Regimental Headquarters so as to secure decentralisation.
On the 7th August, 1914, the New Zealand Government cabled to the British authorities offering the service of an Expeditionary Force which was accepted on the 12th, when steps were immediately taken to mobilise and concentrate the quotas at the four centres so that embarkation could take place on the 28th August. The establishment of the Expeditionary Force provided for a Headquarters somewhat similar to that of a division, which included a G.O.C., with an Assistant Military Secretary and one aide-de-camp; a general staff officer, 2nd grade, with one officer attached; an A.A.G., a D.A.A.G.; an A.Q.M.G. and D.A.Q.M.G.; an A.D.M.S. and a D.A.D.M.S. Major-General Godley, C.B., I.G.S., was appointed G.O.C.
The personnel was assembled in groups at each Military District. "A" section of the Field Ambulance was enlisted from details of the 4th Wellington Territorial Field Ambulance; "B" section from the Auckland No. 1 Field Ambulance; and "C" section at Dunedin from the 2nd Field Ambulance and O.T.C. of the Medical School. The Mounted Brigade Field Ambulance was recruited in Christchurch, Headquarters of the No. 6 Mounted and the 3rd Field Ambulances. The N.C.O.'s and other ranks were almost exclusively volunteers from the Territorial Force. The officers were, in the case of the senior ranks, all volunteer officers with long service; some of them had seen active service in the South African war, all had undergone territorial training. There was no cadre of regular officers and N.C.O.'s as in the combatant formations, only one of the N.Z.P.S., the late Captain Quartermaster Sandham, M.C., N.Z.M.C., who had been instructor to medical units in the Wellington District was attached as Sergeant-Major to the Main Body Field Ambulance so that the Medical Service was exclusively territorial and comprised many of the best trained and most efficient N.Z.M.C. officers in New Zealand. The Field Ambulances were concentrated at an early date, the Mounted Unit at Awapuni Race Course near Palmerston North, which afterwards became the N.Z.M.C. Depot for New Zealand, and the Field Ambulance at Epsom near Auckland. The equipment supplied consisted of 1898 pattern panniers. The ambulance waggons were a light pattern of local construction. The G.S. waggons, also of local manufacture, were country waggons bought at the time of mobilization.
Ten transports, the only ships available in New Zealand waters at the time, were chartered by the New Zealand Government and converted into troopships, and before the transports were taken over each was surveyed by a board of officers, including a medical officer, who made recommendations as to the necessary alterations. The troopships differed somewhat from the usual type of British Indian transports: hammocks could not be provided, owing to there being so few in New Zealand, so that tiers of bunks fitted with straw mattresses were erected in the holds; the sanitary appliances were satisfactory, there was one bath per 50 men. No alcoholic liquors except those in charge of the medical officers were allowed on any transport, but dry canteens were established by the New
It was anticipated that embarkation would take place at the end of August, but owing to naval considerations it was postponed until the 24th September. After embarkation of troops and horses further instructions were received to delay sailing for some weeks, and the Force did not ultimately take its departure until the 16th October. The postponement gave valuable time for further equipping the Force and was made full use of by the Field Medical Units in instructing and training their men.
The Field Ambulance eventually embarked, less details and horses, in No. 8 Transport, the Star of India, the Mounted Field Ambulance in No. 3 Transport, Maunganui, with their horses and transport. A detail of Medical Staff and one Dental Surgeon was posted to each of the other transports. The total strength of the Expeditionary Force embarked was 360 officers, 8067 O.R., 3,815 horses. Of the officers and men 6,241 were New Zealand born roughly 75 per cent. of the Force. All the transports had rendezvous at Wellington and under escort of H.M.S. Minotaur, H.I.J.M.S. Ibuki, and H.M.S. Philomel, the convoy weighed anchor at 6 a.m. on the 16th October, reaching Hobart on Trafalgar Day where the troops were put ashore for exercise in the morning. The ultimate destination, as far as was then known, was Bulford Camp on Salisbury Plain where already a contingent of New Zealanders, then domiciled in or visiting England, were mustering; while a certain number of New Zealand medical officers were already serving with the B.E.F. in France.
On board the New Zealand transports there was little sickness of importance. Inoculations with typhoid vaccine were completed and vaccination proceeded with—only three men refused inoculation, they were returned to New Zealand later. Measles of a mild type was the prevailing disease in the various transports up to the date of arrival at Albany, Western Australia. Opportunity was found here for exercising the troops both ashore and in the handling of the ship's boats. A few sick were disembarked on the 1st November. The Australian warships Sydney and Melbourne joined the escort and the convoy resumed its journey. Three casualties in the N.Z.M.C. were reported on the voyage to Colombo: during the "Neptune" celebrations on board the Arawa, Maunganui hauled out of line and steamed head to swell to allow of an acute abdominal emergency to be operated on with the least possible movement of the ship; the patient, a member of the N.Z.M.C. made a good recovery, the operator was
Disembarkation took place at Alexandria on the 3rd December and following days; the sick were transferred to Ras-el-Tin hospital. Some inconvenience was caused to the Field Ambulance owing to the fact that their horses were not on the same transport as the men and waggons. The O.C. Field Ambulance comments in his diary as follows:—"the practice of sending the unit horses and transport by another boat has not proved satisfactory; as a result the ambulance had to encamp without tents or cooking appliances." The General Staff diary comments on this matter by stating that the principle of separating the mounted men as little as possible from their horses was observed in New, Zealand. The principle should, for many good reasons, apply to mobile medical units, which should be embarked with their horses and transport in the same vessel so as to disembark ready for immediate action as to sick or wounded if required.
It was now decided that the New Zealand Contingent should remain in Egypt as part of the Imperial Force in garrison there and should form the nucleus of a New Zealand Division. For the purpose of increasing the establishment the First Australian Light Horse Brigade with its Field Ambulance and the Ceylon Planters Company were attached. A camp for the Division was formed near Cairo on the edge of the desert astride the Heliopolis-Suez road which ran east and west through the camp. The New Zealand Field Ambulance established a receiving station for 200 sick in the lines, and the whole of the Abasseyeh hospital was set apart for the use of the New Zealand troops; the sick from Ras-el-Tin were transferred to this hospital, New Zealand Medical Corps details
Training of medical units in sectional, company, and brigade operations commenced on the 14th December and went on uninterruptedly until February. The sanitary and preventive measures adopted in the Heliopolis camp conformed with those in use in Egypt. Units were allowed to dispose of kitchen refuse to contractors; the conservancy was maintained by civilian labourers; the latrines were of the open pan type; a water supply was laid on. As regards preventive measures, T.V. inoculations were completed, without many dissentients protesting—those that did, some 35, were repatriated to New Zealand by returning ships. Venereal disease prevention was aimed at by ordering a weekly inspection of officers and men, and the repatriation of all those found to be suffering from syphilis. On the 22nd December the Field Ambulances of the Division, two New Zealand and one Australian, were inspected in the morning by Col. Manders, R.A.M.C., A.D.M.S. in Egypt, and in the afternoon, by
The end of the year saw the death of another N.Z.M.C. officer, Captain James Alexander Bell, of the Mounted Field Ambulance, who died at Abasseyeh hospital from cerebral haemorrhage on the 29th. His funeral was attended by representatives of every unit in or about Cairo, and both the G.O.C., Egypt, and General Birdwood were represented, the latter in person. The total wastage from deaths and sickness to the end of the year 1914 was: deaths 6; invalided to New Zealand 17.
Voluntary Aid Societies were now very active in assisting the New Zealand forces. There was not at this time in New Zealand, any provision made for co-ordinating the work of the many "Patriotic" and Voluntary Aid Societies formed in all parts of New Zealand at the outbreak of war, but in the general enthusiasm many offers of gifts, money and services were made from all parts of the Dominion. Quite early in August the "New Zealand War Contingent Association" formed under the auspices of Lord Plunket in London had initiated its benevolent and fruitful work. Other Societies in New Zealand—the Red Cross, St. John's Ambulance Association the Y.M.C.A., and the Salvation Army—contributed
Early in January, 1915, it had been decided that the New Zealand Force was not to be broken up; it was to form the nucleus of a mixed division, to be known as the "New Zealand and Australian Division" which, with the 1st Australian Division, was to form the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps under General Birdwood's command. Instead of the three infantry brigades which normally form the complement of a division of infantry, two brigades of cavalry—the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade and the N.Z.M.R. Brigade—were substituted so that there were four brigades in all: the New Zealand Infantry Brigade; the 4th Australian Infantry Brigade, with their two Field Ambulances; and the two Mounted Brigades, also attended by their Mounted Brigade Field Ambulances. The Artillery, comprising three brigades and one howitzer brigade, were all New Zealand troops; as were the Engineers and Army Service Corps. The Medical Service was
The first three months of the New Year were devoted to the training of the Main Body in Egypt—a training of a most strenuous nature shared by the Medical Units. But it was not by field training alone that the Ambulances were exercised. There was a camp "hospital" with 262 patients suffering from infectious and other diseases, and early in January there was a mild outbreak of smallpox (four cases), which necessitated the re-vaccination of the whole Division at the rate of 10 per cent per diem So effectual was this preventive operation that by the 14th January no less than 50 per cent. of the Division was temporarily non-efficient by reason of successful vaccination. Colonel Begg, commanding the Field Ambulance, somewhat aggrieved, says in his diary that he had at this time some 44 men detached for duty at Abasseyeh hospital, the remainder mostly engaged in his Camp hospital, and but little time left for field training; although he recognised the importance of the experience in hospital work attained by his nursing orderlies.
The end of the month was destined to give the Commanding Officer some idea of the preparedness for war of the New Zealand Field Ambulance, as he was ordered to entrain for Ismailia on the 26th of January with the New Zealand Infantry Brigade who were to help in the defence of the Suez Canal against the advancing Turkish Columns. It was the eve of the Festival of Mouled-en-Nebi, the birthday of the Prophet, and we may assume that as the Turkish Force did not attack until the night of the 2/3rd February, the German plan was some days behind schedule time. We were in touch with a Force estimated at 12,000 Ottoman troops with field and heavy artillery and pontoons concentrated at some 5 to 6 kilometres distance from the eastern banks of the Canal. Two battalions of our infantry, with two sections of field ambulance and the Brigade Headquarters, were moved to Ismailia to cover the ferry, and two battalions, with one section of field ambulance, to El Ferdan on the Canal bank north of Ismailia. New Zealand troops were detached to Serapeum and as far south as Suez; some medical details attended the detachments.
The main attempt by the Turks to cross the Canal in pontoons eventuated near Serapeum where men of the Nelson Company assisted Indian troops to break up the attack. To "B" section of
Gun fire was heard during the day on the 2nd February and in the afternoon heavy rifle fire to the south. Ismailia received a spattering of shells from field guns on the 3rd. The battle was now well engaged, and by 3.30 p.m. Turkish wounded prisoners were being admitted to "B" section's dressing station at Ismailia. Other enemy wounded, too badly hurt to be fit for transport to Cairo, were looked after by our people at the railway station; in all some 81 Turkish wounded prisoners were attended to between the 3rd and the 5th. Major Murray, N.Z.M.C., in his diary notes the "explosive" effect of the modern pointed bullet fired at close quarters with the great destruction of tissue and multiple shattering of bone produced; nearly all the wounds were caused by rifle fire and were severe: there were only two bayonet wounds observed. The method of treatment adopted was: a thorough clean up of the injuries, painting with iodine, and the application of plain sterilized gauze dressings. It had been found, in France, that where a wound was painted with iodine and dressed with the double cyanide of mercury gauze some blistering of the tissues took place owing to chemical action. All troops were originally provided with ampoules of iodine solution, to be used with their medicated first field dressing, but owing to this untoward action of the combined dressing, the iodine was withdrawn and the medicated, antiseptic dressing retained. The German field dressings were plain sterilized, but it was considered more prudent to preserve the germicidal character of the "blue gauze" in the British first field dressing issued to the individual.
When all signs of activity on the Suez Canal front had subsided, the Brigade and the Ambulance, now blooded and a bit heady from their first smell of powder, returned to camp at Zeitoun, the cynosure of all those who had remained perforce behind. Two matters of medical importance were revealed by this minor operation at the Canal: the regimental medical officers were insufficiently equipped with medical stores, and the infantry were short of first field dressings. These matters were promptly attended to. The first field dressing is a part of a man's equipment, as essential as
Brigade training in the early days of March, followed by divisional training in the latter part of the month, brought the field ambulances into more mimic battles, night marches and medical manoeuvres. Six dusty horses hauling ambulance waggons through yielding sand to the old trysting place, the 2nd Water Tower, where to the rattle of side drums signifying heavy machine gun fire "Northland" engaged in severe hostilities with "Southland" or the New Zealand and Australian Division utterly discomfited their old friends the East Lancashire Territorial Division,—"our beautiful East Lancashire Division" of Sir Ian Hamilton,—and artefacted casualties laid themselves down in grateful ease beneath the waggon covers of improvised dressing stations. Field days, night manoeuvres, inspections and grand reviews followed in monotonous succession until the Division found itself at last in that high state of fitness and military efficiency, coupled with exasperation, which imperatively demanded an immediate removal to a more active sphere of occupation remote from the flesh pots of Egypt.
Meanwhile the tally of sick men increased somewhat,—the unfit were being eliminated,—the camp hospital and the hospital at Abasseyeh were well filled: deaths from pneumonia were all too prevalent, 206 men sick with venereal disease were despatched, under escort, to Malta on the 26th. Most of these, young men probably of the very best fighting stuff, trained to the pinnacle of physical fitness and warlike spirit, brought to disgrace by the irresistible temptations of a sensuous oriental city. A heroic attempt was made by zealous New Zealand medical officers to combat the sources of venereal infection by visit and inspection of licensed brothels, and brigade ablution tents were provided, possibly with some success. But the problem of venereal prevention is a thorny subject, so beset by "Moral Considerations" and prudish disdain, so much a problem of the soldier's life and the tempestuous wilfulness and devil-may-care of men, possibly doomed to die, who have been wrought to a pitch of overmastering fitness and exuberance by skilful training for war, as to make it then, now and forever insoluble. The philosophy of Omar ruled the soldier, all were tent-makers in those days when to-morrow they might be
The Division was now complete, ready and fit for anything. Rumours were abroad towards the end of March; a serious operation, overseas, was in contemplation. The two Infantry Brigades, the New Zealand and the 4th Australian with their ambulances and the divisional artillery and engineers with divisional troops were to be embarked in transports for Mudros early in April; the horsemen of the mixed division were to be left behind for the present with the mounted field ambulances. The men of the Medical Corps under Lt.-Col. Begg, who was a most zealous commander and a strict disciplinarian, had been through four months of hard training. They had caught a glimpse of real warfare at the Suez Canal and had obtained valuable and varied experience both in their own hospital in camp as well as the base hospital at Abasseyeh. The many marches in the desert had served to instruct the officers in map-reading and the use of the compass and other matters pertaining to desert fighting. They had learnt by experience the value of sanitary and preventive measures in camps; they were now fully trained and were no doubt in a high state of efficiency for war.
The services of
Two New Zealand reinforcements, the 2nd and 3rd, brought a quota of N.Z.M.C. officers and men in December and March, Major Mathew Holmes, late P.M.O. of the Samoan force, was in charge of the 3rd N.Z.M.C. reinforcements, which at this time were being supplied at the rate of 2¼ per cent. of the overseas medical troops, per month; a rate which was inadequate to cover wastage and was later increased to 4 per cent. per month. Promotion to captain was granted in March to all lieutenants N.Z.M.C.—including the dental surgeons—who had sailed with the Main Body. Of the expediency of this early promotion of junior medical officers, some of them but recently qualified, there has been much argument. The factors governing promotion were at this time quite simple in theory. The medical troops of the Main Body were enlisted for the duration of the war, no temporary contracts, no temporary commissions made. Each officer was shown on the N.Z.E.F. gradation list, published in Egypt, and his seniority dated from the day of
Two medical officers per battalion, one a junior officer, was the authorised establishment at this time. The dental surgeons were distributed as follows:—To held ambulances, 2 dentists—thus the 4th Australian Field Ambulance had 2 N.Z.M.C. dental surgeons attached; and to each mounted brigade field ambulance, 1 N.Z.M.C. dental officer. So keen was the competition amongst dental officers to be allowed to go forward to active service that the A.D.M.S. ultimately consented to a ballot, and by this means the four successful ones were chosen. To No. 1 Australian General Hospital, one N.Z.M.C. dentist was attached, the remaining five were sent to the Overseas Base in Egypt. One medical officer, one dental officer and 11 N.C.O.'s and O.R. were sent back to New Zealand in April in charge of some 75 officers and O.R. invalided. The supernumerary medical officers, nine, in number were posted to the New Zealand Base formed at Alexandria.
Preparatory orders for embarkation were issued on April 3rd. The sick in our field ambulance were transferred to the New Zealand Hospital at Abasseyeh, and those of the Australian units to No. 1 Australian General Hospital, Heliopolis. On 10th April, 1915, tents were struck, the medical equipment loaded on to the waggons, the medical units entraining on the following morning. The medical stores and panniers of the New Zealand units were replenished and overhauled, so that the equipment was brought up to the existing imperial requirements, all save the field ambulance transport, which received special attention. The ambulance waggons—delivery vans converted—which had been brought from New Zealand had been unfavourably reported on by Col. Begg, but alterations to the body so as to adapt them to service pattern stretchers had been carried out by the State Waggon Works in Cairo. Gosler, a converted German tramp of about 8,000 tons. After moving into the outer harbour certain sanitary defects became so apparent on board the Gosler, that, by the advice of the A.D.M.S., sailing was delayed, the personnel disembarking. On completion of the necessary work—cutting extra seuppers in the 'tween decks where horses were accommodated—the troops re-embarked and the ship sailed on the 17th. She carried the Headquarters of the New Zealand Brigade. The 4th Australian Field Ambulance, less transport, sailed in the Californian on the 10th with the remainder of the convoy. The Lutzow had aboard General Godley and Divisional Headquarters Staff, including the A.D.M.S., Col. Maunders; the D.A.D.M.S., Gosler eventually arrived a week late at the rendezvous at Mudros Harbour, where were assembled some 120 ships of all varieties, the battleships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, of four nations, Britain, France, Russia and Australia.
The military forces now assembled at Mudros consisted of one French and four British Divisions: the 29th Division, Regulars; the Royal Naval Division, a recently formed unit consisting of volunteers; the first Australian Division; the New Zealand and Australian Division, lacking one Brigade of Infantry; and the French Division of mixed Territorials and Senegalese troops under General d'Amade. The M.E.F., comprising some 75,000 officers and men, was about to embark upon the most intricate and hazardous operation in amphibious warfare: a landing against determined opposition. An operation likely to be attended by heavy casualties and one in which the problems of the evacuation of wounded by sea presented difficulties as yet not explored, nor elucidated by previous experience. It is of interest, then, to consider momentarily the medical arrangements made prior to the landing at Gallipoli, which have been the subject of much controversy and ill-informed criticism both in England and in the Dominions. If there is just blame attachable to the medical staff by reason of the partial failure of these arrangements, the N.Z.M.C. surely must be held in part responsible, at least as far as Anzac is concerned, as certain of our officers were in medical charge of the ambulance transports, and our chief medical officer—the A.D.M.S.—was for a time, at least, directly associated with the adoption of the scheme of evacuations. What follows, therefore, is an attempt to set out quite plainly the sequence of events which led up to the formulation of the scheme drafted by the D.M.S., M.E.F., Surgeon-General Birrell, and the Administrative Staff of
On the 4th of April Arcadian. With the party was Lt.-Col. Keble, R.A.M.G, A.D.M.S to the D.M.S.; Surgeon-General Birrell had remained behind with the D.A.G., Bgr.-Gen. Woodward, making arrangements for the base hospitals in Egypt.
Col. Sicilia then at Mudros, and one ambulance transport, the B2 Caledonia. Col. Howse was advised that he would be required to provide a ship for slightly wounded cases, and medical personnel to the extent of three officers, 20 O.R., from the medical field units under his command, for the purpose of manning the ambulance transport allotted to his division. At this interview it was made clear that, at that time, no medical officer had been appointed D.D.M.S. to the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. To the Headquarters of each of the two corps of infantry which formed part of the B.E.F. in 1914, a senior medical officer was appointed as deputy director of medical services, his duties being to co-ordinate the medical work of the two divisions which then formed an army corps. So far no similar appointment had been made for the Australian and New Zealand Corps; General Carruthers, who was A.A. and Q.M.G. of the corps, consulted Col. Howse and asked him to draft a scheme of wounded evacuation for the corps. Col. Howse, following the general lines of Lt.-Col. Keble's draft for the 29th Division, submitted a tentative plan on the 16th. This scheme selected a transport (not named) to be manned by medical personnel drawn from field ambulances and equipped with medical and surgical stores supplied by the First Australian Casualty Clearing Station: but Col. Howse considered that such an arrangement was not the most satisfactory. He held that it would be preferable to use the Osmanieh—-the Constantinople ferry boat—and that personnel should be provided by the 2nd [Australian Stationary Hospital then at Mena. He had strong Objections to the use of troopships in that they all had horses aboard, and he considered it impossible that they could be adequately Clan McGillivray was ultimately allotted to the First Australian Division.
Col. Manders, A.M.S., A.D.M.S. to the New Zealand and Australian Division arrived in the Lutzow on the 15th, and had an interview with Col. Keble, at which it was settled that Col. Manders, being senior, should act as D.D.M.S. to the corps—an appointment which our A.D.M.S. accepted with considerable reluctance. In his capacity as D.D.M.S., he visited General Birdwood and as a result of the conference the corps issued in their operation orders (No. 1) instructions to the effect that:—The hospital ship Gascon, for serious cases, was allotted to the corps with two ambulance transports, the Clan McGillivray, and the Seeang Chun for slight cases; making provision for 200 lying down eases and 1200 sitting up—about 5½ per cent. of the full strength of both divisions. The necessary steps were taken by both A.Ds.M.S. to supply the troopships selected with personnel and stores. The transport selected for the New Zealand and Australian Division, the Seeang Chun, had on board the headquarters of the 4th Australian Brigade, Brigadier-General Monash, and the 14th Australian Infantry Battalion. She was a well found ship with a sick bay aft giving accommodation for 30 cot cases; she carried no horses. Three N.Z.M.C. officers and 20 O.R., medical personnel were detailed for duty with this ship, intended only for lightly wounded and a short voyage, of say three days, to Alexandria. Col. Manders issued a very important instruction to the A.D.M.S Australian Division which made provision for a senior medical officer to be appointed, who would act with the naval beach masters at the landing places in supervising the embarkation of casualties; he was to see that wounded were duly classified and that serious cases were sent to hospital ship, the slight cases to ambulance transport, and was above all, to notify General Birdwood's Headquarters on the Queen when a transport had embarked her full complement of wounded.
On the 18th Surgeon-General Birrell arrived in Mudros with the Administrative Staff, whose presence
On the 19th the D.M.S. cabled to Egypt for the extra medical personnel, and ordered the following units to report at Mudros:—The 16th Stationary Hospital; the 2nd Australian Stationary Hospital, and No. 5 Advanced Supply Depot of Medical Stores.
Of these alterations in the medical plans, both A.D.'sM.S., Manders and Howse, had some verbal notification; they were at present acting in accord with the original operation orders of the Australian and New Zealand corps, but they were now informed that the field units would be relieved from duty on the ambulance transports and that their stores would be replaced on arrival of the stationary hospitals. Col. Manders took the necessary steps to supply the Seeang Chun with N.Z.M.C. officers, personnel, and one and three quarter tons of medical stores from the N.Z.M.C. reinforcements and reserve medical stores on board the Seeang Bee as he strongly objected to depleting his field units. He had been informed that an additional number of transports would be selected for serious and slight cases after the hospital ships had been loaded but he made it clear, in his diary, that he was not satisfied with the arrangements and that there was a want of harmony between the office of the D.M.S. and his own, owing wholly to lack of adequate communication, as the ships Arcadian, General Ian Hamilton's Headquarters, and the Lutzow, it must be remembered, were half a mile apart and the only means of communication was by pulling boats on a wind-swept harbour, at times so rough as to temporarily interrupt all communication.
On the 21st, the day originally planned for the landing, it was blowing hard and the sea was so rough that transport from ship to ship was not available; the transfer of medical personnel could not 3 Minnewaska (Corps headquarters) General Birdwood's ship, where Admiral Thirsby outlined the full scheme of operations intended to be carried out on Gallipoli, which, as far as our Intelligence showed, would not be without severe opposition. Amongst other subjects the estimates of probable casualties at the landing were discussed. Col. Howse dissented stoutly from the original estimate of 5½ per cent. casualties and also expressed his dissatisfaction with the corps medical arrangements. Col. Manders informed General Carruthers, that: "there seems to be the same mix up as far as the hospital ships are concerned," but the A.D.M.S. was not as yet in possession of the fully drafted scheme of medical arrangements. By "hospital ships" in the above fragment from his private diary, he means ambulance transports for lightly wounded, not hospital ships. He consequently had a long interview with the D.M.S. on the same matter without satisfactory results, as far as he was concerned. Part of the misunderstanding was due to the fact that, owing to the rough weather, correspondence dated the 20th and emanating from the D.M.S. office, did not reach Col. Manders until the 22nd, having passed through "A" branch of Corps where it was delivered at 4.30 p.m. on the 21st. This important document was to advise Col. Manders, acting as D.D.M.S. that the 2nd Australian stationary hospital was at his disposal—on arrival from Egypt—for duty on the Lutzow the Ionian or other ships he might select for the use of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, and that No. 5 advanced Supply Depot of medical stores, due to arrive on the Himithus, was placed at his disposal. This message which, had the units referred to been in Mudros harbour, would have relieved Col. Manders in his real anxiety took two days to cover a sea distance of half a mile. This incident demonstrates one of the multiple difficulties of amphibious warfare: variable and often insufficient means of intercommunication. The only question Col. Manders could now ask was: where were the medical units concerned?
Col. Howse with Col. Carruthers visited the D.M.S. in the forenoon in regard to the medical arrangements, and were informed that Col. Manders acting as D.D.M.S. had been communicated with and that he had received full instructions and that the second Australian Stationary Hospital had been cabled for Col. Howse was still dissatisfied and later reported to Corps that only one transport, the Clan McGillivray had been provided for the Australian Division.
On the receipt of these belated instructions Col. Manders as D.D.M.S. of the Corps, with General Carruthers the A.A.Q.M.G., again visited Surgeon-General Birrell. During the course of the interview Col. Manders exploded a bombshell by showing to the D.M.S. a letter from General Birdwood, the Corps Commander, representing that he, Col. Manders, would be unable to fulfil the duties of D.D.M.S. Australian and New Zealand Army Corps in addition to those of A.D.M.S. New Zealand and Australian Division. Col. Manders was personally thankful to be relieved of all responsibility as regards Corps medical arrangements and had at heart the satisfaction of thinking that two transports, the Clan McGillivray and the Seeang Chun were complete with medical stores and personnel. But as a matter of fact the Seeang Bee had not yet despatched the medical officers, men and stores to the Seeang Chung owing to rough weather and lack of transport.
The 23rd saw the end of the storm, it was a beautiful day; the Admiral-in-Chief issued instructions that landing operations would take place on the 25th, the transports started to move out of the inner harbour. There was a conference on board the Lutzow at which were present amongst other commanding officerss, the A.D.M.S. and D.A.D.M.S., Lt.-Col. Begg of the New Zealand Field Ambulance and Lt.-Col. Beeston, V.D., of the Australian 4th Field Ambulance. The nature of the operation assigned to the New Zealand and Australian Division was outlined: the Division was to form part of the forces landing between Fisherman's Hut and Kaba Tepe with the object of seizing the ridge over which the Gallipoli-Maidos and Boghali-Kojadere roads run, including Sari Bair. The intention was to cut off the retreat of the Turkish forces on Kilid Bahr Plateau and prevent reinforcements from reaching them. The method to be adopted was to land the first Australian Division under a covering party to seize Sari Bair and its main spurs and to put the New Zealand and Australian Division "through them" to capture the second objective namely Mal Tepe, the fall of which would lead to the surrender of Kilid Bahr and the domination of the forts at Maidos. It was anticipated that the landing would meet with a determined resistance.
Col. Manders explained the medical arrangements which were somewhat as follows:—A Casualty Clearing Station would land early on the beach and establish a dressing station at the northern Gascon; light cases to the Clan McGillivray and Seeang Chun; transport from shore to ship by navy launches equipped as hospital boats. The old maps, 1.40,000, printed in Egypt were issued to the medical officers and all necessary verbal instructions given. Lt.-Col. Begg returned to his ship, the Gosler, and made all matters as clear as he could to his officers.
As it had been very rough in the harbour it had not been possible to practice disembarkation from boats, which was a feature of the preparation of other units, but on this day the bearers went through the manoeuvre of embarking in rowing boats satisfactorily. Captain Walton, N.Z.M.C was detailed for temporary duty on the Seeang Chun, with one other medical officer. Lt.-Col. Beeston, O.C 4th Australian Field Ambulance, had similar orders and made similar dispositions except that he was not obliged to detach ambulance personnel to man the Clan McGillivray.
On the 24th the final draft of medical arrangements prepared by the Administrative Staff and signed by Surgeon-General Birrell, D.M.S., M.E.F., was issued to "A" branch and the General Staff on board the Arcadian. No copies were sent to the A.D.'sM.S. Australian Division or New Zealand Division. Some interesting points are revealed in this document. The C.C.S. personnel was to be landed at 2 p.m. with as much surgical and medical equipment as could be man-handled; the remainder of the equipment of the C.C.S. was to follow later. Two hospital ships were available: one for Helles, the Sicilia. 400 cot cases, and the Gascon for the A.N.Z.A. Corps, accommodation, 500 cot cases. Two more hospital ships were to be available on the 27th. The Beach Master, a naval officer, would start at 2 p.m. to evacuate wounded from the shore by means of launches each capable of holding 12 cots—three were allotted to the corps—they were to be towed to the hospital ships. Four ambulance transports were provided: Lutzow, 200 serious, 1,000 slight cases; Ionian, 100 serious, 1,000 slight; Clan McGillivray, 100 serious, 600 slight; Seeang Chun, 100 serious, 600 slight. This list, if we include the hospital ship, made provision for transporting 500 cot eases and 1600 slight cases from each division, on an estimated basis of over 16 per cent. casualties for the operation. The Lutzow and the Ionian were to be supplied later with personnel and stores by the 2nd Australian Stationary Hospital. No. 1 Australian Hospital at Mudros was to be used to receive sick only. It was proposed to evacuate wounded to Alexandria and Malta direct.
No. 2 Australian Stationary Hospital, cabled for on the 19th, arrived this day in the Hindu, but was unable to report to the D.M.S. who remained in ignorance of the disposition of this unit. Three R.A.M.C officers and 20 O.K. R.A.M.C., from the 16th Stationary Hospital boarded the Seeang Chun on which they found three N.Z.M.C officers; 20 O.R. N.Z.M.C; and extra medical stores. On the arrival of this party Captain Abbott, N.Z.M.C withdrew with his men as he had been previously instructed that he would be relieved by stationary hospital personnel; but two N.Z.M.C. officers were obliged to remain on the transport on account of lack of boats and rough weather. All sick were put ashore; the transports moved off just after midnight.
On the 25th the O.C 2nd Australian Stationary Hospital received his orders that he was to provide stores and men for the ambulance carriers. He was unable to comply as the transports had sailed; he was instructed to stand fast; but the naval authorities ordered the Hindu to sail at 7 p.m. for Helles. He should have supplied three officers, 20 O.R. to the Lutzow and the same to the Ionian; one officer and 16 O.R. to the Clan McGillivray; and 15 O.R. to the Seeang Chun—the latter the only part of the order he was able to comply with as this transport had not yet left Lemnos.
The Gosler with the New Zealand Field Ambulance aboard sailed for Kaba Tepe at 9 a.m., preceded by the majority of the transports, passed the mouth of the Dardanelles where the 29th Division was landing under the cover of the guns of the Fleet, and anchored off Kaba Tepe at 3 p.m. on Sunday afternoon. Both A.D.'sM.S. had landed early on Anzac beach, both still in ignorance of the final medical arrangements, both most grievously employed. On the deck of the Gosler the bearers were standing to, medical equipment in readiness. The beach landing places were being shelled; the great war ships in rear of the Gosler were pounding the distant hills; a few shells were falling into the sea amongst the transports. Presently the destroyer Foxhound came alongside—she could take 500 men on her decks easily—Major O'Neil and his bearers scrambled down on board her. Each man had three days rations and a ground sheet to carry besides his usual equipment; number fours of squads carried extra water bottles; each bearer carried firewood and some extra dressings. The bearers and the tent subdivision men parted with careless greetings; things did not appear to be going well on the beach—the situation was obscure—the landing places and the slopes above under heavy shell fire.
From the Foxhound, carrying ambulance bearers, New Zealand Engineers and A.S.C., when close in shore the parties transhipped to barges each capable of holding 20 to 30 men. In the tow there were several boat loads, each with an N.C.O. in charge whose duty it was to rally his bearers on disembarkation after parting from the small steamboats. When they parted from the tow the boats became strung out as they rowed towards the beach; there was a strong current running; spent bullets were plopping in the water, there were bursts of shrapnel near the beach; no one was hit. Owing to the set of the current the bearer squads were distributed along the beach where they landed; it took some time for them to collect and reform. There was much to be seen on the beach. New Zealand and Australian dead—many wounded—down the beach to the right the Australian C.C.S. at work in a haze of dust near an opening into a gully—the wounded silently taking the places of those landing from the barges. A small pebbly beach and very crowded, only a cricket pitch in depth, the steep face of the shrub covered hills springing up straight from its landward edge. Above was incessant rifle fire and the smoke of shrapnel bursts; noises, dust, and strange
Major O'Neill was in the first boat to land, with him was
The A.D.M.S. had landed from the Lutzow at 10 o'clock with Divisional Headquarters, which were established in a small gully leading up to the plateau, afterwards known as Headquarters Gully. The fighting troops had landed irregularly, now from one transport, now from another. As each platoon or company came ashore it was rushed into the firing line in support of the First Australian Division on the ridges S.E. of a long gully, afterwards known as Shrapnel Gully, which divided the position by its rugged steep-sided cleft running in a north easterly direction. The result of this confused landing was that the units became hopelessly mixed up; the wounded of both divisions, commingled, streaming down mainly in the centre and left flank of the position.
Col. Manders had made two attempts to get a signal through to the D.M.S. on the Arcadian. His first message despatched at Arcadian at 5 a.m. for the Dardanelles. He found no means of communicating with the shore during the forenoon; the Arcadian was shunted to Tenedos in the afternoon. All signals from the shore were conveyed by the wireless station close to Ari Burnu Point direct to| Queen Elizabeth, where Sir Ian Hamilton had part of his headquarters. There was no means of communication. There was no D.D.M.S. at Corps Headquarters in the Minnewaska—General Birdwood's Headquarters—and had there been it is doubtful if in the heat of a confused and desperate amphibious battle, with its appalling difficulties of inter-communication, whether A.D.M.S. and D.D.M.S. could have had personal touch by signal. Fighting had to come first; the collection and evacuation of wounded would proceed according to plan. No D.D.M.S. had been appointed to fill Col. Mander's place.
With the approval of the Beach Master, a senior naval officer, acting on the D.M.S.'s medical arrangements, wounded after 2 p.m. were permitted to re-embark on the barges bringing fighting men. The launches for cot cases were plying to and from the hospital ship embarking wounded at a point close to the station of the 1st Australian C.C.S.—Lt.-Col. Giblin, A.M.C. commanding—who had wrought manfully in blood and sweat from an early hour, but were now dangerously congested. In the afternoon all the wounded were not passing through this station; evacuations were taking place in barges at the northern end of the beach, consequently all classes of wounded from the most severe to the insignificantly trivial were boarding the transports irregularly and untallied. The Seeang Chun, the headquarters of the 4th Australian Brigade, and one battalion still on board in reserve and not yet ordered into action, was taking in wounded at 6 p.m. The R.A.M.C. and the N.Z.M.C. officers set to work with a will. The heavily equipped fighting men cleared the decks as best they could to allow the stretcher cases to come aboard "painfully and slow." No stretchers were returned to the shore, the wounded lay and were dressed on the decks, not moved from their stretchers as they came aboard. The Lutzou also had a considerable number of wounded by 6 p.m. and, as we have seen, was as yet without medical personnel or stores. Here the Chief Veterinary Officer and one N.Z.M.C orderly did all that they could right willingly: Major Young with his morphia and hypodermic syringe; the orderly with the water bottles—two men, amongst many wounded, who tried to help as best they might.
But to return to the shore. The remaining parties of bearers of the New Zealand Field Ambulance soon got into touch with Capt. Craig, R.M.O. to the Auckland Battalion, close to the wireless station at the northern end of the beach, near Ari Burnu Point. This hardworked officer had established his R.A.P. earlier in the day, near Walker's Ridge, but was ordered to form a collecting post on the beach by the A.D.M.S. and to evacuate his wounded to the First Australian C.C.S. near "Hell Spit." After 2 p.m. he got several tows of wounded away from a point opposite his Post, with the approval of the A.D.M.S., as the C.C.S. was overcrowded, and the carry was long—about half a mile—the beach very congested at the southern end. At dusk, the anxieties of the AD.M.S. increased; he set the remaining field ambulance bearers under Captain Tewsley to work clearing the beach from the north end and despatched another message to the D.M.S. timed 6.45 p.m.: "To which ship shall now send further lightly wounded?" At Capt. Craig's post there were many wounded lying on stretchers. They had received attention, were dressed and ready for evacuation. One of them, an officer of the Auckland battalion, greeted the bearers:—"My God we are glad to see you fellows—there are hundreds of wounded chaps up on the hills." Barges were being towed in by naval launches, by the A.D.M.S.'s orders. Our bearers loaded these barges which were ill adapted to taking stretchers; as fast as the barges came they were filled up; but it was soon noticed that no stretchers were returning; the bearers bringing down wounded from the hills required to be supplied with stretchers in return. A corporal and an orderly were sent out with one barge to bring back the stretchers. Neither stretchers nor men returned: the men had been seized for duty on some ship lacking medical personnel. The A.D.M.S. personally controlled this embarkation, knowing that by now the C.C.S. was hopelessly overcrowded and overworked.
Through the early hours of the night, Major O'Neil, now reinforced by his bearer officers and men, worked his parties to right and left of the plateau, some reaching Walker's Ridge where the Canterbury companies were, others, Shrapnel Gully to the right; many wounded were found and brought in, most of them in their shirts and trousers only, as during the warm day they had fought without their coats or packs, which had been thrown off on the beach. It was found impossible to make out tallies for many of these men, as the bearers could not use the bull's eye lanterns—which they carried for this very purpose—without drawing fire; and snipers were everywhere, even within our lines. Morphia was given
There was terrific rifle and machine gun fire all night. All was confused. There was deep anxiety amongst the senior officers; the military situation was dangerous, uncertain. Evil rumours filled the gullies and the beach; some men whispered: "Failure"; others talked of evacuation! As yet there was no artillery to support us beyond one Indian mountain battery and one field gun, while the Turks had the best of the position, and dominated ours. Their artillery, posted out of reach of the naval guns, was well manned well served with an abundance of ammunition and doing deadly execution on our exposed positions. There had been some delay in getting troops ashore, a strange hiatus in the landings between 12.30 and 4 p.m.—precious hours wasted. The Itonus carrying the Wellington Battalion under
There were estimated to be 1,500 casualties from the Corps at midnight, most of them taken off by 11.30 p.m.; the prepared ships were full; the hospital ship Gascon sailed at midnight with 500 wounded aboard.
At midnight was held a momentous conference of leaders: the question of reembarkation was under discussion; the Admiral, the G.O.C. Sir Ian Hamilton himself, were consulted; the position of the Anzacs was very precarious indeed; but it was finally determined that Anzac should stick it out and dig in for dear life. This uncertainty, this doubt—well founded—as to the security of the position, shared by the highest command, was in itself one of the
In the early hours of the 26th reinforcements were landing: the 4th Australian Brigade had one battalion, the 15th, ashore by midnight, and fresh eager men were hurrying up to the dangerous posts at the head of Shrapnel Gully. Wellington and Otago had not as yet been seriously engaged—Auckland and Canterbury had borne the brunt of it—so everybody fell to accordingly, even the field ambulance bearers found themselves entrenching tools, and they dug, dug, dug as Sir Ian Hamilton advised them against the shrapnel in the morning. Before the dawn, there was a lull in the fight; and if our morale was shaken, if our men were exhausted, so clearly was the Turk, possibly, as history suggests, more so. A few of the bearers on the beach snatched a little sleep, only to be wakened as daylight was breaking by the landing of two New Zealand howitzers. A sergeant of the Medical Corps on rising found that he had shared the blanket of a dead man; the latter part of the night was bitterly cold.
Major O'Neil reported early in the morning to Brigade Headquarters and got into touch with Capt. Craig's R.A.P. and with Capt. Baigent, N.Z.M.C., R.M.O. to the Otago Battalion. Craig was to the left with Canterbury, Baigent on Plugge's Plateau. The enemy's guns opened fire early, but the Queen Elizabeth came up with Sir Ian to lend a hand and silenced them for a while with gargantuan shrapnel. With confidence renewed by this wonderful display, an attempt was made to reorganize even though the battle was again hotly engaged. Canterbury, Auckland and Otago with some part of Wellington were in the firing line, the 15th Australian Battalion having a "fierce time" up at Quinn's.
Down on the beach near Ari Burnu just north of the Headquarters Gully, Capt. Tewsley had established a post, its back to a clay bank which afforded some shelter; here, wounded coming in from our left round Ari Burnu were being tended. Much trouble there was from snipers' fire at Ari Burnu point; wounded being killed with the regimental stretcher bearers until 10 a.m. when our howitzers got the range and silenced the snipers. Wounded came into Tewsley's post during the day by the beach track around the point from Walker's Ridge, named after Brigadier Walker, then temporarily commanding the New Zealand Brigade; but
Very early in the morning Col. Manders had despatched a signal message to the D.M.S.:—"Re previous message, to which ship should further serious and lightly wounded be sent." It does not appear that any reply was received to this message—frankly, the D.M.S. was completely cut off from any co-operation in the medical arrangements. He had asked, on this day, that he or his A.D.M.S. might be allowed to join General Headquarters on the Queen Elizabeth in order to supervise the evacuations which he considered were not being carried out in accord with the plans agreed upon. A reply to this request came from G.H.Q. to the effect that they were making all necessary arrangements in accordance with the D.M.S.'s plan. During the day a naval surgeon had been put aboard the Lutzow where there were over 300 wounded, now 17 hours without medical attention. The medical personnel and stores to man this ship were aboard the Hindu, lying at anchor off Helles. The officer commanding the 2nd Australian Stationary Hospital, whom we have seen arriving late at Mudros was still awaiting orders from the Vice-Admiral. He was, of course, powerless to move in the matter as the transports were not allowed to use their wireless plant. The Itonus and Ionian were receiving wounded during the day. On the evening of the 26th there were about 500 wounded aboard the Seeang Chun; her original anticipated capacity was 100 cot, 600 walking cases; she had sufficient medical personnel and stores, as we have seen that two N.Z.M.C. officers with stores had boarded her in Mudros Harbour. General Carruthers came aboard about 6 p.m. and ordered the two N.Z.M.C. officers, Captain Walton, the senior, to report with stores to the Lutzow. This was done, so that there was at least no shortage of medical stores aboard the Lutzow, although of orderlies there was but one.
In the forenoon the A.D.M.S. visited O'Neil's post. He expressed admiration for the work so far done by the ambulance, and the arrangements made by them; but in the evening he took to his diary for consolation and wrote hard words about the seaward people. He had been keenly opposed to the making of the base at Alexandria; his opinion was that the prepared transports should unload wounded at Lemnos so as to be constantly available. The journey was one of only a few hours from Anzac as compared with three days to Alexandria. He says, "We have about 2000 wounded up to date. The first night
By the 27th the whole of the infantry of the New Zealand and Australian Division were in the firing line or support; a battery of New Zealand field artillery had been landed. The 4th Australian Brigade was on the right of the New Zealand Brigade, the points held being from left to right: Walker's Ridge extreme left, next in sequence, the Neck, Plugge's Plateau, Pope's Hill, Quinn's Post, and Courtney's Post, the three last named had access from Shrapnel Gully on the right. Some units of the Australian Division were still mixed up with our division, but the line was somewhat more stabilised. A very stormy counter-attack by the Turks developed at 9 a.m. on our left. New Zealand Brigade Headquarters warned Major O'Neil of the situation and shortly after he had orders from the A.D.M.S. to move at once to the foot of Walker's Ridge. This he did, with two bearer sections, passing round Ari Burnu point, eventually taking over a station which had been used by Lt.-Col. Peerless, V.D., R.M.O., Canterbury Battalion, on the 25th. It was a sheltered cleft at the foot of Walker's Ridge, just north of the "Sphinx" a prominent detached rock near Russell's Top. Lt.-Col. Peerless, who had been hardworked here since the 25th—casualties-in his battalion for the first day alone were 20 killed, 89 wounded, 101 missing—on the arrival of the field ambulance promptly climbed to the ridge to establish a new R.A.P. closer to his battalion headquarters. There was heavy rifle fire on the ridge above. The approach was up a precipitous cliff side, by a very narrow, rough goat track which admitted men in single file only and led to a zig-zag trench about two feet wide. It was, as may be imagined, exceedingly difficult to clear wounded by this, the only available track. Not far from the top O'Neil's party got into touch with Major McKillop, N.Z.M.C. R.M.O. to the N.Z.E., and later, with the R.A.P. of Major George Home, N.Z.M.C., R.M.O. to the Wellington Battalion, which was holding a front of 500 yards and hotly engaged: their casualties were 17 killed, 105 wounded, during that day. There was heavy rifle and machine gun fire most of the day on the ridge. The field ambulance bearers experienced great difficulty in clearing
At the advanced dressing station where O'Neil was established, the wounded were dressed, splinted, and given a drink, the water supply being maintained by parties of water duty men and other carriers who brought it round from the beach in kerosene tins. No sources of supply, natural or other, were available at the foot of Walker's Ridge. From O'Neil's post it was possible to carry wounded to the landing places via Ari Burnu Point, about three quarters of a mile distant; the going was heavy in loose sand; there was much snipers' fire and some shrapnel to be faced near the projecting point, so much so that the bearers removed their white brassards—as they believed that the Turkish marksmen paid little respect to the Red Cross—which made the stretcher bearers conspicuous and a better mark. One wounded man was shot on his stretcher while rounding the point. Near the point of embarkation, Capt. Tewsley's post already established, took over the wounded and embarked them in barges during the day. There was heavy shelling on the beach from 2 p.m. to 9 p.m., many wounded passed through the collecting post.
Sometime in the afternoon, between 2.30 and 5 p.m. Col. Manders sent the following message to D.M.S., M.E.F.:—"Lutzow filling up rapidly. Request name of next hospital ship. Where is advanced depot of medical stores? Running short of supplies." But to this the D.M.S. was unable to reply, it is doubtful if he had the message until two days later. He was off Helles in the Arcadian and found it impossible to communicate with the shore or with divisions, although he knew by now that the General Staff of Headquarters were still supervising the evacuations and had despatched five Australian transports to Alexandria without his instructions or supervision, and that his fully matured plans were not being adhered to. The whole of the Administrative Staff of G.H.Q., M.E.F. were also on the Arcadian and quite unable to assist, although the evacuation of wounded was part of their duties, not the duty of the General Staff. The Lutzow left shortly after 5 p.m.; she had a sufficient supply of medical dressings and drugs; Capt.
The total casualties for the corps were 500 for this, the third day. During the first three days fighting, the New Zealand and Australian Division lost 17 officers, 224 O.R. killed, 35 officers, 655 O.R. wounded, the missing not recorded: a total casualty list of 931. The losses of the Anzac Corps were 3000 approximately in the same period: say 15 per cent. of the force engaged.
The 28th was a day of reorganization and consolidation. There was no marked military activity save the now usual shelling of the beach—even that horror somewhat abated. The A.D.M.S. was now most anxious to land the tent subdivisions of the ambulances and he took steps to have them disembarked. The tent subdivisions of the New Zealand Field Ambulance on the Gosler had opened a dressing station on the 26th. Many wounded were coming aboard; the hospital ships and ambulance transports were inadequate to deal with all casualties. No doubt in the unavoidable confusion of the first few days many trivial cases boarded the prepared transports, so encroaching on the accommodation available for stretcher cases; as the result, barges carrying wounded drew alongside any transport where there was a chance of quitting their pathetic cargo. There was considerable delay and difficulty in getting stretchers up the companion way of the Gosler, although fortunately the sea was calm as it had been during the previous days. An operating table was set up in one of the larger cabins and at least one amputation, performed. Blankets were provided from the G.S. waggons in the hold, and the stretchers were placed on the top deck under cover of the awnings. The wounded were New Zealanders and natives of India. Shortly after mid-day on the 28th the tent subdivision had orders to disembark. All equipment, with the exception of tents, ground sheets and blankets, was brought safely to shore towards dusk. Tewsley's party handed over their collecting post and rejoined the A.D.S. under O'Neil, and here, with its back to a clay bank, the M.D.S. was established, the party during the night excavating and filling sand bags so as to make some sort of shelter from shrapnel. Evacuations proceeded satisfactorily during the day; again there was a loss of between 400 and 500 in the Corps.
The 4th Australian Field Ambulance bearers had been working assiduously in Shrapnel Gully in rear of their brigade since the
The enemy fire was slackening off, the military situation was somewhat improved. Part of the Royal Naval Division was landing. Anzac had come to stay. And as the diarists all said—there was beautiful bathing on the beach.
We are now in a position to close our reflections on an exasperating problem: the evacuation of wounded in amphibious warfare. There was nothing much in military history of similar operations; in the "Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations," dated 1913, we will find little to guide us in the matter and only this much information bearing on the point:—
Owing to the difficulty of transmitting orders at sea naval and military orders should be drawn up at such a date prior to embarkation as to allow sufficient time for completion of the necessary arrangements. Orders for the disembarkation of troops should include:—"medical arrangements."
Combined military and naval operations involving a landing of troops against armed opposition are the most difficult of all warlike manoeuvres and have rarely proved successful. Coupled with the dangers to be faced from the opposing military and naval forces, are the elemental hazards of the sea, unfavourable weather conditions multiplying the risks enormously. These dangers were faced at Anzac and overcome: the forces intended to disembark did disembark without crippling casualties; guns horses and mules were beached, and mountains of stores, to scheduled time. This in itself was an "unparalleled feat of arms" and seamanship. Twelve hours storm during these anxious days would have led to irretrievable disaster; the luck was with the landing parties. But above all the evacuation to transports of over 3000 wounded, simultaneously with the landing of fighting troops on a shell swept beach, and in an open roadstead was a feat for which the navy deserves the highest commendation. That the wounded should suffer was, and is inevitable. That there was hardship, discomfort, real suffering and loss of life caused by the unsatisfactory provisions made for some of the temporary hospital transports is true. Adequate provision of available transports was made in the final scheme of medical arrangements, for deck space, personnel and stores, and had these medical arrangements been carried out in full, much of the hardships and dangers for the wounded would have been eliminated. The causes which contributed to the partial failure of the scheme were:—
The 1st Australian C.C.S., landed on the 25th, did magnificent work as a dressing station, but could not exercise its normal functions as a casualty clearing station as we now understand them; neither could the small advanced dressing stations of the bearer personnel keep even a nominal roll of the wounded they collected and dressed and helped to evacuate.
There is little doubt that had the Hindu been in touch earlier much could have been done to equip the transports Hindu remained "Missing." Owing to the restrictions placed on the use of wireless she was unable to communicate with the responsible naval authority and remained on the high seas off Helles without instructions until the 29th, when she arrived at 7 p.m. off Anzac distributing her precious stores, officers and men to various transports on the following day. The D.M.S. comments in his diary, "the Anzacs wired they wanted dressings. Unfortunately the Clan McGillivray and Seeang Chun which had large stores had left for Alexandria without [my] orders." He also infers that the classification of the wounded seems to have been wanting in spite of beach officers having been notified that certain ships were for very slight, others for serious cases. A trawler was supplied to the D.M.S. on the 29th; Lt.-Col. Keeble went round the transports and reallotted wounded to ships according to classes.
With regard to the classification of wounded ashore: we have seen that Col. Manders in his orders had detailed an officer for this purpose but he cancelled the order when he ceased to be D.D.M.S.—we have seen also that both A.D'sM.S. in person, worked on the beaches prior even to the hour appointed for the first evacuations at 2 p.m. But having in view: the overcrowding of the C.C.S. and the initiation of evacuation from another point further north out of control of the C.C.S., the distance seaward at which the transports had to anchor on account of shell fire, and the anxiety to get wounded off as night fell, due to general tension and uncertainty as to holding out in the very insecure positions attained, it is impossible to suggest that anything better could have been done by the shore parties. Everyone praised their work.
Whatever the extent of the failure of an almost impossible and unprecedented feat of evacuating wounded from a hotly
One more document we must examine before we dispose of this consideration: it is a copy of a signal message dated 28.4.15 from the AA. & Q.M.G. Australian and New Zealand Army Corps to General Birdwood. It is signed by Brigadier General Carruthers:—"I yesterday organised the hospital Lutzow, Itonus, Ionian, Clan McGillivray, Seeang Chun. I have had to disorganise the field ambulances somewhat to get the medical officers and equipment. The wounded are very uncomfortably housed and the attendance is insufficient and the drugs scanty, but no more was possible. The Hindu with the stationary hospital equipment has never come at all. I have given all the transports orders to return as soon as possible and have told the medical officers to select and bring back any men slightly wounded who are fit to rejoin the ranks. Hold parties and military transport staff have in most cases stayed on board. As the doctors have no medical attendants the hold parties are doing the work."
As regards the Lutzow, Captain Walton, N.Z.M.C., reported that there was no shortage of drugs or dressings but there was a dearth of nursing apparatus. He had one medical officer but no orderlies; of the 500 wounded on board, 5 died during the voyage to Alexandria.
On the 1st May the D.A.D.M.S. tells us that the beach was a mass of men, mules, munitions and shrapnel; and the most deadly of these were the mules. Up in Shrapnel Gully, the chief highway of communication and traffic that lay between the New Zealand and the Australian positions—described in later maps as Kumur Kapu-dere—affairs were very unsatisfactory. The Turks held the heads of the gullies leading into the main dere and dominated all our movements by rifle fire and observed shrapnel bursts. With the object of improving our positions at the head of the gully, an offensive was prepared designed to deny observation to the Turks. The operation was to include a knoll—Baby 700—overlooking the left fork or "Monash's" Gully, and was to include a general advance of several hundred yards to the N.E. and E. entrusted to the New Zealand and Australian Division. One section of bearers from the advanced dressing station at Walker's Ridge was detailed to proceed to the head of Monash's Gully, and at the fork in the dere, near the base of "Pope's Hill," a dressing station was formed in touch with Captain Baigent, N.Z.M.C., R.M.O. to Otago.
The attack commenced at 8.30 on the night of the 2/3rd May. The Otago Battalion, hung up by severe machine gun fire, were unable to advance far and had heavy losses. The work of collecting the wounded was unusually difficult; it was a very dark night but no lights could be shown; it had rained, and the Pte. Simpson A.M.C., a bearer of one of the Australian Field Ambulances, according to Lt.-Col. Beeston. See his booklet, "Five Months at Anzac."
By an order published this day the name "Anzac" was made official: the beach where the main body had landed was given this name, and later it was applied to the whole position occupied by the Australians and New Zealanders.
On the night of 5th May the three New Zealand, bearer subdivisions embarked from a small pier erected close to the Australian C.C.S. and marked at night by a red light. They were to accompany the New Zealand Brigade to Helles for the attack on the 10th. The party boarded the T.B.D. Bulldog at 1.30 a.m. It was a cold and windy night, but the crew took as many of the bearers as they could accommodate below and regaled them with hot cocoa. The officers slept in the ward room, the naval officers making them right welcome. The parties landed at "V" beach and
After an intense bombardment the New Zealand Brigade advanced in successive waves at 10.30 a.m. on the 8th. They were temporarily cheeked after reaching 250 yards from their jumping off position, but ultimately made about 400 yards of ground at heavy cost, and dug in where they lay, 300 yards south of Krithia, in fields thickly sown with poppies and ox-eye daisies. The ground gained was held and consolidated during the following days until the night of the 11th, when the old "enemy" of long past manoeuvre days in Egypt, the 42nd East Lancashire Territorial Division, relieved. The casualties were heavy: from the 6th to the 10th of May, 128 killed; 653 wounded or missing; total, 781; over 25 per cent. of the effectives.
Major Craig, R.M.O. to the Auckland Battalion was seriously wounded on the 8th, while tending wounded in the open. Capt. Baigent of Otago, and Capt. Mitchell, replacing Lt.-Col. Peerless wounded, established their combined R.A.P. in a building called "White house," a small ruin consisting of three stone walls and a mud floor, it had no roof, it was much exposed to shrapnel and rifle fire hence difficult to clear by daylight. Many wounded, about 40 in all of the 29th Division and the New Zealand Brigade, were sheltered here during the day, one of the chaplains the Revd. Thos. F. Taylor, helping to bring them in. To the left of our line in the Sagali Dere, Capt. Home of Wellington had his R.A.P and from there the bearers had a long carry down the dere to the beach or to the dressing station at Pink farm.
On the 9th the transport of the 87th Field Ambulance was available as far as the collecting post; walking wounded could reach the beach either by the track or down the Sagli Dere on the left; but many stretcher cases had to be carried direct to the beach by hand, and by this means during the night of 8/9th close on 200 cases had been evacuated on both routes. On the 9th the Otago
During the absence of the brigade many striking events had been recorded in Anzac. The New Zealand Mounted Brigade, 1500 strong, had landed, and with them the bearers of the New Zealand Mounted Field Ambulance. There had been much trench fighting at Quinn's Post at the head of the dere. Major-General Bridges, commanding the 1st Australian Division, had died as the result of a wound of the femoral artery dealt him by a sniper in Shrapnel Gully.
On the 18th of May there was heavy shelling by 8 and 11 inch guns from the direction of the Dardanelles. Part of the works at Quinn's Post were blown in. Information was obtained that there was much movement of Turkish guns and troops in the direction of Anzac. The enemy was reinforced and a determined counter attack by the Turks culminated on the 19th with a general assault on all sectors. The newly arrived 2nd Turkish Division was engaged; their losses must have amounted to 9000 killed and wounded as all attacks were beaten off with heavy slaughter; our artillery and machine guns, wonderfully handled, ploughed bloody furrows in the Turkish massed infantry. The losses of the New Zealand and Australian Division were not heavy; 65 killed, and 237 wounded during the two days, 18th and 19th. The total loss for our division from the 25th of April—the landing—up to the 20th May, the Turkish counter-attack, was 659 killed, 2212 wounded, 594 missing, in all 3465. These losses had been in part made up by the reinforcements and 2000 mounted riflemen.
The dead lay in festering heaps in front of our trenches, and on the 20th, two Turkish medical officers with Red Crescent flags approached Pope's Hill. Two Australian medical officers went out to meet them. The Turks desired an armistice to bury their dead and collect their wounded. The armistice granted on the 24th had good sanitary reasons to justify it, the dead lying in front of our Sarcophagides, the "carcass" flies, have a black and white chequered abdomen, they extrude living larvae which are armed with powerful claws capable of tearing and consuming all animal tissue, including soft bone. They burrow deeply and attain full growth in a few days, when they abandon their feeding place to pupate in the ground. Such infection of a wound can only occur under rare conditions. It is stated that over 3000 Turks were buried on armistice day. Capt. Home, N.Z.M.C. had some conversation with a Turkish officer who informed him that the 400 Australian and New Zealand prisoners in Constantinople were safe and well-treated.
During the month of May the extent of the Anzac position had been somewhat enlarged by the establishment of outposts on our left flank. No. 1 outpost was on a detached hill on the left bank of the Sazli Beit Dere, some 500 yards from the extremity of Walker's Ridge; No. 2 outpost and No. 3 outpost were on small under features close to the beach some 1000 yards further on to the north, No. 3 outpost the furthest out on the left bank of the Chailak Dere, No. 2 on the right bank of the Sazli Beit Dere. The water courses or "dere" which were dry at this season of the year, both took their origin on the heights of Sari Bair. A long communicating trench, the "Big Sap," connecting these posts with dead ground at the foot of Walker's Ridge, had been dug and continued round the cape at Ari Burnu so as to give protection against the constant rifle fire directed against this point. The full extent of beach covered by the New Zealand and Australian Division along this line of communication was about 3000 yards, from Shrapnel Gully to No. 3 outpost.
The New Zealand main dressing station on Anzac Beach, now well established at its old site—fairly well dug in and sand-bagged, an operating tent pitched—was receiving many wounded and sick: during the first fortnight of its work, 637 wounded and 177 sick had passed through. There were two advanced dressing stations, one of these was in Shrapnel Gully at the foot of Pope's Hill at the site already used by the bearer
In the later half of May and early June, the sickness rate of the division was noticeably increasing. Cases of gastroenteritis had been common for some time, by the middle of June, in spite of heavy fighting and an increasing severity of shelling on the beach, the sick evacuated were in the proportion of three to two of the wounded; and by the end of June, sickness was assuming alarming proportions, equivalent to 35 per 1000 per week. Owing to incessant shelling of the beach, substantial sandbagged walls and head cover had to be made to protect the main dressing station, and a shelter for wounded accommodating 60 stretchers. By breaking up the shattered boats of the first landing parties, sufficient timber was obtained to form a roof on which 9 inches of earth was heaped. At first, no operations, except those required for the arrest of haemorrhage, were performed at the main dressing station, as expeditious evacuation to hospital ships was possible; but on occasions when the sea was rough, it was necessary to detain the wounded for some time, so that abdominal wounds were subjected to immediate operation, the cases being detained ashore for three to four days after operation. About 25 per cent. of such cases were ultimately evacuated in good condition, the remainder dying after operation. A considerable number of head injuries involving a depressed fracture were also treated by operation at the M.D.S., the immediate results in these cases appeared to be good. Early operation in both conditions, with retention of the patients, was the rule for a time at least, but the increasing accuracy and effectiveness of the enemy shelling, now from two points of the compass, ultimately wrecked even the sandbagged shelters and compelled removal to safer quarters at the foot of Walker's Ridge; but here, operations were quite out of the question owing to dust and flies. The shelling of the dressing station by the Turks was unavoidable owing to the crowded condition of the beach. No red cross flag was flown most of the time.
In the old main dressing station the wounded frequently arrived on donkey back and were able to ride right up to the dressing table on to which they could be assisted. The famous donkey man "Simpson," possibly apochryphal, who with his little Egyptian donkeys assisted so many wounded down the Shrapnel Gully—"the valley of death" as some diaries name it—was reputed to have been killed in May. Many of the Australian field ambulance bearers and our own made use of these handy little animals for those who were lightly wounded—a novel method of ambulance transport attracting much attention, and a peg for many a pious tale. The donkeys of the New Zealand field ambulances were used also for water transport from the beach to the advanced dressing stations—most units had purchased a few donkeys either in Egypt or at Lemnos—they would have proved more useful if they had been shrapnel proof, or had been blessed with hides as tough as the shagreen skin of the wild ass the "Peau de Chagrin" of Balzac. As water carriers they were, while they lived, invaluable.
No water carts had so far been landed, and no wells of any importance located. In some the water was brackish, others early polluted during the heavy fighting. The main source of supply was from barges arriving daily at the beach, from which the water was pumped into troughs, and later tanks. The water duty men of battalions were mainly used as medical orderlies to the R.M.O., as they had no water-purification duties to perform; some of them were employed as supervisors of sanitary work—in either capacity the N.Z.M.C. details attached to battalions were most useful to the R.M.O.'s One of these, L/Cpl. Singleton, D.C.M., already referred to as doing good work on Walker's Ridge in April, while standing just outside the main dressing station on June 24th sustained a wound in the back, penetrating the abdomen, from which he died on the 25th. Other casualties in the N.Z.M.C. were three killed, and three or four wounded. One of the water duty men met with a strange death—bayonetted by our sentries who mistook him for a Turk as he was returning to our lines from a burial party at night.
This concludes what may be described as the first phase of the Anzac Campaign. The landing; the consolidation of the position; the repulse of the counter attack. The military situation was now one of stalemate, stationary warfare, and the minor enterprises of trench fighting.
With the coming of summer and the degeneration of the military operations into a condition of stagnation—a veritable siege of the Anzac garrison—sickness, the enemy of all beleaguered garrisons, joined forces with the Turk and took daily an ever increasing toll of victims. In the first week of June, the evacuation's by sickness from the Anzac corps amounted to 456; but during the last week of the month, 818 sick were evacuated from the beach—a sickness wastage equivalent to 35 per 1000 per week, or one brigade a month.
Gastro-intestinal disorders had become almost universal by the end of June, severe diarrhoea with bloody and mucoid stools were the common symptoms. The rations were at first blamed: it was suggested that the excessive consumption of "bully beef" and fresh meat with a lack of fresh vegetables was the cause; others considered that the frying of the meat in the mess tins—every man cooked for himself in those days—and the consumption of army biscuits were the aggravating causes. What is one man's meat may be another's poison, wherefore, during the Armistice, our men swapped army biscuits for rye bread with the Turks.
By the middle of the month the first cases of "Enteric" or "Typhoid" were notified to A.D.'sM.S by the base and stationary hospitals at Mudros. There was an immediate search for carriers, those known to have had typhoid were evacuated and a request was made for a resident pathologist. The prevailing diarrhoea was now found at the bases to be baccillary or amoebic dysentery.
Flies, first noticed about May 15th, had become a pestilent horror towards the end of June. The D.M.S., Surgeon General Birrell, was consulted. His memorandum, although subjected to much humorous criticism, was on the whole quite sound in view of existing sanitary knowledge in the M.E.F. He pointed out that the breeding places should be located and that all refuse should be dealt with promptly by incineration or otherwise; the use of fly-papers was recommended. A very senior officer, a brigade commander, promptly indented for 4000 fly-papers and miles of string so as to festoon the dere—a reductio ad absurdum, which damned the memorandum. Crude petroleum was indented for, but
Sanitary methods were rigorously enforced. A sanitary officer was appointed to each sector of defence. Major Sinclair, N.Z.M.C., D.P.H., since dead, was then divisional sanitary officer; we have seen that he landed with the advanced guard, armed with a testing case and charged with an impossible duty, to advise on the purity of the water consumed by the half-maddened fighters struggling about the muddy water holes of Shrapnel Gully during the first days of the landing. Other medical officers and one dental officer, Captain McKenzie, N.Z.M.C.—who shortly after landing established a dental chair somewhere in the trenches near Russell's Top—were allotted to sectors of the defensive position and assumed sanitary control over the beach and other unallocated areas. In the trenches scrupulous cleanliness was aimed at: refuse which had previously been thrown out at the back of the parados, or promiscuously, was buried or incinerated. Wells were controlled; some water holes were condemned and put out of bounds; the issue of fresh meat was cut down for trench troops and alternative issues of potatoes and oatmeal were made. Lime juice was issued twice a week. R.M.O.'s were allowed to draw condensed milk, arrowroot, and bovril in small quantities for issue to walking sick; the regimental sick kitchen for light diets became a feature of the R.A.P. at a later date.
Towards the end of the month Colonel Manders complimented the medical officers on an improvement in sanitary conditions; but it was now evident that there was a serious incidence of "enterica" amongst the New Zealand troops; and that amoebic and bacillary dysentery were epidemic. It was suggested that the amoebic dysentery was imported by carriers from Egypt, but it was known to be endemic on the Gallipoli Peninsula in pre-war days, and it is now known, although at that time not proven that this disease may be fly-borne to the same extent as is bacillary dysentery. The "enterica" cases were, in part, due to infection by carriers, ambulatory and undetected cases, or ordinary carriers from Egypt, but most frequently by carriers amongst the Indian troops, aided by fly infestation, and open latrines. The first latrines had been dug on the beach at low water during the days of the landing: later, small trench latrines were established, but were not much used when the shelling of the beach areas became intolerable. Deep and shallow trench latrines had their adherents. The steep ground at Quinn's Post offered little space for shallow trenching, so that deep trenches
The sanitary diaries of N.Z.M.C. R.M.O.'s and district sanitary officers, still extant, serve to show that the medical staff were triers and were acting up to existing lights. The following extracts from a sanitary diary are typical:—
"Refuse. Between the top support trenches and the fire trenches, refuse has been thrown over the parapet. All through the sector refuse is lying about; at X Sap I have noticed a foul refuse heap which has been there for several days, it is now swarming with flies. It should be covered in immediately." We knew later that covering in was of no avail, the flies had already laid their eggs, the larvae would emerge through an incredible depth of light soil. Incineration was the only remedy.
"Urinals and Latrines. Notices should be put in the trenches directing troops to these places."
The writer goes on to condemn the shallow trench latrines which had been abandoned at the beginning of the year in France—at least in the trenches—and advises deep trench latrines 6 feet deep, 2 feet broad, 10 feet long, with a rail supported on two biscuit tins filled with sand, with the usual "antisplash" apron of biscuit fin to prevent soiling of the ground by urine and the undercutting of the trench walls to prevent fouling. Such a latrine would suffice, he says, for 500 men. Disinfection with lime was recommended. The extract continues:—"The A.D.M.S. recommends Indian pattern urinals: holes to be dug 2 feet in diameter and 3 feet deep with graded stones from the size of a cricket ball below to that of a walnut above." The diarist next dilates upon the duties of the regimental sanitary detachment. "The regimental sanitary squad [sic] are not scavengers and should not be employed in the collection of refuse. I would make them responsible for the following duties: (1) Refuse pits to be
"Meat Issue. One half of the present bully beef would be ample, much of it is thrown away. The fresh meat issue is too large; with the cooking utensils [the mess tins only] available, the meat cannot be used before putrefaction sets in." [The meat became fly-blown by viviparous "green bottle" flies.] "Some men are suffering from boils and an intractable superficial inflammation of the skin [desert sores?]. I have asked for an extra ration of lime juice for these men for medicinal purposes. Bacon, cheese and jam are plentiful, and much appreciated, but the bacon is too salt and there is no water available for soaking. I would strongly recommend an increase in the water ration, the quantity allowed is not sufficient to keep the men healthy. I have measured carefully the milk cans for the supply of water and find that they hold 2¼ gallons when filled to the top. The water has been issued in these cans on the assumption that they contain 2½ gallons. Allowance should be made for this shortage." The water supply was jealously guarded; this haggling about two pints amongst nine men is very pathetic.
A note from Captain Baigent's diary:—"In May the New Zealand Brigade relieved the 4th Australian Brigade in Quinn's and Courtney's Posts. Sanitation was a very difficult problem in these days owing to the great heat, the prevalence of flies and lack of space. Courtney's Post would not accommodate the whole battalion, and the men not actually in the trenches were bivouacked on terraces. The only space available for latrines was on the slope exposed to snipers, thus necessitating the construction of sand bagged protection. Later on we were forced to tunnel through a knoll about 30ft in order to use a small protected hollow on the other side for latrines. Flies were our main worry. The men had the greatest difficulty in swallowing their food before the flies attacked it. Owing to the heat and the swarms of flies, fresh meat had to be cut up immediately it was received and put into dixies and stewed. My R.A.P. at Courtney's
The Posts at Quinn's and Courtney's were both of great military importance, and of course hotly disputed, Quinn's especially, guarding the head of the right fork of Monash's Gully was a most dangerous death trap place where the Turkish works and ours almost adjoined. Affairs of mine and counter-mine, fierce bombing raids, even hand to hand encounters were not uncommon. The 16th Battalion of the 4th Australian Brigade had deplorably heavy losses early in May, but at the time described by our diarist the line had been more or less consolidated.
Captain Home, N.Z.M.C. of the Wellington Battalion writes of these posts and their difficulties. "Tuesday, June 1st. Moved this morning from Reserve Gully to Courtney's Post on the south side of our general position. Courtney's Post hangs by its eyebrows on the edge of a steep gully, and we are camped in bivouacs dug out on the declivity. Here it is a war of trenches and explosives, of bombs, grenades, mines and counter mines and other infernal machinery. We have dynamiting parties out every night and mines burrowing towards the Turk trenehes—as they are also mining towards us it is a matter of acute interest which side gets the blow up first. So far the honours are about easy, but the Turks have more than once rushed the crater, but none of them got back again, so that if they had the honours that time we took the tricks. My chief worry is the impossibility of proper sanitation on the crowded hillside, and flies are becoming very thick. When we first took over it was a sort of rabble (sic) ground, scrambling, unformed, loose tracks, and bivouacs scraped out here, there, and everywhere on the hillside, so that Colonel Malone said that getting the men out was like digging periwinkles out of their shells. They looked just like a lot of magnified rabbits, both in their earth works and their sanitary arrangements. Colonel Malone had the steep hillside terraced so that the men of a platoon could settle down side by side. Proper steps were made so that men could get a decent hold coming up and going down."
The Wellington Battalion was very highly disciplined and well organised by the genius of Lt.-Col. Malone. His domestic
In July was reached the height of the summer heat: night temperatures in spite of the sea breeze were higher than the day temperatures which ranged from 83° to 85°F in the shade at midday. Sickness had reached dangerous proportions: the weekly evacuations from the corps by sickness alone exceeded 400. A return received by the A.D.M.S. from Mudros showed that 61 cases of enteric had been diagnosed at the bases, in all 142 cases from the corps. Early in the month there was a cholera scare, one or two cases had been diagnosed tentatively—they proved later to be severe baccillary dysentery. Orders came from the D.M.S. to initiate anti-cholera inoculations. On the 7th July the A.D.M.S. distributed vaccine, prepared at St. Mary's, London, and by the 16th, 4000 men had been immunised; the reactions were mild. Two "cholera hospitals" were projected, one for each division. All water was to be chlorinated, but for various reasons this could not be done: of the canvas troughs issued to units for the purpose very few remained intact.
About this time the unusual consumption of drugs and medical comforts by the New Zealand medical officers was commented on. There was a shortage of castor oil, a drug much in favour at the time. There was sharp division of opinion amongst medical officers as to the merits of holding up sick at battalion headquarters, feeding them on medical comforts, drugging and treating them on the off-chance of keeping up effective strength. Some R.M.O.'s did not believe in the R.A.P. "soup kitchen," but thought it best to evacuate to the field ambulance who were holding all the sick that they could accommodate. The R.M.O.'s were trying to hold men in the ranks. Anzac was now one big hospital. Towards the end of the month of July, one of the brigadiers held a conference of his R.M.O.'s to discuss the
It was freely granted that the very arduous work called for was necessary and unavoidable. There was feverish preparation forward for the August offensive. Battalions were depleted, the average strength 25 per cent. below normal. The bacteriologist at Mudros reported the causes of the sickness to be:—dysentery of shiga type, amoebic dysentery and undifferentiated "enterica." The A.D.M.S. advised the D.M.S. that the health of the division was bad and likely to become worse and authorised a rum issue three times a week to act as an appetiser, a cocktail to coax the men to eat their rations—a very popular A.D.M.S. for the nonce.
One of the most dreadful of the sanitary problems was the disposal of decomposing bodies lying in the vicinity of the trenches, sorry memorials of repeated attacks by the Turks under Enver Pascha, who came at the end of June to drive the Anzacs into the sea, but left some 300 dead in front of our trenches; another holocaust, but, unfortunately, not a whole burnt offering to the gods of Ansac. From the decomposing bodies there came an unbearable stench in the trenches; an extract from the diary of a sanitary officer gives luminous if repulsive details:—"July 5th Decomposing bodies. Lime is urgently required to deal with this trouble. Enemy dead are lying within a few yards of No. X Sap. The stench is abominable and the trenches are crawling with maggots. Troops have to remain in the trench constantly, the smell causes them to vomit. It is impossible to remove or bury the bodies as a machine gun is trained on the spot." [Enemy trenches not many yards away.] "Lime would greatly improve matters as I have already found out."
Of these noisome dead, over 200 were buried on the night of 2/3rd July by the New Zealand Mounted Brigade. In other instances the bodies were sprinkled with kerosene and burnt; where the enemy trenches were very close to ours, it was necessary to use grappling irons and drag for them; the decomposing body
To these major horrors were added the "minor horrors of war." Lice infestation, first noted at the Suez Canal in February, had now become a universal torment because of propinquity, inadequate means of disinfestation, and partly through ignorance of the life habits of the parasites.
Meanwhile military matters of great moment were in prospect as the following extract from the diary of Captain Guthrie, N.Z.M.C, R.M.O., of the Canterbury Mounted Rifle Regiment, shows:—"July 19th, 1915. One notices a general preparation on all sides, the supply depot below us is increasing steadily in size. Large boiler-like tanks are being put in place with pipes laid on; an engined pump is installed at Anzac. All communication trenches are being widened; a road along the shore to No. 2 outpost is being made. Last night a complete howitzer brigade came ashore, 18 guns. Men are practising hill climbing, Anzac beach and foreshore are piled up house high with all sorts of stores and ammunition. All this work is done at night time. Every precaution is being taken against gas. We all have masks; Vermorel sprayers are in the trenches. Some day, not very far away, more troops will land and an advance on a big scale will be made." With Anzac thus busily engaged and no fighting in prospect until August 7th, we can afford a moment to look back at New Zealand and its doings since the main body left, and what had happened at overseas and the home bases during the first year of the war.
In New Zealand, shortly after the departure of the main body, reinforcements on the highest scale had to be despatched at regular intervals, and in order to concentrate, train, and equip these reinforcements, a large tented camp was opened at Trentham on the site of the Dominion Rifle Association's Ranges, situated in the Hutt Valley, some 20 miles N.E. of Wellington on the Wairarapa line of railway and adjacent to the large station used for the service of the Trentham Race Course. Concurrently with the mobilisation of volunteers from the existing territorial force and the civilian population, the training of the territorials and cadets was successfully carried out during the year 1914-1915,
The first duty of the D.M.S. was to recruit medical officers for the N.Z.E.F. This he did by enlisting the assistance of the British Medical Association (New Zealand branch), who published an appeal for volunteers in their journal. A second appeal was never made: volunteers were immediately available and continued to come in freely all through 1915 to furnish reinforcements, to man the new medical units formed, and to staff the training and concentration camps, the most important of which was Trentham, the final jumping off place for reinforcements.
Trentham Camp was situated, as we have seen, in the Upper Hutt Valley, a healthy country district, very thinly populated. Surrounded by steep hills, there was an area of flat country in the valley, the soil being a stony or gravelly loam, fairly permeable, the sub-soil, river gravel of high permeability; very dry in summer time but inclined to be damp and retentive of moisture during the winter months. The rainfall was somewhere about 60
The measles outbreak, at first of a mild nature, gradually increased in severity until, about midwinter, it acquired an unusual virulence. Cases were described as being "malignant": a suffocative type with septic bronchitis, and a haemorrhagic type "black measles" were observed. It is, of course, open to argument that the last named cases were indeed examples of the cerebro-spinal meningitis which broke out later. There was no military hospital then; in New Zealand, with the exception of a small camp hospital in marquees. The Wellington Public Hospital acting as a base hospital soon became overcrowded, so that a temporary hospital had to be improvised. The old plague hospital at Berhampore in Wellington, built by the City Council in 1900, during the plague scare, was taken over and enlarged by the use of marquees. This hospital in turn became seriously overcrowded and early in June had 87 patients with a staff of 3 nurses, 1 sergeant N.Z.M.C. and 4 O.R. A part time medical officer was visiting three times a week.
The rapid onset of dangerous symptoms and the early unexpected termination of many cases of pneumonia and the alarming death rate were freely discussed in the press of the Dominion at the time, so that public attention was focussed Under the Hospitals and Charitable Aid Act of 1908. all public hospitals in New Zealand are in part maintained by rates, in part by Government subsidy and are under the part control of the Inspector General of Hospitals, who is also chief health officer.
The D.M.S. was made responsible for:—(1) Military organisation of the N.Z.M.C., training, appointments, transfers of personnel; (2) All medical arrangements (except sanitation) in camps and camp hospitals; (3) Medical embarkation and disembarkation duties; (4) Examination of recruits and, in part, invaliding boards. The new arrangement came into force in June.
Colonel Valentine acted with vigour as soon as appointed, and in as much as he already controlled the necessary hospital accommodation and was a government servant of long standing and had a staff of trained medical officers, he was in a much stronger position to act than a part time territorial officer. The "Victoria" ward at Wellington Hospital was opened as a military ward of 60 beds; large wool stores at Kaiwarra, providing accommodation for 150 beds, were placed at his disposal by patriotic merchants; the race course buildings at Trentham were appropriated, a large tea kiosk giving room for 100 beds, the
As regards the cerebro-spinal meningitis there had been much doubt as to the diagnosis in the earlier cases. At least three deaths from meningitis were reported in June, but were ascribed to influenzal measles or tubercular infection. One death at sea in the 5th reinforcements who sailed in June was diagnosed cerebrospinal meningitis, but it was not until July that the diagnosis was clearly established at Trentham by the late Prof. Champtaloup, Bacteriologist to the Dunedin Medical School and the Government Bacteriologist, During the epidemic of C.S.M. in Victoria in 1915, 644 cases were reported with 888 deaths and 60.2 per cent. mortality. The outbreak included 421 cases in the military population of the training camps.Diplococcus Meningitidis in the cerebro-spinal fluid of a fatal case, and by culture of the organisms. There were six deaths from C.S.M. in July, others, less numerous in August and succeeding months, but the epidemic never reached the severity of that at Codford in 1914 amongst Canadians and other troops, or the epidemic of 1915 in Australian Camps.
In July the maximum number of sick in hospital from all causes rose to 872: the Trentham camp strength was at this time 7498; there was serious overcrowding; on the 9th the D.M.H. advised breaking camp. This advice met with much opposition but in the end was acted upon, and on the 10th there was a general exodus, the troops being billeted or distributed in smaller camps in the district; only 2000 remaining at Trentham. This heroic effort broke the epidemic, it flatly subsided, nor is there much evidence to show that the scattering of the troops caused any dissemination of C.S.M. in the civilian population; certainly it had a beneficial moral effect on the troops and also upon the civilians, who in some instances had accused the defence authorities of criminal neglect. Partly in consequence of this accusation a public commission, to investigate the sanitary conditions at Trentham, was summoned by His Excellency, Lord Liverpool. It consisted of His Honour Judge Hoskins of the Supreme Court,
The general health of the troops in Trentham cannot be said to have been good during the period under consideration. The total number of cases of illness of any description requiring hospital treatment from the opening of the camp up to July 22nd, was 2813 with 33 deaths, a mortality of 1.16 per cent. of the sick. In all some 13,607 men had passed through or had occupied the camp in the period, and taking the mean population of the camp as 4,500 men, the annual mortality of the soldier population, very crudely considered, approximated to seven per thousand. The annual death rate of the civilian population of the comparable class, males from 21 to 45, the arm-bearing population, for the previous 5 years in the Dominion averaged a little over five per thousand per annum. But considerable improvement in sanitation followed the inquiry: adequate drainage, good roading and acceleration in the building of the hutments soon improved matters. The Trentham Commission recommended that not more than 30 men be allotted to each half hut allowing 51 square feet of floor space to each man, and that the total camp population should not exceed 4000. A permanent P.M.O. was appointed to the staff of the Camp Commandant, Lieut.-Col. Moris, N.Z.M.C. took over the duties in July. Material assistance and valuable advice was given to the military authorities by a medical committee consisting of civilian doctors set up to act as an advisory board. In these deliberations, the New Zealand branch of the British Medical Association played a strong part.
Four new medical units were formed in New Zealand in the first year of the War:—"B" Section of No. 2 New Zealand Maheno. As the result of representations made by General Godley with regard to the necessity of establishing in Egypt a New Zealand hospital manned by representative New Zealand surgeons, the Defence Minister, Colonel the Hon. J. Maheno on the 20th May from Wellington, with orders to report for duty to the Imperial military authorities in Egypt. 31 ladies of the New Zealand Army Nursing Service were also embarked for service in the Imperial hospitals.
Up to May 2nd 7,928 sick and wounded of the N.Z.E.F. who had been evacuated from the Dardanelles were, or had been, under treatment in various hospitals in Egypt, Malta, and England so that the offer of a second stationary hospital from New Zealand was gratefully welcomed by the Army Council. Hurriedly mobilised, No. 2 New Zealand Stationary Hospital sailed for Egypt on the 13th June, 1915. The unit comprising 8 officers, 87 O.R. was under the command of Lt.-Col. Parkes, N.Z.M.C, P.M.O. of the Auckland military district. Like number 1 New Zealand Stationary Hospital it was well staffed as a surgical team: the Senior Field Officer, Major Savage, N.Z.M.C, was an eminent Auckland surgeon, whose untimely death from C.S.M. shortly after landing at Alexandria robbed the unit of its most brilliant member.
The No. 1 New Zealand Hospital Ship Maheno was staffed by 7 officers, 61 O.R. and was commanded by Lt.-Col. the Maheno sailed in May: we shall find her at Anzac in September.
The 5th Reinforcements, nicknamed the "Fighting Fifth" were now well on their way to Egypt—July, 1915—and went into camp near Cairo prior to re-embarking for Anzac on the eve of the August fighting. The Pont de Koubeh hospital accommodated at this time some 300 sick and wounded New Zealanders, and was under the command of
When the Anzac force left Egypt Lt.-
On July 22nd No. 2 New Zealand Stationary Hospital arrived after landing Major Savage, N.Z.M.C, suspect C.S.M., at Suez. Lt.-Col. Parkes was ordered to take over the Pont de Koubeh Hospital from Major Byam, R.A.M.C., then commanding. On July 27th, Major Savage was dangerously ill. He was seen by Sir David
Serving the two New Zealand hospitals now established in Egypt, there was a convalescent home of 50 beds at Alexandria in the Mustapha district, controlled by Lady Godley. The staff consisted of a nursing sister and a few orderlies—"B" class men from the base depot at Alexandria. It was visited daily by a R.A.M.C. officer. The house was a fine one in a big garden and very comfortably furnished; discipline was strict; the feeding arrangements excellent; it was a well run establishment doing valuable work.
We have seen that many New Zealand sick and wounded had been transported in hospital ships as far as England. Some sort of a base for Anzac troops existed at Weymouth early in 1915, but as yet no New Zealand base. In order to provide for the New Zealand casualties reaching England at this time, the New Zealand War Hospital was opened at Mount Felix, Walton-on-Thames, on July 31st, 1915. The funds necessary for its initiation had been raised in England by New Zealanders with some help from the Dominion, but without any appeal made to the British public.
Following the initial success at the landing, the Anzac corps—numerically too weak in men or artillery to continue the advance on the main ridge dominating the Narrows—had been tied down to a passive defence. The area of territory so far gained was not sufficient in extent to afford full protection to the landing places nor the beaches further north, lightly held by our outposts. The security of the piers and store dumps was menaced daily by observed bombardments at moderate range. The troops were much weakened by disease, and the high sickness wastage rate of the Anzac corps threatened an attenuation which would soon rob it of all efficiency as a fighting force.
At Helles, the same deadlock existed. No further ground could be gained on the slopes of Achi Baba now gashed with tiers of trenches and bristling with barbed wire. The Commander-in-Chief, Sir Ian Hamilton, early in June, foresaw the deadlock and obtained reinforcements to the extent of two army corps to complete his task of assisting the Fleet to conquer the Narrows. There were various possible methods of continuing the offensive, but the plan adopted was to reinforce Anzac with sufficient troops to carry their original objectives, Koja Chemen Tepe, Sari Bair, the dominating points of the range, and the spurs leading seawards, with a simultaneous landing at Suvla Bay, so that a rapid advance on the left of the Anzacs might join hands with them for a final advance to Maidos from a good base and sure harbour at Suvla. The new forces were concentrated in various islands, Imbros, Lemnos and Mytelene; the early part of August was selected because the moon rose late, ensuring long hours of darkness. The water supply for so large a body of troops and transport animals was a special source of anxiety. It was believed that there was an ample supply in the Anafarta Valley. Anzac however, must be provided for: a reservoir was dug on the hillside to be filled by a pump landed for the purpose. The pump, a very large and mysterious affair, lay on the beach for some time attracting the attention of the artillery observing officer at Kaba Tepe who, coming to the conclusion that it must be a monstrous
As Anzac was to deliver the knock out blow, Anzac was to he reinforced by a division. Much heavy work was doing in preparation, well hidden "possies" for the new troops, new roads to be made, stores and munitions to be landed; hence the excessive and exhausting fatigues of the latter end of July, which are referred to in the sanitary diaries. At the beginning of August everything was in readiness and when the news spread from Shell Green to Wellington Terrace, the tired and sickly garrison were heartened and all aglow to undertake this new and promising adventure. General Birdwood was to have 37,000 rifles and 72 guns, the landing party at Suvla would comprise two divisions, and the old war dogs at Helles were to bark up at the Turks on Achi Baba, pinning them to their ground. Stealthily, by night, the new troops came in and were packed away in crowded Anzac, till the hive was full and the time for swarming had come.
The local tactical scheme was as follows:—A very determined sortie was to be launched from the extreme right of our line by the 1st Australian Division, destined to seize the Turkish "Lone Pine" positions, and, in order to attract the enemy reserves to that side, the Fleet were to simulate an attempted landing at Kaba Tepe; whilst on our left, strong assaulting columns breaking out beyond our outposts to the north were to climb in the night through the steep gorges that led upwards to the crest line of Sari Bair. On the morning after, two divisions from Suvla would be joining hands on our left and would assist in the final rolling up of the Turkish right flank. Such was the general idea; we must examine it somewhat more in detail, at least as far as the central attack is concerned, an attack in which the New Zealanders were to play an important part.
The New Zealand and Australian Division were to lead in the movement that was to seize the heights of Sari Bair. To this end the 13th Division under Major General F. C. Shaw, C.B., and Cox's 29th Indian Brigade of Gurkhas and Sikhs, were placed under General Godley's command with additional artillery. The battle orders issued from Anzac Cove by General Birdwood, dated 3rd August, 1915, read, in part, as follows:—
"The New Zealand and Australian Division, the 13th Division, less three battalions, less artillery, the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, and 1 mounted artillery brigade, less 1 section, will occupy the line, Chunuk Bair—Hill 350, during the night 6/7th August; operations to commence at 9 p.m."
The main ridge which shielded the Narrows from our observation ran inland almost due N.E. from near Kaba Tepe to Hill "Q", its highest point, some 2,500 yards inland from the mouth of the Chailak Dere at No. 3 outpost, and rose gradually from the sea on our right to 971 feet at its highest point on our extreme left. The ridge was the watershed of the Peninsula; on the western side Anzac and Suvla, on the eastern, Maidos, the Narrows and the only military road from Bulair to Maidos and Helles. The distance from Hill 971 to the nearest point of the Narrows was about 3½ miles. From the main height six spurs were projected towards us; the longest spur, a continuation of Sari Bair itself, terminated in Tasmania Post, the extreme right of the Australian. Division facing Kaba Tepe. On the crest of this main spur a military track ran all the way up through Lone Pine, Johnson's Jolly, Quinn's Post, Baby 700, Battleship Ridge, Sari Bair, Hill Q, to Koja Chemen Tepe, dropping down at the northern extremity of the massif into the village of Biyuk Anafarta. The second spur ran seaward through Russell's Top, Walker's Ridge, and McLagan's Ridge to Plugge's Plateau; between the main spur and the second lay Shrapnel Valley with its offset, Monash's Gully; the third spur, terminating at No. 2 and No. 3 outposts, ran out to sea in a westerly direction, bounded by the Sazli Beit Dere to the South, and the Chailak Dere to the north. About two miles north along the beach from Anzac, the mouth of the Aghyl Dere (Farm Gully) opened out into flat land and was separated from the Kaiajik Dere, the next stream, by the spur Damakjelik Bair, the foot hills at this point trending almost due west delimiting the northern extremity of Sari Bair. The last spur was the Abd el Rhaman Bair running almost due north from 971 with the Asmak Dere, said to be a running stream on its seaward side. Like the spokes of a giant wheel these six spurs were projected seaward from 971. We were to attack the hub by advancing between and upon the spokes. Maps give only a poor impression of the extreme roughness and broken nature of the country where a difference of a few feet frequently meant untenable exposed slopes or dead ground completely protected from any kind of fire.
In considering the medical arrangements for this operation two important points emerge:—The line of evacuations of wounded must be along the rim of the wheel—across our front—and by hand carriage over at least 2½ miles, as there was no ambulance transport and no road practicable by daylight: sea transport might be possible if fresh piers could be erected, say, at the mouth of the Chailak Dere, the centre of the new attack. As there was no rapid means of crossing the spurs from dere to dere, small dressing
On August 3rd, the New Zealand Brigade concentrated in Happy Valley just north of Mule Gully where the New Zealand Field Ambulance had its main dressing station. The strength of the New Zealand Field Ambulanee was at this time 11 officers and 146 O.R. The A.D.S. was still up in Monash's Gully at the foot of Pope's Hill under command of Major Murray. At Mule Gully Lt.-Col. Begg had, besides his main dressing station, an "Enteritis Hospital" in charge of Major Hand Newton, who commanded the New Zealand Mounted Field Ambulance bearer parties which arrived at Anzac on July 24th, and a dental section under Capt. Don, N.Z.M.C., now fitted with appliances for the repair and making of artificial dentures and doing a great deal of work. The mouth of the big sap leading out to the outposts was not very many yards away, and some tanks for local supply of water had been recently installed. The position was not under observation and was well protected down as far as the beach by the high cliffs of Walker's Ridge. The 4th and 5th were quiet days except for heavy shelling of Anzac Beach. 1000 New Zealand reinforcements—"the Fighting Fifth"—arrived with part of the 13th Division, Cox's Gurkha Brigade, and three British field ambulances, the 39th, 40th and 41st, less their tent subdivisions.
By August 6th the final preparations for the advance that night were complete. At 2 p.m. Col. Manders held a conference of field ambulance commanders at the New Zealand M.D.S. at Walker's Ridge for the purpose of distributing the new 1/20,000 maps and explaining more fully his orders, of which the following is an exact copy:—
[Secret.] Medical Corps Orders by Colonel N. Manders, A.M.S., Commanding Medical Corps, New Zealand and Australian Division.
Information.—The G.O.C. Army Corps intends a series of operations on August 6th; his objective is the lineGaba Tepe, Chunuk Bairand thence along theChunuk Bair Ridgeto, and includingKoja Chemen Tepe.The G.O.C, New Zealand and Australian Division undertakes operations on the 6th-7th August as follows:—(1) With covering forces to attack and hold the line
Destroyer Hill-Beauchop's Hill.The force for this movement comprises:—The New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, the Otago Mounted Rifles Regiment and Maori Contingent.
The New Zealand Mounted Field Ambulance is allotted to these troops. The Bearer Division will move forward to collect wounded as soon as possible after daybreak 7th August.
The O.C. Bearer Division will send word to his O.C. when he has found a convenient site for the Field Ambulance and a practicable route for its advance. This site will probably be in the
Chailak Derewhere Brigadier-General Russel collects his men after the attack.The O.C. Bearer Division should send two messengers at quarter hour intervals to inform his O.C. of above.
The line of evacuation in all cases will be to the nearest Casualty Collecting Station on the beach.
The O.C. Mounted Field Ambulance will inform A.D.M.S. of the hour he moves off, and the number of stretchers he is taking with him.
Right Assaulting Column.—The New Zealand Infantry Brigade, one mountain battery, one company of New Zealand Engineers, under Brig.-Gen. Johnson will move up the gulliesSazli Beit Dere and Chailak Dere;their first objective is the line Point 161 (80) (K.6)Chunuk Bairhead ofKur Dere(81. A. 4); their further objective is theBaby700. There will be a halt after the first objective has been obtained.The medical units allotted for this Force are:—C Section New Zealand Field Ambulance and 1st Australian Light Horse Field
Ambulance. C section will take the area Sazli Beit Dereand 1st A.L.H. Ambulance theChailak Dere.The Bearer Sub-Division New Zealand Field Ambulance and Bearer Division 1st Australian Light Horse Field Ambulance will follow the above Force at daybreak August 7th.
The O.C.'s of these units will send back messengers similarly as directed for the New Zealand Mounted Field Ambulance (above) to inform their C.O. of the advance of the Tent Sections; they must bear in mind that the nearer they get to their final destination,
i.e.,the heads of their gullies, the better.O.'sC. will inform the A.D.M.S. of the hour he moves off and the number of stretchers he takes with him.
Left Assaulting Column.—The 29th (Indian) Brigade, 4th Australian Infantry Brigade, one mountain battery, one company New Zealand Engineers under Brig.-Gen. Cox, will attackKoja Chemen Tepeand will move viaWalden Pointand theAghyl Dere.The Medical Units allotted are the 3rd Australian Light Horse Field Ambulance and C Section 4th Australian Field Ambulance.In the event of the G.O.C. attacking by both branches of the
Aghyl Dere,the 3rd A.L.H. Field Ambulance will take the right branch.The instructions regarding the time of departure and request for Tent Sections is the same as for the
RightAssaulting Column."A" Section of New Zealand Field Ambulance and 4th Australian Field Ambulance are held in reserve; they must be prepared to move at short notice with only such equipment as can be carried on stretchers. The former will reinforce the left assaulting column and the latter the right assaulting column. They will be asked for by the
Seniormedical officer of the left or right assaulting column by message to A.D.M.S. who will be with G.O.C. at Divisional Report Centre.The A.D.M.S. wishes if possible, that the two Light Horse Field Ambulances will be able to leave their wounded in charge of the 4th Australian Field Ambulance and New Zealand Field Ambulance, and push on to collect wounded at the final assault; in any case it is imperative for them to keep some portion, however small, for this purpose. The main thing to be kept in mind is that there shall be some portion of a field ambulance able to advance with the troops.
In case of a shortage of stretcher bearers, messages for reinforcements will be sent in good time to A.D.M.S. and it should be made clear where exactly they are wanted.
The areas to be cleared are roughly as follows:—
New Zealand Mounted Field Ambulance:
Big Table Top(80 C.9);Old No.3Post(80. B.9);Beauchop's Hill (92x7and 8) and all adjoining slopes.
Right Assaulting Column.—C. Section, New Zealand Field Ambulance: Both sides ofSazli Beit DeretoChunuk BairandKur Dereand finallyBaby.1st Australian Light Horse Field Ambulance: Both sides of
Chailak Dere to Chunuk BairandKur Dereand finallyBaby.
Left Assaulting Column.—C. Section, 4th Australian Field Ambulance: Both sides, left branchAghyl Dere, Koja Chemen Tepe.3rd Australian Light Horse Field Ambulance: Both sides, right branch
Aghyl, Dere, Koja Chemen Tepe.In case of urgency the A.D.M.S. allows O.C. units to exercise their discretion in calling up to their assistance the A. sections of 4th Australian Field Ambulance and New Zealand Field Ambulance, held in reserve, informing the A.D.M.S. of their action, but they are to bear in mind that the heaviest losses will probably be at the final assault
Koja Chemen Tepe(971) and joining hands with the Light Horse Brigade onRussell's Top.The Australian Light Horse Brigade will hold our present position on
Pope's Hill, Walker's Ridge,and will subsequently join in the assault to turn the enemy out of theChess Board;their line of evacuation will be either byWalker's Ridge,where there will be a dressing station of the 13th Division told off for their use at the bottom of the gully, orNash Valleywhere B. Section New Zealand Field Ambulance and 4th Australian Field Ambulance are already posted; the latter section must, however, be ready to move at short notice as it may be required for duty elsewhere.Sections of field ambulances acting independently will keep A. and D. books, and the tallies marked
Mudrosfor light cases orBasefor serious injuries; M. and B. will suffice in urgency.The A.D.M.S. feels sure that every wounded man will leave the beach properly dressed, labelled, and given suitable nourishment. Water must be most carefully used; for this reason only the most urgent operations should be undertaken. It is expected that all troops will be entirely dependent on their water bottles for at least eighteen hours.
(Sgd.) N. Manders, Col. A.M.S. Commanding Medical Corps, N.Z. & A. Div.
So far the plans of the new landing and the exact nature of our outbreak had been kept secret by Sir Ian Hamilton's orders,
4.30 p.m. The action was opened by three battalions of the 1st Australian division who attacked "Lone Pine" and held it against powerful counter attacks: there were heavy losses. The other subsidiary attacks from Quinn's. Pope's, and the Neck were unsuccessful and very costly. The dressing stations and Ambulance bearers in Monash's Gully were fully occupied during that night in clearing to the Australian C.C.S. on the beach.
9 p.m. The main attack against Chunuk Bair was initiated by the New Zealand Mounted Rifles and the Maoris, who took old No. 3 outpost and Big Table Top on the left bank of the Chailak Dere and Beauchop's Hill on the right bank. Following these movements the New Zealand Infantry Brigade advanced up the Sazli Beit and Chailak Dere. The left assaulting column reached
7/8/15. 3.50 a.m. The brigade major of the New Zealand Brigade, Major Temperley, reports many wounded in the Chailak Dere and that stretcher bearers are required. An hour later the 1st Australian Light Horse Field Ambulance with 25 stretchers was on its way up the dere. About this time wounded were coming down to the M.D.S. from Walker's Ridge as a result of an attack on the Neck by the 8th Australian Light Horse who had extraordinarily heavy casualties, the greater number being killed. "B" Section of the New Zealand Field Ambulance in Monash Gully was still fully occupied by casualties from Quinn's and Pope's.
By 6 a.m. on the 7th, the New Zealand Infantry had joined hands about Rhododendron Spur and the Apex. Some of the Gurkha Brigade were on the left—all Were preparing for the final assault of Chunuk Bair. In the early morning light the New Zealand Brigade on Rhododendron Spur saw a surprising sight: away to the north at Suvla what seemed to be a mighty Armada riding at anchor in the Bay. The secret of the New Army's landing had been well-kept, so far it had filtered only to brigade headquarters. The cheering sight of the new force coming up on their left must have encouraged the tired New Zealanders to push on and hang on to the slopes of Chunuk Bair, the crest line of which was not more than 400 yards away. Some desperate men did push on but were compelled to dig in after meeting an impassible fire from right and left and enduring piteous losses. In daylight no further advance could be made.
6.10 a.m. The A.D.M.S. instructs O.C. New Zealand Field Ambulance and O.C. 4th Australian Field Ambulance—Lieut.-Col. Beeston, A.M.C., V.D.—to move up their parties to the positions already agreed upon. During the night the engineers had erected a small pier at the mouth of the Chailak Dere, for the evacuation of wounded, it was now flying a red cross flag borrowed from the
8 a.m. All forward movements had ceased. The Auckland, Canterbury, and Otago Battalions were at the head of the Chailak and Sazli Beit Dere, Wellington in reserve. All attempts to push on had been frustrated by heavy enfilade fire from Battleship Ridge, the main spur, on their right, and by gun fire from the "W" Hills out Suvla way. Our left flank brigades were also temporarily hung up. Divisional Headquarters had moved to No. 3 outpost where there was good cover except from occasional overs from Baby 700 and the ridge above. Colonel Manders now ordered the Tent Subdivision of "C" Section New Zealand Field Ambulance to open at or near No. 2 outpost. The party under Major O'Neil, D.S.O., N.Z.M.C. proceeded to the Sazli Beit Dere carrying equipment by hand, passing in the sap many Turkish prisoners; they opened at about 11 a.m. at No. 2 outpost, where they handled about 30 cases; an emergency tracheotomy was required in one case, a wound of the larynx. The positions of the medical units now were:—
3rd Australian Light Horse Field Ambulance in Aghyl Dere with some portion of the 4th Australian Field Ambulance whose main dressing station was opening in ground very much exposed to fire. The New Zealand Mounted Field Ambulance had a dressing station at the mouth of the Chailak Dere the 1st Australian Light Horse Field Ambulance, a dressing station half way up the Chailak Dere; the New Zealand Field Ambulance: A.D.S. at Monash Gully, M.D.S. in statu quo; C section collecting post in Sazli Beit Dere; A.D.S. at No. 2 outpost. The locations of the R.M.O.'s were: the Mounted Brigade R.M.O.'s and R.A.P.'s at Big Table Top; and near Beauchop's Hill, where one of them captured 17 prisoners; Captains Guthrie, N.Z.M.C., and Buchanan, N.Z.M.C. were in touch with the Australian Ambulance near Waldren's Point. Most of their wounded were evacuated by 8 o'clock. As regards the R.M.O.'s of the Infantry Brigade the following narrative of Captain Baigent throws some light on the situation:—"At 10.30 p.m. on the night of the attack, the Otago Infantry leading, the Wellington and Auckland Battalions started
At the mouth of the Chailak Dere there was a small olive grove and some dead ground where the wounded soon collected; the New Zealand Mounted Field Ambulance had an operating tent pitched and was working at this point at an early hour. Before 10 o'clock bearers from the New Zealand Field Ambulance under Major O'Neil passed this point on their way to Aghyl Dere where they collected wounded from about Beauchop's Hill carrying them down to the barges loading at the pier, at No. 3 outpost, or handed them over at No. 3 outpost. These wounded were mainly Gurkhas. Owing to lack of barges evacuations from the small pier were being delayed and a very considerable congestion of wounded took place in the dry water course.
10 a.m. Stretcher bearers were urgently required at Pope's Hill, much congested with wounded. Colonel Manders having his hands full applied to the A.D.M.S. Australian Division for
The Naval Transport Officer, Lt. Greenshields, R.N., working the small pier as N.T.O. was short of barges for evacuation. The pier, a small not very stable trestle arrangement was under rifle fire; there was some shelling at the mouth of the Dere; the wounded were lying on stretchers near the pier under the scanty cover of the sand banks. Major Newton whose dressing station was hard by, had two of his wounded killed and six patients wounded a second time besides some of his staff hit.
Up at the Apex, the wounded of the Gurkhas and the Aucklanders were lying out on the forward slopes where the daylight attack on Chunuk Bair had been arrested. Many wounded were awaiting evacuation; stretcher bearers were urgently required by the New Zealand Brigade Headquarters shortly after 1 o'clock. The A.D.M.S., still persuaded that the main flow of wounded should come down the Sazli Beit Dere, orders Major O'Neil and his party to proceed to the collecting post in that locality, but shortly after was informed as to affairs at the head of the Chailak Dere by receiving the following message from Major Helsham, A.M.C., of the 1st Australian Light Horse Field Ambulance, timed 1 p.m. "I am advancing my post to what was the R.A.P. near the head of the Chailak Dere [Baigent's Turkish Kitchen]. I think it will take to-day and to-night to evacuate the cases there and I will employ this unit for that purpose, as many casualties are expected in the evening; could I be supplied with fresh bearers and as many stretchers as possible"? The A.D.M.S. replies to Brigade that he will do what he can.
By 2 p.m. Major Murray reports from Pope's A.D.S. that he has evacuated 173 casualties since 5 p.m. on the 6th and that his station is clear. But the A.D.M.S. cannot as yet avail himself of the services of the N.Z.M.C. party at Pope's Hill, because, by the plan, the New Zealanders on Chunuk Bair once the crest was firmly held, were to sweep southwards along the main crest, Battleship Ridge, descending upon Baby 700 and Pope's Hill, driving the Turks before them. It was thought that this movement would be the bloodiest work of the whole engagement, as the Turks were well entrenched, and that wounded would be evacuated in very large numbers through Monash's Gully.
By 3 p.m. both Aghyl Dere and the Chailak Dere appeared to be choked with wounded. The 4th Australian Brigade wired to say
From Major Helsham, A.M.C., 1st Australian Light Horse Field Ambulance, halfway up the Chailak Dere, a further report comes late in the afternoon: that he has urgent need of bearers and stretchers as carrying to the beach wastes much time. To this the A.D.M.S. replies:—"Do not evacuate but concentrate wounded, all evacuations to the beach are interdicted until 8 p.m." Fresh troops from the reserve were moving up the Chailak and Aghyl Dere to reinforce the attackers against the final push timed for the grey of dawn on the morrow; up through the rugged torrent bed, water, ammunition, rations and reinforcements were mounting in a solid, slow-moving surge. After sunset, men and mules choked the narrow tracks, opposing all beachward movement. Here were Welshmen, Auckland cavalry, Maoris, men of Worcester, Sikhs and Gurkhas, struggling upwards, bound for the top of the Dere, where at the "Apex" men jostled in bunched up masses, some in dead ground, some on the reverse slopes, an easy target for the guns near Anafarta. No getting the loaded stretchers down through this mass of men and mules.
At the main dressing station at Walker's Ridge, Lt.-Col. Begg had 200 casualties for evacuation; a pier had been built at the foot of Walker's Ridge—Walker's Pier—but the pinnaces and boats could not reach it at present owing to the state of the tide. No C.C.S. had as yet arrived. The M.D.S. must remain where it is for the present. Only walking cases could be got rid of during the day. Major O'Neil opened his tent subdivision in Sazli Beit Dere where he handled some 30 cases during the night. He had been relieved by a small party of bearers of the 40th Field Ambulance, 13th Division, who formed a collecting post at No. 3 outpost.
In the evening Major Helsham realised that he could not get his wounded away that night. Many had been lying out in the open and had not had any food since the previous evening. They had been fighting in their shirt sleeves and had no greatcoats. He wires now at 6 p.m. for 100 blankets, water and some cases of milk and arrowroot.
Evacuation at No. 3 pier was resumed at 8 p.m. Capt. Finn, N.Z.M.C., Dental Surgeon attached to No. 4 Australian Field Ambulance with the N.T.O., Lieut. Greenshields, R.N., were working together at this point under great difficulties in a spatter of overs from Battleship Ridge. The picket boats could not get to the pier on account of low water, they had to use ships' boats—25 sitting cases to the trip. Up to 10.40 p.m. some 350 sitters had been shipped away; it was impossible to load stretcher cases. It was proposed that the orderlies should wade out into the water so as to load the pinnaces; pinnaces could only take two lying cases at a time. The N.T.O. had wired for horse lighters or motor driven lighters, the famous "Beetles" used for landing troops at Suvla was what he wanted as they had a draw bridge at the bows which could be let down on touching bottom, and they would have taken a very large number of stretchers. The A.D.M.S. after a conference with the N.T.O. strongly represented to Corps Headquarters that if even the posse of stretcher cases at the pier was to be dealt with that night he must have the large lighters; the only other alternative was to carry round by the beach road to Anzac. The text of the A.D.M.S.'s message, timed 11 p.m., is as follows:—"Have conferred with the embarkation officer. We concur only possible method of evacuation is by motor lighters or horse boats. It must be done expeditiously as the beach is under fire. Cannot keep wounded longer on shore as stock of medical comforts is getting low."
During the night preparations are in train for the final sweep upwards to Chunuk Bair, at 4.50 a.m. on the 8th. The attack was to be preceded by a heavy artillery bombardment at 4.15 a.m. Over 600 prisoners with several machine guns had been taken during the day, and miles of new territory acquired to give the Anzacs elbow room.
4.50 a.m. The second attack of the New Zealanders on Chunuk Bair on the 8th, headed by
5 a.m. Prior to this hour the A.D.M.S. proceeded up to the dressing station of the 4th Australian Field Ambulance in the Aghyl Dere where he found that the 3rd Light Horse Ambulance had moved into "Australia" Gully, a north running branch of the Aghyl Dere, and had formed an advanced dressing station, and were evacuating wounded from Monash's Brigade to the dressing station of the 4th Australian Field Ambulance at the junction of the Aghyl Dere and Australia Gully. At 7.30, while Col. Manders was still away, the Acting D.A.D.M.S.,
Very few casualties had passed through the M.D.S. at Walker's Ridge during the night; by 9 a.m. on the 8th some 50 cases were awaiting evacuation; a few bearers from the 41st Field Ambulance —13th Division—were assisting. "C" section was still in Sazli Beit Dere about half a mile from the mouth, "B" section still complete at Monash's Gully A.D.S.
Very heavy fighting was going on all along our front, the Wellingtons and the 8th Worcesters, with other troops assisting, were digging in as best they might to secure a precarious footing on Chunuk Bair crest under a wicked fire from all quarters; all forward movement had ceased—Malone of Quinn's the hefty leader, was dead, and with him most of the Worcester officers besides many others, the wounded lying thick about the the Apex and in No Man's Land between it and the forward trench line. A further message from Major Helsham gives a clear impression of the medical situation. "9.30 a.m. There are at present no relays of bearers to take over wounded from this station at the head of the
The 40th Field Ambulance of the 13th Division which had relieved Major O'Neil at No. 3 outpost at dark on the previous evening, collected, fed, and dressed some 350 cases during the first twelve hours they were evacuating to the pier. There was now an increasing congestion of wounded about No. 3 and No. 2 outposts. Affairs were not going well at the Red Cross Pier; there was serious congestion at the mouth of the Dere, the enemy fire was holding up evacuation. The N.T.O., Mr. Greenshields was killed before noon. Capt. Finn, N.Z.M.C, remained on and took his place.
Col. Manders was nearly the whole forenoon in the Aghyl Dere sector where exceedingly heavy casualties were occurring and where no less than five ambulances were working. There were the 3rd Australian Light Horse Field Ambulance, the 4th Australian Field Ambulance, the Indian Field Ambulance, the 39th Field Ambulance of the 13th Division and part of the 41st Field Ambulance. The D.A.D.M.S. of the 13th Division was at Waldren's point, where the 39th Field Ambulance had their M.D.S. More serious losses were being met with in this area than in the Chailak Dere, at least three brigades and part of a fourth were heavily engaged. The ambulance bearers were suffering considerable casualties; the Dere at its upper end completely open to fire and observation. Major Holmes now though it wise to bring the New Zealand Field Ambulance into action in the Chailak Dere—where as yet only the 1st Australian Light Horse, part of the New Zealand Mounted, and a party of 41st Field Ambulances were working. Lt.-Col. Begg reported at 10.45 a.m. that he could spare about 12 men with six stretchers, that "C" section are not very busy having dealt with only 58 cases since they opened on the night of the 6/7th, and that he thinks "B" section could be used also, as affairs, are not pressing at Monash's Gully.
The Medical position at noon was this:—A.D.M.S., Col. Manders, had now about 600 casualties mostly stretcher cases for evacuation. No. 3 pier was working fitfully under great difficulties; the mouth of the Chailak Dere, No. 3 and 2 outposts, were choked with stretcher
By midday the battle is easing down. On Chunuk Bair the remnants of the assaulting column, who by now have lost nearly every officer, are still hanging on. At Lone Pine on our right fierce fighting is still in progress since the afternooon of the 6th. The Turks seem to be shaping up for a counter attack at the head of Monash's Gully, the loss of which would have disastrous results. The A.D.M.S. cannot afford to take any bearers from the A.D.S. at Pope's Hill, Murray and his section are ordered to stand fast; the main thing is to get the C.C.S. ashore. But by 5 p.m. affairs appear to be very bad both in the Aghyl and Chailak Dere. Lt.-Col. Beeston, A.M.C. has succeeded in pushing "C" section of the 4th Australian Field Ambulance further up the Aghyl Dere; the A.D.M.S. of the 13th Division has sent up some more bearers to the assistance of the 4th Australian Brigade whose losses are pitiable. Major Helsham is again asking for assistance—a few bearers from the 40th Field Ambulance proceed to the dressing station of the 41st; the A.D.M.S. now determines to utilise "C" section of the New Zealand Field Ambulance, he accordingly sends orders to Major O'Neil:—"Proceed with your section to the head of the gully, get into touch with General Johnson [commanding New Zealand Brigade], and advise in the morning how many stretchers you require to evacuate to the beach." "A" section bearers had fortunately just cleared O'Neil's A.D.S., he did what he was ordered to do and proceeded to the head of the gully he was in, namely the Sazli Beit Dere. The intention of the A.D.M.S. was not clearly shown in his order. Nor is there any means, now, for determining what his intentions were. But it would seem that the better disposition of the party would have been in the Chailak Dere.
We will now follow the adventures of Capt. Baigent, on the 8th. "I shifted my R.A.P. up to the Apex, my battalion was in reserve. Padre Luxford was with me"; [we remember him at Helles], "we took cover in the scrub which was very tall. It afforded concelment from "W" hills. During the day I had many wounded through, and Padre Luxford was wounded." He lost his leg by this wound; and later at No. 2 N.Z.G.H. was chaplain, held in much awe by those who had not been to Gallipoli. He died in New Zealand after a long and very painful illness, much honoured, his memory ever green to those who saw his tireless devotion to the wounded at Anzac and Helles. Capt. Baigent continues: "The wounded were carried down by the regimental stretcher bearers as far as the A.D.S. of the 1st Australian Light Horse Ambulance, at the old Turkish bivouac, where I had my first R.A.P. Home, Pearless and Craig were up at the Apex too. No rations, no water had reached the battalion when they moved up at dark to dig in."
The military situation of the New Zealanders on the evening of the 8th is, in tabloid form:—The New Zealand Brigade with the Auckland Mounted Rifles, and the Maori Contingent, are holding Rhododendron Spur and the reverse slopes of the south western end of Chunuk Bair. There is great difficulty in supplying the firing line, 400 yards ahead of the Apex, with guns, ammunition, water and communications. Adequate consolidation of this line is impossible, the trenches in some places are only a few inches deep. The main avenue of approach, a very narrow track through the Chailak Dere, is under direct observation of the enemy, and impossible for large bodies by daylight and by nightfall congested by stretcher parties, mule transport of the Indian S. & T. carrying water in fantassahs, ammunition boxes, and supplies; wounded side tracked everywhere, making progression impossible at times. Heavy cross fire by artillery and rifle fire on the upper slopes still further delay the arrival of water, ammunition, tools and reinforcements. On our left Cox's Brigade, the 4th Australian and the 39th Infantry Brigade of the 13th Division are as badly off. The Aghyl Dere is so open as to be unsafe to move in by daylight. They are holding on there with heavy losses. The force at Suvla which was ordered to seize Ismail Oglu Tepe—the "W" hills from which our advance on the heights is enfiladed by the Turkish artillery—has not been able to be of any assistance and have not as yet joined hands with Monash. Fresh plans for a final assault are drafted. A new brigade—Baldwin's—of five battalions, all of the 13th Division, drawn from the corps reserve is to pass through our firing line at Chunuk Bair. Cox is to assault "Hill Q," joining hands with
By 8 p.m. Baldwin's battalions were entering the mouth of the Clailak Dere. The A.D.M.S. was instructed that the Dere must be kept free of stretcher parties during this phase in order to give Baldwin's column a clear passage to the Apex. General Godley in his report on the August fighting says "with this object" [giving Baldwin. a clear passage] "arrangements were made for the narrow track to be kept clear of all obstruction such as wounded coming down, rations going up, etc" With the tramp and dust of Baldwin's men assailing his jaded senses, Colonel Manders sits at his dug-out door powerless to help. His last reserves of stretcher bearers are in, his hands all tied by the necessities of the military needs. About him is a dust-grey welter of wounded, half naked, hungry, thirsty and forlorn, the tiny handful of the 40th Field Ambulance quite inadequate to help even a moiety of these sufferers of all races—water even is scarce. Blankets, there were practically none; most of the Anzacs, lying out on stretchers without shelter had fought all day in their shirts; the night was chilly; many had been lying there for over 24 hours. With a sad heart the A.D.M.S. turned to his own diary written for his family alone. "The lines of communication have been broken down," he writes, and a little further on, "completed 31 years of service—only one more"!
Now hear the story of the missing C.C.S.: it arrived off Anzac at 2 a.m. on the 7th August on the Ikalis, which also had the 16th C.C.S. aboard. They waited and signalled, but no lighters came off—they went to Suvla—there were no orders for them there. Lieut.-Col. McNaught, R.A.M.C, O.C. 13th C.C.S. was permitted to wire his whereabouts to the A.D.M.S. of the 13th Division, and on the 8th had orders to disembark on "A" beach at Suvla, where from is not clear. Both commanding officers duly disembarked at Suvla to be told by the beach master that they were both wanted at Anzac. On arrival at Anzac, Colonel Keeble, A.M.S., now acting as D.D.M.S. ashore, ordered Lieut.-Col. McNaught to proceed to No. 2 post. On arrival he found the 40th Field Ambulance bearer parties there, and noticed a small and flimsy pier with a red cross flag flying, being shelled; he also noticed one of our batteries just in front of it. He did not see Colonel Manders. His equipment was over a mile away at Anzac, no transport could be got that night; the beach road could not be used by daylight—that night it was choked with Baldwin's
Out in No Man's Land between the fire trench and the Apex, the R.M.O.'s and their stretcher bearers spent most of the night clearing the slopes of the wounded of four brigades.
4.30 a.m. The final assault on Sari Bair was delivered after a heavy bombardment by all available guns and ships; the 6th Gurkhas achieved the heights from which they overlooked the Narrows. Baldwin's column arriving late, delayed by traffic, in the dere—8 hours marching 2000 yards—deployed in daylight only to find the crest lined by the enemy in strength, the Gurkhas hurled off the heights, and the battle lost. The New Zealanders whose orders were to stand fast until Baldwin touched their left were the pivot of manoeuvre. The pivot remained, the manoeuvre had failed. The New Zealanders held what they had gained, but the doom of Anzac was sealed.
7.30 a.m. Major Helsham reports from the Turkish bivouac "More bearers and stretchers are required on the line between here and the beach. 100 bearers with stretchers are necessary. It is no use clearing this station at present as my line is choked with wounded who cannot be shifted owing to lack of bearers." To this the D.A.D.M.S. replies that stretchers are in plenty at the embarkation pier—that he has no bearers at present but will supply them as soon as possible. Lieut.-Col. Beeston reports that he has moved his "C" Section further forward into a position better suited to evacuation from the 4th Australian Brigade.
8.30 a.m. D.A.D.M.S. requests O.C. New Zealand Field Ambulance to send some bearers to reinforce the 1st Australian Light Horse Ambulance, and despatches an officer with an important message to the D.D.M.S., Lieut.-Col. Keeble, stating that no casualty clearing station had arrived as yet and that he is without means of attending to the wounded at No. 3 and No. 2 outposts, as all his ambulances are fully engaged and that he requires to be cleared.
9 a.m. The total casualties dealt with at Monash's Gully, A.D.S., since 8 p.m. the previous night, was only 11. Lieut.-Col. Begg, N.Z.M.C, now senior medical officer with the division, is transferred to Headquarters as acting A.D.M.S. Major O'Neil, D.S.O. is to take command of the New Zealand Field Ambulance. The 13 C.C.S. is now coming into action between No. 3 and No. 2 outposts in a depression of a line of low hills 400 yards long and about 30 or 40 feet high, overlooking the beach and the embarkation pier, some two or three hundred yards away. Here the C.C.S. took over from the 40th Field Ambulance a sandbagged shed used as a dressing station and operating room, one large dug out shelter with 5 beds and space for from 15 to 20 stretches. Water in limited quantity was available from a well at the foot of the Chailak Dere. The 40th Field Ambulance had cleared 750 cases in all since it opened at No. 3 outpost. A portion of the unit remained to assist the C.C.S. The remainder went to reinforce other units, the 41st in Chailak Dere, the 4th Australian in the Aghyl Dere. Their casualties for the three days:—2 killed, 4 wounded. The whole detachment numbered 6 officers, and 125 O.R. with light equipment only, and four trained ambulance dogs, evidently the bearer subdivisions, and during the 8th no less than 2 officers, 1 N.C.O. and 73 bearers had been sent forward to the A.D.S.'s, leaving 4 officers and 52 bearers to man No. 3 outpost, where there were estimated to be 600 wounded to carry to the beach. These facts deserve sympathetic consideration because of the complaints made by Anzac Units, at the time, of lack of attention to wounded at No. 3 outpost. Lieut.-Col. Begg in a reply to a query in this matter from the A.A. and Q.M.G. of the New Zealand Division dated 8th August, 1915, remarks that the complaint was mainly well founded, that Colonel Manders had considered the condition unsatisfactory but that the whole trouble was due to the non-arrival of the 13th C.C.S. We have seen how this unit was handled and that it was not in any way to blame for its late arrival, and I have tried to show that the 40th Field Ambulance, a small party of bearers, were of course wholly overwhelmed by the numbers of wounded coming in. They worked for 76 hours on end; they did their best—carried to the pier and to Anzac when the big sap was clear of traffic—drew water—built some sort of a sandbagged shelter—and helped to clear 750 cases under the worst possible conditions. As to the movements of the ambulance dogs, alas, there is nothing told in the diaries.
3 p.m. A message comes from the New Zealand Brigade Headquarters for more stretcher bearers. The A.D.M.S. orders up "A" section and the new O.C. of the New Zealand Field Ambulance with all equipment that can be carried on stretchers; no transport is available; the bearers of "B" section are to remain at Walker's Ridge; "C" section in Sazli Beit Dere and Brigade Headquarters is notified of the despatch of one section of New Zealand Field Ambulance to assist in evacuations from the Apex. Major Newton, at Chalk Hill, is unable to send reinforcements as his strength is now reduced to 24 men only. 8.30 p.m. Major O'Neil proceeds with "A" section to a position near the Brigade Headquarters in the Chailak Dere and opens a dressing station there. Some details under the Quartermaster Lieut. Sandham, and the dental section—Captain Don, N.Z.M.C.—remain at the M.D.S. at Walker's Ridge, "C" section still in the Sazli Beit Dere.
We will again follow Captain Baigent's diary. "August 9th Major O'Neil came up early this night to assist and the New Zealand Field Ambulance formed an A.D.S. below 'Rose's Hill.' They cleared my R.A.P. The carry down to the C.C.S. was about 1200 yards. At 12 p.m. some of the 5th reinforcements were told off as stretcher parties, they also carried to the beach." The "fighting fifth," who arrived in the heat of the battle, had many casualties and now some of these stout fellows are tasting the full bitterness of war in carrying their mangled comrades back to the beach. Lieut.-Col. Begg at 11 p.m. asked for 100 of these men to carry 50 stretchers to the Apex; the party was immediately despatched. Captain Baigent continues:—"About 1 a.m. [on the 10th] I was dressing a wounded man, one of us was using an electric torch and every time we showed a light it drew fire; eventually I was hit. I was carried down to the C.C.S. where I found a lot of wounded lying about. There were no tents and no blankets, some of the wounded had no clothing on except their shirts, shorts and putties. Later on through the night I was evacuated to Anzac beach."
That night the New Zealanders were relieved on Chunuk Bair, coming back to the main position on Rhododendron Spur, now somewhat more organised as a defensive line. At 1 a.m. on the 10th a further 80 men of the 5th reinforcements were detailed as stretcher bearers and at 3 a.m. Captain A. V. Short with "B" section bearers of the New Zealand Field Ambulance moved out under orders to join O'Neil's party; all wounded in the Chailak Dere were away before daylight.
At 5.30 a.m. the Turkish counter attack opened, in strength estimated as a division led by Kemal Bey in person. By 9 a.m. they were massing on the forward slopes having driven in the thin line of the New Army Battalions holding the New Zealand Trench on Chunuk Bair. A very determined flank attack was beaten off by Monash's Brigade but the most terrible hand to hand fighting took place about the Farm on the left of the Apex. Here Baldwin was killed. The 5th Wilts were practically annihilated, the Worcesters and Warwicks left without an officer. All our reserves were in—it was touch and go—but the line held at the Apex and from Cheshire Ridge to Warwick Castle at the head of the Aghyl Dere. By midday all counter attacks had been driven off with very heavy losses on both sides. O'Neil's A.D.S. at the head of the Dere had been withdrawn to a position a little lower down, conforming to the movements of troops now reorganising the position, the Apex now being the most forward point attained in the advance, 500 yards short of Chunuk Bair. Major O'Neil was now made responsible for all evacuations from this area; all wounded coming down were to be supplied with a haversack and water-bottle in order that they might have water and rations issued before they left the beach. Major Murray at the Monash Gully A.D.S. reported all clear by 10 a.m. Things were quiet there, the Lone Pine position was now safe; it had netted some five V.C.'s to the Australians; the Turkish counter attacks which lasted three days had died down.
The 13th C.C.S. was as yet not fully manned, some equipment had been brought up by hand and by transport on the beach road during the previous night. There were now 7 medical officers with about 20 O.R. of this unit at work; 50 fatigue men were added as stretcher bearers. Work on the beach and the pier was dangerous on account of bursts of rifle and M.G. fire from the Turkish lines above—it does not appear that any of this was aimed fire—dropping bullets were falling even in the C.C.S. where men were wounded occasionally. Captain Finn, had much trouble in getting the wounded away from the pier as the boats were small and few. Only an occasional horse barge was available, but from 6 p.m. on the 9th to 6 p.m. on the 10th, 168 lying down and 350 walking wounded got away to sea from this pier. Other walking wounded had been despatched down the big sap towards Anzac where they were handled at Walker's Pier by the 16th C.C.S.; but some 431 stretcher cases remained at No. 13 C.C.S. that night. Three hospital ships sailed on the 9th: Sicilia, Dongola Devanha, tranferring 2,500 cases to the Aquitania at Mudros. Only one hospital ship, the Neuralia was off Anzac on the 10th.
The three days fighting had cost the New Zealand and Australian Division and the 13th Division 375 officers, and 10,358 O.R. killed, missing, or wounded. The N.Z.M.C. casualties were not heavy: one R.M.O. wounded, one evacuated sick on the 10th. The New Zealand Field Ambulance had four wounded, but the New Zealand Mounted Field Ambulance lost 25 per cent. of their effectives from sickness or wounds.
During the night the removal of the wounded from the slopes of Sari Bair continued. By 4 a.m. on the 11th Major O'Neil reported that there were large numbers of stretcher cases to be evacuated and he asked for strong parties of bearers to be sent up. The A.D.M.S. applied to the A.A. and Q.M.G., Major Bentick, for the necessary men. Tarpaulin shelters and an operating tent had been erected at the C.C.S. but there was still insufficient cover for all wounded, who were coming in very quickly during the forenoon, in spite of evacuation by sea; quite 400 still remained at noon. A message from Colonel Keeble at Anzac states that the navy have sent every available boat, and that he has applied for a motor lighter. There was some improvement in the number of tows arriving after this, but later in the afternoon evacuation from the pier was discontinued after several men had been killed by observed machine gun fire from Battleship Ridge—range, say 1250 yards. It became necessary to evacuate by hand along the sap to the 16th C.C.S. whose pier at Walker's Ridge was safe. For this purpose the 13th Division furnished large parties of infantrymen who carried through the whole night. After dark it was possible to resume work at No. 3 pier. Up to 6 a.m. 209 lying and 492 sitting had been evacuated by sea, many hundreds also by the sap.
On the 12th the collecting station for wounded in the vicinity of the pier had 37 stretcher cases, these were brought up to the C.C.S; the red cross flag which had flown for 5 days on the pier head was struck, as the place was now considered too dangerous for further use. There were about 1000 casualties this day, 380 remaining in the C.C.S. which was not clear until two "Beetles" each capable of taking a very large number of stretchers reported at Walker's pier on the 13th. By this time the battle was over and the military situation had reverted to trench warfare.
In reviewing the medical arrangements and operations of medical troops during this very dramatic period in the history of Anzac
Several factors contributed to a partial failure in the evacuations. First, lack of small craft to embark the wounded. Early on the morning of the 7th the Australian and New Zealand Corps Headquarters were requested to communicate with Sir James Porter on board the yacht Liberty stating their requirements of tows for the two new piers. We have seen that at No. 3 pier there was a shortage of tows and that the craft was unsuitable. There was of course the tidal difficulty, the slender, inadequate pier, and above all the danger and the loss of life caused by shelling and rifle or machine gun fire. Had "Beetles" been made available at this pier on the 7th or 8th many lives might have been saved as that type of craft was shrapnel proof and could take aboard a very large number of stretchers expeditiously. Men could embark or disembark in fours from these new self-propelling machines, devised especially for amphibious warfare. There must have been a shortage of tows at Anzac at 11 a.m. on the 8th as they wired that they were full up. It is admitted by all competent authorities that tows were insufficient to clear expeditiously on the 8th. The second factor leading to a break down was lack of land transport. So evident was this that the D.M.S. who, with Surgeon-General Babtie, V.C., had considered the
The final report of the Dardanelles Commission sums up the matter thus:—"The evacuation was carried out in accordance with Sir James Porter's dispositions, and on the whole the cases were better sorted than in the original landings, but there was still considerable confusion. The scheme for the evacuations in August was based upon an approximately correct estimate of casualties, and the supply of hospital ships was much larger than that at the first landing. On the whole the scheme worked well, though again there were cases in which the transports were not satisfactory and the organisation for transferring the wounded to the ships was imperfect."
That the operations were on a much larger scale than at the landing is shown by a comparison of casualties. The British losses for the landings from the 25th April to the 20th May, 1915, are given in Sir Ian Hamilton's first despatch:—
Total casualties, 1714, about 50 per cent. of the effective strength of the Brigade.
The remainder of the month of August was taken up in consolidating and improving the defensive position which was not completely rectified until a "minor" operation, in which New Zealand troops co-operated, had added some 460 acres of territory
The Kaiajik Aghala, known to us by its contour as Hill 60 was held by the Turks and endangered communications between Suvla and Anzac besides dominating important wells as Susak Kuyu. It was determined to attack along an extensive front with this hill as the right pivot on which the Anzac left was to be directed while the 29th Division attacked the "W" Hills, the chief thorn in the side of Anzac. New troops were landed at Suvla including the 29th Division brought up from Helles. The New Zealand Mounted Rifles the New Zealand Engineers and the 3rd Australian Light Horse Ambulance were to be part of the Force under General Cox who had two infantry Brigades including the 4th Australian and his own Indian Brigade, all very much below strength of course. The O.C. 4th Australian Field Ambulance was to detail 2 bearer sub-divisions to clear their own Brigade, and the 3rd Australian Light Horse Ambulance was ordered to use their bearers in clearing one of the British Battalions of the 13th Division. Both ambulance parties assembled in Australia Gully and had orders to evacuate wounded to a newly erected pier opposite Waldren's point. Australia Gully, a tributary of the Aghyl Dere, lay to the west of the Damakjelik Bair and led up to the water shed of the Kaiajik Dere across which, to the north, lay Hill 60. The distance to Waldren's point would be over a mile, the open ground closely searched by rifle fire and shrapnel.
3 p.m. After a heavy bombardment of "W" Hills and neighbourhood, very little of it falling on Hill 60, General Russell's mounted men moved out to the attack descending into the deep gully to assault several parallel trenches on the hillside opposite. The 4th Australian Brigade were on their right, the Indian Brigade on their left. The N.Z.M.R. captured and held two lines of trenches; the 4th Brigade held a precarious footing on the same side of the dere. The Suvla Force had no luck—the 29th Division suffering heavily. Secure touch on our left was not yet established.
At 6.45 p.m. the O.C. No. 4 Australian Field Ambulance reported that as two of our guns were in action near the new pier opposite his M.D.S. at "Waldren's point, the pier had become inoperable for the evacuation of wounded. He protested against using a red cross flag in such close proximity to the guns. The A.D.M.S. instructed him to evacuate to the 16th C.C.S. at No. 3
"My regiment was detailed in conjunction with another regiment to take a sector of trenches on a hill to the north about 500 yards away as the crow flies. There was a preliminary bombardment of the trenches which was supposed to demoralise the enemy. The 4th Australian Brigade were on our right, the Connaught Rangers on our left, the latter had to take a well 200 yards away from our trenches. After the bombardment the men jumped out of the trenches, casualties commencing right away. Fire was coming in pretty hot on the parapets. Waiting for a comparative lull I took my chance, the S.B.s [regimental stretcher bearers] followed on my heels. We had to get down the hill 30 or 40 yards to get any material cover. Behind a bank 10 yards from the trench we got a man hit below the clavicle, he was not bleeding and was under cover. A S.B. was detailed to put on a dressing. Remainder made another bolt, Smith got winged in the leg, died afterwards, poor fellow—compound fracture. I was down in the scrub just getting below cover when I got hit—absolutely fatal luck. I knew I was hit in the back of the neck. I retained consciousness but my legs and arms were not under control, they were moving in vermiform a la
The diarist corrects this statement by saying that the Turks turn their bullets the wrong way round. All this very interesting as exemplifying current opinion. The Germans said the same thing of us in 1915. It was clearly shown that the modern "humane" pointed projectile is at moderate ranges infinitely more destructive on account of its momentum due to high velocity and its shape and composition that the larger, more slowly moving projectile of earlier wars (see Delorme War Surgery. 1915, for a full discussion.) The diarist was relieved by another medical officer and got away safely to a hospital ship, his concluding remarks deal with the Light Horse Field Ambulance. "The 3rd Australian Light Horse Field Ambulance were splendid fellows, Captain Cave and his bearers coming up at the critical time."
We have seen that both the Australian Light Horse Ambulances played a valuable part in the August medical operations. In this engagement the N.Z.M.B.F.A. sent up a party on the 22nd clearing to their M.D.S. at Chalk Hill. On the 22nd further heavy fighting took place at Hill 60 during which the R.M.O. Wellington Mounted Rifles Captain H. J. McLean, N.Z.M.C. was severely wounded. The 15th Battalion A.I.F. also lost their R.M.O., Captain Luther, A.M.C., killed in action; a very valued officer.
The final assault on Hill 60 took place on the 27th: the N.Z.M.R., the 10th Australian Light Horse and 2 Australian Infantry Brigades, the 4th and 13th co-operated. The fighting throughout was of a hand to hand nature with bayonets and bomb and lasted two days: there were heavy casualties. The net result was an almost complete occupation of the disputed hill trenches and a firm conjunction with the Suvla force.
The A.D.M.S., Lieut.-Col. Beeston, V.D., A.A.M.C., late O.C. 4th Australian Field Ambulance who succeeded Lieut.-Col. Begg, N.Z.M.C. evacuated wounded 16th August, 1915, issued medical operation orders for the engagement of this date. In anticipation of the attack, O.C. 16th C.C.S., who had relieved the 13th C.C.S., had established an advanced evacuation station at the pier opposite Waldren's point. Severe lying cases were to be carried to the C.C.S. at No. 3 outpost in view of surgical treatment. The N.Z.M.B.F.A., the 3rd A.L.H.F.A., and the 4th Australian Field Ambulance now had posts at the head of Australia Gully, and as the attacking force from the Australian and New Zealand Division was only 1000 strong it is seen that a sufficient number of bearers was available.
Some time after the attack Lieut.-Col. Thomas, N.Z.M.C. commanding the N.Z.M.B.F.A. was killed while leading
The capture of Hill 60 concluded the offensive operations at Gallipoli; the remaining period was one of defensive operations, and ultimately, preparation for evacuation.
During the beautiful autumn months of September and October, although old Anzac and its shell-haunted beach still retained its grim character, in the main, "greater" Anzac was a spent volcano. The Dardanelles Campaign had become of secondary importance in the opinion of those in authority in England; all efforts were at present bent in preparing for the big Loos offensive due to commence on the 25th September. No great addition to the Gallipoli Force could be made until after that offensive had taken place, it was possible only to send small reinforcements so as to enable Sir Ian Hamilton to maintain his positions, his army acting as a containing force for the Turkish Army so protecting Egypt or Townshend's Force in Mesopotamia, now nearing Kut, from further aggression.
The first move in the new programme was the relief of the Anzac troops who were, by now, non-efficient as a fighting force mainly through sickness and exhaustion. The Second Australian Division came in to relieve; the 54th East Anglian Territorials, took over our positions north of the Aghyl Dere; the 13th Division —what was left of it—rejoined the 9th Corps at Suvla. These moves were not completed until the 10th of September by which time the remnants of the New Zealand and Australian Division were resting in Lemnos. The rest was most urgently needed. The strength of the two Infantry Brigades, nominally 4000 each, had fallen, in the case of the New Zealand Brigade to 1050 on the 12th September, while the 4th Australian Brigade numbered only 875. General Russell, whose mounted rifle command of four regiments had totalled 2000, could now muster only 200 officers and men. The New Zealand Field Ambulance had dwindled to 5 officers, 82 O.R., and they had received 4 officers, 50 O.R. reinforcements since landing. Most of the R.M.O.'s attached to the Brigades were casualties by wounds or sickness.
That this wastage was not wholly due to fighting is evidenced by the fact that the New Zealand Field Ambulance admitted 1693 sick and 1435 wounded during the month of August. The sickness wastage had been extraordinary: at the end of August
Obvious signs of war weariness were also noted by observant medical officers. One R.M.O. notes in his diary after a tour of inspection of his trenches: "The men have lost their old keenness for sniping and observing. They lie about the trenches taking little of their old interest in the business of fighting." Not only the medical officers but the combatant officers were keenly alive to this paralysing wastage. The following report from Brigadier General Monash is a lucid commentary on the position. He addresses the New Zealand and Australian Divisional Headquarters from Australia Valley on 17th August, 1915:—"I am becoming seriously alarmed at the persistently adverse reports made to me by the Regimental officers of the brigade as to the physical condition and health of the troops. Evacuations for sickness which could not be treated in the lines amounted to 150 in the last four days, and are daily on the increase, the principal complaints being tonsilitis, bronchitis and dysentery. There are also many sick men, not evacuated, who are set aside for light duty but are really not to be counted upon in an emergency. The medical officers also state that the physical fitness and powers of endurance of the personnel not actually reporting sick are much below normal. I should be glad if the A.D.M.S. could be asked to make a thorough investigation into the health conditions of the brigade with a view to advising what steps are possible to restore its fighting efficiency." A very striking report from one of the medical officers of this brigade is worthy of perusal. "The sick parade this morning numbered 42, of these 31 are not in a state to be depended upon as fighting men in any emergency, they are mostly incapable of any form of exertion. In the trenches I notice that many of those who used to be the keenest of our old hands now seldom shoot or observe; they have reached the stage of absolute indifference." This R.M.O. goes on to describe the condition of one young soldier in his battalion, now recognisable as a typical picture of War Neurosis, a term as yet unknown at Anzac. "Private … aged 18 undersized, was in one attack on the afternoon of the 26th [Hill 60]. He went forward with his platoon commander and 10 men. They took cover under a hedge" [probably the boy's statement] "the officer told them to fire a few rounds but private… could not discharge his rifle, nor even put it to his shoulder; he was told by his officer to crawl back, which he did. On the evening of the 28th his pulse was 120 his temperature 100 degrees. He could not walk in a straight line, he had violent trembling of the whole body with twitching. He was holding both hands tightly clenched together and on making
Every effort was being made in August to check wastage by the establishment of "rest stations" in the ambulances. In the loose terminology of the time these rest stations were described as hospitals, whereas they were of course anything but hospitals. At the very best they offered only a few bell tents, the sick man brought his own blanket, great coat and ground sheet; an extra blanket was found by the ambulance. In some instances a stretcher was provided but the majority lay on the ground previously levelled to make a platform. Sir Ian Hamilton in his Gallipoli diary gives a pen picture of a C.C.S. at Helles, in July. "Walked through the different wards talking to some twenty officers and 200 men; mostly medical cases. Do not think things at all up to the mark. Made special note of the lack of mosquito nets, beds, jayamas and other comforts…. Too bad, when so much money is being spent, to see men lying on the ground in their thick cord breeches in this sweltering heat, a prey to flies and mosquitoes." Conditions were similar at Anzac in the ambulance rest stations but the medical unit were compelled by the instance of the military situation to retain every man possible on the Peninsula because once evacuated from the beach the soldier was lost to his unit indefinitely. It was necessary to return to duty men who were obviously not fit, in order to conserve the rapidly dwindling strength of Anzac. In their efforts the medical officers were often aided and abetted by the spirit of the men who, although not really able to carry on much longer, hoped to "stick it out" for the sake of their comrades, as every evacuation meant extra work for somebody: this, more especially in the case of officers.
There seems to have been some real difficulty in obtaining sufficient drugs and comforts towards the end of the month. Lieut. Sandham, Quartermaster of the New Zealand Field Ambulance reports to the A.D.M.S at the close of August as follows:—"I beg to point out that I have requisitioned every day for the last three weeks for arrowroot, cornflour, meat extract and brandy. The brandy I have been able to obtain only in very small quantities while the cornflour and arrowroot I have been unable to get until to-day, when I received six pounds of each. Meat
That the rest stations did some good there can be no doubt. The New Zealand Field Ambulance, after arrival in the Chailak Dere, admitted to its rest station 94 patients of which 23 were discharged to duty and 28 evacuated, leaving 43 remaining under treatment at the end of the month. Yet the temporary relief which the debilitated soldier had obtained was quite inadequate to his needs.
The causes leading to the abnormal sickness wastage, which had material effects in determining the failure of the expedition and which was a characteristic of the whole campaign, in which more men were lost through sickness than were evacuated for wounds, may be considered from a variety of angles. The climate, almost sub-tropical during the summer, was an important factor. One of the first of the predisposing causes to be considered is the clothing of New Zealand and Australian troops. Nothing indeed could have been more primitive than their garb: a battered slouch hat, the red band of the pugaree, where it survived, faded to a pale apricot colour, a pair of shorts, daily growing shorter, worn inside out as a necessary precaution against lice infestation of the seams, putties and boots, an identity disc and a first field dressing completed their get up. The skin in most cases tanned a coppery brown from excessive exposure to the sun, the knees very often bandaged to cover up abrasions which became ulcers that refused to heal. Excessive insolation of the skin is, in all probability, injurious to white troops in the field, however beneficial it may be when used therapeutically in the treatment of localised tuberculosis in the high lands of Switzerland. In warfare the "shorts" and the kilts, however attractive, have this great disadvantage that they leave a large area about the thighs and knees exposed to all sorts of minor injuries with consequent infections which are disabling. It is said that a French General in command of British troops in the near east forbade the use of shorts not for hygenic reasons but because he considered them indelicate! Here, then, in the scanty clothing of the New Zealand Tiadatha descriptive of the Balkan summer is vividly reminiscent:—
It is questionable whether any alterations in the dietary—and some were made—could have improved the sanitary situation. The baneful system of individual cooking, then prevalent, would have ruined any ration however good; every man cooked for himself, every dug-out bceame a midden of fly contaminated food and food refuse. When the soldier should have been resting he was engaged in predatory expeditions in search of water and fuel for his kitchen, and when the final product of his cuisine was consummated, it, no doubt, was highly indigestible, however appetising. The individual kitchen was wasteful of energy and rations; its products too often a breeding or feeding place for flies. The large open latrine was a stone's throw away on the crowded hill side, and from kitchen to latrine there was much coming and going all day by the swarming hosts of winged enemies.
Of flies there was more than enough, and of many kinds. Lucilia Caesar, the green bottle fly was most numerous in the vicinity of the trenches; it bred in the dead bodies lying in No Man's Land. One of the favourite sights of the Apex, reserved as a rule for "new chums" was a periscopic vision of the body of a Turk lying not too far from the parapet completely wrapped in a write shroud of living maggots, larvae of Lucilia Caesar. It came to be known in 1916, by Wenyon's experiments reported by Stitt and Balfour, that Lucilia and the Caliphoroe green and blue bottle flies, were carriers of amoebic dysentery, and that after feeding on human dejecta, which were known to contain cysts of Entamoeba Histolytica, the excreta of the flies were found to be teeming with such cysts. Can it be doubted but these flies were actively disseminating one form of dysentery, the amoebic type. Further, the house fly was noted to be breeding quite freely in human dejecta: it was found by experiments carried out by the Indian Ambulance attached to Cox's Brigade that in the shallow trench latrines flies bred to perfection, the earth covering the small trench (3x2x2) being carpeted with larvae at the end of a week after filling in; even spraying the contents, before covering, with 10 per cent. Cresol solution did not seem to be a deterrent. Typhoid fever and the paratyphoid fevers with the various types of dysentery certainly could be propagated by flies bred under these conditions. Other fly breeding places were the mule lines and the manure heaps at the foot of the Chailak Dere. Incineration of the mule manure was well done by the Indians S. & T., after the methods practised in India—drying and burning in specially constructed heaps— at least during the dry weather. When rains came it was no longer possible to incinerate. There was much manure, much refuse
Now that there was breathing time and fresh troops to man it, Anzac was to be put through an intensive course of supervision and sanitation. The dietary was the first consideration as the following documents show. The first is a letter from General Godley addressed on 10/9/15 to Anzac Headquarters in which he says:— "In connection with the health and general want of spirit of the troops of this Division I am convinced that the monotony of the diet is a factor largely responsible. The brands of preserved meat issued, particularly "Fray Bentas," quickly become unpalatable and the men prefer to do without meat rather than eat it. The meat is coarse in fibre, non-nutritious and too salt; in comparison with that obtainable from Australia and New Zealand, it has no place. I recommend that preserved meat of varied kinds, beef, roast and corned, roast mutton, sausages and tongues, etc., be obtained from the leading firms of the Commonwealth and Dominion. I also strongly recommend the establishment of a canteen where the men could purchase food of a variety suitable to their particular taste. Any expense incurred would be more than recouped in the improved health and morale of the men." To this letter Corps replied:—"All the points raised by you in your memorandum of the 10th instant have been and are under
A very active sanitary commission organised in England in July had been sent out to the near East to advise General Baptie, V.C., P.D.M.S. on matters concerning the health of troops in Egypt and the Dardanelles. The Commissioners:
Towards the end of September the first sanitary section was formed by the New Zealand and Australian Division. The earliest sanitary sections appeared in France about April, 1915, they were the First and Second London Sanitary Sections, Territorial formations, sent out originally to fill the place of the Sanitary Sections on the L. of C. whose duties are defined in F.S. Regs part I. Chapter 9 See. 85. Besides their duties on the L.O.C. these units were doing a lot of necessary work in looking after areas just behind the line that had no settled sanitary control. Sanitary sections were not part of the original establishment of the Regular Army but became a part of a Divisional Composition in August, 1915. The New Zealand and Australian Sanitary Section was organised to supervise the cleansing of the unallotted areas, the miles of roadways, beaches and communications that had no definite military sanitary control; cleanliness of the public thoroughfares was the first consideration and the erection of public conveniences. The men of the sanitary section, 21 in number, were not, at first, drawn from medical personnel, there was none to spare; they came from the Australian Light Horse and the Infantry, and were quite untrained, so that a course of instruction had to be arranged.
At Mudros, where the New Zealanders were in rest camp at Sarpi, there was a serious shortage of N.Z.M.C.: so many had been evacuated sick at the latter end of August the two New Zealand Ambulances could muster only 7 officers and 74 men. Inoculations with the R.A.M.C. vaccine, T.V., were proceeding; the site selected for injection was a few inches above the olecranon process of the left arm which was found to be preferable to the abdominal wall site previously used in New Zealand. A small See Appendix: Dysentery at Anzac
Up to the end of September affairs at Anzac remained quiescent. About the 23rd Colonel Beeston, A.M.C., the A.D.M.S., was evacuated with symptoms suggestive of hepatic abscess. In Anzac, since the landing, he had commanded the 4th Australian Field Ambulance with distinction until he replaced Lieut.-Col. Begg, N.Z.M.C., as A.D.M.S. of the Division in August. He was succeeded by
Towards the end of October some early indications of the onset of winter, occasional gales with colder nights, stimulated the preparations for the wintering of the troops. Rain fell on the 22nd, and the temperature dropped, but the weather otherwise was fine and warm.
The fall of Serbia and the retreat of the Russians from the Brest-Litovsk line were unfavourable to Anzac. Lord Kitchener's message was to dig in as there was no present intention of evacuating, but it was apparent that the Turks were receiving better ammunition than heretofore, as by the defeat of the Serbian Army the railway was now opened from Nish to Constantinople. Sir Ian Hamilton had been recalled to England; the D.M.S. Surgeon General Birrell bade his farewell in September; General Godley was temporarily commanding the Corps; General Birdwood commanded the M.E.F. until relieved by General Munro, who visited Anzac on the 30th. The gales of October washing away our piers and wrecking the lighters, so as to render communications with the shore or the landing of troops impossible for
Affairs at the Base in Egypt at this time may be considered briefly. We have seen that No. 1 New Zealand Stationary Hospital was established at Port Said. It was at first used as a convalescent hospital and had 500 beds in August. The No. 2 New Zealand Stationary Hospital commanded by Lieut.-Col. Parkes, N.Z.M.C, had been constituted the New Zealand General Hospital by recommendation of the D.M.S. in Egypt, Surgeon General Ford: and, by an agreement between the New Zealand and Egyptian Governments, we took over the Pont de Koubbeh Hospital of the Egyptian Army with 612 beds opened in August
A concentration camp for unfit men of the N.Z.E.F. had been formed at Suez. The necessity for this camp arose early in August. Men unfit for further military service were being boarded in hospitals and posted to various convalescent camps, but there was great difficulty in keeping in touch with these men: many were lost sight of for a time, to reappear only when a transport was due to leave for New Zealand. They now clamoured for return, but by this time no trace of their board papers could be found although they claimed to be permanently unfit. On the other hand many cases were boarded for return to New Zealand but could not be found when the transport was sailing. A concentration depot near the port of departure was required. Ultimately a camp for 600 unfit and invalid men was authorised by instructions received from the New Zealand Government and by 21st August, 1915, was established with Captain Tapper, N.Z.M.C., in medical charge. Invalids were still returning to New Zealand in large numbers: the Tahiti took 500 in August, the medical personnel consisting of 2 N.Z.M.C. officers, 12 O.R., 4 nurses; the Aparima, carried 100 venereal cases under 1 M.O. and 5 O.R., N.Z.M.C. But owing to representation made by our Defence Minister, that 25 per cent. of these venereal cases returned fit to New Zealand, and further the G.O.C. N.Z.E.P., Gen. Godley,
The New Zealand Hospital Ship Maheno, Col. Collins, N.Z.M.C. in command, called at Anzac on 21st August and left for England on September 13th. She was inspected by Col. Maheno on August 27th. She has accommodation for 350 cot cases and 100 cases on deck. The staff, all specially selected, consist of N.Z.M.C. officers, 7; nurses, 14; other ranks, 61. She is well equipped with all the most modern fittings, having two operating rooms, X-ray room, laundry, isolation and observation wards. Many small comforts are provided for patients which one would only expect in a first class hospital ashore: for instance, there is a small library in each ward. The public of New Zealand subscribed £40,000 for the purpose of providing complete equipments and fittings adapted by New Zealand labour." Col. Howse finds some objectionable features: double deck cots which make surgical treatment and nursing exceedingly difficult; lack of single or double rooms for the use of very senior officers; that the quarters provided for N.C.O.'s and the men of the N.Z.M.C were inadequate.
Early in October No. 1 New Zealand Stationary Hospital was warned for departure overseas. General Godley had already applied to have the unit sent to Lemnos, but to his request there was no reply. Colonel Heaton Rhodes, the New Zealand Red Cross Commissioner, had also asked that the hospital might be sent to Mudros; he was informed that its destination was unknown. Ultimately it embarked at Alexandria on 19th October on the s.s. Marquette, with 8 officers, 28 N.Z.A.N.S. nurses, 9 N.C.O.'s., 77 O.R., total 122, in company with the 29th D.A.C., comprising 500 officers and men, 500 mules, and a quantity of ammunition. The Marquette was torpedoed on the 23rd when 60 miles from Salonika. She sank in 7 minutes with a loss of 18 N.Z.M.C., N.C.O.'s and O.R. and 10 N.Z.A.N.S. nurses drowned. The survivors were picked up after variable periods of immersion up to 10 hours, and carried to Salonika or to Egypt. The equipment, of course, was a total loss.
By the end of October the New Zealand General Hospital had admitted all the New Zealand sick and wounded then in Egypt
By the 10th November, the bulk of the New Zealand troops and the 4th Australian Brigade had returned to the Division at Anzac looking much improved by their rest. The New Zealand Field Ambulance under Lieut.-Col. E. O'Neil, D.S.O., took up its old quarters above the Turkish bivouac in the Aghyl Dere; the N.Z.M.B.F.A. now commanded by Lieut.-Col. Murray, N.Z.M.C.— late Major in charge of Pope's Hill A.D.S.—established its M.D.S. near Chalk Hills but to the north of the old site occupied in August. Lieut.-Col. Begg, C.M.G., had returned to his appointment as A.D.M.S. relieving Lieut.-Col. Downes, A.M.C.—the 5th A.D.M.S. of the Division. One had been killed, one wounded, and 2 evacuated sick. Major Mathew Holmes, N.Z.M.C., was now acting D.A.D.M.S.
The return of the troops coincided with the visit of Lieut.-Col. the
The visit of the Sanitary Commissioners came a little later. Lieut.-Col. Dudgeon, R.A.M.C. was the first to arrive. He inspected part of the lines of the New Zealand and Australian Division occupied by the Australian Light Horse. His advice was to push on with the flyproofing of latrines and to enforce the chlorination of all drinking water. He noted a marked prevalence of gingivitis or pyorrhoea incident to a great extent in the older residents, considered by some to be an evidence of scurvy which certainly existed amongst the Indian supply and transport drivers at Anzac. For this dental condition which the Sanitary Commissioners believed to be a predisposing cause in gastro-intestinal disorders adequate dental treatment of drafts was strongly recommended. The provision of company kitchens and the abolition of individual cooking was another matter commented upon. All these measures, however, had already been under consideration and were strongly recommended by the local sanitary officers. Lack of material was one of the chief difficulties in completing the necessary sanitary work already in hand. Most units, had already, by force of circumstance, adopted the company kitchen. The need for greater economy in food and fuel was urgent. By now most of the scrub and the few olive trees originally on Anzac had been cut down for fuel or constructional purposes, so that it was necessary to make an issue of one pound of fuel daily per man. In most instances the type of kitchen adopted was the raised trench pattern with puddled clay and stone walls and suitable openings for kettles—as figured in the 1911 Manual of Military Engineering, plate 7—with small ovens ingeniously contrived of oil drums, kerosene tins and other heterogeneous metal containers. There was a chimney of biscuit tins, and in some kitchens a roof of galvanised iron—how obtained the C.R.E. had yet to learn—and a few sandbags for walls to close in the dug-out. In some instances a stock pot made from an oil
The much-to-be-desired fly proof latrines had not yet been universally adopted. Model latrines were erected in the dere by the sanitary section, but owing to the shortage of fuel any wood used in their construction soon disappeared—the troops even cut down for fuel the scrub which concealed them from enemy observation. Here was a real difficulty: any sort of timber was more precious than gold or even life. All the ration boxes which might have been used for flyproofing were used as fuel, the normal use in the field. The simplest form of improved latrine consisted of an oil drum with a movable fly-proof lid, as first devised in France early in 1915 by the London Sanitary Companies. They had two faults; the lid was movable, hence removed nightly; the lids were not self-closing. In certain places deep fly-proof latrines were constructed: that is, very deep broad trenches covered by planks and provided with movable lidded seats so constructed as to be self-closing. Substantially made, these deep trenches acted well and were moderately flyproof. As used in Egypt at a later date they had a serious defect that flies were able to breed in them, the larvae subsequently emerging, it is said, through six feet of sand. The only solution seemed to be incineration of the contents of the bucket-type of latrine; this again needed fuel. Nevertheless the persevering R.M.O. urged by the Sanitary Officer obtained some wood, by means other than those provided for in the Regulations, and when he found his wooden fly-proof covers vanished in the night, remade them with biscuit tin lids covered with sacking. Truly, as Sir Ian Hamilton says:—"Anzac was ever resourceful in the face of adversity."
The conservancy of the trenches themselves presented peculiar difficulties. In the Apex area certain readjustments of the trench system were forced on us by the certainty of heavier bombardments in the near future. An alternative front line had to be dug
The chlorination of drinking water recommended by the sanitary commissioners, was now strictly enforced, but owing to lack of experience there were some well founded complaints of evil tasting water. Certain initial difficulties had to be overcome, the chief being the provision of bleaching powder—a product which had not previously been used in the New Zealand and Australian Division. There was some confusion as to what was required, as chloride of lime had been an issue for water purification, but eventually a fair supply of the new preparation was discovered at the A.S.C. Depot. Again, there were no water carts of the new pattern—Ruston mark 4—which were not on issue to our division nor to any Australian troops at this time. Neither water duty men nor medical officers had any definite knowledge of the new method of chlorination. This was hardly possible as the process was a confidential matter even in France, and no official document dealing with the use of the cart had been issued. The old procedure of chlorination by chloride of lime and dechlorination by thio-sulphate was the only one taught to the troops who landed. Canvas troughs were originally provided for the purpose, but had ceased to exist except as issues on charge to battalions. The water duty men, perfunctorily trained in the first instance, and having no duties to perform, so they said, were rapidly absorbed into the R.M.O.'s medical establishment and became medical orderlies, dressers, or sanitary men. It became necessary, if chlorination were to be enforced, that these water duty details should be instructed in and encouraged to carry out the functions for which they were detailed. A new pattern water cart was kindly lent by a field ambulance of the 54th Division, a class was initiated and demonstrations in clarification and chlorination held. There was some show of ill will towards the new order of things, as the nursing of sick and attentions to the wounded seemed more honourable than water duties; however, all difficulties were eventually overcome and each brigade chlorinated daily in the 300 gallon tanks provided. The only danger in the provision of a pure water supply to the trenches —chance pollution in transit—was now eliminated. The water from the new wells opened up at No. 3 outpost was in all probability of very fine quality; there were no habitations in the vicinity to contaminate it, and it was otherwise well protected. But the handling at the large tanks where the water was piped into the Fantassahs for mule transport, offered some chance of pollution. Dust might have been introduced either at the principal reservoirs or at the smaller brigade tanks close to the line. All these dangers
The last of the sanitary recommendations was:—The provision of dental prophylaxis. This had already been provided for by the A.D.M.S. who opened a "dental hospital" at No. 2 outpost, with four N.Z.M.C. dental officers, four mechanics, and essential equipment including the necessary apparatus for prosthetic work; and this apart from the dental work done by N.Z.M.C. dental officers attached to the Field Ambulances. New Zealand had certainly led the way in the provision of an adequate dental service for an Expeditionary Force and a dental hospital capable of carrying out any form of repair or mechanical work and the making of dentures and provided with cylinders of nitrous oxide gas and dental engines perched on a trenched hill side, cheek by jowl with a very noisy mountain battery, surely reaches the "limit" in front line dentistry.
But in spite of all this sanitary effort the last days of Anzac were again to see an orgy of sickness. In the cold snaps that came in October epidemic jaundice broke out amongst the garrison, the veterans mostly affected. The epidemic developed a very severe form in the middle of November, one case of icterus gravis, dying at the C.C.S. on the 13th. Epidemic jaundice of armies had been met with in most wars since Baron Larrey first described a jaundice associated with haemorrhages observed by him at Cairo during Napoleon's campaign in Egypt. The fatal case alluded to above was of this type, indeed, from the petechial haemorrhages, it was at first mistaken for a case of C.S.M., but a post-mortem examination showed that it was haemorrhagic icterus. Weil of Heidelberg gave his name to the disease in 1886 by describing an epidemic jaundice in Germany. During the South African War, over 5000 cases were reported with a low death rate. The spirochoetal form of haemorrhagic jaundice with a high mortality rate was first reported by Tuada and Ito in Japan in the first year of the great war and several French investigators on the Western Front had already confirmed their findings in 1915. The outbreak we were observing was common to Helles, Anzac and Suvla, with a variable incidence of 2 per cent. to 10 per cent. in units. The speakers at a meeting of the
The French pathologists, Sarrailhé and Clunet, working at Helles, considered the jaundice to be a type of paratyphoid gall bladder infection, while Martin at Lemnos was partly in agreement. It certainly was not spirochœtal jaundice.
Of the few pleasant memories of Anzac which medical officers retain, most will agree that the meetings of the Anzac Medical Society organised by the ever-resourceful Colonel Howse, were the chief; and the hours of deliberation spent in the 1st Australian C.C.S., now moved to safer and more commodious quarters south of the Sphinx in Reserve Gully, will ever be remembered. The meetings originated in a sanitary conference held in September at which all the sanitary officers attended. Each area of defence had a sanitary officer attached; these sanitary officers were not necessarily specialists, nor did they command sanitary sections. At the conference many questions of moment were discussed:— Chlorination of water; lice infestation:—one very enthusiastic officer of the Indian Field Ambulance demonstrated specimens of the body louse, which he carried in an inner pocket in test tubes with gauze coverings, and like the pelican of the desert, had nurtured with his own blood twice daily; the characteristic differences in pigmentation of the two types—the "grey back" of the white man and the black louse of the Gurkha—were admirably demonstrated to a hushed and devout audience. At the next meeting on the 14th October, 1915, the late
But the time was rapidly approaching when the Anzacs would be leaving Anzac and the M.E.F. abandon its hold on the Peninsula for a while. Several events of moment cast their shadow on the darkening days of the occupation. Lord Kitchener came; he saw—he hesitated—very much was at stake—but at last, reluctantly, he ordered the evacuation. The loose-end Anzacs assembled and cheered the great soldier lustily; it seemed to do him good; he smiled and waved his hand in almost affectionate response: he was at heart himself an Anzac. But all must be kept secret, the Turk must be educated to believe that we had taken up permanent winter quarters. To this end, all in ignorance of early departure, the erection of winter quarters by the garrison proceeded, warm clothing was issued and fresh material landed. Two events, however, must have brought the situation home to most observant officers with striking clarity.
The first was the blizzard at the end of November. On the 28th there was a bitterly cold wind blowing from the north, the heavy rainfall of the previous days was now followed by snow; slush and snow made communications very difficult; the trenches were very muddy, and in places nearly full of water. The 54th Division marching out suffered severely, and had several cases of frost bite. The N.Z.M.R. Brigade who were relieving the 54th spent most of the night in the open under very severe conditions. All day there was a high wind, communications between ship and shore and the evacuations of sick and wounded became impossible. On the 29th snow lay on the ground, it was freezing hard, eight degrees of frost were registered; there was no hospital ship available; the growing number of sick and wounded still held up. Many small craft and one destroyer were blown shore at Imbros and at Suvla. The piers were washed away. Worse still, the Turk put down an unusually heavy bombardment with brand new high explosive on Lone Pine trenches, killing and wounding a very large number of Australians including Major Millar Thompson, A.M.C., Divisional Sanitary Officer of the
The blizzard, if it killed the flies, brought with it a very dreadful loss of life due to exposure, chiefly at Suvla. In many cases both Turk and Britisher was drowned in the trenches. Frost bite of a severe type was seen in the Indian Brigade, several cases of gangrene of the feet occurred; but with the New Zealanders and Australians, things were not so bad, only three cases of frost bite of mild type were admitted to the New Zealand Field Ambulance and there was a proportionate incidence in the other ambulances of the Division. Strenuous efforts were made by all senior officers to counter the danger and a providential issue of gum boots about this time contributed to the success of their preventive measures.
A few cases of mild trench foot had been seen during October in the 7th Australian Brigade then holding the Apex. The weather was not cold at the time, the trenches were quite dry. The cause of the trouble could not be attributed to cold or wet, but it was found that the soldiers affected had not taken their boots off for many days. The tightly fitting pantaloons and puttees were the chief factor in determining stasis in the foot. All these cases had the typical signs of trench foot, swelling, tenderness, and acute pain of a neuralgic type, with areas of blunted sensation in the usual distribution, but they all did well and recovered shortly. Instructions were issued that men should remove their boots at stated periods when in support, and that puttees should be worn loosely applied. There was no trench foot following the blizzard: the condition then seen was true frost bite.
The water and ration supply had become an increasing anxiety for the Administrative Staff at Anzac during these gales: mainly dependent upon supplies from Imbros, when the frequent gales prevented the daily replenishment of the reserve tanks, a water famine threatened. A condenser plant was in course of construction but owing to the "change in policy" unknown yet
A ration shortage was also evident at the end of November, a daily supply of fresh bread could not be maintained and biscuit was a poor substitute, as there was much gingivitis and dental trouble. On many days the available ration fell much below the value of normal war rations. A sanitary officer estimated several daily issues as furnishing from 3,300 to 3,400 calories each, and it was not possible for the men to utilise the full carbohydrate allowance in this ration as it was hard biscuit. Transport difficulties on land, rough seas, and absence of adequate shipping and piers contributed to a food and water shortage which, although never acutely felt, probably contributed during the last few weeks to weaken the garrison, whose metabolic demands for heat formation were not being adequately met. Certainly an appreciable loss in weight was experienced by nearly every one towards the end of the month. During the first three days of December, no less than 40 officers and 1352 O.R. were evacuated sick out of a total corps strength of 25,900; of these, some 24 from Anzac Corps by effects of cold.
Another event of minor importance early in December was the bombardment of the 16th C.C.S. at No. 3 outpost, with 5.9-in howitzer high explosive shell, entailing serious loss of life amongst the sick and wounded. The bombardment was intended for the Mountain Battery, a biscuit toss away, but the overs fell into the marquees of the C.C.S. No Red Cross convention can guarantee the protection of a medical unit which persists in keeping bad company: a noisy party of screw guns to wit; lack of room was our only excuse—the Turk could not, be held blamable. There were 280 cases in the C.C.S. of which 40 lying, one shell exploded in the surgical ward where the lying cases were, killing and wounding many of them—the ward was wrecked. The R.A.M.C. officers and men stood by and cleared the patients into the adjacent sap—shells falling all the time—until every patient was removed; there were 4 patients killed, 11 wounded. The shells were of a new type and horribly effective, it was clear now that Turkey was getting plentiful supplies of new ammunition and howitzers, and that if Anzac was not starved out or frozen by gales or blizzards, it would shortly be shelled out of the Peninsula. The heavy casualties at Lone Pine and at No. 3 outpost from shell
The medical arrangements for the evacuation were based on the assumption that there would be serious casualties when the rear guard parties were embarking, and that it would be necessary to leave many of the wounded behind in charge of a limited staff of medical personnel under the protection of the Geneva Cross, and in accordance with the Convention. I refer now to the arrangements made at Anzac only. The evacuation of troops had to be conducted in two stages: first, a reduction of the garrison to a minimal strength, calculated to hold the position for from two to four days, and a final embarkation of all guns and men to be completed in two nights. Hold or "keep" positions covering the beaches were defined; the embarkation of the small rear guard was to be at "Walker's Ridge and carried out in reverse order to the landing operations. It was during the final stages that casualties might be expected if the Turks became aware of our manoeuvre and followed up. During the preliminary steps to be completed before the 19th, the usual arrangements for the evacuation of sick and wounded would be adhered to, but during the rear guard movements, to be completed by the 20th, the lightly wounded men were, to embark with the fighting troops. Two hospital lighters were to be provided for the conveyance of seriously wounded, and the Vice-Admiral would provide boats off shore throughout the final stages when stragglers or walking wounded came down to the beaches. A proportion of medical personnel with accommodation for seriously wounded was to remain on the Peninsula until the evacuation had been completed, in order to tend such casualties as could not be embarked with the last of the rear guard. The following morning permission would be asked of the enemy, under a, white flag, for the medical personnel and the wounded to be embarked on the hospital ships, which were to remain. The total of medical units to be evacuated comprised about 8 field ambulances; 4 mounted field ambulances; 3 casualty clearing stations; 1 stationary hospital, the 1st Australian; 2 Imperial sanitary sections: the 5th Advanced Supply Depot of medical stores: and the New Zealand Dental Hospital. The tent subdivisons of the ambulances of the New Zealand and Australian Division were closed on the 12th and, curiously, the secretary of the Anzac Medical Society issued notices for a meeting to be held on the 19th. On the 12th the 16th C.C.S.,
The Turks were apparently quite unaware of our intentions. They were busily employed digging and repairing their barbed wire. Fires had been lighted by us in many of the sites previously occupied; all movements had been carried out at night. No unusual number of transports or hospital ships was visible by day, the weather very favourable, calm with moonlight and thick fog at night. On the penultimate night the two New Zealand Ambulances and the 3 Australian Light Horse Ambulances embarked at 7 20 p.m., on one of the "beetles" boarding the H.M.S. Mars, a pre-Dreadnought, where the officers, especially the surgeon, gave them a hearty welcome, a very good supper, and found them a place to bunk in. About 7,700 in all got away that night.
Approximately 10,000 troops remained, these in turn were safely embarked the following night from three piers, almost the last to leave being the staffs of the casualty clearing stations. There was only one casualty. The following morning our warships found the Turks busily engaged in shelling the abandoned trenches.
From Mudros the Division sailed by various transports to Alexandria. Christmas day was spent at sea; the A.D.M.S., Col. Begg, on board the Huntsgreen, with the New Zealand Field Ambulance, presided at an N.Z.M.C. dinner party, amidst a scene of opulent luxury, as it appeared to the Anzac Garrison.
After disembarkation at Alexandria about the New Year of 1916, the two infantry brigades of the New Zealand and Australian Division entrained for Ismailia; the New Zealand Brigade went into camp at El Moascar, the 4th Australian Brigade near the central railway station; the mounted brigades reassembling at Heliopolis. The camp, El Moascar, was situated in the desert about a mile to the westward of the town and was bounded on the southern side by the Sweet Water Canal, which separated it from Lake Timseh, and on the eastern side by the Abbasia Canal. To the north was open desert, mainly hard sand, and to the westward cultivated ground by the banks of the Canal which accompanied the railway to Cairo. The town of Ismailia, which owes its origin to the French engineers and employees of the Suez Canal Company, is situated at the junction of the Port Said, Suez, and Cairo railway lines. The European portion, built in the French style, cheerful spacious and well ornamented by public gardens and leafy boulevards, presented a fairy-like illusion of sumptuousness to the jaded troops from Anzac, so long exiled from any semblance of civilisation, more especially as life in the desert camp was at first very uncomfortable. There was a serious shortage of tents: most of the men were in bivouac only, which they found less comfortable than their old dug outs on the Peninsula; many indeed, reverting to their cave-dwelling habits, attempted to burrow into the sand. The nights were cold and there was a shortage of blankets, and at times even of rations. Equipment and baggage was still detained at Alexandria owing to congestion on the railways. The officers and men had with them only those few effects which they had carried on the person from Anzec. By the 8th of January conditions were improving but there was still much overcrowding in the tents when the 7th Reinforcements arrived. The transport and horses, which had remained at Zeitoun, were now coming into the camp, further reinforced, on the 17th of January, by the 2nd Battalion of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade, recently employed on the western frontier in guarding the railway during the Senussi operations. The 4th Australian Brigade joined us at Moascar shortly after, and
As important changes were pending in the organisation of the N.Z.E.F., now grown to dimensions far exceeding those of the "Main Body," we must review very briefly conditions at the Bases up to the end of 1915. In New Zealand, recruiting for the N.Z.E.F. was still on a voluntary basis, but it was stimulated to some extent by local recruiting committees. The numbers offering were constantly in excess of the military requirements of the moment, although the requests of the Imperial Government for reinforcements on a higher scale than previously agreed to were readily complied with. By maintaining the training of the Territorial Force and the Cadets, the N.Z.E.F. was continually fed by an uninterrupted stream of officers, N.C.O.s and men, the majority of whom having served for four years in the Territorial Force helped to stiffen the reinforcements drawn from the civilian population. Recruiting, attestation, medical examination and posting to training drafts admitted to camp at stated intervals, bi-monthly, was a function of the Territorial Force; sorting, training and final assessment of medical fitness for active service was in the hands of the Permanent Staff, combatant and medical, of the Reinforcement Camps. The regulations for the medical examination of recruits were similar to those prescribed in 1911 for examination of candidates for admission to the New Zealand Permanent Staff, and were almost identical with requirements set out in R.A.M.C. Regulations, 1905, Appendix No. 16. The age limit was from 20 to 40 years. Under instructions issued by the D.M.S. all necessary arrangements, including the selection of examiners, were made by the Territorial P.M.O.s of the four Military Districts, as a rule, experienced N.Z.M.C. officers of good professional standing. N.Z.M.C. officers on the active or reserve list were selected as examiners, and in outlying districts a certain number of civilian practitioners were employed and as neither the P.M.O.'s nor the examiners were whole-time men, a fee of 2/6 per recruit was payable. In the large centres the medical examinations were carried out at
One factor in the problem which had attracted much attention was the number of rejections, then averaging about 25 per cent. of the recruits: the public of New Zealand had not yet realised the extent of physical unfitness normally present—they were to be more fully enlightened and disillusioned later on. Having in view the fact that the 6th Reinforcements arriving at Lemnos in October, 1915, on being classified, were found to show a moderate percentage of unfit by pre-war conditions, the 25 per cent. of rejection in New Zealand was certainly a generous assessment. Owing to complaints from Trentham that the physique of the 7th Reinforcements was not so good as that of previous drafts, the Surgeon General rescinded the previous instructions and increased the stringency of the examination.
As early as Januray, 1914, General Godley had realised that an experienced R.A.M.C. officer was required in New Zealand, to act as a Staff Officer to the Territorial D.M.S. and as an, instructor to the N.Z.M.C. Colonel Robin, in 1915, had recommended the appointment of a "regular" D.M.S. in his annual report—ultimately the New Zealand Government decided to apply to the Secretary of State for a senior R.A.M.C. officer of wide experience to act as D.G.M.S. to the Military Forces in New Zealand.
The new D.G.M.S. found, on arrival, in September, 1915, a reformed camp at Trentham, now all hutted, well roaded and drained; the work had been put through in a very short time by the Public Works Department employing very large gangs of workmen. A large "model" camp at Featherston, some 27 miles north of Trentham on the same railway system, was in course of construction, and was to provide accommodation for 7000 men. At Trentham as P.M.O.,
As there was no supply of Flexner serum available in New Zealand or, then, in the Commonwealth of Australia an autogenous vaccine was prepared by
One curious fact in connection with the epidemic was that the incidence was usually in the inhabitants of the huts and not amongst the tent dwellers. Professor Adami in his account of the epidemic amongst Canadian troops in Bulford in the winter of The War History of the C AM C.
In October, 1915, a training camp for Ambulance Details and N.Z.M.C. generally, had been established at Awapuni Race Course near Palmerston North, at first commanded by a combatant officer under the direction of the O.C. Military District. The success of this camp was assured from the start, when Maheno, as Commandant of the depot when control passed to the D.G.M.S. The No. 1 N.Z.H.S. Maheno 10 officers, 67 O.R. under the command of Lieut-Col. J. S. Elliott, N.Z.M.C. sailed in November carrying N.Z.MC. reinforcements to Alexandria.
By the 1st of January, 1916, New Zealand had despatched 27,902 officers and men to the N.Z.E.F. Of these, 2688 were dead, missing or prisoners of war; 4,857 were wounded, or rick in hospitals in the Mediterranean or England; and 3111 had returned to New Zealand. The Medical Unite despatched were:—One Mounted, two Field Ambulances; two Stationary Hospitals; and two Hospital Ships. Including the Regimental Medical Officers and the Reinforcements, up to and including the 7th, the total Medical personnel embarked from New Zealand comprised 124 officers, 1150 other ranks. These figures include 13 dental officers
The Imperial Government in view of the large numbers of New Zealanders available, suggested the formation of a New Zealand Division; this was ultimately agreed to by the New Zealand Government in February, 1916, and the mobilisation of the Division was authorised by Corps Routine Orders on the 18th of February. Major General Sir A. H. Russell, K.C.M.G. assumed command of the Division.
The Medical Headquarters consisted of: Colonel Begg, C.M.G., A.D.M.S.;
The important question of N.Z.M.C. reinforcements attracted attention during the period of reorganisation. In November, 1914, the Imperial Government requested that reinforcements should
There were at this time some 89 officers N.Z.M.C., and 960 other ranks in Egypt. A few details, medical students, who had joined the Main Body, were returned to New Zealand in February, but at the time of the formation of the No. 2 Field Ambulance a certain number of men were added to the N.Z.M.C. strength from the infantry units. These details with the available Medical Reinforcements and the new Field Ambulance from New Zealand, provided for the increased personnel of the Division. The new ambulance, to be designated No. 2 New Zealand Field Ambulance was ultimately formed by utilising "B" section of the Second Field Ambulance formed in New Zealand in 1915 and already in Egypt and a draft of officers and men from the Main Body Ambulance which had served in Gallipoli, with a certain number of details drawn from the Auxilliary Hospital—part of the No. 2 New Zealand Stationary Hospital established at Moascar Camp in January, 1916, under Major McGuire, N.Z.M.C.—and a proportion of stretcher bearers drawn from infantry reinforcements. Lieut.-Col. Murray, N.Z.M.C., was appointed to command this unit on the first of March, The two sections of the second Field Ambulance formed in New Zealand, and known as the Rifle Brigade Field Ambulance, under the command of Lieut.-Col. Hardie Neil, N.Z.M.C. late Commandant of the Awapuni Depot, became the No. 3 New Zealand Field Ambulance of the New Zealand Division. All three ambulances were now engaged in training.
A second Anzac Corps was in course of formation: General Birdwood still retained command of the first Anzac Corps, General Godley was to command IInd Anzac of which the New Zealand Division would be a part. Besides assuming command of a Corps, General Godley still retained his statutory appointment as Commander of the N.Z.E.F. for the administration of which he was responsible to the Dominion Government. At the time of the visit
At the time of the formation of the Division it was considered that there was an undue proportion of fit men both in hospital and the various depots. This view was shared by the D.M.S., M.E.F., Surgeon-General Bedford. There was a tendency, it was said, to treat soldiers invalided from Gallipoli with undue leniency. Many had been invalided to England or New Zealand for trivial conditions of disability. In September, 1915, there were 2,927 soldiers of the N.Z.E.F. in England whilst the number actually at Anzac was somewhat less, 2,840; at this time only 16 per cent. of the troops despatched from New Zealand were in the field. General memoranda dealing with the return of fit men to New Zealand had been cabled to Egypt by the Defence Minister. It is probable that Invaliding Boards of the period were not as exacting as was desirable; they were in many instances ill-provided with case sheets
The important question of promotion in the N.Z.M.C. was at present under revision; a gradation list was in course of compilation. Owing to the fact that unit promotion in the field units had been the rule since the Expeditionary Force had first sailed, and that promotions were at the same time being made in New Zealand, there was some confusion and some dissatisfaction amongst the N.Z.H.C. officers and N.C.O.'s of the so called "Main Body." By regulations issued by the N.Z.E.F. the promotion of N.Z.M.C. officers now became a Corps matter, as the whole of the Expeditionary Force, N.Z.M.C., was classed as one unit for the purposes of promotion, but the promotion of N.C.O.'s still remained a unit arrangement as promotion up to the rank of sergeant could be approved by the O.C. of any medical unit. In one instance a water duty man had been promoted to corporal in Anzac by his battalion commander! The rank of staff sergeant did not, as yet, exist in the N.Z.M.C. Several recommendations had been made by officers commanding for promotion to this appointment which were not approved by the A.D.M.S., as he was of opinion that the experience gained, so far, by N.C.O.'s was not sufficient to warrant the extra rank. Two staff sergeants arriving from New Zealand with the Rifle Brigade Field Ambulance were obliged to relinquish the appointment on joining the Division. The method adopted at the Awapuni depot was to grant temporary rank only, which lapsed on joinging unit with the Division. There was as yet no gradation list for N.C.O.'s.
One other administrative matter we must consider. The New Zealand dental service was now to be reorganized; Captain Finn, D.S.O., N.Z.M.C., the dental officer whom we have seen evacuating wounded from the No. 3 pier at Chailak Dere, for which good work be had a D.S.O., was now appointed as acting administrative dental officer, attached to N.Z.E.F. Headquarters. The ideals of a compact dental service attached to a Division were not as yet fully attained. The opinion of the G.O.C. N.Z.E.F., at this time was that:—The O.C. of a medical unit to which a dental section was attached should be able to undertake the administration of the section so that a separate Dental Corps Headquarters was unnecessary. A dental section comprised:—one dental officer, rank: captain; one corporal, dental mechanic; one private, dental orderly; one private, clerk. Two dental sections were attached to
By the end of March the New Zealand Division was nearly complete, the 7th, 8th and 9th Reinforcements had arrived; the three Brigades, the 1st, 2nd and the New Zealand Rifle Brigade, were at full strength and the Divisional Medical Units, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Field Ambulances and the Divisional Sanitary Section, were mobilised and undergoing a course of training. The necessary medical personnel had been attached to the various formations.
At the end of January the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions had occupied the front line, across the Canal, the New Zealand and Australian Division remaining in reserve in Ismalia. The New Zealand Mounted Brigade had been holding the outposts since February. By the 5th March our Division was moving out to Ferry Post and taking over the line vacated by the 2nd Australian Division now coming into Moascar for final preparation for entrainment for Alexandria and the Western Front. By the 8th the moves were completed and one section of the No. 2 Field Ambulance with the N.Z.M.B.F.A. were marched out to the canal defences to serve the Division and the N.Z.M.R. Brigade. "A" and "C" Sections of the Rifle Brigade Ambulance, henceforth known as No. 3 New Zealand Field Ambulance, arrived at Ferry Post from New Zealand on the 16th.
The No. 1 New Zealand Stationary Hospital, Lieut.-Col. McGavin commanding, hurriedly recalled from Salonika, took over the Auxiliary Hospital at Moascar. The New Zealand Stationary Hospital as it was now named, reorganised and re-equipped after the torpedoing of the Marquette was at first employed as a C.C.S., later as a stationary hospital. The total number of patients treated during its stay at Salonika was 6989 including 500 eye cases and 1000 dental; the work of the unit was very highly appreciated by the local medical authorities. They had only 48 hours notice of movement and left Salonika Harbour, sailing this time in a hospital ship, arriving safely at
Shortly after arrival in Moascar there was a mild outbreak of G.SM. mainly in the 4th Australian Brigade with sporadic cases amongst the New Zealand troops. The originating infections no doubt, came from the Reinforcements, the contributing causes being cold weather, a shortage of tents, and a lack of blankets, causing a huddling together at night in the overcrowded tents. The carrier rate was shown to be very high: out of 114 contacts isolated, 41 were bacteriologically examined, of these, 9 were positive, giving a carrier rate of 21 per cent. It was well known at this time that the carrier rate was invariably high during epidemics. Dr. Arkwright, of the Lister Institute, working at Bulford in the winter of 1914-15 with the Canadian pathologists, notably Captain Ellis, C.A.M.C.—afterwards known to the New Zealand Division as O.C. No. 5 Canadian Mobile Laboratory at Baillieul—was able to demonstrate the fact that the carrier rate amongst non-contacts was often higher than amongst the contacts, that is, tent or hut mates. It seemed evident that room infection was not the usual cause of the disease but that the centre for dissemination might be the canteen or institute, a fact which would more clearly explain the sporadic nature of the incidence. The outbreak in the troops at Moascar was closely associated with rose measles, widely spread in the 8th and 9th Reinforcements and for which they were quarantined on arrival, and the catarrhal infections—mitigated in Egypt by the superior climatic conditions and absence of humidity—which had been, observed in New Zealand and elsewhere as concomitants of epidemics. Over a dozen cases were notified amongst the New Zealand troops, most of which terminated fatally. The preventative measures adopted were:—isolation of tent contacts and bacteriological examination of throat swabs, universal throat gargling parades, twice daily, using permanganate of potash 1-1000 solution. The numbers accommodated in tents was reduced from 12 to 8 men in circular tents, and from 25 to 16 in E.P. tents. The isolates were released from quarantine following one negative throat swab; but positives suffering from naso-pharyngeal irritation or catarrhal symptoms were subjected to local treatment and were retained in isolation
Towards the end of February venereal diseases became very prevalent: from 50 to 70 cases a week being admitted to hospital; at the same time the field ambulances were treating an unusually large number of cases of scabies, a disease unknown in Anzac. The relationship between these two diseases it not sufficiently appreciated. So far no energetic measures of prophylaxis had been adopted but in March instructions, emanating from the D.G.M.S. in France, led to a regular weekly venereal inspection
The interior economy of units was a matter which was receiving sanitary consideration. A canteen committee was established to ensure control, sanitary and economic, over the camp bazaar and institutes. All mineral waters were subjected to rigorous examination, and factories not complying with the regulations enforced by the Division were put out of bound to the canteen purveyors. The R.M.O.'s who inspected daily were authorised to condemn eatables that appeared undesirable or were of poor quality. All mugs used for draught beer were to be washed in Condy's fluid— C.S.M. precautions—and cooked meat or eggs were to be served on pieces of bread laid on clean sheets of paper in order to avoid the risk of eating from badly washed plates. The kitchens of the units were closely supervised and
In March a part of the Sanitary Advisory Committee, a member of which had inspected the old Division at Anzac, visited the camp at Moascar. Lieut.-Cols. Balfour, Hunter and Buchanan reported on the sanitary conditions existing; a part of their report reads as follows:—"We found that the sanitary requirements were receiving careful attention, the work going on included the substitution of deep pit latrines revetted with sand bags and covered with flyproof boxes, for a defective open seat and bucket system with incineration of faeces. The change of system will not only be beneficial as regards conveyance of infection by flies and dust but it will do away with the nuisance which frequently arises from acrid smoke, and should diminish the use of native labour about the camp, and the special risk of infectious disease which the presence of these labourers entail. The incinerators are mostly of open type, often broken and are not well adapted to burning bucket contents, especially if the native labour used for the purpose is unsatisfactory." The decision of the Sanitary Committee strengthened the hands of the Anzec troops who were strongly opposed to the system in use when they took over the camp, that is: open latrines on the bucket system and incineration of faeces in" the camp incinerators. The objections to this system were these:— The latrines were not fly proof. Incineration of faeces was very difficult to carry out except in specially constructed incinerators. Of these special incinerators there was not a sufficiency in the camps. Skilled labour was difficult to obtain amongst the Egyptians and finally, the process was so repugnant to Colonial troops that it could not be efficiently carried out by them. In this connection it is interesting to recall a system of individual incineration devised by the No. 1 New Zealand Stationary Hospital while in Salonika, and first suggested by Surgeon-General McPherson. The principle involved was one of segregation of liquid from solid excreta and
During the month of December there had been an increase in the number of typhoid and paratyphoid "A" and "B" cases with an increase in eases of dysentery of baccillary type admitted to the New Zealand General Hospital. There was a parallel increase in cases diagnosed influenza or tonsilitis which, probably, should have been more correetly labelled P.U.O. As already noted the Sanitary Advisory Committee had commented on the marked incidence of enteric in New Zealanders accompanied by a very high mortality. Returns furnished by the New Zealand Record Office showed that up to the end of October, 1915, there had been 453 cases of enteric fever amongst the New Zealand troops, with a 20.5 per cent. mortality. The Advisory Committee recommended that all convalescent "enteries" (which included the paratyphoid cases) should be returned to their respective countries, the object to be gained being:—not isolation of potential carriers—but a longer period of convalescence. Against this decision Lt.-Col. Parkes, N.Z.M.C, had protested, as in many cases the diagnosis was clinical only and had not been confirmed bacteriologically: less than half the cases evacuated to New Zealand were bacteriologically diagnosed. "Enteric" had then, its old meaning:—Typhoid fever. There was much confusion in terminology at the time: the term enteric was used to cover typhoid and paratyphoid infections. Results of the bacteriological tests and the agglutinations carried out at the central laboratory, owing to mixed infections, and various vaccinations giving cross agglutinations, became so unreliable that the tests were abandoned about this time by order of the D.M.S. Of 84 cases, New Zealand patients subjected to complete investigation during October, November, and December, 1915, the results showed that 60.7 per cent. were indefinite; 4.7 per cent of the cases were proved typhoid: 4.7 per cent paratyphoid B; and 29.7 per cent. paratyphoid A. The typhoid cases came from Gallipoli as did the paratyphoid A; the paratyphoid B all came from local camps in Egypt. A circular memorandum entitled "The Bacteriological Examination of Cases of 'Enterica'" issued from the office of the P.D.M.S. in Egypt on 3rd February, 1916, showed that there was a very small proportion of true typhoid infection, and that the greatest proportion of cases were paratyphoid "A" in the Gallipoli cases. The whole controversy is so buried in obscurities of nomenclature and diagnosis as to be hardly worth while reviving, were it not for the fact that validity of the New Zealand immunisations had been
By the recommendation of the Advisory Committee a supply of T.A.B. (triple vaccine against typhoid and the two paratyphoid "A" and "B" infections) had been indented for from the R.A.M.C. College in London. The vaccine arrived in February, 1916, and was used immediately to inoculate the incoming reinforcements. A triple vaccine was first used in the French Army in 1910, but in 1909 a similar vaccine was on the market in England, and was used to immunise civilians proceeding to India. The œther killed triple vaccine of Clovis Vincent was used by the Italians in 1912 during their war in Tripoli, but T.A.B. was not yet in general use in the British Army in France (see R.A.M.C. Journal, May, 1916). Inoculations were completed for all the division early in April: two injections were made, of 5 cc and 1.0 cc, at one week's interval, mainly in the pectoral region below the left clavicle. The reactions were brisk but not severe, so that only 20 per cent, of the troops were immunised on one day, allowing for one day's rest following the injection. The work was done at the field ambulances.
The necessity of establishing a "delousing" plant for the New Zealand Division became apparent shortly after arrival in Egypt. The urgency of this consideration was indicated by a memorandum of the A.D.M.S. dated 7th February, 1916: of which the following is an extract: "Relapsing fever is now very prevalent in Ismailia. The mortality is fairly high and the drug required to treat it very difficult to procure [Salvarsan]. This disease is spread by lice infestation and the men of the division are largely infested. I wish to draw attention to the urgent necessity of forwarding the scheme for bathing and disinfesting of troops in the New Zealand and Australian Division." A scheme was in contemplation at Anzac which included hot shower baths and Serbian Barrell disinfectors in which the A.D.M.S. was much interested just prior to the evacuation. Some of the New Zealand troops had now been nearly 18 months in the field without any means of disinfestation, and relapsing fever was endemic in Egypt and at the time of the Moascar encampment there was a severe outbreak in the Egyptian Labour Corps at Ismailia. It was of the berberine type the invading organism being the Spirochoete Berbera carried by the body louse or the head louse. Another type of relapsing fever seen at Gallipoli was the Indian variety caused by the Spirochoete of Carter, a much milder type than the Egyptian disease. In the case of the berberine type of fever the body louse after feeding on the blood of an infected man remains inoccuous until the 5th day when it is capable of transmitting the disease up to the twentieth day. The Spirochoete is contained in the body fluid of the louse and may infect the minute wound caused by the bite when the parasite is crushed, as in scratching. Relapsing fever played a prominent part in the sanitary difficulties of the Balkan Campaign, of 1912-1913, when liee infestation became a cause of the spread of typhus fever. The association of these two diseases had previously been observed. It was mainly on account of the danger of, bringing typhus to the "Western Front that stringent orders were issued, at the instance of the French Command, to ensure that all troops from the East should be efficiently disinfested from lice prior to embarkation for France.
The New Zealand Division had initiated its own scheme prior to the issue of these orders in March but the water supply presented itself as a first difficulty. The Ismailia water purification plant was not able to keep pace with the demands of so many camps, as well as the pipe-line supply for the Sues Canal defence system to the east of the town. The town water works were of a very special type designed by Puech and Chaballe, French Dr. Leiper in Cercaria of Bilharzia Haematobia. In February the D.M.S., M.E.F., had published a circular memorandum on the subject founded on the work of Dr. Leiper, helminthologist to the London School of Tropical Medicine, which showed that endemic haematuria was exceedingly prevalent in Egypt—70 per cent, of the native population in Ismailia was infected—and further that the water of the Sweet Water Canal, its branches, marshes, pools and surface waters were more dangerous than well water owing to the fact that they harboured the intermediate hosts, two small snails, Bullinus Contortus, not unlike a very small winkle, and Planorbis Boissyi, a flat and very small snail shaped crustacean. The ova of Bilharzia after escaping from the human body per urethram or per ano, hateh out in water into free swimming Miracidia; the freshwater snails act as intermediate hosts, the larvae entering the snail's body, undergo further development into a opocyst which in turn produces innumerable Cercariae. The Cercariae, very minute, are free swimming, and gain entrance to the human body by penetrating the skin and mucous membranes. An infected mollusc may continue to discharge Cercariae for a period of three weeks. Bullinus Contortus was stated to be common in the marshes and ditches about Ismailia.Cercaria exists in New Zealand.
The problem of making the water safe for bathing was a difficult one for the A.D.M.S.: our arrangements were explained to the Sanitary Commission whose opinion was invited. In their report they refer to the matter thus:—"We were shown a scheme for the combined washing and disinfesting establishment for the camp. Some fear was entertained of infection by the Cercaria of Bilharzia, as the water is to be drawn from a pit fed by the Sweet Water Canal. It seems possible to adjust the heating apparatus so that all water used is raised, if not to boiling point, at least to 70 or 80 degrees F. We think this should be made the rule. By so cercaria; as cercaria will pass through two feet of sand, an ample filter bed must be provided; a temperature of 150° F. kills cercaria instantly; but free chlorine, in the proportions used for water purification, will not kill cercaria; whereas one part in 50,000 of fresh chlorinated lime kills in three minutes, cercaria will live 1½ hours in 1 part to 300,000; the bisulphate water purification tablets are effectual as normally used in water bottles; and lastly cresol, at the rate of 1 ounce to 60 gallons or 1 in 10.000 kills almost immediately. In practice the dangers were obviated by digging soak pits some feet from the bank of the Abassia branch of the canal, so allowing for ample percolation through sand, at a site free from weeds or rushes. The water was pumped into a large tank of 1,500 gallons capacity, in which it was heated to 150 degrees F. and 1 in 10,000 cresol solution was added. The water was cooled in a cooling tank and was used at ablution benches by the men, for washing their underclothing and for the bath. All underclothing subsequently went into a steam disinfecting chamber where it remained 30 minutes. A 4 h.p. boiler achieved by the C.R.E., Lt.-Col. Pridham, R.E., was utilised for water heating and steam disinfection. The disinfection chamber 9 × 9 × 9, constructed with a wooden framework, walls of tarred paper, and a concrete floor, was used for steam disinfestation of the clothing; 30 minutes was allowed for each change, with packing and unpacking, say one hour in all. A team of natives were employed to disinfest the trousers and pantaloons by passing hot irons along the seams. The O.C. sanitary section so organised the work that a 1000 men could be bathed and disinfested in one day. The cost per man was a fraction over one halfpenny per treatment, this included soap which was issued. Our plant was supplemented by a locomotive disinfector sent to Moascar by the D.M.S., which consisted of an ordinary iron railway truck into which steam at a 100 lbs. pressure was admitted from the locomotive; 40 minutes sufficed, in the closed truck, to sterilise large quantities of clothing if suitably spread out. When made into bundles the sterilisation was not effectual; in several instances living lice were found in clothing so treated.
By March, 1915. New Zealand had despatched overseas over 31,000 troops, of these 10,000 were casualties: dead, missing, sick
All available troops from Egypt were now being hurried to the Western Front: the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions of the Anzac Corps, under General Birdwood, were the first to embark, the New Zealand Division following on their heels. General Godley was to remain behind for a while, the IInd Anzac Corps was still in course of formation. On the 3rd of April the Commander-in-Chief of the M.E.F., Sir Archibald Murray, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., accompanied by H.R.H. the Prince of Wales, inspected the New Zealand Division at war strength. The great review was a moving sight indeed to all New Zealanders: the proud march past of our 20,000 horse and foot, harness on back and high of hand eager to take their place in the Empire's ranks in Flanders—the preordained
By the 6th April embarkation commenced in three flights. The New Zealand Mounted Brigade, under General Chaytor, now forming part of the Anzac Mounted Division commanded by General Chauvel, A.I.F., remained in Egypt and with it the New Zealand Mounted Field Ambulance, under the command of Lt.-Col. Hand Newton, N.Z.M.C. The New Zealand Sannary Hospital with 410 patients remained temporarily at Moasear. The O.C., Lt.-Col. McGavin, N.Z.M.C., had pressed a just claim for his unit to be converted to a C.C.S. for the service of the division, a provision contemplated by the New Zealand Government, but from a letter directed by the D.D.M.S. N.Z.E.F., to the D.D.M.S., L.O.C. dated 6th April, 1916, it would appear that it had been decided by the Imperial authorities that a New Zealand C.C.S. was unnecessary. Here was a most unfortunate misunderstanding. The stationary hospital possessed a fine surgical team which so far had not had much opportunity to develop its surgical ability. The cases treated at Moascar were mostly medical, one-third of them venereal disease. The conceptions of the functions of a C.C.S. were at this time, in the East, somewhat limited by local experience, vide the landing of the 1st Australian C.C.S. at Anzac prior to the landing of the bearer subdivisions. On the Western Front, stationary warfare had by now amplified the duties of the C.C.S., bringing it into line with the French Ambulance, or the German Feld Lazaret in the sense of bringing the surgical or operative treatment of wounds as close up to the firing line as possible. Early operation had soon proved its worth as opposed to the old South African policy of expectancy—any surgery that really mattered to the wounded man as regards the saving of life, was now the province of the C.C.S. probably the most important medical unit in the field, and the pivot of manoeuvre in the evacuation of casualties.
By the 9th April, the third and last flight of the New Zealand Division had entrained for Alexandria. Divisional Headquarters reached Marseilles on the 11th. The passage through the Mediterranean was uneventful for the old Gallipoli transports again freigthing Anacs to further adventuers.
On the 11th April, 1916, the first units of the New Zealand Division were disembarking at Marseilles, and, after an all too fleeting glimpse of the glowing colour of the Pays Lumière—then in full radiance of Spring—were hurried on by rail through Paris to the cold wet plain of Flanders, concentrating near Hazebrouck, about the 15th, in the Second Army reserve area. Divisional Headquarters were at Bleringhem, between Hazebrouck and Aire; here the A.D.M.S. established his office. Not far away on the road to Hazebrouck the 1st New Zealand Field Ambulance under Lt.-Col. E. O'Neil, D.S.O., opened its first tent sub-division, at the Chateau de Morbecque, on the site of a moated keep of the Flemish warrior, Dennis de Morbecque who had fought with Edward the IIIrd at Crecy, and whose tomb and effigy lay in the village church hard by. At the village of Tannay, Lt.-Col. Hardie Neil, N.Z.M.C., with the 3rd New Zealand Field Ambulance was in billets, his tent subdivision open in the school house at Thiennes, serving the 3rd Brigade, scattered through various farms and hamlets in the vicinity. The 2nd New Zealand Field Ambulance accompanying the 2nd Brigade had arrived later, on the 20th; Lt.-Col. Murray opened at Warne, close to Roquetoire the 2nd Brigade Headquarters. The Division was to be in reserve for a month; two divisions of the Corps, the 1st Australian and the 2nd Australian, were holding the line in front of Armentières and Sailly Sur la Lys. General Birdwood's Headquarters were at La Motte au Bois, on his staff, was the D.D.M.S., Col. Manifold, C.B., I.M.S.
The field ambulances were chiefly engaged, at first, in collecting their new transport and equipment. The transport waggons, horses, and mules, and the Ruston Mark 4 water carts were drawn from the Imperial Ordnance dépot at Abbéville, and were escorted to their respective units by transport officers and A.S.C. attached; the motor ambulances were not supplied until a little later. The new equipment, drawn from the supply depot of medical stores, included two water chlorination cabinets for each ambulance, designed for the purpose of estimating the amount of chlorination required to purify a given sample of
The weather was very wet and cold when the troops arrived, so that an extra blanket was issued by Army authority to the Anzac troops who, coming from Egypt, felt the keenness of the northern spring more than the acclimatised British troops, now on their summer allowance of one blanket only. The New Zealanders, not yet accustomed to the rather ragged billets, in farm yards, barns, lofts and byres, found themselves, at first, rather uncomfortably housed in their novel surroundings. So far, they had no experiences of billet life. Some billets undoubtedly were better than others, but the majority of the farm buildings and out offices were by now dilapidated by the constant passage of troops, through the dearth of labour, and above all, of material. So that the farmers, who profited in revenue by billeting, were apathetic in maintaining their buildings, more especially as claims for compensation were also, at times, an added source of income. The whole question of billeting and requisitions had been legalised in France by the laws of the 3rd of July, 1877, and subsequent laws, and the right of billeting troops in France and Belgium had been accorded to the British Army. In England the powers of the annual Army Act provides authority for billeting troops, only, when the Territorial Force is embodied, in case of grave national emergency; but as France and Belgium have conscripted armies the billeting laws are permanently embodied in the Legislature. The procedure was briefly this:— On arrival in a Commune the billeting officer would, according to French law, apply to the Maire or the Adjoint au Maire (Deputy Mayor) through whom, alone, billets might be obtained. The requirements of units would be stated to the Maire who allotted the billets or cantonments from a list kept for this purpose at the Mairie. Billets de logement, or billeting orders were then issued to be presented by the incoming troops to the proprietors on taking over the cantonments. At the time of vacation the billeting officer handed the proprietor a billeting certificate signed by the O.C. of the unit showing the amount due, by which document the proprietor claimed payment at the Mairie. As a rule claims for dilapidation were settled by mutual agreement;
Under the close billeting system in France, whereby a hundred men or more might be lodged in the outbuildings of a large farm— the lofts, barns, and byres being packed with men—stringent rules dealing with conservancy were very necessary. All refuse, including solid excreta was to be incinerated; where men were distributed over a wide area, the shallow trench latrines were permitted; but in closer aggregations a pail system with incineration, or deep fly-proof latrines, were required, where the subsoil permitted; where the subsoil water was in close proximity to the surface pails were necessary. The principle of segregation of liquid from solid excreta was compulsory where incineration— considered to be method of election—was practised. Much ingenuity and resource were required in devising conservancy appliances and the whole of the arrangements exacted a close supervision by regimental medical officers. Every effort was made by commanding officers to improve their billets and so provide for their men as to make the conditions of living as comfortable as possible. Needless to say the village estaminets became a perpetual source of pleasure and recreation to the Anzecs, always most welcome guests. Indeed the esteem in which the Anzacs were held by the French-Flemings, even from our earliest days in France was conspicuous. And it was not all cupboard love, indubitably there was also some natural love and affection between the parties. However that may be, the estaminet life—with all its faults—had something to recommend it from the point of view of morale—it kept the men amused.
The first anniversary of Anzac day was duly celebrated by the joyous announcement of the opening of the leave season to "Blighty." Many a young New Zealander was now to see "Home" for the first time; the leave allowed was eight days. The allotment to the ambulance personnel was 8 per week, but as the leave season was closed in June, some of the officers and men did not get away until after the Somme operations. The regimental medical personnel had their share of the battalion weekly allotments.
As the Division was ordered to take over the line in front of Armentières at an earlier date than anticipated, the 2nd and 3rd
In order to provide accommodation for soldiers who were not seriously ill but required a few days treatment, No. 1 Field Ambulance was instructed to open a divisional rest station at Chateau de Morbeque. Divisional rest stations had now become a recognised establishment on the Western Front, the idea was evolved from the earlier convalescent depots formed in the winter 1914-1915, at first as trench foot hospitals. The Austrian Staff Officer, Ritter von Hoen, whose manual, "The Strategical and Tactical Employment of the Medical Service," translated into English by Surgeon General Macpherson and published in 1909 as an official manual, possibly suggested the principle of keeping soldiers with minor disabilities, including slight wounds, within the Divisional or Corps Areas in a convalescent depot so as
The first medical unit to move into Armentières was the Divisional Sanitary Section who took over the duties of the 17th Divisional Sanitary Section and their quarters at the École Professionelle— the technical school at Armentières. By the 10th May, all moves were complete: at noon, the New Zealand Division had taken over its first sector of defence in France, with divisional headquarters in very handsome houses in the Rue Sadi Carnot, stated by the inhabitants to be the 5th Avenue, the Belgravia of the city. The houses were mostly modern, built in the Flemish style and must have been inhabited by wealthy manufacturers before the War. The A.D.M.S. established his office at the Civil Hospital which still harboured a few patients. No. 2 Field Ambulance relieved the 52nd Field Ambulance at the main dressing station, at a girls' school in the Rue de Messines, near the main road to Bailleul; their advanced dressing station was in a well preserved detached villa in the Rue des Jesuits in the Houplines area to the north-east of the town. The 3rd Field Ambulance took over from the 51st Field Ambulance with a main dressing station at the Cercle St. Joseph, a young men's club, just to the west of the new brick church of Notre Dame, while their advanced dressing station was situated in a brick kiln, on the high road to Lille at Chapelle d'Armentières, to the south side of the town. Each ambulance was serving its corresponding brigade.
The town of Armentières is situated on the right bank of the river Lys on the main road from the coast through Cassel, Baillisul, to Lille, of which city it was a busy, wealthy suburb. Very active and prosperous was Armentières before the war— with its linen bleach works strung out along the banks of the Lys, its thriving textile industry, its busy hum of spinning jennies and its many looms. The old fashioned weaver had a fine Flemish house in his factory grounds; the more modern built showy houses in the Rue Sadi Carnot. There was a good train service to Lille, distant by road, less than twenty minutes run in a car. The industrial centre round Houplines village to the north-east was of recent origin and formed a dense agglomeration of
As a frontal attack on Lille was an impossibility for us, there could be no thought of an advance from the bridge head at Armentières: defensive tactics were dictated by the nature of the local military situation. The possibility of a German advance was
A very important defensive measure was being closely scrutinised at this time: protection against poison gas—gas defensive measures. The type of attack to be expected was by cloud gas discharged from cylinders in favourable wind conditions; the gas shell had not yet come into use. There had been just recently an attack on the First Army by a discharge of chlorine gas; the mixture of phosgene with chlorine in 50 per cent.
A system of gas-proofing dugouts was devised by adjusting blankets to double doors so as to make the chamber tight against gas. Gas-proof chambers were installed in the advanced dressing stations: in use, the screens were saturated with hypo solution by means of Vermorel sprayers kept for the purpose; as the doors of the gas proofs were double and gas tight, men could enter or leave the shelter obviating the admission of gas by using the neutralising spray in the air lock. Part of the work of the division was the pushing on with the construction of gas proof ragouts or cellars for the protection of the reserves or for the accommodation of wounded.
During the month of June there were several alarms of gas probably due to the lack of experience of our own troops: but some of the alarms originated in the German lines. The "gas alarm" was given by means of sirens worked by compressed air known as "Strombos" horns, the beating of improvised gongs, such as a length of railway iron, or by firing coloured rockets irom the trenches; church bells in the vicinity were tolled to warn the civilians; the whole dismal chorus of sound very
The protection of the wounded from gas was provided for by allotting extra smoke helmets to the ambulances whose personnel and gas N.C.O. were well trained in the use of the appliances. The treatment of gassed cases consisted in the administration of ammonia from special glass capsules carried by the stretcher bearers; vomiting was encouraged by the use of emetics of salt and water; all gassed cases were to be evacuated from the cloud area as speedily as possible and on stretchers as lying cases. The treatment at the main dressing stations consisted of:—exposure to fresh air, oxygen inhalation and the use of small doses of morphia. The late effects; acute bronchitis, and broncho-pneumonia, were specially feared and were very frequently fatal; hydrœmia of the lung with intense cyanosis, not relieved by oxygen, preceded the end; atropine seemed to have little effect in controlling this condition of suffocation.
The medical scheme of evacuations of wounded from the trench systems required a considerable amount of careful consideration and organisation. Each A.D.M.S. in taking over such a system drafted his own scheme based on existing regulations, sometimes amending them as needs indicated, but generally in this stationary type of warfare there was little left to individual initiative, the various posts and routes of evacuation being permanent and part of the local defensive scheme. The medical arrangements always included provision for a retirement and the evacuation of wounded in conditions of a severe and sustained attack. At Armentières custom and military needs had already prescribed certain stereotyped routes of evacuation. In each of the two sectors the method varied but slightly.
The old village of Houplines proper was on the road to Commines and distant about two miles from the centre of Armentières. It had a village church of some antiquity and a modern Maine, situated at the south and north poles of the village respectively and connected by a straggling street of small houses in a dilapidated condition from shell fire, and abandoned by the civilians. Our front line trenches were 1200 yards to the east of the village, and the neighbouring village of Frelinghem, only a mile and a half away to the north on the Warneton-Commines road, was well inside German territory. Two regimental aid posts were accommodated in houses at Houplines. One of these was in the basement of an old estaminet, of which the front part, facing the enemy, was much damaged. The ground fell sharply to the river from the road level so that the back part of the house gave on to a garden some 10 or 12 feet below the roadway. The bank afforded some protection to the basement rooms. There was a kitchen with a cooking range, and two other rooms gas-proofed by means of doors and blankets. One was used as a dressing room, the other as a living room for the R.M.O. The situation was pleasant enough—on a quiet day—the garden and the river offered an agreeable outlook; there were meadows beyond the river and much to atone for the brutal ugliness of the broken village above,—at least it seemed a haven of rest for the wounded man from the trenches. The regimental bearers would have bound him up, placed him on a stretcher and carried him down the communicating trench and the avenue shoulder high, till they reached the mouth of the sap by the road into Houplines—a long carry of 1200 yards—over treacherous duck walks and round many an awkward corner where there was barely room to get the stretcher to pass. Down a sloping path from the street, into the garden there was access to the R.A.P. and here the Medical Officer readjusted the dressings, gave what aid he could, morphia if required, entered the particulars of the casualty and tagged him with a special tally—red for serious cases—white for less serious. A wheeled stretcher in charge of one of the bearers of the field ambulance carried the wounded man as far as the Advanced Dressing Station, three-quarters of a mile away, along the main road to Armentières. It was not safe |to bring a car into Houplines in daylight on account of its proximity to the firing line; at night it would have been very dangerous because of the shell holes in the road and enemy machine gun fire. Cars very rarely went into this village during the latter part of our stay in the sector. The advanced dressing
The Right Sub-sector had a somewhat similar chain of evacuuations. The R.A.P.'s here were in dugouts in the trenches, generally behind the front line or in proximity to Battalion Headquarters. Wounded were carried down the communicating trench to the R.A.P. by the regimental stretcher bearers; in places where it was difficult to handle the ordinary pattern, stretcher, a short trench stretcher came into use. From the R.A.P. the wounded were taken down to the support line, thence across the fields to; the Lille Road where they were met by wheeled stretchers sent forward by the advanced dressing station party. One of the A.D.S.'s was in a brick kiln, the other on the main road in a ruined brewery where there were solid cellars and gas proof accommodation. Cars could come up by daylight unobserved to the brewery, about a mile and a half from the main dressing station at Armentières, through desolate ruined streets, often encumbered with the debris of fallen houses.
The difficulties of this chain of evacuations would have been enormously increased in the case of severe fighting, owing to the fact that the routes lay through narrow streets which rapidly became impassable if there was much heavy shelling. Alternative
We have seen that there were two main dressing stations, one at the north end in the Rue de Messines on the main road to the bridge at Nieppe, the other, at the south end near the Notre Dame Church. Lieut.-Col. Murray at the Rue de Messines had to take over a small scabies hospital and baths for the treatment of that condition; on the ground floor of the girls' school two dressing rooms were established and a holding ward for wounded. A motor ambulance convoy—22nd M.A.C.—collected wounded and sick from the main dressing stations at a stated hour daily, but urgent cases such as abdominal injuries were sent away by special car at the earliest possible moment. A separate car was used for the transfer of infectious cases despatched to a special hospital or other unit designated for the appropriate type of disease. The general arrangements for the evacuation of sick were very complicated and required close supervision both as regards authorised form of diagnosis and destination. Prisoners of war were treated as our own wounded and were evacuated to C.C.S., if stretcher cases. They were to be searched by the Medical Officer in charge, all documents being retained, and notification was required by the Headquarters of the Division in order that interrogation by a staff officer could, if the condition of the wounded men permitted, be carried out at the M.D.S. The walking wounded prisoners were handed over to the Assistant Provost Marshal; no military escort was required for stretcher cases. At the Cercle St. Joseph, Lieut-Col. Hardie Neil had a very complete operating theatre established under the supervision of
Of the general methods adopted for the treatment of the wounded at this time a full account was given in the memorandum "Treatment of Injured in War," published by the War Office in 1915 and which was now in the hands of all medical officers. The principal points emphasised were these: where amputation was necessary in a field ambulance, patients should be retained after operation for at least 24 hours; haemorrhage was to be arrested by ligature, the use of the tourniquet was condemned, as it had been proved that infection by gas forming organisms was very liable to occur in tissues in which the circulation had been obstructed; abdominal wounds were to be sent on by special car for immediate operation at C.C.S., wounds of the back, loin or buttock with abdominal pain were to be treated as abdominal wounds—they were frequently penetrating wounds of the abdomen; penetrating wounds of the chest were to be plugged and sealed by strapping at the field ambulances so as to close them hermetically; suture of any type of wound was prohibited.
The Divisional Sanitary Section had taken over a very big job of work: no less than a leading part in the municipalisation of Armentières. With the decrease in population, due to the frontier condition of the town, and the destruction of Houplines and consequent cessation of work in the factories there, the municipal life of Armentières was at a low ebb. A town Major appointed by the British Army was responsible for the allocation of billets and the administration of the "civil" life of the military population which outnumbered the civilian by two to one. With the loss of the electric power which had been provided by Lille prior to the war, street cars ceased to run; there was no electric lighting; and shelling had caused a cessation of street cleaning and road maintenance. The municipal water supply had been taken over by the British Army and was controlled by our Engineers; on that score there was little cause for anxiety save that the pumping plant was liable to be put out of action by shell fire. Alternative plants were provided and maintained in view of this eventuality. The Abbatoirs had been converted to the use of a detention compound; sanitary and veterinary inspections had ceased; the civil hospital was closed with the exception of a casualty ward. The Maire drove in daily in his car from Hazebrouck and functioned in a portion of the civil hospital where a few clerks and civil guards kept up a semblance of municipal administration; the Town Hall and Mairie were no longer inhabited except by the military police. The Division in occupation filled the place of the municipality, providing police, fire brigade, street cleaning, water supply and sanitary work where required. The sanitation of the city was handed over to the army authorities, who by the Divisional Sanitary Sections administered a variety of matters concerned therewith. There was a signed agreement made with the Municipality of Armentières, ratified in turn by Divisions occupying the town, that for the sum of 40 francs a day the "army" would sweep and clean the streets and squares and remove mud from the main drains by all means at their disposal; but in the case of a withdrawal of troops the Army would no longer be responsible to the municipality for these services. An extraordinary document, surely, as in order to carry out this contract it became necessary to employ a very large amount of personnel, mainly bearers of the field ambulances not otherwise engaged, or later, rose measles contacts who were allegedly in quarantine. Horse teams and drivers were used to work the mechanical road sweeping brushes or to draw the dust carts.
The town water supply was ample and of excellent quality, it was drawn from a deep well sunk to 300 feet close to the canal. The Siemens de Frise method of purification by aeration and ozonisation which existed before the war, and which was both modern and efficient, could not be used by us as the plant had been badly damaged by shell fire, but as the bacterial content of the water varied between 3 to the c.c. at the Power-house and 15 to the c.c. at the outermost reticulations, and B. Coli was never present, there could be no doubts as to purity. As chlorination was an army order it was enforced in the Division and all carts filling at stand pipes in the town received the regulation 30 grammes of bleaching powder, producing 1 part in a million of free chlorine. Constant watch was kept on all regimental water carts by the Sanitary Section and surprise samples of their contents were taken at intervals for bacteriological examination by the 5th Canadian Mobile Laboratory of which Colonel Nasmyth, C.A.M.C. was the chief and Captain Ellis, C.A.M.C., the second in command. Both these Canadian officers helped the New Zealand Division to their utmost, and the well known laboratory at Baillieul furnished bacteriological reports on the town water supply every week, at least, while the New Zealand Division was acting as the municipal health authority. This frequent examination was considered necessary as the supply was intermittent. Furthermore, adequate supervision of the regimental water carts by other authorities than the R.M.O. were enjoined by Second Army Orders issued by the D.M.S. It had been found that in many instances surprise visits made to regimental carts showed that chlorination was not being B. Coli. present; and the third 3,600 bacteria to the c.c. Of the two chlorinated carts, one showed five organisms to the c.c. the other a virgin water. As regards water supplies in general the Second Army had provided regulations which now applied to the Corps and were communicated to the Division in due course. Shallow wells were the main source of supply outside the Armentières town area. The water, which was obtained from a stratum of sand underlying the surface clay, found at no great depth—say 10 to 17 feet—was never safe to drink without previous chlorination or boiling. In the summer months, owing to the very large number of troops using them the shallow wells tended to run dry. In order to conserve and protect supplies a sub-committee was formed in each divisional area consisting of one R.E. and one medical officer whose work was to be co-ordinated by a Corps Water Board. The water supplies for troops in the firing line were to be provided by wells some 500 yards apart with pipe lines where possible to take the water direct to the trenches by pumping. In all brigade areas the Brigadier was to organise "water patrols" to conserve and supervise all wells, ponds and other sources of water. In most cases the source of supply was closely inspected—wells with pumps in use especially—the bacterial content was examined and a large wooden notice board was attached to the well showing its quality, whether fit for drinking or for washing only, and bearing in large characters the number of scoops of bleaching powder required for chlorination. The Divisional Water Sub-Committee was engaged in locating wells suitable for the supply of the trench line. In connection with the trench water supplies
One of the most important sanitary considerations was the supervision of the divisional baths and laundry and disinfesting plant established at Pont, de Nieppe in a disused bleach works on the banks of the Lys facing Armentières and just north of the bridge. For the use of the bleach works the British Army paid a rental, and the plant was very suitable for the purposes both of baths and laundry: the huge vats used pre war for bleaching linen yarn with Eau de Javel, the substantial hydraulic presses and the copious supply of hot water from the large boilers were appliances adequate to all purposes. The Pont de Nieppe baths were well known on the English front as the first large institution of the kind to be established—by the 6th Division who were quartered in Armentières in the winter of 1914-1915. The large vats made surprising tubs for the men to bathe in; the hydro-extractors, rotary driers, the hydraulic presses and the extensive drying rooms, all used in the linen industry, were quite suited to the purposes of a laundry, so that several of these "blanchisseries" became operable as laundries at various points on the Lys in 1915. A large personnel partly military, partly civilian was employed at Pont de Nieppe: 1 officer, 2 sergeants and 65 O.R. N.Z.M.C. were supplied by No. 1 New Zealand Field Ambulance; the washing, ironing and mending staff comprised 185 women under a forewoman; the general control and direction was the duty of the Medical Officer in charge. Roughly, some 1200 men could bathe, be disinfested, and have their washing done in one day. Apart from the comfort which the hot bath provided the chief object in view was disinfestation of the clothing, which was attained by ironing with hot irons and brushing with special steel brushes—in the case of the outer clothing—the women being instructed in the method of searching for and destroying the lice ova, mainly hidden in the inner seams of the trousers or pantaloons. The under clothing was subjected to boiling in disinfectants, washed, dried and subsequently repaired. The wool of condemned socks was unravelled and used by highly expert darners in the mending of those that could be made serviceable.
Pediculosis—infestation by lice—had now become almost universal in the British Armies and presented a very real and constant menace of typhus fever, a disease known to be lice-borne and which had already devastated the Serbian and Austrian
The work done by the baths in the last fortnight of May was considerable: 446 officers, 21,675 men bathed; 13,779 shirts and 13,746 pairs of socks washed, with a corresponding tally of under-clothing; the total number of pieces washed; 99,066. The consumption of coal was from 30 to 35 tons a week; soap 1½ tons;
It seems almost incredible that one duty performed by the Sanitary Section should have been an anti-malarial campaign; yet such was the case, malaria was endemic about Nieppe. The fevers of the low countries, known in the days of Marlborough, were in part malaria, which wrecked a British Expeditionary Force in 1807 on the Island of Walchern, and still persisted in the Lys Valley. There were known carriers in the Nieppe area where cases occurred annually. The larvae of Anopheles were first identified by us in July, all pools and ditches where they were found were duly oiled. One case of malaria was notified as occurring in a soldier of one of the field ambulances.
Control of the licensed brothels and filles publiques did not come officially under our sanitary authority, but was administered by the civilians—a local doctor carrying out the bi-weekly inspections; our police, however, kept a watchful eye on the matter. Infected women were segregated, and treated at our special hospital until removed by the tardy operations of the French Army authorities. Our venereal incidence was not high; infections mainly originated in England during leave.
Shortly after the arrival of the Division in France the long marches on the pavé roads brought to light a great deal of foot trouble and in the case of some Battalions the numbers of men falling out through lameness was considered very discreditable. It appeared clear that commanding officers were not carrying out the usual and necessary foot inspections and that there was a need of closer attention in this matter. The Division had no trained chiropodists although every Battalion in the Regular Army had specially trained men and came into the field with a Battalion Chiropodist and a regulation box of instruments. This matter had not been overlooked in New Zealand, as at the time of the 8th Reinforcements a professional was employed at Trentham Camp in training Army Chiropodists and pouches of instruments were given to such of the pupils as had qualified. One of these, a sergeant, at the instance of the Brigadier, who recognised the value of the work, had been appointed a whole-time chiropodist to the 2nd Brigade and partly in consequence of the
A Dental Hospital was established in May at 42 Rue Nationale under the control of Lieut-Col. Murray, of the No. 2 Field Ambulance and in charge of Captain Tymona, N.Z.M.C., Senior Dental Officer, with two other officers, at which prosthetic work only was executed. All cases requiring mechanical work were drafted there by the dental officers working at the field ambulances who attended to extractions, fillings and other dental operations, the mechanics being transferred with the vulcanising and other required apparatus to the Dental Hospital. But at No. 1 Field Ambulance in charge of the Divisional Rest Station, the Dental Section remained intact so that all classes of work surgical, prophylatic and prosthetic could be performed there. Every effort was being made by medical officers to put the teeth of the
Early in the spring of 1916, there had been a very marked increase of activity along the whole of the British front which now extended from Boesinghe on the Yser to Curlu on the Somme. The 10th French Army had been withdrawn into the General French Reserve by reason of the Verdun Battle which still raged in June, and British troops had replaced it in the trenches of the Loos-Arras sector. Some 40 British Divisions, with abundant ammunition were, as the summer advanced, becoming more and more active in demonstrating, by raids, cutting out expeditions, bombardments and aggressive tactics against the opposing trenches. The policy was in part directed to reanimating a combative spirit in the troops long tied to stagnant warfare and to train them for future offensive operations. The New Zealand Division, when it took its place in the line, was committed to this general scheme of local fightfulness, an important and essential prelude to the larger operations. Therefore, the quiet of the Armentières sector was to be rudely disturbed; our orders were to continue the raiding policy without giving the enemy any rest whatever, and to give back shell for shell—retaliation heaped upon retaliation—to which purpose our artillery found itself supplied with undreamed of stores of ammunition. The busy trench fighting and aggressive tactics of the Anzac troops may have seemed at times a useless waste of life, and activity ill applied, especially to those who lived in luxurious billets in Armentières, but it was all part of a concerted scheme, calculated to complete the training of the New Armies, and served the purpose of pinning the enemy to his lines and preventing him from employing troops elsewhere. Germany was at the moment deeply committed to the Verdun operations which held out little prospect now of final victory, but the very opposition set up by the devoted patriotism of France was itself a loadstone that drew the Germans on to further lavish expenditure of lives squandered in what had now become a national obsession. By June, the battle was at its fiercest phase, and had lasted 130 days during which the enemy had advanced five miles. The great Russian drive in the Bukovina was now overwhelming the Austrians in Gallicia where, by June the 16th, Kaledin had advanced at least 50 miles, taking an incredible number of prisoners. To meet this invasion, German Divisions had to be withdrawn from France. But England was
On the 16th June our first raid was made. In the evening a secret order to O.C. No. 2 Field Ambulance advised him to prepare to receive casualties at about 11 p.m.: extra bearers and stretchers were sent up to the Advanced Dressing Station. Our guns opened an intense bombardment at 11 p.m. our raiders with blackened hands and faces and carrying strange weapons entered the "breakwater" trench in front of Houplines at 11.35; little of importance was found except a few German dead, but identification was obtained. After midnight the Germans released gas on the 41st Division on our left, but, although the gas was felt at villages in our rear, the Division was not affected. By 2.30 a.m. all wounded were in: 4 officers, 14 O.R., including raiders. Everything was in readiness for their reception and immediate despatch to C.C.S. in our motor ambulances. Over a third of the wounds were head wounds caused by shrapnel; the majority were severe, all due to the counter bombardment on our trenches during the raid. On the 22nd the 2nd Australian Division raided, bringing retaliation on Arnentières; one of the shells thrown into the town just missed the sick officers' ward in No. 3 Field Ambulance; a gas alarm helped to intensify the animation of the scene which, as usual, was at its brightest about midnight. On the 23rd we shelled Perenchies Church, the enemy replied by bombarding Houplines, wounding several civilians who were received by No. 2 Field Ambluance. Bombardments and retaliation continued until it became necessary to evacuate all sick from the No. 2 Field Ambulance: it was not considered safe to keep them there, as civilians were being killed and wounded in the immediate neighbourhood.
On 24th June, the No. 1 Field Ambulance marehed into Armentières to relieve No. 3; they had marched the 19¾ miles from Morbecque, in 7½ hours marching time, with a halt of one hour at
Raid succeeded raid until the end of June when a much greater activity became necessary, in consonance with the great Somme offensive, now fully engaged. By this time very few sick were being treated in the field ambulances, and the lightly wounded were evacuated as soon as dressed. On July the 1st No. 1 New Zealand Field Ambulance had a very narrow escape, a 5.9 inch naval gun opened fire on the big church of Notre Dame, the Main Dressing Station, being in the direct line of fire received nearly all the overs. The patients, fortunately few in number, were removed to cellars at both ends of the building. Much damage was done to the buildings and later, during the bombardment, it was found necessary to shift the patients from the east to the west cellar; this was safely accomplished in the intervals between shells. The "hospital" by now had six or seven shells into it—the roof had gone at one end and the whole place, including the operating theatre, was a litter of debris, plaster, wood and rafters—the end and side walls were breached. Luckily, there were very few patients; two main body sergeants, Campbell and Greenwood, who were on duty, helped the patients out of the wards and cellars so that through their efforts no casualties occurred. The No. 1 Field Ambulance took up fresh quarters in the Institute St. Jude, Rue Dennis Papin; our stock of churches was rapidly dwindling, they had to be content with the school chapel for the main dressing station; a small crypt below accommodated a few wounded, while the staff were billeted in the College dormitories. The same night 1st Wellington raided at the junction of the 24th and 50th Saxon Divisions; they lost their Adjutant, Captain McColl, killed and had 1 man killed, 8 wounded, and by 3 a.m. on the 2nd. 18 wounded of ours and 2 German wounded were received by No. 1 Field Ambulance. The following night the Wellington Regiment sent out a party of 4 officers, 104 O.R., which found no enemy in the trenches raided, but suffered heavy casualties: one officer, and 2 O.R. killed; 4 missing; 35 wounded. The town was shelled about midnight and by 2 a.m. on the 3rd, the wounded were coming into the M.D.S. of No. 2 Field Ambulance: they were wet through and covered with mud, which in many instances was plastered into their wounds; most of the injuries were severe due to bombs or machine gun fire at close quarters; when dressed and warmed up they were
In the trenches we had many casualties: a party in one of our bombing posts in front of the wire was missing; one wounded Saxon remained in our wrecked trenches. Both field ambulances were fully occupied, extra officers and bearers were sent up from each to assist in evacuating the wounded from the Epinette. The motor ambulance drivers did good work steering their cars through the town in the height of the bombardment, houses crashing to the ground in every street during the two hours the action covered. The new billets occupied by the 1st Field Ambulance were badly damaged by a heavy shell which just missed the flimsy chapel; many of our men were killed or injured in the town billets. By 1.30 a.m. on the 4th the wounded were coming down to both Main Dressing Stations; great difficulty was experienced in getting the stretcher cases out owing to blockage of the communication trenches by shell fire and the debris in the streets of the town which the cars had to avoid as best they could. Most of the wounds were severe, chiefly compound fractures of the arms or legs; there were several cases of men suffering from shell shock due to being half buried in the trenches By 8 a.m. 72 wounded had been evacuated to C.C.S. by No. 2 Field Ambulance and No. 1 had dealt with a smaller number (32) as their sector was not affected. The casualties in the 1st Auckland Battalion who held the Epinette on the night of the
The 5th of July was a very quiet day: certain changes in our dispositions were taking place, we were assuming a wider front, relieving Australian troops on our right in preparation for what proved to be the most costly and disastrous raid attempted by the Anzacs in this sector. The Second Anzac Corps with General Godley in command had arrived at Baillieul early in June, having left Egypt with the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions. The New Zealand and 5th Australian Division were to form IInd Anzac Corps; the 4th Australian Division going to 1st Anzac. The D.D.M.S. of IInd Anzac was then Colonel Reuter Roth, A.M.C., and the D.A.D.M.S. Major Butler, D.S.O., a trusty R.M.O. at Anzac where he won his decoration. On the 5th of July the 2nd Australian Division was being relieved partly by New Zealanders; General Birdwood and 1st Anzac were going south to the Somme— we were now under command of General Godley. The 1st Field Ambulance took over the brewery on the Lille road of which mention has been made and which had good cellar accommodation. "C" Section of No. 3 Field Ambulance relieved the same Australian Unit at the M.D.S. at Erquinghem, some 2½ kilometres south of Armentières on the main road to Estaires, Bethune, and Arras. They took over the communal school which was provided with an "elephant" dugout inside one of the class rooms used as the dressing station, and an advanced dressing station at Bois Grenier. As our front, now held by three brigades, had been so much extended—from the Lys to Bois Grenier—it required three main dressing stations and five advanced dressing stations, and at the instance of the D.D.M.S. the New Zealand Divisional rest station was moved up to L'Estrade near Steenwerck. The No. 1 Field Ambulance found better quarters at the Maternité in rear of the civil hospital, using the Institute St. Jude for billeting the personnel; the Maternité had an operating theatre with tiled floor very suitable for a dressing room, and through this newly
The 14th and 15th Ambulances of the 5th Australian Division were settling down at Bac St. Maur, Fort Rompu, Sailly sur la Lys, and at Nouveau Monde, where they had established an officers' rest house,—a Corps unit. The 14th Australian Field Ambulance was at Sailly. and their D.R.S., with ours, at L'Estrade. A very serious operation was in preparation by the 11th Corps on our right, a feint attack on the Aubers ridge south-west of Lille— a raid on unusual lines and in very considerable strength. The 5th Australians, on our immediate right, temporarily attached to the 11th Corps for the purpose, were to participate. As the operations of the 5th Australian Division were to be on a large scale—and the probable casualties estimated at 2,500—the D.D.M.S. IInd Ansac had requested the A.D.M.S. of the New Zealand Division to take over part of the line. The M.D.S. party at Erquinghem, under Major Neil Guthrie, M.C., was reinforced by 1 officer. 3 wheeled stretchers, and 1 motor cyclist of the 3rd Field Ambulance and by 1 bearer sub-division and 7 motor ambulance cars of the 61st Field Ambulance of the 20th Division, one Brigade of which was now under our command and was covering Fleurbaix. On the 18th the New Zealand bearer subdivisions were relieved from the baths and the street cleaning squads and "A" section bearers of the 3rd Field Ambulance went to Erquinghem, one officer with a tent sub-division and 60 convalescents from the D.R.S. at L'Estrade took over the baths, so relieving the whole of the bearer personnel. Major Guthrie now had the strength of a full field ambulance; from his M.D.S. at Erquinghem he had established two advanced dressing stations: one at Bois Grenier for the New Zealand Rifle Brigade; one at Croix de Rome, Fleurbaix, for the 60th—also a rifle brigade—of the 20th Division; all his cars were parked at Waterlands in the vicinity of Erquinghem but across the Lys.
Meanwhile the activities of the New Zealand Division were to be increased: raids followed in rapid succession, gas, smoke and shells were floated or hurled towards the enemy's lines; he, not to be outdone in animosity returned in kind. There were heavy losses on both sides. A condition of quasi-open warfare culminated on the 19th at 6 p.m. when the 11th Corps with two divisions, the 5th Australian, and the 61st assaulted the Aubers Ridge, carrying out Sir Douglas Haig's intention—a threat to
In acknowledgment of our bearers' work the Corps D.D.M.S. sent the following commendatory message to New Zealand Divisional Headquarters: "The Corps Commander has expressed his admiration of the good work done by the A.D.M.S., officers and O.R. of the Medical Service of your Division in collecting and evacuating wounded on the 20th and 21st of July, 1916. Please convey this message to all medical personnel concerned; it gives me great pleasure to publish this high praise."The A.D.M.S. of the 5th Australian Division, Col. Hardy, A.M.C., wrote to Colonel Begg as follows:—"I cannot tell you how much I appreciate your assistance. Every man was working and a sudden call for aid made me feel desperate. Your help came at
In spite of all this turmoil and bombardments, ever increasing in intensity, the soldier's round of social pleasures went on undisturbed. In June there was an Axeman's Carnival in the Forest of La Motte at which our Maori Pioneers triumphed over lumbermen from Canada, bushmen from Tasmania, and bucherons of France. The Division organised swimming sports at the baths in August and held a great horse show on the banks of the Lys over against Erquinghem. There was a picture theatre in the Éeole Professionelle and an occasional concert party, both playing to crowded houses. Institutes and canteens were opened by the Y.M.C.A.; many shops remained where clothing, groceries and even luxuries could be obtained; restaurants, cafés and estaminets were daily and nightly crowded. Above all the many brave men and women of Armentières who remained, at work, or because of their work people, helped to cheer and entertain the soldier and make his life in the town pleasant. These hardy Flemings had a great love of home and a strong faith in the British soldier who would one day surely drive the enemy away and give peace to their beloved town—our people—we their Defenders, brothers of their own Poilus!—and to this day they speak well of the "Brav Néo Zélandais"—they remember our doings and the little lads who sold their papers in the trenches are now themselves soldiers, and they, too, remember the days when Armentières was in the jaws of war. Of the dangers cheerfully faced by these industrious people, our records speak quite plainly. Their wounded were evacuated with our wounded: men, women and little children: in the month of July alone 397 men, 208 women and 78 children, the majority of these wounded by shell fire, were evacuated by our ambulances. A certain number died in our dressing stations, including one French soldier, on leave to his home at Le Bizet Francais—heavily shelled on the 8th of June. Of our own dead we recall how they lie in brotherly ranks marked by service crosses, hard by a factory where the girls were used to closing up their ranks when a shell fell and blotted out a spinning jenny and its workers.
But the Division was going south to test its mettle in the Somme battles. We were leaving Armentières for a while, our blue-eyed fair haired Saxon "cousins" across the border whom we had baited if not cowed—they were of the same stubborn breed—were also on their way south. We were to meet again. 2nd Auckland raided on the 12th of August finding the 11th Division of the 6th Reserve
The division moved by stages, partly by rail from St. Omer to Abbéville and partly by marches into the Fourth Army Reserve Area in the Somme Valley between Abbéville and Amiens, completing its concentration by the 22nd of August. Divisional Headquarters were at Hallencourt ten to twelve miles east of Abbéville. The division now had a strength of 18,525, and its first units, the N.Z.E. and the Pioneer Battalion, were moving into the forward area about Albert on the 25th.
The ambulances—which had moved with the brigade groups and were billeted in villages adjacent to their respective brigades— put their bearer subdivisions into training immediately after arrival: route marches, physical training and games were the principal exercises practised with the object of getting the men into hard condition for the arduous work to come. A high standard of physical fitness is required of ambulance bearers, whose work demands both strength and endurance, and for which they must be trained as infantrymen.
A large amount of extra equipment was at this time carried by all the ambulances including 150 stretchers instead of 76; 400 blankets; 1000 shell dressings, and other additional supplies. The material was more than the G.S. waggons could carry, so that some of the loads had to be distributed amongst the horse ambulances, of which each unit still had three. For this reason, partly, the dental sections, of which the division had six, were ordered to the base at this time, as it was found impossible to carry their equipment, equivalent to 4800 lbs in weight. Some enquiries were being made at this time by the D.G.M.S. in France as to the establishment of the New Zealand Dental Sections attached to the division: our field dental service had attracted some attention on account of its novelty and efficiency. In reply to enquiries from the D.M.S. Fourth Army, Colonel Begg expressed the opinion that the New Zealand Dental Sections were not satisfactory as field units on account of the weight of their equipment. At Armentières three dental surgeons and twelve mechanics with the heavy equipment had been able to attend to all the dental needs
Another important medical unit of ours was already established in the Somme area. The New Zealand Stationary Hospital, which had left Moascar shortly after the division, disembarked at Le Havre on the 13th June, under Lieut.-Col. McGavin with a strength of 12 officers; 126 O.R., with No. 10 Dental Section attached. After a short period of training at No. 1 Camp, and a course of gas defence instruction, the unit detached 7 officers and 83 O.R. under Major Acland, N.Z.M.C. to act as a C.C.S. in conjunction with No. 2 G.H. at Quai d'Escale, dealing with large numbers of casualties from the Somme which they tended and transferred to hospital ships. On the 10th of July, the O.C. and his Q.M. proceeded to Amiens where arrangements were made to relieve the 1/1st South Midland C.C.S. at the convent of the Sainte Famille and the Lycée a girls' school. The final moves of the stationary hospital were completed by the 13th when they took over from the outgoing unit: 11 officers, 88 O.R. patients; an X-Ray plant; equipment and accommodation for some 712 patients; the 12th Mobile Laboratory and the Fourth Army Ophthalmic Centre were also attached. The buildings which the New Zealand Hospital took over were historic. In the early days of the War No. 7 G.H. (R.A.M.C.) opened here, in Amiens, late in August, 1934, but on the approach of German patrols the hospital and all its equipment, including the X-Ray plant, had to be abandoned. The Germans entered Amiens, occupied it for 10 days, and utilised the hospital, but owing to the prevision of the Rev. Mother Superior Mc Gaudin, most of the equipment was saved including the X-Ray plant, stated to have been hidden in the cellars. The British red cross flags were still flying when the French returned to the Cathedral City. The 1/1 South
The New Zealand Division was now about to take part in the great battles; the marches up the Somme Valley commenced on the 2nd of September; Amiens was passed by easy stages and by the 9th the division was concentrating between Albert, Fricourt, and Becordel. The Allies' long premeditated campaign on the Somme, to be launched at our junction with the French Army in front of Peronne, was hastened by the necessity for relieving the pressure at Verdun. Allied War Council at Paris This period marks the commencement of the battles of attrition and the abandonment of the strategical aims. Haig Command, page 120.
With a high heart, the New Zealand Division took ground in the appointed positions on the 11th of September, relieving one brigade of the 55th Division and portion of 2nd Brigade B.E.F., by the 3rd (N.Z.R.) Brigade. Our division formed part of the XVth Corps. Our front covered about 800 yds.: the northern end of Highwood, a sea of shell holes pierced by jagged tree stumps, like masts of sunken ships, lay 1000 yards away to the left front; facing our line, some 300 yards distant, was the trench on the crest on which the 5th Bavarian Division were working actively by night, it ran into that portion of Highwood which they still defended; the village of Flers, more or less undamaged, was about
The medical arrangements which we are about to study were prearranged by the XVth Corps whose D.D.M.S., via Thistle Alley to Thistle Dump and thence by car, than through the open to Green Dump and thence to the Quarry. The length of the hand carriage was less to Thistle Dump, say 2000 yards maximum, than via Green Dump to Montauban, say 3000 yards, but there was a tendency for wounded from our division to flow down from the right flank of the position by the latter route because the character of the country somewhat favoured that line as we shall see presently. So then, based on the Corps M.D.S. and Collecting Post, we have two advanced dressing stations: the "Quarry," 4½ miles away at Montauban fed by its bearer relay post, Green Dump, nominally evacuating the right of the line; and Flat Iron Copse, four miles away, evacuating the left of the line. Such were the tactical dispositions of the medical lines of evacuation just prior to the first engagement—the Battle of Flers.
The A.D.M.S. 's operation orders were issued on the 11th, and on the 14th a conference was held at which the ambulance commanders met the A.D.M.S. It was now decided that Lieut.-Col. Murray, N.Z.M.C. commanding the 2nd Field Ambulance should take charge of all forward evacuations from the A.D.S. at Flat Iron Copse; the bearers of the three field ambulances were put at his disposal with all the motor ambulance cars, 21 in number. The 41st Divisional Medical Units were to have the Quarry A.D.S. and Green Dump, and were responsible for evacuations from that sector which might include the extreme right of the New Zealand Division, so that all New Zealand personnel was withdrawn from these posts. Certain important administrative instructions, already issued to medical officers, were discussed in detail: the regimental aid posts were to be supplied before action was engaged with bearers from the ambulances to act as guides to the B.R.P. and to keep up communications. We
The duties of the corps collecting post were mainly classification of all that mass of men lightly wounded, sick, gassed, suffering from shell shock, or hysterical conditions, or battle stragglers, not obviously unfit for service. A police posse, provided by the corps, was stationed at the post, where men not clearly disabled by injury or sickness—after a careful examination by a senior medical officer—were collected, the military police being charged with the duty of returning the stragglers to their unit; at the A.D.S. there was also a police posse with similar duties. A nominal roll of all stragglers handed over to the police was to be furnished daily to the A.D.M.S. Of the methods adopted to ensure adequate sorting of this mixed bag, we shall enquire more fully at a later period. In all these arrangements dictated by the D.D.M.S. at corps headquarters we see the first clear indications of the growing importance of the corps medical staff as a command and the massing of the ambulance resources to clear the corps front; each division was still responsible for its own forward evacuations but beyond this point the medical arrangements were now in the hands of the D.D.M.S. and there was to be an expansion of the corps control and some increase in the responsibilities of the D.D.M.S. as time went on—conditions resulting from the close order fighting of position warfare and the battle of limited objectives.
The battle about to be engaged, which we call the battle of Flers, was a very important operation destined to clear the flank of Combles so that the town might be pinched out rather than crushed out by our artillery fire, and was to comprise the united efforts of two British and one French Army. On the 13th, corps d'elite"—and they were opposed by the best of German troops: the Prussian Guard facing the Canadians; some of the best of Bavarian Divisions facing the Fourth Army. For the enemy we had a terrible surprise in store: the heavy machine gun section, known as "Tanks," now to be used for the first time in the war. There was a chance that this new weapon might cause such disorder in the German ranks that when the third line positions were penetrated a break through might occur; for this eventuality a mass of cavalry was brought up and stood in readiness to work through to the rear of the Bapaume defences. Indeed there was every probability that the combined effort would result in a striking victory.
Facing the New Zealand Division were four important lines of trenches: the Crest trench, some 200 yards ahead of their assembly trenches, the Switch trench just in rear of it, the Flers system covering the village 1000 yards away, and the Gird system the last of the organised enemy lines covering the village of Gueudecourt, two kilometres from Flers. The village of Flers did not form a part of the New Zealand objectives, it and the road which approached it from Longueval was in the territory to be taken by the 41st Division on our right. Two battalions of our second brigade were to take the first objectives the Crest and the Switch, the 3rd, (N.Z.R.) Brigade was to pass through in four waves of battalions to the further objectives. It is hardly necessary for us to recall the slow pulverising
During the night the battle opened on our extreme left where the Fifth Army attacked and took the "Wunderwerck," a super strong point in the Hohenzollern line, so freeing the left flank of the Canadians and by 5 a.m. on the 15th the four tanks allotted to the New Zealand Division were moving out to show the way to the Infantry. The morning broke in perfect Autumn weather, a slight mist lying in the valleys, the two Battalions of the Second Brigade and the Rifle Brigade were waiting the signal in their assembly trenches. At 6.30 a.m. the engagement opened, the intensive bombardment, and the creeping barrage crashed out from thousands of guns of all calibres. The two New Zealand Battalions advancing in waves passed over the Crest trench without difficulty, later suffering considerable losses from machine guns in the Highwood, attained their objective beyond the Switch trench in 30 minutes and on time, but it was not until some hours later that they had completed the clearing out of desperately fighting fragments of the Bavarian Division who still clung to portions of the broken trench line. The Rifle Brigade was now pressing on to the second and third objectives.
At 6.45 a.m. the first of the walking wounded were filing into the bearer relay post at Thistle Dump, and were being directed on to the A.D.S. Stretcher cases coming down a little later were conveyed by wheeled stretchers or by horsed ambulances to Flat Iron Copse. The 2nd Otago Battalion had had heavy casualties, losing nearly half its effectives, and as their wounded began to come in, extra ambulance waggons were required at the A.D.S.
Before ten o'clock, the 3rd Battalion of the N.Z.R.B. had been held up by uncut wire in front of their sector of the Flers trench and a considerable accumulation of wounded was growing in a position in the rear of the right flank of the Division; the walking wounded coming straight back in line with the Flers-Longueval road to Green Dump had reported the matter. But just at this time the 41st Division had met also with opposition and heavy shell fire in or about the village of Flers, so that most the bearers of that division were withdrawn from Green Dump and moved forward to the south east of Flers. At 10.30 a.m. tanks came to the rescue of the 3rd Battalion of the Rifle
Wounded, lying and walking, were coming freely through the A.D.S., Lieut. Col. Murray had explored his front about this time, and found that as far as the Switch trench the ground was. practically clear of wounded of the 2nd Brigade and the 2nd Battalion of the Rifle Brigade with whose R.M.O., Captain Brown, N.Z.M.C. he was in touch. Captain Duncan, N.Z.M.C., of the 2nd Canterbury Battalion was wounded and had been evacuated. Green Dump was reported not busy and the Quarry A.D.S. practically clear of wounded. By noon it was becoming clear that the wounded of the remaining battalions of the N.Z.R.B. were not coming down at all freely, although all were now in the third line of the attack, and our right flank was well out beyond Flers. The enemy had put down a barrage in front of the Switch trench on the crest which it was very dangerous for bearers to pass through. It was also known that these battalions had sustained substantial losses. The A.D.M.S. now directed the A.D.S. parties to push the bearers ahead as far as circumstances would permit in order to clear this flank. By 1 p.m. it became known that the R.M.O. of the 1st Battalion, N.Z.R.B., Captain Bogle, had established his R.A.P. earlier in the day at a point south-west of Flers, that there was some congestion of wounded at this post and that some of his cases were coming through Green Dump and the Quarry A.D.S. Up to 2.30 p.m. approximately 500 British and 120 New Zealand patients had passed through the corps collecting station, wounded mainly from the 2nd Otagos, the 4th, 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the N.Z.R.B. Captain Aitken, N.Z.M.C. was ordered to relieve Captain Duncan with the 2nd Canterburys. At about 3 in the afternoon the Flat Iron A.D.S. was heavily shelled—near 100 wounded were in or about the station at the time—some of our bearers were killed or wounded, and had it not been for the prompt action of Captain A, V. Short, N.Z.M.C., who rallied the bearers, and himself assisted in bringing the stretcher cases under cover, many more lives would have been lost.
By 5 p.m. the advance had ceased. Martinpuich and Coureelette had been carried by the Canadians and the Scottish Division on their right. Highwood had at last been cleared, but with grave losses to the 47th Division; the New Zealand and 41st Divisions were linked in a salient covering Flers, but Morval and Les
It had appeared to Lieut.-Col. Murray that the evacuation of wounded was proceeding satisfactorily; at 5 p.m. he reported that everything was going well and that he had succeeded in getting extra stretchers and blankets up to the R.A.P.'s on his front. He was quite satisfied that the 1st and 2nd Rifle Battalions were evacuating through Green Dump and that the 41st Division were attending to that flank through the A.D.S. at the Quarry. At 6 p.m., however, there was considerable congestion of wounded at Flat Iron Copse, evacuations were delayed by the supplies coming up to the front line through the narrow road from Mametz practicable for wheeled traffic as far as Thistle Dump; the wounded of the 47th Division were coming in freely; our A.D.S. was shared by that Division as it was on the route from the eastern corner of Highwood, where the Londoners had sustained very severe losses, and where their line joined the left of our division. The wounded from our right flank evidently were finding their way in to the 41st area but a few wounded from Captain Bogle's R.A.P., not yet definitely located, were coming into Flat Iron Copse. As evening drew on the bearers of No. 2 New Zealand Field Ambulance were showing signs of great fatigue: the day's work had been heavy and the carries long—the work of evacuation much hampered by the barrage on the crest, through which the bearers must pass as the communication trenches were so badly damaged as to be unsuitable for the carriage of stretchers—all work beyond the crest trench had to be done in the open. There had been some casualties: one bearer killed, several wounded. Lieut.-Col. Murray now requested the A.D.M.S. to send fresh bearers and more ambulance cars, and shortly after, three bearer sub-divisions from No. 1 Field Ambulance under Captain Mitchell, N.Z.M.C., reported for duty, with three motor ambulance cars and three lorries. And by half-past seven p.m., the bearer subdivisions of "A" and "B" Sections of the 3rd Field Ambulance, under Major Martin, N.Z.M.C, had orders to move up to Flat Iron Copse.
Rations and water were, by 7 p.m., on their way up to the front line. In Flers some wells had been located and in many of the German dugouts, bottles of soda water had been found.
Evidently there was something wrong with our right flank evacuations as a message reached Lieut.-Col. Murray through the A.D.M.S. at about 11.30 p.m. originating from the 3rd Brigade Headquarters It read:—"3rd Brigade report large numbers of wounded at R.A.P. Carlton trench and elsewhere." To which the A.D.M.S. added:—"Send officer to Brigade Headquarters to investigate. Ensure that close touch is kept with R.M.O.'s and that R.A.P.'s are kept clear." Now the 3rd Brigade Headquarters had moved early in the morning to the junction of "Fat" and "Flag," trenches just in front of the R.A.P. where Bogle was, and it is assumed, and seems probable, that the report sent in by the 3rd Brigade refers to Bogle's post and not to the R.A.P. at Carlton trench.
The night was fairly quiet in the trenches; by midnight corps orders arrived for the operations on the following day, which were timed to take place at 9 a.m. on the 16th: a resumption of the attack at Les Boeufs and Gueudecourt to enable the cavalry to get through. Our Division with the 41st and 44th, were to complete the capture of the objectives allotted to them for the 15th. Tanks again would lead the way: one of the reasons for causing the tanks to lead off before the infantry was that they might avoid wounded men lying on the ground in their track; it was necessary to attach three men to each tank on the 15th for the purpose of shifting the wounded. Fortunately the tanks were very slow, advancing only 15 yards a minute on badly shelled ground. During the night, no doubt in anticipation of a break through, all first line transport moved up to Green Dump including that of the 3rd New Zealand Field Ambulance.
After midnight wounded were coming down in large numbers to the corps main dressing station. The New Zealand Section were working in shifts in the marquees allotted to them. All wounded were receiving A.T.S. injections, the necessary dressings and
Shortly after midnight confirmation of the block on our right flank came through from the "A" branch of the 41st Division who reported that large numbers of New Zealand wounded were coming through their A.D.S. at the Quarry, Montauban, and they asked that New Zealand bearers be sent forward to assist with the evacuations. Col. Begg, who was holding one section in reserve now instructed the O.C. No. 3 Field Ambulance to send his "C" section bearers to the Quarry and by 2,35 a.m. on the 16th,
The first New Zealand Brigade was entrusted with the task of completing the work of the division, and by 7 o'clock, the R.A.F. reported the Gird trench for which they were bound, to be not then occupied by the enemy. While yet in their assembly trenches the 1st Wellington Battalion met and repulsed a counter attack launched by the 6th Bavarian Division, and shortly after moved out to the assault of their objectives.
At 7.35 a.m. Lieut.-Col. Murray reported Carlton trench to be clear of wounded at 5 a.m. He had visited Thistle Alley which now became an advanced A.D.S. and had proceeded along the road to Longueval in order to ascertain if a better route
By 10 a.m. a very clear account of the medical situation on the right flank came to headquarters from the 2nd Brigade, who reported that Captain Bogle, R.M.O. of the 1st Battalion of the N.Z.R.B. had 120 stretcher cases in an exposed position about 650 yards west of the south end of Flers, near some old German dugouts, the position now definitely located by a map reference. Something of this had already been reported by the 3rd Brigade at midnight, and again at 6 a.m., but owing to a misunderstanding, two officers sent to Carlton trench by Lieut-Col. Murray did not report to 3rd Brigade Headquarters—not easily found, as they were in a deep dugout—but had reported to the 41st Divisional A.D.S. with the results already shown. Now bearers were asked for at a definite locality, the matter seemed clearer. The A.D.M.S. sent an officer to report to the 3rd Brigade Headquarters. This was done, and, promptly a small party of volunteers, mainly transport details, under Captain Grant, N.Z.M.C.—transport officer of the 3rd Field Ambulance, who had arrived at Green Dump—set out
By midday wounded were coming in freely to the A.D.S. at Flat Iron Copse: serious cases—mostly compound fractures and severe head injuries; the wounded of the previous day had shown a preponderance of machine gun casualties. Owing to the heavy barrage on the trench on the Crest, the work of the bearers was difficult, dangerous and slow, the ground was very badly cut up; the bearers were suffering casualties. Thistle Alley, the communication trench, leading to the Crest was heavily, shelled with H.E. and lachrymatory gas; a few shells containing what was deemed to be some other type of gas compelled the parties at the advanced A.D.S. to work in goggles and helmets for a time. By 1.30 p.m. stretcher cases were coming in from Bogle's Post to Thistle Dump, the A.S.C. party of No. 3 Field Ambulance having arrived. One of them acted as a guide for the bearers now sent forward from Thistle Dump, "though," as Lieut.-Col. Murray says in his diary, "evidently from the fact that the wounded of the 1st N.Z.R.B. were coming through [prior to this] our bearers were already in touch with this R.A.P." 50 details drawn from the reinforcements were now put at the disposal of Lieut.-Col. Murray as additional stretcher bearers to sweep the ground in front of and behind the most advanced R.A.P.'s.
Shortly after 2 o'clock, orders were issued cancelling all further movements of the 1st Brigade, the advance ceased; we did not attack the Gird system, but heavy trench fighting still persisted in attempts to clear a communication trench called Drop Alley, which marked our left flank, and which was still held by the Bavarians. By 3 o'clock the forward evacuating officer, Major Martin, had cleared most of the wounded from his front, but an impassable barrage had now fallen like a curtain on the Crest impeding the work of clearing Bogle's Post, which could not be resumed until the barrage lifted or until dusk. The Switch trench was very heavily shelled during this afternoon, all traffic had to pass over the spur of the main ridge, on which Crest trench and Switch trench were sited. The high ground was under observation by the Germans, our new communications were not as yet completed, the New Zealand Pioneers were engaged in the work of digging an avenue leading into our forward positions. The open ground over which the bearers had to carry was pitted by deep shell holes
We will now follow the advance of the 1st Brigade, this day accompanying the 1st Canterbury Medical detachment in the narrative of Capt. Johns, N.Z.M.C., the R.M.O. "The battalion got into action on a Saturday [September 16th], going through an enemy barrage which started as soon as we showed our noses over the crest of the hill. It was a perfect rain of shells, high explosives, which fortunately were very local in their effects and did not cause as many casualties as would have resulted had the Huns used shrapnel. They also turned machine guns on us as we got nearer the village. I followed the battalion up with the corporal medical orderly and my batman, and while we were patching up some of our wounded, we lost sight of the battalion. The ground was covered With dead and wounded New Zealanders and Germans, as our fellows of another brigade had attacked the previous day and cleared the Germans out of the village; we were supposed to be going up to relieve them. What between shell dodging and patching up wounded on the way, it was well on in the afternoon before we caught up with the battalion in Flers. The village was knocked to pieces. That night I got a sort of aid post fitted up near headquarters; our battalion had taken over trenches in advance of the village. We then had a good look round the village, nearly everyone was drinking soda water and smoking cigars, and bad collected some sort of souvenir. I got into the German doctor's dugout where I found cigars galore and several things that I wanted— drugs and dressings, any amount. These dugouts are great places, dug in some cases down to 100 feet below the surface and made jolly comfortable and safe from artillery fire."
As darkness came the bearers of "C" section No. 3 Field Ambulance under Captain Robertson finally reached Bogle's Post from Green Dump. They lost two men killed and eight wounded going up. There was a very large number of wounded collected about this post. Captain Bogle at the time when the 3rd Battalion of the Rifle Brigade was hung up the previous day—his own battalion being the last—received a large number of wounded from
That night, about the same time, the A.D.M.S. had decided to establish a new dressing station at Longueval in order to assist the parties coming down from our right flank positions in and in front of Flers; to this effect he instructed Lt.-Col. Hardie Neil, N.Z.M.C., to collect his bearers and to proceed to Longueval forthwith in order to establish himself there. Again the A.D.M.S. had occasion to stress the importance of having telephonic communication with the A.D.S. as much time was lost by messengers on foot who frequently went astray at night or were delayed by shell fire. Curiously enough, the same idea had occurred to General Sixte von Arnim commanding the Bavarian Corps at the Somme in June, 1916. In his report of that date he says:—"Telephonic communications also assumed great importance in consequence of the wide distribution of the medical arrangements. It is desirable that the regulations should emphasise the importance of having adequate telephonic communications between all medical units in the line so that these units are not overlooked until all the other telephone lines have been provided." In order to get over the difficulties of intercommunication runners from the A.D.S. at Mat Iron Copse were detailed to the Brigade Headquarters of the 3rd and 1st Brigades situated in Carlton trench.
At midnight a very heavy close barrage was put down along the crest from Delville Wood to Highwood which completely interrupted our evacuations from Bogle's post for four hours; the curtain, calculated to prevent the division from bringing up supplies and supports was, at least for bearers carrying wounded, impassable. The vicinity of Thistle Dump was drenched with lachrymatory gas and heavily shelled by large calibre guns searching for our batteries; a most unpleasant night for the bearer relay post; the weather, too had broken; occasional showers were falling; one of the horsed waggons was lying ditched by the roadside.
At 3 a.m. orders were issued by the XVth Corps for a resumption of the advance on the 18th. The divisions on the corps front were being relieved; the 41st on our right, by the 55th, whom we had previously relieved. The New Zealand Division alone remained unrelieved on the corps front. To our left, the doughty cockneys of the 47th Division also held out.
By 4 a.m. the barrage on the Crest had slackened and the shell fire at Thistle Dump had so abated that the horsed ambulances were once more able to get up to the advanced A.D.S. The bearers were stated to be "on their last legs" and if more casualties were to occur, they would be unable to carry on. No. 3 Field Ambulance reached Green Dump before dawn and the O.C. Lieut.-Col. Hardie Neil, after reconnoitring the position as far as Bogle's Post found it impossible to get cars down the Flers—Longueval road; consequently, wounded would still have to be carried to Thistle Dump, the nearest point to a road open for vehicular traffic. Captain Gilmour, N.Z.M.C., with 30 infantrymen detailed to act as bearers had proceeded early to Bogle's Post where it was reported there were still some 80 stretcher cases; another party of 95 bearers under Captain Kemp, N.Z.M.C., had advanced at daylight from Thistle Dump. The combined parties soon cleared, and by 10 a.m. Major Martin by personal reconnaissance was able to report that the fateful R.A.P. was practically clear. Captain Reid of No. 1 New Zealand Field Ambulance relieved Captain Bogle, killed in action; Major Martin, Captain Robertson and Captain Prior remained on at the post during the morning.
Lieut.-Col. Hardie Neil, by 10 o'clock, had finally decided to establish his A.D.S. near Carlton trench at Green Dump about 600 yards to the east of Thistle Dump A.D.S., and near the Longueval-Bazentin road down which stretchers could be carried. His Brigade Headquarters were near at hand, and he was fortunate to be able to utilise a large dugout built by the New Zealand Pioneer Battalion when they were camped there prior to the arrival of the division; it had two tunnelled entrances 36ft. long and sufficiently wide to admit stretchers to a central chamber 9ft by 40ft which was suitable for use as a dressing room.
By noon the last of the wounded of the N.Z.R.B. were brought in, a heavy barrage was still falling and there were casualties amongst the stretcher parties; some of the bearers, who showed symptoms of gassing, had to be evacuated. At 3 p.m. the shelling about Bogle's Post became very violent, it was much exposed to view from the enemy positions about Gueudecourt, some 3000 yards away to the right. The few wounded remaining were hurriedly brought into the dugouts or the most sheltered positions; while doing this Major Martin was wounded by shrapnel in the abdomen, the face and the neck. A stretcher party was immediately organised by Captain Prior to carry him back to the A.D.S. at Thistle Dump, he passed through the A.D.S. at Flat Iron Copse
During the day there had been a very heavy bombardment of our front trenches and at Flers. At 5 p.m. the "A" branch detailed a party of 200 men of the 2nd Brigade to search for wounded and clear all the ground between the Flers and the Switch trenches. Major McCormack, N.Z.M.C. 2nd Field Ambulance went out in charge of this party. All R.A.P.'s were reported clear. The search party returned at midnight: they found no wounded lying out, the ground was clear—they brought in no wounded except their own casualties.
We will again take up Captain John's narrative for the 17th: "The next day, Sunday, they opened up on the village with their artillery and gave us beans all that afternoon and night. I expected a shell through the dressing station any minute. Everywhere else we were getting it; we had tear gas into the bargain. It was very curious, our eyes began to smart and run for no apparent reason, fortunately they did not give us any of the real gas." From Captain John's R.A.P. in Flers, the most advanced, the carry was now about two and a Quarter miles as far as Thistle Dump, and about the same to Green Dump, from which point a further carriage by hand of three-quarters of a mile was necessary in order to reach the cars at Montauban; but the best route was still through Thistle Dump. Orders were issued this night for a resumption of the offensive on the 21st. Heavy rain was falling so delaying the operations. A congratulatory message came in from the Army commander, General Rawlinson, expressing high praise of the fine fighting spirit, the admirable energy and dash displayed by the New Zealand Division.
The week had opened in heavy rain which continued incessantly until Wednesday; the remainder of the week was dull and cloudy, so hindering preparations for a further offensive. The roads and the fore-field were now very difficult to negotiate: all further operations on a large scale were postponed until the 24th Meanwhile minor operations still continued and very determined and costly trench fighting raged on our front in so adjusting our line and flanks as to give the division a dominating position, and the upper hand against the Bavarians. During the day of the 18th the 8th Londons came up on our left fighting their way through Drop Alley; while our right flank was establishing a firm
On the 19th, in the heavy rain, the bearers were much delayed by the mud; it was taking four hours to complete the trip to the Flers A.D.S. and back with a loaded stretcher through the churned up crater area. The motor ambulances too, were held up by the bad condition of the roads, but by 3 p.m. all R.A.P.'s were reported clear. Extra blankets and stretchers were now pushed up to the R.M.O.'s of the 1st Brigade holding the line. There was considerable shell fire in Flers where some of the New Zealand Sanitary Section were now engaged in testing the three wells located there and which our N.Z.E. were attempting to develop. The sanitary section reported the water to be free from metallic poisons and to be serviceable with chlorination. Of the condition of the fore-field, Captain Johns tells up something: "On Monday night we were relieved and went back about two and a half miles [to Green Dump] for a few days' rest—the most miserable night I've ever spent. We were about three hours floundering about in the mud and the shell holes. Talk about mud at this place! I never saw anything like it in my life—a regular sea of mud—it was so jolly slippery that now and again you would fall full length into it. We arrived absolutely mud from head to foot. I had about half my battalion on sick parade the next morning." It rained hard all that night and no one can doubt but that the allegedly resting brigade bad a very wretched time in their bivouacs. It cleared somewhat during the morning of the 19th, but there was a marked increase in the numbers of sick admitted to the C.C.P. Dysentery had broken out amongst the troops on the Somme, and a few cases of trench foot were being evacuated from the front line. A supply of fresh socks and whale oil was finding its way, with difficulty as may be imagined, to the trenches.
There was bloody trench fighting on the 20th and 21st, at the junction between our left and the 1st Division who had now relieved the hard tried Londoners. The 2nd Canterbury Battalion had 150 casualties about Drop Alley in this operation, and the work of clearing the stretcher cases, already very difficult on account of the mud, was much impeded by a gas and H.E. barrage let down between Highwood and Delville wood; masks or goggles had to be worn by the bearers and several suffering from the effects of the gas had to be evacuated.
That day a congratulatory message was received by the A.D.M.S. from the D.M.S. of the Fourth Army, which read as follows:—"The D.M.S. Fourth Army, and the D.D.M.S. XVth Corps desire to make known to all ranks of the N.Z.M.C. their appreciation of the work done during the recent operations: the arrangements for evacuation of wounded and the successful way in which these arrangements worked, met with their special approbation. Casualty clearing stations report that the treatment of all New Zealand wounded evacuated to them has reached a very high standard, and that no cases have been evacuated without having received anti-tetantic serum. The D.M.S. has communicated as above to the D.G.M.S., commanders of medical units and regimental officers will communicate this to all ranks under their command." This flattering message was duly published in medical corps orders and gave considerable encouragement everywhere to all ranks of the N.Z.M.C. Up to this date some 3423 casualties had been sustained by the division, of these, 2428 wounded, 495 killed, and 450 missing; of the wounded, over 2000 had been tended by the N.Z.M.C whose losses up to the 21st had been 5 officers, 66 O.R. killed or wounded. During the lull in the fighting it was found possible to rest the bearers, a section at a time.
We now may be permitted a moment to review the train of events that had befallen since the opening of the engagement. The casualties in the medical corps seemed inevitable owing to the very heavy and continuous shell fire and the very long routes of evacuation. Bearers were killed even in front of the A.D.S. at Flat Iron Copse; no place seemed to be exempt The loss of two such brilliant officers as Bogle and Martin on the same day, and at the same post, was keenly felt by the corps. Martin was a dexterous surgeon, endowed with a maximal energy and indomitable courage. After a brilliant career as a student at Edinburgh he served in the South African war, and after taking his fellowship returned to New Zealand where he was appointed surgeon to the Palmerston North Hospital. In 1914 he
We have seen that the road from Becordel through Fricourt and Mametz was, beyond the last named village site, operable by motor vehicles, in fine weather, as far as the Flat Iron A.D.S. where there were a few splinter proofs and dugouts. Traffic beyond to the Thistle Dump bearer relay post, a small dugout
At the Corps collecting post Lieut-Col. O'Neil had devised a well organised scheme for dealing with the large numbers of wounded sick and stragglers, sometimes reaching a total of over 3000 in a day, coming down from the corps front in the 21 ambulance cars, 15 char-a-bancs and 7 lorries utilised in this service. By the use of extra marquees, some timber, many ammunition boxes and a few tarpaulin covers, a series of rooms had been constructed—the ordinary tentage of the field ambulances was of course quite inadequate for so large an establishment. The patients on arrival passed into a receiving room where they were seen by a medical officer called a "spotting" officer. His duty it was to sort out the more urgent cases so that they might have immediate attention and to place on stretchers and evacuate immediately to C.M.D.S. such wounded as were obviously not "sitting" cases but whose injuries were of a more serious nature. On leaving the reception room the patients filed through a recording office where the A.F.W. 3210 "buff slips" and the A.F.W. 3118 field medical card, not yet completed, but enclosed in the waterproof envelope were tied to the soldier's tunic. Other clerks in this department were constantly engaged in compiling the A. and D. books of the unit and the Form A.36, a nominal roll of casualties, and the A.F.W. 3185, a daily summary of evacuations by divisions; of these, A36 was the more important as it was the document by which casualties by name were notified to the base. With his "buff slip" and his field medical card, the wounded man was conducted to the waiting and refreshment room where, on seats improvised from ammunition boxes and warmed by charcoal braziers, he was regaled with hot drinks, food and cigarettes. In his turn the now somewhat comforted man was admitted to the dressing room where he first received his injection of A.T.S., the operation duly noted on his field card, buff slip, and on his wrist, where a large "T" in indelible ink was inscribed by the specially trained medical orderlies who alone controlled this department. Passing now into the hands of the medical officers his wounds were redressed, if necessary, and such surgical treatment as was demanded by splinting, removal of small superficial foreign bodies and so forth, was given, which being done the medical officer entered a description of the injury on the buff slip and the field medical card which was returned to its envelope and remained attached to the man, but the buff slip, purely an inter-departmental chit, passed back to the record
The preparatory bombardment for the battle of the 25th began on the 24th, leading to an increasing enemy fire somewhat interfering with movement about Thistle Dump, where there was a great concentration of our guns. The new advance was to be on a large scale, covering six miles, the French Army and the Fifth Army were co-operating. On the Fourth Army front, Morval, Les Boeufs, and Gueudecourt were to be taken and the last organised enemy system, the Gird trenches, were to be wrested from the Bavarians. It was hoped that our cavalry would be able to get through near Gueudecourt, when a general advance might have been possible; the morale of the German Divisions in front was said to be badly shaken. It was known to us that the Bavarians in front had lost very heavily during the past
In preparation for the forthcoming operations, the A.D.M.S. had made certain important dispositions. In consultation with the combatant branch, new R.A.P. sites were selected: in Flers, in a deep German dugout; and in the vicinity of Bogle's Post, where a new bearer relay post was formed, approachable along the Turk trench. All these posts were made splinter proof by our engineers. Thistle Dump was also somewhat strengthened and was to be used as an advanced A.D.S. despatching wounded direet to the corps stations. Officers commanding brigades were instructed to keep the A.D.S. parties informed as to the disposition of casualties and indicate the localities in which they were likely to be found. Owing to our heavy losses in medical personnel, the A.D.M.S. made further provisions for minimising these losses. First as regards the regimental officers: they were supplied with steel breastplates—Dayfield body shields—as issued to bombers; they were instructed to exercise care in avoiding needless exposure and to direct operations—after they had moved forward with the final wave of their battalions—entirely from the positions selected as R.A.P.'s by their commanding officers, and from which they were not to move. The medical officers in charge of forward evacuations were also to be provided with body shields—all medical officers at this time wore steel helmets when beyond the A.D.S.—and that they were not to visit R.A.P.'s with bearer parties once contact had been established; but that the parties should be led by senior N.C.O.'s. These recommendations became orders and had the sanction of Divisional Headquarters. The weather had now cleared and the ground had hardened somewhat.
Medical Operations 25th, 26th and 27th September, 1916.
The 1st New Zealand Brigade, the attackers, had completed the relief of the 3rd N.Z.R.B. by 6 a.m. on the 25th; zero hour was fixed for 12,30 p.m. By noon the ambulance bearers were in touch with all R.A.P.'s, a certain number detailed to act as runners for the R.M.O.'s. The new bearer relay post had been reinforced by parties from Thistle Dump. At 2, a heavy bombardment by our guns announced the opening of the attack and
The morning of the 27th was quiet, the weather fine, all the movements of the enemy were fully in view; at 7.30 a.m., two Bavarian ambulance waggons could be seen approaching the ruined Abbey at Eaucourt, they remained a while to pick up wounded from the dressing station there, and retired unmolested on a good road towards the village of Le Barque, whose inquisitive church steeple peered at our lines behind its fringe of trees just a mile and a half from the factory corner. On our side the country was so torn and shattered that we could find no road for the conveyance of wounded nearer than two and three-quarter miles from our front line. The attack of the 1st Brigade was launched at 2.15 p.m. and was accompanied by an intense barrage. The 1st "Wellington Battalion on the right penetrated the Gird system with ease and soon found touch with the 55th Division on our right. 1st Canterbury followed on the left; the 1st Auckland Battalion ran into M.G. fire and eventually reached Canterbury's left, but 1st Otago had a difficult task: along the left flank of their advance lay the strongly held "Goose Alley" its junction with the Gird System, 1200 yards ahead, was their objective. Three companies advanced in the open, one company bombing its way up Goose Alley; in the three companies, in the open, there were very heavy casualties from M.G. fire or shrapnel; the bombing company was held up near the junction and was obliged to put a stop in; the situation for a time "remained obscure." A tank was detailed to assist, and portion of the Rifle Brigade was put under
At 2.30 p.m. the bearers reached the Otago R.A.P. which Captain Prior had established in a cutting in the North road running from Flers to the Abbey at Eaucourt; by 4.30 walking wounded were coming through the Plat Iron, a few reaching Green Dump by the Flers road, but by 5.30 p.m. there was a heavy enemy barrage covering the Goose Alley. Captain Johns gives us some account of what happened that night:—"The next day [the 27th] the Battalion Headquarters moved up, I shifted out of the village of Flers further along a road to a dressing station, to be nearer my battalion as there was another attack on the same afternoon. We had no sooner got to it than the shells began to whistle about us and machine guns pumped in bullets on
At 2 a.m. on the 28th the medical situation was clearer, extra bearers were sent up to the neighbourhood of Goose Alley. During the night 109 stretcher cases and 198 sitting and walking cases passed through the Flat Iron A.D.S.; the wounds were chiefly caused by M.G. fire and shrapnel, and there was a very large proportion of compound thigh and compound leg fractures. The regimental stretcher bearers of the Otago Battalion were nearly all killed or wounded and many wounded were still lying out at 7 a.m. on the 28th, so that 6 squads of ambulance bearers had to be sent to Captain Prior to assist his few remaining regimental stretcher bearers. Further, a disaster had befallen the 4th Battalion of the N.Z.R.B.: their tank did not materialise, they were caught by shrapnel at their assembly point; their losses were considerable. Divisional Headquarters decided to cancel the further attack. Our losses were now known to be heavy: by 11 a.m. 119 stretcher cases and 227 walking had passed through the A.D.S. and at 9 p.m. all available bearers were out: 200 blankets were carried up to the R.A.P.'s. Through the ensuing night many cases were brought in with severe compound fractures of the lower limbs who had been lying out in shell holes since the afternoon of the 27th, ungetatable and, in some instances, the wounds were now very foul. The carry had increased to three miles of hand carriage from Factory Corner. It was now very difficult to get rations and water up in limbers along the Longueval-Flers road, furthermore the road was frequently barraged and could be of no use for horsed ambulances. Our total casualties reported for the 27th and 28th were:— 55 killed, 52 missing, 259 wounded, total 366.
The morning of the 29th was misty. By 7 a.m. the relief of the 1st Brigade was complete; nearly all the wounded were in,
At Green Dump a strange fatality befell; there was a fair amount of shell fire there in the afternoon while the O.C. No. 3 Field Ambulance, a genial host, was preparing a recherche dinner for some of the battalion commanders of the 1st Brigade newly come in. An ill-fated 5.9, unbidden guest, fell upon his kitchen burying both the assistant cook and the dinner; the cook was a total loss, but the dinner, a joint of roast beef, was at length unearthed in the shell hole by some enterprising fossikers; but everybody preferred bully beef au naturel. The dinner otherwise was a great success. The same day 2 N.Z.M.C. men were injured by exploding Mill's grenades which they had inadvertently kicked. Half buried in the mud that held the rusted pin in place a stumbling foot frequently set free the spring and was shattered by the explosion. Green Dump was studded with these jettisoned grenades,
The last operation, in which the New Zealand Division was engaged, was the taking of Eaucourt L'Abbaye by the 47th Division—now returned to our left—a hard fought soldiers' battle lasting two days and costing us many casualties. The 2nd Brigade were chiefly engaged although part of the 3rd Brigade was employed on the right. At 2.30 p.m. on the 2nd of October, the whole of the corps artillery was turned on in front of the New Zealand lines covering nearly 2000 yards,—no other division of the XVth Corps was moving—with this barrage oil drums ejected from mortars were mingled which, bursting after they landed, drenched the enemy trenches in sheets of flame. Our assaulting columns met with fire heavier than usual but, in spite of serious losses, had secured their objectives and a bit more than was required by 5 p.m. The oil drums had worked dreadful havoc; two groups of German dead, some 30 in all, were found in a holocaust so burnt as to be unrecognisable. But our casualties for the day were heavy: 106 killed, 108 missing, 378 wounded, of which some were reaching the A.D.S. by 5 p.m.— mostly severe wounds—many compound fractures. Rain fell during the night. By 6 a.m on October the 2nd, 84 stretcher
In heavy rain the lean, exhausted units of the division were relieved by the 41st Division after 23 days' fighting, with a total reported loss of: 61 officers killed, 3 missing, 198 wounded; other ranks, 1036 killed, 702 missing (of these only 22 prisoners, nearly 500 killed), 4745 wounded, a total casualty list of 6743, exclusive of the sick, well over a third of the effectives. The medical units were relieved by the ambulances of the 41st Division.
The only units to remain were the N.Z.F.A, Brigades who long before the division arrived had supported the corps front and who still were in action when their comrades shook the mud of the Somme battlefields from their numbed feet. Of the medical arrangements of these units, there is not much to know, their medical officers living at Brigade Headquarters, visiting their batteries from time to time, their wounded carried direct to the nearest advanced dressing stations, all too close in some instances to the batteries. On the 21st October,
At the corps collecting station, Lieut.-Col. O'Neil had a well organised establishment with adequate accommodation and good roads, all provided by his own parties and those of the 139th Field Ambulance attached; ultimately he had accommodation for 200 cases which he housed for one night during a breakdown on the L.O.C. which blocked the casualty clearing stations. In all this station dealt with 15,542 sick and wounded, of these 582 New Zealand sick, 2671 lightly wounded. The largest group dealt with in one day was 77 sick, 3122 wounded; the daily average being 150 sick, 500 wounded, evacuated at the rate of about 100 patients per hour.
At the corps main dressing station the New Zealand Section of three tent subdivisions had their own marquees of which one was fitted up as a dressing station with two operating tables; the teams worked in two shifts of twelve hours each. A special marquee was used for resuscitation from shock which at that date consisted in removing the clothing, putting on pyjamas, warming with bottles and hot blankets and transfusion of hypertonic saline solution. The anasthetics used were chloroform, and various mixtures of chloroform and ether. As the guillotine amputation was now condemned, the formal procedures were adopted, generally the eliptical flap method, the flaps packed with hypertonic saline solution. The objections to the "guillotine" method, only used in cases of advanced sepsis or gas gangrene, were these:—First a large surface of wound taking months to heal over with a disfiguring adherent scar; Secondly the necessity for further operation on the exposed bone. A very large number of splints were in use in these days, amongst them was the Thomas splint for fractured thighs, which Sir Anthony Boulby was at this time attempting to bring into universal use on the Somme, but the Liston long splint was still somewhat favoured in the ambulances on account of facility in transport. The memorandum of 1915 had advised the use of the Thomas splint by field ambulances but the method was not yet sufficiently stressed, much less enforced. We have seen that the D.M.S. was satisfied with the surgical work of the N.Z.M.C. teams working at the C.M.D.S.
Of the sickness wastage and the sanitary effort at the Somme, a few words must suffice. There was a markedly increased incidence of diarrhoea and "enteritis" noted during the lull in the fighting, this eventually proved to be the onset of an outbreak of bacillary dysentery: nearly 300 cases of "enteritis" were
In the matter of personal hygiene, little or nothing could be done for front line or reserve troops, with the exception of issues of dry socks. The following instructions were issued with regard to trench foot prevention. "Men in the trenches will be made to remove their putties and boots and socks, at least once a day to dry their feet and treat them with whale oil or anti-frostbite grease, and put on dry socks. Spare socks will be taken into the trenches by all ranks. Tight boots must, not be worn, nor should the boots be laced tightly. The above will be published in all battalion and company orders." Baths were available at Vivier Mills for the details camp between 6 a.m. and 9 a.m.: 170 per hour was the maximal accommodation.
There was a marked increase in the P.U.O. rate for the division, a condition due to "trench fever" but not as yet wholly recognised. The disease was first described by
The sickness wastage rate of the division calculated as evacuations from C.C.S. out of army area to L.O.C. reached 10 per 1000 on the 23rd of September, the highest rate for the month, but in spite of all hardships and conditions which were of the severest nature even in modern warfare, the health of our troops was satisfactory to this extent that the mean rate of wastage was only 7.6 per 1000, whereas the mean rate for the whole of the Fourth Army was 8.4 during the six weeks we spent in the Somme Valley.
All during our operations at the Somme the New Zealand Stationary Hospital was busily employed at Amiens and some at least of our wounded and sick were fortunate enough to get there. During the month of October they admitted 679 wounded, 2228 sick; of the wounded 56 died and of the sick 2 only. At the end of the month there were 224 patients remaining, as their accommodation had been reduced by the opening of the convent schools. War or no war—though at Amiens the Gothas flew over by night to fill the role of the "sandman"—the little French girls had to go to school: with these war babies it was a case of "L'état de guerre, l'état normal." Another New Zealand medical unit, the H.S. Maheno, on her second commission, was plying between Havre and Southampton so that a New Zealander might by strange chances have passed from one of our ambulances to the New Zealand Stationary Hospital, thence by ambulance train to Havre, and by the Maheno ferried to Southampton, would have reached the 1st New Zealand General Hospital, then established at Brockenhurst in the New Forest.
By the 14th of October, 1916, the New Zealand Division was taking over its winter quarters and sector of defence at Sailly sur la Lys, relieving the 5th Australian Division, then on its way to the Somme area. The 2nd Brigade, with the 3rd New Zealand Field Ambulance attached, went into Armentières there joining Frank's Force, a unit less than a division in strength, including part of the newly arrived 3rd Australian Division, and responsible for the Armentières defences. No. 1 New Zealand Field Ambulance took over from the 14th Australian Field Ambulance a main dressing station, baths, and a laundry at Sailly with an advanced dressing station at Fleurbaix in the Port-à-Clous Farm. No. 2 New Zealand Field Ambulance relieved the 15th Australian Field Ambulance, taking over the D.R.S. at Nouvenu Monde, two miles south of Sailly on the road to Estaires with an A.D.S. at Eaton Hall. On the 20th, Lieut-Col. McGavin, late O.C. New Zealand Stationary Hospital took up his appointment as A.D.M.S. of the division, relieving Colonel Begg, C.M.G., who was appointed D.D.M.S. of the IInd Anzac Corps. General Godley and his staff were at this time in Baillieul and the corps comprised the New Zealand Division, the 34th Division, and the 3rd Australian Division. First Anzac, now composed of the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Australian Divisions, was in reality an Australian Corps, the term Anzac no longer applied, in truth. IInd Anzac was still a part of the Second Army under General Plumer, whose command comprised four corps. The Second Army had a fine reputation, both for its fighting qualities, and for its administrative organisation, and had since 1914 maintained a dogged defence in the Ypres salient of evil fame, historic for its heroic sacrifices.
The sector of defence taken over by the New Zealand Division was that very battle ground where the 5th Australian Division had lost so heavily in July, in their disastrous raid against the Aubers Ridge, and was known as the Right, or Sailly sector, in length approximating to 5,600 yards and extending from Bois Grenier nearly to L'Aventie. There were two equal subsectors, each held by a brigade. To our right was the 56th Division of the First Army with headquarters at La Gorgue; to our left was
The medical arrangements made for the evacuation of wounded in the right subsector were as follows:—Two regimental aid posts with bearer relay posts were situated at Rifle Villa, and Eaton Hall respectively, in ruined houses adjacent to the support line and somewhat strengthened by sandbagging. Both posts could be cleared by wheeled stretchers along the Rue du Bois and Rue Pétillon to the A.D.S. at La Croix Lescornex, thence by waiting motor ambulance to the M.D.S. at Nouveau Monde; each R.A.P. had four bearers of the ambulance attached and at the A.D.S. there was one medical officer and 15 O.R. N.Z.M.C. In the left subsector there was a similar arrangement, except that the bearer relay posts were not up at the R.A.P.'s which were in the support trenches; the evacuations by wheeled stretchers along the road proceeded to the A.D.S. at Port-à-Clous farm near Fleurbaix where there were two cars always in readiness and one medical officer and six O.R. provided by the 1st Field Ambulance Main Dressing Station at the baths at Sailly. It would have been quite feasible to have worked the whole sector by means of one M.D.S. with two A.D.S.'s but the system had been taken over as it stood by the division and was not materially altered. In case of raids warning was given to the field ambulance concerned. It was found by experience that special medical arrangements and a temporary redistribution of medical personnel was necesary in dealing with the casualties from organised raids. We were fortunate in this sector in being able to get motor ambulances up to within easy range of the R.A.P.'s, in most cases, as the sector, always a quiet one, had never suffered prolonged destructive bombardments. The village of Fleurhaix, although very considerably damaged by shell fire still afforded a certain amount of billeting room, and at our end of the village there were many houses still intact: as for instance Port-à-Clous farm. Further back, say 2,500 yards from our front line, the farm houses had scarcely been touched, and afforded billets for the reserve battalions of the brigade in line.
At Sailly, beyond the destruction of the church by fire in 1914, there was little evidence of damage by artillery, and most of the houses, the schools and factories, were available for billeting. The M.D.S. of the No. 1 New Zealand Field Ambulance was situated close to a large bleach works where the laundry and baths were established, and had at one time formed part of the toying sheds used by the "blanchisserie," consequently, it was not of a very luxurious character, but by the aid of linen hangings, it had been made serviceable, clean and bright looking.
The rest station taken over from the outgoing division had little to recommend it for our purposes: it had huts and tents for some 50 men; many of the huts were dilapidated and provided poor shelter, and for the severe winter in Flanders tents were, of course, out of the question. Material had to be provided out of the scanty stores of the C.R.E. which were to a greater extent required in the front line, as, owing to necessity for wintering troops in the Somme crater area, enormous quantities of timber and other trench materials had to be provided, leaving the Second Army temporarily a little short. With the assistance of some of the Pioneers and the bearers of the No. 2 Field Ambulance the more serviceable huts were covered with malthoid and lined with hessian, the ceilings with calico. New huts were built from the wooden frames of condemned structures and lined inside and out with malthoid spread on wire netting. Three Nissen bow huts were also obtained from New Zealand Engineer stores, each providing accommodation for 10 men. Each hut was fitted with a small stove; a footway of "duck boarding" connected each with the two mess huts. A kitchen, a butcher's shop and a bath house were constructed, the hot water for the baths was provided by placing a 400 gallon tank on a specially constructed brick incinerator, the dry refuse furnishing the fuel. Eaeh of the living huts was provided with floor, matting, beds and complete bed furniture, including sheets and pillow slips, while a few deck chairs struck a note of luxury in the improvised wards. Most of these additional
By the end of November the sickness wastage for the division had risen to 8.4 per thousand per week, the highest rate for any division in the Second Army, and the matter was brought promptly to the notice of the D.D.M.S., Colonel Begg, by Surgeon-General Porter, D.M.S. of the Second Army and after the manner of all such "reminders" was duly referred to our A.D.M.S. for explanation. Delay in completing the D.R.S. and insufficient accommodation for sick in the field ambulances were the chief causes operating to inflate the sick evacuations. There was much bronchial catarrh, some influenza, of a severe type, in one case verified by post-mortem examination. P.U.O. was much in evidence, very likely trench fever; there were cases of broncho-pneumonia; middle ear disease, stirred up by the bombardments at the Somme; and local septic conditions, chiefly caused by pediculosis and scabies, owing to absence of bathing facilities during September. Our artillery had just recently returned to the division and were much debilitated by their long tour of duty. There were many obvious sanitary defects not as yet remedied: draughty, uncomfortable and dilapidated billets, poor cooking arrangements; absence, at least for the moment, of drying rooms, wet ill-drained trenches; hot ill-ventilated, stuffy estaminets; problems at present under consideration and receiving attention, but in the general remoulding of the sorry state of things, there was need for time, much material, considerable labour, and the expenditure of prescient thought. But while the fighting men were busy paying inquisite calls on their neighbours, across towards Lille, strengthening their front line, draining thei drowned trenches, surveying their No Man's Land, and attempting to make it a part of New Zealand, commanding officers had little time to devote to the frills of fireside arrangements; the men were working assiduously and were as a rule too tired and too careless to make much of themselves when off duty, the fever of the Somme was still in their bones—they were too restless to settle down and make a "cushy" job of it. Consequently they fell ill and the A.D.M.S. was duly admonished by the D.D.M.S., who in turn had received the expressions of disapproval of the D.M.S. Our wastage rate was exercising some slight upward pressure on the curve of the Second Army rate of evacuation for sickness.
In order to appreciate the true inwardness of sickness wastage rates in any army in the field it is necessary to understand that there are two types of wastage: first, the wastage of the division chez-lui, at home in the bosom of the Army family. But if he has to be evacuated beyond the C.C.S. he passes out of the Army on to those dark and devious ways called the L.O.C., where in his further peregrinations through General Hospitals and the Convalescent Camps, he vanishes from sight and the Army mourns his loss, which now becomes an Army wastage. Evacuations from the C.C.S. are not wholly dictated by the severity of the case but are, more frequently a question of accommodation, hence, if divisions send down too many sick at a time, a eertain amount of overflow at C.C.S. follows, as the clearing station must clear to keep some beds open for battle casualties. The advantages, then of having adequate D.R.S. accommodation are two-fold: first, there is provision for comfort and treatment for minor ailments betimes, so warding off the advent of possible complications; and, secondly, it provides a reservoir in the divisional area which so regulates the flow of sick to the C.C.S. as to keep down both the Divisional and the Army rate of wastage. This latter is not in its essence a "paper" saving, it is a very real advantage as it prevents congestion on the L.O.C. units and in turn regulates the flow of sick and wounded to the home bases, so saving undue wastage to the Field Force.
By the Divisional sick rate we mean the average number per thousand evacuated weekly to C.C.S., the Army wastage is, of course, lower as it expresses the loss per week per 1000 of sick evacuated out of the Army area to the L.O.C. units: general hospitals and base hospitals. It may be of interest to compare divisional wastage rates as set out in the following table, showing wastage in four battalions of the 1st Brigade in Gallipoli in July, 1915, at Armentieres in July, 1916, and at Sailly in November, 1916, the period at present under consideration.
The three periods have this in common: the sick rate was abormally high; each period was marked by considerable activity without heavy fighting. The last period, winter 1916, corresponds with the acme of the reaction following the hardships of the Somme fighting and in this way resembles the Gallipoli period. The Gallipoli wastage is now seen in its most lurid light. An approximation to the normal sickness wastage from a division would be something about the average of the Second Army wastage which varied between 4 and 6 per 1000 per week; we have seen that the Fourth Army had a rate of 8 per 1000 during September, 1916, a very high rate of wastage, due, in this instance, to an outbreak of dysentery and the unusually trying conditions of the Somme fighting. The average for the New Zealand Division during the first year in Prance was 5.7, but always higher than the average of the Second Army, which was rather under than over 5 per 1000 per week. During this winter, for every man evacuated for wounds from the Second Army, three men were evacuated for sickness.
It was late in November before there was anything approaching reasonable accommodation and comfort at the D.R.S.; there were then 26 huts in all providing accommodation for 120 sick, some 30 others occupied the roomy brick garage and the loft above it. The provision for heating and lighting arrangements for the huts was achieved by drawing stoves and lamps from the N.Z.E. stores, supplemented by donations from the Red Cross Society. As regards stores drawn from the Red Cross Society, there was a certain reluctance on the part of the Army authorities to avail themselves over much of the generosity of Red Cross depots: the reasons, which were partly military and partly strategical, were quite sound. One of these reasons was that the Army was averse from allowing mobile medical units such as the field ambulance and the C.C.S. to become encumbered by equipment or materiel, which although invaluable in providing for the more efficient treatment of sick and wounded in stationary warfare, might limit mobility in a war of movement. The essential characteristic of a mobile medical unit is mobility, and movement depends upon transport; loads are known and calculated in advance and a certain number of vehicles are allotted to the unit proportionally—any increase in loads must limit the essential mobility, on which depends the facility with which the unit can develop its tactical functions. It was an army ruling that only such stores as could not be obtained from Ordnance might be procured from the Red Cross depots; but as there were minor
As to the working of the D.R.S., it functioned as a tent subdivision of a field ambulance with some added equipment and stores; beds, for instance, and bed linen, and a supply of food stuffs suitable for the class of case treated. Prior to admission to the rest station the sick had been taken in to the receiving department of a field ambulance where, if the nature of the illness was not such as demanded immediate evacuation to C.C.S., they were detained for observation for several days so as to eliminate,
The eoal supply of the D.R.S. presented some little difficulty at first; the regulation issue of fuel at this time was: 3 lbs of wood, ¾-lb. of coal per man per day for troops not in the trenches, for troops in line, 1½ lbs. of coke and ½-lb. of charcoal per man per day. Most of this fuel was utilised in the company kitchens; a portion was earmarked for the divisional baths—great eaters of eoal. Luckily the divisional fuel issue was mainly coal, supplied
There was, for officers, a rest house controlled by IInd Anzac Corps. At first established at Nouveau Monde and run by the 5th Australian Division, it was, in the winter of 1916, transferred to La Motte. The Chateau of La Motte au Bois was hidden in a clearing in the Forest of Nieppe, on the road between Hazebrouck and Merville. Surrounded by an ancient moat it had a romantic appearance and was so far back from the front line as to be much quieter than Nouveau Monde where the sounds of battle were distinctly too near and too individually recognisable to be conductive to rest for jaded officers. The chateau was well suited to its purpose as it had large handsomely furnished rooms providing a dining room, a library, and a billiard room; there was accommodation for 25 officers and their batmen. The period of rest allowed was 14 days and the class of case most suitable was the officer who was run down or suffering from some minor ailment which could be benefited by a quiet comfortable rest in pleasant surroundings. The chatelaine, Me. La Baronne de la Grange, who was unfailing in her endeavours to make the officer patients comfortable, remained in residence in a separate wing, and was widely known to the higher command by reason of her hospitality. A detachment of ours under Major Walton, N.Z.M.C. was detailed for the service of the Anzac Officers' Rest House; later Major Izard, N.Z.M.C. succeeded, and ultimately the whole detachment was relieved by Australian details in July, 1917.
Another important medical establishment to be reconstituted was the dental hospital. As we have seen, prior to leaving for the Somme there were six dental sections attached to the division, but as there was as yet no provision for the transport of their heavy equipment they had to be sent to the base in August. Shortly after arrival in winter quarters the A.D.M.S. applied to
The duties of the Sanitary Section, now under the command of Major Sinclair, N.Z.M.C., D.P.H.—appointed in November, 1916—were, as may be imagined, very varied. The water supplies of the division were patrolled and examined from time to time for chlorination; pumps and wells were charted and the quality of the water noted; samples were collected from water carls and tested for chlorination. Three villages, Croix du Bac, Sailly sur la Lys, and Le Nouveau Monde, all situated on the pavé from Armentières southwards, and the last named town, came under the supervision of the New Zealand Section as regards
One of the most important duties of the Sanitary Section was the daily disinfection of the blankets by means of the "Clayton" sulphur dioxide apparatus, a service undertaken with the object of combating lice infestation and the dissemination of scabies. The Fodden Lorry Disinfector, with two "Thresh" chambers, could deal only with 60 blankets per hour, 30 blankets being the maximum load for each chamber: twenty minutes were taken up in heating and expelling air; twenty minutes in steaming and
The divisional baths and laundries operated by No. 1 New Zealand Field Ambulance at Sailly had a capacity of 1000 men per diem and had been improved by the addition of much needed machinery; the laundry employed 150 women and was capable of delivering 40,000 pieces of washing, duly repaired, in one week. During the winter months there was an inevitable increase in lice infestation and in the incidence of scabies in spite of the activities of the baths, now called "Cleansing Stations," caused by close propinquity in dugouts where blankets were communal property and usually shared by the men. It was even made a ground of complaint by the civilian population at home that men proceeding on leave were frequently infested and that they distributed both pediculosis and scabies in England. Methods of disinfestation in use at this time were faulty: as it was impossible to treat all men of a unit on the same day the clean mingled with the unclean in billets or dugouts, the regimental blankets were shared and the "carriers" who shunned the baths re-distributed the infestation. Another cause for the continuance of infestation after delousing was not recognised at this time: the fact, lately emphasised by Lloyd, that Official History of the War, Medical, Vol. 1, page 7.P. Vestimentorum sometimes lays its eggs on the pubic and axillary hairs where they remain undetected and undamaged by the bath. Apart from the danger from typhus fever, and the now growing opinion that trench fever was carried by lice—not yet fully established by experiment—the local irritation of the skin and infestations productive of impetigo in its various forms, were a serious source of wastage. Evacuation out of the division by sickness due to I.C.T. (local septic conditions), and to skin diseases, showed a definite increase during the winter months: both curves Were on a slowly rising gradient which determined a higher average each year from these causes. Scabies, also was much more common and was responsible for much of the wastage by skin diseases and I.C.T. such as furunculosis, superficial abscesses, and impetiginous manifestations. One of the causes of the spread of scabies was the
There had been a perceptible rise in the venereal curve during the winter, attributed to leave being granted freely both to London and to Paris; the average for 10 weeks up to January 6th, 1917, had been 11.4 cases per week, of these, two-thirds infected in London. Colonel Begg called for a report on this matter from the division; the report showed that very little venereal disease was of local origin. Suspected women in the area were brought promptly to the notice of the A.P.M. by the field ambulances; quarantine and inspection by a civilian medical practitioner followed; and, later, deportation by the French Army Authorities acting through the local Gendarmerie—if the woman proved to be infected. Weekly V.D. inspections were carried out in all units with good results, several cases being detected each week that otherwise would have been concealed. The A.D.M.S. had already made representations to the G.O.C. in the matter. As the outcome of much serious consideration it was decided to issue to each man a special card similar to that in use in the Australian Divisions, on which was inscribed a strongly worded appeal to men going on leave to follow Lord Kitchener's advice: to avoid strong drink and to respect womankind; to be chaste and to be temperate. But there was more than this, there was also an indication of the helping hand for those who had been led astray and very clear instructions as to where to report in London for prophylactic treatment. Several "blue light" stations for early treatment had been established both at Australian and New Zealand Headquarters and at many hospitals in London, where no questions were asked, no names were taken, and where all that could be done was done under highly expert advisers to eliminate the risks of infection post factum. Ante coital prophylaxis was not advised by the New Zealand Division, but in order that the man might be able to treat himself if not within reach of a blue light establishment, a nargol outfit was recommended and the men proceeding on leave were supplied on request with outfits which contained protargol jelly for injection and a calomel cream. Similar outfits were in use in the Navy and had been taken by us from German prisoners in Armentières.
At a time of minimal activity, such as the winter of 1916, in the Second Army when all other branches of the service were attending courses of instruction the need for some school for medical personnel became very prominent. For some time past it had been manifest that the training of medical officers joining the Division was inadequate to the needs of front line units. To remedy this, the formation of a divisional school for the training of regimental medical officers was brought up as a proposal to the D.D.M.S. IInd Anzac. Colonel Begg was heartily in sympathy with the movement as he had already expressed strong opinions on the matter in his first report on the work of medical units attached to the Division in June, 1916, wherein he had emphasised the difficulty in obtaining trained regimental medical officers, and the patent fact that in many cases no adequate training had been undergone by reinforcement officers. He had recommended that medical officers should receive a thorough course of instruction in New Zealand under experienced officers prior to embarkation and added that lack of training in N.Z.M.C. officers had greatly increased the work and anxiety of the medical administration of the Division. The D.D.M.S. decided to make the school a Corps affair; he appointed Lt.-Col. Irvine, R.A.M.C.—who was O.C. of the 102nd Field Ambulance of the neighbouring Division, the 34th—and the late
In January Lieut.-Col. Murray, D.S.O., relieved Lieut.-Col. Irvine as Commandant of the Anzac Medical Officers School, the latter taking up duties as Acting A.D.M.S. of the 34th Division. The building appropriated was in many ways well adapted to the purposes of the school. It was a modern Flemish house and had modern appliances, electric light and central heating, it made a very comfortable home for the mess and such students as could be billetted there. The course had been extended to 11 days and
The Second Army classes in sanitation at Hazebrouck continued during the winter, some medical officers passed direct from the
A divisional school of instruction in field sanitation was opened on the 8th January, 1917, at which the sanitary detachments of units, as laid down in war establishments, attended for a period of five days. The syllabus covered the whole of the duties of the sanitary personnel of field units detailed in Field Service Regulations, part 2, section 84, with added matter of contemporary importance. The hours of daylight were spent in outdoor demonstrations and practical work, the remainder of the day in lectures indoors. The working hours were from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. with an hour's break for dinner. Two lectures were given in the late afternoon, each of 40 minutes duration, illustrated by coloured diagrams and models prepared by the Sanitary Section who had charge of the school. The regimental medical officers reported favourably on the improvement in the general interest shown in their work by sanitary men, in consequence of this course of instruction.
An inquiry into the work of the regimental chiropodists trained at the divisional school at Armentières showed that in the majority of cases the chiropodists were well trained and efficient, regimental medical officers were unanimous in agreeing that the work had been most valuable to the battalions on the marches to and from the Somme, and that in most instances the chiropodists were keen and skilful. As evidence of the necessity of constant attention to the condition of the infantryman's foot, it was noted that in one week ending September 9th, 1916, no less than 45 cases were evacuated to C.C.S. from the division on account of injuries to the feet from marching. The total evacuations during that week numbered 248 so that the loss due to
The winter of 1916-1917 will be memorable in Flanders on account of its severity; it was very wet and cold until the end of December; the new year opened with a fall of snow and an unusually severe spell of hard frost when temperatures lower than ever experienced since 1882 were recorded. Curiously, the intense cold snap at midwinter did not affect the health of the troops prejudicially, on the contrary, there was a decrease in the sick rate during the month of January, 1917, the average for the division being 5.43 per 1000 per week, a little more than the army rate. In the early part of the winter Vincent's angina was noticeably prevalent, but with the onset of hard weather the wastage by diseases of the respiratory system took a leading place; an unusual type of influenza with, in some instances, severe broncho-pneumonia as a complication caused many casualties. There was little doubt now, that the New Zealand troops were very prone to these respiratory infections, much more so than British troops—it was even said that the New Zealanders provided the whole of the pneumonia of the Second Army during this period. There could be only one explanation of the constantly recurring fatalities in New Zealand troops from this cause which had been recorded during the Maori Wars; in the South African War; in the camps in New Zealand; in Egypt; and again in France; the cause:—clearly a lowered or absent immunity to special types of the pneumoccus, an immunity which British troops, coming from a more densely populated country, had acquired in childhood.
Trench foot, owing to its prevalence, had become a notifiable disease in the Army. It had been a very formidable source of wastage to the British Army in 1914: up to January 24th, 1915, it was stated by Mr. Tennant in the House, that there had been 9175 cases of frost bite, but Lord French, in his "1914," estimates that there were 20,000 cases in all, and cites the example of one brigade which sustained casualties to the extent of 700 in four days. French observers in 1916 were inclined to believe that the causative factor was infection by a mycelium which had been isolated by Professor Vuillemin, but there seemed to be a consensus of opinion amongst the English authorities, following the experiments of Lorrain Smith, that cold and wet with congestion of the limb in the dependent position due to pressure of the puttee
Another war disease from which the division suffered, slightly was trench nephritis. Although there was a very slight increase in the general rate of incidence during the winter months, in all some 20 cases diagnosed nephritis had been evacuated in a period of four months. The condition was attracting considerable attention in the Second Army at this time and the disease was notifiable. As a war disease it had been first observed in the American War of the Rebellion in March, 1862, when it assumed epidemic proportion after a prolonged period of trench warfare. About March, 1915, the incidence of acute nephritis became noticeable amongst the British troops in France. Much investigation followed at St. Bartholomew's Hospital, where a special team made an exhaustive study of the disease without much light Lancet, Lancet,
In view of this theory and the fact that Indian troops—the greater part non-meat-eating—were immune, the lessened incidence in New Zealanders and the suggestion of a lower rate of transient albuminuria might be attributed to the fact that our troops were habituated to a higher protein value in their domestic ration, and consequently demanded a higher meat ration than British troops. But this is highly contentious ground; more especially as to the scorbutic condition, if it existed.
By December the Division was settling down to make the best of its quarters in the villages by the Lys, many schemes were in hand to give added comforts to the billets, to improve the cooking of the company kitchens; to provide recreation for the resting troops. General Sir Andrew Russell was above all a great fighting general, but he had a very keen eye to interior economy as well. In this he was ably assisted by Lieut.-Col. Reid, A.S.C., the A.A. and Q.M.G., an accomplished "regular" soldier, with an unusual capacity for organising. With this officer the relations of the A.D.M.S. and the medical service of the Division were always happy. Both by the Divisional Commander and the "A" branch the recommendations of the A.D.M.S. invariably received earnest consideration and powerful execution. The need of the moment seemed to be expressed in one word:
A memorandum—"Hints on Cooking in the Field," had been issued by G.H.Q. and was distributed to all units in the Division. The matter was being pressed upon the notice of unit commanders. Lack of adequate training in army cooking was evident, but was destined to be remedied later on by the Army School of Cooking at Hazebrouck. The betterment of the regimental kitchens was a matter which General Russell and Lieut-Col. Reid saw to personally. They were determined to make an end of the damnable monotony of the eternal stew; their enthusiasm spread to the regimental commanders, much improvement in the messing arrangements followed. Regimental messing funds were established so that the army rations could be supplemented and a greater variety provided, in order that the men should be fed as well as all circumstances permitted.
Our heavy losses in experienced company officers at the Somme explained part of our difficulties in interior economy. Without good company officers no divisional sanitary or economic instructions could bear fruit. Billets unquestionably afforded poor comfort, owing to lack of light and fuel, and were not conducive to rest or contentment. Many of the buildings had been damaged by shell fire or other causes: wear and tear of war conditions; continued coming and going of troops. The billets in forward areas were mainly barns or lofts, often dark and impossible to heat; many of them draughty and in a tumble-down condition. The proprietors, willing enough—so they said—to effectuate repairs, complained of lack of material; while the troops, at present too much occupied with the defence system, had no time to attend to their own comfort. In the villages the billets were somewhat better—factories, schools and so forth, but proving of little attraction to the men. The inevitable alternative was the village estaminet. Ultimately by using our own N.Z.E. stores and by co-operating with the proprietors, who found some labour, the leaking roofs were repaired and the draughty walls made weather proof—straw, woven into mats, provided some mitigation of the hardness and coldness of billet floors; arrangements were made when possible for heating and lighting the billets and in this
A large well stocked canteen, a barber's shop, and a watch repairing depot were established: all run by details from the division. The Y.M.C.A. had an institute in the main street with a cinema, but as a larger place of entertainment was required, a theatre was built by our Pioneers called the Kapai Theatre, with a facade reminiscent of a large Maori whare, and accommodation for 1000 spectators seated on rude benches. On the stage of this theatre a variety of talent gave nightly entertainment in conjunction with the Divisional Cinematograph. Amongst the more important engagements were: Lena Ashwell parties; the famous "Bow Bells" troupe of the 56th Division; the Band of the Royal Engineers; and later our own Divisional Pierrots, which the 3rd New Zealand Field Ambulance was chiefly responsible for organising, and to which they furnished, from their personnel, nearly all the orchestra with their instruments, and some of the chief performers, Lt.-Col. Hardie Neil, N.Z.M.C. acting as impressario,—another example of the various strange duties imposed on medical officers by the exigencies of the. times. An officers' club was established and provided a warm, comfortable ante-room and writing room for such officers as could not get over to the Second Army Officers' Club at Baillieul, to which a special omnibus ran twice weekly at appointed hours. In this way some attempt was made to organise the amenities of normal existence and towards the end of the year there were ample facilities for recreation, and an ordered social life for those who were out of the trenches, the moral and sanitary value of which was of primal importance.
The first Christmas day of the New Zealand troops in France was observed as a holiday, as far as trench warfare permitted. Ceremonial visits were paid by the A.D.M.S. to the field ambulances and the D.R.S. where 150 patients were comfortably housed. General Godley visited them at dinner time—the rude tables spread with Christmas cheer—his remark was short but emphatic: "You have done 'em uncommon well, Murray." There was a glorious Christmas tree in the afternoon in the divisional theatre for the children of Sailly and Bac St. Maur, which General Russell with important French officials attended, to receive the thanks of delighted guests in an wonderful speech delivered by one of the little girls. There was a reunion of the N.Z.M.C. officers who were not on duty at the billets of the No. 1 Field Ambulance, attended by the D.D.M.S., Colonel Begg: the second Christmas dinner of
The Germans had bottled up their wrath and on New Year's Day, in return for our Christmas boxes they sent over a sprinkling of shells aimed at our front line system without causing any damage or any casualties. We had our revenge on the 7th January, when the 2nd Battalion of the Rifles entered his lines before dawn, killing many of the 65th Prussian Infantry and bringing back 19 prisoners with the loss of 1 killed and 5 wounded. The weather now became arctic, hard frosts and heavy snow compelled a partial truce. The Lys was completely frozen over; any that could obtain skates made use of them; even the Prussians could be seen holding skating parties which our artillery rudely dispersed. On the night of the 3rd February, retaliation came unexpectedly in the form of gas shells. On a clear moonlit night our forward billets at Fleurbaix were shelled with a mixture of phosgene and high explosive, and the right brigade, the N.Z.R.B. had their front and support line freely plastered with 75 num. gas shells fired from trench mortars. Either the men did not realise that gas was being used or there was delay in rousing the sleepers, or in some instances the expiratory valves of the small box respirators, previously in use during the night—there were two separate bombardments—were found to be frozen together; all these and other causes, the combination of H.E. with the gas shells, led to a large number of casualties by gassing. The ill effects of the gas were not, at first, noticed, there was much movement owing to the dispersal of the sleeping men; it was late before the matter was reported, and many of the gassed men had walked considerable distances before they were received into the ambulances. 14 gassed were admitted to No. 1 Field Ambulance and about 20, including 2 officers, to No. 3 Field Ambulance; of these some 5 men died in the dressing station. The most startling feature of the whole occurrence was the fact that the men did not complain of any ill effects for many hours after gassing, and that the onset of grave symptoms, in the fatal cases, was abrupt. The cyanosis, restlessness, dyspnea and collapse, and ultimate death within a few hours, of young robust men, shocked the medical officers in attendance in this their
Our final revenge in the Sailly sector eventuated on the 21st February, when the 2nd Auckland Battalion: 18 officers and 500 men raided the opposing lines under a heavy barrage; the enemy were caught at 'stand to" and lost about 200, including 44 prisoners brought in by us. No. 1 Field Ambulance received 97 of ours and 13 German wounded from this raid. The methods adopted in this operation—for which the ambulance was duly warned—were as follows:—The A.D.S. personnel was pushed forward to form a collecting post and an extra number of bearers were sent to the bearer relay posts and regimental aid posts. Communication was kept up by a motor cyclist between the collecting post and the original A.D.S.; extra ambulance waggons were brought up to the nearest point on a road where wounded might be loaded and communication between the ear station
On the 25th February the N.Z. Division gave over command of the Sailly sector to the 57th Division at 12 noon, our medical units handing over to Wessex and West Lancashire Territorial Field Ambulances, at the same time relieving the medical units of the 25th Division. The A.D.M.S. reopened his office at Steenwerck; the Divisional Headquarters of our new sector: Le Touquet-Ploegsteert.
It was not without well directed effort and whole hearted enthusiasm that New Zealand had succeeded in recruiting, training and embarking some 30,000 men during the year 1916, a force equivalent to the whole of her peace time Territorial Force; in all, there had been despatched overseas some 60,898 men by the end of this year and there remained on the strength of the N.Z.E.F. at the end of December, 1916, 47,114 men with the division in France, with the mounted brigade group in Sinai, or at the bases in Egypt, England and France.
In New Zealand recruiting, still on a voluntary basis, had been sufficient to mobilise over 75,000 troops, that is to say, 7 per cent. of the total population. The European population of New Zealand in Menigococcal infeciton in military camps during The carrier rate of these trained men is stated to have been only 5 per thousand just prior to embarkation.Streptococcus hamolyticus—later shown to be an active agent in the purulent bronchitis of New Zealand troops in England—was playing in this epidemic, does not appear clearly from the documents, but several facts emerge from contemporary descriptions of the disease which suggest strongly that the septic pneumonias of Trentham and Featherston in 1916, were one and the same disease as the very fatal purulent bronchitis of 1917 and 1918. From reports furnished by medical officers it is agreed that the disease was of sudden onset, that it was associated with a rash, petechial or haemorrhagic in character, that there was intense purulent discharge from the naso-pharynx and a very high temperature reading, that a peculiar lividity was noticed early in the disease described as "a typical blue earthly look not like cyanosis"; that the lung condition resembled rather a capillary bronchitis than a lobar pneumonia; that the sputum was purulent and offensive in odour, and that it yielded on bacteriological examination an abundance of streptococci, whereas pneumococci were scantily present. We shall have occasion to refer to this perplexing problem at a later period as it presented itself in the camps on Salisbury Plain in late 1917 and 1918. One almost inexplicable factor in
No fault could be found with the sanitary conditions existing in the camps, as domestic arrangements had by now reached a high level of efficiency, but, as in 1915, the hospital accommodation was still inadequate to meet the emergency in 1916. At the outbreak of the second epidemic the P.M.O. at Trentham had 265 beds available in an assemblage of buildings designated the "Cottage Hospital," with 30 beds, the "Wairarapa" building, 150 beds; the Casualty Ward, 36 beds; Izard Convalescent Home, 50 beds. The various buildings in camp, the Cottage Hospital, the Wairarapa Ward and the Casualty Ward, constituted the Trentham Military
As early as January, 1915, the British Medical Association (New Zealand Branch), were desirous of doing something of a patriotic and practical kind in the national crisis, and with an assurance of substantial pecuniary assistance from the members, met in deputation the G.O.C. and the D.M.S. At this interview it was decided that the sum of money subscribed by the B.M.A., then over a £1000, would be best utilised in improving the accommodation for sick at Trentham Camp, which at this time consisted of a marquee with six or seven beds not provided with bed linen. The matter was referred to the acting Defence Minister, Sir Francis Bell, who approved of the motives of the subscribers. Meanwhile the fund grew and a party of ladies of Wellington district afterwards known as the Ladies' Military Hospital Guild, with Mrs. Luke, Mayoress of Wellington, as President, had offered to find all necessary beds, bedding, and linen for the hospital. After protracted deliberations in which three Government departments and the Minister of Defence were concerned, a contract was let by the 27th of April, for a sum of £2889, to provide a cottage hospital to be known as the Trentham Military Hospital, with accommodation for 18 to 20 beds. Of the inadequacy of this provision for a camp of 7000 men, the public of New Zealand were very soon aware when the first epidemic of cerebro-spinal meningitis broke out in 1915. The hospital was not then completed nor was it available for use until late in September of the same year. There was a good deal of feeling displayed against the Defence Department by certain branches of the British Medical Association about the delay in providing even the small hospital, the cost of which had been borne to a great extent by their subscriptions, in some instances individually very generous. The late Major Savage, N.Z.M.C., of Auckland, subscribed £500.
The Trentham Commissioners report had found that as no provision had been made in advance for hospital accommodation at the camp, there was consequent overcrowding during the 1915 epidemic, and a disorganisation which was to the prejudice of the patients and as the result of this, late in 1915, another ward was built, a large octagonal open sided pavilion giving accommodation
The staff commanded in 1916 by the P.M.O., Lieut.-Col. Andrew, N.Z.M.C., an establishment calculated on a basis of 200 beds, was: 7 officers, one dental officer, 1 Q.M., 5 N.Z.A.N.S., 68 N.C.O.'s and O.R. N.Z.M.C. At the beginning of the year the D.G.M.S. had arranged that men rejected from the reinforce ments might be recruited to the N.Z.M.C, Home Service Section, and had also provided for their training at the depot at Awapuni and the usual examination for promotion. Frequent changes in the service owing to men transferring to other units and to drafts to the hospital ships was a cause of some lack of efficiency in the Trentham detachments, although from what may be gathered, the work, generally, was considered to be satisfactory. On the outbreak of the second epidemic, when the admissions to hospital amounted to over 800 for the month of July, further accommodation was required and the tea kiosk at the race course again came into use by the courtesy of the Racing Club, who were already finding accommodation for the medical officers and nursing staff, N.Z.A.N.S., in the trainer's quarters on the race course. Of the efficient and painstaking work of the whole medical staff during this trying period, there is ample evidence.
At the instance of the Minister of Health, at this time, the
It may appear from the above recital that there was a lack of forceful medical administration in 1916. As yet the D.G.M.S. was not permitted fully to control his department. We have seen that sanitation and military hospital administration were a function of the Public Health Department. That the question of hospital accommodation at Trentham was a matter not directly under the control of the D.G.M.S., although he certainly administered the personnel of the hospital. Further, we find the Minister of Public Health setting up a committee to investigate sanitary conditions in the Trentham Camp, a committee consisting of the very officers of the Health Department who were personally responsible for sanitary direction. The absence of any fully constituted General Staff, and the one man control of what represented the War Office, namely, the Department of Defence, to whom the G.O.C. and his staff were to a great extent subordinated, that and the dual control of medical arrangements could not make for smooth running and efficiency. The succeeding epidemics in the camps served to emphasise this lack of co-ordination in medical administration, which was inevitable under the conditions, but which, however disconcerting, was not in any way aggravated by lack of sympathetic understanding between the various parties concerned. As there were no N.Z.E. constructional services in New Zealand, both the Public Works Department and the General Manager of Railways, were concerned with the small matter of the cottage hospital at Trentham which became so complex a problem as to demand the attention of no less than three ministers, one important department and the Cabinet; a condition vividly recalling the difficulties of the medical services in England in the winter of 1854 during the Crimean
The medical arrangements made for the classification and disposal of invalids returning to New Zealand were complex; but above all extraordinarily sympathetic and humane. On the arrival of a transport or hospital ship, and prior to disembarkation, the invalids were inspected by a medical board consisting of a representative of the D.M.S., generally the local A.D.M.S, and a representative of the D.M.H., local health officer, holding honorary military rank, and the medical staff of the ship. The invalids were classified under the following heads:—
The classes (a) and (b) came immediately under control of the Minister of Health; the classes (c) and (d) under the D.G.M.S., whereas the last category (e) passed into the control of the Repatriation Department and, or, the Pensions Department. Railway passes were provided to the port of disembarkation for the next of kin in every instance; and the transport of the stretcher or walking cases was undertaken by the St. John Ambulance Societies and the New Zealand Motor Service Corps, a volunteer military formation. Ambulance trains were in waiting and on these trains the next of kin of the more serious cases were often allowed to travel. Both cot cases and convalescents for hospital were transferred to the nearest public hospital in their own district so as to be close to their homes; and in the case of convalescents granted sick leave. Facilities were provided for medical treatment, where required, by the local territorial N.Z.M.C. officers with certain restrictions as to duration of treatment imposed by the D.G.M.S. and supervised by the A.D.M.S. of the military district, who, in the case of further hospital treatment being required, boarded the patient and handed him over to the Public Health Authorities. The D.M.H. now made all necessary arrangements except the issue of railway warrants, a function of the O.C. district in all cases of transfer. The average cost of maintenance in public hospitals was 5/- per diem which was charged to the Defence Department.
The early history of one of the chief military hospitals, King George V. Hospital, is associated with a period in 1916 during which the Rotorua Sanatorium, a balneological station in the hot lakes district under the control of the Tourist Department and provided with a medical superintendent, became a convalescent depot for returned invalids of the Auckland District. For reasons of discipline it was early found that some military control should be exercised at this depot The Superintendent, Dr. Herbert, was therefore given military rank as Hon. Major N.Z.M.C., a combatant officer, Colonel Newall, and some N.C.O.'s and details, in all 20 N.Z.M.C. were posted to the Sanatorium early in 1916. There was then a total of 150 beds available and a new polygonal block had been erected at Pukeroa Hill, which became the nucleus of King George V. Hospital, of which Colonel Newall was first commandant.
At Hanmer, also a Tourist Department Sanatorium in the vicinity of hot mineral springs in the South Island, somewhat similar arrangements existed. And at Lowry Bay in Wellington Harbour, a fine house lent by
The importance of an efficient dental service for war had been recognised in New Zealand from the outbreak of hostilities,— dentists, as we have seen, were attached to the Samoan Force, the Main Body and the reinforcements. The Dental Sections with the Division had been organised by the Dental Administrative Officer now on N.Z.E.F. Headquarters. Dental work in the camps in New Zealand had increased enormously; large numbers of recruits were still being rejected by reason of dental defects, which meant a serious loss of man power. Recognising that no recruit should be refused for dental defect only and also that it was necessary to supply dental officers to the N.Z.B.F. at the base and overseas, the New Zealand Dental Association, in June, 1915, made a patriotic offer to the Government to treat all recruits gratuitously as far as time permitted, a charge for material only being made. This offer was accepted and for two years the dentists of New Zealand continued to give this valuable service. Afterwards Known for plastic surgery of the jaw at Queen's Hospital (New Zealand section), Sidcup. This at the instance of the Defence Minister who was instrumental in foundation the N.Z.D.C.
I have said that recruiting, even in 1916, was on a voluntary basis, but in August, 1916, the National Government of New Zealand, on account of the prolonged nature of the war and in order to avoid any possible delay in the regular despatch of reinforcements, decided to pass legislation providing for compulsory service. The Military Service Bill in England, whereby voluntary enlistment was replaced by compulsion, passed the House of Commons in mid
Of the base in Egypt in 1916, there is not much to be said: at present it consisted of a small camp at Moascar with a medical officer and an officer of the dental corps, and served the Mounted Brigade Group then in Sinai. There was a New Zealand Convalescent Home at Heliopolis, the Aotea Home; there were no other medical units than the Mounted Field Ambulance. The medical operations of this section of the N.Z.E.F. are dealt with in a separate chapter.
The N.Z.E.F. Base in England had its beginnings at the office of the High Commissioner for New Zealand, Sir Thomas Mackenzie. At first there was an Australian and New Zealand Base at "Weymouth, and some of the 3000 sick and wounded in England at the end of 1915, were either in British hospitals or at the
During the month of May the whole of the headquarters units left in Egypt came to London, including the D.D.M.S., Colonel Parkes, N.Z.M.C., and his staff, and set up their officers in Southampton Row. A New Zealand Medical Board was appointed forthwith and negotiations were entered into with the New Zealand War Contingent Association with a view to taking over their hospital at Walton-on-Thames—heretofore a civilian institution controlled by a committee with Lord Plunket as Chairman—which had 350 beds and a present total of 200 patients. This, by the generosity and self-sacrifice of the New Zealand War Contingent Association was ultimately accomplished; and in August, Marama in June, 1916, disembarking at Southampton, and taking over Lady Hardinge'g hutted Hospital, originally built for the use of the Lahore and Meerut Divisions in 1915, at Brockenhurst in the New Forest, about 14 miles from Southampton. The main portion of the establishment was a hutted structure of two wings of 10 wards, each fitted with 36 beds, a central administrative block, and the usual operating theatre, X-ray room, dental surgery, and dispensary. In addition to this section two large hotels in Brockenhurst, already in use as hospitals were taken over: Balmer Lawn Hotel, about one mile from the headquarters having 200 beds, and Forest Park Hotel, with a similar capacity. The scattered distribution of the three sections was not conducive to ease of administration as it meant increasing the staff. From September 1916, the admission rate rapidly rose in sympathy with the Somme operations and in the last four months of the year the admissions averaged over 700 a month; the total admissions for the half year being 3,846, with 1,100 beds available.
At Walton-on-Thames, the accommodation was increased by marquees and a scheme of building which was to provide four hutted wards of 70 beds each; the total beds thus brought up to 1040. A staff was gradually built up from category men amongst the patients; by kindly assistance from the Canadian forces who lent nursing sisters; and by the employment of a large number of V.A.D.'s. Both N.Z.M.C. officers and O.R. reinforcements were at this time urgently required to replace casualties in France. During 1915, the War Contingent Hospital had an average bed state of about 90, but in 1916, after conversion, the average rose to 500.
With the arrival of the training battalions from Egypt, it became necessary to open a new unit for the infantry base: the Commandant, Lt.-Col. Smyth, A.D.C., N.Z.S.C., took over Sling Camp on Salisbury Plain as a reserve group or infantry base training unit. It was also decided to form a command depot for New Zealand troops at Codford. The Imperial Government had early found that a general base depot was unsuited to the requirements of category men, whose training must differ considerably from that of fit men. The British Command Depots were originally medical units under the control of a medical officer; the
No. 3 New Zealand General Hospital was formed at Codford by taking over an R.A.M.C. Hospital in the Command Depot, it had some 330 beds available, and by September was partly manned by us:
The formation of three new medical units and the necessity for staffing Sling and Codford was a serious drain on the N.Z.M.C. reinforcements: of the three general hospitals, only one had a full establishment on formation, the others had to remain for a time understaffed with unusual strain on the personnel. This was
The London Headquarters Medical Staff now comprised the D.D.M.S., N.Z.E.F., Colonel Parkes, the A.D.M.S. Base,
In July, 1916, the average wastage from the Division in France was about 9.6 per cent. per month. Of this 4.8 per cent. was Teaching hospitals in the United Kingdom and the remainder either killed or in the L.O.C. Units in France. Sick and wounded then in hospitals in England numbered 90 officers, 2352 O.R., the average
In October 1916, there were, as the result of the Somme fighting, 4740 sick and wounded in England. Of these the New Zealand H.S. Maheno took 370 patients back to New Zealand during the month. The wastage from the division was now at the rate of 300 per week. During the first six months in France the division had sustained approximately losses to the extent of 2,250 killed; 7,750 wounded; sick, evacuated to England, 1000. The per annum wastage was now estimated at 23,000, of which 2000 sick; 25 per cent. of all cases evacuated became "C" class: the total repatriations of unfit estimated at 4,375 per annum. At the end of the year the strength of the N.Z.E.F. in England was 12,124, of which the main groups were distributed as follows:—
There were 4,636 reinforcements available, of which 1283 were at the Overseas Base at Etaples.
By the 1st March, 1917, the whole of the New Zealand Division had cleared the Sailly sector and had taken over from the 25th Division, a sector of defence in Belgium known as the Ploegsteert-Le Touquet sector. The right of the line extended as far south as the Lys, north of Armentières; the left touched St. Ives, the north-eastern corner of Ploegsteert Wood. The road running east from Ploegsteert to Warneton cut the position into two subsectors. In the right subsector the evacuation of wounded was superintended by the 1st Field Ambulance now in command of Replaced
There was a certain liveliness in the St. Ives sector—raids, trench bombardments, and the like, which entailed a moderate number of casualties—but the evacuation of the wounded presented little difficulty, as the existing facilities were excellent. About the middle of March the Division readjusted its position, moving northwards beyond St. Ives. The 1st New Zealand Brigade was relieved in the Le Touquet sector by a brigade of the 3rd Australian Division holding Armentières, and our position was extended northward from St. Ives to the Wulverghem-Messines road across the valley of the Douve where we relieved the 36th, Ulster Division. Medical arrangements were handed over and fresh disposition of medical personnel became necessary. The new sector taken over was a prolongation northwards of our original line and extended from St. Ives, the southern limit, to the Wulverghem road where our left subsector ended. In front was Messines, only a little over half a mile distant, its battered church still a prominent mark on the opposing sky line. South to St. Ives our trenches ran across the forward slopes of Hill 63 which confronted Messine to the south-west and flanked the Ploegsteert Wood. The combination of high ground and a dense wood made the position a strong one; it had been saved from the wreckage of the first battle of Messines by Hunter Weston's Brigade, of the 6th Division, in October 1914, and presented
The south side of the hill was well wooded; at the point where hill and wood adjoined was "Hyde Park Corner," a centre of considerable activity and evil fame as a shell trap for enemy artillery. The medical dispositions in this area were concentrated on the Charing Cross A.D.S., which we shared with the 3rd Australian Division; but in the northern sector an entirely different route of evacuation was established. The No. 1 New Zealand Field Ambulance moved to Ravelsberg just outside of Baillieul on the road that led through Neuve Eglise, via Wulverghem to Messines. The A.D.S. was at "Kandahar" Farm, on this road, about three to four miles east of Neuve Eglise, in farm buildings affording protection by splinter-proofs for about 100 lying cases. In front were two R.A.P.'s one at St. Quentin Cabaret, just a mile further east along the road, the other at a farm called La Plou Douve in the Douve Valley, both very much exposed to observation from Messines ridge which dominated the valley as far as the high ground about Neuve Eglise. Kandahar Farm was in telephonic communication with the M.D.S. at Ravelsberg, and was in touch with trench tramlines loading into the forward positions. It was distant from our front line about a mile and a half, at the nearest point, where the trenches crossed the Wulverghem-Messines road. Two large ambulance cars were kept at the A.D.S., and evacuation to Ravelsberg via Neuve Eglise, a distance of about 3½ miles, could be safely accomplished with motor transport, even by daylight.
Precautions against gas were at this time subject to very careful consideration. The Russian General Staff had reported an increased use of gas shells on their front; and prisoners we had taken had heard that a new form of lethal gas was to be used shortly. For these reasons a very thorough revision of gas defensive measures was initiated: the Divisional Gas Officer,
Early in March, the D.D.M.S., Col. Begg, C.M.G., visited the D.M.S. Second Army, for the purpose of discussing the scheme for evacuation of wounded during the forthcoming operations. The military plans for the capture of Messines were now well in hand, and the troops destined to carry out the operation, the 25th, 3rd Australian, and the New Zealand Divisions, in the IInd Anzac Corps area, were already concentrated in their positions of assault. Ultimately, as the result of personal inspection, Colonel Begg selected two sites for the C.M.D.S.'s; the first draft of the plans allowed for the accommodation of 1,300 patients, in hospital Nissen huts and marquees at both stations. Hospital Nissen Bow Hut: Bow shaped; constructed of corrugated iron: lined with match boarding. Dimensions, 60 x 43 x 19ft. 10ins.
Early in April the New Zealand troops, a brigade at a time, were relieved from duty in the trenches and sent out into the back areas where they underwent a period of intensive training on ground similar to that over which they were to attack. They had demonstrations on the subject with the aid of very large sized models of the terrain, in which every trench, sap, and strong point in the Messines position was reproduced.
An extraordinary amount of care was devoted to this special training and to the work of the Divisional Trench Warfare School near Ravelsberg, as it was realised by the Higher Command during the Somme operations that lack of skill in the intricacies of modern warfare and in the apt use of the newer weapons had resulted in casualties to British troops which could have been avoided by greater individual skill-at-arms. A certain detail of medical personnel accompanied each brigade during its period of training in the back areas.
Several important administrative adjustments in the N.Z.E.F. were made during this period, the chief of these, the formation of the 4th Brigade Group. In April, 1917, the strength of the N.Z.E.F. in England was over 15,000; it had grown in consequence of the lowered rate of wastage from the Division during the winter months; there were now some 10,000 "A" Class men available as reinforcements and the Division in France was over strength. It was hoped, at the time, that a new Anzac Division might be formed by two brigades of Australians in England, with the addition of the 4th New Zealand Brigade. The supply of the necessary reinforcements from Australia and New Zealand, however, presented insuperable difficulties to the fruition of the proposal, well favoured both by the War Office and the Anzac Commanders in France. New Zealand certainly disapproved of the continued existence of a 4th Brigade Group, but acquiesced in its temporary constitution and employment, with the proviso that it should not be reinforced and that it should ultimately be broken up to supply reinforcements for the Division. Early in April a special cadre of seasoned officers and N.C.O.'s was sent to England to join and train the new units required, and to organise the group, which was to be commanded by Brigadier-General Hart, D.S.O. At the end of April two N.Z.M.C. officers with picked N.CO.'s were ordered to England to mobilise No. 4 New Zealand Field Ambulance, which one of these officers, Lieut.-Col. McLean, N.Z.M.C. was to command.
The unexpected demand for officers and men to complete the new medical unit put a severe strain on the resources of the N.Z.M.C. personnel in the United Kingdom. The number of officers N.Z.M.C. with the N.Z.E.F. in England and France, at this time, totalled over 150. The services of the Anzac Corps, the Division, the Stationary Hospital, the Overseas Base in France including reinforcements, required 74 officers; and the front line units had a first call on reinforcements. The base units in England were below minimal establishments, and were working at a disadvantage owing to lack of sufficient staff. Some small accession of strength came from the enrolment of New Zealanders who joined the N.Z.M.C. on completion of their engagements with the British Forces; but the prevision made in 1916, of a shortage of medical officers for the N.Z.E.F. was now fully vindicated. To some it appeared that the resources of New Zealand in medical man-power hardly justified the maintenance in England of three general hospitals which, had they been fully staffed, would have absorbed as many officers as were required for the N.Z.E.F. in France. The policy of segregating New Zealand sick and wounded in our own hospitals had met with adverse criticism certainly, but it had the approval of the D.G.M.S., Sir Alfred Keogh, who agreed with the contention that under our own medical supervision, men of the N.Z.E.F. were returned to duty in a shorter time than when distributed in British Hospitals throughout the United Kingdom.
In order to provide the necessary O.K., N.Z.M.C, each Base Hospital was called upon to contribute its quota of men. The draft from No. 1 N.Z.G.H. was relatively the largest: 6 N.C.O.'s and 55 privates; but the other general hospitals each supplied a quota of trained N.C.O.'s and orderlies whose place was taken by V.A.D.'s and "C" class men. Increased reinforcements, both of N.Z.M.C. officers and men were demanded from New Zealand, more especially as the sinking of Hospital Ships during the unrestricted submarine offensive compelled the replacing of N.Z.A.N.S. by N.Z.M.C. details in the two New Zealand Hospital Ships. No. 4 New Zealand Field Ambulance was mobilised at Sling Camp on the 28th of April. The personnel consisted of a draft from the New Zealand General Hospitals of 145 N.Z.M.C. N.C.O.'s and privates made up to strength from the 22nd Medical Reinforcements and by the neeessary A.S.C. and M.T.A.S.C. details. The first step taken in the training of the unit was to send all the N.C.O.'s and junior officers to a special "bull ring" class organised by the infantry instructors. A short, brisk course
The reorganisation of Sanitary Sections had been made the subject of a special meeting of the Second Army Medical Society held during the month of April, 1917. The questions at issue were thoroughly discussed by officers interested, D.A.D.M.S.'s, Sanitary Section commanders, and officers in charge of Mobile Laboratories. The concensus of opinion expressed was: that all Sanitary Sections should be guided by a central policy dictated by approved scientific thought and that uniformity of detail in execution was most essential; and further, that in order to attain continuity of local effort, Sanitary Sections should remain in allotted areas and should not move with divisions. The outcome was a new organisation and distribution of Sanitary Sections which became Army units, detached from their respective divisions. So, the New Zealand Sanitary Section in command of Captain Sinclair, N.Z.M.C., D.P.H., passed under Army control on the 15th
Another important medical unit, the New Zealand Stationary Hospital at Amiens, was about to move up into the Second Army area. During the six months, July to December, 1916, some 11,870 British troops had passed through the unit, of which 10,865 sick and 1005 wounded during the active operations at the Somme. The mortality amongst the wounded was about 10 per cent. and of the sick about 28 per cent. In October, 1916, Majors Acland and
The early months of 1917, in Flanders, were bitterly cold and spring was late in coming; frosts and occasional snow with intervals of wet weather continued throughout April, but by the middle of May, fine, warm weather and, at times, a somewhat oppressive heat finally banished the winter. The New Zealand Division with an average strength of 20,250, had reached a very considerable degree of general fitness. During the month of May, the sickness wastage rate had fallen as low as 3.9 per 1000; the lowest rate for any month the division had spent in France. During April and early May the infantry brigades had, each in turn, enjoyed a spell of hard training away from the trenches which improved their health considerably. Yet the Division was in the throes of a mumps epidemic which had reached its acme at the end of March, and was still lingering on. The epidemic began in December, 1916, and was assumed to have spread to us from the 3rd Australian Division, then on our left, and in which the disease had become epidemic since its arrival in France. Measles and mumps were both responsible for a very considerable temporary wastage in the British Armies in France: in the year 1916, no less than 4,333 cases were reported, and of these, 3,629 were Australians. The incidence was chiefly in men who came from sparsely inhabited countries—the Highlands, the Scottish Islands, Australia, New Zealand and the frontiers of India—whose levies had not as yet acquired the immunities normally present in other British troops recruited from more densely populated countries. In spite of early precautions, such as segregation of contacts and disinfection, the disorder spread rapidly and simultaneously through all units, so that isolation of contacts became impossible without dislocating the work of the
The curious immunity to trench nephritis in New Zealanders and Australians was commented on by Colonel Soltau, consulting physician to the Second Army, at a meeting of the Medical Society, held at the 2nd Canadian C.C.S., at Remy Siding, on the 11th of May. Colonel Soltau said that there had been 718 cases observed in the Second Army during the past three months, of which the New Zealand Division had 10 cases only, and the 3rd Australian, 6; both of these Divisions of the IInd Anzac Corps, had much the lowest incidence in the Second Army; the 25th Division was evacuating 20 cases per month.
Owing to the increase in enemy submarine activity, a rigorous policy of economy in food stuffs was now being enforced in the B.E.F. The New Zealand Division, apparently without any difficulty, excelled in securing economy—more especially in fats—the average quantity of first class dripping saved by the New Zealand Division was over twice as many pounds as any other
Active operations on a large scale on the Somme front had ceased by the end of November, 1916, owing to unfavourable weather conditions, but to the north of the Ancre some heavy fighting continued, during which Thiepval and Beaumont Hamel were taken. The plan of campaign for 1917, as projected by Joffre and Haig, contemplated a joint offensive on the Somme front in February or April. But a change in national and political views abhorring the war of attrition, the "blood bath" of the Somme, led in France to the demission of Joffre and Foch; and a new plan of operation, by whirlwind battles on the Aisne heights, devised by Nivelle was universally hailed by England and France as the new short cut to victory. At a conference of Premiers at Calais in February, Sir Douglas Haig was subordinated to the French Generalissimo, and was instructed to support the Aisne campaign to the fullest extent. Part of the Joffre-Haig scheme included an attack on the northern hinge of the Siegfried line in front of Arras; it was agreed that this
The British "push" at Arras early in April, although limited in extent, was extraordinarily successful. Vimy Ridge and Bullecourt were taken with about six miles of the Siegfried line, and as compared with the Somme offensive of 1916, our gains were greater and our losses much less. Nivelle's armies attacked in great force in the Champagne, but were brought to a stand some seven miles short of their objective, the Laon Plain; a local tactical success, but of no strategic importance, bringing no compensations for the heavy casualties, disappointment, and loss of morale which the failure of the ambitious scheme carried in its train. The fighting about Arras had to be maintained for a much longer period than was anticipated so postponing the Flanders Campaign—in order to give support to the long drawn out French operations. The schemes of the Allies had failed, at least in bringing an end to the war, a consummation seriously envisaged by the more sanguine: Nivelle was replaced by Pétain, who was to nurse the French Armies back to a more optimistic mood, and Sir Douglas Haig was left free to prosecute his Flanders Campaign, also a part of the old Joffre-Haig plans for 1917. To this course the British Cabinet was agreed in May.
Early in the war
The second battle of the Messines-Wytschœte Ridge may be taken as the perfected type of the battle of limited objectives. Preparations had been under weigh ever since the late autumn of 1916, which included the laying down of broad gauge and narrow gauge railways leading right into the heart of our positions, the formation of many new roads, mining operations of an unheard of magnitude, and at an unusual depth, and the accumulation of vast stores of ammunition and engineering material. Not the least important of the preparations was the training of the troops. Each division destined to assault the position knew its sector as it had trained in the back areas, over exact models of the positions to be taken. The topography of the trenched country had been studied in all its intricacies by aerial photographs, and the front line had been systematically explored by reconnaisance patrols. "The final preparations were carried out," says
The medical arrangements made by the Second Army, the Corps and the New Zealand Division were no less thorough. Early in March Surgeon General Porter had summoned the D.D.M.S.'s of the various corps to discuss the medical plans. The allocation of duties to the various commands were clearly outlined. The A.D.'sM.S. of divisions were to be responsible for evacuation of the wounded from the fighting line to the Corps Main Dressing Stations. The D.D.'s M.S. of corps would supervise the evacuation from the corps dressing stations, and the transport of both lying and walking wounded to the Casualty Clearing Stations to which end a Motor Ambulance Convey was placed at the disposal of each D.D.M.S. Three Corps were to be engaged at the assault on the Messines-Wytschœte Ridge; from north to south: the Xth and the IXth and the IInd Anzac, each Corps having four divisions. The medical arrangements made by each Corps were somewhat similar to those adopted by Colonel Begg for the Anzac Corps, and which we propose to consider more in detail. The Army arrangements included the allotment of the C.C.S.'s of which, No. 53 British, in the Asylum Buildings at Baillieul, and the 2nd Australian C.C.S. at Trois Arbres, not very far from Pont d'Achelles Corps Main Dressing Station, were the chief. Special C.C.S.'s were detailed for particular A.C.C.S. surgical team consisted of: 1 surgeon. an anasthetist, a sister, and an orderly.
Very explicit instructions as to the surgical treatment of the wounded were issued by the Second Army, the more important being these:—Eusol was recommended as the standard lotion; picric acid 2 per cent. solution was to be used for skin sterilization in place of iodine; operations forward of the C.C.S. were to be restricted to the arrest of haemorrhage and the removal of Sodium Chloride, 180 grs.; Potassium Chloride. 4.5 grs.: Calcium Chloride, 4.5 grs.; Boiled water, 1 pint.
The IInd Anzac Corps objectives were limited to the southern portion of the battle field, including Messines village; four divisions were to be employed on a front of about 6,000 yards. A rough estimate of the casualties to be anticipated would be 15,000, allowing for 25 per cent total casualties, of which 1 in 4 killed, leaving about 11,000 wounded; of these over 5000 would be lying cases. Owing to the presence of Hill 63 in the centre of the corps front, and in order to conform to the elaborate traffic control arrangements, Colonel Begg found it necessary to establish the two corps M.D.S.'s already referred to: one for the northern routes at Westhoff Farm; one for the southern routes at Pont D'Achelles. His line of evacuation in the northern sector was to the C.C.S.'s at Baillieul, in the southern to the 2nd Australian C.C.S. at Trois Arbres. No less than four Casualty Clearing Stations were available for his purposes: the 11th at the railway siding at Baillieul was to take the overflow from the
The divisional medical arrangements, which concern us moat may now be examined. The front held by the New Zealand Division and from which we were to assault, lay between the Wulverghem and Ploegsteert roads as they converged from west and south to enter Messines about a mile away along these roads from either flank. The centre of our front line was just half a mile from Messines Church, and touched the Steenbeck,
During the month of May, a great deal of protective work was made at the farm by working parties from No. 1 New Zealand Field Ambulance. The outer walls of the barn were reinforced by a sand-bag breast work 9 feet high and 10 feet wide at the bottom. The ceiling of the ground floor was timbered with six inch props.; above the ceiling which was of brickwork, an "air space" of three feet was made by means of sand-bag buttresses supporting iron rails which were crowned by concrete "bursters." Some parts of the A.D.S. were further protected by curved iron dug-outs constructed inside the buildings. Two large cylindrical water tanks were embedded in the sand-bag walls on the western side away from the enemy fire. A sandbagged shelter in the lea of the farm buildings provided a garage for two motor ambulance cars always stationed at the A.D.S. A good road constructed from the pavé into the yard gave access to the many doorways of the fortified barn and returned in a broad sweep to the road by a separate exit. The material for the roadways was collected by night from ruined brick buildings in the neighbourhood and was carted by the ambulance transport. No casualties luckily resulted in men or horses engaged in this work, but part of the buildings was destroyed by shell fire on the 29th of May, the thatched roof of the farmhouse was set alight and considerable damage resulted; one medical officer, Captain Kidd, N.Z.M.C. was severely wounded. The elephant dug-outs inside the farmhouse remained intact: the barn was not damaged. It was a large building and provided four chambers, of which two measured 24 feet by 20 feet. One used as a dressing station could accommodate four operating tables and had a gas proof exit on to the car roadway; the other a large receiving chamber of the same size as the dressing room, provided shelter for stretcher cases, 28 of which could be accommodated in two tiers on wall racks leaving ample room for bearers. The large receiving room had also a gas-proof doorway for admitting stretcher cases. One smaller room 20 feet by 13 feet gave off
The personnel to be provided for the A.D.S. was:—2 tent subdivisions and 1 bearer subdivision. The equipment included: 600 blankets; 100 stretchers; 5,000 shell dressings; 20 trestles for stretchers; 4 medical comfort panniers; 400 assorted splints; 100 pyjama suits; 2 F.M. panniers; 2 field surgical panniers; 30 hot water bottles; 2 field fracture boxes; 4 Sawyer stoves; 6 primus stoves; 25 camp kettles; 50 petrol tins containing water; 100 gas helmets and 6 acetylene lamps.
The divisional collecting station for walking wounded was at Leeuwerck Farm, situated on a road which ran east and west through the sector, and had access to the Neuve Eglise-Wulverghem road. The route from the trenches was flagged and marked by white-washed posts to maintain direction at night, so that walking wounded could find their way easily. A dressing station had been built at the farm, but owing to heavy shelling it had to be abandoned at the end of May. Another collecting station was prepared close at hand, but at the end of the month, Leeuwerck Farm was repaired; it was supplied with dressings and comforts and a coffee stall for refreshments. A car post for a Ford car was close at hand and could be used in emergency for the evacuation of a lying down case from any of the battery positions in the vicinity. In the northern sector, then, there were three R.A.P.'s from which evacuation of stretcher cases could be effectuated either by communication trenches, by trench tramways or by hand across country to the bearer relay posts, which were adjacent to roads where wheeled stretchers could be used as far as the A.D.S., whence by motor ambulance to the
In the southern sector, south of Hill 63, somewhat similar conditions were provided. An A.D.S. at Underhill Farm, near Red Lodge had been prepared by the N.Z.E. assisted by the 3rd Field Ambulance. It lay close in under Hill 63, thus obtaining protection from observation, but as very many gun and howitzer positions required the same advantages the area was subject to very heavy bombardment at times, for which reason the structures required to be heavily protected by sand bags and overhead cover. Some of the wounded from the extreme right of our line would, it was anticipated, find their way across the western slopes of the hill to Underhill Farm, but as it was to the south of our line of assault it was not considered to be so important as the northern A.D.S. A very detailed plan of this elaborately fortified A.D.S. is to be found in Lieut.-Col Hardie Neil's little book, "Field Ambulance Organisation," which sets out with a wealth of detail the routine work of an ambulance in the warfare of fixed positions such as existed in 1917. As the chief danger at Underhill Farm was gas, because it was in the heart of the artillery positions, very special gas proofing was provided for the reception chambers; and as events proved, the precaution was very necessary. As evidence of the solidity of this A.D.S. it may be cited that several direct hits by shells of large calibre were registered upon it without material damage resulting. The route of evacuation was by motor ambulance to Pont D'Achelles C.M.D.S. about four miles away, the roadway being fair, but at times impassable owing to shell fire or gas.
It would be tedious to enumerate the many minute directions and instructions issued as to personnel, equipment, and detail of evacuation. One or two points, however, may be mentioned as showing the extreme care and foresight exercised by the A.D.M.S. in making his arrangements as complete and harmonious as possible. Telephonic communication was made with the A.D.S.; to supplement this means of contact motor cyclists were also used as heretofore. Alternative sites for both A.D.S.'s were chosen before hand in case either became untenable. Special patrols of N.Z.M.C. orderlies each carrying stretchers and medical
Under the Corps Bureau system all the casualty returns were to be compiled at the M.D.S.'s the only documents to be forwarded by the A.D.S. parties were: four-hourly progress reports showing the numbers passing through and a nominal roll of enemy wounded dying in the A.D.S. For the purposes of facilitating the disposal of enemy wounded an interpreter was posted at each A.D.S.
The IInd Anzac Officers' Rest House at La Motte au Bois, under the command of Major Izard, N.Z.M.C, had by this date become an Army unit, and was now known as the Second Army Officers' Rest House. In anticipation of further demands for accommodation and for the reception of convalescent officers from the C.C.S. during operations, the bed state was increased to 75, the necessary quarters being taken over under army directions.
Sanitary considerations had not been neglected in preparing the medical arrangements of the Flanders Campaign of 1917. A highly efficient reticulated water supply system had been provided for the Ploegsteert sector under army arrangements. There were many water points in the corps area supplied by this water system which covered a wide area of distribution and had its source in the Lys river. As the Lys water was normally heavily polluted, requiring 14 scoops for chlorination—which of course means quite unfit for drinking purposes—and yielding over 1000 total organisms per c.c. with B. Coli present in minimal quantities of the water, a system of purification and chlorination on a large scale was required. At the Jesus Farm across the river from Fort Rompu there were two large water filtration barges. Of these, No. 1—the Ransome-Ver Mehr Barge—was fitted with a streaming sand filter, and was designed for removing metallic poisons from water. Its output was 6000 gallons per hour and its powerful pumps were capable of distributing the flow to a wide area. On board was a chemical and bacteriological laboratory in charge of an R.A.M.C. officer. The No. 2 Barge—Bell System—was similar, although the treatment varied in detail and it had about the same capacity. Both barges were frequently visited by N.Z.M.C. officers attending the corps medical school at Estaires, during the winter. It is of melancholy interest to recall the fact that the gallant barges went down at their moorings, blown up by their crews rather than fall into enemy hands when the Germans crossed the Lys at Sailly in 1918. Other elaborate means of water supply were in use; the Water Tank Companies with motor clarifiers and carriers had been in the field since 1916. and were much in evidence before Messines in May, 1917, the "white dolphins" flashing past carrying 150 to 500 gallons of purified water to remote areas not supplied by the reticulation. Their presence indicated the possibility of a rapid advance into Belgium which in the area to be invaded was known to be very short of water during the late summer months. One section of a Water Tank Company comprising 41 motor tanks and clarifiers, yielding 4,350 gallons per trip was allotted to the New Zealand Division. Apart from the chlorination of all water supplies issued to the Division, special provision had been made by the Second Army to maintain a constant reserve of 30,000 sodium bisulphate tablets with each division. All medical officers were required to instruct the men under their medical charge in the method of using the water purification tablets whenever
The new allotment of Sanitary Sections under Army control temporarily delegated to D.D.'sM.S. corps, had in view the adjustment of sanitary areas in re-occupied Belgium and immediate provision for adequate public health services in the case of a rapid advance until such time as the Belgian authorities were in a position to resume their functions. No more eloquent testimonial to the praiseworthy thoroughness of the medical arrangements can be cited than these sanitary provisions.
During the three days that preceded the assault of Messines there was a final revision of the divisional medical arrangements. These busy days were known as "W," "X" and "Y" days, the attack was to be made on "Z" day and at "Zero" hour. The 4th of June was a bright, fine day; and was announced as "W" day; the attack would be on the 7th unless the Second Army saw fit to pospone it by adding further "W" or "X" days to the calendar. Something yet remained to be done: the New Zealand Stationary Hospital was still busily engaged in erecting Nissen huts at Hazebrouck and No. 1 New Zealand Field Ambulance was putting up tents at Ravelsberg, making preparations to receive and hold 750 patients. The 4th New Zealand Field Ambulance, which had arrived on the 1st of June, had orders to send one section complete to the M.D.S. at Westhoff Farm; and one section to the C.M.D.S. at Pont D'Achelles with the tent subdivision detached to a corps detraining point for lightly wounded at Connaught Siding close to Pont D'Achelles. The advanced parties of No. 2 Field Ambulance were moved into Kandahar Farm A.D.S.
On the 5th, a bright, warm day—"X" day in the battle calendar—there was an appreciable augmentation in the already voluminous output of the Corps artillery and an increase in the enemy reply. There was a conference of ambulance commanders in Colonel McGavin's office at the Divisional Headquarters situated in Westhoff Farm buildings. The A.D.M.S. of the New Zealand Division was now responsible for clearing not only our own divisional front but also for evacuating the wounded of the 4th Australian Division which was to "leap frog" through the 25th and the New Zealand Division in the final stages of the battle. Lieut.-Col. Murray, D.S.O., was placed in charge of forward evacuations at Kandahar Farm, and Lieut.-Col. Hardie Neil with his 3rd Field Ambulance was to proceed immediately to Underhill Farm A.D.S. All the motor ambulance cars of the division were to concentrate at a parking station near Neuve Eglise. During the course of this conference a strange disaster befell at Ravelsberg where the 1st Field Ambulance had their
The 6th of June "Y" day, a dull morning with oppressive heat. Zero hour had now been fixed for 3.10 a.m. on "Z" day; the divisional orders for the attack were issued. The Second Army's medical arrangements were fully completed: the 4th C.C.S. at Baillieul and the 2nd Australian C.C.S. at Trois Arbres destined to serve the IInd Anzac Corps, had each been strengthened by 3 extra surgical teams, 3 additional M.O.'s and from 6 to 12 sisters, besides added bearer personnel up to 60; 16 ambulance trains or temporary ambulance trains were drawn up on the Second Army sidings. The D.M.S. had visited the New Zealand Stationary Hospital and found that it could now accommodate 1000 cases if required; there were 54 wounded and 133 sick in the unit at this date. Colonel Begg summoned a
During the day, Lieut.-Col. Murray, D.S.O., with bearer officers and N.C.O.'s from Kandahar Farm visited the various posts and reconnoitred the communications, the trench tramways, and the overland routes, which were now flagged and marked by direction posts and illuminated signs for use at night. All the available bearers of No. 1 and No. 2 Field Ambulances were assembled at Kandahar Farm and the allotted N.Z.M.C personnel sent forward to the R.A.P.'s, the bearer relay posts, and the Divisional Collecting Post at Leeuwerck Farm.
The Corps Main Dressing station at Westhoff was fully manned, the total personnel under the command of
"Y" day was an oppressive day, but a thunderstorm cleared the air; the afternoon was cooler; the night fine with a full moon. At dusk, under the protection of our fighting aeroplanes, the three assaulting columns of the 25th, the New Zealand, and the 3rd Australian Division, moved into their assembly trenches. The first two divisions had no casualties during this manoeuvre, but at 9 p.m. a heavy gas bombardment caught the Australians; two of their battalions had serious losses from gassing. The gas proof arrangements at Underhill Farm acted well: the doors
"Our R.A.P. was at a place called Fort Osborne"—writes Captain Johns of 1st Canterbury—"we were about 500 yards behind our front line. The 2nd Canterbury M.O., Captain Gordon, N.Z.M.C., shared this same dugout with me. The battalion got in without mishap although the enemy were putting a few gas shells over. It was about 11 p.m. when we arrived; we set our gear in order and waited about until the show started. There was just the normal artillery fire going on, and the Roches had not the faintest idea what was going to happen to them at 3.10 a.m., or that there were thousands of troops massed in the trenches where, usually, there were only a couple of battalions. We had been warned that our people were going to blow mines at zero hour, so at 3 a.m., we got out of the R.A.P. and lay down on the ground behind the trench. Precisely 10 minutes later the whole show was pandemonium, 19 mines along the front went up together, thousands of guns of all sizes and shapes went off as hard as they could lick, besides hundreds of machine guns. The ground rocked for about ten minutes like an earthquake, and in the Boche line there appeared to have been a volcanic eruption. At the same moment our men in the front line trenches jumped out and it seemed as if thousands of living men had suddenly grown out of the ground. They were across No Mans' Land before the Boche got his barrage to work. The casualties were very light and were chiefly due to the men being too eager and getting into our own barrage. We got busy about 4 a.m., the greater number of the wounded were walking cases. Owing to the gas shells we had to knock off once or twice as we could not work properly in the box respirators."
At "zero" the 3rd Brigade on the right and the 2nd Brigade on the left had crossed the parapet—the 1st Brigade at present in
There were three R.M.O.'s working at Fort Osborne at the time of this assault besides Captain Johns: Captain Gordon, 2nd Canterbury; Captain Connor, 1st Wellington and Captain Goldstein 2nd Wellington. The first cases to come down were walking cases who were directed to King Edward Sap and Medicine-Hat trail. The stretcher parties from the bearer relay posts arrived prior to 4 a.m. and at first found some difficulty in using the trench tramline for stretcher cases owing to damage to the ways by shell fire, and the passage of our tanks; but German prisoners were coming in, and, with their assistance, some of the earliest of the lying down cases reached Khandahar Farm just after 4 a.m. At 4.30 the first casualties from IInd Anzac Corps were already in C.C.S. The wounded, now, were being carried by hand by the overland route along the trench tramline to the bearer relay posts. Some of the R.M.O.'s were already moving forward to the newly gained trenches and, at 5 a.m., Captain Addison, N.Z.M.C., R.M.O. 2nd Auckland, had opened an R.A.P. at the Moulin de L'Ospice near Messines. This was the first R.A.P. to be established, and many wounded from all units were dealt with there. At 6.30 a.m. Messines village was clear of machinegun nests, the divisional objectives were being consolidated, and the Engineers were hurriedly repairing the road so that lorries and the Ford ambulance cars were now able to get up as far as Boyle's Farm. Up to this time 168 wounded had reached Kandahar Farm, of which 30 were lying down. The corps M.D.S. at Pont D'Achelles had received 500, of which 200 gassed from the 3rd Australian Division. Everywhere evacuations were proceeding with extraordinary rapidity. From 5.30 to 7.30 the enemy barrage had somewhat impeded work at Fort Osborne, sparse shells were falling in the communication trenches, three bearers were wounded, but after this, for some time, no trouble was experienced. No doubt the Bavarians were retiring their field guns. The attack so far had succeeded with machine-like precision; the medical arrangements resembled the military movements in time-table punctuality; the first ambulance train steamed out of Baillieul at 7.30 a.m. A steady flow of stretcher
By 10 a.m. most of the R.M.O.'s had advanced their R.A.P.'s to dug-outs or trenches in and about Messines, and were in touch with the A.D.S. at Kandahar, stretcher parties had reached them and were clearing their wounded. The numbers of wounded passing through the A.D.S. had diminished somewhat. R.M.O. 1st Otago, Captain Prior, who was known to have advanced earlier, had not yet been located, and later it was reported at the A.D.S. that the first runner sent back by Captain Prior had been killed not far from the R.A.P. east of Messines. The second messenger, more fortunate, brought the map reference of the new R.A.P. safely to the A.D.S. Another R.M.O., Captain Nelson, of 1st Auckland, was not located, he had moved away early with his battalion and had established his R.A.P. well forward of his battalion headquarters, south-east of Messines, and about a mile from the old R.A.P. at Surrey Farm. Here in some German dug-outs, he was for a time overwhelmed with wounded; and quite out of touch with the N.Z.M.C. bearers.
At 12 noon the Division was well established: they had taken 300 prisoners, many machine-guns, and some field pieces. 2,200 wounded had passed through the corps stations in the proportion of one lying to three sitting; stretcher cases were coming in from forward R.A.P.'s which were mostly clear, with the exception of 1st Auckland. The ambulance parties were now taking over the old R.A.P.'s, Boyle's Farm and Fort Osborne, as advanced dressing stations under
Captain Johns' narrative continues:—"About mid-day things were getting a bit slack and the ambulance came along to form an A.D.S., so Gordon and I thought we had better get off to Messines to pick up our battalions. The Germans were still dropping a few shells over the place at haphazard as they had lost all observation. We went up by leaps and bounds and I got up to my battalion safely. I found one company digging in. We discovered a line of German dug-outs and occupied them. I went forward to my headquarters which were a few hundred yards ahead. Here I learnt how things were going and, as I was sitting at the table, I was so dreadfully tired, I must have dropped asleep." Major Johns was known as "très calme," in his battalion; while he was sleeping a 5.9 shell hit the battalion headquarters: it was a solid structure and suffered no damage, but the place was attracting too much attention; consequently the party moved out. Captain Johns went back to his line of dug-outs, where he attended to his wounded, later had a meal and fixed up some sort of a bed for the night.
After 1 p.m. the Germans launched their counter attack, accompanying it by a very heavy barrage on Messines; shells of all calibres up to 8in. were falling in profusion behind our advanced positions. But the assaulting waves of the 1st Guards Division and the 24th Bavarian Division melted under our counter barrage, and we took some prisoners from both divisions who had come up by train from Tourcoing and Haubourdin. Shortly after the 4th Australian Division "leap-frogged" through us to the Oestaverne line, the final objective of the Anzac Corps. During their advance it was almost impossible for the N.Z.M.C. bearers to reach the new R.A.P.'s owing to the barrage which caused many casualties. A sleepered track made by the Engineers, early in the forenoon, led on past Spring Street R.A.P. and by 11 a.m. a Ford car had penetrated as far as this post. Later, a service of motor ambulance cars was established to Spring Street; but regularity could not be maintained as the track was subject to heavy shelling, more especially in the afternoon.
From 5 p.m. onwards there was desperate fighting on our front the 4th Australian Division and the tanks were meeting opposition in the capture of the final line. Cavalry patrols of the Otago M.R. went out to reconnoitre the position, but lost most of their horses. The "situation was obscure." A thick
At 7 p.m. it appeared that the 4th Australians were in their appointed positions, and as they were now in front of the New Zealand Division, Australian bearers replaced the N.Z.M.C. parties in Boyle's Farm and Spring Street. Here, the 4th Australian Field Ambulance relieved men of the New Zealand Field Ambulance whom they had not met since April, 1916, when they parted from a comradeship much cherished from Anzac days. Large N.Z.M.C. bearer parties under Captain Crawford, N.Z.M.C., now went out to clear the advanced R.A.P.'s—a difficult task, owing to the barrage on Messines and in the valley. As night fell, conditions of uncertainty and anxiety prevailed, heavy local counter attacks had to be met in the front line, the exact position of which was not determined at all points. The situation became more complicated by subordinate commanders, fearful of the safety of their own lines shortening their barrage, so causing casualties to the Australians in front, and ill luck had decided that both the enemy and ourselves were using identical star-shell signals for artillery support. It was impossible then for our observing officers to distinguish our own S.O.S. signals from those of the opposing infantry. The losses amongst the Australians from all these causes were very considerable.
About midnight the most forward R.A.P.'s were cleared by the ambulance bearers. There had been casualties: of the Australian bearers, 4 killed and 3 wounded; the N.Z.M.C, parties had, so far, 1 killed, 7 wounded, one R.M.O., Captain Prior, gassed. The wounded of the New Zealand Division, evacuated up to midnight
All through the night of the 7th and early hours of the morning of the 8th ambulance bearer parties, New Zealand and Australian, were carrying from the forward R.A.P.'s to Boyle's Farm or to Spring Street both points now used by the A.M.C. as A.D.S.'s. There was intense work going on behind the captured positions: parties with pack-mules carrying water, food, ammunition, and all manner of trench stores were hurrying up and down with ant-like industry between the dumps and the newly acquired positions. The N.Z.E. were laying down sleepered tracks, building temporary culverts, supervising the construction of a sap through. No Mans' Land, improving the old enemy communications. By daylight they had completed a mule track as far as the Moulin de L'Ospice on the western fringe of Messines, in which neighbourhood at least four R.M.O.'s were working. Not many casualties were reported in this group of R.A.P.'s during the night. Captain Johns tells us, that, having made his bed he slept in it only to be awakened by a large shell, "which had burst at the corner of the dugout and made a hole big enough to bury a bullock in, but the old dugout stood it well. The Huns like the Egyptians, built their 'pill boxes' to last for eternity." At dawn he was awake, he tells us, had a wash, shaved, attended a few wounded, breakfasted and admired the view, notably the work of the Maori Pioneers, heroic wielders of the shovel, who had driven a sap almost up to his dugout.
By sun up on the 8th, all R.A.P.'s were reported clear of wounded; over 2000 had passed through Kandahar Farm, of which 670 were stretcher cases. Spring Street R.A.P. was now connected with Messines by a road repaired during the night, and the motor ambulance cars were able to load stretcher cases here, as the sleepered track from Kandahar Farm was quite satisfactory except at the times when it was barraged. The A.M.C. bearer parties despatched from Spring Street followed the
During the forenoon,
By 12 noon a readjustment in the New Zealand divisional front became necessary in order to avoid a serious congestion of troops. The 3rd Brigade was to be withdrawn to Hill 63 and placed in reserve; the 1st Brigade would hold the New Zealand line with the 2nd Brigade in support. In front, to the east of Messines, the 4th and the 3rd Australian Divisions were now linked up in a fairly solid position. Throughout the afternoon there was no change on the New Zealand front, but the enemy fire was slowly increasing in intensity, and after nightfall became very violent; a counter attack was said to be in progress. Again the 4th Australian Division had heavy casualties, in some instances from our own protective barrages. Up to midnight there were alarms and excursions, and in the midst of this hubbub parties of bearers led by
By 6 a.m. on the 9th, 1121 walking, 799 sitting, and 1029 lying, wounded had passed through Kandahar Farm; a heavy proportion of stretcher cases. The New Zealand wounded amounted to 80 officers, 2460 O.R. A bright warm day, wind rather strong—the military situation fully cleared up by aeroplane reconnaisance. At midday, the 1st New Zealand Brigade had orders to come out of the line and retire to rest billets. All R.A.P.'s were clear in the afternoon, when Lieut.-Col. Murray handed over Kandahar Farm to the 4th Australian Division; his tally of wounded passed through now reached 3126. The bearer personnel of No. 1 and No. 2 Field Ambulances were relieved by A.M.C. and marched to Ravelsberg for a period of rest, having worked almost continuously for three days and nights. No. 3 New Zealand Field Ambulance passed under control of the A.D.M.S. of the 4th Australian Division, now responsible for forward evacuations. Owing to the direction taken by the trench tramways, and the general use of the Wulverghem road, most of the New Zealand casualties had passed through the northern sector, but at Underhill, some assistance was given to the 3rd Australian Division whose A.D.S. was near by at Charing Cross and was occasionally overcrowded.
During the night of the 9/10th, the Division was relieved. The day was quiet, Divisional Headquarters moved into Baillieul. The 4th New Zealand Brigade which had not yet been engaged in the fighting line passed to the control of the 4th Australian Division, taking over a sector of the line just north of the Lys, the Ploegsteert-Le Touquet sector already described. The 4th Field Ambulance established a M.D.S. at Pont de Nieppe, using the routes of evacuation from Motor Car Corner and the A.D.S. at the Brewery.
The second battle of Messines terminated on the 9th of June, what further operations ensued, in advancing our out-post line belong to a period of exploitation of the initial success. With these operations we will deal later, but the moment seems opportune to review the medical work during the assault and capture of the village by the New Zealand Division.
All contemporary accounts written by medical officers agree in stating that the medical arrangements worked satisfactorily. There were some minor imperfections however. First, as to the R.M.O.'s: the position of the regimental medical detachment in the course of an assault is to a great extent a matter for the battalion commander to decide, although divisional routine orders issued at the Somme governed the dispositions somewhat; but,
Captain Nelson, N.Z.M.C., R.M.O. to the 1st Auckland, was in the assembly trenches in front of Spring Street, at zero hour. He advanced with the final waves of his battalion, having with him 4 regimental stretcher bearers, his corporal medical orderly, 1 regimental water duty man of the N.Z.M.C., 1 N.Z.M.C. runner, taken from the old R.A.P., and the battalion chiropodist. He kept close touch with his battalion headquarters detachment. He reached the enemy trench known as "Ulcer" support without casualties, but did not at first occupy the trench. He dug in his R.A.P. in a shell hole—his party carried spades, and were able to improve the position somewhat. Here he attended to such wounded as were in his vicinity and at 5 a.m. despatched his runner to Spring Street, There was no shell fire for about two hours in this locality and at 6 a.m. one squad of N.Z.M.C. bearers cleared his post of stretcher cases which only numbered two. Just before midday he went forward about 200 yards and found a strong concrete "pill box" in "Ulcer" Sap. The dug-out was full of dead and wounded Germans; the dead were removed, the wounded attended to. During the day no bearer parties had penetrated to this post, now over a mile from Spring Street, on the extreme right of the New Zealand Division and the most advanced R.A.P. Some time after the assault of the 4th Australian Division returning German prisoners were commandeered to carry back the accumulated stretcher cases, but it was not until 9 p.m. that Captain Nelson's post was finally in touch with Australian bearers going forward to their own still more advanced posts. After this there was no further trouble, the N.Z.M.C. officers were now fully informed as to the position. In the morning, water supply was a difficult problem, but some water was obtained from a disabled tank and later a pipe supply from Messines was discovered near the pill box. During the 8th and 9th many Australian wounded were brought down to Nelson's Post and Captain Crawford, in person, brought up bearer squads on the morning of the 9th. The regimental stretcher bearers had
Lieut.-Col. Murray's contemporary report on the work at Kandahar Farm has some interesting passages. He says—"Throughout the whole of the operations evacuations proceeded satisfactorily, the wounded coming in very quickly. There was little holding up of wounded forward of the A.D.S., and very few cases that had not been brought in within 24 hours. Later on in the operations a few wounded were located in shell holes where it was very difficult to find them, or, in some instances, to approach to their assistance owing to severe shell fire. The trench tramways were of much assistance in evacuating from Spring Street and Port Osborne. Each trolley had been adapted by special gates to carry four stretcher cases; only three bearers were required to handle the load. The specially constructed protected aid posts, roomy and well equipped with all necessary medical stores, staffed by N.Z.M.C. nursing orderlies, were of the greatest assistance to the R.M.O.'s who were enabled to work expeditiously and safely, and later advance to their forward aid posts with the battalion medical equipment intact and unopened. The field ambulance runners were well used to maintain touch with the advanced dressing station by accelerating the despatch ef bearer parties to an already known point. Occasionally, owing to heavy hostile artillery fire it was not possible, within the bounds of reasonable safety, for bearers and wounded, to clear
A small detraining point for lightly wounded coming down by the 60 c.m. railway was established by one tent subdivision of the 4th New Zealand Field Ambulance. It was near Connaught siding on a track leading to the C.M.D.S. at Pont D'Achelles. During the Messines operations some 900 walking wounded detraining at this station were fed at a long counter in the open, their wounds redressed and their progress assisted to the Pont D'Achelles station. During the afternoon of the 7th a 12in. gun of ours drew up near the siding and engaged with a similar monster in the Lille defences in a very noisy and alarming duel the effect of which was, if anything conducive to accelerated: evacuations.
The A.D.M.S. of the New Zealand Division, Colonel McGavin, was responsible for clearing both the New Zealand and the 4th Australian Division from zero hour up to the 9th of June. He had under his command the whole of the bearer personnel of the Australian Ambulances from 3 p.m. on the 7th until relieved by the Australian A.D.M.S., Colonel Barber, A.M.C. Colonel McGavin makes the following comments in his report written shortly after the engagement. "The total number passed through the advanced dressing stations in the period defined was as follows:—walking wounded, 980; sitting wounded, 1620; lying wounded. 1230; total 3830 (including P.O.W.). The protected A.D.S.'s and R.A.P.'s were very efficiently fortified; several direct hits by 5.9 or 4.2 shells were noted, but in no case did the shells penetrate the dug-outs. The gas-proofing proved very effective at Underhill Farm, the neighbourhood of which A.D.S. was subjected to heavy bombardments by gas. Dayfield body shields were furnished for all medical personnel, but were mostly used by those who were working about the A.D.S.'s and the R.A.P.'s and by the drivers of the ambulance cars, that is to say: by those who, not having to move about a great deal, were not unduly hampered by the extra weight. Five men were hit on the body shields, in four of these cases there can be no doubt that the wearers were saved
At the corps M.D.S. at Westhoff the work had been shared by three departments: walking wounded under N.Z.M.C. officers; stretcher cases tended by British and New Zealand details; and the clerical section—corps casualty bureau—by a mixed detachment of clerks. In the stretcher case department three large hospital huts with four tables each were manned by shifts of six medical officers, one to every two tables. Smaller huts on the opposite side of a plank walk provided an operating theatre, a gas treatment room and a resuscitation room. A large hut controlled by a senior N.C.O. was in use as an evacuation room for stretcher cases. The three large hospital huts used for lying down cases gave on the admission road and received the stretchers in turn or simultaneously as desired. A heavy curtain of blankets separated the receiving from the dressing subdivision of the hut and in each hut the chaplains and orderlies saw to the immediate comfort of the wounded as soon as they were admitted. Four
In the operating department tourniquets if present were removed. Ether by the open method, was administered and haemorrhage was arrested by ligation in situ or by amputation in the case of badly shattered limbs. Chest wounds were closed by suture without an anaesthetic. Abdominal cases were not handled but were sent on urgently—frequently from A.D.S.—by direct car to C.C.S. The operating team of three medical officers
In the dressing of minor wounds iodine was not used; sterilized gauze with eusol was the universal dressing. Picric acid in two per cent. solution with methylated spirit was applied to the scalp, after shaving, where there was a penetrating injury of the skull. The moat interesting advance in first line surgery was the extensive use of Thomas' hip splint as far forward as the original R.A.P. The difference in condition between wounded who were thus splinted and those otherwise dressed, was very striking. All medical officers commented on the vast improvement effected by the use of this apparatus in handling a condition heretofore fraught with extreme danger to the injured. Some of the R.M.O.'s were of the opinion that a supply of these splints should have been brought up to the forward R.A.P.'s by the ambulance bearer parties; in this contention they were right; the idea was developed later.
Cases of gas poisoning were numerous on the morning of the 7th: they were treated in the open by means of the "Novita" sets which were extremely satisfactory on account of their light weight and portability. The apparatus was fitted with a two-way
The walking wounded department was manned by N.Z.M.C. personnel. Here, the steady stream of casualties passed at once to the refreshment counters, where food, drink, chocolate, and cigarettes were dispensed, mainly from the stores of the New Zealand Y.M.C.A. Benches were provided where many a grim story was told and the whole battle, as seen or imagined by the narrators, fought all over again with all its hair-breadth escapes. Very loquacious, the walking wounded are in a fine state of exaltation which, duly fortified by good food and minor comfortable attentions, makes them an easily managed and very patient crowd. Passing in turn before the clerks who filled in the necessary entries on the field medical card, and the buff slip, the cheerful queue reached the inoculation tables where A.T.S. was administered—the fact duly noted in the documents; ultimately they reached the dressing room where the whole staff of six medical officers and their nursing orderlies worked simultaneously during rush hours at 12 chairs. The medical officers completed the diagnostic entries on the cards and indicated the nature of a disposal either to C.C.S. or to D.R.S. in the case of the more trivial injuries. From time to time a few of the wounded would be transferred to the M.D.S. if the severity of the case demanded more elaborate surgical treatment and evacuation by stretcher. It is very remarkable how soldiers with severe wounds such as compound fractures of the upper extremity or, rarely, penetrating wounds of the head or abdomen, manage to mingle with the stream of walking wounded and, through battle inebriation, will walk considerable distances, apparently unconcernedly, until exhaustion compels them to become stretcher cases. From the dressing-room the flow of casualties was directed to the evacuation yard where three-ton lorries fitted with seats, and motor omnibuses carried them away at the rate of 180 an hour during the main rush of the 7th.
From 3 a.m. on the 7th June to 12 noon on the 9th, the Westhoff station handled 187 officers, 4822 O.R.; of these: sitting and lying cases, 1767; walking cases, 2879; over 5000 in all, including German wounded prisoners. The lorry service for walking wounded was well maintained, there was no delay, but on about three occasions the stretcher cases awaiting removal accumulated to about 80. From 5 p.m. on the 7th and onwards
Special huts were provided for the corps bureau in which 22 clerks worked continuously in shifts. The reports, returns, and states to be furnished were:—
The correct compilation of the A. and D. book, the basis of all these returns and states, needed special care and some clear-cut method of recording. The method adopted was this:—The buff slip already described and the field medical card were made out for each wounded man admitted; the slip when completed in the dressing room, was placed in the waterproof envelope which contains the field card, and was collected at the time of evacuation by an orderly specially posted by the loading stage. In the case of the walking wounded the buff slip was their ticket of admission to the lorry, without which they could not pass. From the buff slips brought to the office, the A. and D. books were compiled at leisure. The method was almost identical with that adopted at the Somme in 1916; each A.D.M.S. division had his returns sent to him daily whilst the A. and D. books passed to the field ambulance concerned. But the corps bureau system had its imperfections. One of the troubles at Messines was that the bureau was in the same buildings as the corps M.D.S. The extraordinarily busy environment of such a station is not the most suitable for the work of a highly technical clerical staff. Nor is the much harassed commander of such a station in a position to devote his whole energies to organising and supervising the accountancy. The constant inquiries of divisions, units, individuals even, as to the disposal of certain wounded is
At the corps D.R.S. at Ravelsberg, commanded by
Colonel Begg, who had so carefully prepared and supervised the corps medical schemes, had every reason to be gratified by the results obtained. "At all points," he says, "the plans worked smoothly and rapidly." He makes special comment on the fact that the original dressing and immobilisation of fractures at the permanent R.A.P.'s was well done and that the surgical and operative work of the C.M.D.S.'s was of a high standard. The train arrangements for removing the lightly wounded had worked admirably: the narrow gauge railways carried 1000 the first day: and his fleet of motor lorries and omnibuses had maintained uninterruptedly their five minute services. He anticipated that the divisional rest stations would be able to restore some 1,500 to 2000 men to duty within a week. Several minor considerations required improving, in his opinion. As both the CM.D.S. and
A correct estimate of the casualties of the New Zealand Division during the capture of Messines is difficult to assess. The number of wounded admitted from the Division, including the 4th Brigade from midnight of the 6/7th to midnight on the 11/12th was: officers, 101; O.R., 2895, a total of 2996 wounded. By adding the killed and missing—most of the later subsequently accounted for—we get a total of 3903. The figures on which this estimate is based are drawn in part from the return of casualties furnished by units to the A.A. and Q.M.G. daily. As the Division was relieved on the night of the 9/10th and battalions were not able to state their casualties in full until the 10th 11th and 12th, during which days they were in rest, it is fair to assume that the casualties reported on these dates represent losses in the Messines operation. If the total of killed, wounded and missing, is accepted to be: 473 killed, 2726 wounded, and 434 missing, as shown in the reports mentioned, the total casualties amount to 3633, equivalent to 15 per cent. of the New Zealand troops engaged. The losses may be said to have been light. The difference between the number of wounded reported by units to A.A. and Q.M.G. and the total given by the A.D.M.N. is 270 wounded. Many, no doubt, reported as missing by their battalions were later accounted for as wounded or killed. The number of killed approximates 700.
Surgeon General Porter, in commenting on the operations of the Second Army, states that the total number of wounded was less than anticipated and that the IInd Anzac casualties were much the heaviest: "The wounds on the whole, were severe," he notes, "mainly caused by H.E.; machine-gun bullet wounds were infrequent, forming only from five per cent to ten per cent. of the whole. Penetrating wounds of the head and thorax were numerous but compound fracture of the femur was in lower proportions than usual. This is accounted for by the
Many distinguished visitors—often undistinguished by the busy surgeons working at high pressure—inspected the various stations during the battle. Chief of these was the Army Commander—always distinguished—General Plumer. In a few, homely, unforgetable words he thanked the workers: "You officers of the medical corps," he said at Westhoff, "have not been so fortunate as your comrades in being permitted to assist the wounded in the firing line itself; but you were detailed for duties no less important; which you have performed in a most creditable manner; and, in after years, you also may say with all truth: 'I too, played a part in the Battle of Messines.'"
After a brief period of rest the New Zealand Division came back to the line on the 12th of June taking over the trenches south of the Douve, previously held by the 3rd Australian Division. North of the Douve the 4th Australians were replaced by the 25th Division. Divisional headquarters again established its offices in Steenwerck. The enemy was cautiously withdrawing to a prepared position about a mile and a quarter in rear of his outposts; it was the Corps intention to keep close touch with this local withdrawal and to seize any outlying strong points still held in the slowly crumbling defences. The medical dispositions included the taking over of the A.D.S. at Charing Cross by the No. 2 New Zealand Field Ambulance and the opening of an M.D.S. at Nieppe by the 3rd New Zealand Field Ambulance while the 1st Field Ambulance remained at Ravelsberg. The 4th New Zealand Brigade and its ambulance passed to the command of the New Zealand Division; no changes were made on the sector held by the 4th Brigade.
A limited advance under barrage was carried out on the whole Second Army front on the 14th commencing at 7.30 p.m. In all about 145 wounded were brought in, all R.A.P.'s being reported clear by 9 a.m. on the 15th. The trench tramways through the wood and beyond were extensively used in these evaenations. A readjustment of medical positions followed this operation. No. 2 and No. 3 Field Ambulances established headquarters at the C.M.D.S. at Pont D'Achelles with Charing Cross and Underhill Farm as A.D.S.'s and the 4th Field Ambulance, shelled out of Pont de Nieppe, withdrew its M.D.S. to Nieppe with advanced dressing station at the Brewery.
During the second half of June the Division maintained an aggressive policy, treading heavily on the heels of the retiring Bavarians who were grudgingly giving up minor strong points in their forward defences. There was much artillery activity on both sides, our trench areas were subject to very heavy bombardments, and the back areas, including Baillieul, were receiving an increased
About this time medical opinion had undergone important modification in regard to the nomenclature and early diagnosis of those nervous diseases which we now know as the psychoneuroses of war. According to
Early in 1915,
In March, 1917,
Two very important monographs issued in the "Horizon" Series under the auspices of the French Service de Santé did much to remodel current views and emphasised the great importance of scrupulously avoiding any diagnostic "suggestions" inherent in the terms "commotioné" or "shell-shock." The attitude of Roussy and L'Hermite was somewhat opposed to that of Babinski; the former based their opinions on the observation of cases seen close to the firing line, the latter was strongly impressed by experiences gained at the base hospitals at a longer interval from the original "shock," "commotio," "traumatism," or "suggestion." But the divergencies of opinion in the French workers although very acute and causing many ripples in English neurological circles, were in the main unimportant to the front line surgeons, who chiefly desired to be relieved of the onus of making any expert diagnosis in these ambiguous conundrums. G.R.O., dated June 17th, 1917, introduced a new method of classification and disposal of soldiers who, "without any visible wound became non-effective from the effects of British or enemy weapons in action." The R.M.O. or the ambulance officer was not to record any diagnosis. He was to
The month of June ended in very hot oppressive weather with frequent thunderstorms. The enemy artillery was exceptionally active, much gas was used especially against Ploegsteert Wood; night bombing aeroplanes and long range guns raked our back areas at intervals; our balloons were frequently shelled or attacked by fighting aeroplanes. On the 28th, the Nieppe balloon which had been shelled unsuccessfully for nearly 3 hours was at last brought down in flames by a flash of lightning during a violent thunderstorm, which ended the day. A cynical Frenchman who witnessed the event from Nieppe said to one of our medical officers, "vous voyez qu'ils ont raison les Boches—le Bon Dieu est avec eux—Gott Mit una!" A welcome relief of the Division came at the end of the month, leave reopened on the 1st of July. The medical posts were taken over by the ambulances of the 4th Australian Division. Our headquarters retired to Vieux Berguin, about five miles south west of Baillieul where the tired troops were billetted in pleasant country places. The 4th Brigade Group remained under the command of the 4th Australian Division and did not leave its sector just north of the Lys.
Early in July the 3rd (N.Z.R.) Brigade and the Pioneer Battalion attended by one section of No. 3 New Zealand Field Ambulance went north to assist General Anthoine's Second French Army in digging gun positions. Many untoward delays had hampered the launching of the British coastwise offensive. Even now there was much to be done, especially in the Northern sector. The Germans wondered why we did not come on; and in the middle of July, made a stroke against the 4th Army at Lombartzyde, whereby a bridge head was lost to us. In this operation an unexpected gas shell attack caused very serious casualties because of our unpreparedness for a new and very
All the plans for the British Flanders Campaign were now complete: on a fifteen mile front the Second French Army, the Fifth and the Second British Armies were to attack from the Lys northwards to Steenstrate; the main thrust was to come from the Fifth Army on a front of seven and a half miles in the north of the Ypres salient; General Anthoine was to advance step by step northward of this; and to the south, our Second Army was to strike between Hollebeke and Warneton, feinting a flanking movement to the north of Lille. The IInd Anzac Corps on the right of the Second Army with the New Zealand Division on its right was to push in a south-easterly direction towards Warneton so as to make the enemy believe that a crossing of the Lys was intended. The special work of our division was to take La Basse Ville, a cluster of factories and a sugar refinery, about three-quarters of a mile south-east of Warneton on the main road from Armentières.
By the 19th of July, the New Zealand Brigades, well rested and in good fettle, were coming back to their old position in front of Ploegsteert Wood. The medical arrangements of the A.D.M.S., Colonel McGavin, D.S.O., were not markedly modified from previous dispositions. A special fortified R.A.P. was constructed in the captured German trenches about the centre of our Northern sector near the site of the cabaret "Au Chasseur," which at one time stood on the Messines-La Basse Ville road and about 1000 yards north of the last named village. The R.A.P. was called "Ultimo" from a trench name given by us to a German avenue connecting their front and supporting lines and in which the R.A.P. was situated. The avenue had been restored by us and was operable by stretcher parties. Ambulance bearers taking over wounded at "Ultimo" could carry down the avenue about one mile to the bearer relay post at Dead Horse Corner at the northern angle of the wood, which connected with the Charing Cross A.D.S. by trench tramways. The M.D.S. at Pont D Achelles, similar in all respects to that of Westhoff, provided ample accommodation and was in telephonic communication with divisional headquarters. The A.D.S. at Underhill Farm was at present little used except for local casualties. The dispositions of the 4th Field Ambulance were not altered, their M.D.S. at Nieppe in the Communal School provided accommodation for 60 stretcher cases. The car post at Motor Car Corner was still held serving Surrey
The allocation of medical units was as follows:—No. 1 Field Ambulance, at the D.R.S. at L'Estrade near Steenwerck which had been occupied by us in early 1916. The 2nd and 3rd Field Ambulances divided between the M.D.S. Pont D'Achelles and the A.D.S.'s at Charing Cross and Underhill Farm, supplying all R.A.P.'s with field ambulance bearers. The Dental Hospital was at de Seule not far from the Reinforcement Camp; the usual allotment of dental sections: 1 per field ambulance was adhered to. The New Zealand Dental Sections had been remodelled and had now reached their perfected organisation. The Dental Section which had been, formed in the United Kingdom to accompany the 4th Field Ambulance was a very mobile unit, all cumbersome equipment had been eliminated, with the result that two small panniers, one pack-mule load, now contained sufficient instruments and material for all operations, surgical or prosthetic. The actual space taken up in transport was only half of a half limbered G.S. cart. The Dental Hospital had also been made mobile by allotting one three-ton lorry to the purpose of its transport as required. There was no difficulty in maintaining a constant supply of expendable material as, in accordance with a contract made between the New Zealand Government and the War Office, all necessary dental equipment could be obtained from Advanced Supply Depots of medical stores. In this way all difficulties had been overcome by experience in the field and the New Zealand Dental Corps may justly claim to be the pioneers of a movement which resulted in an efficient and practical dental service for the front line troops.
At 2 a.m. on the 27th, the first attack on La Basse Villa was made, a company of 2nd Wellington entered and hold the village
On the night of the 28th Armentières was subjected to an extraordinarily heavy bombardment with the new "Yellow Cross" gas. Shells seemed to rain into the town for many hours. A very large number of civilians were gassed in their cellars: of these unfortunates the New Zealand Stationary Hospital admitted a convoy of over 100 men, women and children. Armentières was cleared of its remaining civilians and became a city of the dead.
The final attack on La Basse Ville was timed for 3.50 a.m. on the 1st, and was to coincide with the opening of the great Flanders Campaign of 1917, whose first objectives were the ridges about Ypres as far out as Passchendaele. The task of retaking the lost village was given to the 1st New Zealand Brigade. Under the cover of a well planned and skilfully executed barrage, 1st Auckand and 2nd Wellington advanced to the attack on the extreme right of a 15 mile battle front. Two companys of 2nd Wellington penetrated the ruins, cleared the cellars and in a stiff fight lasting 50 minutes completed the capture of the village, killing most of the garrison. All the New Zealand objectives were reported by our contact planes to be secure by 5.40 a.m. and a local attack easily beaten off by rifle and machine gun fire. By 6 a.m. the wounded, mostly by passing through "Ultimo," had reached Charing Cross A.D.S. and at noon, the the tally of our wounded cleared by M.D.S. was, 29 lying and 54 sitting. The German counter attack took place in the afternoon and was accompanied by extremely heavy shelling which gave us more casualties; but, the enemy parties were easily held off by our barrages and infantry fire, although they advanced with much determination. At 5 p.m. there was a downpour of rain which continued all night. About 6 p.m. the wounded were coming in freely, carrying parties organised from Bavarian prisoners assisting. The total at this time was 149, of which 58 lying and 91 sitting. During the night the wounded continued to come down in an unbroken stream; by midnight, the total treated at Pont D'Achelles was 7 officers, 171 O.R. and 9 wounded prisoners. Information obtained from the prisoners showed that
The casualties reported to the A.A. and Q.M.Q, by units of the division for the two operations at La Basse Villa were: killed, 111; wounded, 312; missing, 21: total 444. The 1st Brigade had 61 killed, 183 wounded, 5 missing. The arrangements for the evacuation of wounded worked smoothly, there was no delay at any point. Captain Goldstein, M.C., R.M.O. to 2nd Wellington had his hands full at "Ultimo", but all his wounded were safely in when he was relieved.
The first casualties caused by the new "Yellow Cross" gas were observed on the New Zealand front during the later part of July. Shells containing the so called "mustard" gas were first used in the Ypres salient on the 12th of July 1917; some 2000 casualties resulted. Ignorance as to the nature of the gas and its effects was the cause of the initial losses which were heavy: the incidence of serious cases amounting to over 12 per cent. during the July bombardments, the mortality stated to be in excess of four per cent. On the 31st July some 20 gassed cases were admitted to No. 3 New Zealand Field Ambulance. They complained chiefly of smarting of the eyes and occasionally
Exceptional weather conditions prevailed during the month of August. Heavy rains, cold winds and thunderstorms marked an unusual season; the low-lying forefield south of the Douve became a swamp, the trenches filled with water. All the hardships of the muddy battlefields of the Somme were reproduced, even trench foot broke out amongst the drenched trench workers. Winter precautions, including the use of rubber boots, became a necessity and solidified alcohol for fuel, and pea soup tablets were isued for use by the outposts. Everywhere there was a considerable weight of enemy bombardment, most severely felt in the front positions and attended by heavy casualties. During the first 14 days of this wretched month we had 211 killed, 941 wounded and 10 missing. Sickness claimed 1130 casualties. The divisional sick wastage rate crept up to over 10 per 1000 per week. If we add to the battle casualties our losses from disease this fortnight claims no less than 2292 soldiers lost to the division, a wastage equivalent to 20 per cent per month, or about double that recorded for the whole of the first year in France, which did not exceed 10 per cent. per month for infantry, 5.4 per cent. pioneers, engineers or artillery and 2 per cent for medical troops. The Anzac Corps was holding the flank of the salient and was taking the heaviest fire which the enemy could concentrate on what seemed to them the most dangerous point in their defences. Amongst other evidences of their activity our baths at Pont de Nieppe were rendered useless by heavy shells. The neighbourhood of the A.D.S. at Charing Cross was feverishly searched by 21 cm. howitzers. Baillieul was shelled by day and bad its share of the night bombing raids which killed many of our horses in artillery and field ambulance lines. Even Hazebrouck was subject to occasional bombardment by a naval gun firing at the phenomenal range of over 20 miles. This necessitated the hurried evacuation of the New Zealand Stationary Hospital, a step decided upon by the D.M.S. All patients were removed to hospitals in the St. Omer area. By the 10th most of the staff with the exception of 5 officers and 60 O.R. was detached for service with other medical units of the Second Army. The work of dismantling the hospital was proceeded with, all equipment was packed and ready for transport by the 14th. A new site at Wisques, near St Omer was
The last week in August saw a welcome relief for the division. On the 23rd the 4th Australian Division was taking over a part of our line and on the 27th the relief was completed by the 8th Division. The sorely tried troops marched to various entraining points about Baillieul, ultimately detraining in the Lumbres area, where pleasant billets in a beautiful fertile country provided a sheltered retreat for well earned rest.
While the Division rested and trained the battles in the Ypres salient were reaching an impasse from which not even the best troops of the British Armies could break through. In the northern sector, along the road that led from Ypres to Graven-staffel and the heights above Passchendaele progress was despairingly slow. Tempestuous weather and the surprising toughness of the defences combined to stay the Fifth Army in a morass beset by steel and concrete fortresses that, like the tombs on the Appian way, flanked the road to Gravenstafel. In the operations of the 16th of August the Fifth Army—although successful everywhere else—failed to make headway in the St. Julien sector; their advance had been so delayed that a German counter attack drove back the thinned waves of assault to their original positions. Wet weather followed for the rest of the month. The Second Army was now brought up and set at this unforgiving sector north of the Menin Road and on the 20th September another great battle was fought. The Australians of 1st Anzac broke into Polygon Wood and, with the other Corps to the south of them, took all the high ground on the Menin Road, once held by us in October, 1914, now regained after two months piecemeal fighting. But in the St. Julien sector the ground was low lying, wet and sodden, studded with pill-boxes, and to be conquered only yard by yard with heavy losses. The 25th and 26th of September saw further minor progress: the Australians cleared Polygon Wood completely and took Zonnebeke village, and to the north, London and North Midland Territorials made good a long chain of pill boxes, carrying our line to Kansas Cross at the foot of Abraham's heights just two miles from the original point of departure; objectives gained at so great a cost which should have been attained early in August. No hopes of a break through now remained; it was to be a scramble for winter positions.
The French armies, nursed back to better humour by Pétain's cautious leading, had, during this month of September, taken their final revenge at Verdun and by a carefully planned and well
The Italian offensive across the Isonzo was now at an end; it had been successful but unfruitful; Gorizia still barred the way to Trieste and the morale of the Italian people and of part of its army had been shaken by ultra socialistic propaganda. Riots in Turin, mutinies in the Army were signals of impending misfortune. Already German and Austrian Divisions were concentrating against Cadorna's flank and were destined to wipe out all his successes of two years laborious fighting. By the triumph of the Soviet parties, the Russian front had finally collapsed; the rolling up of Rumania was now inevitable. And yet, everywhere there was talk of Peace. While Ludendorf was training new armies in the obscurity of the Russian front, and grimly encouraging his Western Armies, reeling from a multiplicity of blows he dreamed of peace in 1918 through a crushing German victory.
On the 14th of September,
The area taken over by IInd Anzac was a rectangular strip about 17 miles in length from east to west and had an average width of about one mile. Forward of Poperinghe the area was served by one road only, the main road to Ypres. All the traffic of IInd Anzac, most of that of the XVIIIth Corps and part of that of 1st Anzac, converged at Poperinghe where there was at all times a dense, slowly moving surge of packed transport, and along the main road to Ypres the traffic flowed on both sides of
Operations at Gravenstafel 4/6th October, 1917.
The Second Army and the Fifth Army were to renew the attack on the 4th of October. IInd Anzac Corps on the left of the Second Army would fight on a two divisional front. New Zealanders to the north to take Abraham's heights, the 3rd Australian Division on their right. In front was the 4th Bavarian Division whose dispositions were known to us from accounts given by prisoners. The task of our division was to be accomplished by the 1st and the 4th Brigades. Each brigade would attack
Colonel McGavin's medical arrangements for the evacuation of wounded hinged upon the A.D.S. at Wieltje and the bearer relay posts in front of it. The post at Wieltje taken over by Lt.-Col. Murray, D.S.O., and the No. 2 Field Ambulance was in a mine gallery some 100 yards long which terminated in a large excavated chamber. Two openings led out on to the road, down one of these, on an inclined plane, stretchers could be lowered by ropes and, by the other, exit from the dressing room was gained to the roadway above, where motor ambulance cars received their loads. There was accommodation for a large number of wounded, and the dressing station was secure against any shells the enemy were likely to use at this point. The main bearer relay post forward of the A.D.S., on the Gravenstafel road, and about a mile distant, was in a collection of concrete dugouts and sandbagged shelters known as "Bridge House," or "Midland Farm," on the line of the trench tramway that skirted the road. One medical officer and 12 stretcher bearers formed the garrison of this post, which had the usual reserves of medical supplies, comforts, stretchers, blankets and water. Half a mile further on, and near the junction with a road running north to St. Julien, was a cluster of relay posts in concrete dugouts of which the chief, to the south of the road, was known as "Spree Farm;" all were situated in what had been the British front line during August and early September, when our advance was delayed by wet weather, and it was from this line that the third attack was made on September the 20th. The garrison of each of the relay posts was 12 bearers. The most advanced bearer relays were at the R.A.P.'s; on the left "Gaschyler Galleries," on the right "Delve" Farm. From Delve Farm, distant some two miles from Wieltje, there was a chain of relay posts some 400 yards apart linking up with Bridge House. At the Gaschyler Farm Galleries R.A.P., about 1000 yards north-east of "Spree Farm," there was ample accommodation in deep dugouts for the R.M.O.'s of the left brigade, and 26 N.Z.M.C. personnel besides the regimental stretcher bearers. The northern infantry track, a trench grid pathway, led up to this R.A.P. whose route of evacuation was on
In the northern suburb of Ypres there is a harbour at the terminus of the Yser Canal which was at one time flanked by tall warehouses. The locality was known as Kaaje (quay), a mildly busy place in pre war days when the sea borne trade came and went By Dixmude, but now horribly mangled and ravaged by three years of siege. This was the only outlet for the northern portion of the salient, all traffic converged here to a bridge across the Ypres-Commines Canal not far from the harbour. The returning track having passed the bridge led to a bend known as the Devil's Corner where tradition had it that it never ceased shelling, and a little further on the road turning westward towards Poperinghe, passed a corner where there was safety and which was known as Salvation Corner. The painstaking regularity of the bombardment of Kaaje resulted in the wrecking of every house in the neighbourhood; there was none left intact in 1915, few standing in 1917—a melancholy spot known to the present generation as "Dead End." A road started eastward from the harbour, leading to Poelecappelle Passing through St. Jean and Wieltje, the latter only a mile and three quarters from the Yser embankment. At Dead End the reserves of the N.Z.M.C. were concentrated—reserves of bearers, stretchers, blankets, and medical supplies, mostly in dugouts in the canal embankments.
Halfway to Poperinghe was the village of Vlamertinghe, in 1914 a romantic Flemish townlet with high gabled roofs, an ancient moated farm and a mighty windmill built of solid brickwork jacketed in white plaster, flanking the shady roadway like a Norman fortress. It had abandoned its sails and taken to steam in competition with the more modern flour mills further down the road at Brandhoeck. Our divisional sick collecting post was in the moated farm, the corps walking wounded collecting station in the Vlamertinghe mill.
In the corps medical arrangements made by Colonel Begg, certain modifications, in the general principles of evacuations need a moment's consideration. At Messines we have seen that the evacuation of the wounded from A.D.S. was carried out by the division by means of its own cars. The Anzac medical arrangements for the battle of Gravenstafel included the pooling of all ambulance transport and the clearing of the A.D.S.'s by M.A.C. under corps control. Possibly, this was done in order to avoid waste of transport; possibly, for traffic control. All A.D.S.'s were now to be cleared under corps arrangements through corps M.D.S. and corps walking wounded station to the C.C.S.'s. A corps gas treatment centre was provided and a large corps rest station. No special corps bureau for recording casualties was devised, although 1st Anzac had already established the practice; all returns were still to be furnished by C.M.D.S. and C.W.W.C.P. as at Messines, although matters had been improved by segregating walking from lying wounded in separate units.
The final medical arrangements were completed on October the 1st. No. 2 New Zealand Field Ambulance, Lt.-Col. Murray, D.S.O., commanding, was in charge of forward evacuations with headquarters at Wieltje mine shaft. All bearers of the three Field Ambulances were at his disposal. A reserve of 70 bearers had been formed at Dead End; there was a total of 217 bearers available for forward work. It is to be noted that No. 3 Field Ambulance was with its brigade, as yet in corps reserve. At each of the three R.A.P.'s there were 24 bearers N.Z.M.C. and two runners. 30 bearers under Major McCormack, N.Z.M.C, at Midland Farm; with 24 bearers in each of the relay posts. No. 1 Field Ambulance under Major Craig, N.Z.M.C.—temporarily in command, replacing
On the 2nd of October the D.D.M.S. held a conference of A.D.'sM.S. and reviewed the medical arrangements. Two tent subdivisons of the 10th Australian Field Ambulance joined No. 4 New Zealand Field Ambulance at Vlamertinghe Mill. On the 3rd our division moved up its fighting headquarters to Dead End. No. 3 New Zealand Field Ambulance coming under divisional control, two of their tent subdivisions went to C.M.D.S.: half the bearers, to Dead End.
The concentration of the 1st and the 4th Brigades was successfully accomplished; they lay on their taped lines astride the Gravenstafel road in front of Kansas Cross. It was a quiet day; a cloudy sky with occasional bursts of sunshine; the enemy artillery fire slackening. There was a cool breeze and a threatening sky towards evening; it rained during the night. The night was suspiciously quiet, and for this reason—the enemy also were assembling for an attack on the British lines at that very point where the Second and Fifth Armies were massed to advance on an eight mile front in the direction of Passchendaele. The 45th Bavarian Reserve Division and the 4th Guards Division had just been brought down from Roulers; other divisions were to attack further south. The German objectives were Zonebeke and Polygon
Rain began to fall at zero hour, a strong south-westerly wind sprang up as our barrage, unusually heavy, fell full upon the huddled masses of the Bavarians in their assembly positions. The going was bad and our battalions, finding the enemy in strength met with considerable resistance; there was heavy fighting but later the enemy surrendered freely and the advance continued. Some heavy shells fell about the Wieltje Post causing casualties there, but by 8 a.m., 50 lying and walking wounded had passed through. By 9 a.m. both divisions of IInd Anzac reported capture of their first objectives and were in touch with contiguous troops. At 10, the enemy shelling about the A.D.S. was much more severe but the wounded were coming in freely; a party of 200 German prisoners were employed as bearers to bring down cases by road from Midland Farm. Towards midday the attack on the final objectives beyond the Gravenstafel Spur was in progress. Reports from the bearer relay posts showed that all was going well. There was as yet no news at the A.D.S. of the whereabouts of the R.M.O.'s of 3rd Canterbury and 3rd Otago, although walking wounded were coming in from both battalions. About this time evacuations from the A.D.S. were temporarily held up for want of cars; about 30 stretcher cases awaited removal. The motor ambulance convoy was delayed by the mass of traffic on the only road at our disposal, the Ypres—Kaajev—Gravenstafel road, now densely packed with lines of heavy lorries rumbling up the narrow way, while enemy shelling added to the delay and congestion. At noon, a counter attack was in progress, but it was a spineless affair and easily dispersed by our artillery, no doubt considerable confusion had been caused to the enemy by our unexpected onslaught and the heavy losses inflicted on his massed assault troops by our rolling barrage. By 1 p.m. our brigades were well established in their appointed positions; consolidation was in progress along the whole front, and large numbers of prisoners were coming in, including a battalion headquarters captured intact with all its important documents at Kron Prinz Farm, an elaborate concrete fortress which we were to use to some purpose later.
By this time some 240 stretcher cases, 490 walking and 80 wounded German prisoners of war had passed through the A.D.S. The number of stretcher eases is remarkable, for the carry by hand was now nearly two miles and the number of bearers employed not much over 200. Already 70 per cent. of the total wounded were in. One R.A.P. still remained "in the air" it was
The narrative of the advance of the missing party was not devoid of incident. It starts at zero hour when Captain Barron, N.Z.M.C., of the 3rd Canterbury s and Captain Farris, N.Z.M.C. of the 3rd Otagos lay in shell holes behind the white taped lines on which their battalions were marshalled and where they bad spent an uncomfortable night. The troops moved off a little before zero as they wanted to be clear of the enemy barrage and be well up to their own when it opened. Behind the last wave came the R.M.O.'s with their 32 stretcher bearers marching in single file in four columns some distance apart. Captain Barron's narrative of subsequent events is easy to follow. "It was a misty morning, the ground was fairly hard but the shell holes made the going slow. Our party carried stretchers, a pannier which I had specially fitted up, a box containing extra dressings and a few splints.
By nightfall it was known that our casualties were not heavy. The day had been a very successful one for the British Armies and very costly and disastrous for the enemy. The New Zealand Division had taken 1159 prisoners from four different divisions; the Army had at least 5000 prisoners, and many German dead lay on the conquered ground. Since midday nearly 500 wounded had passed through the A.D.S. At the walking wounded post there was little to be done as the light railways were running the wounded down from Wieltje to Vlamertinghe—about 400 were evacuated in this way—the remainder had been sent down in empty returning lorries during the day. A half ambulance train was run into Ypres during the forenoon, the first to arrive there since 1914; it took away 200 wounded from the southern battlefield. At the corps walking wounded collecting post, the total number of casualties dealt with by No. 4 Field Ambulance was 39 officers, 1944 O.R., including 13 officers, 367 O.R. German wounded prisoners of war. Some congestion resulted at this station which was not well suited to dealing with so large a number of casualties. At midnight all spare bearers were moved up to Spree Farm where Major McCormack now established the main bearer relay post. All posts were clear save Otto Farm, where there were about 30 stretcher cases. The night passed in comparative quiet but heavy rain was falling.
As early as 2 a.m. on the 5th. parties from Spree Farm set out for Otto Farm and by 8 a.m. many wounded had been safely brought in, but the bearers showed signs of the greatest fatigue, their work was hampered by the rain which had fallen during the night. Lieut.-Col. Murray now called up all remaining ambulance personnel; the weather had cleared and it was essential to search the battlefield. By 12 noon the additional bearers arrived at Wieltje. Wounded were coming in slowly, only 38 stretcher cases had been admitted since 8 a.m. An occasional shell fell at intervals about the A.D.S. In the afternoon Colonel McGavin visited the Wieltje station to make arrangements for the relief which was pending. By 6 p.m. all forward posts were reported clear, it had taken full 12 hours to clear Otto Farm; there was two miles of hand carriage which cost three hours of hard trudging to accomplish. The whole journey to Wieltje, three miles, consumed four hours and required relays of 18 men to one stretcher. The day passed quietly enough, and at 8 p.m. the advanced parties of the 2/2 West Riding Field Ambulance had arrived at Wieltje. During the night it was possible to make use of the trench tramways from Bridge House, thus saving a mile
The 6th of October opened with rain and cold winds, all reliefs were completed at an early hour and command of the sector passed to the 49th Division at 10 a.m. Before it was handed over the New Zealand front line had been consolidated. Two almost continuous trenches had been dug across the 2000 yard front of the Division, well down the forward slopes of Abraham's heights, communication trenches were in forward progress, and mule tracks and duckboard tracks had been pushed forward from our old front line. The single road that led forward to Gravenstafel was as yet not practicable for artillery, but work there was in hand; our engineers were laying down a roadway of heavy baulks of timber clamped with iron dogs. All medical personnel returned to unit in the afternoon; the A.D.S. at Wieltje was handed over. The bearer subdivisions were sent out to the reserve area in motor omnibuses for rest and refitting. The divisional headquarters moved back to Watou.
So ended the successful engagement of Gravenstafel where the 4th Brigade fought its first and last battle and won its spurs handsomely on Abraham's heights. It had succeeded because of surprise and because the weather conditions were at least passable, the ground sufficiently hard to permit of reasonable speed in the advance. The artillery support had been most powerful, skilfully directed and under sensitive control. Our losses were in consequence unusually light. The numbers of wounded and sick evacuated by the A.D.M.S. for the period from noon on the 4th to noon on the 7th were: 1326 wounded; 398 sick; say 16 per cent. wounded in the two brigades and including the killed, 20 per cent of casualties. Both the bearer officers, Major McCormack and Captain Addison, M.C., and their bearers worked hard and with untiring energy. Every acre of the pockmarked ground of our advance was searched and without any assistance from infantry—if we except the German prisoners and some help obtained from our Pioneers during the relief—the N.Z.M.C. bearers alone carried to safety over 400 stretcher cases in two days, a remarkable feat if we consider the nature of the terrain, the length of the carries and the almost complete absence of cover until the galleries at Wieltje were reached.
Orders had been issued by the Second Army for a renewal of the attack on the 9th. It seemed there was every prospect of obtaining good results by further exploitation of our successes. The positions so far gained in the St. Julien sector gave excellent observation of the northern end of Passchendaele ridge. Preparations were pushed forward for the final assault of the last bit of high ground now held by the Germans. The other divisions of IInd Anzac, the 49th and 66th were now to be engaged. The 49th Division took over the New Zealand positions and medical arrangements; the A.D.S. remained at Wieltje but Otto Farm became a bearer relay post and two advanced concrete fortresses became the permanent R.A.P.'s: Kron Prinz Farm and Waterloo Farm, both well down on the forward slopes of the Gravenstafel ridge. Meanwhile our tent subdivisions employed in the corps stations remained in position. At the mill at Vlamertinghe alterations were made in the dispositions by the erection of marquees and redistribution of personnel so as to facilitate the work. No. 4 New Zealand Ambulance remained in charge and were assisted by tent subdivisions of other medical units of the Corps.
Some short account of the operations of the 49th Division we must consider momentarily as they form an important prelude to the disastrous situation at Bellevue Spur which was the Waterloo of the New Zealand Division. The morning of the 8th of October was cold and windy, all clocks had been put back during the night so as to revert to winter time. The New Zealand Pioneers and Engineers remained in the battlefield struggling with the roading problem; "corduroy" and fascined ways were laid down; all the stores and material brought up by pack mules. The conditions were only too familiar to New Zealand roadmakers, who quell the stormy seas of mud in our backblocks; home-like conditions, but disquieting. In the morning a good drying wind had cheered them on, but evening fell in desperate weather. In the cold cliché of the Corps diary: "The work of forward communications was behindhand, bad weather, since the 5th, had impeded progress." The usual number of muddy walking wounded struggled through the mill at Vlamertinghe. The attacking troops of the 49th Division were assembling at 6 p.m.; heavy rain fell and continued to fall during a night of intense darkness and boisterous wind. In ground that was now a quagmire, correct adjustment of the assaulting line was a matter of chance, all landmarks were obliterated. The disposition of the medical personnel was somewhat similar to
On the morning of the 9th in fine but windy weather the assaulting brigades of the 49th got away with their barrage but were brought up almost at once by withering machine gun fire from the Bellevue Spur which projected to the north of the sunken road leading up to the highest point of the ridge. Uncut wire flanked the sides of the gentle slope to their right and the steel and concrete walls of the fortresses crowning the Spur, and undamaged by our shells, spluttered with fire from concealed machine guns handled by determined men fighting desperately for the last bit of vantage ground remaining to the Germans on the lost ridges. The British losses were very heavy, the medical situation grave. At least 50 stretcher cases were lying at Waterloo Farm and many others reported to be as yet out in the open. The difficulties were exceptional, the wounded came in as fast as they were cleared; there was a two mile stretch devoid of cover and constantly swept by shell fire. 391 bearers out had brought in only 146 stretcher cases, nearly every stretcher had to be carried three miles by hand over ground in places a foot deep in mud. Infantry were asked for to clear the field but the situation was as yet so uncertain that the troops could not be spared. During the day a steady flow of wet and muddy wounded came to the Mill at Vlarmertinghe: 12 officers and 372 bedraggled men. That night the New Zealand Division was coming in to relieve the 49th.
By 4 a.m. on the 11th the bearers of the 49th Division were exhausted; infantry detailed to assist them owing to a misunderstanding in a telephonic communication, failed to carry out instructions. The evacuations by light railway from Spree Farm and Midland House had not been satisfactory. Trains were erratic, sometimes none for six or seven hours, sometimes three within the hour. The wounded suffered a good deal from cold, lying or sitting in open trucks. The road was impassable for by ammunition limbers and pack mules as to be quite unsuited for stretcher parties or horsed ambulances. At 3 a.m. the railway ceased to work.
At 6.30 a.m. on the 11th, Lieut.-Col. Murray, D.S.O., and Major McCormick, N.Z.M.C., with 60 bearers went up to the A.D.S. at Wieltje to take over, and at 9 a.m. they set out to make a personal reconnaisance. By the trench grid track, they reached Dump House, a bearer relay post, on the Gravenstafel ridge, about 500 yards north of the village site, and half a mile further on, they found Calgary range—whose name dated from Canadian times in 1915—where Captain Benham, R.M.O. to the 2nd N.Z.R.B., had his R.A.P. and a few stretchers awaiting removal. Pushing on to Kron Prinz Farm, a few wounded were located in shell holes on the way up and at this most forward and exposed post, Captain Reid, N.Z.M.C., of the 4th N.Z.R.B., had several cases awaiting evacuation. 12 N.Z.M.C. bearers were left behind and Colonel Murray's party ultimately reached Waterloo Farm about midday. Here they saw a long grey structure, consisting of two armoured concrete compartments surrounded by a litter of broken war material of every description. Captain Venables, N.Z.M.C., attached 2nd Otago was here and reported 50 stretcher cases, mostly of the 49th Division, awaiting bearers, while many more were lying out in pill boxes or shell holes in the vicinity. The situation was very difficult, as Waterloo Farm was in full view, more especially from Bellevue Farm, held by the Germans and about 1000 yards distant on a spur which projected into the valley from Passchendaele ridge. A gentle slope fell down from Gravenstafel to the valley of the Ravebeke or Strombeke, about 1200 yards from Abraham's heights. Both Kron Prinz and Waterloo were well down this slope not far from the muddy stream; both were subject to machine gun fire from the Bellevue fortress. The difficulties of clearing these forward slopes, so open to enemy observation, had been thoroughly appreciated by the Canadians in 1915, as when they held practically the same ground, they were compelled to site their R.A.P.'s in rear of the Gravenstafel Ridge on account of the fact that their front line was strongly dominated by Bellevue Spur; this necessitated long carries for the regimental stretcher bearers. Five hundred yards west of Gravenstafel crest, under cover of its slope a fresh bearer relay post was established by us in a concrete dugout called
The assembly of our two assaulting Brigades, the 2nd and the 3rd, proceeded under untoward circumstances, the ground on the forward slope was exceptionally heavy, the mud, in places knee-deep, retarding progress. Ultimately the Brigades, the Rifles on the left, the 2nd Brigade on the right, lay astride the road to Bellevue. The N.Z.R.B., in front of Kron Prinz Farm across the muddy Ravebeke with a cemetery on the hill in front of them, the 2nd Brigade still on our side of the creek and in part facing the Bellevue Spur and a sunken road to the south of it. Half a mile away to the right of their advance were "water fields," "marsh bottom," "dad trench"—unknown regions yet—but full of fateful possibilities. In the little time at our disposal—the Second Army was anxious to push on—the medical posts were manned and fresh dispositions made. In the right sector Waterloo Farm R.A.P. was served by a relay at Wimbledon, and on the left, Kron Prinz Farm, had a relay at "Dump House" near Calgery Grange, with a larger post at Kansas House in front of Kansas Cross where Captain McGhie, N.Z.M.C., in charge of this sector, was stationed with 56 bearers. Further back along the road, at Somme Redoubt, Major McCormick, in charge of forward evacuations, had a reserve of 56 bearers to be used in common by both sectors. An advanced walking wounded collecting post was under construction at Spree Farm in a large pill box half hidden in the debris of the farm in which it originally had been constructed. Here, Lieut.-Col. Hardie Neil and parties of No. 3 Field Ambulance were busy clearing the ground for the erection of tents which were to be used as a dressing station and a refreshment booth to be worked by our Y.M.C.A. The light railway had now reached this point but the road from Wieltje was negotiable by Ford cars only, with difficulty.
During the evening of the 11th the weather broke; it rained heavily. Patrols of the Otagos had reported much uncut wire along the front of our assaulting positions. This was bad news. It was cold that night, it rained incessantly and an inky darkness fitfully streaked by German star shells, hid the ugliness of the battle landscape. The enemy were uneasy, their artillery fired
Zero hour on the 12th of October, 5.25 a.m. on a cold raw morning; rain was falling. Our barrage opened, weak and patchy—in places it could not be seen at all—many shells failed to explode in the muddy ground. The 3rd Brigade, on the left, whose assembly was complete, advanced with the barrage and fought their way to the cemetery at Wallenmolen, high ground of importance to us and the British Division on our left, but in a short while found the fire of machine guns, protected by chains of uncut wire, so imperious, that they could make no further headway. The unfortunate 2nd Brigade had little protection from the barrage, such as it was: the men groped their way through a swamp against the murderous fire of the Bellevue fortress, till they were forced to lie down in front of a deep zone of standing wire which some heroic souls had partially penetrated. "The horror of the shell hole area of Verdun was surpassed," writes General Ludendorff in his memoirs describing this terminal phase of the Flanders Campaign, "and through a world of mud the attackers dragged themselves slowly and steadily and in dense masses. Caught in the advanced zone by our hail of fire they often collapsed.…Then the mass came on again; rifle and machine gun jammed with mud. Man fought against man." So the 2nd Brigade came on, losing heavily, but made little progress in the slough of the Ravebeke morasses.
By 6 a.m. the walking wounded were slowly coming down; taking the duckwalk tracks they missed the post at Spree Farm, so that it became necessary to collect them at St. Jean as on the 4th. By 8 a.m. stretcher cases were coming in; the going was very heavy, the road impassable beyond Midland Farm. The small Ford cars had difficulty in getting up even to this post. The railway was available as far as Spree Farm, but part of it was under almost continuous shell fire—nevertheless it had to be used. By noon, it was clear that the attack had failed, and that the New Zealand Division, for the first time in its history, had not accomplished its appointed task. The 3rd Brigade had gained some 400 yards, the 2nd Brigade was hung up with heavy losses by a continuous belt of uncut wire not much ahead of its point of departure. The Bellevue fortress grimly overlooked their precarious lines and belched fire from a score of machine guns;
The A.D.M.S. came up to Spree Farm in the afternoon. Trains were infrequent and irregular, but lorries with engineer stores were lumbering up as far as this point. Extra stretchers and blankets were sent up by the A.D.M.S., packed on mules, each mule carrying six stretchers. 400 infantrymen were brought up from the 4th Brigade to act as stretcher bearers. By 4 p.m. the full extent of our losses was becoming clear; from 12 noon to 4 p.m. 78 lying, 214 sitting and 440 walking cases had passed through the A.D.S.; it was estimated that there were still 230 stretcher cases to bring in and that 1200 men would be required to clear the field. The N.Z.M.C. bearers had suffered many casualties—a considerable number gassed—others showed unmistakable signs of exhaustion, and had to be ordered to rest by their officers. It may be remembered that before our own attack commenced, the bearers had been employed during the afternoon and night of the 11th in assisting to clear about 120 stretcher cases of the 49th Division. This undoubtedly hampered their own work on the 12th and dissipated their energy before the assault began. It required six bearers working for six to seven hours to bring one stretcher case the 3,700 yards from the R.A.P.'s to Spree Farm, and when the. squad arrived it was so fatigued as to require several hours rest. The mud, in places, was knee deep, the bearers were frequently bogged and required the assistance of their mates to extricate themselves. At Waterloo
Up to this death trap dragging through a hell of mud came the bearers of the field ambulances. One squad leader,
The enemy showed no inclination to counter attack or to leave his concrete fortress; he, too, was counting his losses and clearing his wounded. Our dispositions for the night were: that each brigade had two battalions only in the front line. As night fell, it was known that we had over a 100 prisoners but that our estimated casualties exceeded 2000. The number of wounded passed through the A.D.S. at Wieltje was only 235 lying, 53 sitting and 460 walking. Walking wounded to the number of 38 officers, 1748 O.R., with many wounded Germans, had been tended by No. 4 Field Ambulance at Vlamertinghe Mill.
It rained heavily during the night; it was intensely cold, but there was "quiet" on the battlefield except for a few gas shells in the forward area. With great expenditure of energy, and in spite of all difficulties, the men in the front line were supplied by carrying parties with water and rations. Extra blankets and water were brought up by the ambulance bearers to the R.A.P.'s. All through the night stretcher parties furnished by the 4th New Zealand and the 147th Brigade of the 49th Division led, in many instances by N.Z.M.C. bearers, struggled
By 10 a.m. on the 13th there were at least 500 bearers working, there was still some shelling in the forward area but stretcher bearers were—by mutual consent—allowed to work in peace close up to the Ravebeke. No other parties were permitted to move on the forward slopes, machine guns and snipers saw to that, but a stretcher was a passport; the mud had made a truce, the enemy were no less busy getting in their own wounded. Reports showed that there were still very many wounded to bring in. The 2nd Brigade had 200 at least at Waterloo Farm, the Rifle Brigade 40 to 50 at Kron Prinz Farm Infantry parties of the reserve Battalions were organised as stretcher bearers to supplement the infantry from the 49th Division. By 4 p.m. only 98 stretcher cases had been brought down to Wieltje in eight hours work but at 5 p.m. a train load of 40 arrived and was followed by others. Up to this time at least 250 infantry had been working along the track to Dump House on the crest and from there through the mud via Calgary to Kron Prinz Farm bringing in with great labour a number of lying cases inadequate to clear the R.A.P. By nightfall some 523 wounded had passed through the A.D.S. during the day; of these over 200 lying. Captain McGhie at Wimbledon, finding it impossible to get more wounded away in the dark, collected all that he could reach and housed them for the night in the dugouts in his neighbourhood. Reports showed that the forward areas were clearing but that there were at least 70 lying wounded at Waterloo Farm of which only 30 could be under cover. Blankets had been carried to the R.A.P.'s by the N.Z.M.C. bearers, the R.M.O.'s did what they could with these coverings.
Early in the morning of the 14th there was heavy shelling on the tracks, both H.E. and gas were used. No doubt the duckboard tracks had been seen by aeroplanes the previous day. The northern track now reached to within half a mile of Kron Prinz Farm and the southern to Abraham's Heights, still very short of Waterloo Farm. These narrow wooden tracks were the only means of approach to our positions and were kept under fire although not subject to direct observation. To clear the battlefield very large numbers of men were required, the A.D.M.S succeeded in getting together about 1000 in all: D.A.C., the N.Z.A.S.C., the N.Z.F.A., N.Z. Engineers, Pioneers and Infantry. By 8 a.m. one party of 100 from the divisional train with 20
The following day, the 15th, the weather improved but the shelling about Spree Farm, the road west of it, and the A.D.S. at Wieltje increased. Frequently the wounded waiting to be lowered by ropes into the mine shaft were wounded again or sometimes killed as they lay on their stretchers in the roadway. About Spree Farm the condition of the road was fantastic; broken transport, bogged guns, dead mules and a welter of jettisoned ammunition flanked the causeway, our only road for wheeled traffic. The German guns were searching for a large howitzer of ours in the neighbourhood. Spree Farm was repeatedly hit. Beyond on the track the infantry were still assisting in clearing the wounded. The ambulance bearers were by now badly done up after nearly 60 hours continuous work; their feet blistered and swollen, a few already showing signs of trench foot; others so severely chafed about the neck and shoulders from the web slings used in carrying stretchers as to be quite unfit for work. Spree Farm was a place to be avoided that afternoon, constant searching by the enemy's heavy guns ultimately led to the explosion of an ammunition dump, causing a large number of casualties in the vicinity. The total number of wounded for that day was much less, only 167 were evacuated, whereas the sick numbered 342.
On the 16th the weather was ever so much better, the road was drying rapidly, but the shelling was as heavy as ever. So severe was it about Spree Farm that the post had to be abandoned by the N.Z.M.C. personnel, who were brought back to the Somme post half a mile nearer the A.D.S. The front, fortunately, was fairly quiet. The 3rd Brigade which had not had adequate rest before Passchendaele, as they had been employed in cable laying, now moved out to the Second Army Reserve area near Lumbres and with them went one section of the 3rd Field Ambulance. The estimated casualties for this brigade were 48 officers, 1164 O.R. killed, missing or wounded.
During the week that followed the relief of the New Zealand Division was gradually completed by the Canadian 3rd Division. The enemy artillery fire on the roads, boarded tracks, and back areas was considerably increased; night bombing was intensified. On the 2lst the bearer relay posts were relieved by personnel of No. 10 Canadian Field Ambulance. The 2nd Brigade accompanied by the 1st Field Ambulance entrained for the rest area and the Corps Walking Wounded Station was handed over by the 4th Field Ambulance to the 11th Canadian Field Ambulance. The following day the 2nd New Zealand Field Ambulance was relieved at Wieltje by the 10th Canadian Field Ambulance. The weather was fine but it rained in the afternoon and in the evening the 4th Brigade and the 4th Field Ambulance entrained at Ypres. The Dental Hospital which had been at Poperinghe during the operations loaded its equipment on two lorries and departed. Command passed to the Canadians, and by the 25th all New Zealand units were in rest, the headquarters at Nielles in the Lumbres area west of St. Omer.
In reviewing these costly operations at Passchendaele, Colonel Begg makes some comments, which, in order to avoid repetition, I have somewhat condensed. "The IInd Anzac Corps during the month made three assaults; on the 4th, the 9th and the 12th. For the attack of the 4th, weather conditions were favourable and little difficulty was experienced in dealing with all casualties. The heavy cars of the divisions in line were put at the disposal of the Officer Commanding the Motor Ambulance Convoy and were employed in evacuating the A.D.S.'s. The system worked quite effectively and the wounded were evacuated in a minimum time. For the second attack on the 9th the conditions were very bad. The roads were congested with traffic and the battlefield converted into a sea of mud. The greatest difficulty was experienced in clearing the wounded; with six men to the stretcher it took five
Colonel Begg invited the A.D.'sM.S. to furnish an appreciation of a scheme whereby an addition of 200 stretchers and 500 blankets to their existing divisional supplies, could be made to suffice for operations extending over 21 days. Colonel Begg goes on to say that there was difficulty in dealing with slightly gassed men as it was impossible to determine the severity of the case. Gas had thrown open a wide door for malingering, and the undoubted severity of late complications following a condition,
Casualties passed through corps dressing stations from 6 a.m. 4th October, to 6 a.m, 18th October 1917:—Stretcher cases: 231 officers, 4,412 O.R.; walking wounded: 131 officers, 6,831 O.R: totals: 362 officers, 11,243 O.R. The total number of gassed was 12 officers, 424 O.R.
Colonel McGavin in his report on the operations emphasised, the fact that when the Division took over from the 49th Division on the 11th there was no time to carry out protective work at medical posts. The time at his disposal was sufficient only to reconnoitre the sector, man the posts and equip them with the necessary medical supplies. He points out that the night of the 11th was occupied in bringing in over 120 stretcher cases of the outgoing division, and that this preliminary work exhausted the N.Z.M.C. bearers before the actual assault took place. "For a time," he says, "the railway service was not in operation, which compelled the hand carriage of certain wounded over a distance of 6100 yards from Kron Prinz Farm to Wieltje, the greater part of the route under shell fire and with mud in places four feet deep. The advanced walking wounded collecting post at Spree Farm, owing to increasing shell fire hardly fulfilled its purpose." On the very important question of stretcher and blanket supplies to the front line Colonel McGavin says:—"The number of relay posts necessitated by the abnormally long and difficult carry increased the number of stretchers required, as large reserves had to be maintained at these posts. The rain and mud necessitated a frequent change of blankets at the relay posts and the A.D.S.; so that instead of three blankets, each patient required six or nine. The supply of stretchers required depends largely on the number of relay posts established. In these operations, owing to the abnormal conditions, the bearers rapidly became exhausted, and at night easily lost their way." The conditions existing, therefore, necessitated many relay posts, at each of which a number of stretchers had to be maintained to
The condition of the wounded brought in during the operations of the 4th were favourable, but very unsatisfactory during the succeeding battles. There was a high proportion of wounds caused by machine gun fire. Penetrating wounds of the abdomen and thorax appeared to be less numerous than usual, but fractures of the lower limbs were much more frequently observed. Trench foot was noted in many cases that had been long lying out in isolated shell holes, and gas gangrene was prevalent, especially in the wounded of the 49th Division, some of whom had been exposed for several days. Of the corps dressing stations, the opinion of the A.D.M.S. as to their functions and utility must be duly weighed. He says in his report:—"There was congestion at the corps walking wounded collecting station on the 4th owing to slowness in dressing. It appeared that cases were dressed unnecessarily, especially as they had only just been dressed at the divisional walking wounded collecting post. The C.M.D.S. was well managed but I am still unable to understand what advantage is gained by interposing a corps walking wounded post and a corps M.D.S. between the A.D.S. and the C.C.S.'s. The corps
To enlarge the C.C.S.'s by reinforcing them with the medical officers and other ranks withdrawn from the corps stations, which could be eliminated and to provide a clerical staff from the divisions for the purpose of making records in a bureau adjacent to the C.C.S., would effect a considerable economy in transport, material, personnel, and would, I believe, gave many a life or limb." This opinion of the A.D.M.S., written at the time, based on his experiences at Messines and Passchendaele, demands careful consideration.
In attempting to estimate the casualties sustained during the two operations near Passchendaele, we must first consider the actual number of New Zealand wounded handled by the corps medical units during the period. First, the battle at Gravenstafel: The D.D.M.S. reports that during the period, 3rd to 7th October, the total New Zealand wounded admitted was: 40 officers; 1140 O.R.—figures which approximated to those given in the returns furnished by the A.A. and Q.M.G., namely: 1077 wounded; 80 missing.
During the period 13th to 18th October, which covers the days of the Passchendaele operation, the following report of
For the first operation at Gravenstafel the proportion of lying to walking wounded was as 37.5 per cent. to 62.5 per cent., whereas during the Passchendaele battle the proportions were: lying, 27 per cent., walking, 66 per cent. At Messines, out of a total of 3126 wounded passed through the A.D.S. at Kandahar Farm, 40 per cent. were walking cases, 36 per cent. lying. It will be easier to compare these figures by a glance at the following table:—
Transport facilities were exceptionally good at Messines, hence the smaller proportion of walking cases. At Gravenstafel, transport was adequate, the figures representing the norms in all probability; whereas at Passchendaele transport facilities were very bad, hence the smaller number of lying cases. By comparing the figures we arrive at the conclusion that in these battles, characterised by good, fair, and inadequate means of evacuation, about one-third of the wounded required transport on stretchers, while much more than a half could walk a considerable distance to evacuating points and less than 20 per cent. required sitting accommodation.
The casualties in the N.Z.M.C. for the two engagements were not so heavy as at the Somme, but the period of work in the battlefield was of shorter duration. The killed
During October our losses from sickness were over one-third of the losses in wounded: the average sickness wastage of the Division during the month was 12.4 per 1000 per week, reaching the sinister proportion of 19 per 1000 per week during the last 7 days of the month, when the Division was in rest. This rapid increase in sickness wastage was due partly to the inclement weather, partly to exhaustion caused by the very arduous nature of the operations. The Second Army rate of wastage by sickness during October averaged 10 per 1000 per week: generally, sickness wastages in Army and Division were higher than at the Somme. For the period extending from the 30th of September to the 27th of October, no less than 1392 New Zealand sick were evacuated from the C.C.S.'s to general hospitals; the sickness was serious, therefore; and if we add the sickness wastage to the computed battle casualties we find that the Division lost near 7,500 men during the month. By these losses the Division had reached such a degree of exhaustion as to render it temporarily unfit for further active operations; added to the weakness caused by fatigue, sickness and depleted numbers was a generally felt depression consequent upon our lack of success at Passchendaele and a certain dimming of ardour from which the Division was slow to recover.
After a few weeks rest, during which very large numbers of sick were evacuated daily to the New Zealand Stationary Hospital, the Division received orders to relieve the 21st Division and to take over ground recently held by Ist Anzac south of Passehendaele. The Divisions forming IInd Anzac Corps remained the same: the 49th, the 66th, and the New Zealand Division. By 13th November the 4th Brigade battalions were taking over the line, the remaining brigades entraining in the rest area. Command of the sector passed to the New Zealand Division on 16th November, divisional headquarters being at Chateau Ségard in a hutted camp south of Ypres; the bulk of the troops in camps situated in the neighbourhood of Poperinghe and Dickebusch. The sector of defence of 2500 yards comprising two subsectors, each held by a brigade, extended from a small stream, the Reutelbeke, some 1200 yards north of Gheluvert on the Menin road, to a road junction to Reutel a mile south of Broodseinde on the main road Passchendaele-Becelaere. On our front three spurs projected into the valley in front of Becelaere. Our posts lay across these spurs separated by valleys in which small streams ran in a south easterly direction. The southernmost spur was the most elevated, and at its eastern extremity still afforded a slender footing to German troops in the ruins of the Polderhoeck chateau. Our front line consisted of a series of shell-hole outposts, with machine guns covering the undefended intervals; the support line comprised a chain of organised localities linked up by a continuous travel trench; the reserve line, the main position, some 1200 yards from the outposts was held as a continuous line of defence. No Mans' Land was very wide; a condition of semi-open warfare existed. The weather was fine, the ground very muddy, but the sandy subsoil of the new sector was advantageous, as the mud was not so tenacious as that in the heavy clay lands about Passchendaele. In rear of the divisional front was the Polygon de Zillebeke, Polygon Wood, now a muddy pock-marked space jagged with broken tree stumps; within the wood there had been a racing track and, at the northern extremity, the Butte de Polygon, a rifle butt of unusual height—of all this the wood, the track, the Butte—only the latter remained
The evacuation of wounded from this sector hinged upon the A.D.S. at the École de Bienfaisence near the Menin gate of Ypres, an historic medical post. It was a M.D.S. during the first battle of Ypres, then an imposing quadrangle of brick buildings of handsome design and solid structure, previously used as an Industrial or Reformatory School for boys, but ever since September, 1914, as a dressing station. Lopped, maimed, and battered by three years of intermittent bombardments it still preserved a trace of its original structure and the stout cellars, now fortified and protected, continued to give shelter to the wounded and their attendants. The 3rd Field Ambulance in charge of wounded evacuations for the divisional front, took over the École, and Lieut.-Col. Hardie Neil assumed command of the bearers detached from the other ambulances. As the building was still subject to artillery fire, work was put in hand by parties of N.Z.E. assisted by N.Z.M.C. bearers in order to improve shelter, to drain the cellars which were liable to flooding, and to strengthen the vaults and dugouts. In the main cellar a well planned dressing room was furnished with every necessary for the comfort and immediate treatment of the wounded, including a liberal supply of oxygen cylinders, and it may be said that this A.D.S. realised all the ideals of perfected organisation which had been evolved during three years of position warfare. The A.D.S. served 4 R.A.P.'s each approached by duckboard walks and as a rule situated in or adjacent to the support line. The bearer relay posts were four in number; one in the southern sector, at Clapham Junction, a point of convergence of many plank walks, on the Menin road about a mile east of Hooge, where there was a detail of two medical officers and 41 O.R. N.Z.M.C.; the second bearer relay was at Hooge Tunnel half a mile ahead of the village site; a third, in the large crater at Hooge. The wounded were carried down by hand along the duckboard tracks to Hooge crater or to Westhoeck where the fourth bearer relay post was stationed at a car post, where there was a loading point for motor ambulance waggons. The route lay along the Menin pavé past Burr Cross road and Hell Fire
Medical and surgical matters of first importance were under consideration at the close of 1917. The year had been notable for a great advance in the surgical treatment of the wounded in front line units. During the Flanders Campaign the staff and equipment of the C.C.S.'s had been doubled, each now had 24 medical officers and manned eight operating tables; the added personnel was derived from the United States Medical Service, comprising many of America's best known surgeons, and surgeons drawn from the Colonial Forces. During the rest periods of the Division, officers from our ambulances were attached to surgical teams with which they worked until recalled at the resumption of operations. In the three and a half months of fighting that followed the 31st July, the total wounded numbered 196,000; of which 60,000, or 30 per cent., were operated on under anaesthetics at the C.C.S.'s where, now, all that was necessary in decisive surgical treatment could be accomplished. The advance of military surgery during the war was an epitome of modern surgical progress since the days of Lister. First, antiseptics to combat the long forgotten suppurations of war wounds that confronted the surgeon in the early battlefields; next physiological methods of wound treatment; lastly, the surgical removal of all damaged tissues with the use of antiseptic pastes, aiming at primarily suture—all efforts at first directed to combatting infection. The next step was the improvement of methods of splinting and fixation in which the Thomas splint was pre-eminent. Lastly came the fight against shock. A study of traumatic or wound shock had been carried out during the past four months by a body of British and American workers in the First Army area; the deductions and working recommendations of this committee were rapidly disseminated throughout the Armies, and -gr. was recommended, as was the intravenous transfusion of 6 per cent. gum acacia in normal saline with the object of raising the blood pressure. On all these matters special instructions were issued and the recommendations became Army Orders.
Another matter of medical importance was the increase in gas casualties. Mixtures of phosgene and mustard gas—some said a new type of gas smelling of sulphuretted hydrogen—were frequently used by the enemy artillery. On the night of the 16/17th November there was a heavy bombardment of our back areas with mixed gases, the "shoot" opened at 11 p.m. and continued until 2 a.m., not without casualties. This type of gas attack, in which there was concentration on limited areas, was now much used by the Germans and realised very material results. Special instructions were issued, the intention of which was to secure earlier evacuation of all slightly gassed men and a greater care in handling this class of casualty and their clothing, so as to minimise ill effects to the attendants.
Trench foot was frequently seen in the later part of November. During the year ending 31st October, 1917, some 147 New Zealand soldiers were evacuated from the Division for trench foot. The precautions adopted during this period had comprised the use of whale oil frictions to the feet, a daily supply of dry socks and the issue of rubber boots when in the trenches; dry standings were provided as far as possible in forward positions, and hot drinks and food were regularly supplied to front line troops at night. During the coming winter Colonel Begg had determined to enforce the camphor method of prophylaxis, in use in the French army, and already very favourably commented on by the New Zealand Stationary Hospital. The new method included the issue of camphor soap for foot washing, and a camphor borax dusting powder to be used daily with the dry socks provided. The application of whale oil was to be discontinued. In order that the new method of prophylaxis—which is highly efficient against ordinary chilblains—should be well understood by all, a chiropodist from one of the ambulances was, at this time, attached to each bathing establishment, his duties being to supervise the application of the camphor soft soap and the dusting powder and, generally, to attend to any faulty conditions in the bathers' feet. At a time when regular foot inspections could not be carried out with any degree of thoroughness in the battalions, such inspection by a skilled N.Z.M.C. chiropodist was very valuable, especially so for the large detached parties in the camps away from their battalions, who were deprived of the services of the chiropodists, now permanently with the troops in front line and made responsible for the prophylaxis of trench foot. At the baths all must pass the inspection of the N.Z.M.C. chiropodist in attendance, and all had the benefit of his services. The experience of trench foot which the Division had at Passchendaele showed that the puttee was a contributing factor in causation. A contemporary divisional report on the "Lessons to be learnt from recent operations," has the following pertinent paragraph:—"Under conditions such as those prevailing on October 12th and subsequent days, it is a question whether puttees should not be left off before troops go into the line. There appears to be little doubt that the constriction of the leg caused by the contraction of the puttee contributed largely to the occurrence of trench foot, as the average puttee contracts 3½ inches in length when wet. It was frequently observed in advanced medical posts that the puttees of the wounded were very tight and that the feet were visibly swollen, even with the
About the time of taking over in the new sector it was noted that the divisional wastage by sickness was extraordinarily high; the mean strength was about 18,700, the sickness wastage averaged 12.8 per 1000 per week evacuated out of army area, whereas the average Second Army rate was 9.1 per 1000 per week: a very unusual rate of wastage. The other two divisions of the corps showed equally high wastage which must be attributed to hardships endured during the Passchendaele operations. Other causes operating in the New Zealand Division were:—an outbreak of rose measles traceable to reinforcements who acquired the infection at Etaples where it was endemic. A few cases had been reported in September and October, but during the rest period, in consequence of crowding in close billets and inclement weather, the disease became general, and the height of the epidemic was reached about the middle of December. Another source of wastage was scabies and the various skin diseases complicating it. Trench fever was disabling an ever increasing number, and trench foot as we have seen, helped to swell the list. The principal sources of sickness wastage on the Western Front could now be attributed to faulty personal hygiene. Of the intestinal disorders, hitherto so fruitful a source of disability in previous wars, there was little left save an occasional sporadic outbreak of dysentery during the late summer months, easily controlled and never very important as a menace to the efficiency of the armies. Far otherwise was it with P.U.O. or trench fever: always prevalent, easily contracted, and difficult to eradicate, where so many men habitually harboured the intermediate host now proved to be the louse. A most powerful waster of armies was trench fever, as it often resulted in prolonged unfitness for active service and as it could be fought only by means of the divisional cleansing stations. But the perfected ritual of personal disinfestation and the efficient cleansing of the clothing were not as yet fully elaborated, the fact that the body louse
Scabies, with its crippling skin infections, was another disease rife in the Division and added a considerable volume to the flow of invalids from the army area. The disease could be easily detected and the skin complications observed in the bathing establishments, but the treatment was difficult and the complications most refractory. Impetigo, furunculosis, and local abscesses or glandular infections, caused serious gaps in the fighting line; a source of wastage needing control by early segregation, efficient treatment and, again, sterilization of clothing and blankets, in this instance best carried out by means of the Clayton S.O. Official History of the War. Hygiene, p. 9.2 disinfectors now attached to the baths. The Army Cleansing Station had now become a key position in the conflict against parasitic invasions: Colonel Soltau is of opinion that no less than 50 per cent. of the total admissions of sick were due to diseases caused by dirt or body parasites, and were preventable by enforcing hygiene of the person and clothing, he writes: "What was wanted was more baths, more laundries, more vermin destroyers, and more adequate provisions to ensure that the soldier had the opportunity of using them."
In spite of all preventive efforts, except in the periods of heavy fighting, the sick of the New Zealand Division and of the British armies, always outnumbered the wounded. A return of officers and O.R. pensioned in England for disabilities from the outbreak of the war to the 30th November, 1917, showed that while 43 per cent, of the total were pensioned by wounds or other injuries received while on service, 55 per cent. were discharged on pension because of disease. Preventable disease in warfare, not only does it increase the total of human sufferings and prejudice the conduct of war, but what is of greater consequence, it is productive of moral and material effects on the welfare of the race much more detrimental than those attributable to wounds honourably won in the battlefield.
December was cold with hard frosts. The early days of the month saw the Division engaged in a minor operation about
General Plumer and the Second Army Headquarters went to Italy on the 20th the New Zealand Division passing into the command of the Fourth Army. Our second Christmas Day in France was exceptionally cold, snow fell in the evening. The day passed quietly except for an affair of patrols: a small party of 20 attempted to raid one of our posts, but was driven back, leaving in our hands a prisoner—a lad of 20—batman to the platoon commander. Turkeys and plum puddings were provided for the men out of the line, and there was a grand dinner followed by a concert at the divisional rest station. For the German troops there was no Christmas cheer—so our Intelligence informed us—their bread ration had been recently augmented;
We must now leave the Division in their winter trenches in order to glance down the New Zealand lines of communication; the longest, surely, of any British force operating on the Western Front. Our point of departure will be the travelling Medical Board which had been provided by the Division for the purpose of classifying the large numbers of category men accumulated in France during our two year's campaigning and who were employed on a variety of duties in rear of the front line: some at divisional headquarters, others at corps headquarters, some at the stationary hospital and the remainder at the base at Étaples. The Board held monthly sittings at each of these places. The usual procedure was that "C" class men were evacuated to England for repatriation to New Zealand, no "B" class were permitted to leave France, but were detailed for employment at the various points enumerated. The members of the Board, appointed in June. 1917, were: Lieut.-Col. Murray, D.S.O., N.Z.M.C., with Major Guthrie, M.C., N.Z.M.C. and Capt. W. Aitken, M.C., N.Z.M.C. The supervision of the Board was in the hands of Colonel Begg, D.D.M.S., to whom all reports were furnished. An abridged form, N.Z.M. 6 had been devised by N.Z.E.F. Headquarters in London, with the approval of the War Office, it furnished all the necessary information required and was now in use by the Board. In this way co-ordination in the important matter of classification and invaliding Boards and Pensions assessment was attempted.
The fact that the Commander-in-Chief of the N.Z.E.F. was. at the same time a British Corps Commander in France, even though dissociated from the so-called Anzac Group, did not prejudice co-ordination of administration; although seemingly an inconvenient arrangement, yet, through the capacity for work of General Godley and the harmonious cooperation of the G.O.C. in Charge Administration it proved workable and efficient. But it may be said, generally, that coordination of the medical services in France and in England, was to a certain extent prejudiced by the administrative situation. The N.Z.M.C. in England being under the direct control of the
Interchange of medical officers between the field and the United Kingdom base units, was desirable in many ways, more especially in the case of some junior officers who were hastily qualified at the outbreak of war in order to Join the Main Body and on whose behalf the University authorities in New Zealand were pressing for post graduate training in the base hospitals. Such interchange was difficult to arrange satisfactorily because of the not unnatural disinclination of the N.Z.M.C. higher staff in France to part with experienced officers, or to accept in exchange from the base senior officers who had no previous experience of field work. Promotions, at the U.K. Base were perforce influenced by professional attainments, which were of less value with the Division than war wise knowledge. The difficulties of the problem were not made any easier by the medical administrative conditions already outlined.
The New Zealand Stationary Hospital, at Wisques fully staffed, by the energy of their personnel had considerably improved the establishment by the erection of huts and an elaborate roading and drainage scheme. There were 700 beds available and a further expansion to 1000 beds was in course of completion. The class of patient admitted, now in greater numbers than ever before in the history of the unit, consisted largely of the N.Y.D.N. type, but there was also a considerable volume of admissions for P.U.O. and respiratory infections. Pending the completion of the operating theatre and X-ray room no large number of surgical cases could be admitted, but there was every prospect of completing this necessary work early in 1918. At the end of the year Lieut-Col. O'Neil, D.S.O., relinquished command of the unit, proceeding to England on duty; he was replaced by Lieut.-Col. Hand Newton, N.Z.M.C., late commanding the New Zealand Mounted Brigade Field Ambulance in Palestine.
At the base at Étaples, there were in September some 6650 New Zealand reinforcements, but in November many were temporarily held up by quarantine on account of measles; the N.Z.M.C. reinforcements, of which the divisional medical units
In England the year 1917 had witnessed a great improvement in the administration of our medical services and a notable expansion and perfection of the arrangements for handling the very large numbers of our sick and wounded arriving from France. The medical headquarters in Bloomsbury Square now comprised:—the D.M.S., Colonel Parkes, C.M.G., N.Z.M.C; the A.D.M.S.,
A most important rectification in the methods of boarding temporarily and permanently unfit men of the N.Z.E.F. had been brought about by establishing uniformity of the procedure of Invaliding Boards, and by bringing the classifications of the Travelling Board in France into harmony with the categories in use in England. A standing Medical Board was established under the presidency of Lieut.-Col. Acland, N.Z.M.C., the consulting surgeon, who making his headquarters at No. 2 N.Z.G.H. had handed over the surgical division of No. 1 N.Z.G.H. to Major T. M. D. Stout, D.S.O., N.Z.M.C., Lieut.-Col. Acland also presided over the standing invaliding boards which were constituted at the Depots by the addition of the Commandant and the S.M.O.: the inclusion of a combatant officer as a member of the Board being considered an advantage. By these means uniformity in boarding, classification and invaliding was attained.
A Discharge Depot had been established at Torquay, to which all those found to be permanently unfit, were drafted, but owing to the dearth of overseas transport, this unit, although relieving the pressure in the hospitals, was itself usually much overcrowded. During the quarter ending July 31st, 1917, no less than 599 officers and men were repatriated to New Zealand from this unit. There were two medical officers stationed at the depot, of which Captain H. A. Davies, N.Z.M.C., was S.M.O.
But it was chiefly in the general hospitals that the most important changes were evolving: with the increase in knowledge of military surgery, and the final triumph over the problem of the infected wound, attention was now being directed more particularly to specialisation. Orthopœdics, physiotherapy, plastic surgery, and psycho-therapy were becoming more widely practised and demanded an increase of medical staff with specialised training. During the first six months of the year there had been a chronic shortage of medical officers and trained N.Z.M.C. orderlies, made necessary by the demands of the 4th Field Ambulance in part, and partly by the increase in the number of medical units in England. Expansion of hospital accommodation in order to meet the greatly increased flow of casualties expected during the Flanders Campaign was the first necessity, and as the summer and autumn yielded its thousands of patients, the accommodation steadily increased, but was not, in October and November, sufficient for all New Zealand casualties, as 1500 patients had to overflow to British hospitals. On 30th November, 1917, the New Zealand hospitals accommodated 141 officers, 4441 other ranks, and there was a total of near 6000 New Zealand wounded and sick in the hospitals in England including our own; yet during that month no less than 2799 unfit men had been evacuated to New Zealand by hospital ships and by ordinary transports or direct liner. The numbers to be handled were considerable then: the total for the year exceeded 14,000 sick and wounded evacuated from France, of which 44 per cent. were invalided as permanently unfit for service, while the remainder required at least six months hospital treatment, convalescence, and training before rejoining the Division.
No. 2 New Zealand General Hospital at Walton-on-Thames had now expanded to 1530 beds, huts had taken the place of tents, the Mt. Felix Mansion had been appropriated for wards, and a new operating theatre an X-ray room and a laboratory had been erected in the grounds. A special "jaw" department under Major Pickerell, N.Z.M.C., Professor of Dental Surgery at the
At No. 1 New Zealand General Hospital, Brockenhurst, under the able administration of Colonel Wylie, C.M.G., N.Z.M.C., many beneficial changes had taken place and the accommodation was much increased. A neurological centre was established at Balmer Lawn under the direction of Major Marshal McDonald, N.Z.M.C., who had acquired a wide experience of the psycho-neuroses of war and neurological conditions generally during his service with the French Army in 1916 and 1917. To this centre all "functional" cases were transferred and the results attained were attracting appreciative attention. More arresting from the surgeon's point of view, however, was the first institution of an orthopœdic department at Brockenhurst. With the great advances made in the after treatment of injuries, in which Sir Robert Jones was a pioneer, and the provision of special military orthopœdic hospitals in London, Liverpool and elsewhere, the New Zealand Hospitals were keeping step. Provision had been made by the D.M.S. for the special training in British units of New Zealand surgeons, and at Brockenhurst already there were the elements of a military orthopœdic hospital with its physio-therapy and plaster departments, splint shops and curative workshops, all of which were much perfected in 1918. But Brockenhurst had now become the orthopœdic centre of the New Zealand Medical Service in the United Kingdom. Already representations had been made to the D.G.M.S. in New Zealand to make similar provisions for the after care of the wounded, as certain medical officers returning to the Home Base were to be available for the formation of orthopœdic departments.
Consequent upon the submarine warfare and the frequent interruptions of the Havre-Southampton Ferry Service, the inward flow of patients to Brockenhurst was, at times, very irregular.
Up to December, 1917, some 7862 patients had been admitted and discharged during the year, and of these, no less than 1303 came in June during the Messines rush, and 1451 during October following Passchendaele. It is stated on good authority that the wounded from Messines were being admitted at Walton within a few hours of the assault; the maximum of 1491 beds was filled within a few days and the excessive work thus entailed in both hospitals caused severe strain on the staff. Owing to the exclusion of British wounded from our two large general hospitals and the fact that they served one division only, at times in a quiet sector, at times engaged in costly fighting, the admissions were so irregular as to necessitate breathless spells of work during active operations and comparative inactivity at other times. But the policy of having our own hospitals justified itself for administrative reasons as well as for the added comforts it provided for our men, to whom a New Zealand Hospital seemed more like home.
At the Convalescent Hospital, at Hornchurch, which now had a capacity of 1,900 beds a very complete Physio-Therapy Department had been established under the direction of two medical officers and a staff of 18 masseuses and masseurs. No less than 30 massage couches were available, with whirlpool baths, mechanotherapy apparatus, radiant heat and light baths, all accommodated in suitable quarters where 400 cases could receive treatment daily. The Y.M.C.A. had also fitted up vocational workshops, wherein a variety of useful crafts were taught. Owing to the growing shortage of foodstuffs in England a small area of land about Hornchurch was put under intensive cultivation for vegetable growing and some attempt was made both here and at the other hospitals to rear domestic animals, pigs, fowls and rabbits, whereby to increase the daily rations.
In the Salisbury Plain group of units No. 3 New Zealand General Hospital, at Codford, was so remote from the ordinary routes of evacuations from France and had so few beds—which hardly sufficed for our own and the British sick of the immediate district—that it had no admissions by convoy. Much representation to Southern Command had so far failed in increasing the hutted accommodation so as to make the complement of beds up to 500. Attached to this hospital was the Venereal Disease Section, a very important department which, as it was a Detention Hospital, enclosed in barbed wire and supplied with a guard, had been at first attached to the Command Depot for rations and discipline. Admissions varied between 30 and 50 a week, the
At the Command Depot, numbering some 2000 men on the strength, Major Bernau, N.Z.M.C. had replaced Lieut.-Col. Pearless, N.Z.M.C. as S.M.O. Additional medical officers were now attached and under Major Bernau's direction classification was brought to a closer discrimination. By means of a card system, each man's status and an epitome of his history was recorded, which simplified the sorting process considerably. The opening of the Discharge Depot had relieved this unit of a congestion of "C" class men, which was very desirable. Physical training was now energised and having in view a possible shortage in man power, a vigorous campaign of combing out was initiated.
At the Infantry Base Training Depot at Sling, there was usually over a brigade strength in four battalions corresponding to the territorial regiments in France. The Rifle Brigade section, 2000 strong was moving towards the end of 1917 into a separate camp
Reinforcements for the N.Z.M.C. had heretofore been concentrated at Sling where there were few facilities for training, but in October it was decided to transfer them to a special depot established at Eweshot in part of the hutted camp occupied by the N.Z.F.A. Reserves. At its inception, the N.Z.M.C. Depot had a strength of 2 officers, 77 O.R. Major A. V. Short, M.C., N.Z.M.C., late D.A.DM.S of the Division was the first commandant; an admirable choice, as this distinguished young officer had gained a very wide and varied experience during his three years continuous service in the field His syllabus of training and his methods of instruction, more especially his insistence on hospital training and concentration on gas defensive measures, and the best methods of protecting medical aid posts against artillery fire, made the course both novel and eminently practical. To the Cambridge Hospital at Aldershot, nearby, he sent his orderlies in rotation
Through the generosity of Mr. and Mrs. C. A. Knight, a New Zealand Officers' Convalescent Home had been established at the end of 1915, which was at first controlled by Matron Reynolds, N.Z.A.N.S., but with increasing needs, the establishment was so enlarged in 1917, as to accommodate 40 officers. A medical officer, Major Bernau, was placed in charge of the home, and was succeeded, later, by Captain Chisholm, N.Z.M.C.
In all our hospitals and depots, luxurious recreation halls, clubs and canteens provided with billiard tables, cinemas, and a variety of other means of amusement had been provided by the New Zealand Y.M.C.A. and the New Zealand War Contingent Association, whose staffs of voluntary workers, both ladies and gentlemen, bent every kindly effort towards the task of comforting and helping the sick and wounded with unfailing energy and sympathy. Of special worth was the venture of the War Contingent Association in establishing a hostel in London where men on leave from France could find a home and live under agreeable conditions at a nominal cost. In this work, the administrative capacity and energising activities of a New Zealand gentleman, The late Sir Robert Nolan. K.B.E.
The results of treatment in the New Zealand Hospitals in 1917, showed that 58 per cent. of the sick and wounded evacuated from France, could be made fit for active service again; that less than 1 per cent. died of wounds and that over 40 per cent. required repatriation to New Zealand. Of the latter it was estimated that at least one-third could ultimately be returned fit for general service after a period ranging between six and twelve months treatment and rest; but only a very insignificant fraction of those repatriated were classified in New Zealand as fit for overseas drafts. The repatriation to New Zealand of the temporarily or permanently unfit soldiers of the N.Z.E.F. was carried out by ordinary transports, direct liners or by the New Zealand hospital ships. During the month of November, 1917, the transports Mokoia, Tainui, and Ruahine left England carrying Maheno and Marama, had their regular sailings from New Zealand to Avonmouth, the round trip outwards and home consuming three months.
The Maheno. the first to be commissioned, had accommodation for over 400 patients, the Marama the larger of the two, carried as many as 565 patients in July and August, 1917, through the Panama Canal. As this hospital ship was the last to arrive in New Zealand in 1917, we may recall briefly the salient events of this her 5th commission, as the voyage and her operations were typical of other commissions of the New Zealand hospital ships. Under the command of Marama sailed from New Zealand on 22nd September, 1917, reaching Albany on 3rd October and called at Capetown on the 20th where 18 officers, 2 Q.U.A.I.M.N.S. and 480 O.R., British sick and wounded, were embarked for English ports. The medical staff on board consisted of 6 officers; 1 adjutant and quartermaster; a dental officer; and 76 O.R., N.Z.M.C. To this complement eight R.A.M.C. orderlies were added to assist with a draft of 50 mental cases embarked and who required close attention. Leaving the Cape on the 24th October, Avonmouth was reached without mishap on the 11th of November. Disembarkation was completed in some four and a half hours which was considered to be slow. Ten days later the New Zealand patients were coming aboard: 23 officers, 2 N.Z.A.N.S., and 522 O.R.; the ship sailing at 10 p.m. on the same day. Colon was sighted on the 5th of December; here representatives of the American Red Cross Society, officers of the Civil and Military Departments and sympathetic friends visited the ship and made arrangements for the entertainment of such of the patients as were fit to go ashore. Many gifts were distributed to the cot cases remaining and the most generous and enthusiastic hospitality was dispensed by the U.S. colony. At Balboa the British Ambassador, Marama steamed out into the Pacific and, calling at lonely Pitcairn Island, finally reached Auckland Harbour on December 28th. 1917. It was at this time customary for hospital ships and transports to anchor off Rangitoto for some hours prior to disembarkation at the wharf at Auckland. During this interval important Marama was visited by His Excellency the Governor, Marama reached on January 1st 1918, the voyage having lasted 100 days, during which the ship had transported over 1000 patients. The Maheno commanded by the Hon. Colonel Collins, C.M.G., leaving England in December, and carrying 410 patients, was due to arrive in New Zealand just one month later. Over her long lines of communication New Zealand was transporting her soldiers at a net average cost of 14/1 per ton, including hospital ships whereas the B.E.F. rate paid by Australia was 15/2 and the rate paid by the United States 'under her charters was £1 12s. 2d. per ton; and again the liability of the New Zealand Government, in the event of loss of a vessel, was less by 16 per cent. than under Imperial charters, so that the Dominion could claim not only the longest lines of communication of any British force engaged in the Great War, but could also boast of the cheapest rates of transportation.
By the end of the year, 1917, New Zealand had despatched to overseas forces in all, 88,221 soldiers, of whom 11,487 had been killed or had died as the result of sickness or accidental injuries and 14,141 had returned to New Zealand. Of the returned soldiers, 11,675 had been discharged from the service and of this number 1,167 had been found unfit on arrival at overseas bases
The environment of the two large reinforcement camps was vastly improved: the new camp at Featherston was well planned and gave hutted accommodation to 7000 troops under the most favourable conditions, while Trentham had restricted its population to 3000, and in both camps, which now represented a capital value of half a million pounds, good roading, drainage, and cheerful Institutes made for greater comfort: while a certain attractiveness had been added by the cultivation of gardens and ornamental grounds, mainly about the vicinity of the camp hospitals. In marked contrast to previous years, the health of the reinforcements in training during 1917, had been excellent: in all, some 36,191 men had passed through the camps—the average population being about 10,000—and there had been 4,104 admissions to hospitals, giving a constantly sick rate of 12.49 per 1000 per annum, as against 19.59 in 1916; a rate comparing very favourably with that of the British army in 1913, which was 23.53 per 1000. The deaths from all causes numbered 30. A mortality rate of 1.2 per 1000 for the total reinforcements, or, more closely computed, as far as is possible with a floating population, 3.8 per thousand of the mean strength, a rate considerably lower than that of civilian adults of a like age. A most gratifying success had attended the persevering efforts of the sanitary officers: epidemic diseases had been wiped out of the camps; only 14 admissions for pneumonia had been recorded as against 91 in the previous year; and 13 cases of cerebro-spinal meningitis as compared with 107 in 1916, when the total admissions by infectious diseases numbered 1,574, whereas in 1917, they had fallen to 62. The chief difficulties encountered in previous years had been the susceptibility of the incoming recruits, and the rapid spread of catarrhal infections amongst
The preventive measures adopted to meet the danger were no less thorough and drastic than they were ultimately successful. The most important precaution was the segregation of all new recruits in special encampments for a full month of quarantine prior to admission to the training section. A Spartan simplicity and rigour was enforced in the segregation camps where the men were sheltered in I.P. tents with floor boards and boarded sides—a type of tent much more familiar to the bushman than the circular tent—and the number of inmates in each tent was jealously limited. The canteens and institutes were "open air" in type, and as the A.D.M.S. Sanitary, Lieut.-Col. McGill, N.Z.M.C. says in his report, "there were no snug retreats." The camp site was roaded and drained and divided into quarters; drying rooms were provided; but there was little protection against high winds save such as was afforded by fences built of manuka scrub. Above all, the absence of closed canteens and institutes, where infections could be disseminated in crowded overheated rooms, and the refusal of all leave to the isolates were measures deemed to be the key notes of the scheme of prevention. During the four weeks of probation—a period sufficient to cover all possible incubations—the new arrival was subjected to a careful bacteriological investigation of his naso-pharynx by throat swabbing and cultural examination. All carriers were, in this way, detected on arrival. The regular use of zinc chloride spray inhalation chambers by all, with special care for those who showed any disorder of the naso-pharynx, and prompt segregation of the carriers of any suspicious or abnormal organism, was the second step taken to rid the camp of the winter plagues. Further, the period of quarantine was put to good use for the purposes of vaccination against small pox, immunisation by T.A.B. and dental treatment, so that by the time the recruit passed from this purgatory into training he was free from the pupillary cares of the medical officer.
In the camps a very efficient sanitary service existed; an area of one mile radius from the camp centre was under military sanitary control, which included visits of inspection to the civilian houses and farms in the prescribed area. All civilians working in camp were subject to throat swabbings
It has been noted that men in category "Cl" were accepted for military service in New Zealand. In order to fit these men for general training, a special "C1." camp was established at Tauherenikau near Featherston. The course of graduated training lasted for from four to six weeks, and was conducted by a special staff of P.T. instructors under the supervision of the medical officers. The results of this graduated training were fairly satisfactory; at the end of the course some 46 per cent. of the men were improved to "A" class and passed to the reinforcement camps, the remainder discharged to lower categories. But many were rejected for service in France after arrival in the United Kingdom.
The two military hospitals, under the control of the D.G.M.S. were now well equipped and the various buildings at Trentham provided roughly 200 beds. The new isolation block was completed in 1917, at a moderate cost of £100 per bed and gave accommodation for 54 patients, in all, with separate detached sections for the various infections. Recently the Wellington Racing Club had furnished a ward of 35 beds, called afer their name, W.R.C. and situated near the Cottage Hospital. In September an operating theatre was in course of construction and by the end of the year the Trentham Hospital was able to undertake all necessary surgery for both of the camps. At Trentham, Lieut.-Col. Leahy, N.Z.M.C., had replaced Lieut.-Col. Andrew as S.M.O.; while at Featherston, where hospital accommodation was not so complete,
The system of dual control shared by the Public Health Department and the Defence Department in the case of sick and wounded although still in operation, was not satisfactory; it led to duplication of work, some confusion, and above all, to a serious lack of discipline amongst the military patients of civilian institutions. But already the Minister of Defence, Sir James Allen, was moving to have this anomaly remedied as he realised that the care of the sick and wounded of the Expeditionary Force was essentially a function of the Defence Department alone.
As sure information of an impending German offensive on a large scale had reached them early in November, the action agreed upon by the Allies, for the first half of the eventful year of 1918, was to stand upon the defensive. The preponderating strength of the German forces on the Western Front, brought about by the collapse of Russia and Roumania, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and the temporary exhaustion of Italy, enabled General Ludendorf to anticipate decisive results from a campaign waged with fresh troops highly trained in the new tactics of the offensive, which he had elaborated during months of training on the quiescent Eastern Front. From November, 1917, to March, 1918, fresh German formations were detraining without intermission behind the lines and gradually increasing the number of his divisions from 146 to 192, until he had at last 23 divisons more than England and France had then on the Western Front. For the Central Powers the time had come for a gambler's throw in which success was essential in order to attack, divide and defeat the Allied Armies peacemeal before the weight of the American troops could turn the scales in our favour. The war must be over before September, for by that time the United States would have 18 fully trained divisions in the field, all having a leaven of troops with war-wise experience gained by liason with French or British formations during their period of probation. Germany had much to fear from our relentless blockade and the people's need of food; much to apprehend from Bolshevik propaganda amongst her troops and proletariat; already there were signs of waning morale in certain elements of the Central Powers, more especially in Austria. Heartily weary of the defensive battles of 1916 and 1917, and not a little encouraged by the success and vigour of their counter attack at Cambrai in November, 1917, where the new offensive tactics were first tried out, the German Armies longed for the initiative, but above all, longed with an impassioned desire for a final issue to the Great War: its hardships, privations, and its butchery.
Knowing all this, the Allied chiefs met in conference at Doullens in December and forthwith entered upon the task of making good their defences. Sir Douglas Haig had 60 divisions of British troops, but his Armies were at a low ebb: he was short of reinforcements to
The shadow of these great events to come already lay on the New Zealand Division in rest areas about Cassel and Hazebrouck. It was the second occasion upon which General Russell's headquarters had billetted at the old chateau of Renescure; once before, in 1916, on the way to the Somme battles, now again on the eve of greater battles in the valley of the Anere.
January and February had been spent in dreary weeks of trench fighting in desolate wintry places; our casualties, not heavy, but now more frequently caused by gas, which lodged in dugouts and stole almost undetected upon the drowsy inmates. Another of our medical officers had fallen. Lieut. Haworth, N.Z.M.C., R.M.O. to the 1st Auckland Battalion who had relieved Major Nelson, M.C., wounded at Passchendaele, was killed on the first day of February; a promising young officer not long with the Division. During these two months our total battle casualties numbered 877, of which 25 per cent, wounded by poison gas, but our sick evacuations were nearly double that figure: 1788 in all, of which 730 were suffering from trench fever. Late in February there came a period of rest. Active training for all units was at once put in hand, much use
Because of the multiplicity of professional duties thrust upon them, the field ambulances, were not able to devote as much time as was desirable to physical training; there was a shortage of medical officers; some attached to corps formations or corps medical units, others attending the Fourth Army School of Instruction for medical officers; others again fully employed at the divisional rest station at Hazebrouck, or at the various collecting stations for sick in the brigade areas. Reinforcements of men and N.C.O.'s of good physique and excellent morale were forthcoming from the 4th Field Ambulance, now called the Reinforcements Field Ambulance, but the officer shortage was seriously felt by the A.D.M.S. There was much medical work to be done, as the sickness wastage was still unenviably high and attracting serious attention from the D.M.S. of the Fourth Army: Surgeon-General O'Keefe. An active campaign against skin parasitism was in progress. Baths, more baths, and more frequent bathing and sterilization of clothing and blankets were the ideals set by the consulting physicians. P.U.O. was now known to be trench fever, in most instances, and myalgia and D.A.H. were both looked upon as evidences of louse infestation and the sequelœ of trench fever.
Propaganda against venereal infection was wide spread, energetic and, it was hoped, successful. Ablution rooms were instituted in France in all our medical stations and the free issue of prophylatic appliances to the N.Z.E.F. in England—authorised by the New Zealand Government—was stated to have reduced the venereal diseases rate from 3 per cent, to 1.54 per cent, in New Zealand troops in the United Kingdom. Already there was a small, determined, and very audible group of civilians banded together for broadcasting a crusade against venereal diseases, whose urge was perceptibly felt by Dominion Military Authorities. Yet with the prospect of desperate fighting ahead, and in spite of the menace of a thunderous German offensive, the tireless efforts of the medical officer were directed solely to the eternal, never ending domestic struggle with disease.
At the time when the Division marched into the rest area the troops had been warned to stand prepared to move into action at short notice. Something was being done in this direction by the A.D.M.S. The field ambulances and their transport were paraded in turn, the men in marching order, the waggons loaded with the
When, on the 21st March the first onslaughts of Ludendorf's initiative fell upon our Fifth Army front, where it junctioned with the French, that very day orders were issued for the Division to prepare for immediate movement. Questions of detail, considered in advance, had been settled: the Division was to move to another Army area by brigade groups, entraining at Cassel, at Caestre and Hopoutre, the motor transport proceeding by road. The A.D.M.S. recalled his officers from outlying duties, directed the ambulances to evacuate their sick to the nearest C.C.S. and despatched the Dental Hospital by lorry to the New Zealand Stationary Hospital, retaining the usual allotment of mobile dental sections attached to the ambulances. All medical stores and equipment in excess of authorised establishment was to be left behind in charge of small holding parties until such time as more thorough disposal could be made. The entrainment was ordered for the 25th, the destination being St. Pol and Frevant in the Third Army Reserve Area in rear of the Arras salient. With the 1st Brigade group, comprising the 1st Brigade and Divisional Headquarters, a company of A.S.C., two companies of the Machine Gun Battalion, and the New Zealand Signal Company, went the 1st Field Ambulance, entraining at Cassel on the 25th. The 2nd and 3rd Field Ambulances, both under control of the 2nd Brigade group, entrained at Caestre the same day, part of their motor transport proceeding by road to Corbie. While still on the move, the Division had countermanding orders directing that the units should detrain at Amiens to join the VIIth Corps of the Fifth Army.
On the 25th Divisional Headquarters were at Corbie in touch with the VIIth Corps, but fresh orders, now issued by the Higher Command, redirected the Division to Mailly-Maillet, north of Albert, where they were to form part of the IVth Corps of the Third Army. Colonel McGavin was at Ribemont, five miles north of Amiens, the ambulances not as yet detrained. In view of the confusing alterations in our detraining orders the A.D.M.S. issued general instructions to the field ambulance commanders to the intent that they were to act, for the present, under the orders of their respective brigade commanders; that they were to make all arrangements as regards dressing stations and collecting posts in conformity with the movements and directions of the brigadiers and that they had
On the 21st of March, after a short but titanic bombardment—the most furious yet experienced in this war—two German armies launched their attack with near a million men on a 55 mile front from the Sensée river north of Cambrai, to the Crozat canal, south of St. Quentin. Our Third Army in the northern sector, and our Fifth Army in the southern area, opposed the avalanche. Favoured by a dense mist, the myriad diminutive fighting units discharged like electrons from the enemy masses permeated rather than penetrated our thinly held outposts, and flowing along lines of least resistance, had filtered through our front positions, during the first day; in some places, over-running the gun positions. The following day, the mist still aiding, our 30 divisions were driven back in a disconnected line by the irresistible numbers most skilfully handled, no where aggregated, but everywhere perceptible in tiny knots of determined men, handling a wealth of light machine guns closely followed by a greatly daring field artillery. Outflanked and out numbered, our troops withdrew from their main defences, and on the 25th the Germans were in Peronne and Bapaume, having driven us back 10 to 15 miles to the old positions held at the end of 1916, prior to the German retirement. On the 24th it was clear that a grave disaster had befallen; the old battlefields of the Somme, whose historic villages had cost us so much bitter fighting and loss of blood, were being reconquered in a flash by the irresistible rush of our opponents. The spear head of the German thrust had found a gap, ever widening, between the Third and Fifth Armies. Part of the Fifth Army was now south of the Somme, but its left wing, the VIIth Corps was about Mametz and the Highwood; the right of the Third Army was at Hébutere 14 miles from Doullens—we
General Russell, on receipt of his orders, proceeded to Hedauville, where in the early hours of the 26th he held a conference of his brigade commanders at which the situation was outlined and action was concerted. The enemy was believed to have crossed the Ancre near Beaucourt, a mile and a half east of Beaumont Hamel; the 62nd Division, now the extreme right of the Third Army, was stated to be retiring from the Ancre north of Miraumont, but would make a stand this day about Puisieux au Mont, 3½ miles north of Beaumont Hamel. The 12th Division, on the left of the VIIth Corps had been ordered to hold the line of the Ancre from Albert to Hamel. The New Zealand Division was to close the gap of about three miles between the right of the 62nd Division and the left of the 12th Division on the line from Hamel, a small hamlet on the Ancre due south of Beaumont Hamel, to Serre north of the latter about 1½ miles. The centre of the New Zealand line would be Beaumont Hamel with Hamel to the south and Serre to the north of our front, which was to face almost due east on high ground overlooking the Ancre Valley. The concentration point ordered for all units was Hédauville, six miles north-west of Albert, on the main
Meanwhile the ambulances were marching up to Hedauville, but it was not until the afternoon that the 1st New Zealand Field Ambulance, under the command of Lt.-Col. Craig, N.Z.M.C., was fully concentrated. They had detrained at Amiens that morning, the personnel proceeding by busses to Pont Noyelles, whence they marched the 10 miles to Hedauville. The horsed transport, which had trekked from the detraining point, arriving about 5 p.m., made the unit complete and immediate steps were taken to establish an A.D.S. at Mailly-Maillet, four miles further north and about 3½ miles in rear of Beaumont-Hamel, the centre of our divisional front. From the A.D.S. at 10 p.m. a party of 50 bearers under
On the 27th the divisional front, not yet wholly stabilised, was subjected to several determined attacks. The enemy shelling, increased in volume, fell upon our lines as far back as Mailly-Maillet and Hédauville, but three separate assaults were driven off by our machine gun and rifle fire with substantial losses to the attackers and in the evening local counter attacks by our infantry re-established and advanced certain portions of our line. The divisional transport concentrated about Hédauville was drawing fire from the opposing artillery, so much so that it was now moved out of the vicinity of the village and the 2nd and 3rd Field Ambulances were ordered to Bertrancourt in divisional reserve, and later divisional Headquarters, withdrew and re-established their offices at Bus en Artois.
Our wounded collected from the R.A.P.'s during the night numbered just under 300 while 100 British and some 30 to 40 prisoners of war wounded passed through the A.D.S. at Mailly-Maillet. No. 3 Field Ambulance at Bertrancourt opened a tent subdivision and received 140 British wounded from the division on our right. No difficulties were experienced in these evacuations, all R.A.P.'s were easily cleared to a collecting point practicable for cars near Achonvillers, thence to the A.D.S., and as rapidly as possible to the M.D.S. of the 1st Field Ambulance in buildings at Beaussart. The M.A.C. of the Vth Corps cleared along the road that led from Beaussart to Bertrancourt, thence through Louvaincourt and Marieux, where Corps Headquarters were, to the 3rd Canadian Stationary Hospital in Doullens. Lt.-Col. Murray, D.S.O., stationed at Mailly-Maillet, assisted Lieut.-Col. Craig in establishing his forward evacuating zones and by the following day, as the enemy had ceased to advance, evacuations were proceeding along the usual lines of position warfare. The ambulances were now withdrawn from the command of brigades and No. 3 Field Ambulance was instructed to establish a divisional walking wounded collecting post near the M.D.S. at Beaussart.
By the 28th the worst was over in the Somme area; French troops were now present in strength; there seemed every prospect of the Amiens defences proving stable, solid and impenetrable. But the enemy's plans were culminating in the great blow struck this day at the Arras sector. By this assault the Germans hoped to turn our vital positions at Vimy and to break down the right shoulder of their salient. The powerful attack on a 20 mile front from Puisieux to Oppy penetrated our forward zones, but was brought to
On the front of the New Zealand Division whose brigades had now been reformed, there was no serious assault on the 28th, but the other two divisions of the IVth Corps, the 42nd and the 62nd repelled attacks successfully; the main fighting was further north. Our own artillery was now in position and actively engaging enemy columns moving in the Ancre Valley, over which our positions gave us very good observation. The 3rd Brigade, in front of Colincamps on the road to Serre, carried out a minor operation necessary for the rectification of their line which, after some obstinate fighting, they brought to a partial conclusion towards nightfall, taking six machine guns and some prisoners. Heavy rain fell in the afternoon, the day was cold; the enemy shelling which had increased in strength during the afternoon fell with marked intensity about Colincamps, where
In anticipation of the attack, the A.D.S. at Mailly-Maillet had been reinforced; extra bearers and runners had been supplied to the R.A.P.'s, of which two were in Colincamps for the left sector, two at Englebelmer for the right sector, while the central R.A.P.'s were in Mailly-Maillet. All had good roads of approach. At each brigade headquarters an N.Z.M.C. runner with a bicycle was attached so as to maintain touch with the A.D.S. In the afternoon the A.D.M.S. visited the D.D.M.S. IVth Corps, Col. Pollock, R.A.M.C., at Marieux; our immediate requirements were extra stretchers, blankets and hot bottles. Owing to the reduction in equipment necessitated by rapid movement the ambulances had been obliged to shed all the wealth of extra equipment which was permissible during the long period of
The situation on our divisional front was very quiet during the day of 29th March, there was little enemy fire of any kind. A few shells fell in the back areas about Bertrancourt; the weather was dull and cold, limiting observation, and transport had been removed from the vicinity of the villages and disposed in small parcels so as to offer fewer targets. At Acheux railway station, Lt.-Col. Hardie Neil, with details from his 3rd Field Ambulance had made satisfactory arrangements for an entraining point for lightly wounded: in the station buildings he had accommodation for a dressing room, a shelter for the wounded, a cookhouse, and a refreshment counter with other necessary provisions. At Beaussart. in the school house, he had established his walking wounded post and for transport he was given all the horsed ambulance waggons of the divison. No. 2 Field Ambulance was stripped of its stretchers to supply the A.D.S. and forward posts and 1000 blankets were obtained from Amiens from the divisional supplies and held in reserve by the A.D.M.S. The total wounded for the day did not exceed 46, but one medical officer, Captain Ardagh, attached to 1st Auckland was amongst the number. The A.D.M.S. who for some time past had been eight officers short in his establishment, and who had not as yet been able to obtain the necessary reinforcements, was obliged to apply for six R.A.M.C officers to replace his casualties. But his reinforcements in N.Z.M.C officers were to join the Division early in April.
On Easter Sunday, a mild day with constant showers, our centre and left brigades provided an assaulting party of four
Our new positions gave a fine view over the Ancre valley to Thiepval, Pozières and the Albert-Bapaume road. Flers lay in that direction only 7½ miles away and to the north-east, Bapaume at about the same distance. The Division was highly elated and congratulatory messages flowed in from many quarters from our old chiefs Birdwood, Plumer, Godley and also General Monash now commanding the 3rd Australian Division and fighting hard south of us, whose old brigade the 4th Australian, comrades of Anzac, were on our left hand at Hébuterne during the crisis.
The opening days of April were quiet enough. There was occasional rain, but the weather had improved and the roads were drying up satisfactorily. A party of N.Z.E. aided by the N.Z.M.C. bearers had much work in hand for the protection of the A.D.S. at Mailly-Maillet which was subject to an increasing amount of enemy shelling. Adjacent to the building was a large brewery with substantial vaulted cellars which they connected with the A.D.S. cellar by breaking through the dividing wall. The vaulted ceiling of the brewery cellars was strutted with heavy pit props and above it was erected the usual "bursting course," consisting of concrete slabs on iron rails supported by sandbagged buttresses. As warnings of the imminent use of gas shells by the Germans were to hand all doors were securely gas proofed. At the M.D.S. at Beaussart, also very exposed to bombardment, similar work was undertaken; we had already suffered casualties amongst the medical personnel, both here and at the A.D.S. The civilian population had abandoned both these villages, now fast caught in the battle zone, but at Bertrancourt some few old people and invalids remained, and as it was very undesirable that they should continue to live in the village they were removed by French motor ambulance cars. In the school and some Nissen huts, close to the prisoners of war divisional cage No. 2 Field Ambulance established a sick collecting post with about 50 patients.
The experience of the last 10 days of March had demonstrated the importance of divisional medical units retaining their mobility. The pushing forward of the C.C.S.'s during the three years of static warfare had to a certain extent limited the usefulness of the main dressing stations. During the rapid withdrawal of our divisions from the Hindenburg line while the M.A.C.'s were fully employed in removing patients, from the C.C.S.'s, the motor ambulance cars of the divisions were used in many instances to
The end of the week saw the German assaulting columns making their last general attacks on the Amiens positions. A portion of the advancing masses fell upon the New Zealand Division on the 5th. At 5 a.m. a very heavy bombardment—the heaviest yet experienced by our troops—fell upon our front line and back areas, concentrated with especial intensity about Beaussart, Bertrancourt, and as far back as Bus en Artois. Following this, powerful attacks by storm troops were launched against the left of our line; the outposts at La Signy Farm were driven in but our trench on the crest held firm; all assaults were beaten back with heavy casualties to the attackers. In the afternoon the 2nd Brigade on our right felt the weight of the enemy and dealt with him as the Rifle Brigade had done, adding to their triumph the bringing down of a low flying aeroplane whose pilot and observer they captured. During the bombardment of the front line we lost another medical officer,
The 6th was deemed a "quiet day" although the shelling still continued, but in diminished depth. A fresh attack, on our left, had to be beaten off by our artillery fire and the battle still raged to the south of us. Our line, however, was by now well established on a favourable position and behind our front trenches a heavily wired main position had been constructed by the N.Z.E. and the Pioneers. The morale of the Division had never been more exalted and our infantry were well prepared, even eager, to meet any assault the enemy might choose to fling upon them. During these stirring days of semi-open warfare our losses had been heavy and were estimated to be:—550 killed, 1800 wounded and a few missing; but we had more than held our own, we had actually taken something from the Germans in the shape of territory, prisoners and material.
But the crisis of the Somme battles was passed, the way to Amiens and the Somme estuary was stoutly barred, and the tide of the German eruption was setting towards our northern flank about Estaires and Armentières. Already we were reverting to the old impasse of trench fighting and the routine of position warfare. The principal work of the N.Z.M.C. during the rest of the month was concerned in strengthening the various forward posts and improving the protection of the A.D.S. at Mailly-Maillet. Battle casualties averaged about 40 per diem, and although shell fire was considerable, the evacuation of the wounded presented little difficulty; good roads in most cases permitted the use of wheeled stretchers as far as the R.A.P. and the rolling nature of the country gave such concealment as enabled the motor cars to come well forward unobserved. At Louvencourt No. 3 Field Ambulance was holding 150 sick and continued to despatch the usual daily service of trains to Gezaincourt; the return journey took three hours to complete and with four coaches and four trucks there was ample room for 300 sitting and 56 stretcher cases. A bathing station near the ambulance had been reestablished and the usual fight against parasitism was renewed. But as ever happens to an industrious division, no sooner has it made comfortable local arrangements, than some other unit steps in to reap the advantages. At the end of the month, owing to the necessity for the Division "sidestepping" to the north so as to cover Hébuterne the well protected A.D.S. at Mailly-Maillet, which now had shell proof cellar accommodation for 100 stretcher cases and was well lighted by a derelict acetylene plant discovered by us in the abandoned village, had to be handed over to units of the 12th Division, who relieved our right subsector, and the readjustment necessitated taking over an A.D.S. at Sailly-au-Bois about a mile and a half west of Hebuterne. No. 2 Field Ambulance was instructed to make the necessary arrangements while No. 1 Field Ambulance had orders to erect a M.D.S. in tents at Bus en Artois close to the fringe of the Chateau Woods. Steps were taken to put the Sailly au Bois A.D.S. into a proper condition of defence as it was wholly unprotected and consisted of rooms in a vacated estaminet situated on the main road. On the very afternoon on which we took over, Lt.-Col. Murray had 1000 sand bags filled to block all the windows, the next day beams taken from buildings already wrecked by shell fire were collected and placed over the roof and covered by sand bags filled with broken bricks so as to provide a bursting course. The outside walls were next strengthened by a breast work of sand bags filled with chalk blocks; this gave protection from small shells at least. As there was likelihood of heavy Maheno late in 1917. He had been with his battalion since early in March.
North, in Flanders in the old familiar places about Armentières, Sailly, Ploegsteert, and Baillieul, the second German blow had been struck just as we had straightened our line on the Ancre. On the 9th, Ludendorf's birthday, and anniversary of the taking of Vimy in 1917, under the weight of densely packed German divisions, our defences melted away in front of Estaires. The Lys was crossed at Sailly and Bac St. Maur. Armentières was turned and out troops withdrawn, destroying the bridges as they passed. At Ploegsteert, some of the New Zealand Artillery the 2nd (Army) Brigade, N.Z.F.A. fought their guns in defence of the wood until their last few rounds, which were fired at point blank range into the houses in Ploegsteert village, while the 25th Division, who had fought with us at Messines were forced from hill 63 by the German torrents pouring down their wonted course, the Douve valley. New Zealand reinforcements, cyclists and cavalry gave a willing hand in the defences of Meteren—what time the 1st Australian Division was detraining at Hazebrouck—and later at Kemmel, when Messines had fallen. The story of the 4th Field Ambulance ends in this stormy period. On February the 7th, it ceased to be attached to the New Zealand Division and became the New Zealand Reinforcements Field Ambulance, a temporary unit, but it continued, under the same command, and with the same officers, to carry out its assigned duties at the A.D.S., Ecole de Bienfaisence, at Ypres: later it was relieved and took over the Corps Scabies Hospital at Remy Siding. In March Lt.-Col. McLean, N.Z.M.C. left the unit to command No. 3 N.Z.G.H. at Codford and Captain Venables, M.C., N.Z.M.C., assumed his duties. At the end of March the remainder of the unit was attached to the 2nd Entrenching Battalion, the only portion of the 4th Brigade still left in the Fourth Army Area and in April, the remaining officers and personnel were drafted to the Division as reinforcements. There remained Captain Venables, M.C., now R.M.O. to the 2nd Entrenching Battalion; in this duty he was mortally wounded on the 8th May, and died in the 3rd Australian
The British position on the Ancre had now become so secure and the diversion in the north had so relaxed the efforts of the Germans fronting us, that the whole complex routine of normal trench warfare was reestablished in the New Zealand Divisional Area. On our part: frequent raids and harassing bombardments—in the raids we had rather the better of it, nor were our casualties heavy. On the enemy's part, fierce burst of artillery fire, crashes, shell storms, lasting from two to three minutes in selected areas and an increasing use of shell gas bombardments. Gas drills and gas precautions were practised and strictly enforced; and very necessary they were because of the high concentration of poison vapour occasionally secured in small areas by projector fire in incredible profusion. In a neighbouring division no less than 2000 casualties due to gas poisoning were evacuated following a few hours concentrated gas bombardment; many serious cases and fatalities resulted. As our casualties during May were about 25 per cent, of those we sustained in April, the evacuation of small numbers of wounded daily, presented no problem of any magnitude. The A.D.S. at Sailly-au-Bois now well fortified, gave cover for some 100 stretcher cases; the greatest number of wounded handled in one day was on the 5th, when the New Zealand Division engaged in a minor operation with the 42nd Division north of Hebuterne.
The Third Army—which the New Zealanders found to be no less highly organised in technical administration than our much admired Second Army—early in May reopened its schools of instruction temporarily interrupted by the German invasion. Surgery, especially that of the front line, was a speciality of this Army, whose Consulting Surgeon,
Sanitation revived during the period of quiesence, sanitary sections having no control in forward areas, the preventive service of the Division was maintained by local sanitary officers appointed to areas. A course of instruction in water duties was opened at Louvencourt and at Hesdin the Army School of Cookery, previously in Albert, was visited by officers interested in interior economy, and was attended by cooks selected from the various units. The general health of the Division was very much the same as that of other, units of the Third Army whose rate of wastage was nearly 10 per thousand per week, while the Division hardly exceeded 8 per
The month of May was one of intense expectancy and anxiety for the British Armies. The battles in Flanders and on the Somme had died down at the end of April. Messines and Baillieul were lost, but Bethune, Hazebrouck, Kemmel and Ypres we still held. Finding the gates ajar in Flanders Sixte Von Arnim had flung his whole weight upon them, so that his line now bulged into a very unhandy salient, south of Kemmel, and was much tormented by the Allied artillery. Both here and in front of Amiens the German reserve divisions had lost heavily, and the British Armies, given a few weeks respite, were already recovering from a condition of exhaustion as great as that of the Regular Army at the end of 1914. Doubt and uncertainty as to the point at which Ludendorf would next strike still tormented the British Higher Command. So far the hymn of hate had been set to marching time against the sole "fiend"—England—and there was every reason to apprehend a further onslaught against our enfeebled armies whose destruction Germany seemed solely to compass. But the gathering storm broke on the Chemin des Dames at the end of May, and if it did not fully expose the intention of our opponents, it seemed to promise at least a prolongation of the breathing time our forces so badly needed.
On 7th of June the New Zealand Division was relieved in front line by the 42nd Division, passed into reserve and for the next three weeks enjoyed a period of rest, but still in somewhat close proximity to the Corps front. The weather was fine and hot; the country about Doullens smiling, wooded and fruitful, and peaceful. Cricket matches, sports meetings, and the Kiwi Troupe of
Towards the end of the month an epidemic of unknown origin was spreading through the divisions of the Third Army and was already causing many casualties in the New Zealand Divisions. During the week ending June 29th, 1373 sick were admitted to the field ambulances, but beyond an increase of the numbers of cases of P.U.O. and influenza, there seemed to be no cause for alarm. The disease although severe for a few days was of short duration most men being able to resume duty in from 7 to 10 days time; many were treated by their own unit and were not even admitted to the field ambulance. The Third Army sick wastage rate was 10 per thousand during the last week in June; one British division in the Army had no less than 500 admissions to C.C.S. during this week; but the New Zealand Division, by establishing an isolation camp, kept its official wastage figures within reasonable bounds. This was the first wave of the great worldwide epidemics of 1918, and 1919, which originating in America in 1917 travelled from west to east, first breaking out in Spain in May, then spreading to all the armies of the B.E.F. in France in May and June. The first wave was not attended with much mortality, nor was it marked by any severity of complications, but by its high infectivity it disabled large numbers simultaneously, if temporarily. The name given to the disease in the western armies during the summer phase was "Three Day Influenza," and it was not treated as a notifiable disease. The maximum number under treatment in our division at the isolation camp at Marieux Wood was 1045 on July 3rd, but the figures dropped rapidly as the month advanced until in the early days of August the disease died out completely.
Thoroughly rested, the division, by the 7th of July, was taking over a new sector in the corps front between Hébuterne and Gommecourt, destined to be the jumping off place for their final victorious battles in the autumn.
Prior to the British counter attacks of August, 1918, there was a six weeks period of semi-open trench warfare on the front held by the IVth Corps. On July 3rd, the New Zealand Division took over a new sector of defence in a maze of trenches between Gommecourt and Hebuterne, and became the centre division of the IVth Corps with the 42nd Division on our right the 37th on our left. General Russell moved into Headquarters at Couin, two miles north of Bus en Artois; the troops were billeted about Bayencourt and Coigneaux. The local tactical situation was as yet a defensive one. Our line was held in great depth, with outpost positions so sited as to give mutual support and well in advance of the main position which was on the heights of Gommecourt Ridge facing south-east towards Puisieux-au-Mont.
Fine weather and roads but little damaged by shell fire made for ease of intercommunication behind our lines and greatly facilitated the medical arrangements. No. 3 Field Ambulance took over an A.D.S. at Fonquevillers behind Gommecourt with a tent subdivision stationed at Bayencourt, the two connected by a car post at La Haie Chateau—midway between—on a good road. The chain of forward medical posts in the right subsector was based upon a bearer relay called Bull's Hotel in dugouts at the western extremity of Hebuterne which served the R.A.P. "Peryman's Post," in Hebuterne, by wheeled stretchers or hand carriage. A track called by us Pipi track, operable.by wheeled stretchers, led back over a distance of a mile and three-quarters to the car post at La Haie Chateau. In the left subsector there were two bearer relay posts, one, in Gommecourt to which Ford cars had access, and in front of it in an advanced bearer relay "Mathew" connecting up with the R.A.P. at Salmon Point about 1200 yards in front of Gommecourt. From "Mathew" a trench tramway was available but could not often be used on account of shell fire. Between Gommecourt and Hebuterne in a trench named Guiness by some bibulous division—whose trench names were variously representative of well known British liquors, rum, beer, gin, whisky and stout—the R.A.P. "Guiness's Post," was evacuated by "Stout" trench to the Gommecourt B.R.P.
In such a labyrinth of trenches, the monstrous product of British and German industry expended during three years of underground warfare, there was little difficulty in finding suitable positions for R.A.P.'s
The network of defences in Gommecourt had served the Germans well in 1916, during the early days of the Somme offensive, as all our attacks failed to dislodge them from their positions, the most northern embraced by our lines of assault. After the first day the battle was broken off in this sector and it was not until Beaumont Hamel had been taken and the German retirement to the Hindenberg line had commenced in" 1917, that we entered into the Gommecourt fortresses. The lines of evacuation for wounded from our new sector were secure but as our outposts advanced, and that fairly rapidly, the R.A.P.'s were soon left far behind, so that towards the end of the month it became necessary to advance them to a closer proximity to our extended positions.
The M.D.S. opened by the 1st Field Ambulance was at Souastre about three miles west of Fonquevillers. The A.D.M.S. in his medical arrangements had provided for the administration of A.T.S. and the recording of casualties to be carried out at the M.D.S. exclusively. The divisional rest station under the 2nd Field Ambulance, at first established in tents and huts at Couin, moved later to Authie mill where it became the corps rest station commanded by Lieut.-Col. Murray, D.S.O., and accommodating about 150 patients in all. The medical tactical scheme included the selection of alternative posts in rear of our stations and detailed instructions to medical officers as to the action to be taken in case of a retirement and as to the alternative routes of evacuation for wounded already determined.
The early part of the month was chiefly taken up in nursing the influenza patients in the Isolation Camp: in all some 4000 cases were treated there during the summer epidemic.
Meanwhile our outpost line, far from adopting a passive attitude, was aggressively pushing out into the labyrinth of trenches which formed part of the old German front system of 1916. Our left battalion occupied a salient about half a mile deep, a situation which was rectified on 9th July by the 3rd Brigade in a successful operation; the casualties treated at the A.D.S. were one officer and 40 O.R. But the number of wounded passing through our posts was below the average of the previous month and, had it not been for the constant trench fighting of the division, would have been unusually small. Hostile artillery fire
On the 15th a more important advance under barrage was made by the 3rd Brigade between Rossignol Wood and a point just in front of Hebuterne, known as "Fusileer" trench. Special preparations were made by the A.D.M.S. for this operation: the bearer relay at Bull's Hotel was strongly reinforced by bearers from No. 1 Field Ambulance and the car posts doubly manned. By arrangements with the officer commanding the Corps "shock centre" provision was made for the administration of preserved blood at the A.D.S. at Fonguevillers. The attack was wholly successful and carried our outposts much beyond the objectives originally traced. Our casualties were light: 3 officers, and 66 O.R., including 8 wounded Germans, passed through the M.D.S. during the day. The following morning the Germans counterattacked but without effect: they lost 39 prisoners and 15 machine guns. We had singularly few casualties, the wounded coming down in very good condition on account of the satisfactory chains of evacuation and the intensely warm weather which did much to minimise shock.
The very day that we engaged in our modest trench offensive, the final German offensive in the Great War was being delivered against the French bastion at Rheims. It failed: and on the 17th Foch's winning campaigns opened with vigorous assaults on the Marne salient by three French Armies reinforced by United States and British Divisions. The 15th, 34th, 51st and the 62nd British Divisions under our old commander, General Godley of the XXIInd Corps, with the New Zealand Cyclist Battalion won honourable distinction in these battles which were to convert the German advance into a disastrous retreat. Colonel Begg still attached to the XXIInd Corps as D.D.M.S.
Already on our front there were suspicious signs of a German withdrawal: explosions heard on the 20th in Rossignol Wood seemed to indicate the blowing up of dugouts; other unusual movements in the enemy's lines were observed. As yet, the prospect of a German retirement on a large scale did not seem at all clear, but it was imperative to keep close observation on any local withdrawals; to which end, cooperating with the 42nd Division, we pushed on, meeting with some resistance. We had 76 casualties through the A.D.S. as the result of an advance of several hundred yards which penetrated the communication trenches in front of Hebuterne and in Rossignol Wood, now definitely abandoned by the Germans. The advanced party of the
The 8th of August 1918, is stated by Ludendorf in his Memoirs to have been the black day of the German armies, and on the evening of that day he realised that further offensive operations could not be undertaken by the Central Powers. The failures at Amiens, in Flanders, on the Marne, and at Rheims and the vigour and skill of the French counter-offensives had used up most of the German Reserves. The locking up of many good divisions in the Marne salient negatived the original plan of a resumption of the Flanders battle, and the surprise attack, south of the Somme, conducted by the Canadians, Australians and British Divisions with 400 tanks on the "Black" day was a victory of such magnitude as to be decisive and final in the Amiens battle. German morale was weakening, their effectives dwindling, while the Allies, daily growing stronger by the accretion of American Divisions, had already attained numerical superiority. To their greater numbers were added preponderance of artillery and a new weapon, the light tank, which was the most effectual counter to barbed wire entanglements. And foremost in the causes leading to a German débacle was the united command, the harmonious rhythm of the Allied attacks, making pressure at many points so timed as to harry the German reserves from one field to another, only to engage breathless in a lost encounter. It was already the twilight of the Gods—the great Valhalla of the Wotan, Siegfried, and Brunhilda lines was still untouched—but Foch had foretold its doom. Ludendorf frankly advised Peace negotiations, but Hindenberg, still hopeful, determined to shorten his line by falling back behind his steel and granite walls. The battle of the Roman roads
The battle of Bapaume was the first great trial of strength of the rallied British Armies and is stated to have been the most anxious, critical and hard fighting battle in the whole war. Mangin had prepared the way by his turning movement of the 18th, 19th and 20th August between Compiegne and Soissons which was calculated to draw German reserves in his direction, but a powerful group of German Divisions, warned betimes of our intentions, stood ready to meet the British advance. The first objective of the Third Army was the Arras-Albert railway.
On the 19th the A.D.M.S. of the New Zealand Division received warning orders for the forthcoming attack. A conference of A.D.'sM.S. of the IVth Corps was held the same day at the office of the D.D.M.S. and when Col. McGavin returned to the Division he summoned his field ambulance commanders to confer. The whole IVth Corps, now consisting of five divisions by the recent addition of the 5th and 37th, would advance to the Ancre Valley from Achiet le Grand to Miraumont. General Russell's orders were for the 3rd New Zealand (Rifle) Brigade to attack through Puisieux au Mont to Beauregard on the road to Miraumont where our right would cooperate with the 42nd Division in capturing a high point known as the "Dovecote" and push our patrols as far as the river above Miraumont. To the north, passing through the 37th Division the 5th Division on our left and the 63rd Division continuing the line northwards, would press south-eastwards so narrowing the New Zealand front until
The medical arrangements made by the A.D.M.S. were these: No. 1 Field Ambulance at the M.D.S. in Souastre would continue its duties; No. 2 Field Ambulance at Couin with one officer and 150 Infantry attached as bearers would be in divisional reserve and would receive all sick but would evacuate such as would not be fit under 24 hours; No. 3 Field Ambulance, with headquarters at Bayencourt, would be responsible for forward evacuation. All the bearers of No. 1 Field Ambulance were at the disposal of Lieut.-Col. Hardie Neil. All the motor ambulances less two, with the whole of the horsed ambulance waggons of the Division under the Quartermaster of the 3rd Field Ambulance—Captain Finlayson, N.Z.M.C.—acting as Transport Regulating Officer, were available for evacuations and were to be parked at Souastre. Inter-communication would be maintained by detailing one N.Z.M.C. runner to each R.M.O. and posting motor cyclists at the M.D.S., the A.D.S. at Bayencourt and at "Perryman's Post," now an A.D.S. in Hebuterne, lately a bearer relay post. Telephones connected the A.D.M.S. with the M.D.S. and the dressing stations at Bayencourt and Fonquevillers but the latter was to be handed over to the 5th Division at two hours following zero time, when A.D.S.'s would be established in Gommecourt and at Bull's Hotel in Hebuterne. The car posts would be correspondingly advanced at the same time. The usual provisions for walking wounded were to be made by marking tracks and by installing separate refreshment and dressing accommodation for their reception, while the horsed ambulance waggons were available for their conveyance from the A.D.S.'s to the M.D.S. At the M.D.S. a four hourly report was to be furnished showing the numbers of wounded passed through and the usual returns were to be compiled. The M.A.C. would evacuate the M.D.S. only. These simple divisional arrangements form a contrast to the elaborate corps schemes of the battles of 1917, but we were approaching a period of open warfare in which divisional medical schemes would give greater scope for individuality and self-reliance.
On the night of the 20th/21st, the concentration of the 5th Division behind our lines and the mounting of our attack proceeded without hitch. The ambulance transport, by direction, did not concentrate until after dark as all movements by daylight
These operations may be considered as comprising three phases: first, the advance to the Ancre on the 21st and 22nd; second phase, the envelopment of Bapaume and the withdrawal of its garrison, from the 24th to the 28th; third, the advance to the line Riencourt-Bancourt beyond Bapaume and the repulse of the German counter attack on August 31st. The operations of the 21st and 22nd were of a preparatory nature. Zero hour was at 4.55 a.m., the dawn was very misty, and observation was limited. By 6.50 a.m. the N.Z.R.B. had captured Puisieux and were reported to be within 200 yards of their objectives. They had taken many prisoners, their casualties were light. The mist cleared by 10 a.m. and shortly after that hour all the New Zealand objectives were attained. At this time the A.D.M.S. directed the A.D.S. to move forward to a large dugout "the Catacombs" in the chalk at a point midway between Hebuterne and Puisieux. The road adjacent was practicable for motor transport and there was but little shell fire, so that evacuations proceeded quite smoothly and there was no congestion at any point. The total New Zealand wounded admitted to the M.D.S. for the day was 46. In addition some 70 wounded from other divisions with 33 wounded Germans were brought in; making in all 150 for the day's operations. During the night the 42nd Division secured the Dovecote after determined fighting. This day was remarkable on the IVth Corps front in that three divisions, associated in Gallipoli, again fought side by side: the 42nd East Lancashire Division, which had relieved us at Helles, and the Royal Naval Division now the 63rd, which had been with us at Anzac.
The following day, the 22nd, was a quiet day very few wounded passed through the M.D.S., not exceeding a score from all sources; the main fighting was further north. The reserve bearers of the infantry detachment under Lieut.-Col. Murray went to harvesting, the medical posts remained in situ and no incident of medical importance was reported, save that orders were issued for the reopening of the D.R.S. at Authie Mill. This suggested two issues present in the mind of the D.D.M.S.: hard fighting ahead and limited advances. Warned that the New Zealand
The following day, the 23rd, the British battle array was opening out its flanks, the Third and the Fourth Armies were fighting on a 33 mile front from just south of Arras to our junction with the French south-east of Amiens. The New Zealand Division was still in Corps reserve and, beyond a short advance to the Ancre by elements of the 3rd Brigade, was not engaged. The junction between the divisions on the left and right had squeezed out our front line. The Australians recaptured Albert and Meaulte, while the Third Army made headway in the northern area of the battlefield. Sir Douglas Haig, encouraged by these successes, and now fully confident that the breaking point of German resistance had been reached, determined to push on with increasing violence and audacity.
During the night of the 23rd/24th the 1st and 2nd New Zealand Brigades were concentrating in front of Loupart Wood and Grevillers in the neighbourhood of Achiet le Petit. That night two parties of the 3rd Field Ambulance, under Major Goldstein, M.C., N.Z.M.C., and Major Johns, M.C., N.Z.M.C., moved into Bucquoy to form an A.D.S. The bearer subdivisions with one bearer subdivision of No. 1 Field Ambulance marched at midnight under Captain Hutson, N.Z.M.C. and concentrated near Achiet le Petit. The following medical arrangements had been made:—to each brigade headquarters 20 N.Z.M.C. bearers were attached, and to each R.M.O. one squad of 6 N.Z.M.C. bearers, with one runner, N.Z.M.C. to keep touch with the A.D.S. The forward evacuating officer was to push out a bearer relay shortly after the brigade advanced; the A.D.S. at Bucquoy was to be prepared to move forward as the situation demanded; the M.D.S. would open at Esarts at an early hour; empty returning supply lorries were to be used for evacuating the walking wounded.
At 1 a.m. on the 24th, battle orders were issued by the divisional staff for the advance of the 1st Brigade—with the 2nd in support—to Grevillers and Loupart Wood with the ultimate object, Bapaume. At 4.30 a.m. the 1st Brigade advanced and made satisfactory progress through the wood and the village site, but the division on our left, failing to get Biefvillers less than a mile to the north, our 2nd Wellington Battalion was
The advance of the ambulance bearers under Captain Hutson, N.Z.M.C., began at 4 a.m. when the bearer subdivisions moved forward to a cutting in front of the railway line at a point where it crosses the road from Achiet le Petit to Grevillers. From this post, the "Railway B.R.P." squads of four bearers with wheeled stretchers were able to work forward along the road, of which the surface was uninjured, to the R.A.P.'s of the 1st Brigade about Grevillers. Ford cars were used as far as the Railway Post, the heavy cars had a loading station just in front of Achiet le Petit. By 7 o'clock wounded were coming in to the A.D.S. at Bucquoy. At the M.D.S. at Souastre, the walking wounded were loaded on to empty returning lorries and although there was some slight delay in getting sufficient M.A.C. cars in the afternoon, all stretcher cases were cleared without difficulty. In the afternoon the 2nd Field Ambulance in reserve was moved up to Souastre. There was no hitch in the evacuations which proceeded smoothly; up to 6 p.m. the wounded passed through totalled 16 officers, 252 O.R., of which 182 were from the New Zealand Division. A German regimental aid post was overrun just in front of Grevillers, here three German medical officers were taken and reached the A.D.S. during the day. By 6 p.m. our line was half a mile in front of Grevillers, just one mile from Bapaume. During the day we had captured 400 prisoners and several guns. The British line south of us was through Le Sars to Mametz. That night the A.D.M.S. issued orders for the M.D.S. to advance to Bucquoy while the A.D.S. was to open in Achiet le Petit.
On the 25th the 2nd Brigade had orders to advance through Avesnes to the high ground north of Bapaume and to seize a line to the east of the town on the Cambrai road. The objectives of the 1st Brigade were: to encircle Bapaume from the south, junctioning with our left Brigade when the town had been surrounded. At 5 a.m. both brigades were in movement, the 2nd Brigade met with severe resistance and by 10 a.m. had reached Monument Wood on the Bapaume Arras road. Here there was much fighting with heavy casualties, but 150 prisoners had been taken and the brigade was pushing on in a renewed assault in the late afternoon. South of Bapaume, and conforming to the movements of the division on their right, the 1st Brigade made little progress in spite of staunch fighting: the Transloy-Loupart
About 2 p.m.
The M.D.S. which opened in Bucquoy at 2 p.m., admitted 12 officers and 238 O.R. wounded of the New Zealand Division, and
During the day we had captured many prisoners and some guns and by nightfall our 2nd Brigade, steering a northward course about Bapaume—still strongly held by determined machine-gunners—had reached a point near Bcugnatre, north, and to the eastward, while the 1st Brigade faced by an impasse was still due south of the town. The German Divisions had orders to hold up our advance at all costs so as to permit of an orderly withdrawal of their troops in the old Somme battlefield. Bapaume, the goal of our 1916 battles, was a central keep in a powerful organised zone of defences, the main trace of which facing south-west had been the original German positions of 1916, but now remodelled and presenting a firm bastion strongly reinforced by many Divisions.
For three days the battle raged about the broken walls of Bapaume, whose desperate resistance seemed to increase rather than diminish as the days dragged on. The greatest battle yet fought by Haig was fully developed by the 26th, when the First Army, breaking out from the Arras heights headed by Canadians and the Guards swept rapidly through their old battlefields of 1917, regaining at a bound all that had been surrendered in March and pushing onwards tore a six mile gap in the northern extension of the impregnable Seigfried zone. The Hindenberg wall of steel and granite was turned; the Germans must fall back, and that rapidly, towards the inner Cambrai defences. This was the decisive day in the contest which was to regain all that we had lost in March and give us a dominance in positions and in morale over our opponents, which must lead to their final overthrow.
Throughout the three days struggle, the close of which on the 28th saw the abandonment of Bapaume and its subsidiary defences the IVth Corps maintained its dogged pressure on the tough German line. To the north the 5th Division and our Rifle Brigade made some headway but with heavy losses, the New Zealanders penetrating ultimately to the Cambrai railway line,
The Division undertook no offensive operations on the 27th or 28th, the dispositions remained the same; Bapaume was to be enveloped, not assaulted at great cost frontally. Our heavy guns rained shells all day into the doomed town and our defensive positions were improved to meet a sortie by the reinforced garrison, or a counter attack by divisions coming to raise the seige. Most of the wounded brought in during the early hours of the morning of the 27th, casualties of the previous day's fighting, were evacuated prior to 6 a.m., the total for the division being 11 officers, 250 O.R. In all over 300, but the numbers evacuated as a result of losses sustanied on the 27th, 28th and 29th, did not exceed 150. Enemy shelling was much increased on the last two days, our car post at Biefvillers was again affected, two men were wounded and two large cars had their bodies blown clean off. As the shelling subsided on the night of the 28th, a strange silence fell upon Bapaume—away to the eastward was seen the glare of burning dumps, and just before dawn our patrols penetrated the town to find it abandoned. Immediately our line pushed forward, the Rifle Brigade early reaching the old sugar factory on the Cambrai road, the 1st Brigade temporarily checked at the road leading south-east from Bapaume to Beaulencourt.
During the day the A.D.M.S. reconnoitred a post at Grevillers. indicated by Lieut.-Col. Hardie Neil, as the most suitable site for the A.D.S. A good cellar in the ruined village with a large yard adjacent was selected and preparations made to make it ready for occupation. At Irles a convenient post for a M.D.S. was inspected and Lieut.-Col. Craig was instructed to send forward parties to construct the necessary protective works. That night General Russell, whose headquarters had now advanced to dugouts in front of Buequoy, issued orders for a forward movement of the 1st and 3rd Brigades to Riencourt and Bancourt on a line due east from Bapaume: the advance under barrage was to commence at 5 a.m. and had as its most remote objectives Haplincourt where the 5th Division would be on our left at Beugny and the 42nd Division on our right at Villers-au-Flos; a total advance of three miles. Acting on these orders the A.D.M.S. made arrangements with his field ambulance commanders to advance their posts during the day—if our progress was satisfactory—to Grevillers and Irles; the field ambulance in reserve remaining in position.
The Rifle Brigade was in movement at 5 a.m. on the 30th. Closely following the barrage they cleared Fremicourt village by 6.30 taking many prisoners. The 2nd Auckland Battalion assembled in front of Bancourt bat did not move with the barrage as the Division on our right could not advance at the hour appointed. During the period of assembly the Battalion headquarters were posted in a sunken track east of the Péronne road in rear of an intervening ridge which separated the Battalion from Bancourt. The enemy counter barrage fell heavily about this point and one large shell knocked out most of the headquarters party including the R.M.O., Captain Simeox, who was very seriously wounded. The Chaplain, the Rev. Dobson, assuming the duties of R.M.O., bound up the wounded and got them away safely to Grevillers. 2nd Auckland ultimately carried Bancourt although the village of Riencourt resisted the 42nd Division until nightfall. Our casualties were considerable. Lieut.-Col. Hardie Neil made a personal reconnaissance at 8 a.m. in the direction of Bancourt and at 1 o'clock the A.D.S. was advanced to Grevillers. Car routes through Bapaume, where the road surface was good, were used to clear the northern sector and bearers relays pushed out beyond Grevillers to the vicinity of the Peronne road. Great difficulty was experienced in removing the wounded from Bancourt owing to enfilade machine-gun fire from Riencourt until the latter village was taken by the 42nd Division. Shortly
At dawn on the last day of the month a heavy barrage fell upon our front line, two large German tanks advanced to our outposts and later the whole of our front was strongly counterattacked by a Saxon Division. Some ground was at first yielded, but ultimately the position was restored; two disabled tanks lay in front of our outpost line and about 50 Saxon prisoners remained in our hands. The capture of Bapaume was now completed and our lines in front of it were secure. A car post was established early in the day in the buildings, used before the retreat by a British C.C.S., which were adjacent to the old sugar factory on the Bapaume—Cambrai road and about a mile westward of Fremicourt. The route of evacuation was now through Bapaume to Grevillers. The casualties passing through the M.D.S. numbered 10 officers, 235 O.R. New Zealanders, in all over 300 wounded were evacuated including 30 Germans. The light railway at Puisieux, now adapted to carrying lying cases, did much to expedite the journeys of the M.A.C who were experiencing some little difficulty in linking up the C.C.S. at Doullens with the rapidly advancing Corps front, already ten miles beyond its point of departure.
Throughout this hard fought 10 days about Bapaume, no difficulties in the evacuation of wounded presented themselves; all went well, and with the utmost expedition, all wounded were cleared in good condition to C.C.S. The multiplicity of trenches, dugouts, and galleries in the chalk, the results mostly of German efforts in 1916, provided well protected posts for medical personnel, both the R.A.P.'s and bearer relay posts. Good roads and less severe shelling permitted a free use to be made of motor ambulance cars and without serious losses in transport. The A.D.M.S. in his report on this period, one of transition from position warfare to that of open engagements, comments on this aspect of ambulance transport work:—"The good condition of the
A motor ambulance travels at least four times faster than bearers carrying by hand; only one driver and an orderly are required to transport four stretcher cases; one lying ease requires a squad of four bearers who take four times as long as a car; in other words, it would take 16 bearers four times as long to evacuate four lying cases as it takes two men with a car. The exposure of personnel is, therefore, as 1: 32" On these grounds the A.D.M.S. was of opinion that cars had not, in the past, been pushed up as far forward as might have been done; and that economy of mechanical transport had been given undue weight in its relation to economy of personnel. In regard to the location of the M.D.S. the A.D.M.S. formed the opinion that this medical post should be brought well forward but just out of range of field artillery and say, 9,000 to 10,000 yards behind the front line, as the closer to the A.D.S. it is sited, the greater the saving in ambulance transport for forward work. He goes on to comment on the work at the A.D.S. and lays stress on the importance of having well trained nursing orderlies capable of dressing wounds efficiently under the direction of a medical officer, so expediting the clearance of wounded and preventing congestion. The wounded, he notes, come down in waves and unless rapidly dressed and passed on, there is grave danger of a large number of cases collecting—a disadvantage accentuated in cold or wet weather when covered accommodation is limited. The A.D.M.S. concludes his report by stating his views on field ambulance organisation: "The field ambulance organisation in its adaptability and in the variety of combinations of its elements leaves nothing to be desired. In any action involving large numbers of wounded and especially where long hard carries have to be undertaken, the bearer personnel is necessarily inadequate. This difficulty is easily overcome by obtaining Infantry to act as bearers, each squad being in charge of a trained N.Z.M.C bearer. It is not recommended that the bearers in a field ambulance be increased in numbers, as in quiet sectors there would be no employment for them."
A number of items of Ambulance equipment proved unnecessary or excessive in quantity had been recently handed in. Field Medical Panniers, 1; Field Surgical Panniers, 1: Field Fracture Box 3; Surgical Haversacks, 12; Medical Companions, 2. Waites' Collapsible Camp Cooker.before action of Infantry detailed as bearers to the ambulance held in reserve: so increasing the total bearer personnel by over 100 per cent. The infantry bearer detachment furnished by the reserve Brigade, numbering 150 under an officer, were provided with red cross brassards, and were used forward of the A.D.S. under the guidance of N.Z.M.C. N.C.O.'s.
The casualties for the Division, from the 21st August to the 31st inclusive, are estimated to have been: 411 killed; 1848 wounded. The number of wounded of the New Zealand Division passing through the medical posts during this period was 80 officers, 1847 O.R.; and in all the two ambulances engaged, dealt with over 2,500 wounded in eleven days; the heaviest day being the 25th, when 20 officers and 319 O.R. wounded of the New Zealand Division were safely evacuated; the grand total of wounded for that day being 482. About 250 German wounded are included in the gross total of the operations. The proportion of lying to sitting cases was 41 per cent. and 59 per cent, respectively.
Our losses by sickness during August averaged about 180 cases evacuated to base hospital per week, the strength of the Division over 18,200, making an average weekly loss of about 9 per 1000 per week, which corresponded to the average wastage
The days of the 1st and 2nd September saw stubborn fighting in our advance beyond Bapaume, towards Haplincourt; some progress was made each day and we took many prisoners, but our casualties were not inconsiderable. On the evening of the 2nd our line lay in front of Haplincourt, the 2nd Brigade now holding the divisional front. On the 3rd, the German resistance seemed to weaken, fires behind his lines indicated retirement, our troops pushing on without severe opposition passed through Haplincourt and advanced to Bertincourt. At 5 p.m. the A.D.S. was moved into Bancourt and a car and relay post was advanced along the road leading to Bertincourt to the site of a feld lazaret recently occupied by the German medical corps. The M.D.S. opened in the buildings once used by the 29th C.C.S. near Grevillers and it was found that the huts although somewhat damaged by shell fire, were still quite serviceable.
Each day the Division made rapid progress, the German rear guards falling back hurriedly on the Cambrai defences, until about the 8th, increasing resistance on our front made it clear that the retirement was coming to an end, and that the approaches to the Hindenberg line were to be held in force and with determination. The divisional headquarters had reached Villers-au-Flos; the main body of the New Zealanders was in possession of reserve line trenches held by British troops in March, 1917, about Havrincourt and Metz-en Couture. In front was the Treseault spur and a trench system originally British, known as the African trenches. The 3rd Brigade had relieved the 2nd in front line and on the 8th received orders to advance up the Trescault ridge to occupy the African trenches in co-operation with the 17th Division, now part of the IVth Corps. From his office at Reincourt, about a mile south-east of the D.R.S. at the old sugar factory on the Bapaume-Cambrai road, the A.D.M.S.
The first assault on the Trescault spur was on the 9th September, the New Zealand Division being to the south of the village on the road to Gouzeaucourt, where the 3rd Brigade attained all objectives and took nearly 100 prisoners. A copious use of gas shells by the enemy had marked the last two days of his retirement and on this day there was very considerable gas bombardment of the forward areas. A total of 36 gassed patients was tended during the morning, many suffering from the effects of "blue cross" gas, Dichlor-arsene. The wounded of the 1st and 2nd N.Z.R.B. came in early to the A.D.S. at Ytres; the total wounded for the Division being 3 officers and 127 O.R.; only two battalions were concerned, whose combined R.A.P. was in the "Quotient" trench line just in front of Metz-eu-Couture, while the bearer relay posts were at Mill Farm and Neuville. In all, including wounded prisoners, 216 casualties cleared the M.D.S. en route for a C.C.S. at Colincamps. On the following day the 10th, the situation remained generally unchanged, although enemy counter attacks realised minor successes in the African system about Dead Man's Corner. There was heavy gas bombardment of the forward area, our losses from this source being 17. The forward chain of bearer posts was reorganised: from the R.A.P.'s in front of Metz and on the southern edge of Havrincourt wood, a first class road in good condition from Trescault village led into Metz. Just half a mile from the latter village on this road
Meanwhile preparations were in hand for a more important assault on the recalcitrant Trescault spur and the African system, once the old British front line and the point of departure for a portion of our stormers in the surprise attack on Cambrai in November, 1917. Four miles to the north was Burlon Wood and the village of Moeuvres where the 56th Division—the Bow Bells our neighbours at Sailly in 1916—fought the German counter offensive on November, 30th, 1917. The 10th was a cold day and showers fell at intervals; a conference of the A.D.'sM.S. of the IVth Corps was held at Grevillers where the D.D.M.S. had established his office. The 56th C.C.S. had now been advanced to the old C.C.S. site on the road to Biefvillers, previously occupied by us as a M.D.S. The day was "quiet" on our front, the casualties numbered about 60, with a proportion of gassed much above the normal. The following day, the 11th, was spent in preparation for the second attack, which had been postponed 24 hours and was to take place on the morrow. The weather was cold, with intermittent showers. The A.D.M.S. held a conference of his field ambulance commanders at which the divisional orders for the assault, timed for 5.25 a.m. were discussed. With the 38th Division on the right and the 37th on the left, the New Zealand Division was to form the centre of the Corps front and would have three battalions of the 3rd Brigade in the front line. Under a strong barrage furnished by our own and additional batteries of the divisions in Corps reserve the assaulting waves had as final objectives the African system at the top of the ridge dominating Gouzeaucourt and the railway from Cambrai to Peronne less than three miles from the Hindenberg line. The medical arrangements made were these:—No. 3 Field Ambulance with the bearer sections of No. 1 Field Ambulance and a detail of 50 infantrymen attached as stretcher bearers was to evacuate the forward areas to the main car post at Mill Farm, thence to the A.D.S. at Ytres. The most forward R.A.P.'s were in a sunken road leading up towards Dead Man's Corner, a road junction on the top of the ridge about three quarters of a mile eastward. From the sunken road the route was by hand to the Crucifix Corner, just a quarter of a mile out of Metz on the road
Zero hour was at 5.30 a.m., there was heavy fighting. Our left battalion in touch with the 37th Division, early attained the final objective, but resistance increased from the centre to our right, where touch was not obtained with the sister division. Confused fighting in a complex trench system followed and was accidented by strong bombing attacks by the Jägers, which drove in our line—especially bitter the struggle about Dead Man's Corner. The first walking wounded arrived at 6.25 a.m. at Mill Farm about two and a half miles from the front line. They reported the barrage to be "lovely" and all going well. The first lying case was carried down by hand by German prisoners; some time later, Ford cars were able to get up as far as Crucifix Corner. Owing to heavy shelling by high velocity guns the A.D.S. was moved back from Neuviile to Ytres, at least for lying cases, but a small staff remained on at the former post to collect walking wounded. The R.A.P.'s were clear by 11 a.m.; there were few casualties on our right near Gonzeaucourt "Wood: wounded from
The struggle with bomb and bayonet continued during the 13th and 14th, and culminated with a fierce counter attack at night by the Jägers headed by flame throwers, which did not wholly re-establish their line, although we lost some ground. There was increased shell fire on all roads forward of Mill Farm but light cars still penetrated as far as the Crucifix. No alteration in medical dispositions were made, the wounded evacuated being over 160 each day with increasing numbers of gassed. Night bombing, the terror of the moonlight, was severe in the back areas, about the A.D.S. especially, and although there were many casualties in the neighbourhood none actually in the N.Z.M.C. parties. But those who, on the night of the 13th, saw two German bombing planes blazing a fearful cometlike trail through the dark as they crashed to their doom, forgot to rejoice.
Relief was at hand, and, on the 15th, the 5th Division took over our sector. Parties from the 13th and 14th Field Ambulances infiltrated our medical posts, and the Division went into rest after four weeks almost continuous fighting, the divisional headquarters at Favreuil, the ambulances about Bihucourt and Biefvillers.
The victorious campaign of the Allied Armies which opened in the last days of September, 1918, comprised the greatest battles recorded in History. Seven nations in arms contested the western field with millions of skilled fighters possessed of weapons and engines of destruction which even at the outset of the Great War were unknown and undreamed of. The objective of this world clash was the immediate and utter destruction of the field forces of the Germanic League. Heretofore no such operations planned to end the war by a succession of rapidly falling strokes had been possible; equality in means and will to fight made the contestants so evenly matched that for years there could could be no decision. But now, in the autumn of the fifth year of the war, conditions on the western front were changed; the breaking down of the German Armies, aggravated by their fruitless offensive in the summer, had been made manifest by the Entente successes in August and early September. The united Allied Command could now at long last, previse the speedy overthrow of their opponents and, with all confidence possible in warlike ventures, hope for decisive results from their well matured and skilfully devised scheme of operations.
The central idea in this great strategic concept was the seizure of that knot of railway communications which is included in the triangle Valenciennes—Maubeuge—Mons, into which the British Expeditionary Force had been hurried in 1914, and once driven out, had ever since striven to regain. It was the central ganglion of the German communications that controlled the maintenance of their armies in France from Lille to Metz. Such a stroke, if successful, would end the war by breaking the military power of Germany and that instantly. The position of the German Armies in France was indeed critical: added to the losses in men and material which they had sustained during their six months summer offensive, was the manifest loss of morale caused by the knowledge that the Entente Powers were waxing daily in strength by the reinforcement of American Divisions. The collapse
The task elected by
The final campaign opened on the 26th September in the Argonne to the west of the Meuse, where powerful American and French Armies attacked towards Mezières on a wide front. On the 27th Haig's First and Third Armies broke through the Hindenberg line on the Canal du Nord at Moeuvres, gaining the east bank of the canal and extending their front from the Sensée innundations to Burlon Wood. On the 28th the battle line included Gouzeaucourt; 10,000 prisoners and 200 guns had been taken and the left shoulder of the British battle front was brought up level with the right. The Fourth Army struck on the 29th and the whole British front from St. Quentin to the Sensée was ablaze. In Flanders the King of the Belgians was leading his Armies up the road to Paaschendaele, and directing Plummer's Second Army towards Messines, Ploegsteert Wood and Armentières. Everywhere on the Allied fronts from Baghdad to Dixmude the Entente forces were advancing. By the 1st of October New Zealand machine-gunners were entering Damascus, the Serbian Army was on the banks of the Danube; the Hindenberg line was broken; while at Spa, in the Ardennes, Ludendorf was solemnly announcing to his War Lord that the end had come and that Germany must sue for peace—and that instantly.
The principal events in the Battle of St. Quentin-Cambrai in which the New Zealand Division was concerned comprise the passage of the Hindenberg line at Welsh Ridge and Bonavis spur on the 29th of September; the advance to the Scheldt Canal south of Cambrai on the 30th; the establishment of a bridge head at Crèveeoeur on the 1st October; and the final passage of the canal on the 5th.
During the short rest period close attention had been directed to anti-gas training as the daily harassing fire with blue and yellow cross gases had materially increased the casualties in the IVth Corps, from which, in one week, no less than 188 gassed casualties had been evacuated to C.C.S. Artillery units were chiefly affected, and in most instances, owing to the men continuing to work in areas where low concentrations of gas persisted. Lectures and gas drills were given daily to all units and particular care was devoted to the gas training of the ambulance personnel, who were very liable to suffer from want of attention to necessary precautions. The equipment of the field
On the 26th orders were issued for the concentration of the Division in the Havrincourt area, and at 6 p.m. the same day the 2nd Brigade group accompanied by the 1st Field Ambulance were on the march. During the day a conference of field ambulance commanders was held at the A.D.M.S.'s office. It had been arranged that No. 1 Field Ambulance under Lieut.-Col. Craig should take over the duties of forward evacuations and man the A.D.S. in the forthcoming operations, and that Lieut.-Col. Murray, D.S.O., should hand over the D.R.S. to Lieut.-Col. Hardie Neil, and assume the duties of the M.D.S. On the 27th the 2nd Brigade was still moving up by lorries to the vicinity of Bertincourt The IVth Corps was attacking with the 42nd Division on the following day. The A.D.M.S. inspected the 2nd Field Ambulance in marching order, and the advance parties of No. 2 and No. 3 Field Ambulances were on the move. In the evening No. 1 Field
During the day Colonel McGavin had reconnoitred Trescault with Lieut.-Col. Craig and it was decided to establish the A.D.S. in the ruins of the village whence somewhat damaged roads led forward to Ribecourt and Villers Pluich in the direction of the advance of the attacking brigades. A dense network of trenches, part of the main Hindenberg line, ran diagonally through the divisional front from Laffaux. Wood towards Ribecourt and Trescault. At Ruyaulcourt a site for the M.D.S. had been visited by Lieut.-Col. Murray and the A.D.M.S., and the 42nd Divisional Ambulance parties there were to hand over to our No. 2 Field Ambulance that evening. It had rained during the day, the weather was cold and the sky overcast, but the rolling character of the terrain suggested little danger of mud interfering with the evacuations. All available transport and personnel were now sent forward to Trescault providing Lieut.-Col. Craig with 106 extra N.Z.M.C. bearers, four small and six large ambulance cars in addition to his own transport, besides some horsed ambulance waggons. That evening the A.D.M.S. wrote the medical corps orders, which follow, and which are reproduced in full because they represent what may be considered to be typical divisional medical orders of this important period and because of their brevity so markedly in contrast to the very voluminous medical arrangementst of the years of static warfare.
Copy.SecretCopy No. 11 New Zealand Division.Headquarters, 28th Sept., 1918. N.Z.M.C. OrderNo. 71by , D.S.O., A.D.M.S. ColonelD. J. McGavin New Zealand Division.Reference Map:—57.D: 1: 40,000.
- Information.
- On the night September 28th/29th the New Zealand Division will pass through, the 42nd Division and continue the advance:
- To complete the capture of the Bonavis Ridge;
- To secure the bridgeheads across the Canal de St. Quentin and Escault River between Vaucelles and Crevecoeur sur L'Escault, both inclusive.
In the event of La Vacquerie and the Bonavis Ridge being in the enemy's possession, the 2nd New Zealand Infantry Brigade (on right) and 1st New Zealand Infantry Brigade (on left) will attack in conjunction with the 5th Division on that night by moonlight.
Zero Hour will be 3.30 a.m.
- The 3rd (Rifle) Brigade Group will be prepared to move at 6 a.m. on September 29th to relieve reserve brigades of 42nd Division in an area east of Trescault.
- O.C. No. 1 New Zealand Field Ambulance will:
- Establish advanced dressing station at Trescault forthwith;
- Detail one bearer squad and runner to each battalion of 1st and 2nd New Zealand Infantry Brigades forthwith;
- Place bearer relay posts and car posts at suitable locations with reference to regimental aid posts when these are established.
- O.C. No. 2 New Zealand Field Ambulance will take over the main dressing station at Ruyaulcourt from 42nd Division forthwith.
Evacuations of wounded from R.A.P.'s to M.D.S. will be by hand carriage, wheeled stretchers and field ambulance cars.
O.C. No. 1 New Zealand Field Ambulance will have, at his disposal all cars of No. 2 New Zealand Field Ambulance and all except two large cars of No. 3 New Zealand Field Ambulance. These cars will be sent forward to Trescault by O's.C. Nos.
2 and 3 New Zealand Field Ambulance forthwith. He will also have at his disposal the horsed ambulance waggons of Nos. 2 and 3 New Zealand Field Ambulance.
- From main dressing station stretcher cases will be evacuated by cars of 21st M.A.C. and walking cases by:
- Light railway from walking wounded entraining post at Ruyaulcourt (P.9.d.8.2.);
- by busses and lorries provided by 21st M.A.C.
- The A.D.S. will be established and be prepared to open at 5 a.m. on 29th September.
- Office of A.D.M.S. will open at Velu on 29th September at an hour to be notified later.
- New Zealand Field Ambulances to Acknowledge.
(Sgd.) D. McGavin, Colonel, A.D.M.S., New Zealand Division.Distribution: (9.30 p.m.):—
- D.D.M.S., IVth Corps.
- "G" New Zealand Division.
- "A" and "Q" New Zealand Division.
- O.C. No. 1 New Zealand Field Ambulance.
- O.C. No. 2 New Zealand Field Ambulance.
- O.C. No. 3 New Zealand Field Ambulance.
- A.D.M.S. 42nd Division.
- War Diary.
- File.
- Headquarters. 1st New Zealand Infantry Brigade.
- Headquarters. 2nd New Zealand Infantry Brigade.
- Headquarters. 3rd New Zealand (R) Brigade
No. 1 Field Ambulance on receipt of these orders moved into Trescault and despatched N.Z.M.C. runners and bearers to the 1st Brigade. Both brigade headquarters were near Ribecourt, two miles further north on the road to Marcoing. By some strange accident to the motor cyclist Lieut.-Col Murray did not get his orders until 1.30 a.m. on the 29th, he was then at Bus, west of Ytres but by 3 a.m. he had opened at Ruyaulcourt in some Nissen huts and farm buildings previously used by the 42nd Division as a main dressing station.
At 3.30 a.m. in moonlight, our Infantry battalions advanced across the Couillet Valley and in conjunction with the 5th Division on the right and the 62nd on their left, attacked the Bon Avis Ridge and La Vacherie at daybreak. By 9 o'clock the ridge was firmly held and our patrols were pushing down to the canal banks; our losses were not heavy. The wounded of our own and neighbouring divisions and German wounded were passing through Trescault A.D.S. early in the morning, but the first waves did not reach the M.D.S. at Ruyaulcourt until 8 a.m. The delay was due in part to the distance—four miles to the A.D.S., but mainly to the bad conditions of the forward roads from Metz-en-couture to Ribecourt. There was no difficulty however, in evacuating; car posts were pushed forward towards
The weather had been fine all day but rain came on in the evening and continued throughout almost the whole of the night. Owing to persistent shelling in Trescault the A.D.S. was advanced at 7 p.m. to a sunken road half way between Trescault and Ribecourt where a car post had been established earlier in the day. The main German trenches crossed the road at this point affording cover and shelter in the deep dugouts which were plentiful. Apart from this move and some slight delay in clearing stretcher cases from Trescault the evacuations proceeded smoothly. Up to 10 p.m. another 100 wounded had reached the M.D.S but during the remainder of the night few wounded came in. The day had been a successful one, much ground had been gained and well over 1000 prisoners taken. During the night the orders were to continue the advance, but it rained incessantly until 2 a.m. and the night was very dark. The enemy held the eastern bank of the canal and river, and appeared to be increasing his numbers. Our further advance was consequently delayed until daylight. According to Corps information the Germans were retiring to eastwards of the water ways and the chief opposition, it was anticipated, would be met with in the passage of the Canal. This information must have been accurate else the brigades could not have penetrated the trench zone with such apparent ease and at so slight a cost.
Rain ceased at 2 a.m. on the 30th, and two hours later the enemy artillery fire fell upon the assembly points of our infantry who just before daylight were advancing against Crèvecoeur and Vaucelles. Small parties penetrated across the stone bridge at Crèvecoeur but beyond this no further progress was made that day. The ground had dried up during the morning; the evacuation of the wounded presented no difficulties. A car post was established in the Couillet Valley, at the junction of the roads
At 5.30 a.m. on the first of October, the 1st and 2nd Brigades were pushing on in their attempt to cross the Canal. Part of the 1st Brigade passed the water ways by the bridges at Les Rues Vertes and emerging from the village of Masnières made a bold stroke for the northern outskirts of Crèvecoeur. Rumilly to the north was still in German hands, the 3rd Division were attacking there. By 8 a.m. the 2nd Wellington Battalion had joined hands with the 2nd Brigade in Crèvecoeur, but the 1st Auckland Battalion to the north met with stubborn resistance about the road to Cambrai and pushing on beyond with considerable losses were met by a strong counter attack from Serainvillers which drove them back to the Cambrai road at a point where it passed through a cutting just about half a mile north of Crèvecoeur. A wayside crucifix looked down on the road at this point which became a calvary for many of the Aucklanders. After 11 a.m. a car post had been pushed forward to the south of Rue Vertes at the junction with the Marcoing road. At 1 p.m. a message from the 1st Brigade reached the A.D.M.S.
"Namo casualties estimated 60 O.R. R.M.O. unable to cope with situation can Deri send doctor and strong stretcher squads to mon Plaisir Farm G 27d.9.7. to assist and cars to cross roads G 32 b.oo.7o aaa addsd Fetu reptd Deri (signed) Huni 1300."
This obscure missive was quite clear print to the A.D.M.S. whose code name was Deri and explained that Huni, the 1st Brigade, wanted help at a farm just a mile east of Masnières on the road to Crèvecoeur where casualties of the 1st Auckland Battalion had accumulated. Captain Ardagh, M.C., N.Z.M.C., had moved his medical detachment across the canal about 10 a.m. and pushing on in rear of his battalion established his aid post at a farm curiously named "Mon Plaisir." The heavy fighting about the crucifix brought down a large wave of wounded to
At 10 p.m. Rumilly was reported to be occupied by the 3rd Division and on receipt of this information the A.D.M.S. issued instruction for the M.D.S. to move forward to Ribecourt and for the A.D.S. to be advanced to Rues Vertes to positions which he bad reconnoitred during the day. It had been a day of hard fighting, over 1000 prisoners had been taken. We had succeeded in making a secure lodgment in Crèvecoeur; but towards Vaucelles no advance was made beyond the Canal line—the Beaurevoir-Masnières defensive system, heavily wired, was still intact south of Crèvecoeur.
It rained hard during the night but all wounded were safely in. and a fine clear morning followed. The New Zealand Division found its line thrust eastwards into a sharp salient about Crèvecoeur so that no further advance on our part was desirable until the supporting divisions made progress on our right and left. At 10 a.m. the M.D.S. opened at the southern end of Ribecourt village in farm buildings much battered by shell fire. A party of 50 New Zealand Pioneers under an officer was attached for the purpose of clearing the rooms of debris and making roads through the large farmyard which was littered with broken material fallen from the damaged barns. The A.D.S. was in a quarry by the side of the road just at the southern entrance to Rues Vertes; a large dugout offered shelter for about 40 stretcher cases and operating tents provided the necessary dressing rooms. On account of the exposed position and shelling of the road no reserve of ambulance transport could be maintained at this post, all of it was sent back to the M.D.S. At a ear post, pushed forward along the road south of the canal and about two miles west of Crèvecoeur, one small car was kept and was fed by a bearer relay on the eastern edge of Masnières, north of the canal.
Up to the 5th no further move was made, the medical posts remaining unchanged, the number of wounded collected well
Signs of a German withdrawal were clearly seen on October the 5th: the IVth Army to the south had penetrated and turned the Beaurevoir-Masnières line, the Germans were shelling Vaucelles; it was time to be up and doing. Our patrols pushed forward across the bridge at Vaucelles and climbed the wooded heights beyond. By 1 p.m. the 3rd Brigade had reached the old Mill of Lesdain and another pleasant farm named Bel Aise while the 2nd Brigade were clearing the Cheneaux Wood. The weather was fine and warmer, and casualties were few, the total for the day was under 70, of which 41 were New Zealanders; but the following day owing to heavy shelling of the back and front areas our casualties were somewhat increased: over 100 were evacuated and we had two stretcher bearers killed. No important moves except a readjustment of the divisional front took place, and on the 7th the A.D.M.S. whose office had moved from Bertincourt to Trescault was making arrangements in view of a combined attack on the Masnières line timed for 4.30 am. on the 8th. Winter time had been introduced on the night of the 6th so that the zero hour now corresponded to mean solar time.
On the 8th the Third and Fourth Armies were resuming the attack with the object of exploiting their penetration of the Hindenberg defences. On the IVth Corps front the 37th Division on the right about Vaucelles, the New Zealand Division at Grèvecoeur and the 3rd Division on the left in the neighbourhood of Serianvillers were to advance to objectives about Esnes. No change in the medical dispositions was necessary as the advance was of limited depth. The night passed quietly, only 17 wounded were admitted to the M.D.S. The morning was dull, favouring our movements. By 8 a.m. the 3rd Brigade reported all objectives attained; they were in Esnes and patrols were in | Longsart, nearly a mile further east. Many prisoners had been taken and much of our artillery was across the canal and in action on the east bank by 1 p.m.
At 7 a.m. all the horsed ambulance waggons were brought up to the A.D.S. and a car post was advanced to the north of Crèvecoeur in close touch with the B.A.P.'s. By 8 a.m. the walking wounded and some stretcher
Especially happy and patient were the German wounded; a burly Saxon lying contentedly on his stretcher, ravenously munching a large chunk of bread and butter and drinking with gratitude from a mug of cocoa, was jocularly asked by one of our medical officers to sing the hymn of hate while he was inspecting the injury—a flesh wound of the thigh. "Give us a Gott Straafe Fritzy," said the major. "Nein! nein!" beamed the Saxon through his wide horn rimmed glasses, "a Gott Straafe vil I not gif," and went on volubly to explain that he was a Saxon of the blue eye and fair hair, that Saxons and Anglo-Saxons were cousins, that the war was a cruel business in which only the capitalist thrived while the worker suffered and died to save the plutocrat, and a lot more of Lord Northcliffe's propaganda stuff with which the German soldiers had been fed by our aeroplanes for weeks past. Happily wounded, and away from the hunger and misery of it all the Saxon soldier, in a torrent of broken English, expressed his gratitude and proclaimed aloud the universal brotherhood of man. Of such thoughts and intense sensations—for the Saxons are a kindly sentimental people, but little less so than the Anglo-Saxons—the German revolution of November, was born.
At 7 p.m. a second trainload of walking wounded was despatched, but the number of stretcher cases awaiting evacuation was considerable, there were very large numbers of German stretcher cases coming in. Evidently the fighting had been severe. Lieut.-Col. Craig managed to get cars up to Crèvecoeur late in the afternoon, which greatly facilitated the evacuations and reported all R.A.P.'s clear at 6.30 p.m., but the A.D.S. was not clear until 10.30 by which time the stream of wounded had dried up somewhat. The A.D.M.S. reported his medical arrangements as working without a hitch, and the numbers of wounded of the New Zealand Division cleared by 7 p.m. as 17 officers, 181 O.R. and, in all, 476 casualties evacuated during the 24 hours. But at the M.D.S. the work continued during the night, the dressing tables were just able to keep pace with the evacuations and at 11 p.m. there were still 60 stretcher cases in the yard awaiting attention: many of these German wounded recently come in from the A.D.S. Towards midnight a few extra cars were obtained from the 30th M.A.C. which helped to relieve the temporary congestion, but the station was not wholly clear until 6 a.m. the following morning. In the 24 hours ending at 10 a.m. on the 9th the M.D.S. had evacuated 843 wounded, of which 50 per cent. were stretcher cases; the New Zealand Division had sustained in the neighbourhood of 460 casualties exclusive of killed. We had now definitely smashed through the Hindenberg line and the whole division was across the canals and the Masnières line; in front lay open country towards Le Cateau, whither the Germans were hurriedly withdrawing through wooded lands untouched by war.
If we include the penetration of that portion of the Beaurevoir-Masnières system with its 50 yard deep belts of heavy German wire which still barred our way to open country on the morning of the 8th, the passage of the Hindenberg system by the New Zealand Division may be said to have occupied 10 days from the 29th September to the 8th of October, both days included, during which period of continuous fighting, some 7 miles of trenched positions was passed with a total casualty list of under 2000 killed, missing or wounded; actually the M.D.S. evacuated 1399 wounded of the New Zealand Division from the 29th to the 9th of October. The number of wounded reported to the A. and Q. Branch by battalions was 1345, while 238 were reported killed and 365 missing. A large proportion of the missing, no doubt, were killed as we lost few prisoners; but some of the missing had passed through extra-divisional dressing stations. The casualties
On the 9th before dawn, a touch of early frost whipping the air the 2nd Brigade were advancing under a barrage, but they met with no resistance, the Germans had withdrawn to the line of the Selle River. Through Longsart our Brigade passed at nine and by dusk had pushed patrols into Fontaine-au-Pire and Caudry, having covered three miles during the day. Very few wounded came in to the A.D.S. which at 3.30 moved up to Longsart and opened in small farm buildings. A site for the M.D.S. had been selected during the morning and late in the afternoon Lieut.-Col Murray took over a large farm at Le Grand Pont hamlet half a mile west of Esnes. Divisional headquarters were at Lesdain in the evening; the A.D.M.S. reported 26 wounded admitted for the day. At the M.D.S. the buildings were undamaged by shell fire and afforded warm billets for the ambulance personnel in the out houses and barns; bunks with fine wood shavings used by the German troops provided beds, a luxury unknown for many days past. A party of eight unwounded Germans was found to be hiding in the barn, and was, for the nonce, attached to the field ambulance for general duties.
During the two following days the advance continued until Briastre and the crossings of the Selle were reached, where a halt was imposed by stern Jägers, who held the eastern banks. Our advance guard was over the river by the night of the 11th having passed by an improvised bridge thrown across by our Engineers, but a formal attack was necessary to force the stoutly held positions; this was arranged for on the 12th. At the M.D.S. the German prisoners proved useful, two of them were engineers employed in demolition work, and in gratitude for their kindly treatment by the ambulance no doubt, they extracted two large unexploded mines from the farm precincts. No. 3 Field Ambulance was now ordered up from Bapaume, and on the 11th took over the Grand Pont station from Lieut.-Col. Murray who advanced his M.D.S. to the A.D.S. site at Longsart in a small cluster of farm buildings providing only limited accommodation. The A.D.S. moved to Fontaine au Pire.
The battle of the 12th was to establish the Division on the eastern banks of the Selle in front of Briastre. The attack was
The 1st Wellington Battalion had to fight hard to make good the bridge head, and it was not until 6 p.m. on the 12th that they captured the Bellevue Station on the railway running to Solesmes. The Jäger Division which had previously rough handled the 3rd Brigade at Dead Man's Corner had to give way, but they fought to the last and very few of them surrendered. At the A.D.S. some 100 casualties from the Division were brought down from a car post west of Veisly and a bearer relay in the vicinity of the village. The M.D.S. was moved into Beauvois during the afternoon and opened at 5 p.m. in a large building, evidently a school, which had been used as a hospital for lightly wounded and sick by the German Medical Corps. There was good accommodation: the buildings being untouched by shell fire, the windows even intact and above on the top floor were warm rooms furnished with bunks where the personnel found comfortable quarters. Shortly after midnight the station was clear; the run to C.C.S. was now consuming seven hours but there was no congestion of wounded as the numbers fell off considerably after 6 p.m. That night command of the sector passed to the 42nd East Lancashire Division and the New Zealand Division went into reserve in the area which they had captured about Beauvois Esnes and Longsart where the few civilians remaining did their best to make them welcome.
During the operations which had been initiated on the 29th of September, up to the 13th of October, a period covering a fortnight's constant and at times severe fighting, the A.D.M.S. reported that the evacuation of wounded had invariably been carried out rapidly without any apparent difficulty and without serious losses to medical personnel, a success which he attributes to the satisfactory condition of the roads which enabled motor cars to be pushed well forward and allowed the bearers to use wheeled stretchers to the fullest extent. During 16 days of September 94 officers and 2264 O.R. wounded passed through the dressing stations and for
Of the missing many were killed, a. few admitted to other formations as we lost an insignificant number of prisoners. The discrepancy between the numbers of New Zealand wounded evacuated from the M.D.S., 1572, and the figures reported to the A.A. and Q.M.G. may be accounted for in several ways. Many wounded suffering from trivial wounds remained on duty; a few would be discharged from the A.D.S. to their unit, others after an injection of A.T.S. at M.D.S. would go back to their battalions.
There was no alteration of importance in the medical dispositions during the period of rest, except that a dental hospital was opened at Beauvois and one dental section was attached for duty to No. 3 Field Ambulance. With rest and the usual training the health of the Division improved considerably, the sick rate being 8.8 per 1000 on the 19th October, well below the average of the Third Army. Already some grumblings of the winter influenza epidemic, much more severe than the summer affliction, were heard: it was prevalent in all European countries Pneumococcus shown by New Zealand soldiers it had been agreed to immunise the incoming reinforcements with a mixed catarrhal vaccine prepared by Dr. Eyre of St. Thomas' Hospital in collaboration with Captain Lowe, N.Z.M.C., bacteriologist at No. 2 New Zealand General Hospital.
The prophylactic inoculation with two doses of the original vaccine caused little disturbance and was made obligatory for incoming reinforcements. But the very serious late autumn outbreak of purulent bronchitis on the transport "Tahiti," carrying the 40th Reinforcements stated to be associated with I influenza, and the summer epidemic of influenza in England, brought universal immunisation for New Zealand troops in England into practice at the end of September, 1918; but rather late, as it proved, for the winter epidemic, which caught some of the camps during the very process of immunisation. The advisability of immunising the New Zealand troops in France was suggested to Colonel McGavin by Colonel Parkes, but the opinion of the consulting physician of the Third Army, Colonel Heringham, was not then strongly favourable to the proposal, nor did the A.D.M.S. of the New Zealand Division consider the moment opportune for such immunisation, as the Division was engaged in active operations of a critical nature. The proposal was not adopted in France, although in England, Lowe and Eyre claimed encouraging results from the prophylactic injections. In the last weeks of October the first wave of the epidemic was upon the Division and was considered to have been introduced by men returning from leave in the United Kingdom as the spread was
But the passage of the Selle river was not yet completed: the enemy was holding the crossings in strength and seemed to have adequate artillery support. The line of the Sambre and Oise Canal to the south of the Selle was forced on the 19th by the Fourth Army and American troops, and on the 20th the Third Army was again attacking the disputed crossings of the Selle north of Le Cateau. That day the 42nd Division, on our Corps front, marched at 2 a.m. from Briastre, and although held up by serious resistance, much wire, and frequent counter attacks, advanced to positions a mile east of Solesmes. It was now the turn of the New Zealand Division to exploit the success.
Our Division was to pass through the 42nd at 8.40 a.m. on the 23rd, a determined advance was to be pushed through under barrage with the object of seizing bridges across the Ecaillon river at Beaudignies near Le Quesnoy. Our brigades were concentrating on the 22nd, the 2nd Brigade was to lead the advance. At a conference of field ambulance commanders at the office of the A.D.M.S. at Beauvois on the 22nd there was a final revision of the medical arrangements. No. 1 Field Ambulance had by now taken over the M.D.S. at Beauvois as a D.R.S. and was instructed to admit and hold all sick collected during the operation. Lieut.-Col Murray, was ordered to take the duties of forward evacuating officer; already a site for an A.D.S. at Solesmes had been reconnoitred by Major Jory, N.Z.M.C. and advanced parties sent on in the early afternoon. No. 3 Field Ambulance under Lieut.-Col. Hardie Neil, that day decorated with the D.S.O. for his good work about Bancourt, was to open a M.D.S. at Veisly; his advanced party of one tent subdivision under Major Goldstein, M.C., was moving up to take over. Lieut.-Col. Murray returned to his unit, now marching in heavy rain to Solesmes, the bearers, without packs, on foot, the tent subdivisions with light stores transported in motor ambulances. The packs and heavy equipment had been stored at Beauvois. 40 bearers were detached to the 2nd Brigade; one runner, eight bearers to each R.M.O.,
No less than four divisions of the IVth Corps were advancing on the same narrow front on the 23rd and at the appointed hour the New Zealand Division represented by the 2nd Brigade with the 37th Division on their right, passed through the 42nd and 5th Divisions respectively. Our 2nd Brigade, from in front of Romeries astride the road to Baudignies met no opposition until descending the western slopes of the St. Georges River: here they had casualties from artillery and machine-gun fire, but pressing on they found the enemy resistance rapidly failing. Baudignies was taken, and through the night the two bridges at that village across the Ecaillon were made secure by outposts 1000 yards to the eastwards of the crossing. The casualties had not been heavy. At 8.30 a.m. the A.D.S. opened at the Brasserie L'Abbaye in Solesmes: a fine, roomy building with good cellars, but as the Germans had recently used it for stabling their horses, it needed vigorous work through the night to prepare for the reception of wounded. In the cellars, which were well lighted, and well ventilated, a dressing room capable of accommodating 100 stretcher cases was made ready with a reception room for walking wounded in the office. Lightly wounded were arriving by 10 a.m. and a car post had been established in a sunken road south of Romeries. The bearer relay post occupied a farm at the
Divisional headquarters having moved into Solesmes in the afternoon the A.D.M.S. proceeded to reconnoitre an advanced position for the A.D.S. and selected the farm at Vertigneul at present used as a bearer relay. As the result of the fighting about Baudignies, many more wounded came in through the night. The following morning the A.D.S. advanced to Vertigneul where the farm buildings offered only moderate accommodation, the M.D.S. moved up to Solesmes taking over the Brasserie previously occupied by No. 2 Field Ambulance. There was considerable shelling of the divisional area during the day, increasing our casualties, and by 6 p.m. the wounded of the Division admitted was over 200 for the previous 24 hours, or about 300 for the two days. Amongst the wounded there was a high percentage of gas casualties. We had 1 killed and 4 wounded in the N.Z.M.C. owing to heavy shelling of the forward areas during the day. The car post had been advanced to Pont-a-Pierre and the bearer relay close in to Baudignies, but the same congestion of traffic delayed evacuations and the roads were in poor condition. All R.A.P.'s were reported clear by 6.30 p.m.
The days that followed until the end of the month were occupied in semi-trench warfare, a gradual infiltration of the German rearguard positions; the daily casualties not exceeding 40 to 50; there were no concerted operations and no alteration in the medical dispositions. By the 27th the New Zealand outposts had crossed the vital railway to Valenciennes. That, day there were many gas casualties, and so serious was the gas concentration that it became necessary to remove all civilians in the vicinity of Baudignies in our ambulance cars; while we lost a car post, blown up at Pont-a-Pierre, with four casualties to the N.Z.M.C. party there. In order to avoid the shelled area a road
Valenciennes was entered by the Canadians on the 1st of November, but as yet no signs of a German retirement were evident in front of the Third and Fourth armies between the Scheldt and the Sambre. Too much valuable war material was lying just behind the German front now on the point of withdrawing to the Antwerp-Meuse position. The war material they were attempting to salvage but, above all, the 80,000 German wounded in feld lazarets and forward hospitals must be removed to safety. Marshal von Hindenberg tells us that the wounded could not be left behind for the honour of the German Armies; while Ludendorf curiously deplores the loss of his delousing stations, which had to be abandoned. At no point in the advance of the New Zealand Division did we overrun any German field hospitals yet open, the wounded that remained in our hands we gathered in from the field, casualties of the day. Great indeed must have been the energy and determination of the German Sanitats Kompagnien who so faithfully evacuated their wounded, and with very poor transport, from the rapidly crumbling rear guards. In order to hasten and to demoralise the retreat a general advance by the First, Third and Fourth Armies over a 30 mile front from Valenciennes south to Oisy on the Sambre, was ordered for the 4th November; the final operation of the Great War.
The part to be played by the New Zealand Division was to capture Le Quesnoy, clear part of the Mormal Forest, and advance to objectives beyond it on the road to Bavais and Mons. The last battle fought by the New Zealanders in the Great War, the most successful operation of the Division, was graced with a tincture of romantic adventure. Guarding the high road to Bavais and Mons lay, pathetic anachronism, an 18th century fortress, perfect miniature of Vauban's geometric art. The last in the chain of frontier fortresses which barred Marlborough's road to Versailles after Malplaquet and from whose walls the sullen shamefaced British troops were drawn off by secret pact in 1712, while Prince Eugene pursued the siege alone. Those were the spangled days of Pompadour warfare and sieges "according to the art"; and if the battles were few, the slaughter and the sufferings of the wounded were great. Both armies had combined to clear the battlefield of wounded, two days after the costly victory at Malplaquet where 20.000 dead and wounded lay
But Quesnoy was not to be attacked; too many defenceless civilians mostly women and children were within the walls. Le Quesnoy, the strong place, was to be denied the last rites, the rubric and ritual of a siege according to the decencies of the art, not battered by a siege train nor approached by sap and parallel but gently veiled in a smoke screen projected from our guns while our brigades brushing swiftly by and joining hands to the eastwards broke through the forest beyond, leaving Vauban's masterpiece in the hands of a mopping up party!
Such in brief were the battle orders of the Division examined at a conference of ambulance commanders in the office of the A.D.M.S. at Solesmes on the 3rd of November. The medical dispositions included the advance of the A.D.S. to Baudignies where it was to open at 8 a.m. on the 4th, and, as the battle line went forward, was to push on about midday to the eastern vicinity of Quesnoy in a locality to be decided upon by reconnaissance in the morning. A car post to be established at the eastern outskirts of Baudignies would serve a bearer relay posted in the sunken road leading to Orsinval near the Fort Martin farm. All the bearers of No. 1 Field Ambulance and all available ambulance waggons were to be placed at the disposal of the commander of the A.D.S. and the usual complement of N.Z.M.C. bearers and runners was to be distributed over night to the R.M.O.'s about to be engaged.
At 5.30 a.m. on a misty morning the 30 mile battle line advanced: the New Zealanders, hidden by the smoke screen and sheltered by their barrage, completed the envelopment of Le Quesnoy, taking many guns and prisoners. By noon the 1st Brigade passing through the 3rd was advancing from Herbingnies but Le Quesnoy, now several thousand yards in rear of our front line, still held out. By 6.30 a.m. walking wounded and stretcher
Le Quesnoy, not to be denied, after the customary summons to the garrison—our trumpet was an aero plane—was ultimately taken by assault and escalade. With ordnance strangely suggestive of the top boots of my Uncle Toby, the fire from the ramparts was beaten down; the covered way was crowned; the outer ditch crossed; the garrison driven from the ravelin. And at 4.30 p.m. impatient riflemen crossing the caponier and the tenaille, gained the foot of the curtain by a stone weir—said to have been erected by a bishop who wanted a carp pond and who evidently cared nothing about the art of fortification. Two officers planted their ladder against the 30 foot curtain, so gaining the ramparts, other riflemen at their heels drove the garrison into the casemates and flung open the Valenciennes gates to our advance. If we except the taking of Ulm which was surprised in 1706 by young personable officers camouflaged as ladies, no such headlong wooing of a fortress is recorded in history: the siege lasted four and a half hours only from the investment to the capture by assault. History repeating itself could again say, as the French had written when they retook Le Quesnoy in 1712, "A warmer siege was never seen."
By 6 p.m. 98 stretcher cases and 193 sitting had been evacuated and 7 mortally wounded had died in the A.D.S. Three German R.M.O.'s and their dressers were now attending to the German wounded, but it was not until 10.30 p.m. that the A.D.S. was clear. Lorries coming up in the evening assisted in removing the last of the German walking wounded. During the 14 hours that had elapsed since zero hour, the total of wounded treated and evacuated was 860, of these, 246 stretcher cases. Close touch had been kept with all R.A.P.'s of the 1st Brigade, now far to
At daybreak the 2nd Brigade passing through our outposts worked their way along the northern fringe of the Mormal Forest and by evening had emerged on the eastern limits within a few miles of Bavais. Heavy rain coming on about 9 o'clock clogged the roads for transport and delayed the passage of wounded to the M.D.S. now pushed on to Baudignies. At midday the 3rd Field Ambulance took over the "Hospital Civil et Militaire" in the Rue Thiers in Le Quesnoy. The building had been recently used by the Germans as a military hospital and was found littered with debris and in a very untidy condition. A sister of charity was the only attendant left. The military side of the hospital built in brick was modern and had five good wards of 20 beds each with a well fitted operating theatre. The civilian hospital had several wards and side rooms; the administrative block, out offices, and kitchen, were all of a useful and commodious type. No such ambulance location had ever before fallen into our hands. Wounded came in during the afternoon from our own and other divisions, and later a large batch of German wounded with their medical officers and orderlies were discovered in the casemates of the town ramparts, evidently the regimental medical detachment; in. all 20 German stretcher cases were brought in. The heavy rain prevented the evacuation of the hospital during the night, but comfortable quarters and an abundance of palliasses stuffed with fine shavings, spoils of the victors, aided by the enraptured attentions of the liberated civilian townsfolk, made all snug and comfortable. At 6.30 p.m. command of the sector passed to the 42nd Division and the New Zealand Brigades had orders to withdraw into billets in the neighbourhood of the captured city. By 10 p.m., when Lieut.-Col Murray closed his A.D.S. and opened a temporary M.D.S. for the 42nd Division, he had evacuated for the previous 24 hours: 50 stretcher cases and 79 sitting. The total wounded treated by the ambulances from the 4th to the end of the operations at Le Quesnoy as reported by the A.D.M.S. was: officers, 25; O.R., 436; the total evacuated: 785, including 165 wounded prisoners of war; while the N.Z.M.C. casualties included in the total were 3 wounded, 1 critically. Amongst the wounded was an odd case needing special lines of evacuation:
Our last battle had been extraordinarily successful. The Division had advanced seven miles in two days, had captured a fortress and several villages, had taken over 2000 prisoners and many guns; and our losses were very light in proportion to the gains achieved. The 2nd Field Ambulance continued to function as an M.D.S. until early on the 6th, as the 42nd Divisional R.A.M.C. had difficulty in getting up stores owing to the congestion of the roads. Bridges across the Prechettes stream had been destroyed and at one point near Pont Billon it was found necessary to drag one of our light ambulance waggons across a railway bridge as the only practicable route for the returning advanced bearers who came in by 10 a.m. By midday all New Zealand wounded were clear of the 2nd Field Ambulance, only some German wounded in charge of their own medical officers and orderlies remained; these were the last wounded to be admitted and discharged from a New Zealand Field Ambulance. At Le Quesnoy No. 3 Field Ambulance was busily engaged in making ready for any emergencies at the hospital. By orders of the Maire a bevy of women and children all armed with brooms, besoms, and other implements of cleanliness, appeared in the wake of the town crier and fell upon the wards and rooms of the Hospital which Lieut.-Col. Hardie Neil had taken over under very unsatisfactory conditions from the outgoing unit—as he states in his diary. But a detail of 50 German prisoners, presumably the after party, materialised from the divisional cage and in a short while wards and rooms and yards were brought to a condition of passable cleanliness and in this guise were duly handed over to the 3rd Canadian C.C.S. on the 9th.
M. Poincaré visited Le Quesnoy on Sunday, the 10th, when the troops including No. 3 Field Ambulance paraded in the Grande Place and there was martial music and much rejoicing in the old town; and still greater rejoicings on the morrow: for the end of the Great War had come. Sister Divisions of the IVth Corps had pushed on manfully beyond Bavais but the 8th Division of the First Army had beaten them in the race, and reached the goal of long desire: and so the five year battle of the British Armies ended where it began—at Mons.
When the New Zealand Division left Egypt in April, 1916, the New Zealand Mounted Brigade Ambulance, as we saw in Chapter VII., remained with its Brigade—both units now dissociated for the rest of the war from the New Zealand Division.
The Anzac Mounted Division under General Chauvel, A.I.F., comprised four brigades: three of Australian Light Horse, and one of New Zealand Mounted Rifles. To each brigade a cavalry ambulance was attached:—the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Australian Light Horse Ambulances; and the New Zealand Mounted Ambulance. The work of these units while attached to the New Zealand and Australian Division in Gallipoli has already been referred to. In April the New Zealand Mounted Field Ambulance was at Ferry Post, accompanying its brigade on outpost duty some seven or eight miles East of the Suez Canal. The ambulance, at this time commanded by Lieut.-Col. Hand Newton, N.Z.M.C., was organised in two sections, and in accordance with the existing establishments of a British cavalry ambulance. There were six medical officers and about 120 O.R., including N.Z.M.C. and N.Z.A.S.C. drivers attached; the transport, which had come from New Zealand comprised ambulance waggons and general service waggons of Dominion manufacture and seven motor ambulance cars provided in Egypt. The medical equipment was similar to that of the field ambulances, consisting of medical and surgical panniers and ordnance material. The tentage comprised circular tents and two operating tents giving shelter for 50 patients.
At Serapeum, near the railway station, the headquarters of the Anzac Mounted Division were established. The A.D.M.S. was Lieut.-Col. Downs, A.M.C. with Captain Hercus, N.Z.M.C. of the New Zealand Mounted Ambulance as D.A.D.M.S. On 6th April the Division moved up to No. 3 sector of defence, based on el Kantara and on Salhia or Salahieh, where the New Zealand Mounted Field Ambulance was encamped with the brigade on the edge of the cultivated land. It was from this point, probably, that Moses headed his caravans towards Sinai, and it was also at this spot, certainly, that Naploeon concentrated his four divisions for the Syrian Campaign. The New Zealand Mounted
During the month the ambulance reorganised its transport for desert warfare. Six sand carts—two-horsed light drays with a square hood and very broad tyres—each accommodating two stretcher cases were substituted for the ambulance waggons; while camels were provided for carrying wounded in cacolets, and for the transport of rations, water, equipment, and bearers.
Towards the end of April the advanced troops of a Turkish Expedition, moving westward to attack the canal north of Kantara, had reached the Katia Oasis, driving in English Yeomanry who were holding that position. The Anzac Mounted Division marched out to meet them and finding no Turks in Katia, occupied Dueidar, 15 miles, and Romani, 25 miles out from Kantara. In these movements the New Zealand Mounted Field Ambulance journeyed with its brigade—then in Reserve—to Hill 70, some seven miles east of Kantara. It had followed the route trodden by man from time immemorial from Salahieh—the last town in the Nile Delta on the edge of the desert, the point of departure of the old caravan route from Egypt to Syria—and, if we are to believe certain authorities, midway between their point of departure and Kantara, they passed over the very spot where Pharoah's army was lost in the Serbonian Bog, or the old Pelusiac branch of the Nile.
Early in May the desert transport of the ambulance was completed by a camel section comprising 81 natives under a warrant officer and 140 camels. Of these, 29 camels were for equipment, 17 to carry cacolets providing transport for lying and sitting cases, and 77 baggage camels for personnel. About this time
It was now the Khamsin season; the average midday temperature rose to 109° F. or over in the shade of the double tents. Much reconnaissance work was in hand and there were many casualties from heat stroke amongst the unseasoned troops,
Other expeditions with reconnoitring bodies early convinced Lieut.-Col. Hand Newton that his bearer sub-division required to be mounted. At first mules were provided for this purpose as there was no authority as yet for the reorganisation of the New Zealand Ambulance. The Australian Light Horse Field Ambulances and the British Cavalry Ambulances had already an allotment of horses for 24 bearers. The baggage camels were found to be too slow to keep up with horsemen, and were otherwise unsuitable, so that the camel sections were withdrawn from the field ambulances at least until further experience showed that a cavalry field ambulance fitted for desert warfare required to be subdivided into a mobile and a so called immobile section.
At the end of May our ambulance moved to El Debabis to form a dressing station, sending on mounted bearers with sand carts with the column patrolling as far as Bir el Abd about 20 miles from Katia. One, lightly wounded, riding his own horse, and one wounded Turk were brought in; the ambulance returning by Ogratina to Bir et Maler and a date-palm plantation or Hod, which they had occupied as headquarters since early in the month and where they remained until near the end of June.
Experience gained during the reconnaissance period showed that the existing pattern of desert cart, which required six horses in sandy country, was too light in construction; the square hood was flimsy and soon broke away. Sand sledges on broad four-inch runners with two horses proved successful for stretcher cases and gave an easy ride to a seriously wounded man. The camel cacolets were very uncomfortable, and the camels were too slow. The lying cacolets, on account of their unruly movements, were almost impossible for seriously wounded men. Stretchers of regulation pattern proved very difficult to carry on horseback, so that the need of a lighter pattern, or a folding
General Chaytor, who was making a personal reconnaissance in an aeroplane on July 19th, observed long columns of the enemy approaching on an eight mile front from Bir Salmana, less than 20 miles east of Katia. The 52nd Lowland Scottish Division, which had been at Helles in 1915, and was now holding the railhead near Romani, moved up into prepared defensive positions while our cavalry outposts, keeping close watch on the enemy
On the 3rd of August the Turks occupied the Katia Oasis and advanced against Romani with one column, while two other columns led by traitorous Bedouins, who had access to our lines, attempted to turn the right flank of the position by seizing high ground southwest of Romani, not far from the Pelusium station on the military railway. Here, after a stiff fight, they were driven off and counter attacked by the Anzac Mounted Division.
Early on the morning of the 4th the N.Z.M.R. Brigade in camp seven miles east of Kantara, moved out towards Dueidar and by midday was attacking near Mt. Royston, about four miles east of Pelusium railway station. The Mobile Section of the New Zealand Mounted Field Ambulance, under Lieut.-Col. Hand Newton, following the Brigade opened a dressing station at Canterbury Ridge, a mile from the railway line, and evacuated their wounded to Anzac Siding, north-west of Pelusium. The following day the bearers and transport for wounded pushed on with the advancing New Zealand Brigade who were attacking the Turks at Katia. The Tent Subdivision did not get up until 5.30 p.m. when they opened a dressing station and received wounded. During this fight we lost one of our medical officers: Captain Wood, N.Z.M.C., R.M.O. to the Wellington Regiment, who with his medical orderly was dressing wounded close up to the south-western edge of the date palms of Katia. Both the medical officer and the orderly were mortally wounded and died shortly after the action, which was broken off at nightfall. The Mobile Section moved back to Et Maler, near Romani, arriving at 6.30 am. on the 7th with exhausted horses; they handed over their wounded to the 2nd Australian Light Horse Field Ambulance who formed a divisional receiving station. That same day the Immobile Section of the New Zealand Mounted Field Ambulance, under
On the 6th, 7th and 8th of August, their rear guards offering a stubborn resistance but losing many men and much material, the Turks fell back until they reached Bir el Abd, some 20 miles from Romani: here they seemed to be in strength and determined to make a stand. The Anzac Mounted Division attacked Bir el Abd on the 9th and a severe engagement followed. The New Zealand Mounted Rifles in the centre of the Battle line were counterattacked by very strong bodies but held their ground in a somewhat critical position until they withdrew at nightfall. There were many wounded in the Canterbury Mounted Rifles which the R.M.O., Captain Orbell, N.Z.M.C., had much difficulty in extricating under heavy fire. The Mobile Section had followed on and during the day had established a dressing station three miles behind the firing line on the caravan route at a date plantation known as Hod Ed Debabis, where they collected wounded, evacuating serious cases to the 47 kilometre peg and the lightly wounded to Ogratina. During the action the ambulance was bombed by aeroplanes, losing 5 N.C.O.'s and men wounded, and several horses killed. At night when the action was broken off they moved back five miles to Ogratina, where the remaining wounded were taken over by an ambulance convoy. During these operations they had cleared in all 141 wounded. On the 10th the Mobile Section moved forward to Hod el Debabis, while the Immobile Section dealt with 167 wounded which were evacuated by train via Romani to el Kantara. The Turks were retiring on the 12th, and it was determined that the Anzac Mounted Division should hold the country as far east as Bir el Abd, as transport difficulties precluded an immediate advance. The enemy had lost so heavily that he was unable to continue his daring enterprise, and all danger of a further invasion of Egypt was definitely averted.
The experience gained by the medical service was discussed in conference of ambulance commanders: many important imperfections in the organisation of the medical formations for desert warfare were brought to light and amended as far as was possible. The most salient points were these:—Owing to the fact that the regimental Maltese carts could not be used there was so much difficulty in transporting the regulation pattern stretchers that they never reached the firing line—improvised stretchers made of blankets and rifles had to be used, but were a poor substitute. The regimental stretcher bearers, leing armed with a rifle, were compelled either to abandon their weapon or experienced much inconvenience from carrying it
The months of September, October, and November were a period of outpost duty, rest, training and organisation. Sanitary effort was not neglected, although the sickness wastage rate of the Mounted Division would have been considered very high on fee Western Front, as it averaged from 12 to 14 per 1000 per week. There had been a mild outbreak of cholera following the advance in August: the disease was prevalent amongst the
During this period of waiting for the railway to come forward—it was moving at the rate of a mile a day—no military operations of importance took place, but in November railway construction had advanced so far that plans for the capture of el Arish were under discussion. It was not until December the 20th, however, that the town, completely surrounded by the Division, was found to be abandoned by the enemy, who had offered no resistance. It was otherwise in 1799: Napoleon, who had arrived in front of el Arish on the 17th of February—he had ridden or driven up from Cairo in seven days—found a very lively siege in hand, and one of his divisions under Reynier fighting a pitched battle on the east bank of the wadi in order to disperse the Turkish relief columns coming down from Gaza. The fort at el Arish fell into his hands on the 20th, and on the 25th he was in Gaza; it was but a little more than three weeks since his columns had moved out from Salahia!
Our Turks had retired to Magdhaba where, on the 23rd, they were to be attacked by the Division. Sir Philip Chetwoode, who arrived by motor launch and had landed on the beach at el Arish, now took command of the whole force of cavalry and camelry of which the Desert Column was formed and issued
The battle opened at 10 a.m., the New Zealand troops attacking from the north-east. The bearer personnel took up a position near brigade headquarters on some high ground overlooking the town and from there sent forward sand carts, sledges, and bearers to the collecting posts, formed by the R.M.O.'s. The Turkish Garrison, although completely invested by the Anzac Cavalry, and the Camelry, held out in their redoubts with well directed machine-gun fire and a battery of mountain guns to assist them, until approaching evening warned the besiegers that no water could be obtained until they entered Magdhaba and that the place must be carried by storm before nightfall. A bayonet charge settled the matter; the Turks surrendered by 4.30 p.m. and at dusk, our horses were watering at the captured wells. There had been few casualties at the dressing station up to 2 p.m., but by four o'clock large numbers of wounded were coming in as the result of the final assault. Many of the wounded, both Turkish and British, were brought into the well equipped Turkish Field Hospital at Magdhaba, and as they could not be cleared that night, remained there until the 24th in charge of the 3rd Light Horse Field Ambulance, some R.M.O.'s and the D.A.D.M.S., Captain Hercus, N.Z.M.C., who was in charge of medical arrangements. The main force retired to el Arish that night leaving two cavalry regiments to protect the wounded. The New Zealand Mounted Field Ambulance had a brisk twelve hours work, as they did not get in all their wounded until 3 a.m. on the 24th; they tended 15 officers and 153 O.R. Their first convoy comprising 9 sand carts, 3 sledges, 1 captured Turkish buggy and cacolet camels, left at midday on the 24th, and the whole Ambulance Mobile Section cleared the dressing station
In the new year the invasion of Palestine was decided upon and preparations for the execution of this war policy were on foot. On the 8th of January, 1917, the Desert Column was concentrated at el Arish for a raid on Rafa, the first outpost on the Turkish frontier. In this dashing cavalry exploit five mounted brigades were employed; 2 Australian Light Horse Brigades, the New Zealand, the 5th Yeomanry, and the Camel Brigade. The medical troops comprised a mounted field ambulance mobile section for each brigade, and two ambulance convoys, the desert equivalent of an M.A.C. Each ambulance convoy had 2 officers, 20 O.R., 16 A.S.C., 68 native drivers, 74 camels, 8 sand-carts, and was capable of transporting 126 patients of which 46 lying down. The distance to be covered from el Arish to Rafa was over 30 miles, in part through desert, partly on formed tracks beyond Sheik Zowaiid, a halfway halting place. Railhead, where hospital trains could load wounded, was now up abreast of el Arish where the field ambulances of the 52nd Division formed receiving stations, the equivalent of main dressing stations or C.C.S.'s
At 4 p.m. on the 8th the Desert Column was set in motion and forded the wadi el Arish, the old frontier of Egypt, now a
At 1 a.m. on the 9th, the march was resumed along the Darb el Sultaniyeh—the Way of the Kings—the beaten track of all the armies of the ages. As the sun came up the enemy was found strongly posted on a smooth green hill, its sides scarred by trenches and on its crown a redoubt of very formidable appearance. The cavalry brigades closing in from all sides—the New Zealanders from the north galloping through the village—dismounted and encircled the hill with a ring of well nourished fire from machine-guns and rifles. The battle was fully engaged by 11 a.m. The New Zealand Mounted Field Ambulance Tent Subdivision had opened a dressing station near Divisional Headquarters at Shokh el Sufi, about four and a half miles south-east of Rafa, while the bearer divisions had formed a collecting post on a road leading from the north, at a spot about two miles from the New Zealand firing line near General Chaytor's headquarters. Owing to the very open nature of the hillside and the absence of cover, the sand carts could not be brought up as far as the R.A.P.'s, so that most of the evacuations had to be by hand and in this work the light bamboo stretchers proved their worth. Very few wounded had reached the Tent Subdivision by 2 p.m., but after this hour the flow became increased. The first convoy of lightly wounded left the New Zealand Mounted Field Ambulance early in the forenoon for Shiek Zowaiid. The battle dragged as the afternoon wore on, the position was so strong and so well defended that it seemed that we must be held up until nightfall, before the final assault could be made. Already a regiment of Turkish infantry was on its way from Khan Yunus to relieve the two battalions at Rafa. The position was indeed critical when, at 3.30 p.m., Sir Philip Chetwoode gave orders for a concentration of all available artillery on the redoubt and a general assault. As no visible results followed this order,
The desert had now been left behind; the wanderings in the wilderness had ceased. To our nomads, now over a year in the desert, the spring time luxuriance of the plains of Philistia seemed
By the end of March railhead had reached Rafa; preparations were forward for the capture of Gaza. On the 23rd a conference of field ambulance commanders was held for the purpose of discussing the oncoming operations. The task set for the cavalry was to envelop the city from the north and north-east, and on the 25th, the three mobile sections, less camel transport, were moving with the Anzac Mounted Division across the Wadi el Ghuzze to Beit Durdeis some four miles north-east of Gaza. At 2.30 a.m. on the eve of the first battle of Gaza, the New Zealand Mounted Field Ambulance Mobile Section, less the Tent Subdivision and Camel Transport, accompanied the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade to Deir el Belah on the high road to Gaza, three miles south of the Wadi el Ghuzze, where they went into bivouac. Starting at 2.30 a.m. on the following morning, the 26th of March, a twelve mile trek via Tel el Ahmar, four miles due south of Gaza, brought the column to Tel el Humra in the vicinity of Beit Durdeis, where the Anzac Mounted Division were now in position to strike from the north and the north-east. South of Gaza the Infantry of the 53rd Division failed to get home in their frontal attack. Their losses were heavy; they made little headway. It was now the turn of the Anzac Division, and by 3 p.m. the New Zealand Mounted Rifles were trotting out, under a desultory shell fire, to el Masrah, a little more than a mile due north of Gaza, where they dismounted for action, with the 2nd Australian Light Horse on their right pushing down from the north. Each New Zealand regiment as it dismounted was accompanied by one sand cart, but the main transport park of the Mobile Section remained under cover of a steep bluff close by brigade headquarters.
As the New Zealand Mounted Rifles fought their way through the northern outskirts of the town, close touch with the R.M.O.'s was maintained by the N.Z.M.C. bearers, and casualties were collected within a few minutes of their reaching the aid posts. There was good cover from huts and tall hedges of prickly pear.
As the afternoon wore on, and our men penetrated further into the suburbs the whole ambulance transport was pushed up as close to the firing line as cover permitted. The Tent Subdivisions and the Camel Transport did not reach Beit Durdeis until late in the afternoon. Lieut.-Col. Hand Newton opened his tent subdivision north of Gaza where he admitted wounded until 10.30 p.m. when he was ordered to withdraw to the west bank of the Wadi el Ghuzze.
When dark came and the fighting died down the Mobile Section had orders to withdraw, but no move was made until the last of the sand carts came in and word had been received from the R.M.O.'s that all was clear. The transport available was barely sufficient to accommodate the 6 officers and 28 O.R. wounded, of which all but three were New Zalanders. No Turkish wounded were carried away, they were made as comfortable as possible with a first field dressing and left where they fell. On arrival at the concentration point ordered for the Anzac Mounted Division an endeavour was made to feed and dress the more seriously wounded, but at 11 p.m. came the order to march, and the New Zealand mounted field ambulance sections, carrying their wounded with extreme difficulty in the crowded carts, in inky darkness, retired with the brigade to el Belah, 15 miles back, where, after a very trying journey, the patients were handed over to the 1st Welsh Field Ambulance at 7.30 a.m. on the 27th, and were transferred to the 54th C.C.S. at Kahn Yunus on the day following.
At the second attempt to take Gaza, the Australian and the New Zealand Mounted Divisions were assigned the duties of watching the road to Beersheba and engaging Turkish reinforcements that might be marching from the latter direction to the assistance of Gaza. The Mobile Section left its bivouac by the sea shore near el Belah on April 16th and forded the Wadi el Ghuzze with the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade near Shellal where the Tent Subdivision established a dressing station. The transport of the mounted ambulances had by this time been augmented by two limbered waggons, which served to carry the Tent Subdivision equipment; six sand carts still filled the duties of ambulance waggons; camels and cacolets were discredited as they had proved far too slow and too primitive for mobile ambulance work in Palestine. On the 19th the New Zealand Mounted Field Ambulance moved up to a point on the west bank of the Wadi Imleh about four miles south of Abu Hareira, where the New Zealand Mounted Rifles went into action. A
During the hot summer months the operations stagnated. The failure at Gaza and the establishment by the Turks of an entrenched line over 20 miles long to Beersheba limited the movements of the Desert Column to a war of outposts, trench digging, reconnaissance and patrolling, more especially in the direction of the open flank to the eastwards. Early in May an Anzac Rest Station was formed by the Immobile Section of the New Zealand Mounted Field Ambulance at el Marakeb, on the beach, opposite Kahn Yunus. While acting as a receiving station at el Belah this Immobile Section had suffered severely from aeroplane raids, having 2 N.Z.M.C. O.R. killed, and 9 wounded besides losing horses on the 4th and again on the 9th of May. Major Trotter, N.Z.M.C., at this time commanding the section, with assistance from the Red Cross Society, organised a very pleasant tented camp where sea bathing and an improved dietary did much to restore the vigour and spirits of jaded Anzac convalescents who arrived daily by cacolet camels from their respective ambulances for a ten days rest.
All through this long period of summer heat the troopers suffered much from sickness, and the weekly wastage rose to over 20 per 1000. Sanitary effort was not neglected and with the cheerful co-operation of our old friends, Majors Le Lean and Austin, every effort was made by Major Harvey Sutton and the Anzac Sanitary Section to maintain field sanitation at as high a level as possible. A determined war was waged against dust, bad water, flies, lice, and the anophelines, and especially against boredom and the weariness of the spirit begotten in men remote from the amenities of home life, even of civilisation, and who had no opportunities of getting leave nor any change from the dreadful monotony of the East. Periods of rest in June and September during which bivouacs were established by the sea, and recreation provided, did something to relieve the war weary Veterans of the Sinai Campaign. With the cooler nights of October
Important administrative changes had come about. The Desert Column was now included in the "East Force" under Sir Philip Chetwoode's command, and with the formation of other mounted divisions became the Desert Mounted Corps of four divisions under the command of General Chauvel. Command of the Anzac Division, comprising the 1st and 2nd Australian Light Horse and the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigades passed to Major General Chaytor, C.B., D.S.O. Colonel Downes, A.A.M.C. became D.D.M.S. of the Desert Corps, while his late appointment was filled by Lieut.-Col. Croll, A.A.M.C., who became A.D.M.S. of the Anzac Division with Major Hercus, N.Z.M.C., as D.A.D.M.S. The organisation and transport of the mounted ambulances had been somewhat remodelled; the mobile sections had now 1 G.S. waggon each, with 3 limbered waggons in which to carry their tents and equipment. Camel transport was no longer used but riding camels were provided for personnel. The sand carts, 12 in number, still represented the ambulance waggons; there was one water cart, and it was hoped to be able to attach one light motor ambulance car to each of the three ambulances of the Anzac Division. Cycle or wheeled stretchers capable of being adapted to horse traction had been issued, in limited numbers, but proved unserviceable and were shortly withdrawn.
After a period of rest on the beach at Marakeb where men and horses took on renewed spirits and vigour, the Division closing its rest camp in the last week of October, was on the move for a magnificent cavarly drive against the Turkish left flank at Beersheba. East Force was on "Z" day to envelop and seize Beersheba; the 60th Infantry Division attacking frontally while the cavalry by a wide encircling movement, were to cut the railway to Jerusalem and envelop the Turks from the East. The medical arrangements were these:—the mobile sections would, as usual, accompany their brigades. To the New Zealand Mounted Field Ambulance Tent Sub-Division was given the task of forming a divisional collecting station near Iswaiwin about six miles by road south east of Beersheba, while the A.D.M.S. proposed to hold one tent subdivision, that of the 1st Australian Light Horse Field Ambulance, in reserve. If all went well the divisional collecting station was to move into Beersheba when evacuated by the enemy. At Asluj, some 16 miles south of Beersheba, the three immobile sections of the Anzac ambulances were to form
Leaving their point of departure near Kahn Yunus, a two days' march of about 30 miles, during which water was very scarce, brought the N.Z.M.R. Brigade and the New Zealand Mobile Section to Asluj, a station on the Turkish military railway which accompanied the road from Beersheba to el Auja on the Sinai frontier. Here a halt was made on the 29th. On the night of the 30th the march was resumed in brilliant moonlight, and by 7 a.m. on the 31st the Anzac Mounted Division was assembled on high ground near Iswaiwin and Khasm Zanna overlooking their objective, the Tel el Saba and the low lying ground to the west, where the mosque of Beersheba could be seen dominating the town.
At 9 a.m. the advance of the N.Z.M.R. began—their objective Tel el Saba, the key of the Turkish position—while the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade on their right were directed upon Tel el Sakati about six miles out to the north-east of Beersheba on the Hebron Road. Divisional Headquarters remained at Khasm Zanna, three miles from Tel el Saba and about five miles from Beersheba. It was close to this point that the Tent Subdivision of the N.Z.M.F.A. established the divisional collecting station at 12.40 p.m. The bearer personnel and transport had gone forward with the firing line. The road that came from the Turkish positions in the town and went south-east in the direction of Asluj was in good condition and practicable for light motor ambulance cars so that the work of the bearer personnel was much assisted by pushing the motor ambulances to a car post a mile forward of the divisional collecting station. Throughout the action close touch was maintained by the bearers with the R.M.O.'s and at no time was there any shortage of sand carts to clear the R.A.P.'s.
At a little after 2 p.m. the Auckland Mounted Rifles took a trench line on the eastern face of Tel el Saba and the main position was rushed at 3 p.m. Shortly after this the 1st A.L.H. Brigade and the Australian Mounted Division galloped in a dashing charge over the trenches south-east of the town and Beersheba and its remaining garrison fell into our hands.
During the day the motor ambulances had carried wounded to the corps receiving station at Asluj which by 7 p.m. was full.
The Anzac divisional collecting station was also full so that casualties had to be collected by the Tent Subdivision of the 1st A.L.H.F.A. on a road midway between Asluj and Beersheba. As shelter could not be provided for all the wounded in the N.Z.M.F.A. Tent Subdivision, an overflow was directed to a dressing station formed by the 5th A.L.H.F.A. close by, and as the road to Beersheba was not yet open, the wounded had to remain in the divisional collecting station during the night. By midnight the N.Z.M.C. personnel had fed and dressed the remaining patients and, as their equipment included 120 blankets and the night was cold, all were made as warm as possible in improvised shelters.
At 6 a.m. on the 1st of November two enemy aircraft descending to 1200 feet bombarded the area occupied by the N.Z.M.F.A. still open for wounded, and although red cross flags were prominently displayed, and there were no fighting troops within two miles, yet the aircraft, after expending their bombs, sprayed the encampment with machine-gun fire; it seemed deliberately. Bullets and bomb fragments penetrated the tents and bivouacs, tore even the red cross flags, but, by strange providence, the only casualties were one wounded again hit, and one mule killed. At 2 p.m. that afternoon all patients were cleared by motor ambulance to Beersheba and the Mobile Section, reunited, joined the Brigade at Tel el Saba. The Tent Subdivision had dealt with a total of 60 wounded and 13 sick during the operation, the total casualties of the Anzac Division being 15 officers, 150 O.R. The water supply throughout the action was extremely limited and, but for a thunderstorm on the night of the 29th, which filled some water holes, the wounded would have fared badly.
But more serious fighting was to follow. From the 1st November onwards the infantry fight was continued in the attempt to break the Turkish line to the west of Beersheba during which period the Anzac Mounted Division and the 54th Division were engaged in protecting the right flank to the north and east of the town, a portion of our line subjected to heavy Turkish counter attacks. The N.Z.M.R. Brigade was in action on the 4th, 5th and 6th near Tel el Khuweilfeh, some eleven miles due north of Beersheba, close to a good military road used by the Turks in their retreat and where they now fought a stern rearguard action and delivered many counter attacks. On the 4th November, the N.Z.M.F.A. had orders to proceed to Mikreh, about two and a half miles south of Tel el Khuweilfeh
The night had passed quietly at the A.D.S. but at dawn casualties came in. One sandcart went down early to the Tent Subdivision passing over the road which was shelled at intervals and was in places open to machine gun fire, and as the journey was completed without mishap, the sand carts continued to evacuate the forward positions during the day. Some lightly wounded from the firing line came down to the A.D.S. on horseback, but the stretcher cases could not be evacuated until nightfall as the position was very exposed. As the brigade was to be relieved that night all the bearer personnel came in with the stretcher cases, reaching the Tent Subdivision about midnight. The Camel Brigade Field Ambulance which was to take over, had opened at 5 p.m. and helped with the work of the divisional collecting station. But in the morning it was found that the N.Z.M.R. Brigade had not been relieved through the night so that the whole of the bearer personnel was obliged to return to the A.D.S., at about 10 a.m. In the afternoon the Brigade was relieved by the Imperial Camel Corps and all went back to bivouacs near Mikreh, the horses going 10 miles into Beersheba for water. During this action the N.Z.M.F.A. dealt with 133 wounded and 36 sick. Of the wounded, 5 officers and 64 O.R. were of the New Zealand Brigade.
On the night of the 6th the infantry divisions broke the line west of Beersheba and at dawn on the 7th, the Anzac
On the 11th of October the N.Z.M.R. Brigade left Beersheba on its forced march of 56 miles through Sheria, Huj and Burcia arriving at Hamame on the 12th at 10 p.m., where it rejoined the Division. The weather was hot and oppressive, water was very scarce on the march, but supplies did not fail as "B. Echelon" the improvised divisional train arrived on the same day.
On the 14th the Division while pushing north encountered stiff opposition after crossing the Wadi Rubin. The Turks in superior numbers held a strong position on ridges covering the road to Jaffa. At noon the A.D.M.S. instructed the N.Z.M.F.A. to open a divisional collecting station at el Kubiebeh three miles north of Yebna. At 1.30 the N.Z.M.R. Brigade was engaged at Ayun Kara and was meeting strong resistance; an hour later wounded were coming in to the Tent Subdivision opened near the mosque in el Kubiebeh. The bearer personnel had found a covered position about one mile further north. During a very determined counter attack on the left of the Brigade there were heavy casualties on our side, but the attack was beaten off and the position secured by 4 p.m. Following this the collecting station rapidly became congested; the wounded were fed, dressed, given A.T.S., and accommodated in improvised shelters. At 8 p.m. the 1st A.L.H. Field Ambulance was ordered up to open at Kubiebeh so as to relieve the N.Z.M.F.A. and from this time onwards all further wounded brought in were directed to the relieving Tent Subdivision. At 10 p.m. Lieut.-Col. Hand Newton evacuated 69 lightly wounded by means of the returning brigade supply waggons, but the bearer personnel, on account of darkness and rough country, could not clear the battlefield of New Zealand wounded until after midnight. Early the next morning our sand carts brought in some seriously wounded Turks and in the
A regiment of N.Z.M.R. had entered Jaffa two days after the action at Ayun Kara. Lieut.-Col. Hand Newton was ordered to proceed there on the 17th for the purpose of taking over the French hospital, but the buildings were found to be in such an unsavoury condition, due to a hurried withdrawal of the Turks, that after herculean efforts, the small staff of the Tent Subdivision—the bearers being still with the Brigade—found it impossible to cleanse the wards satisfactorily. The mattresses were heavily infested with bed bugs, mosquitoes extraordinarily prevalent, and the sanitary offices and water supply were in a dangerous condition of neglect and disrepair. In fact, as some wit suggested, the hospital seemed to have remaind unopened since the retreat of the French Syrian Force from Jaffa on May 27th, 1799, on which day the army surgeon, Desgenettes, indignantly repudiated Napoleon's suggestion that the 60 moribund sick, about to be abandoned, should be granted euthanasia by an overdose of opium. Lieut.-Col. Hand Newton reported to the A.D.M.S. that the French hospital was unfit for occupation and on the 20th, General Chaytor, whose headquarters were now in Jaffa, arranged for the Mounted Field Ambulance to take over a portion of the Jewish college as a garrison hospital.
An operation by the N.Z.M.R. resulting is many casualties was carried out on the 24th and 25th of November. The Brigade crossed the Auja river north of Jaffa, seizing bridge heads and leaving three squadrons supported by infantry north of the river to secure the ford and the bridge at Hadrah. The Turks responded by a counter attack in force, which drove our outposts back over the disputed river crossings. The N.Z.M.F.A. Bearer Section with transport was at 8 a.m. on the 25th close to the
During the period of rest in January the troops, were in tented camps; about them were pleasant garden villages, embowered in trees and set about with vineyards and orchards, where the orange throve and the almond flourished: Jewish colonies founded now for many years under the Zionist movement. Here, there were white people, some who spoke English, as they had come, some from America, some even from Australia and New Zealand. In these pleasant and gracious surroundings the sickly troops renewed their health by recreational training and release from monotony. Of all the villages Richon Le Zion close to Ayun Kara, was the most treasured by the New Zealanders; here General Chaytor had his headquarters; and here the Municipal Washhouse—the town had been planned on the most modern lines—made a famous divisional baths so that with the aid of wine vats and large boilers a weekly hot bath could be given to the whole force. Disinfestation of clothing from lice was a pressing problem. A mild type of relapsing fever was not uncommonly seen in Anzac troops and typhus was known to be endemic in the Turkish Army. Owing to the very infrequent visits of the train disinfesting plant to railhead, the only means available were the brushing of the seams of the clothing and the wholly futile use of N.C.I. or "Oxford" louse powder which served, not at all as a deterrent, but rather as a relish to the parasite in his blood feasting. A small hot air disinfesting plant, taken by our Division from the Turks at Ramleh, was much appreciated, but the
After the fall of Jerusalem plans for the 1918 operations were maturing. Reorganisation of the mounted ambulance transport—the never to be settled question—was again considered. In February the new transport equipment was issued, not without vigorous protest from the Anzacs. Under their old establishment each mounted ambulance had 12 sandcarts, 20 cacolet camels, and, recently, 4 light motor ambulances; all of which provided transport for 40 lying and 38 sitting cases. Under the new orders the sand carts were to be replaced by 6 light horsed ambulance waggons; the cacolet camels and the riding camels for the tent personnel were to be withdrawn. This readjustment it was urged, imparied both the mobility and the carrying capacity of the ambulances. The sand cart, however defective in construction, had much to recommend it:—it was two wheeled and much handier that the light ambulance waggon; it carried three lying cases with ease as opposed to two; it could be hauled empty by two horses in any country, whereas the waggons required four; and above all, its adaptability to sandy, marshy or rough country, or to muddy roads, and the ease with which it could be manoeuvred quickly across country to the proximity of the firing line made it vastly superior in cavalry operations of a scattered nature. In a word, the ambulances were loath to part with the desert cart, whose worth had been proved in two years of campaigning on all conditions of surfaces, from deep sand to glutinous mud; the broad tyres and the two wheels were the keynotes of its perfection.
Eight months campaigning in the Jordan Valley with two raids into the mountains of Moab, the first a partial, the last a complete success, concluded the operations of the N.Z.M.R. Brigade and its ambulance in the victorious year of 1918. Although Jerusalem had fallen on December the 8th, the Turks still held on to the wilderness about Jericho in the Jordan Valley, less than 20 miles by motor road from the Holy City; and were still using the Dead Sea and a motor road east of Jericho to Es Salt and thence to Amman on the Hedjaz railway for the transport of grain from the southern extremity of Moab. In order to drive the enemy out of Jericho and deny him the use of the Dead Sea near the mouth of the Jordan an expedition was
On the 17th of February, 1918, the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade was concentrated at Bethlehem where the cold wintry weather on the Judean Hills was a sharp change from the pleasant warmth of the maritime plains about Richon which they had left two days before. The New Zealand Mounted Field Ambulance, commanded by Lieut.-Col. Walton, N.Z.M.C., was in camp at Mar Elias, midway between Bethlehem and Jerusalem about two and a half miles from either point. For the purposes of the raid they were permitted to retain four sand carts; otherwise their transport was as laid down in the new establishments; but six baggage and twenty cacolet camels were now added to the transport. The Turkish positions astride the broad motor road leading down from Judea to the Jordan were attacked by the infantry on the 19th near Talaat Ed Dum, ten miles east of Jerusalem, while the Anzac Mounted Brigade, using an ancient track six miles south of the main road endeavoured to outflank the enemy and penetrate to his rear at Jericho. As the track was narrow and very rugged, and permitted the passage of horsemen in single file only, no wheeled transport could accompany the cavalry. The N.Z.M.F.A. with their 26 camels went down by the rough goat track to Ali Muntar, a hill momentarily held by the Turks but soon overrun by the N.Z.M.R., and bivouacked for the night, there were no casualties. The following day the N.Z.M.R. engaged a position covering Neby Musa about six miles south of Jericho. By noon the infantry had cleared the motor road at Talaat ed Dumm and the Turks were falling back on the Jordan. After some sharp fighting the N.Z.M.R. had their way just after midday, went on three miles, but were unable to advance upon Nebi Musa which lay across a deep chasm impassable to horses, and covered by artillery enfilade fire. The ambulance stumbling down the three miles of steep hillside picked up some sick and wounded at the site of the engagement, collected a few more lightly wounded coming in on horseback and settled all down comfortably for the night in tents carried by the camels. That night the 1st L.H. Brigade scrambled down into the depths of the Jordan Valley and reached east of Jericho on the morning of the 21st; but the enemy was now well away to the. Jordan, six miles east. Our ambulance had much difficulty in getting down the steep rocky torrent bed, where horses had to be led in many places, and in transporting the sick and wounded in the cacolets. At times the patients had to
But they were not to enjoy a long period of rest, as early in March preparations were afoot for a very remarkable raid by the Anzac Mounted Division. The intention was to interrupt the communications of the Turkish forces who, based on Amman, were operating along the Hedjaz railway against our allies, the Sherifean troops. Es Salt, the largest city east of Jordan, was to be seized by the 60th (London Territorial) Division operating along the motor road from Jericho; while the cavalry, outflanking the Turks, dashed into Amman and blew up a large railway viaduct in the vicinity. In order to do all this it was necessary first to cross the Jordan river, now in flood, and as the Turks in retiring from Jericho had burnt the wooden traffic bridge at the Ghoraniyeh crossing, where the motor road passes over to es Salt, it would be necessary to construct pontoons. Wet weather and a flooded Jordan delayed departure, but by the 20th of March, the force was concentrating at Talaat ed Dumm, halfway down to the Valley.
On the 13th a specially organised Mobile Section of the N.Z.M.F.A. under the command of Lieut.-Col. Walton, N.Z.M.C., marched out of Richon with the Brigade. They had left behind their Immobile Section, really "A" Section Tent Subdivision with part of the heavy equipment of "B" Section. The personnel of the Mobile Section comprised 5 officers, 35 O.R., N.Z.M.C., 1 farrier A.S.C., and 4 N.Z.E. signallers with a helio and lamps
After a halt in the Judean Hills a descent was made into the valley and by the 21st March, all were concentrated about Talaat ed Dumm and Jericho. The force known as "Shea's Group" included the 60th Division, the Anzac Mounted Division, and one Imperial Camel Corps Brigade, a bridging train and three batteries of mountain guns. As the enemy, now warned by our enforced delays, held the crossings on the Jordan, the passage was a matter of some intricacy, but bold swimmers of the London Regiment established by night a small bridge head at Hajlah about three miles above the Dead Sea and the Anzac engineers threw over a pontoon which enabled the infantry to pass and to enlarge the bridgehead. Still nothing could be done at Ghoraniyeh until the Auckland Mounted Rifles, crossing by the pontoons, swept the eastern banks of Jordan by a series of charges. The following day the whole force was across, the 60th Division by a stout bridge at Ghoraniyeh, the cavalry at Hajlah. Crossing the Jordan plain, eight miles eastward to the Moab foothills, the N.Z.M.R. and the Mobile Section reached Shunet Nimrin on the es Salt road, where they halted for the night. The following day it was obvious that no wheeled transport could accompany the ambulance in its march up the mountains by villainous tracks through the valley of the Wadi es Sir so that the waggons were ordered back to the motor road and the Mobile Section with its camel transport breasted the long climb of 4000 feet to the Moab Plateau. All that day and all night they climbed over wretched muddy tracks in cold, bitter rain and sleet to the village of Ain es Sir, 15 miles from the valley on the western edge of the plateau. Many of the camels
Data of time and space must now be closely considered. Amman was about nine miles from the cross roads east of Ain es Sir; the road running north at the cross roads connected with the main es Salt-Amman Road—nominally a motor road—at Sweileh and passed through Bkt. um Audd, distant about two miles. At this point or some 400 yards to the west of it, it was decided to place a Tent Subdivision of the 2nd A.L.H.F.A. to act as a divisional receiving station. At Ain es Sir, the Tent Subdivision of the N.Z.M.F.A. would open, clearing to the motor road via Bkt. um Audd. It was considered that motor ambulance cars coming up from Jericho and passing through es Salt could reach the divisional receiving station at um Audd, which was about 15 miles east of es Salt, or 35 miles by road from Jericho. No other roads suitable for wheeled traffic existed. The nearest infantry ambulance M.D.S. was west of es Salt in the valley of the Shahib river. The Anzac Receiving Station—an operating team—would be established in conjunction with the Infantry M.D.S. Cacolet camels coming from the Anzac firing line would require four hours at least, to reach the motor road at Sweileh; the number of wounded transported—say 50 per trip of 12 hours. The nearest operating team was not less than 20 miles from the divisional collecting station. No wounded, clearly, could be carried down the Tough tracks used by the cavalry in scaling the Moab mountains. All roads leading from Amman were mud tracks and unfit for wheeled traffic in this severe weather, as it had rained almost incessantly since the valley was left. The camels and their drivers upon whom we were dependent for all evacuations from the firing line by Bkt. um. Audd, were suffering greatly from exposure and short rations. Finally the nearest C.C.S. was in Jerusalem, 20 miles from Jericho—60 from Amman—but the road from there on was practicable—if not blocked with traffic—for heavy ambulance cars. These were some of the problems of the medical situation, without discussing the possibility of a shortage of medical supplies. The A.D.M.S. had at his disposal 3 tent subdivisions and 150 cacolet camels, enough transport possibly, for 150 wounded. Bad news came in early on the morning of the 27th when the cavalry were advancing
The N.Z.M.R. Brigade advanced on Amman and came into action three miles due south of the town with their right overlooking the Hedjaz railway, their left on the Wadi Amman. The bearers of the N.Z.M.F.A. formed a collecting post close to the river where they were for a time subject to shell fire but suffered no casualties. By 4.30 p.m. the N.Z.M.F.A. Tent Subdivision had opened with the Camel Brigade Field Ambulance about two miles out from Ain es Sir, on the road running east to Amman. The wounded, brought in by cacolet to the divisional collecting station at um Audd, proceeded thence by the divisional sand carts to the field ambulance of the 60th Division in the Wadi Shahib. By midnight on the first day 13 officers, 170 O.R. wounded, had been evacuated: of these, the N.Z.M.F.A. bearers had sent down 11 New Zealand wounded and 7 sick.
On the following day, the 28th, little progress was made: there was a very determined resistance by the garrison of Amman, well posted and well served by field artillery to which we could only reply with mountain guns. In the afternoon a general attack with the assistance of a brigade of infantry and the mountain guns did not realise any substantial gains, but time must be played out so as to allow the demolition parties, working to the south of Amman, to wreck the viaduct. The N.Z.M.F.A. bearer personnel, had a mounted runner both at brigade and divisional headquarters and were in constant touch with the R.A.P.'s. The bearers acted as escort for the wounded coming down in camel cacolets from the bearer post to the Tent Subdivision and served as guides for the returning camels. Evacuations from the front line were satisfactory but the Tent Subdivision was already running short of medical supplies, and blankets; the wounded were suffering severely from cold and sodden clothing, as brutal rain and icy winds still dogged the expedition. That day 13 officers and 124 O.R. wounded were evacuated from the Division.
On the 29th there was a shortage of wheeled transport at the divisional collecting post: sand carts sent from Bkt. um Audd through es Salt to the M.D.S. at 4.30 a.m. on the previous morning had not yet returned. The A.D.M.S. was urgently in need of tentage and supplies—there were only 6 operating and
The attack dragged on, an affair of trenches and machine guns; but our people were determined—a night assault would be made and every effort expended to reach the viaduct. At 3 a.m. on the third day of the siege the New Zealand Brigade rushed a hill overlooking Amman; they advanced over 1000 yards and held the position against counter attacks, pushed well home with bombs and under heavy artillery screens; we had serious casualties. But all efforts elsewhere failed to shake the garrison in spite of their substantial losses; the game was drawn; we must withdraw. Early in the morning the bearer parties of the N.Z.M.F.A., in anticipation of heavy casualties, brought up all available cacolet camels and, until noon, all seemed to be going well, but with the very substantial losses incurred by the brigade during the counter attacks, the bearer post became crowded. No cacolet camels were returning. All were being used from the Tent Subdivision to the A.D.S. at um Audd; the camels breaking down from fatigue, want of food, and cold.
As the afternoon wore on the wounded of the N.Z.M.R. accumulated. The medical officer of the Wellington Regiment, Captain Gow, N.Z.M.C., the R.M.O. of the Auckland Regiment, Captain Wilton, N.Z.M.C., and an R.M.O. of the Camel Battalion had a combined R.A.P. about 1000 yards in rear of the hill taken by our Brigade which became congested with wounded. In spite of urgent calls from the ambulance and the brigade headquarters, no camels could be obtained. The R.A.P. had to be cleared by carrying the wounded back over a mile to brigade headquarters in blankets, the combatants doing most of the work, and the post was cleared at 4 p.m. when the orders to withdraw were issued. After this only 2 cacolet camels came up to the R.A.P. although some 20 to 30 wounded were brought down from the firing line. All these patients the R.M.O.'s tied to their horses—some had penetrating wounds of head, thorax or abdomen—and the firing line held fast for a precarious three hours until all were brought away. The only alternative was to
At 7 a.m. on the 1st April, the march was resumed down the Wadi Sir. The rear guard, formed by the Wellington Regiment, no sooner clear of the village of Ain es Sir, was fired upon by the Circassians, losing 8 killed and 8 wounded, including one N.Z.M.C. bearer who had a penetrating wound of the abdomen. While the Wellingtons dealt bloodily with the offenders the ambulance people loaded the wounded on the cacolets, bringing all safely to Shunet Nimrin by 7.30 p.m. The total of casualties tended by the divisional collecting station—which travelled by the main road—was 513 wounded, 49 sick, British troops; and 13 wounded and 10 sick Turks. The casualties in the N.Z.M.R. Brigade were:—killed: 6 officers, 32 O.R.; wounded: 6 officers, 116 O.R.; missing: 13 O.R. Yet in spite of the hardships of evacuation over nine miles by cacolet or, in some instances, lashed to a horse, and at least fifteen miles over a very bad road in sand carts, or again by cacolet, and a motor journey of 40 miles to Jerusalem, the condition in which the wounded reached the C.C.S.'s was considered to be on the whole most gratifying. Five wounded are reported to have died in transit on the Moab plateau which, considering the means of transport, shortatge of blankets, and the severe weather, is not remarkable. Most astonishing is the completed story of the medical arrangements and the surprisingly good condition of the wounded; much to be admired the determination with which the R.M.O.'s Capt. Gow received the M.C. for this engagement.
And now for the rest of the summer and early autumn the Anzac Mounted Division was in bivouac in the weird depths of the Jordan Valley, 266 fathoms below sea level, where no Europeans had ever dared to live in summer time before. But the Anzacs were not Europeans and they stuck it out somehow, although in the summer months the thermometer rose above 115° F. in the coolest double tents of the ambulance, and an acrid alkaline dust hung in the scorched atmosphere penetrating everywhere, scalding the throat and searing the eyes, and the Khamsin blew such fiery gusts that even the flies died.
Sanitation presented many difficulties. Horse manure and human dejecta spread in the sun dried to tinder in two days and burnt readily, but the dust nuisance required sedulous regulation—Mosquito brigades worked incessantly, canalising the stagnant pools, clearing out weedy growths and oiling the waters that trepidated with the larvæ of anopheles. There was at first a serious wastage from malignant malaria: during June and August the cases averaged 80 a week in the Anzac divisional troops employed in the valley; as many as 221 were evacuated in the first week of August. But after this, while in the protected areas, the rate fell by one half and it was not until September that malignant malaria decimated the troops. In all this work the Anzac Mobile Laboratory, which remained in the valley throughout, rendered most valuable assistance, more especially in training the ambulance officers in malarial diagnosis.
Casualties were light although there were frequent affrays of outposts east of Jordan. Short periods of rest up in Judea at King Solomon's pools, Bethlehem, and Jerusalem, where the air was keen and wondrous chill after the heat of the valley, helped to maintain the Anzacs in some degree of fitness; but high sickness wastage rates were recorded. In July the average was nearly 40 per 1000 per week evacuated to C.C.S. and this figure was exceeded in September. Malaria, of which the malignant form increased in incidence in late autumn, was the chief cause of wastage. Gastro-enteritis and dysentery were a negligible factor. Many mild cases of sickness were treated in Jerusalem at the Desert Corps Rest Station, and the usefulness of this institution in maintaining strength was abundantly manifested.
But now the end was at hand; once more the Anzacs would climb the mountains of Moab and this time to a final victory over Amman and the IVth. Turkish Army. Allenby's master stroke was to break the Turkish line in the plains of Philistia, unleash his impatient horsemen and sweep all Armageddon into a net cast towards Damascus. All happened as planned; on the 19th of September the enemy lines of resistance broke and melted in the orange groves of Jaffa; three divisions of cavalry galloped through the breach, never halting until they drew rein about a beaten army. No more complete victory is known to history.
In preparation for the last campaign General Chaytor took command of all the British troops in the Jordan Valley; his command known as "Chaytor's Force," comprised the Anzac Mounted Division, the 20th Indian Infantry Brigade, 2 battalions of Jewish troops under Patterson of Zion Mule Corps fame, and 2 battalions the West Indian Regiment. The task assigned to this composite force was to secure the right flank and the Jordan crossings, and to exploit any withdrawal that offered opportunities for a winning stroke against the IVth Turkish Army. The 19th, the day of the great battle on the coast, certain first moves took place in the Jordan Valley. The 1st N.W.I. Battalion was operating north of Jericho on the west of Jordan. Captain Hay, N.Z.M.C., in charge of 15 camels and 12 bearers, detached from the Mobile Section went up to collect wounded and admitted 23 West Indians. The N.Z.M.F.A. Mobile Section was still in camp, but at 9.30 p.m. on the 21st moved to the Wadi el Auja to take over a station of the 1st A.L.H. Field Ambulance, three miles north of Jericho on the Roman road west of Jordan, where Captain Hay's party rejoined. That night the N.Z.M.R. Brigade moved on and occupied Fussail, ten miles north of Auja; some 39 casualties—only three New Zealanders—were evacuated by light horsed ambulance waggons and light motor ambulance cars. The following day, the 22nd, the British line was 20 miles north of Jerusalem and the New Zealanders were securing the important bridge across the Jordan at Jisr ed Damieh, capturing many prisoners while their casualties were light. By evening their advanced guard was across the Jordan following the Turkish rearguards to es Salt. The ambulance opened a dressing station in the foothills near the crossing at 5 a.m. The wounded brought in by camel cacolet were mostly Turkish; our casualties were trivial. In the afternoon the ambulance moved down to the flat near the bridge where they took over a Turkish field hospital with 128 sick and 4 wounded, captured by our Brigade, whose
It was now clear that the IVth Turkish army which had faced us all the summer was retiring in all haste to Moab and the Hedjaz railway. What followed is soon told. Again the long and exhausting escalade of the mountains of Moab; a day's halt for concentration about es Salt and Ain es Sir and a brilliant envelopment and capture of Amman almost without artillery support—the guns were slow to clear the mountain tracks—and, on the 25th, the surrender of the garrison, some 1700 in all, with about 500 sick. The day after the fall of Amman the New Zealand ambulance took over a Turkish hospital near the railway station and after the capitulation of the Turkish corps to the south of Amman, tended over 500 enemy sick near Kissir.
So ended the war against man and here began the victory of disease. In the first 12 days of October the ambulance admitted over 700 cases of malaria, most of it malignant. The New Zealand Brigade lost at least a third of its strength. Many a horseman dropped from the saddle during the descent to the Jordan, and many died afterwards in the hospitals in Jerusalem. All through September the incidence of malignant malaria had been increasing in the debilitated troops holding the river crossings, where anti-mosquito measures were not neglected; but the effect of moving into the untreated Turkish areas at the Damieh crossing north of Jericho was a wholesale infection of the New Zealand Brigade with P.U.O. of which 62 per cent was diagnosed as malaria, and in the greater number the disease was malignant in type. Furthermore, there were over 1000 cases of P.U.O. negative for malaria which were influenza, no doubt contracted from the Turkish prisoners. The D.A.D.M.S., Major Hercus, D.S.O., N.Z.M.C., who had devoted much energy to anti-malarial work in the Jordan Valley, estimated that during the period of the final operations the Anzac Division alone had 2827 cases, and the whole of Chaytor's force suffered a loss of 4543 by malaria. The last battle was fought and won during the incubation period of malaria; and it was fortunate for the force that this period was not shorter. Here is a poignant episode for the preventive commentator, another "Walchern" wherewith to bludgeon the sanitary conscience of the Army.
Back to Richon and the battlefield of Ayun Kara, where, at the foot of a monument erected by our friends the Zion Colonists, the Armistice was celebrated by a memorial service. And then a long rest at Rafa, and later police work in the Nile Delta, until the New Zealand Mounted Field Ambulance was demobilised in June, 1919, and sailed for New Zealand after five and a half years memorable service in the East.
The outlines of a scheme for demobilising the N.Z.E.F. were drafted at an early date by the G.O.C. in charge Administration, Brigadier General Richardson, C.M.G., C.B.E. In 1917, he had foreseen the necessity for making special provision for the repatriation of disabled men, more especially the blind and limbless; and out of the projects devised to this end, the vocational classes for the limbless in Oatlands Park had grown to importance in 1918. Prior to the Armistice, in conformity with the scheme of demobilisation, the accumulation of low category details was gradually reduced by repatriation so obviating congestion in the Hospitals, more especially in anticipation of heavy casualties in 1918. The Division in France was also facilitating the return to New Zealand on furlough duty, of men with long service: in the case of the N.Z.M.C. both officers and men who had served continuously since 1914 were in some instances permitted to return to their homes for urgent business or family reasons; so that the process of Repatriation had been going on to a limited extent during the spring and summer of 1918, although temporarily interrupted during the mid period of the German offensive.
At the end of October, 1918, the figures upon which the scheme of demobilisation was based were sufficiently imposing: no less than 100,658 men had been embarked for the N.Z.E.F. in New Zealand ports, of which 26,109 had been repatriated and 13,910 had been killed in action or had died of disease overseas. The strength of the N.Z.E.F. in the various theatres of war or on the seas, was at this time 58,560 of which over 50,000 in France or the United Kingdom, and 3,500 in Egypt or Palestine. Repatriation in bulk was initiated immediately after the Armistice; the number of transports available, including most of the large ships then trading to New Zealand, was considered adequate to the purpose of embarking at least 1000 men per week and the time required to complete the evacuation of the war zones was estimated at twelve months. The problems specially interesting the Medical Services were:—
(1) The embarkation of the wounded and sick; (2) The demobilisation of N.Z.M.C. personnel; (3) The provisions for reconstruction in New Zealand.
The Medical Headquarters of the N.Z.E.F. in London was in 1918 organised in various branches somewhat resembling those of the British Army Medical Service. At the head was the D.M.S., Colonel Parkes, C.M.G., whose duties comprised: general policy; liason with the "War Office; inspections; promotions and appointments of N.Z.M.C. officers; honours and awards. The office of the Matron in Chief, Miss Thurston, R.R.C., included in this branch, administered the N.Z.A.N.S. in England, France and Egypt, and controlled the female staffs attached to medical units. The A.D.M.S. Department, under
The D.M.S., in the early part of 1918, had amplified and strengthened our hospitals so as to make provision for the casualties anticipated during the German Offensive. In order to relieve congestion in the medical units the principle had been adopted of supplementing the hospital ship service by ambulance carriers, improvised of the larger and better found transports.
The expansion of the hospitals by tents or the construction of buildings had increased the bed strength to a total of 6,495: the two large General Hospitals having over 1500 beds each, while the Convalescent Hospital at Hornchurch had a 1000 more. The number of patients of the N.Z.E.F. actually hospitalised in March, 1918, was:—in British hospitals, 26 officers and 1058 O.R.; in
The necessity for providing specially trained N.Z.M.G. personnel for the service of reconstruction in New Zealand had been appreciated in 1917, and in accord with this policy Lieut.-Col. Wylie, C.M.G., N.Z.M.C. commanding No. 1 N.Z.G.H., was seconded, in February, 1918, and attached for training to Shepherd's Bush Military Orthopœdic Hospital and Lieut.-Col. Mills, late commanding No. 2 N.Z.G.H., was similarly detached to the Liverpool Orthopœdic Centre at Alder Hay. The intention was to form two military orthopœdic teams to be despatched at an early date to New Zealand, each team consisting of 4 surgeons, 1 surgeon in charge of physio-therapy, 1 radiologist, 4 trained masseuses, 2 N.C.O.'s gymnastic specialists, 1 expert plaster worker, 1 N.C.O. in charge records. The course of training in military orthopœdies was laid down as three months minimal, and was supervised by the army specialists, under
In the outlined scheme of demobilisation an educational campaign was the most prominent administrative provision for tiding over the dangerous period of non-military employment and relaxed discipline following the Armistice. Within the scope of the educational scheme the special training of experts in the N.Z.M.C. was included, as the opportunity available for promoting the efficiency of the medical services in New Zealand was rightly deemed to be of national importance. To this end a small number of officers and men of the N.Z.M.C. serving in France had been returned to England for duty, so that they might renew their knowledge of clinical work in the Hospitals. And further, it was agreed that all those whose long service in the field units—where clinical opportunities were few—had militated against advance in their professional knowledge should be granted some months of study leave in England prior to repatriation. Similar courses for N.C.O.'s who desired to take up laboratory work, massage, radiology, pharmacy, or allied specialities, were already in contemplation.
In the larger hospitals—Brockenhurst, Walton and Hornchurch—beyond changes in personnel and increase of bed states, there
As we have seen, Lieut.-Col. O'Neil, D.S.O., relieved Lieut.-Col. Mill in January, 1918, at No. 2 New Zealand General Hospital. Extra accommodation for limbless was provided at Oatlands Park about this time by the construction of huts, and the general bed state raised to 1800. The accommodation was fully taxed during April and September in sympathy with the operations of the Division, when the daily bed state averaged 1662.
The Department of Plastic Surgery of the Face, under Major Pickerill, N.Z.M.C., was in 1918, transferred from Walton to Queen's Hospital at Sidcup, twelve miles from London. Extra officers were attached to the New Zealand Section there: Captain Marshall, N.Z.M.C.—severely wounded just before Messines—as Specialist Anaesthetist; Captain Rhind, M.C., N.Z.M.C., as Assistant; and Major Rishworth, N.Z.D.C., as Surgeon Dentist. The New Zealand Section participated in the fine work of the well known "Jaw" Hospital and was ultimately transferred intact to the Dunedin Hospital with 59 patients in 1919, so bringing back the expert knowledge of plastic surgery which had attained to such perfection during the war, and which was essential for the adequate treatment of some of the returned men.
At the New Zealand Convalescent Hospital at Hornchurch, with a capacity of 2,500 beds, the most important change in 1918 was the opening of a School of Massage. All through 1918 there had been an acute shortage of N.Z.A.N.S. personnel—supplemented in rush times by the good offices of the Canadian Army Nursing Service—but more especially a shortage of trained masseuses. To meet this the D.M.S. instituted a course of training at Horn-church in conformity with I.S.T.M. standards. A six months training was considered sufficient, but in order to comply with the New Zealand requirements a further course of three months in Swedish remedial exercises and three months in electrical treatment was required. Many of the candidates trained at Hornchurch were enabled to attain the I.S.T.M. certificate, and in this way our future requirements were provided for.
No. 3 N.Z.G.H., under Lieut.-Col. McLean, N.Z.M.C., late O.C. No. 4 New Zealand Field Ambulance had expanded to nearly 1000 beds, including the venereal section of 500 beds. Five new wards had been completed by February, 1918; shelters for the accommodation of T.B. cases had been erected on the hillside above the Hospital. The site, in a deep cleft of the downs, was very damp and drowned in mists during the winter, hot and breathless during the summer by reason of the enclosed nature of the ground and the tier like structure of the wards on the
The chief medical considerations in the camps and depots during the year had been the virulent epidemics of septic pneumonia and purulent bronchitis. In the first term of the year the 31st and 32nd Reinforcements had suffered from an epidemic of measles, rubella or morbilli—contemporary reports say both—which was complicated by fatal broncho-pneumonias. 75 cases of pulmonary infection resulted in 35 deaths, mostly at Brimsdown Bottom Isolation Hospital, Tidworth, during February, March and April. The disease arose on board ship and is reminiscent of the similar outbreak amongst our soldiers returning to New Zealand by the "Britannic" in July, 1902, at the end of the. South African War, referred to in chapter I. It was stated that the more serious form of the disease—whatever it was—was contracted at Newport-News, Virginia, where the ship had called to coal. Some of our men had visited a U.S. camp where the diseases had been prevalent and where purulent bronchitis as a complication had been very severe. The ventilation of the transports, especially at night, was defective, owing to the necessity for keeping the ports closed in the submarine zone, and for this reason the epidemic assumed graver proportions. In view of the seriousness of the outbreak and the necessity for determining the specific cause of the complications, Streptococcus longus, associated with B. influenzae, pneumococci and staphylococci. A streptococcus was occasionally isolated from blood-cultures. The invariable presence of B. in-fluenzae as determined by culture of the sputa by Dr. Eyre of St.
Thomas's Hospital was a remarkable finding, as it put this type of pulmonary infection in the same category as the influenzal pneumonias seen later on during the year. The similarity of the necroscopic and laboratory findings with those reported in New Zealand during the winter epidemics is also worthy of note. Similar cases had been observed in France in the winters of 1914, and 1916; few if any in 1915. Purulent bronchitis was a frequent complication of wounds more especially of the chest, and usually the bacillus of Pfeiffer was the organism most constantly found, although there were no epidemics of influenza at the time. Official History of the War, Diseases of the War, Vol. I., page 213. Eyre and Lowe Prophylactic Vaccinations against Catarrhal infections. Lancet, 1918 Vol. II. page 484,streptococcus as in Trentham in 1916, was a characteristic of the Sling epidemic of early 1918, but as another investigator, Capt Lowe, N.Z.M.C., Bacteriologist of No. 2 N.Z.G.H., had by blood agglutinations shown a definite lack of immunity to the pneumococcus in New Zealanders, all were agreed to adopt an immunising vaccine prepared by Dr. Eyre in collaboration with Captain Lowe and containing mixed organismst
The vaccine was designed to produce an artificial immunity not only against the first three virulent organisms most frequently found in fatal purulent bronchitis, but also to immunise against the other organisms found in catarrhal sputa and nasal discharges. The vaccine was made compulsory for all reinforcements; it gave rise to little obvious reaction administered in two doses at a week's interval, and yielded some evidence of immunising power during the influenza epidemics in England.
The lengthy report on the Sling epidemic furnished by the Army Sanitary Committee on February 28th, 1918, after pointing out the known fact that measles in armies was noted for the increasing severity of the cases during the progress of the epidemic and that the case mortality in such epidemics in the American Civil War had, at times, reached 20 per cent, while in Willochra after sailing from New Zealand, but the full virulence of the enhanced infection did not mature until shortly before landing. Here we have an epitome of the plagues of Trentham and building stones in the world wide epidemics about to come.
Another and a more serious outbreak was that which occurred on board the troopship Tahiti, in August, 1918. The transport carrying the 40th Reinforcements, including 21 officers, 10 N.Z.A.N.S and 1080 men called at Sierra Leone towards the end of August, where she had rendezvous to form part of a convoy. Contact was made with H.M.S. Mantua, a cruiser infected by a serious and fatal form of influenza. Within a few days of the sailing of the convoy, influenza broke out in the Tahiti, and practically the whole ship's complement was affected. A very fatal broncho-pneumonia which complicated the more serious cases, caused 68 deaths at sea before landing at Plymouth, and of the surviving sick, 116 in number, who were transferred to No. 3 N.Z.G.H., three died of purulent bronchitis, and one sister, N.Z.A.N.S. of cerebro-spinal meningitis. It is hardly possible to realise the difficulties of dealing with such a pandemic on board a crowded transport in a submarine zone, where ventilation was limited by reason of the closing of portholes at night, and where practically everyone suffered from the disease, including the three medical officers, the nursing sisters and the N.Z.M.C. orderlies. Much could be said of the zeal and fortitude of the O.C. troops, Lieut.-Col. R. Allen, D.S.O., and the devotion of the N.Z.A.N.S. and the medical officers who were unremitting in their attentions to the sick. The deaths which occurred daily and in daily increasing numbers until no less than 20 bodies were committed to the sea on the 4th of October, had a depressing effect on all, and led to a despondency and apathy in the sick, which in many cases seemed to determine a fatal issue. The cause of the outbreak was closely investigated in Codford, Captain Lowe, N.Z.M.C., coming down from Walton and working in collaboration with Captain Eagleton, R.A.M.C., pathologist at Sutton Veney, who had previous experience of the Sling epidemic.
The opinion of these officers was that the condition was one of severe influenza complicated by purulent bronchitis. The Bacillus of Pfeiffer was demonstrated in 90 per cent, of the fatal cases in combination with Streptococcus longus; the changes found postmortem agreed with the usual findings in purulent bronchitis.
Interest in the epidemic, however, was soon diverted by the most serious of all outbreaks, the influenza epidemic of October and November in France and England. Several thousands of cases in the N.Z.E.F. were reported during this epidemic which affected the Division in France and the camps in England; the total loss from pulmonary complications probably exceeded 150 and in most instances the fatality rate in the pneumonic type was extraordinarily high. The New Zealand Stationary Hospital reported a complication incidence of 12 per cent in all cases of influenza admitted during October and November, and a mortality of over 50 per cent for the pneumonias. The large camps at Sling and Brocton suffered most in England. At Brocton there were 960 cases with 71 pneumonias and 47 deaths up to the 21st of November, 1918. On the 5th of October, the disease was made notifiable in the British armies in France, which had an incidence of 112,274 cases with 5,483 deaths during the winter crisis. Those who had seen the early cases of purulent bronchitis at Sling and Brimsdown Bottom and had marked the heliotrope cyanosis and helpless apathy of the fatal cases of the Tahiti needed no warning as to the outcome of the wholly similar cases seen in France and England at the end of 1918, and already foreshadowed in the reports of the cases observed at Trentham Camp in 1915 and 1916. Nor has the identical cause of this pandemic as yet been made clear: whether it was a virus of the camps bred in men whose vitality was lowered by stresses of war and so enhanced in virulence by passage as to reach in time to the status of a world plague, or whether it was a demonstration of team work by the already known organisms is as yet not fully determined. Whatever the causal agent, perhaps the results led in some way to a furtherance of peace by warning the human race to desist from war, whose hardships had weakened all alike against the common foe, disease.
When the armistice came the medical arrangements for demobilisation were well matured. On November the 30th the hospital bed states showed that there were in British hospitals: 63 officers, 1379 O.R. sick and wounded of the N.Z.E.F., and in the New Zealand hospitals, 172 officers, 4714 O.E., while there was a population of about 3000 category men in the Command Depot.
During the year the hospital ships had continued to sail at one month's interval so that from two to three months elapsed without evacuations, but special transports for lighter cases had helped to fill the gaps. In July, owing to the torpedoing of the Llandovery Castle, hospital ships were obliged to travel via Suez and the Mediterranean. The Marama, in August, with a Spanish Commission on board called at Marseilles and, by decision of the War Office, was not permitted to pass beyond. Cot cases had to proceed overland from England, a condition which prohibited the despatch of the most serious cases so that the curious anomaly resulted that patients too ill to embark on the hospital ships went home in ambulance carriers. In November, both hospital ships were en route for England and were due in December; both, it was anticipated, could clear all the serious cot cases. A delay in the despatch of the Marama from New Zealand had caused serious inconvenience in England by congestion of cot cases, but now, the disappearance of submarines had removed all difficulties in transport. The fine transports Ruahine and Maunganui had been adapted as ambulance carriers, and the great majority of the low categories could be safely accommodated in the ordinary transports. In December, all four ships were loading, thus relieving the hospitals and making way for demobilisation of personnel and equipment. An Embarkation Medical Board under Lieut.-Col. Tracey-Inglis, N.Z.M.C., was set up in January, 1919: the duties of the board were to make provision for the supply of adequate medical personnel and equipment for the transports. The staff of each transport carrying 1000 troops comprised: 2 medical officers, 5 N.Z.A.N.S., 4 Red Cross workers (females) and 10 N.Z.M.C., O.R. Special arrangements were made for the attachment of additional female workers where soldiers' families were included in the draft and supplies of artificial milk devised by
It was of the utmost importance that the increase of medical work during the early stages of demobilisation should not interfere with the existing scheme of medical boards and classification, as the importance of adequate boarding in England was thoroughly appreciated as a preliminary to the work of the Pensions' Boards in New Zealand. The collection and preparation of case sheets, reports, and provisional board papers was a matter to which a considerable amount of detailed attention was directed. All the "A" men were drafted to Sling Camp where they underwent a physical inspection prior to embarkation, while the category men were concentrated at Codford at the Command Depot; and those already found to be permanently unfit (C2) were assembled in the Discharge Depot at Torquay. As the New Zealand standing medical board in France was now no longer required, the President, Major Bowerbank, N.Z.M.C., with his staff, was recalled and established at Codford for the purpose of finally boarding the "B" group to be concentrated there. All case sheets and documents were forwarded to the depot—the medical history sheets had previously been filed at the office of the A.D.M.S. in London—and a board of from 10 to 14 medical officers was set up in specially devised quarters with a large N.Z.M.C. staff, the whole so organised and administered that at least 400 men could be adequately boarded in one day. The assistance of the specialists at No. 3 N.Z.G.H. was made available in doubtful cases and the service of the V.D. section furnished criteria for estimating the present condition of those who had records of venereal infection. The Board dealt only with "B" and "C" class men not requiring any treatment, and in the great majority of cases suffering from minor disabilities which did not at the time suggest serious pensionable disability; but it was precisely this class of men who later furnished the most intricate problems set before the Pensions' Boards in New Zealand, hence the necessity for considerable care in the preliminary boarding.
Demobilisation was proceeding apace and by January, 1919, the number of troops in England and Germany awaiting repatriation was 40,000 of which 14,000 with the Division. Six ships had sailed since November the 11th, eight were due to sail in January, and nine in February, ensuring a rate of about 7000 embarkations per month. The number of ships available was quite satisfactory but strikes in the London Dockyards had
At the end of January, 1919, the total number of sick and wounded in hospitals in England was 115 officers, 2796 O.R., of which 524 of all ranks still in British hospitals. Colonel Parkes, C.M.G., C.B.E., the D.M.S., had taken his leave of the N.Z.E.F., and, in reviewing the work of the New Zealand Medical Services overseas which he had administered during three years, admitted many shortcomings and mistakes in administration due chiefly to a lack of military experience, but which—as he states—were condoned and amended by the ever ready assistance and advice given by the Medical Authorities at the War Office, especially the D.G.M.S., General Keogh; and to the willing co-operation of the Directors of Medical Services of Australia and Canada he claimed to be much beholden for their help in matters concerning the Dominions. In these complimentary expressions he had the concurrence of all his officers of the N.Z.M.C. whose work had brought them into collaboration with the sister services of the Mother Country and the Dominions.
Administrative control of the Medical Department in the London Headquarters was directed, during the remainder of 1919, by
The first medical unit to be demobilised was the New Zealand Stationary Hospital. The year 1918 had proved the most active of all in the history of this unit; the bed accommodation had reached 800 and the monthly admissions had varied between 700 and 1200 during the last twelve months of service in France. The hospital had served a variety of purposes in the Second Army: as a shell shock centre; as an infectious diseases hospital; as a C.C.S. during the Flanders invasion in March; as a pathological centre in connection with the dysentery outbreak in August and September; and as a general hospital with medical, surgical and specialist divisions at all times after the reconstruction of the unit at Wisques in February, 1918. Surgical teams had frequently been despatched to the assistance of the C.C.S.s during periods of heavy fighting; but useful as the work of this unit was, yet it was always a subject for regret by the N.Z.M.C. that the Stationary Hospital had not been constituted as a C.C.S. Originally raised as a surgical unit, it never had opportunity to
The ambulances in Germany were quartered near their respective brigades: No. 1 Field Ambulance at Monheim, No. 2 in schools and a concert hall at Mulheim on the right bank of the Rhine, across the bridge of boats; and No. 3 at Frankenforst: all within easy reach of Cologne. Their Christmas dinners were served just two days after their arrival in the Rhineland. There were plum puddings in plenty, but all deplored the absence of the turkeys which transport difficulties had delayed en route: flagons of rhineish made a poor substitute, although—as duly recognised—not lacking in cheering qualities. Of those who sat at the board that day, many had broken no other bread than that of the army on any Christmas morn this five years past; and still a few who could recall Christmas junketing at tables in the open desert near Cairo or on the dingy transports slinking away from Anzac. They had toasted the day on the edge of the battlefield for four long years, and now at the close of the fifth year there was at last peace on earth and a hope of good will for all mankind.
The A.D.M.S. was established with Divisional Headquarters in the offices of the Bayer Chemical Works at Leverkusen, four miles north of Mulheim. In these very factories Bayers had been as successful in the manufacture of phosgene—normally used in the synthesis of Salol—as they were in the production of aspirin, and it was said that much mustard gas had been produced here during the war. Recalled for duty in New Zealand and temporarily attached to the Ministry of Pensions,
The peace-time duties of the field ambulances were not very arduous: attention to the sick of their brigades and evacuation of the more serious cases to the casualty clearing
Means of recreation were not deficient in the Rhineland: parties of the N.Z.M.C. armed with the "Diggers' Guide to German," a production of the Divisional Press, visited the sights, explored the Cathedral, or were ferried up the Rhine to Bohn or Coblentz. But their chief pleasure was the Opera House, where they heard in song the great Saga of our Norse ancestors—saw and heard Siegfried forging his sword and Brynhilda, daughter of Wotan, riding the winds with the chosers of the slain—saw again, as at Crèvecoeur, and at La Vacherie, the twilight of the Gods and the doom of Valhalla.
Demobilisation and the handing in of equipment and transport monopolised much of the attention of the ambulance commanders. Step by step with the reduction in strength of the Division the medical units were demobilised in turn, No. 3 Field Ambulance being the first to close on February 4th, and No. 2 Field Ambulance just a month later. Owing to difficulties in obtaining railway transport, No. 2 was obliged to part with its cherished mascot "Murphy" a donkey brought with them from Egypt, who had survived the perils of the western campaign while many of his stable companions had been killed in action. What remained
It has been said that the New Zealand Division had failed only once in taking all its objectives, the same might be said of the N.Z.M.C. attached to the Division. Only on one occasion had any adverse criticism on the conduct of the field ambulances reached Corps Headquarters. The accusation made against them was that they had failed to clear the battle field of wounded at Passchendaele! Apart from this glorious failure the medical services of the Division bore a good name in France which they owed to the earnestness of their commanding officers, and the solidity of the rank and file. Above all, the relations of the medical branch to the combatant staffs of the Division had ever been cordial and mutually supporting. Our honoured chief,
By June, 1919, demobilisation was well forward. The closing of No. 1 N.Z.G.H. coincided with the sailing of the "Maheno," the last hospital ship to leave for New Zealand; 158 patients from Brockenhurst were embarked on March 11th, which completed the work of the hospital. During its stay in England this medical unit had admitted a total of 21,004 patients. The New Zealand Convalescent Hospital, Hornchurch, closed in June, No. 3 N.Z.G.H. in July, but the Venereal section did not close until August when the remaining patients, some 200 in number, were transferred to a British Hospital at Chiselden. The Mt. Felix Section of No. 2 N.Z.G.H. had closed by the end of June, but it still had some 80 beds open at the end of August, and retained at Oatlands Park the limbless, still awaiting the fitting of artificial limbs at Roehampton. In all cases medical and surgical equipment and hospital furniture and stores had been shipped to New Zealand in such quantity and of such description as seemed most useful and appropriate, the remainder was disposed of by public sales. Personnel had embarked with the departing transports. A second orthopoedic team comprising six
The New Zealand Defence Department had, by 1918, attained to a high level of organisation. The war policy of the Dominion, directed by a Coalition Cabinet, was administered by a Minister of Defence of marked ability and dominant personality, Colonel the
D.M.S.:
D.M.H.: Hon.
A.D.M.S. (Sanitary):
D.A.D.M.S.: Hon.
D.D.S.:
The Consulting Surgeon in New Zealand at this date was
An important change in medical administration came about in March, 1918. The dual control exercised by the Defence and the Public Health Departments over sick and wounded returned soldiers was, by resolution of Cabinet, abolished and the sole responsibility for the after care and treatment of both discharged and undischarged disabled soldiers was handed over to the Defence Department. The dual system in which the Chief Health Officer and the D.G.M.S. were co-equal failed, not in any way through lack of mutual understanding between the medical officers concerned, but because the arrangement was cumbersome, uneconomical, led to considerable delay in execution and was not productive of military efficiency.
That the system was faulty was admitted by all parties early in the year. As evidence of the cumbersome nature of the existing scheme, the transfer of a military patient from one civil hospital to another is cited. On transfer of a military patient the medical superintendent of the civil hospital concerned communicated with the Public Health Department, whose chief, as D.M.H., if he approved of the transfer (in this he would be guided by the Consulting Surgeon), and if a bed was available in the hospital of destination, referred the matter to O.C. Base Records, who in turn directed the O'sC. military districts concerned: one, to issue the necessary rail warrants, the other, to warn the civil medical superintendent of the hospital of destination. At Rotorua Sanatorium and Military Hospital the system was to be seen in its most complex manifestation. The Sanatorium and Balneological Station was an institution controlled by the Tourist Department. The Medical Superintendent, Dr. Herbert, was an officer of the Tourist Department, his salary
Public hospitals in New Zealand are supported by:—(1) Rates levied in the hospital districts; (2) A Government Subsidy proportionate to the amount levied by local taxation; (3) Fees payable by patients; and to a certain extent by voluntary contributions. The public hospitals are administered by the Hospital and Charitable Aid Boards, lay bodies and voluntary workers who employ a medical superintendent and a staff to administer the hospital and provide treatment for the patitents. In the working of the Hospital Boards the Inspector of Hospitals, also the Chief Health Officer of the Dominion, exercises an advisory and controlling function and has a certain prerogative in guiding the boards in in their selection of medical superintendents, assistants and nursing staffs. The medical superintendents are part time or whole time as is required by the size of the particular institution. But the superintendents, being officers of the Hospital Board, are-certainly more under the control of the Board than they are-beholden to the Public Health Department. Good will between all parties is essential for the smooth running of the Act and in the war period the best conditions prevailed. The boards animated by a real patriotism, co-operated most energetically with the Defence Department in providing accommodation and treatment for the returned soldiers. The link between the Defence Department and the Hospital Boards was the Chief Health Officer.
Under the new arrangements whereby the Defence Minister assumed control over military patients, it was still necessary to make use of the hospital accommodation provided by the civil hospitals. In order to co-ordinate the work, Colonel Valentine was temporarily lent by the Public Health Department to the Defence Department and became a whole time military officer under the D.G.M.S. King George V Hospital at Rotorua and the Sanatorium at Hanmer, and all convalescent homes hitherto administered by the Public Health Department became military institutions. Another change in administration was necessary: discharges of returned soldiers still needing treatment had to be delayed indefinitely and, following the precedent of other Dominions disabled soldiers already discharged from the service required to be reattested prior to admission to hospital for treatment of recurrent disabilities due to wounds or war service. These measures essential to the maintenance of discipline were brought into force during the year.
Close consideration had been given by the D.G.M.S. to the necessity for providing adequate orthoepadic treatment for returned soldiers and provision for the special treatment of tubercular patients, and those suffering from the war neuroses. Public attention had been sharply focussed on these matters early in 1918, and shortly after the new arrangements came into force provision was made for the reception of the first orthopaedic team at Christchurch Hospital and for the erection of military sanatoria for the treatment of phthisis. In Dunedin, Lieut.-Col. Barnett, C.M.G., N.Z.M.C., who had now resumed the Chair of Surgery at the Otago University was instrumental in organising a preparatory scheme for the establishment of an Orthopaedic Centre at the Dunedin Hospital. At the instance of the D.G.M.S., Lieut.-Col. Mill, N.Z.M.C. recently returned from the United Kingdom, forwarded a report after a tour of inspection. The report which was later endorsed by Colonel Wylie, N.Z.M.C., advised that at least 3000 beds would be required; that at present there was a lack of accommodation, lack of trained medical personnel, and especially an inadequate equipment for physio-therapy. The establishment of two large central hospitals under military control, one for each Island, was recommended, and it was strongly urged, on the advice of Sir Robert Jones, who had personally interested himself in the matter, that none but trained military orthopaedic specialists should undertake the work of surgical reconstruction in New Zealand.
It had been intended to send the first orthopædic team to King George V. Hospital at Rotorua, but as Christchurch was more central and offered superior accommodation, the unit was established at Christchurch Hospital in a new block known as the "Chalmers" Wards donated by the estate of the Chalmers family of Ashburton and appropriated to military uses with the consent of the donors. The local Hospital Board, whose medical staff was much depleted by the war, had early realised the advantages their institution would derive from the attachment of the orthopaedic unit more especially in developing their civil orthopaedic work and in the reorganisation of their departments. They agreed to do all in their power to make the conjoint work a success and in October, 1918, Colonel Wylie and his team were busily engaged in opening their various departments.
The close of the year 1918, was a disastrous period of failure for the camp sanitarians; statistics up to November had yielded a promise of a healthier year even than 1917, and encouragement in a belief in the efficacy of the very stringent preventive measures in force. But at the end of the year the results shown did not warrant any great assurance in the value of the sanitary measures adopted to exclude epidemic disease. The average strength of the camps in 1918 had been 9,181, with a total population of 24,434. Of this number 11,578 had been admitted to hospital; the hospital admission rate gave a figure of 36.81 constantly sick as compared with 12.49 for 1917. There were 295 deaths recorded in the camps, equivalent to a mortality of 12.07 per 1000 or 32.13 per 1000 on the average strength. These were the worst figures yet furnished in the annual health reports of the camps, but 73 per cent, of the sickness was due to influenza and of the deaths, 287 were caused by the later influenza epidemic.
There had been a preliminary wave of mild influenza in August and September, but in the first week of November a secondary wave of extraordinary severity swept over the camps. The first outbreak although it seemed to confer some slight immunity, was not attended by any marked incidence of pulmonary complications and it seemed to the medical officers that the throat swabbmgs were fully justifying their existence. But nothing could have warded off the explosive virulence of the main epidemic in New Zealand which so curiously coincided with that of the Division in France, the N.Z.E.F. camps in England and the world wide pandemic of late October and November. On the 11th and 12th of October troopships arriving in Auckland reported 80 cases of influenza on board. The Bacillus of Pfeiffer was very prominent in the first wave, but not so frequently observed in the secondary pneumococcus, a streptococcus and gram negative cocci seemed to be predominant. One interesting investigation made by Lieut. Waters, N.Z.M.C., Bacteriologist at Trentham, is worth recording. He exposed blood-agar plates in the wards and on the verandah of the hospital, others in the canteen and cinema hall of the camp. No cultures of pathological significance grew on the plates exposed in the hospital, but on plates from the picture theatre and more especially the canteen, copious growths of the characteristic organisms were identified. This promising inquiry into the vital question of modes of infection was most unhappily interrupted by the onset of influenza in the investigator. No preventive measures could control the spread of such an epidemic, but the despatch of the 43rd Reinforcements was cancelled; all movements of troop trains were stopped; the camps were rigidly quarantined, and a daily pilgrimage was made to the inhalation chambers. Shortly after Armistice demobilisation of the camps and home services commenced, but the epidemic delayed and lengthened the process and entailed an unusual amount of extra work on the medical service.
During 1919, important changes in administration took place. General Richardson on his return to New Zealand was appointed General Officer in charge Administration, an office not previously constituted in the Defence Department. Major General Henderson, having completed the term of his extended engagement with the Dominion Government, relinquished his appointment as D.G.M.S. at the end of March and on his departure received the public thanks of the Government for his valued services and was awarded the K.C.M.G. His duties were assumed by Brigadier General McGavin, C.M.G., D.S.O., N. Z. M. C., who returned to New Zealand in May. As the gradual return of medical officers, who had held important appointments in the N.Z.E.F. overseas, supplied the Director General with a staff of skilled and experienced subordinates, the senior officers on loan from the Public Health Department were returned to their civil duties.
The first and most important readjustment to be made by Brigadier General McGavin was the closing of a large number of small "war hospitals" or convalescent homes and the concentration of service patients in specialised military institutions. Owing to the over-crowding of the civil hospitals and the inadequate provision of military hospitals prior to 1918 the local Patriotic Bodies in the larger towns had established a number of small soldiers' hospitals and convalescent homes which by reason of their scattered distribution were almost impossible to administer or to control. The maintenance of discipline and the provision of special treatment were both considerations of urgent importance and there was also evident the necessity for a more accurate classification and sorting of the patients domiciled in these units.
Already in 1918 our orthopædic specialists sent out from England had reported unfavourably on the conditions existing in most of the larger hospitals, and this more especially as regards the facilities provided for physio-therapeutic and electrical treatments and the manufacture of splints and corrective appliances. It was noted, for instance, that many cases of functional paresis had been confused with the organic lesions and that both had been subjected to electrical treatments not suited to the respective conditions—many gun-shot injuries of peripheral nerves dating from 1915 and 1916 required treatment by nerve suture.
The first necessity was classification: with this object in view a travelling medical board was set up by the D.G.M.S. with
Owing to the fervour of local patriotic feeling, considerable opposition was offered to the closing of the smaller War Hospitals and Convalescent Homes. The Patriotic Bodies had many good reasons to advance for keeping their respective units open but the Defence Minister, Sir James Allen, was obdurate, he demanded efficiency at any cost and approved of a reorganisation of the military hospitals on the lines of similar formations in the United Kingdom. By means of the Travelling Medical Board the patients were ultimately sorted out and drafted to the now enlarged and specialised military hospitals;
Amongst the first of the specialised units to be constituted in 1919 was a neurological centre for the treatment of the war neuroses. Queen Mary's Military Hospital at Hanmer Springs, in the South Island, had been used as a Convalescent Home since 1915. At first a balneological station under the Tourist Department, possessing a hot sulphur spring, a resident medical officer and a small sanatorium, it admitted convalescents of all categories; but during the war, until 1918, it was under the control of the Public Health Department. Later it assumed a more military character and in 1918 had a combatant officer as commandant, with N.Z.M.C., N.C.O.'s and orderlies and a military medical officer. Major Bernau, N.Z.M.C., had followed Captain Hendry, N.Z.M.C., and was succeeded by Major Brewis, N.Z.M.C., but on the opening of the hospital as a neurological centre, it was commanded by a medical officer,
The proposal outlined in March, 1918, for the formation of military orthopaedic hospitals in the four centres, included an Orthopaedic Hospital at Rotorua. The Convalescent Home known as King George V. Hospital had been in existence since 1916. Lieut.-Col. Herbert, N.Z.M.C., Superintendent of the Sanatorium, had enlarged the Physio-therapy Department and had installed
At the Civil Hospital in Auckland, additional wards for military patients had been established at the end of 1915. The buildings where these patients were accommodated, known as the Annexe, were controlled by the Superintendent, Lieut.-Col. Maguire, N.Z.M.C., who had served with the New Zealand General Hospital in Egypt, but had been recalled to the service of the Civil Hospital. In the March, 1918, proposals, the Annexe was destined to be expanded so as to form a military orthopædic hospital. The institution was inspected and reported on by Colonel Wylie, then Inspector of Military Orthopædies, and it was decided that the Defence Department should assume control. Lieut.-Col. Mill, therefore, in June, 1919, took command of the military unit and was later succeeded by Lieut.-Col. Murray, C.M.G., D.S.O., N.Z.M.C., in September.
The Annexe was closed in March, 1920, and the military patients transferred to Rotorua where the new buildings were now available. The change of site was fore-shadowed in the original policy of 1918, the building scheme had been in part, completed at Rotorua and economy in medical officers and in administrative expenditure in a great measure dictated the change. Ultimately the Annexe was available as a physio-therapy department of the Civil Hospital and a portion was appropriated as a Venereal Clinic for males and females, controlled by the Hospital but supplied by the Public Health Department with a medical officer: Major Brown, N.Z.M.C., late Officer in charge of the V.D. Section of No. 3 N.Z.G.H., Codford, was appointed, while the other officers of his staff who had received special training in England were attached to the Civil Venereal Dispensaries at the chief centres.
In June, 1919, the Camp Hospital at Trentham was enlarged and organised as a general hospital of 500 beds. Colonel Wylie, following Lieut.-Col Mills, had command, and supervised
At Featherston, in the Camp Hospital, a centre for D.A.H. and C.P.D.I. had been formed; the latter designation a nomenclature including all undiagnosed cases of chronic pulmonary disease of indeterminate character, a class like D.A.H., in need of further sorting. A Venereal Division was associated with this Military Hospital which was commanded by Lieut.-Col. McLean, C.B.E., In 1920, Featherston Military Hospital was closed, the cases transferred to Trentham with a proportionate staff and the officer commanding took up the appointment of A.D.M.S. Central Command.
A sanatorium for the treatment of tubercular soldiers had been under consideration since 1918. Situated near Waipukurau, in the Hawkes Bay District, in an ideal climate, and on a hill named by the Defence Department "Puke Ora," the hill of health, the institution was opened late in 1919, and command was taken by
At the Chalmers Military Hospital, Colonel Wylie was thoroughly established early in 1919. All orthopædic departments were well organised and indeed served as a model for the other similar institutions. At Timaru, South of Christchurch, a small military hospital was established in 1919, under the command of Major Ulrich, N.Z.M.C. At this centre, military orthopædic work was developed by the commandant, who had in 1917 been chief of the Surgical Division of the New Zealand Stationary Hospital, and Major Unwin, N.Z.M.C., who held a similar appointment at No. 2 N.Z.G.H., Walton. At Dunedin Hospital, during 1919, the military wards acquired a greater degree of efficiency on the arrival of the New Zealand Section of the "Jaw" Hospital, Sidcup, under Major Pickerill and his assistants, and the attachment to the staff of Major Renfrew White, N.Z.M.C., late of the R.A.M.C., a graduate of Otago University, whose, post graduate training in England had been orthopædic surgery. Under these officers a military surgical unit, with a full range of orthopædic departments, was organised, capable of undertaking all classes of reconstructive work.
On the medical side, as we have noted, the tubercular soldier and the "neurological" type had been provided for. As a further development a convalescent camp was established at Narow Neck, Auckland, whereto many doubtful cases of lung infection and D.A.H. were drafted. This unit, under the command of
Final demobilisation of the N.Z.M.C. was practically completed by the 30th April, 1920, but the medical personnel retained by the Defence Department was transferred to a new formation, the New Zealand Army Medical Department, drawing the same rates of pay as existed in the N.Z.E.F. with which almost all the medical officers retained and nearly 50 per cent, of the N.C.O.'s and men had served overseas. The Department in 1920 numbered 40 officers, 8 commissioned quartermasters or other non-medical officers, 459 N.C.O.'s and other ranks, 210 N.Z.AN.S., or 900 in all—including male and female assistants.
In the process of reconstruction we are now chiefly concerned with the military hospitals alone, which from 1920 onwards were: King George V., Rotorua, with 300 beds; Trentham Military Hospital, 500 beds; the two Military Sanatoria at Pukeroa and Cashmere Hills; the Neurological Centre at Hanmer; and the Convalescent Camp at Narrow Neck, Auckland. The Civil j Hospitals at Dunedin, Timaru and Christchurch absorbed the military staffs in 1920, and developed their civil orthopædic work; there was ample material as a serious outbreak of poliomyelitis in 1916 had left us many crippled children for the full treatment of whose deformities there had been up till now no adequate provision. At Wellington Hospital, which had closed its Victoria Military Ward when Trentham was organised in 1919, there was as yet no provision for establishing an orthopædic division. With the gradual disposal of ex-service patients, the two military hospitals opened their wards to civilians, children mostly. King George V. Hospital had soon over 100 beds occupied by crippled
In the work of medical reconstruction, the voluntary aid societies and patriotic bodies gave valued assistance. The Red Cross Society, ever indefatigable in its activities, on behalf of disabled soldiers, assisted in the hospitals, the sanatoria, and convalescent homes in providing recreation rooms and a wealth of comforts for the patients. No less active in peace than in the field, the New Zealand Y.M.C.A. supervised the picture theatres, and institutes attached to the hospitals, which did so much to relieve the tedium of prolonged orthopædic treatment. And, again, the Salvation Army gave willing help in a like manner. The district patriotic bodies were ever ready to relieve the temporary hardships that beset the disabled soldier in his transition from convalescence to civil employment; and on the concerted efforts of these bodies aided by the vocational training staffs and the Repatriation Department, much of the success of the work was dependent.
A gradual dispersal of the medical personnel of the N.Z.A.M.D. proceeded in step with the reduction in the number of ex-service patients under treatment. At the close of the military year in June, 1922, the total number of in-patients was 920; while the out-patients numbered 756; or 1,676 ex-service patients in all During the year the following military medical institutions had been handed over to the Department of Health: Pukeroa Sanatorium, on 13st July, 1921; King George V. Hospital, 20th October, 1921; Queen Mary's Hospital, 19th January, 1922; Trentham Military Hospital, 31st March, 1922; Cashmere Hills Sanatorium, 31st May, 1922. The treatment of out-patients at
At each of the four centres, homes were established for very chronic or incurable ex-service patients. The Evelyn Firth Home at Auckland; the Rannerdale Home at Christchurch, and the Montecillo Home at Dunedin, each controlled by the D.G.M.S. subsidised by the Defence Department but administered and aided by the Red Cross Society. At Trentham the small cottage hospital with 20 beds remained open as the Red Cross Home pending transfer of patients to a new site in Wellington. Surgical treatment was provided by the local civil hospitals and the surroundings and amenities of the homes were made attractive and agreeable by the known zeal and generosity of the Red Cross Society.
The workshops for the manufacture of artificial limbs and surgical appliances which had been established by the Defence Department at Dunedin, Christchurch and Auckland, were handed over to private firms constituted by returned soldiers who, in the. majority of cases, were limbless men specially trained under the vocational schemes, or, in the case of the splint shops, to the respective Hospital Boards. At Wellington the artificial limb factory remained under the control of the Defence Department The Military Medical Stores branch, under Major Gibbs, continued to supply not only the military wants but the requirements of various Government departments and many of the civil hospitals.
Finally arrangements were made and became effective in July, 1922, whereby the medical treatment, and the other medical activities in relation to service patients should be carried out by the Pensions Department so that co-ordination of medical treatment and pensioning might be more completely and economically
So, in one way or another, the N.Z.M.C. officers were repatriated: many returned to private practice; some took up whole or part time service with the Pensions or the Public Health Departments or other medical branches of the Civil Service; a few became superintendents of civil hospitals; many were attached to the staffs of these hospitals and continue to supervise the after care of disabled soldiers. In the organisation of the New Zealand Medical Services for the Great War, able help had been given by the civil medical officers of other departments of the State, by the hospital boards and their hard worked staffs, and by the civilian practitioners recruited into or co-operating with the Army Medical Department. How, in a measure, these services were repaid I have attempted to show. Each trained medical officer of the N.Z.E.F. brought back with him from overseas some special knowledge or skill which was of immediate avail to the civil population and so the profitable lessons taught by the war became a powerful uplift to the civilian medical organisations of the Dominion. Not alone the officers of the N.Z.M.C. but the rank and file also played an important part in the after war medical reorganisation, as radiographers, laboratory assistants, male nurses, masseurs, and as employees of the civil hospitals or the state departments engaged in medical work.
Of the N. C. O.'s and men of the N.Z.M.C. who served in the Great War much more could have been written that is honourable and worthy of all praise: of their devotion to duty in the field, at the bases, at sea in the hospital ships, and in New Zealand. Of their individual brave deeds but little has been reported—I think they would have it so. But this at least must be said: whatever praise the New Zealand Medical Services may have won in the Great War was, in greater part, earned by the soldierly conduct of the non-commissioned officers and the men of our Corps.
Of our comrades who are dead, whose names are here inscribed, those killed in the field or by disease, our common foeman, it is our hope that their sacrifice may shine forth if but dimly in this book, for those who coming after—perhaps engaged in a like adventure—may read this, their faltering epitaph.
The Army List of 1861 shows four additional names:
In Arduis Fidelis
Died: 13. Including 10 drowned in "Marquette."
No. 1 N.Z.H.S. Maheno: U.S.S. Coy.; gross tonnage 5,282 tons; length, 400.4 ft.; breadth, 50.2 feet. Inter-colonial passenger trade New Zealand—Australia. Medical officers. 7; O.R., 59; nurses, 10. Capacity, 340 cot cases. Charter, 25th May, 1915.
No. 2 N.Z.H.S. Marama: U.S.S. Coy.; 6437 tons gross; length, 420 feet; breadth, 52.2 feet. Passenger trade New Zealand—United States. Medical officers, 9; O.R., 66; nurses, 27; cots, 592. Charter, 3rd November, 1915.
On dates as reported in New Zealand. The total embarked was 92,860
The Official History of the War, Medical Services General History, Vol IV., gives much valuable information on this point, some of which is not referred to in the text of this book. The general tenor of the commentary on the failure of the wounded evacuations is as follows:—
"This seems an unfortunate oversight, for if there was any intention whatever to accommodate serious cases on the transports adequate equipment should have been provided…. What ever fault there was lay in the neglect to make provision for a reverse at the landings…. The conditions were worse at Anzac owing to want of small craft and of organisation for loading ships. The responsibility for this did not rest with the medical authorities…. There was neither means nor room for retaining the casualties ashore for the treatment or until they could be sorted out for embarkation on hospital ships or transports, as had been intended: It was imperative to clear them from the beaches as rapidly as possible. Unfortunately the arrangements for doing so broke down and the utmost confusion prevailed. There was no guiding or directing hand. The D.M.S. was on the Arcadian but the use of the wireless for obtaining information of what was happening was denied him. Classifying the casualties into seriously and slightly wounded became impossible—seriously wounded were embarked on the transports and slightly wounded on the hospital ships. The Gascon Hospital Ship, for example, had received 300 slightly wounded the first day and was consequently more than half full with that class of case and unable to take its proper complement of seriously wounded."
"But it would have been feasible to establish hospitals with a large amount of accommodation on the Island of Lemnos, and if this had been done in anticipation of the landing on the Peninsula much of the trouble would have been avoided. The wounded could have been received there in the first instance and arrangements could have been made for their further evacuation to Egypt, Malta, and England. Unfortunately no hospital arrangements had been made on shore at Mudros nor any medical administration established there until towards the end of May."
As evidence of the feasibility of the establishment of General Hospitals on Lemnos it is to be noted that at the end of December, 1915, there were actually 2 general hospitals, 4 stationary hospitals and 1 C.C.S. open at Mudros with an aggregate bed state of 6,336 beds and a possibility of expansion to double that number.
In the text it is stated that the earlier forms of Dysentery seen at Anzac were Amœbie. In order to avoid discussion on a highly contentious matter the references in the text are solely to contemporary documents and express the current opinions. But the following passage from the official history, Medical Service General History Vol. III. page 432 illustrates a conflicting opinion held by many Pathologists.
"After the evacuation of Gallipoli a large proportion of the troops, mainly Australian and Indian were employed in the Canal Zone. It is not surprising therefore that the two main diseases noted were Dysentery and Malaria. The Dysentery was a relic of Gallipoli, and was at first diagnosed almost universally as being amœbie in type owing to the fact that in the protozoological examinations
Entamoeba, Colihad been mistaken forEntamoeba Hystolitica.As soon, however, as the laboratories were staffed with men trained in tropical medicine the true nature of the disease was shown to be bacilliary, and this continued to be the prevailing type throughout the campaign, although there was a certain proportion of true amœbic dysentery amongst Indian troops brought by them to the country."
A final review of the matter was made at the Annual Meeting of the British Medical Association, held in London in April, 1919. At this great congress most of the pathologists and sanitarians of England, the Dominions and the United States of America who had worked in the war zones were present. The conclusions arrived at were these: Dysentery is a disease of great military importance. Most diarrhœas occurring in armies are Dysentery; and the incidence of Dysentery in armies is directly proportionate to the activities of the pathologists. The knowledge obtained during the Great War was very valuable but much work and time will be required to reconcile the various divergencies of opinion and the controversies which have arisen in the attempt to explain and interpret the results of experimental observation.
As regards Amœbic Dysentery, the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine had recently shown that infestation by Entamoeba Hystolitica is universal in England and apparently without pathological significance. Professor Yorke in his paper read at the Annual Meeting gave the results of over 4000 examinations of convalescent dysenterics. He found 11.5 per cent. of Entamoeba Hystolitica carriers. He pointed out that until recently carriers of Entamoeba Hystolitica were regarded as dangerous to the community and that it was held that so long as a man harboured the cysts he might be subject to a relapse of acute dysentery or to hepatic abscess; but, as the result of the examination of a very considerable number of persons who had never been out of England, it became clear that Entamoeba Hystolitica was indigenous to England and had been so probably from time immemorial. Thus, among 1,098 young recruits 5.6 per cent, were carriers and in 207 lunatics there were 9.7 per cent. Miners in South Wales were found to be more heavily infected than the rest of the community. These figures coincided with those of O'Connor and Wenyon in Egypt in 1917, where 5.3 per cent. of the healthy soldiers and 13.7 per cent of healthy natives were shown to be carriers.
In 1916 Clifford and Dobell carrying out investigations initiated by Wenyon showed that out of 110 New Zealanders from Gallipoli 11.8 per cent. were infested by Entamoeba Hystolitica.
As there is no character by which it is possible, with certainty to distinguish the vegetative stage of Entamoeba Hystolitica from Entamoeba Coli an error in diagnosis was easily made more especially having in view the high carrier rate of the normal soldier population in Egypt; hence possibly the confusion in the early diagnosis of the "Gallipoli flux.' We may conclude, then, that by far the greater part of the disease was Baccilliary not Amœbic Dysentery. The baccilliary dysenteries of the Balkans and Gallipoli were "Shiga" in type.
(for references see Bibliography Appendix II.)
G.R.O., Q.M.G., 13th April, 1915. Rations Scale of:—
The scale of Rations after leaving Egypt will be:—
- 1¼ lbs. Fresh Meat or 1 lb. (nominal) preserved meat.
- 1¼ lbs, Bread or 1 lb. Biscuit or 1 lb. Flour.
- 4 ozs. Bacon.
- 3 ozs. Cheese.
- 2 ozs. Peas, Beans or dried Potatoes.
- ⅝ ozs. Tea. ¼ lb. Jam.
- 3 ozs. Sugar.
- ½ oz. Salt, 1/20 oz. Mustard, 1/36 oz. Pepper.
- 1/10 gill Limejuice. at discretion of G.O.C. on recommendation of S.M.O
- ½ gill Rum. at discretion of G.O.C. on recommendation of S.M.O
- Tobacco not exceeding 2 ozs per week at discretion of G.O.C. on recommendation of S.M.O
M.E.F., G.R.O. 2nd May, 1915. "The issue of Cigarettes, Tobacco and Matches to troops is approved."
M.E.F., G.R.O., 294, 18th June, 1915. "The following scale of equivalents will obtain when the various commodities are available."
- 4 ozs. Jam. 6 ozs. Preserved Meat, or
- 4 ozs. Jam. 10 ozs Fresh Meat, or
- 4 ozs. Jam. Golden Syrup, or
- 4 ozs. Jam. 3 ozs. Cheese.
Corps Medical Officers' Training School, Estaires.
The following is a list of lectures and demonstrations included in the curriculum—
This course was five days and was intended originally to be a Corps affair but the D.D.M.S. decided to leave it to Divisions to carry out. Two pupils from each Regimental Sanitary detachment attended. Billets and rations were provided by No. 1 N.Z. Field Ambulance.
The Syllabus of instruction given was founded on F.S.R. part H. Chapter XI. "Duties of Sanitary Personnel." In addition there were | lectures dealing with the causation of disease founded on the R.A.M.C. Training Manual, Chapter V. The demonstrations were of a practical nature. Most of the day was spent in the open, lectures being taken in the late afternoon.
The following is a typical syllabus:—
Syllabus of Instruction Corps School of Field Sanitation for N. C. O.'s and Men.1st. Day 29th January, 1917.
8.0 a.m. Class assembles at No. 1 N.Z. Field Ambulance. Preparation of Billet and instruction in making straw mats.
12 noon Dinner.
3.0 p.m. Initial Lecture:—
- Duties of a Regimental Sanitary Detachment. Sanitary I responsibilities of O.C. and R.M.O.
- Explanation of the aims and objects of sanitation.
- Outline of course of training.
3.45 p.m. Break.
4.0 p.m. Lecture.
The Causes of Infectious Disease.
Germs.
Infections. Disinfectants.
Carriers.
2nd Day. 30th January, 1917.
7.30 a.m. Breakfast.
8.0 a.m. Parade and Inspection.
9.0 a.m. Lecture: Construction of various types of incinerators.
10.0 a.m. Practical demonstration of incineration of faeces by N.Z.
Sanitary Section at Bac-St-Maur and Sailly.
12 noon Dinner.
1.0 p.m. Construction of Incinerators.
3.30 p.m. Lecture. Life History of the Fly.
4.15 p.m. Break.
4.30 p.m. Latrines and anti-fly measures. Diseases due to fly-born infections.
3rd Day. 31st January, 1917.
7.30 a.m. Carry on.
9.0 a.m. Lecture: Disposal of Waste products. Soil Contamination. Ablution benches.
10.0 a.m Practical demonstration of Field Cooker and improvised ovens. Construction of Sanitary appliances and food receptacles. ClasB will be divided up into 2 sections and time occupied as indicated above till 3.30 p.m.
3.45 p.m. Lecture Construction and sanitation of cook-house.
4.30 p.m. Repetition.
4th Day. 1st February, 1917.
9.0 a m. Visit to D.R.S. and M. O.'s T.S.
2.0 pan. Inspection of Billets in the Divisional Ares. Visit to Field.
Punishment Camp.
3.30 p.m. Lecture:
- Sanitation of Billets.
- Sanitation on the March,
- Disinfection of Billets and dag-oats.
4.15p.m. Lecture: Drainage.
5th Day. 2nd February, 1917.
9.0 am. Few words on good and bad meat. Disposal of offal. Dead animals.
9.30 a.m. Inspection of slaughtering places.
10 30 a.m. Lecture: Sanitation of Horse Lines.
11.0 a m. Suggestions from the class.
Appendix I—Medical Administration.The following table sets out the nature of the disabilities for which war pensions are being granted.
In many cases a pensioner is suffering from more than one disability, but in this classification only the dominant disability is considered, so that the total number of these is the same as the total number of individuals in receipt of war pension on the 31st March, 1924.
|
Wounds | Perm. | Temp. | Total | |
Upper extremity | 1,577 | 600 | 2,177 | | |
Lower extremity | 1,548 | 858 | 2,506 | |
Head and neck | 440 | 289 | 729 | |
Thorax | 356 | 292 | 648 | |
Abdomen | 160 | 109 | 269 | |
| 4,181 | 2,148 | 6,329 | |
Amputations— | | | | |
Upper extremity | 430 | 8 | 438 | |
Lower extremity | 584 | 17 | 601 | |
Double | 39 | | 39 | |
| 1,053 | 25 | 1,078 | |
Special senses— | | | | |
Ocular: | | | | |
Totally blind | 21 | | 21 | |
Loss of one eye | 337 | 9 | 346 | |
Other disabilities of eye | 150 | 33 | 183 | |
| 508 | 42 | 550 | |
Auditory | 261 | 84 | 345 | |
Nasal | 2 | 16 | 18 | |
Respiratory system— | | | | |
Pulmonary tuberculosis | 6 | 1,462 | 1,468 | |
Other diseases | 23 | 929 | 952 | |
| 29 | 2,391 | 2,420 | |
Circulatory system | 95 | 358 | 453 | |
Nervous system— | | | | |
Organic disease | 27 | 31 | 58 | |
Functional disease | 30 | 827 | 857 | |
| 57 | 858 | 915 | |
Insanity | 2 | 28 | 30 | |
Gastro-intestinal | 43 | 271 | 314 | |
Genito-urinary | 43 | 121 | 164 | |
General diseases | 93 | 848 | 941 | |
Fractures (not due to wounds)— | | | | |
Upper extremity | 54 | 28 | 82 | |
Lower extremity | 52 | 40 | 92 | |
| 106 | 68 | 174 | |
Diseases of bone | 14 | 18 | 32 | |
Injuries of joints (not due to wounds) | 204 | 242 | 410 | |
Spinal disease | 9 | 81 | 90 | |
Deformities | 38 | 23 | 61 | |
Disease of skin | 3 | 8 | 11 | |
Miscellaneous | 43 | 101 | 144| | |
| 6,784 | 7,731 | 14,515 |
The History of the New Zealand Medical Services should be read in conjunction with the Official History of New Zealand's Effort in the Great War, (4 vols.) published by the New Zealand Government, of which the text, the maps, and I many illustrations will supplement deficiencies. For more detailed information on the Medical Administration and Operations of the N.Z.E.F. at the Overseas Bases, in Egypt, Gallipoli and France, the student is directed to the collators' typescript notes and compilations bound in four volumes quarto to be found in the Library of General Headquarters at Wellington. The compilation, upon which most of this volume is based, includes a daily precis of events for the years 1915, 1916, 1917, inclusive, copies of all important operation orders, medical memoranda and correspondence with historical notes on the principal war diseases, all arranged in chronological order with indices I and a bibliography. The fourth volume contains all the sanitary memoranda issued to the A.D.M.S. of the Division during the period covered. In the G.H.Q. library also is included a series of contemporary works dealing with war medicine and surgery collected at London Headquarters in 1916-1919, with many official pamplets and memoranda issued by the armies in France or by the War Office.
For matters appertaining to Medical Administration in New Zealand reference should be made to the Appendices to Parliamentary Papers, more especially the reports of the D.M.S. and the D.G.M.S, included in the annual reports of the G.O.C., New Zealand Forces from 1912 onwards. In the New Zealand Year Book some information as to Statistics, Medical and Military is available, but fuller details will be found in the annual reports on the Health of the Troops in New Zealand Camps, compiled by the A.D.M.S. Sanitary for the years 1916-1919.
The war volumes of The New Zealand Medical Journal, edited by
The short Bibliography which follows comprises only those books to which reference is made in the text or those which have been found most helpful to the compiler. The references in Medical Literature are to contemporary articles written by immediate observers and, in most instances, are the earliest references known to the compiler; amongst them will be found many contributions by N.Z.M.C. officers.
Bilharziasis. Mission in Egypt, Report on. Lt.-Col. Robert T. Leiper D.Sc; B.A.M.C Town. Vol. 25, July, 1915, pages 1-55.
Cerebro-Spinal Meningitis: Cerebro-spinal fever in Company Barracks. William Osier, B.M.J., January 30th, 1915, page 189. Epidemic Cerebro-spinal Meningitis: leading article Lancet, March 20th, 1915, page 612. Interpretation | of Epidemiological observations in the light of Bacteriological knowledge: Joseph A. Arkwright, M.D., Lister Institute, B.M.J. March 20th, 1915, page 494. Diagnosis and prophylaxis, Lundie (Bacteriologist Aldershot Command), B.M.J., March 20th, 1915. C.S.M. at Trentham Camp, New Zealand, Sydney Champtaloup, M.B. and John T. Bowie, N.Z. Med. Journ., August 1915," page 169. Fairley and Quest (Melbourne) Med. Journ of Australia. October 23rd, 1915. Alwyn Stewart (Melbourne) Ibid. November 6th, 1915. A classification of Meningococci based on group agglutination, Arthur W. M. Ellis, C.A.M.C., B.M.J., page 881, December 18th, 1915, Carriers in Military and Civilian population in New Zealand. Champtaloup and Bowie, N.Z. Med Journ., Feb. 1916. C.S.M.: a few observations: Lt.-Col. Andrew, N.Z.M.C. (P.M.O. Trentham Military Camp), N.Z. Med. Journ., December 1916, page 257.
See Cerebro-spinal fever. Thos. J. Horder, Oxford Med. Pub., 1915.
See Adami: History of the G.A.M.C.
Dysentery: Notes on the treatment of. Issued by the Advisory Committees for the prevention of epidemic diseases in the M.E.F. Lt.-Col. Andrew Balfour, B.A.M.C. (discusses the various types of Dysentery met with on Gallipoli, in Lemnos and in Egypt, Vol. 25 B.A.M.C. Journ, Nov. 1915.
Ipecacuanha and Emetine in Dysentery, B.M.J. November 13th, 1915, page 728. A lecture on the treatment of Dysentery. Lt.-Col. Sir B. Boss, Lancet, January 1st, 1916, page 1. Common intestinal protozoa of man. Wenyon, Lancet, November 27th, 1915 (Important).
See Reports of Med. Besearch Committee on Dysentery.
Influenza—Purulent Bronchitis: Prophylactic vaccinations against catarrhal infection. Eyre and Lowe, Lancet, 1918, ii. 484; Autumn Influenza Epidemic (1918) as it affected the N.Z.E.F. in the United Kingdom. Eyre and Lowe Lancet, 1919, April 5th; Ibid: Treatment, Eagleton and Butcher. Purulent Bronchitis complicating Measles and Rubella (Sling Camp outbreak), Macdonald, Ritchie, Fox and White, BM.J., 1918 Nov. 2nd.; Preliminary report on the influenza epidemic at Dunedin, Otago, Fitchet, Bowie, Champta-leup and Drennan, N.Z. Med. Journ., 1919, page 1.
Enterica: Paratyphoid Fever and Anti-typhoid Inoculation in France. B.M.J., August 7th, 1915. Mixed Typhoid Vaccinations. Ibid, October 23rd, 1915, page 780. Paratyphoid Fever, discussion on, B.M.J., November 13th, 1915, page 723 and November 23rd, 1915, page 780. Enteric cases at Cairo. Col. Parkes, N.Z.M.C., B.M.J. 1916, July 29th (See also article by CoL Summers, A A.M.C. in same number) Gallipoli cases. Bacteriological Laboratory report (N.Z.G.H.). Capt. F. L. Armitage, N.Z.M.C. N.Z. Med. Journ., December, 1916. Enteric and Paratyphoid fevers, origin of at Gallipoli and Lemnos, 1915. Fleet-Surgeon H. W. Craig, Journ. R N. Med. Services, Vol. 3, 1917, page 364.
See Medical Annual 1916. See Horizon Series (C. Vincent).
Jaundice, Epidemic, of Campaigns: Willcox, B.M.J. 1916, February 26th; I bid: Symposium on, at Alexandria; Weil's disease in Japan: B.M.J., 1916, April 1st, page 491: I bid: June 17th, 1916 Leading article, B.M.J., 1916 June 17th. See also Baron Larrey, op cit.
Jaw, Fracture of, Treatment, Major Piekerill, N.Z.D.C., N.Z. Med. Journ. 1916, page 101.
Lice: Typhus fever and Lice B.M.J., 1915, May 1st. page 784; Lancet, 1915, June 12th, page 125; B.M.J., 1915, November 20th, page 737 (Wittenberg Camp); Ibid, 1915 December 4th, page 841; Destruction of Lice in Epidemics Lancet, 1915, June 19th, page 1307; German Campaign against, B.M.J 1915, October 2nd, page 513; See Shipley's "Mirror Horrors of War," 1st Edition. See Martins' "Surgeon in Khaki." See "Lice and Their Menace to Man." Lt Lloyd. R.A.M.C, Oxford Med. Publication, 1919.
Recruiting in New Zealand: "Our King and Country Need Us," Editorial N.Z. Med. Journ., 1915, October, page 243. "Medical Examination of Recruits": Surgeon-General R.S.F. Henderson, K.H.P., N.Z Med. Journ., Vol. XV., 1916, page 28; Ibid: Hermaphrodism in a recruit, G. Macdonald, p. 46.
See Lt. Drew, "The War Effort of New Zealand."
Sanitation: A Regimental Medical Officer on Gallipoli, Lt. Col. F. E. Fremantle, R.A.M.C. (T), Lancet, 1916, January 15th, p. 163; Gallipoli, the fly pest in: Staff-Surgeon E. L. Atkinson. R.N., Journal R.N. Service, 1916, p 147; Impressions of the Gallipoli Campaign from a Battalion Medical Officers' standpoint. Jour. R.N. Med. Service, July, 1915, page 313; Gallipoli, Water Supply difficulties, Gaskell, Journ. R.N. Services, Vol. 3, 1917.
See Le lean, Sanitation in War, 1st Ed., London, 1915, J. and A. Churchill.
Shell-Shock, War Neuroses: "Mental and Nervous Shock Amongst the Wounded": B.M.J. 1914, November 3rd, page 802: T. R. Elliott, M.D. "Transient paraplegia from shell explosions," B.M.J. 1914, December 12th, page 1004; Shell-shock, a contribution to the study of, Chas. S. Myers, M.D., Lancet. February 13th, 1915, page 317. See Martin's "Surgeon in Khaki" on nervous shock in 1914-1915. Shell-shock, loss of personality from, Anthony Fielding, M.D., Lancet, July 10th, 1915, page 63. "The effects of high explosives on the central nervous system," F. W. Mott, Lancet, February 12th, 1916, page 330; Ibid, February 26th, 1916, page 441. Early methods of treatment: B.M.J. 1916, July, page 73; Ibid, August 5th, 1916, page 201; Ibid, August 12th. 1916, page 242; Ibid, October 28th. 1916; Shell-shock, disciplinary action in treatment of (from German Medical Journals), B.M.J. December 23rd, 1916, page 882. See "Horizon" Series (Babniski), (Roussy and L'Eremite), (Léri). See (Med. Annual 1916).
Surgical Treatment of War Wounds: Gallipoli, Surgery on the Peninsula, J. Morley, Ch. M., F.R.C.S., B.M.J., 1915, Sept. 25th; Work of the Hospital Ship Rewa. by the Medical Staff, Jour. R.N. Med. Service, 1916, January, page 1; Ibid, work of Hospital Ship Soudan, C. Trevor Collingwood, M.V.O., Vol I., 1915, page 315; Ibid, Vol. II., 1915, page 200; "Field Ambulance work at Anzac," Lt.-Col. C. Mackie Begg, N.Z.M.C., B.M.J., 1915, Vol ii., page 806. Eusol: "Experimental observations on the antiseptic action of Hypochlorous Acid and its use in wound treatment." J. Lorrine Smith, A. Murray and Drennan. B.M.J. 1915, July 24th, page 129. Dakin's Solution: La Presse Méd. translated, B.M.J., August 28th, 1915. Eusol, clinical application, report on (Med. Research Com.) Lancet, February 5th, 1916. Dardanelles, a trip to, Watson Cheyne, Journ. R.N. Med, Service, 1916, VoL, 2, page 137. W. Young, M.D., F.R.C.S.E. Notes on cases and treatment at Base Hospitals, N.Z. Med. Journ., 1916, page 194. "Growth of Surgery of the Front in France," Sir Anthony Bowlby, St. Bart's Hasp. Journ., Aug. 1919. See (Delorme War Surgery, 1st Ed., 1915) and ' (Martin, Surgeon in Khaki). See "Early Treatment of War Wounds," Col. H. M. Gray, Oxford Med. Publication, 1919; "Treatment of infected wounds," Carrell and Dehelly. London University Press, 1917.
Trench Fever: "Intermittent fever of obscure origin occurring in British Soldiers in France," G. H. Hunt, M.D., and A. C. Rankin, M.D., Lancet, November 20th, 1915, page 1133; Trench fever, notes on, Captain T. Strethill, B.M.J., 1916, Vol ii., page 186, Major Hurst on, Lancet, 1916, October 1914. See Hurst, "Diseases of the War," 1st Ed. 1917; Report of Med. Resch. Com. and American Red Cross, Oxford Press, 1918.
Trench Foot: Lorrain Smith, Ritchie and Dawson, Experimental Observations, Journal of Pathology, 1915, vol xx., page 160; Delepine, on: Jour. R.A.M.C.,1915, May and Lancet, 1915, Vol i., page 271; "Pied au Tranchéea," Villemin La Presse Méd. precis in Lancet, 1916, Vol i page 1187.
Trench Nephritis: "A new disease," B.M.J., 1915, Vol. ii., page 17 A record of five cases," Nathan Shaw, M.D., B.M.J., September 25th, 1915 page 468; Discussion by Royal Soc of Med. B.M.J. 1916, Vol i., page 278; McLeod and Ameuille. Lancet, 1916, Vol ii, page 468.
Printed by Whitcombe and Tombs Limited Wellington Auckland Christchurch. Dunedin Melbourne and London 52806
These Notes are for the use of Regimental Medical Officers of the New Zealand Division.
They are not a resume of the duties of an R.M.O., but are a summary of orders and instructions which have been issued from time to time in Medical Corps Orders, and such other information as may preserve R.M.Os. from those errors of omission and commission which experience has shown to be most frequent.
During the two or three months Medical Officers are attached to Field Ambulances prior to being sent out as R.M.Os., they are expected to familiarise themselves with conditions in the Field. Amongst these the testing and chlorination of water, and the defensive measures against gas, and also the early treatment of gassed cases are of the utmost importance, and owing to their novelty to the recently commissioned R.M.O., require special attention.
These Establishments vary in the different units. These variations and some other details are shown in the Table in the Appendix. In what follows an Infantry Battalion is referred to.
Each Infantry Battalion has:—
A. Army Medical Corps Personnel.
These details are "attached" to the from the N.Z. Medical Corps.
In the New Zealand Division it is a rule for these water duty men to he exchanged every three months by the affiliated Ambulance. This gives them the opportunity of acquiring knowledge and practice in other branches of their work, and so fits them for promotion when their turn comes. It also contributes to the maintenance of discipline among them, as a few men detached on more or less independent duties are apt to-become slack.
The duties of this Water personnel are:—
These duties, therefore, include the testing and chlorination of water, cleaning of water carts, tanks, petrol tins, etc., ensuring that sufficient supplies of bleaching powder, alum and testing solution are maintained.
B. Regimental Personnel.
(1.) Sanitary.
1 N.C.O. and 8 men, i.e., 2 from each Company.
Their duties generally are to act as sanitary police, to prevent soil pollution, and in detail to supervise:—
The R.M.O. will constantly instruct the sanitary personnel in their duties, and ensure that they are familiar with the most recent instructions re sanitary methods and apparatus.
(2.) Stretcher Bearers. 16 men.
It is the duty of the R.M.O. to train these men, and as this training is of the utmost importance, to remember that the regimental stretcher bearer is in the majority of cases, the first to deal with the wounded man.
These men will be trained when the Battalion is out of the Line, together with at least 16 extra bearers, i.e. additional to establishment.
The subjects of training will be:—
The last is the least important in practice.
The Field Ambulance will lend a N.C.O. to instruct in stretcher drill if requested to do so.
Training will be by lectures and practical work. Each, man will be made to splint the common fractures and apply tourniquets.
(3.) Medical Qrderlies
These assist the R.M.O. in his Medical duties. They take care of the medical equipment, and such records as may be made.
(4.) Chiropədist
The Chiropodist is (in the New Zealand Division) struck off all other duties, and is directly under the. orders of the R.M.O. In addition to the duties more stricrly pertaining to a Chiropodist, he is detailed to-supervise the use of preventive measures against Trench Foot, a duty which, in wet and cold weather, should keep him very fully occupied.
The medical equipment of a R.M.O. is as follows:—
These stores are replaced or replenished through the Field Ambulances.
The following are supplied for use at each Aid Post, and procured by the Quartermaster of the unit:—
"S.B." armlets and stretchers are an Ordnance supply. Crude disinfectants are an A.S.C. supply, and procured by the Q.M. of the Unit from the S.S.O.
A sufficient number of blankets (say 20) should be kept in the R.A.P. and will be obtained by the Q.M. of the unit. When an excessive number of wounded is expected, a larger supply of blankets and some medical comforts will be supplied by Advanced Dressing Stations, on instructions from A.D.M.S.
A Thomas' splint and suspension bar is kept in each R.A.P., and handed over with it to the incoming R.M.O., unless fine R.A.P. is being handed over to a R.M.O. of a different formation, when the splint and bar are taken away with the rest of the equipment. When this splint is used, on a patient, a replacement must be at once secured from the A.D.S. or M.D.S. Instructions for the use of this splint were issued with Medical Corps Orders, dated 24-7-17, and must be studied and practised by all R.M.Os. They should also instruct bearers in the application of this splint.
Although Medical equipment is on charge to the unit, the R.M.O is regarded as immediately responsible for it.
"Expendible" items, e.g., drugs and dressings, are demanded from the affiliated Ambulance of the unit in writing, signed by the R.M.O.
In case of inexpendibie items being lost or rendered unserviceable, in demanding their replacement the R.M.O. must forward with his demand on the Ambulance a certificate stating exactly how, where and when these items were lost or rendered unserviceable.Such general statements as "lost by exigencies of campaign," "destroyed by shell fire," are insufficient. The statement should be something as follows: "…………These items were destroyed by shell fire in the R.A.P. at (location) on (date)." Unserviceable or broken apparatus should be returned, as they may be repairable, and at any rate, prove the genuineness of the claim for replacement. Empty thermometer cases and ethyl chloride tubes will also be returned.
Economy must be exercised by R.M.O.s in expenditure of drugs and dressings. An efficient R.M.O. rarely requires drugs, etc., not included in this equipment.
Items other than medical equipment required by R.M.O., are obtained from Q.M. of his Unit.
A Maltese cart carries the medical equipment, and is driven by the medical orderly. This 'cart is at all times at the service of the R M.O. With Artillery, except D.A.C., this cart is drawn by two horses—with other units by one. The Divisional Ammunition Column is provided with two Maltese carts.
For the purpose of:—
Ambulances are affiliated to units as under:—
No. 1 N.Z. Field Ambulance to
No. 2 N.Z Field Ambulance to
No. 3 N.Z. Field Ambulance to
Although a R.M.O. may draw stores from other than his affiliated Ambulance, it should be done only under exceptional circumstances.
When a Medical Officer is taking over from a R.M.O., either temporarily (as for leave or sickness), or when posted to a unit, he will receive from his predecessor a complete file of Medical Corps Orders, with the instructions, pamphlets, etc., which have been issued with them. He will give a receipt for these, and this receipt will be forwarded by the outgoing R.M.O. to the A.D.M.S. This file of Medical Corps Orders will be kept in Field Medical Pannier, No. 2.
Copies of D.R.O., C.R.O., A.R.O. and G.R.O. may be seen in the Orderly Boom of the unit at any time, and R.M.Os. should extract those Orders affecting their duties, supplies, etc.
Copies of books such as King's Regulations, Field Service Regulations, Part II., may also be seen in the Orderly Boom.
Each R M.O. should be provided with
" R.A.M.C. Training Manual."
"Sanitation in War," by Major P. S. Lelean, C.B. R.A.M.C.
"Hints for R.M.Os. of the Territorial Force," by Captain M. F. Grant, R.A.M.C.
Pro formas for these returns will be kept in Field Medical Pannier, No. 2, and replenished by demand on the Office of the A.D.M.S.
(i) Weekly Sanitary Report—Z.M.F.2.
This must be rendered weekly by 9 a.m. on Saturdays. There is a space to be initialled by O.C of the unit.
The map references and results of tests of all sources from which drinking water is drawn must be given, using reverse of form if necessary.
An addition to this report not provided for is a report on the water carts as regards their completeness in equipment, as laid down on the board, supply of alum and bleaching powder, and cleanliness. This will appear on the reverse of the form.
Distinction must be made between cases of venereal disease reporting, and those detected at the weekly inspection for venereal disease. The latter should be reported to the O.C for disciplinary action under K.R. 462.
(ii) Infectious diseases—Z.M. F.1.
This should be rendered promptly, so that disinfection and isolation of contacts may not be delayed. It is rendered as cases occur. The Company of the patient must be stated for entry on the "spot" map.
(iii) Inoculation return—Z.M.F.4.
This must reach Office of A.D.M.S. not later than 9 a.m. on 25th of each month.
Leave of attached Officers and other ranks is given from the allotment of the unit to which the soldier is attached. The R.M.O. will obtain his leave from the O.C. of the unit, and then forward this in writing for approval of A.D.M.S., who will supply a substitute to report to O.C. unit, generally the day before the R.M.O. proceeds on leave. Date of proposed departure must be stated. The R.M.O. will thus have an opportunity to instruct his substitute on local conditions, etc.
On returning from leave, the R.M.O. must report at once in person or in writing to the A D M.S., when the substitute will return to his Ambulance
On all technical (professional) matters and questions of policy, the R.M.O. will communicate directly with the A.D.M.S. On other matters through the O.C. of the unit.
Suggestions or complaints on sanitary conditions should be submitted to the O.C of the unit before being forwarded to the A.D.M.S., so that O.C. unit may add any remarks, or possibly remedy the defect forthwith.
When a soldier is evacuated to a Field Ambulance, all his clothing and equipment (except ammunition) himself ensure that all clothing, etc., is sent down so that it may be disinfected. Small Box Respirators and P.H. Helmets must not be forgotten.
These will be sent to the Divisional Dental Hospital.
In cases of lost or broken dentures, the R.M.O. should enquire carefully to ascertain if the loss or breakage was deliberate or due to negligence, in which case he would report the matter to the O.C.
Dental cases must parade at the Dental Hospital with their tooth-brushes.
These are sent to the Ophthalmic Centre of the Army on special days, by a special Field Ambulance, to which the patient is sent by the R.M.O. The Ambulance and day and time to be sent are notified from time to time in Medical Corps Orders.
Where a man has broken his glasses, and the prescription for the lenses is in his pay-book, it is sufficient to send the prescription and broken glasses to the Ambulance, unless the error of refraction is of such a degree as to disable the man when he is without glasses.
Deliberate and negligent loss and breakage of glasses must be dealt with in the same manner as for dentures.
These cases are sent to a special Ambulance notified from time to time in Medical Corps Orders.
The whole unit should be inspected once a week to detect these cases. Disinfection of blankets, vide Note No. 19 (vide M.C.O. 476).
14. Ears are not to be syringed by orderlies unless specially instructed by Medical Officers. In cases where the mombrana tympani may have been ruptured by an explosion, the ear will not be syringed at all until (and if) such is directed after examination by a Medical Officer at an Ambulance M.D.S.
No medical certificates will be given by M.Os., nor will they give patients written histories of their cases
In the case of soldiers whom they consider unfit for service at the Front through conditions other than sickness or recent wounds (in which cases they would, of course, be evacuated in the usual way), they will notify the A.D.M.S., giving the history of the case and reasons for their opinion. The A.D.M.S. will make arrangements to inspect these cases.
Inoculation will be carried out in accordance with Army Council instructions Nos. 1339 of 1916 and 522 of 1917, which were consolidated and issued with Medical Corps Orders dated 25-4-17.
The procedure adopted will be that laid down in D.R.O. 928 of 4-ll-16 (and M.C.O. 384 of 7-11-16).
If a complete Nominal Roll of a unit is well compiled, showing the inoculation state of each individual, it is easily kept up to date by adding the name of each soldier who arrives as a reinforcement or attachment, and erasing the names of those struck off the strength. Only the number of complete inoculations should be entered under the column headed "Number inoculated during the month."
Only the R.M.O. or the medical orderly under his instructions "will fill in the Tally Ticket. In all cases the R.M.O. will himself sign it. "In the case of sick he will see that the diagnosis is in accordance, with the" Nomenclature of Diseases."
In the case of injuries other than wounds, it will state whether these are battle 'casualties or accidental.
(i) Gassed Cases.
Gassed cases must be diagnosed as "wounded," i.e., Battle Casualty, or "sick," i.e., accidental.
A case is a battle casualty if it arises from our own gas when it is being used in action against the enemy. It is accidental when arising from leakage of our own gas from its containers, either during transport to or storage in the line: provided that such leakage is not directly due to enemy action, as an enemy shell striking a container.
Cases in which it is not known whether the gassing is accidental or a battle casualty, or whether the man has been gassed at all will be diagnosed "N.Y.D. (? gassed)."
It must also be definitely stated on the Tally of each gassed case whether the gas was. Shell, Drift (i.e., Cloud), or Mine gas.
A diagnosis would appear thus: "Gassed—wounded—shell."
Cases of conjuctivitis arising from gas are diagnosd as "Gassed."
(ii) Shell Shock, Shell Concussion. Neurasthenia, Inability to stand Shell Fire.
These terms are not to be used under any circumstances. The diagnosis will be written "N.Y.D.N." (The last "N" stands for "non-effective").
The R.M.O. will procure all the information he can from the immediate associates of the patient as to the circumstances under which the condition has developed, e.g, undue proximity to an explosion, being buried, etc. He will also make a note of his physical condition, and state his own opinion on the case. This information will be forwarded in a closed cover to the medical unit to which the soldier is next evacuated. He must not express his opinion to the patient, but should assume an air of optimism and encouragement in handling his case:
(iii)"P.U.O." or "P.O.U.O." (" Pyrexia of uncertain origin ").
This is a permissible "diagnosis" in febrile cases, where the symptoms and signs are not sufficiently developed to enable the M.O. to make a definite diagnosis before evacuating the patient. While preserving the M.O. from the necessity of making a diagnosis on insufficient data, it must not be considered to completely satisfy the demands of medical science, or indications for treatment. It should therefore not be used for cases of definite disease, e.g., pleurisy, broncho-pneumonia, etc. Particularly, the M.O. must be assured that it is not covering an early case of some infectious disease, e.g, scarlet fever or C.S.M. It will be particularly used.for such cases as influenza and trench fever.
Trench fever must not be diagnosed as such; but if suspected, as "P.U.O. (? trench fever)," as it is not possible to be sure of one's diagnosis till after a few days' observation.
(iv) Mental and N.Y.D. (? Mental) Cases.
The R.M.O. will forward with the patient to the Field Ambulance to which he is evacuated a report
This report will be sent by hand in a closed envelope, marked "Confidential." Under no circumstances will it be handed over to the patient for transmission.
G.R.O. No. 2485 of 31-7-17, defines Battle Casualties and reads as follows:—
"The following instructions will be observed when reporting casualties:—
All casualties caused by enemy weapons are Battle Casualties, i.e. the men concerned are reported simply as Killed in Action, or Wounded.
Cases of shell shock will only be reported as "shell shock (wounded)" when the D.A.G., 3rd Echelon, has notified the unit in the Field that this should be done. See G.R.O. 2384 (iv).
All casualties caused by British or Allied weapons ('including poisoning by lethal or mine gas) which are in action against the enemy, will be reported as battle casualties, i.e., the man concerned will be reported simply as killed in action or wounded.
In every case where, accidents are strictly flying accidents, and death or injury to an officer or man flying on duty results, the casualty will be recorded in precisely the. same way as a casualty which occurs in action.
All casualties, other than self-inflicted, caused by British or Allied weapons which are not in action against the enemy, will be reported as accidental, thus:—
All cases of mine gas poisoning will be supported by a certificate signed by the Officer i/c of the unit concerned and attached to A.F.B. 213, sent to D.A.G. 3rd Echelon weekly, stating that the casualty was not due to neglect or disobedience of orders. Casualties of this nature caused by neglect will be reported as "accidental."
All self-inflicted casualties will in the first instance be reported as wounded (self-inflicted). When the case has been investigated, the final classification will be-notified by the G.O.C. of the Army concerned to the D.A.G., 3rd Echelon.
For the purposes of these instructions, the word 'weapons' will be held to include gas, liquid fire, high-tension currents, and enemy barbed-wire, as well as all other instruments used in fighting.
In reporting casualties the special nature of the casualty will be indicated thus:—
If the casualty is accidental, the word 'accidental' will be added.
When an officer or other rank who is both 'wounded and missing,' and has been previously reported (l) missing, (2) wounded, the second notification should read:—
In the case where an officer or other rank is reported ' wounded and missing,' and it is desired to correct the report of wounded as well as of mising, thus:—
The occurrence of these must be immediately reported to the O.C. of the soldier's Company, Battery, etc., and a note made on the Tally that the case is one of self-inflicted (or suspected self-inflicted wound) by marking it distinctly with the letters "S.I."
It must be remembered that a self-inflicted wound may be accidental or intentional, but in either case a Court-Martial will be required. The M.O. will, therefore, particularly note the position, direction, etc., of the wound, and especially if there is any blackening of the skin or burning of clothing, showing proximity of the weapon. He will note anything the man volunteers about it.
The O.C. Sanitary Section of the area occupied, is responsible for the disinfection of billets and camps in which cases of the following diseases have occurred:—
The O.C. Sanitary Section will be communicated with by the A.D.M.S. of the Division.
The O.C. Sanitary Section will generally demand a fatigue from the R.M.O. to assist him. This fatigue will be provided from the sanitary personnel of the unit.
In cases of other infections diseases, disinfection will be carried out by the R.M.O. A spraying apparatus and fluid for use in it will generally be lent by O.C. Sanitary Section when asked for in writing by the R.M.O.
Disinfection of clothing will be effected in the Foden Lorry. The location of this lorry is given in Medical Corps Orders from time to time.
With a view to the suppression of scabies and lice, it is well that the men's blankets should be sterilized in the Foden occasionally. The, number of blankets in a Company varies from time to time. The Foden can do 60 blankets pet hour with certainty of sterilization. Whenever possible the R.M.O. should arrange that the blankets are sterilized about every 4 to 6 weeks. By communicating to the A.D.M.S. the number to be done and date, suitable arrangements can generally be made. It is best to do at least one complete Company at a time.
The R.M.O. should ascertain that the men are getting their baths and change of underclothing once every ten days. He should inspect the bathing roster frequently and ascertain from enquiry that it is being adhered to.
This is to be given only at main Dressing Stations of Field Ambulances. It is to be given to all cases in which the skin is broken; therefore even slight scratches should be sent down by the R.M.O. for this purpose. It is also to be given to all cases of Trench Foot, even if the skin is not broken.
In the event of a sudden death occurring outside a medical unit, when sufficient evidence is not forthcoming as to the cause of death, the body is to be sent to a C.C.S. for post-mortem examination.
R.M.Os. will forward the body together with all particulars available as to the cause of death, to the Field Ambulance. Os.C. Field Ambulances will arrange the transport of the body to the C.C.S.
Preparatory to dressing a wound, it is frequently found necessary to cut the clothing in order to remove it without aggravating the injury or causing pain to the patient.
Although this matter is one for the judgment of the M.O. in each case, these officers will (as far as is consisistent with the welfare of their patients) avoid unnecessary mutilation of clothing, and especially of boots, gum, thigh.
Slacks and tunics may be slit up the seams and by completely unlacing ankle boots, and steadying the leg just above the ankle they may be removed without cutting the uppers or causing pain to the patient in cases of injury to the leg and thigh.
Needless exposure of wounded in cold weather is to be avoided, however, and under the circumstances it may be necessary to cut holes through the clothing in order to adjust the First Field Dressing, with the bandage outside the clothing.
R.M.Os. in their usual lectures on First Aid should explain this to Company Officers, Stretcher Bearers and men.
Headquarters Staff of Divisional Artillery or attended by a M.O. of one of the Artillery Brigades is the D.A.C., this M.O. being selected by the C.R.A.
Headquarters Staff of an Infantry Brigade is attended by one of the M.Os. of the Battalions of the Brigade, this M.O. being selected by the Brigadier.
Printed By N.Z Divisional Press 15-8-17