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1. In all eases not hereinafter provided Speaker to decide in cases for which no rules are made.
Election of Speaker; first meeting of new Council
A member proposed as Speaker.
When unopposed such member declared elected.
Procedure when more than one member proposed.
6. In the event of a division being called In event of division for election of Speaker or Deputy Speaker.
7. The member elected shall be conducted Mr. Speaker elect conducted to the chair
8. The proposer and seconder of the Deputation to receive His Honor's confirmation of Election.
9. The Election being confirmed, Mr. Superintendent Introduced.
10. Should the office of Speaker become Vacancy in office of Speaker.
Chairman of Committees may preside in the absence of Mr Speaker. Deputy Speaker
Opening of ordinary Sessions.
Return of new members.
His Honor the Superintendent introduced opens proceedings
15. In the event of anything transpiring If Superintendent unable to I attend at time appointed.
16. The Council shall sit from day to day, Sittings.
17. At the first sitting each day the Council Each sitting to be opened with prayer.
18. Mr. Speaker shall take the chair at Hours of meeting and rising each day. Quorum.
Adjournment for want of quorum.
While Council counted mem bers to retain their seats.
Minutes to be read. Presentation of petitions, &c.
Order Paper
Council to resume at 5.25 p.m.
24. If all motions shall not have been Motions not disposed of before half-past five p.m.
25. No notice of motion for the next sitting When notices of motion to be given.
26. No member shall make any motion Notice to be given before motion discussed.
27. It shall be competent, on the presentation Motions for printing documents, petitions, &c.
Motions to take precedence of Orders of the Day.
Government days.
Form of motion for information emanating from Superintendent
Form of motion for other official information.
Motion or Bill rejected not to be introduced the some session without leave.
33. A motion which has been by leave of A motion withdrawn may be renewed.
34. A Resolution or other vote or order A resolution may be rescinded.
35. All Addresses to the Superintendent Addresses to Superintendent by whom to be presented.
36. All papers and documents laid upon Papers, &c. laid on the table to be considered public.
37. On a motion made and passed "That Call of the Council
38. No order for a call of the Council Order for the same.
Members to address the chair
Motions must be seconded.
When read a motion to be deemed in possession of the Council.
Question of order or privilege to supersede original motion.
Interruptions.
44. Whenever Mr. Speaker rises during a When Mr Speaker rises Council o be silent.
45. A member called to order by Mr. Call to Order.
46. If, in consequence of highly disorderly Member called upon by name after explanation to withdraw.
47. In the case of a charge against a Breach of order by a member: procedure.
48. Any member may of right require A member may request that any question under discussion be read.
Member not to speak twice on the same question. Exceptions.
Questions of privilege-
Motion 'That this Council do now adjourn.Council do now adjourn;" but no discussion shall take place on the original question; and if this second question is resolved in the affirmative, the original question shall be held to be entirely superseded; and the Council shall immediately adjourn till the next usual hour of commencing a sitting; and if the motion for adjournment be negatived, it shall not be
52. In like manner, in course of a debate, Motion "That this debate be now adjourned"debate be now adjourned:" but Mr. Speaker shall confine the discussion as nearly as may be to the question of adjournment, and if such motion be carried, its effect will be merely to defer the decision of the Council on the original question; and if the motion for adjournment be negatived, it shall not be competent to propose it again without some intermediate proceeding.
53. When the motion for the adjournment Resumption of debate.
54. The member upon whose motion any Mover of such motion to be titled to preaudience
55. A question may be superseded: (1) By Questions superseded. 1. By adjournment. 2. By considering orders of the day. 3. By previous Question. 4. By Amendment.
If previous question resolved in the affirmative.
Previous Question superseded by adjournment
Debates interrupted. 1. Privilege. 2. Words of heat. 3. Points of order. 4. Messages. 5. Reading documents.
Complicated questions may be divided.
Question "put" and again stated.puts the question
61. A question being put, is resolved Question determined by majority of voices.
62. Mr. Speaker states whether, in his Mr Speaker states whether ayes or noes have it
63. Immediately after a call for a division Procedure on call for division.
64. An entry of every division list shall Divisions to to entered in journals.
65. In case of an equality of votes, Mr. Casting vote.
No member to vote if personally interested.
Different forms of amendment.
Amendments to be seconded.
Amendments to leave out words.
Amendment to leave out words and insert or add others.
71. When the proposed amendment is to Amendment to insert or add words.
72. No amendment may be proposed in When latter part of question has been amended or proposed to be amended.
73. No amendment may be proposed to No amendment to be made to words already agreed to.
74. A proposed amendment may be, by Proposed amendment withdrawn.
75. Amendments may be proposed to a Amendments to proposed amendment.
76. When amendments have been made, Question as amended put.
When amendments proposed but not made.
From Superintendent when announced other business to be suspended.
To be immediately read.
And members to be uncovered.
Notice of proposed reply to be given.
How debates when superseded by counting out, &c. may be resumed.
83. If the discussion on any question in a Procedure if interrupted by motion being carried to "report progress" or "to leave the chair."
84. All Notices of Motion and Orders of Motions and orders not called on, how dealt with.
85. When a debate on any Motion is interrupted When debate interrupted by adjournment at half-past five.
Quorum.
Procedure when not a quorum.
Procedure on committee breaking up for want of quorum.
89. The Rules of the Council shall be Rules to be observed in com.
90. At the commencement of every Session, Sessional committees.
91. No Select Committee shall consist of Number of members.
92. It shall not be compulsory on Mr. Not compulsory on Speaker to serve on committees.
93. Any member upon whose motion a Member proposing committee to be member thereof.
94. Every notice of motion for the appointment Notice of motion for select committee to contain names of proposed members.
Mode of electing select committees.
Addition, &c. to select committee, how to be made. May sit during adjournment.
Quorum.
Chairman.
99. The examination of witnesses before Mode of examining witnesses.
100. Every Report of a Select Committee Report.
101. A list shall be affixed in some conspicuous Lists of committees to be posted.
102. Whenever it may be considered necessary Power to call for evidence to be asked for.
Chairman to report to Mr. Speaker in cases of special expenditure.
Day to be fixed for reporting.
No discussion to be on presenting report.
Specific motion on report.
When to be presented. mittee.
108. It shall be incumbent upon every Member presenting to acquaint himself with contents.
109. Every member presenting a petition And to affix his name thereto
110. Every petition shall be in writing, Form of petitions.
111. No letters, or affidavits, or other No documents to be attached thereto.
112. No petition shall make reference to Nor is a petition to contain reference to any debate.
113. No petition shall pray directly for a Nor to pray for grant of money
114. Any member presenting a petition Procedure on presenting a petition.
To be received as the petition of the parties signing.
Private petitions to stand referred to Private Petitions Committee
Copies of petitions to be forwarded to Government before presentation.
Bills, how to be introduced.
119. The member having leave to bring Member having leave to bring in a Bill to prepare it.
120. No clause shall be inserted in any Clausesion a Bill not to be foreign to its title.
121. No perpetual clause shall be inserted Bills for temporary objects not to include anything perpetual.
122. Immediately on the presentation of Motions on presentation of Bill.
123. At the first and second reading of First and second reading.
124. Every Bill read a first time, and ordered Bills read a first time to be printed.
Direction for second leading.
Question on second reading.now read a second time."
Amendments to question for second reading.
Amendments to be relevant.
Bills read a second time to be committed.
Procedure in Committee.
131. Any additional clauses must be Additional clauses.
132. At the close of the proceedings of a Bills reported with amendments.
133. Amendments merely of a verbal or Amendments verbal or formal
134. Clerical and typographical errors Correction of errors.
135. When a Bill shall have been reported Bill reported without amendment.
136. When a Bill shall have been reported Bills when reported with amendments may be printed. Notice of motion for third reading Recommitment. Re-commitment
Certificate of Chairman of Committee required before Bill read a third time.
Procedure on third reading.
No motion to be made for amendment on third reading: Exception.
What if a clause be proposed to be added.
141. When a Bill shall have been read a Question "that this Bill do now pass."
142. When a Bill shall have passed the Bill passed, how to be authenticated.
143. All Bills, when passed, shall be presented To be presented to the Superintendent.
144. The Estimates of Expenditure for Estimates trausmitted by message.
145. On the Order of the Day being read Committee of Supply.
Omitting or reducing items.
Proposed in order of printed Estimates.
No motion to he made relating to any prior item.
Question put on the original or reduced vote.
Adoption of resolutions agreed to in Committee.
151. No amendment, whereby the charge Reported resolutions not to be amended so as to increase charge upon the people.
152. Motions for Addresses to the Superintendent Motions for sums to be placed on Estimates to be considered in Committee.
153. On the request of any two members, To withdraw when requested by Speaker.
154. If any person not being a Member Liable to fine & imprisonment for certain acts.
By absence after call of Council.
By absence for more than three days.
By disobedience of orders.
Penalty for contempt.
159. Any Standing Order or Orders of How Standing Orders may be suspended.
160. No proposal for altering or annulling Alteration, &c. of Standing Orders.
161. The whole of these Standing Orders Duration of Standing Orders
The Superintendent has approved of the Standing Orders adopted by the Provincial Council on fifth day of May current.
Dunedin, New Zealand.
Printed under the Authority of the Provincial Government of Otago, by Coulls and Culling, of Rattray-street, Printers to the Provincial Government for the time being.
1. On the first day of the meeting of a List of Members delivered to the Clerk of the House.
2. Members assemble at the time and Members assemble in the House.
3. On receiving such Message, the House, House goes up to Legislative Council.
4. The Commissioners having intimated The Governor's wish signified that the House elect their Speaker.
5. A Commissioner, duly authorized by the At the commencement of a New Parliament, Commissioner appointed to administer the Oath to Members.
Members take the Oath.
House proceeds to elect a Speaker.
A Member proposed as Speaker.
When unopposed, such Member called to the Chair.called by the House to the Chair without any question being put.
He submits himself to the House.
And is conducted to the Chair.
When election of Speaker is opposed.
Question that the Member first proposed do take the Chair.
14. If the Question be resolved in the Question thai the next proposed do take the Chair.see No. 11); but if in the negative, a Question is then put by the Clerk that the Member next proposed "do take the Chair of this House as Speaker," and if it be resolved in the affirmative, the Member is conducted to the Chair.
15. Having been conducted to the Chair, Mr. Speaker elect takes the Chair, and the Mace is laid upon the Table.
16. A Member, having then congratulated Mr. Speaker elect is congratulated, and the House adjourns.
17. Before the next meeting of the House, Mr. Speaker presents himself to the Governor, who approves of the choice of the House.
18. Mr. Speaker then, on behalf of the Mr. Speaker lays claim to the privileges of the House of Representatives.
Mr. Speaker reports his approval.
During the remaining term of the Parliament, Mr. Speaker holds a Commission, authorizing him to administer the Oath.
21. If any Member desire to be sworn in Business interrupted to enable Member to take the Oath.
New Members introduced.
Vacancy in the office of Speaker during a Session.
When Speaker does not claim privileges.
Unavoidable absence of Speaker.
26. On being summoned to attend the Mr. Speaker with the House, goes up to the Legislative Council.
27. Mr. Speaker and the House then House retires, and adjourns during pleasure.
28. Before the Governor's Speech is reported A Bill read pro forma.pro formâ.
29. Mr. Speaker reports that the House Mr. Speaker reports the Governor's Speech.
Motion for an Address in answer.
Select Committee appointed to draw up an Address.
Address reported and agreed to.
Address to be presented by the whole House.
Governor's Speech to be taken into consideration.
Governor's Speech considered, and Motion made that a Supply be granted to Her Majesty.
36. When Parliament is to be prorogued Prorogation by the Governor in person.
37. When Parliament is to be prorogued Prorogation by Commission.
38. Other and further prorogations of Parliament Farther prorogation.New Zealand Gazette.
Sitting Days of the House.
Honrs of meeting.
Prayers.
Doors closed during Prayers.
Notice of Prayers to be given to Committees.
House counted after Prayers. Quorum.
House not counted when met according to Proclamation.
House not counted when summoned to attend the Governor or the Commissioners.
47. If, after the business of the Session House adjourned if 20 Members be not present.
48. If it appear, while the House is in Quorum in Committee of the whole.
49. The doors of the House are unlocked Doors open while House is counted.
50. Whenever Mr. Speaker is obliged to Names of Members present inserted in Journals.
51. If on the days on which Motions have Debate on Motions adjourned at half after Five o'clock.
Business not disposed of.
No new business after half after twelve at night.
House adjourns itself except in certain cases.
Strangers to be taken into custody if in parts of the House appropriated to Members.
56. No Member is to bring any stranger No Member to bring a Stranger into such parts of the House.
57. Every Member is bound to attend the Every Member to attend the Service of the House.
58. Notice is to be given of a Motion for Notice to be given of Motions for Leave of Absence.
59. A Member is excused from service in Members excused from Service.
60. Any Member having leave of absence Leave of Absence forfeited.
61. When an order is made that the Calls of the House.
62. When the Order of the Day for calling Order in which Names are called.
Members not present but subsequently attending.
Members not attending.
Entering and leaving the House.
Members leaving their Seats.
Members not to read Newspaper, &c.
Orders of the Day and Notices of Motions.
Orders of the Day defined.
Orders of the Day on Tuesdays ana Fridays.
71. When the House proceeds to the Clerk to read the Orders of the Day without Question being put.
72. The Orders of the Day are to be disposed Government Orders to have precedence on certain Days.
73. All dropped Orders of the Days are to Dropped Orders.
74. The House proceeds each day with: 1. Order of Business.
Questions to Ministers or other Members.
Such Questions not to involve argument.
In answering a Question, the matter not to be debated.
Notices of Motion.
Notices may be given for absent Members.
Restrictions upon Notices.
81. Notices of Motions take precedence Notice take precedence on Wednesdays and Thursdays.
82. Any Notice containing unbecoming Notices may be expunged.
83. A Member desiring to change the day Notices postponed.
84. After a Notice of Motion has been The terms may be altered.
85. Motions will have precedence on each Precedence of Motions.
86. An urgent Motion, directly concerning Questions of Privilege.
87. Precedence is ordinarily given by Vote of Thanks.
88. A Motion may be made, by consent Motions without notice.
89. When a Motion has been made and Questions proposed.
90. Any Motion not seconded may not Motions not seconded.
Motions withdrawn.
Questions superseded: 1. By adjournment; 2. By reading the Orders of the Day; 3. By Previous Question; 4. By Amendment.now adjourn," or on notice being taken, and it appearing, that a Quorum is
Previous Questions resolved in the affirmative.
Previous Questions, &c., superseded by adjournment.
Debates interrupted.
96. The House may order a complicated Complicated Questions may be divided.
97. So soon as the Debate upon a Question Question "put" and again stated.puts the Question to the House; and if the same should not be heard, will again state it to the House.
98. A Question being put is resolved in Question determined by a majority of voices.
99. Mr. Speaker states whether, in his Mr. Speaker states whether Ayes or Noes have it.
100. No Question or Amendment may be Same Question not to be proposed again.
101. A Motion which has been, by leave A Motion withdrawn may be made again.
Resolution or Vote rescinded.
An Order discharged.
Different forms of Amendment.
Amendments to be seconded.
Amendment to leave out words.
Amendment to save out words, and insert or add others.
108. When the proposed Amendment is Amendment to insert or add words.
109. No Amendment may be proposed in When later part of a Question has been amended, or proposed to be amended.
110. No Amendment may be proposed to No Amendment to be made to words already agreed to.
111. A proposed Amendment may be, by Proposed Amendment withdrawn.
112. Amendments may be proposed to a Amendments to proposed Amendments.
113. When Amendments have been made, Questions as amended put.
114. When Amendments have been proposed, When Amendments proposed but not made.
115. Every Member desiring to speak is Members to address Mr. Speaker.
116. By the special indulgence of the Indulgence to Members unable to stand.
Speaking to Order during a Division.
No Member to speak after a Question has been "put."
Mr. Speaker calls upon Members to speak.
Motion that a Member "be now heard."
Members to speak to the Question.
Personal explanation.
No Member to speak twice.
Except to explain his words.
125. A reply is allowed to a Member who Or to reply in certain cases.
126. Any Member may rise to speak "to Speaking "to Order."
127. No Member is to allude to any Debate Debates of same Session not to be alluded to.
128. No Member may reflect upon any Reflections upon Votes of the House.
129. No Member may allude to any Allusion to Debates in the other House.
130. No Member may use offensive words Offensive Words against either House.
131. No Member may refer to any other No Member to be referred to by "Name"Name.
132. No Member may use offensive or Offensive Words against Members
133. When any Member objects to words Words taken down by direction of Mr. Speaker.
134. In a Committee of the whole House Words taken down in Committee.
Words to he objected to when used.
Members not explaining or retracting.
House will prevent quarrels.
No noise or interruption to be allowed during a Debate.
Rules of Debate in Committee.
Order maintained by Mr. Speaker, and Chairman of Committee.
141. Whenever Mr. Speaker rises during When Mr. Speaker rises. House to be silent.
142. Every Member against whom any Member to withdraw while his conduct is under debate.
143. Every Member present in the House Every Member present must vote.
144. When a Division is called for, the Doors not to be closed until two minutes after Division called for.
145. The doors are to be closed so soon Doors to be closed after the lapse of two minutes.
146. When the doors have been locked, Mr. Speaker puts the Question, and appoints two Tellers for each party.
If not two Tellers, no Division allowed.
Members counted, and their names taken down.
Tellers report the Numbers.
In case of error, House again Divides.
Mistakes corrected in Journals.
Where Votes equal, Mr. Speaker gives casting voice.
Division Lists printed in Journals.
Divisions in Committee.
No Member to vote if personally interested.
156. A Committee of the whole House House resolves itself into a Committee.
157. When such a Resolution has been Mr. Speaker leaves the Chair.
158. When a Bill or other matter (except When Committee has reported Progress.
159. So soon as Mr. Speaker has left the The Mace is placed under the Table.
160. The Chair is ordinarily taken by the Chair taken by Chairman of Committees.
In case of difference, House appoints Chairman.
Committee to consider matters referred.
Questions decided by a majority.
A Motion is not seconded.
"Previous Question" not allowed.
Members may speak more than once.
Order in Debate.
Disorder arising.
Mr. Speaker resumes the Chair in certain Cases.
When 20 Members not present.
House counted by Mr. Speaker.
172. When all the matters referred to Report.
173. When all such matters have not Report of Progress.
174. A Motion may be made during the Motion to report Progress
175. A Motion, that the Chairman do now Motion that the Chairman do now leave the Chair.
176. Every Report from a Committee of Report to be brought up without Question.
177. The Resolutions reported from a Resolutions of Committee.
178. No Select Committee shall consist of Committee to consist of not less than Five nor more than Ten Members.
179. Every Member intending to move Notice of Nomination to be given.
List, of Members serving.
Names of Members asking Questions to be entered in Minutes.
Names of Members present.
Divisions to be entered.
When Quorum not present.
185. Members may he afterwards discharged Members discharged and added.
186. The House appoints the Quorum of Quorum appointed by House.
187. The Quorum of a Joint Committee Quorum of a Joint Committee
188. Whenever it may be necessary, the Power to send for Persons, Papers, and Records.
189. When a Committee is examining Admission of Strangers to Committees.
190. Members of the House may be When Members of the House may be present.
191. No strangers or Members, not being Secret Committees.
192. The Chairman of a Select Committee When Chairman votes.
193. A Select Committee may adjourn Committee adjourns.
Not to sit during sitting of the House without leave.
Evidence, &c., not to be published until reported.
Copies of Evidence delivered to Members of Committee only.
Report from time to time.
Day fixed for bringing up Report.
Report brought up.
Powers of Committees limited to reporting opinions to the House.
201. An Instruction empowers a Committee Effect of an Instruction.
202. It is an Instruction to all Committees Committees on Bills to make Amendments relevant to subject-matter.
203. An Instruction to a Committee on What Instructions may not be moved.
204. An Instruction should ordinarily be When to be moved.
205. An Instruction to a Select Committee Instruction to a Select Committee.
Summoned by Order of the House.
Witness in custody.
Summoned by Committees.
When Witness does not attend a Committee.
Neglect or refusal to attend.
211. When the attendance of a Member Attendance of Members to be examined
212. If a Committee desire the attendance By a Committee
213. If any Member of the House refuse, If Members refuse to attend
214. If any information come before any Committee to acquaint House of charges against Members
215. When the attendance of a Member Message for attendance of Legislative Councillors
216. Witnesses may be examined by the Witnesses examined pursuant to Parliamentary Privileges Act,
217. If it shall appear that any person Tampering with Witnesses
False evidence
Witnesses entitled to protection
Evidence of proceedings not to be given without leave
What corrections may be made in evidence of Witnesses
222. When a Witness is to be examined Examined by the House
223. In Committee of the whole House, By Committee of the Whole House
224. When a Witness is in custody at the Witness in custody
225. If any question be objected to, or Witness withdraws if question objected to
226. A Member of the House is examined Member examined in his place
227. Legislative Councillors and Judges Legislative Councillors and Judges, how examined
228. Bills and Messages from the Legislative Messages from Legislative Council, how received
How communicated to the Legislative Council
Message communicated by Mr. Speaker
Matters communicated at a Conference
Conference desired by Message.
Subject to be stated.
Conferences.
235. In cases in which the Legislative Reasons may he communicated by Message
236. Any Message from the Legislative Message, when considered
237. It is the sole duty of the Managers of Duties of Managers
238. After two Conferences, or Messages Free Conferences
Report from a Free Conference, when considered
Agreed to by Message
Council appoints time and place
Managers
Names of Managers called over
Conferences may be held, although neither House sitting
Message from the Governor
To be read, and time fixed for its consideration
247. A Message in writing from the Governor Message in writing from the Governor, how brought
248. During the reading of a Message Members uncovered during reading
249. A verbal Message from the Governor Verbal Message from the Governor.
250. The recommendation or consent of Recommendation of the Governor, how signified
251. Addresses to the Governor are presented Addresses to the Governor, how presented
252. When an Address is presented by When Address presented by the whole House
253. The concurrence of one House in an Concurrence of Houses signified by Message
Joint Addresses
Legislative Council learns His Excellency's pleasure
Form of presenting Joint Address
Governor's answer reported by Mr. Speaker
Or, by one of the Members who presented the Address
Time for presenting Petitions
260. Every Petition is to be fairly written, Petition to be written, lithographed, or printed
261. Signatures to every printed or lithographed Petition are to be written or properly Signatures to be written
262. No printed or lithographed Petition No erasure or interlineation in printed or lithographed Petition
263. Every erasure or interlineation in a How erasures or interlineations may be made in written petition
264. Every Petition is to be signed at To be signed on the same skin
265. Every Petition is to be written, To be in English or Maori.
266. Every Petition is to be signed by the To be signed by the parties
267. The signatures are required to be Signatures not to be transferred
Common seals of Corporations
No letters, affidavits, &c., to be attached
Debates not to be referred to
Petitions for compounding debts to the Crown
Forgery of signatures
Members to affix their names
274. Every Member presenting a Petition Members to peruse Petitions
275. Every Petition is to be respectful, Petitions to be respectful
276. Petitions in the nature of Election Petitions in the nature of Election Petitions
277. Every Election Petition shall be presented Time for presenting Election Petitions
278. Petitions can only be presented to Petitions presented by Members
279. A Member cannot present a Petition Petitions from Members
280. Every Member offering to present a Members confined to statements of certain facts
281. Every such Petition not containing Not to be debated
Petitions complaining of grievances
Petitions referred to Committee on Public Petitions And in certain cases ordered to be printed
Petitions against taxes
Petitions from Maoris
Reports on Maori Petitions
287. Every Bill (unless sent down by the Bills ordered
288. Every Bill (except as before) is Members appointed to bring in Bills
289. Members may be added to those Members added
290. Instructions may be given to such Instructions
291. There shall be a Joint Committee of Joint Committee on Private Bills
292. Private Bills shall be understood to private Bills
Bills relating to Religion
Bills relating to Trade
Grants of money
Bills ordered to be withdrawn
Bill presented
First Reading
First reading, and printing, without debatenow read a first time," and "That this Bill be printed," are to be decided without amendment or debate.
300. A Bill having been read a first time, Bill ordered to be read a second time
301. On the Order of the Day being read Second readingnow read a second time."
302. Amendments may be moved to such Amendments to Question for Second Reading
303. No other Amendment may be moved Amendments to be relevant
304. A Bill having been read a second Bill committed
305. Every Bill affecting the Waste or Waste Lands Bills
306. On the Order of the Day being read Committee of the Whole House on the Bill
Amendments on Mr. Speaker leaving the Chair
Instructions to Committee
Bills may be considered in Committee together
Preamble postponedseriatim.
Amendments to Clauses
312. It shall be competent to any Member Supplementary Order Paper
313. A Question is put that each "Clause Clauses to stand part of the Bill
314. In going through a Bill, no questions Proceedings upon blanksitalics, and commonly called "blanks," unless exception be taken thereto; and if no alterations have been made in the words so printed in italics, the Bill is to he reported without Amendments, unless other Amendments have been made thereto.
315. Any Clause may be postponed, unless Clauses postponed
316. After every Clause and Schedule has Preamble agreed to
317. No notice may be taken of any Proceedings Proceedings in Committee not to be noticed until report
Report of Progress
Bill reported
Bill as amended to be considered
Bill reported without Amendment
Clauses offered in Committee, or on consideration of Report
A clause with Penalties, &c
324. On consideration of the Bill as Bills recommitted
325. The order for the Third Reading of a Order for Third Reading discharged
326. The Order of the Day being read for Third Readingnow read a Third time, to which Amendment may be moved as on the Second Reading.
327. No Amendments, not being merely Amendments on Third Reading
328. After the Third Reading, and further Bill passed, and Title agreed to
329. The further proceedings on a Third Further proceedings on Third Reading adjourned.
330. Bills of an urgent nature are sometimes Bills passed with unusual expedition
331. The precise duration of every temporary Temporary Law
332. When a Bill has passed the House, Mr. Speaker signs the Bill
Speaker to certify on fair print
And forwards it to the Legislative Council
Bill agreed to by other House without Amendments
When Amendments made by either House
Amendments of Legislative Council considered on a future day
If Amendments agreed to, Message sent
339. If the Amendments made by one If Amendments disagreed with, a Conference may be requested
340. When such Bill shall have passed Bills to be printed fair on vellum
341. Such three fair prints of each Bill Bill authenticated by Clerk of Parliaments
342. The three fair prints of all Bills, Bills presented to the Governor
343. The Royal assent is signified to every Royal assent.
344. Amendments proposed by the Governor Amendment of the Governor to be considered
Governor's amendments to be indorsed on Bills
Forwarded to the Legislative Council, if agreed to
Vellum copies, where to be deposited
Accounts, &c., orderedordered to be laid before the House.
349. Motions for the production of despatches, Addresses for papers
350. Other Papers are presented pursuant Papers presented by command
351. Accounts and other Papers which are Deposited with the Clerk of the House
352. Every Account and Paper is ordered Accounts to lie upon the Table
353. Accounts and Papers are ordered to Ordered to be printed
354. At the commencement of each Session, Printing Committee
355. Speeches addressed to the House by Speeches by Governor, and Bills specially affecting the Maoris, translated, and printed in Maori
Certain Sessional Papers printed in Maori
Papers to be accompanied by a Maori translation in certain cases
Other Papers are translated only by order of the House upon Motion
Aids and supplies not to be altered by the Legislative Council
Penalties, forfeitures, and fees
361. This House will not insist on its Privileges Tolls and charges in Private Bills
362. This House will receive no petition Application for Public Money
Grant of Money
Motions not to be presently entered on
Address for Money
The Governor's Speech considered
Committee on Motion for Supply
368. Mr. Speaker resumes the Chair, and Report from Committee
369. The said Resolution, on being reported, Supply grantednemine contradicente, "That this House doth agree with the Committee in the said Resolution, that a Supply be granted to Her Majesty," and, "That this House will, upon a future day, resolve itself into a Committee, to consider the Supply granted to Her Majesty;" which Committee is the Committee of Supply.
370. The Order of the Day being read Committee Supply
371. When a motion is made, in Committee Questions for omitting or reducing items
Proposed ill order of Printed Estimates
No Motion to be made relating to any prior item
Question put upon the original, or reduced Vote
Reports from Committees of Supply, and Ways and Means
Leave to sit again
Committee of Ways and Means appointed
Chairman of Committee of Supply, and Ways and Means
If difference arises
380. Resolutions of the Committees of Resolutions of Committees agreed to
381. No Amendment whereby the charge Tax not to be increased on report
382. In all cases not hereinbefore provided Speaker to decide in cases not provided for
383. It is contrary to the law and usage Members not to engage in the management of Private Bills
384. It is contrary to the usage, and derogatory Members not to promote measures for fee or reward
Strangers ordered to withdraw
Members not to be absent for more than a week
Not to disobey Orders of the House, or interrupt its proceedings
Penalties for contempt
389. All fines are applied to "The Library Fines applied to Library Fund
390. Any Standing Order or Orders of Standing Orders suspended
391. No proposal for altering or annulling Standing Order to be altered or annulled, only when two-thirds of the House are present
[N.B.—In thisI ndex the Figures refer to the Numbers of the Rules and Orders.]
Absence of Members. Notices of motion may be given by a Member, for any other Member being absent, 79—No Member to absent himself for more than a week without leave, 386—Guilty of contempt, ib. See also Leave of Absence.
Absence of Speaker. Chairman of Committee of Ways and Means to perform his duties, 25.
Access to the Governor. Privilege of free access to His Excellency, 18.
Accounts and Payees:
Ordered to be laid before the House, 348—When Addresses presented for them, 349—Papers presented by Command, 350—In what eases deposited with the Clerk of the House, 351—Accounts and Papers ordered to lie upon the Table, 352—Ordered to be printed when expedient, 353—Printing Committee, its functions, 354—Speeches by the Governor to the House, and Bills introduced into
Addresses:
Modes of presenting, 251—Form when presented by the whole House, 252—Concurrence of the other House, how signified, 253—Joint Addresses, 254—The Legislative Council learn His Excellency's pleasure when he will receive the same, 255—Form of presenting joint Address, 256—His Excellency's Answer to Address presented by the whole House, how reported, 257—The like, to other Addresses, 258.
Motion for Address in answer to the Opening Speech given, 30—Select Committee appointed to draw up the Address, 31—Speech referred, ib.—Address reported and agreed to, 32—When presented by the whole House, 33—Speech to be taken into consideration, 34.
In what cases Accounts and Papers are procured by Address, 349—Motion for and Address to the Crown for the issue of public money not entertained except in Committee of the whole House, 365.
Adjournment of the House. After choice of Speaker, 16—Rules and Orders relative to the Sitting and Adjournment of the House, 39-56—Except in cases mentioned, the House can only be adjourned by its own Resolution, 54—Questions superseded by Adjournment of the House, 92-94—When House adjourned for want of a Quorum, the hour and the names of Members present entered in the Journals, 50.
Adjournment of Select Committees. When Quorum not present, 184—May adjourn from time to time, 193—And (by leave) from place to place, ib.
Amendments to Bills. See Bills, Public.
Amendments to Questions:
Questions superseded by, 92,94—Different forms of Amendment, 104—If not seconded, will not be entertained, 105—Amendment to leave out certain words, 106—To leave out words, and insert or add others, 107—To insert or add words, 108—Amendments to the former part of a question may not be proposed after a later part has been amended, 109—No Amendment to be made to words already agreed to, 110—Proposed Amendment may, by leave, be withdrawn, 111—Amendments to proposed Amendments, 112—When Amendments made, the main question as amended is put, 113—When Amendments proposed but not made, the question as originally proposed is put, 114.
Application for Public Money. Will not be entertained unless recommended by the Crown, 362—Nor proceeded upon except in a Committee of the whole House, 365.
Attendance of Members. Rules and Orders regulating the same, 57-67.
"Ayes" and "Noes." Questions determined by majority of voices, "Aye" or "No," 98—Speaker states which has it; if his opinion not acquiesced in, a Division ensues, 99.—See also Divisions.
Bar of the House. Witnesses examined at, 206—Practice when witness in custody at the Bar is
Bills Public:
How ordered to be brought in, 287—Certain Members named to prepare and bring in each Bill, 288—Members added to those originally named, 289—Joint Committee to determine what are Private Bills, 291—Definition of Private Bills, 292—Instructions to make further provision, 287—Bills relating to Religion, 293—To Trade, 294—For granting money, or releasing or compounding any sum of money owing to the Crown, 295—If not prepared pursuant to Order, or to the Rules of the House, will be ordered to be withdrawn, 296—Bills specially affecting the Maoris are translated and printed in the Maori tongue, 355.
Manner of presenting a Bill, 297—First Blading, 298—First Beading of a Bill pro formâ, 28—Questions for First Beading and Printing to be decided without Amendment or Debate, 299—Ordered to be read a Second Time, 300—Question for Second Beading put, 381—Amendments to Question for second Reading, 302—Amendments to be strictly relevant, 303—Commitment, 304—Question put for Speaker to leave the Chair, 306—When Committee has reported Progress, Speaker leaves the Chair without putting any Question, ib. Amendments to Question for Speaker to leave the Chair, 307.
Instructions to Committee on the Bill; not to be moved by way of Amendment, 308—Several Bills may be considered together, on the same day, without the Chairman leaving the Chair on each separate Bill, 309—Preamble postponed; every
seriatim, 310—Amendments to clauses; limitations thereto, 311—Question put on each clause, That it stand part of the Bill, 313—Proceedings in regard to filling up blanks, 314—Clauses postponed, 315—When Preamble considered and agreed to, 316
No notice taken of Proceedings in Committee until Report, 317—Report of Progress, and leave asked to sit again, 318—Bill reported, 319—Report to be received without debate, and a time appointed for considering same, 320—Where Bill reported without Amendment, 321—Clauses offered in Committee, or on consideration of Report—322 Notice required in certain cases, ib.—Course pursued with clauses containing Rates, Penalties, or other blank, 323—Bills re-committed, 324—Order for Third Reading discharged, and Bill re-committed, 325.
Third Reading; Amendments to Questions for, 326—Amendments on Third Reading to be merely verbal, 327—Bill passed, and Title agreed to, 328—Further proceedings on Third Reading adjourned to a future day, 329—Unusual Expedition, 330—Duration of temporary Laws to be expressed, 331—Bill to be signed by the Speaker, and date of passing certified by the Clerk, 332—Bill sent to Legislative Council with a Message, 334—If the Bill be agreed to, it remains in the Council for transmission to the Governor, 335—If amended, Bill returned to the House, with a Message stating the Amendments, 336—Day to be appointed for the consideration of the Amendments made by the Council; same agreed to or disagreed to, 337—If agreed to, Message to be transmitted to the Legislative Council acquainting them thereof, 338—If Amendments disagreed to, a Conference may be requested for the Adjustment of the Questions at issue; if ac-
Blanks (Public Bills). Course pursued in regard to filling up, in Committee, 314.
Business of the House. Of what the ordinary business of each day consists, 68—Order in which taken, 74—No New Business to be taken after half after Twelve o'clock at night, 53.
See also Bills, Public. Notices of Motions. Orders of the Day.
Call of the House:
When Order for a Call made, Circular Letters to be sent to the Members requiring their attendance, 61—Manner in which the Call is proceeded with, 62—Members not at first present, but subsequently attending, 63—Members not attending at all during the day, 64.
Casting Votes. In case of Equality of Votes (on a Division), Speaker gives a casting voice; any reasons stated by him being entered in the Journals, 152—In Committee of whole House, Chairman gives a casting vote, 163—The Chairman of a
Chair. Member, when elected Speaker, conducted to to the Chair, 11, 14, 15—When Speaker unavoidably absent, the Chairman of Committees takes the Chair, 25—Speaker, when he takes the Chair, reads the appointed Prayer, 41—After Prayers, Speaker counts the House, and if a Quorum is not present, he adjourns the House, 44.
Chairman of Committees of the Whole House:
To perform the duties of Speaker on unavoidable absence of Speaker, 25—Takes the Chair of the Committee of Supply, and of the Committee of Ways and Means, 378—On a Division in Committee of the whole House, if there is equality of voices, he gives a casting vote, 163—In the absence of the Chairman of Committees, the Committee elect their Chairman, 378—If difference arise in Committee concerning election of Chairman, he is appointed by the House, 161, 379—Chairman leaves the Chair if 20 Members not present, 170—Chairman directed to report, 172—To report progress, 173, 174—Motion that Chairman do now leave the Chair; its effect, 175—Signs Bills and presents them to Mr. Speaker, 319.
Chairman of Select Committees. The Chairman can only vote when there is an equality of voices, 192.
Claim of Privileges. Made by Speaker, 18—Exception thereto, 24.
Clerk at the Table. To read the Orders of the Day (after notices have been disposed of) without any Question put, 71.
Clerk Of The House:
List of Members delivered to, on the opening of
Commission for Opening Parliament. Course of proceeding, 2 et seq.
Commission for Administering Oaths to Members, 5,20.
Commission for Proroguing Parliament. Course pursued in regard to, 37.
Commission for giving Royal Assent to Bills, 343.
Commitment of Public Bills:
After Second Reading to a Committee of the whole House, or to a Select Committee, 304—Committee of the whole House; Question put for Speaker to leave the Chair, 306—When the Committee has reported progress, Speaker leaves the Chair without any question, ib.—Amendments that may be made to Question for Speaker to leave the Chair, 307.—Instructions to Committee on the Bill, 308—Several Bills may be considered together on the same day, except on objection by a Member in regard to any Bill not in progress, without the
Committees on Public Bills:
Preamble postponed; clauses considered seriatim, 310—Amendments to clauses, 311—Question put on each clause, that it stand part of the Bill, 313—Proceedings in regard to blanks, 314—Clauses postponed, 315—Preamble considered and agreed to, 316—No notice to be taken of Proceedings in Committee until Report, 317—Report of Progress, and leave asked to sit again, 318—Bill reported, 319.
Committee on Public Petitions. All Petitions referred to, without Question put, 283.
Committees Select:
Number of Members of which composed, 178—On the appointment of every Select Committee, a day to be fixed for their report, 198—Notice of nomination required to be given, 179—Lists of Members serving on Select Committees posted up, 180—Names of Members asking questions of witnesses prefixed thereto in the Minutes, 181—Names of Members present each day to be entered, 182—Particulars in regard to Divisions required to be entered, 183—When quorum not present, 184.
Members discharged from attendance, and others added, 185—Quorum appointed by House, 186—But if no Quorum fixed, all to attend, ib.—Quorum of a Joint Committee, 187—Power to send for persons, papers, and records, 188—Admission of strangers to Committees, 189—When Members of the House may be present, 190—Secret Committees, 191—Chairman only votes when voices are equal, 192.
Adjournment of Committees, 193—Not to sit during sitting of the House without leave, 194—Proceedings void after notice of House going to Prayers, 43—Evidence taken and documents produced before any Committee not to be published, 195.—Proof copies of Evidence to be distributed to Members of Committee only, 196—Report from time to time, 197—Report brought up and laid on the Table, 199—Committees have only power to report opinions to the House, 200—Instructions to Committees, 201, 205—Power of Committees to summon witnesses, 208—How summoned, ib.—Course pursued when a witness does not attend a Committee, 209—What corrections may be made in evidence of witnesses, 221.
Committee of the Whole House:
When Twenty Members not present, the Chairman reports same to the House, 48—Words used in Committee to which objection is made will be taken down, 134—Words to be objected to when used, 135—Rules of Debate in Committee, 139, 167—Disorder in Committee can only be censured by the House, 140—Divisions in Committee taken in the same way as in the House itself, 154.
Form of appointing a Committee of the whole House, 156—House resolves itself into Committee, 157—When Committee, after reporting progress, is ordered to sit again on a particular day, Speaker, when Order for the Committee read, is to leave the Chair without a Question put, 158—The Mace placed under the Table when Speaker leaves the Chair, 159—Chair taken by the Chairman of Committees, 160—If difference in Committee concerning Chairman, Speaker resumes, and Chairman appointed by House, 161.
Committee is to consider only such matters as
ib.—A Motion in Committee is not seconded, 164—Motion for Previous Question cannot be made, 165—Members may speak more than once, 166—Order observed in Debate, same as in the House, 167.
If sudden disorder arise, Speaker will resume the Chair, 168—Speaker also resumes the Chair in other cases, 169—If Twenty Members not present, Speaker resumes the Chair, 170—If Twenty present when the House is counted, the House again resolves itself into Committee, 171—Report made when all the matters referred have been considered, 172—Report of Progress, 173—Motion made during Committee to Report Progress, and ask leave to sit again, 174.
Motion that Chairman "do now leave the Chair," will supersede proceedings of Committee, 175—Report brought up without Question, 176—Proceedings in the House on Resolutions from a Committee, 177—When witness examined before a Committee of the whole House, any Member may put Questions, 223.
Complicated Questions. House may order them to be divided, 96.
Conferences: 231 to 244.
Consent of the Crown. To any Motion or Bill, how signified, 250.
See also Grants of Public Money.
Contempt:
Any Member absenting himself for more than a week without leave held guilty of contempt, 386—Or wilfully disobeying any Order of the House, or wilfully and vexatiously interrupting the orderly
Counting the House:
House counted after Prayers, and if Twenty Members are not present, Speaker adjourns the House, 45—When Chairman of Committee of the whole House reports that Twenty Members are not present, Speaker counts House, and adjourns, 48—Doors unlocked while Speaker is counting, 49—House not counted when it meets for the despatch of business pursuant to Proclamation, nor when summoned to the Council Chamber by His Excellency or Commissioners, 45, 46.
Debates:
Privilege of freedom of speech in Debate, 18—Questions allowed to be put to Ministers of the Crown, &c., 75—Such questions not to involve argument, 76—In answering any question, the matter to which it refers not to be debated, 77—How Debates may be interrupted, 95—Every Member speaking is to address Mr. Speaker, standing and uncovered, 115—Indulgence extended to Members unable to stand, 116—Speaking to order during a Division, sitting and covered, 117—No Member to speak after a Question put and voices given, 118—Speaker calls upon Members to speak, 119—Motion that a Member "be now heard," or "do now speak," 120—Members to speak to the Question, 121.
Explanation of personal matters, 122—No Member may speak twice, except in explanation, or reply, 123-125—Speaking "to order," or upon a matter
Offensive words against either House, or any Statute not allowed, 130—One Member not to refer to another by name, 131—Not to use offensive words in reference to another, 132—Words taken down, 133-135—Members not explaining or retracting, censured, 136—Interference of House to prevent quarrels, 137—No noise or interruption to be allowed during a Debate, 138—Rules of Debate in Committee of the whole House, 139, 167—Means of maintaining order in the House and in Committee of the whole House, 140—House to be silent when Mr. Speaker rises, 141—Member to withdraw whilst his conduct is under debate, 142—In Committee Members may speak more than once, 166.
Debts due to the Crown. Certificate required to be annexed to Petition for compounding, 271.
Disallowance of Votes (on Divisions). If personally interested, 155.
Discharge of Orders. An Order of the House may be read and discharged, 103.
Disorder. If sudden disorder arise in Committee of the whole House, Speaker will resume the Chair, 168—Members wilfully and vexatiously interrupting the orderly conduct of the business of the House guilty of contempt, 387.
See also Noise and Disturbance.
Divisions:
If the Speaker's opinion that the "Ayes" or the "Noes" "have it," be not acquiesced in, a Division ensues, 99—Members speaking to a point of order during a Division to sit covered whilst speaking, 117—Every Member then present must vote, 143.
Doors not closed till after two minutes, as indicated by sand-glass, 144—Doors closed after lapse of two minutes, 145—Question then put, and the "Ayes" and "Noes" go respectively to the right and the left, and Tellers appointed, 146—If not two Tellers for one of the parties, no Division allowed, 147—Every Member counted, and names taken down by Tellers, 148.
Tellers report the numbers to Mr. Speaker, who declares them to the House, 149—In case of confusion or error, House again divides, 150—Numbers inaccurately reported, corrected in the Journals, 151—On equality of votes, Speaker gives casting voice, 152—Any reason stated by him being entered in the Journals ib.—Division Lists printed in the Journals, 153—Member not entitled to vote if personally interested, 155.
Divisions in Committee of the whole House taken in the same manner as in the House itself, 154.
Manner of taking Divisions in Select Committees; entry made in the Minutes, 183.
Doors of the House. Closed during Prayers, 42—The doors unlocked whenever House is being counted, 49—Doors locked during. Divisions, 145—But not to be closed until after the lapse of two minutes, 144.
Dropped Motions. A Motion not seconded is forthwith dropped, and no entry made in the Journals, 90.
Dropped Orders of the Day. To be set down in the Order Book, after the Orders of the Day for the next day on which the House sits, 73.
Election Petitions. Petitions in the nature of, not received unless the requirements of the Election Petitions Act complied with, 276—Time for presenting same, 277.
Entering and Leaving the House. Members to be uncovered; or when moving to any other part of the House, 65—And to make an obeisance to the Chair, ib.
Equality of Votes. See Casting Votes.
Evidence. Taken before a Select Committee not to be published until reported, 195—Proof copies to be distributed only to Members of Committee, 196—Instructions as to revision of, 221.
See also False Evidence. Officers of the House.
Tampering with Witnesses. Witnesses.
Expedition. See Unusual Expedition.
Explanation of Words. A Member who has already spoken may be again heard, to explain his words, 124.
See also Personal Explanations.
False Evidence. Penalty for giving False Evidence to the House or Committee, 218.
Fines. For Contempt, 388—All Fines are applied to the Library Fund, 389.
First Reading of Public Bills:
Is proposed immediately after presentation, 298—Questions for First Beading and Printing to be decided without Amendment or Debate, 299.
Forgery of Signatures to Petitions. A Breach of Privilege, 272.
Freedom of Speech. Privilege of freedom of speech in Debate, 18.
Further Prorogations. By Proclamation in the New Zealand Gazette, 38.
Government Business. Right reserved to the Government to place Orders at the head of the list of the Orders of the Day on days on which the Government have precedence, 72.
Governor, His Excellency, The:
His Excellency's pleasure signified that the House elect their Speaker on the opening of a new Parliament, 4—Governor's approbation of Speaker signified, 17—Privilege of free access to the Governor, 18—Opening of Parliament by the Governor in person, 26—Prorogation by him in person, 36—His Excellency addressed by Mr. Speaker concerning the Bills passed during the Session, ib.—Accounts and Papers presented by command of His Excellency, 350.
Grants of Public Money:
Applications for, not entertained unless recommended by the Crown, 362—Nor proceeded upon, except in a Committee of the whole House, 295, 363—Motions not to be presently entered upon, but adjourned to a further day, 364—Address to
Instructions:
To Committees of the Whole Souse.
Effect of an Instruction to a Committee of the whole House, 201—General Instruction to Committees on Bills to make Amendments relevant to the subject-matter of the Bill, 202—But if Amendments not within the Title of the Bill, to make special Report, ib.—When Instructions may not be moved, 203—How and when an Instruction should be moved, 204.
Select Committees:
Effect of an Instruction to a Select Committee, 205.
On other Matters:
To Members appointed to prepare and bring in Bills, 290—Instructions to the Committee on a Bill, 203, 308—Should not ordinarily be moved by way of Amendment, 308.
Interruption of Debates. See Debates.
Introduction of Members. Form of, when returned after a General Election, 22.
Joint Addresses. How such concurrence signified, 253—Mode of presenting joint Address, 254, 256.
Joint Committee on Private Bills, 291.
Joint Committees. Quorum of, 187.
Journals. A Motion not seconded is dropped and
Judges. Manner in which examined at the Bar, 227.
Keepers of Prisons. When a Witness is in the custody of a Keeper of a Prison, how brought up, 207.
Leave of Absence. Notice to be given of Motions for leave of Absence, 58—Members having leave excused from all service during such leave, 59—Leave forfeited by attendance before the expiration of such leave, 60—No Member to absent himself for more than a week without leave, 386.
Legislative Council. Allusion to Debates in, not allowed, 129. See Conferences. Joint Addresses. Messages.
Legislative Councillors. Means by which their attendance for examination by the House or Committees is secured, 215—Manner of examining a Legislative Councillor at the Bar, 227.
Library. All fines are applied to the Library Fund, 389.
Mace. Laid on the Table when Speaker chosen, 15—Is placed under the Table when House is in Committee, 159—Mace on the Serjeant's shoulder when Witness is in custody at the Bar, 224.
Managers of Conferences. Nomination of Managers, 242—Duty of Managers, 237.
Maori Petitions. Reports on, to be printed and translated, 286—Certain Papers to be printed in Maori, 356, 358.
Meeting of the Howe. Half after Two the time for the ordinary meeting of the House, 40.
Members:
List of, delivered to the Clerk on the opening of a New Parliament, 1—Members assemble in the House awaiting Message, 2—New Members how introduced, 22—Members not to bring strangers in, 56—No Member to absent himself for more than a week without leave, 386—Guilty of contempt, 386—Rules and Orders regulating the attendance and places of Members, 57, 67—No Member may refer to another by name, 131—Nor use offensive words in reference to any Member, 132—Disorderly Members called upon by Speaker by name, 138—Member against whom a charge is made to withdraw while his conduct is under debate, 142.
How the attendance of a Member to be examined as a witness is to be secured, 211, 212—Course pursued if Member refuse to attend, 213—If any information come before a Committee charging any Member, the Committee is to acquaint the House, 214—A Member is examined in his place, 226—
A M ember not to present a Petition from himself, 279—No Member to engage by himself or partner in the management of Private Bills for pecuniary reward, 383—Nor to promote measures in which he has been concerned, for fee or reward, 384.
Members vexatiously interrupting the orderly business of the House guilty of contempt, 387.
Messages:
From the Governor:
Message from the Governor, how brought, 245, 247—Read by Speaker, Members being uncovered, 248—Verbal Messages, how communicated, 249—Recommendation or consent of the Crown, how signified, 250, 343.
From Commissioners:
From Commissioners on opening of a New Parliament brought by the Private Secretary, 3.
Between the Two Houses:
A Member or one of the Clerks of either House may be the bearer of Messages, 228—Messages to be received by the Clerk at the Bar without interrupting the Business, 229—Message communicated to the House by Speaker, 230.
Messages in lieu of Conferences. See Conferences.
Minutes of Evidence and Minutes of Proceedings (Select Committees). What required to be entered therein, 181,183.
Money Bills. Any such awaiting the Royal Assent at the end of the Session presented by Mr. Speaker, who addresses His Excellency concerning the same, 36.
See also Supply and Ways and Means.
Motions:
Rules and orders regulating the giving Notices of Motions, 78, 84—Precedence of Motions, 85—Urgent Motions concerning Privileges, 86—Motions for Vote of Thanks, 87—Motions made, by leave, without notice, 88—Question proposed when Motion made and seconded, 89—Any Motion not seconded, dropped, and no entry made in the Journals, 90—Motions may be withdrawn by leave, 91—A Motion withdrawn by leave may be made again during the same Session, 101—A Motion in Committee of the whole House is not seconded, 164.
Names of Members. No Member to refer to another by name, 131—Members disorderly called upon by Speaker by name, 138—See also Call of the House.
Natives. Petitions from Maoris may be received without regard to the ordinary rules of the House, 285—And may be in Maori, but must be accompanied by a certified English translation made by a Translator duly appointed by Mr. Speaker, 265—Speeches by the Governor to the House, and Bills introduced into the House, specially affecting the Maoris, to be translated and printed in the Maori tongue for the information of the Natives, 355—All other Papers are only translated and printed in Maori by order of the House, upon Motion, 358—Reports on Petitions from, to be printed, 286.
New Members. How introduced, when returned after a General Election, 22.
New Parliaments. Proceedings on the opening of a new Parliament, 1, 24—Form of Prorogation, and
Newspapers. No Member to read any newspaper, book, or letter in his place, 67.
"Noes." See "Ayes" and "Noes."
Noise and Disturbance. Not allowed during a debate 138. See also Disorder. Members wilfully and vexatiously interrupting the orderly conduct of the business of the House guilty of contempt, 387.
Notice. Notice required to be given of Motions for leave of absence, 58—Notice required to be given of the names of Members proposed to be placed on the Committee, 179—Notice of considering Amendments of the Council to Bills, 337.
Notices of Motions:
Relative precedence of Orders of the Day and Notices of Motions, 70, 71—Every Notice to be in writing, and delivered at the Table, 78—One Member may give Notice for another who is absent, 79—Restrictions imposed upon giving Notices, 80—Notices take precedence of Orders of the Day on Wednesdays and Thursdays, 81.
Notices containing unbecoming expressions expunged, 82—Postponement of Notices, 83—Alteration of the terms of Notices, 84—Precedence of Motions according to the order in which the Notices were given, 85—Urgent Motions concerning Privileges, 86—Motions for Votes of Thanks, 87—Motions may be made by leave without Notice, 88.
See also Motions.
Oaths. At the commencement of a new Parliament a Commissioner is appointed by the Governor to
Obeisances. Made by Members to the Chair in passing to or from their seats, 65.
Offensive Words. Against either House or any Statute not permitted, 130—Nor offensive or un-becoming words in reference to any Member, 132—If words used in debate be objected to, the Speaker will direct them to be taken down by the Clerk, 133—The like in regard to a Committee of the whole House, 134—Objection to words to betaken at the time such words are used, 135—Members not explainiug or retracting censured or otherwise dealt with, 136.
Officers of the House. No Clerk or Officer, or Short-hand Writer, employed to take Minutes of Evidence, may give evidence elsewhere in respect of any proceedings, &c., without leave, 220.
See also Clerk of the House.
Opening of Parliament. Proceedings on the opening of a new Parliament, 1-24—The like when not a new Parliament, 26-35.
"Order." Any Member may rise to speak "to Order," 126—A question of Order may interrupt Debates, 95—Speaking to question of Order whilst House is dividing, 117.
Orders of the Day:
Defined, 69—Relative precedence of Orders and Notices, 70—Orders of the Day have precedence on Tuesdays and Fridays, 81—Speaker to direct the Clerk to read the Orders of the Day without
ib.—Dropped Orders, how provided for, 73—No Order of the Day or Notice of Motion to be called on after half after Twelve o'clock at night, 53.
Notices take precedence of Orders on Wednesdays and Thursdays, unless House otherwise directs, 81—Questions superseded by Motion for now reading the Orders of the Day, 92—This however restricted to days on which Notices have precedence, ib.—The Question for reading the Orders of the Day may be superseded by the Adjournment of the House, 94.
Orders of the Souse. May be read and discharged, 103.
Order Paper. See Supplementary Order Paper.
Papers. In certain cases to be translated into Maori and printed, 356-358.
Penalties, Forfeitures, and Fees. By Legislative Council Amendments, to Bills relating to; in what cases the House waive their privileges, 360—Penalties for contempt, 388—Applied to the Library Fund, 389.
Personal Explanations. Members allowed to make, although no Question before the House, 122—But such matters not debated, ib.
See also Explanation of Words.
Personal Interest. Disentitles a Member to vote, 155.
Persons, Papers, and Records. Power given to Select Committees to Bend for, 188.
Petitions, Public:
Time for presenting Petitions, 259—To be fairly written, printed, or lithographed, 260—Signatures to printed or lithographed Petitions to be written or properly attested, 261—No erasure or interlineation in printed or lithographed Petitions, 262—How erasures or interlineations may be made in written Petitions, 263—To be signed on the same skin on which Petition is written, 264—To be in English or Maori, accompanied by an English translation, made by a Translator appointed by the Speaker, 265—To be signed by the parties, and no one else, except in case of incapacity, 266—Signatures to be on the Petition itself, and not pasted upon or otherwise transferred thereto, 267—Common Seals of Corporations, 268—Or under the hand of the attorneys of bodies incorporated out of the colony, 268—No letters, affidavits, &c., to be attached, 269—Debates, or any intended Motion, not to be referred to, 270.
Petitions for compounding debts due to the Crown; certificate required, 271—Forgery of signatures, 272—Members presenting Petitions to affix their names at the beginning thereof, 273—And to take care they are in conformity with the rules of the House, 274—Language of Petitions to be respectful and decorous, 275.
Petitions in the nature of Election Petitions, 276—Time for presenting Election Petitions, 277,—Petitions to be presented by Members only, 278—A Member not to present a Petition from himself, 279.
Members presenting Petitions confined to statement of certain facts, 280—No debate allowed, 281—But Petition may be read by Clerk if required, ib.—Exceptions in favour of petitions complaining
ib.—Petitions against taxes may be received, 284—Petitions from persons of the Native Race may be received without regard to the foregoing forms, 285—Reports on, to be printed and translated, 286.
Places of Members. Rules and Orders regulating the same, 57-67.
Prayers:
Read daily by the Speaker, 41—Notice thereof given by Serjeant to all Committees, 43—Their proceedings after such Notice void, ib.—Doors of the House closed during, 42—House counted after, 44.
Preamble (Public Bills). Consideration thereof in Committee postponed to the last, 310—Considered, and if necessary amended, and agreed to, 316.
Previous Question. Questions superseded by the, 92—The Question for the Previous Question may be superseded by the adjournment of the House, 94—If Previous Question resolved in the affirmative, 93—Motion for the Previous Question cannot be made in Committee of the Whole House, 165.
Printing Committee. Appointed at the commencement of each Session; its functions, 354.
Private Bills. Definition of, 292—Waiver by the House of their Privileges in regard to Legislative Council's amendments affecting penalties, forfeitures, and fees, 360—And in regard to Tolls and Charges in Private Bills, 361—No Member to engage by himself or partner in the management of Private Bills for pecuniary reward, 383—Joint Committee on, appointed, 291.
Privileges. Speaker lays claim to Privileges; their nature, 18—Reports his making such claim, 19—When Speaker elected on a vacancy during a Session he does not claim privileges, 24—Motions concerning Privileges take precedence of other motions, as well as of other Orders of the Day, 86—A matter of Privilege may interrupt a Debate, 95—Forgery of signatures to Petitions a breach of Privilege, 272.
Prorogation of Parliament:
Prorogation by the Governor in person after a Session, 36—The like by Commission, 37—Further Prorogation by Proclamation, 38.
Protection of Witnesses. Rule as to, 219.
Public Bills. Rules and Orders relating to, 287-347.
See also Bills, Public.
Public Petitions. See Petitions, Public.
Quarrels. House will interfere to prevent Quarrels between Members, 137.
Questions:
When Member proposed for Speaker is unopposed he is called to the Chair without any Question put, 9—Questions on the choice of Speaker, how and by whom put, 13, 14—Question proposed when a Motion has been made and seconded, 89—No Member to speak to a Question after the same has been put, and voices taken, 115—Members must always speak to the Question, 118—No Member to speak twice to the same Question, 123.
Questions superseded, viz.: By adjournment, 92,
ib.—Course pursued if Previous Question resolved in the affirmative, 93—Debates on Questions interrupted, and how, 95—Complicated Questions ordered to be divided, 96—Question put by Speaker when Debate is ended, 97—If Question not heard, Speaker will state it again, ib.—Question determined by the majority of voices, 98—Speaker states whether "Ayes" or "Noes" have it; but if this is not acquiesced in, a Division ensues, 99—The same Question may not be proposed twice in the same Session, 100.
Amendments to Questions. Different forms of Amendments to Questions, 104—If Amendments not seconded they will not be entertained, 105—Amendment to leave out words, 106—To leave out words and insert or add others, 107—To insert or add words, 108—When a later part of a Question has been amended no Amendment can be proposed to a former part, 109—No Amendment to be made to words already agreed to, 110—Proposed Amendment may, by leave, be withdrawn, 111—Amendments to proposed Amendments, 112—Question as amended put, 113—When Amendments proposed, but not made, 114.
Questions put by Members. Rules as to Questions put to Ministers of the Crown and others, 75-77.
Quorum:
House, and Committees of whole House. House counted after Prayers, and if 20 Members, including Speaker, be not present, no business proceeded with, and Speaker adjourns the House, 44—If notice taken after business commenced 20 Members not present, House adjourned, 47—When the House is summoned by His Excellency it is not
Select Committees. Course to be pursued when Quorum not present, 184—The Quorum of each Committee appointed by the House, 186—When no Quorum appointed, all are to attend, ib.—Quorum of a Joint Committee, 187.
Reading. Members not to read newspapers, books, or letters when in their places, 67.
Recommendation of the Crown. To any Motion or Bill how signified, 250.
Religion. Order as to Bills relating to, 293.
Replies (in Debate). Permitted in certain cases, 125.
Reports of Bills (Public Bills). Proceedings in Committee not to be noticed until Report, 317—Report of Progress, and leave asked to sit again, 318—Bill reported, and proceedings thereon, 319—324.
Reports from Select Committees. Powers of reporting given to Select Committees, 197—Manner in which Report is brought up, 199.
Reports from Committees of Supply and Ways and Means. How made and dealt with, 367, 368, 375, 380.
Reports from Committees of the whole House. Every
Resolutions of Committees of Supply and Ways and Means. Reported; how dealt with, 367, 368, 375, 380.
Resolutions rescinded. A Resolution or other vote may be rescinded, 102.
Returns. Motions for Returns, Despatches, &c., how made, 349—Rules and Orders relating to Accounts ann Papers, 350, et seq.
See also Accounts and Papers.
Royal Assent to Bills. How signified, 333.
Royal Speech:
Speaker, with the House, goes up to the Legislative Council to hear the Royal Speech, 26—A Bill read pro forma before Speech is reported, 28—Speaker reports Royal Speech 29—Address in answer, how prepared and presented, 30—33—Speech ordered to be taken into consideration, 34—Considered accordingly, 35—And Motion that a supply be granted to Her Majesty, ib.
Sand Glass. Used on Divisions, 144.
Second Reading of Public Bills:
Bills ordered to be read a Second Time on a future day, 300—Question for Second Beading put, 301—Amendments to such Question, 302, 303—Read a Second Time, and afterwards committed, 304.
Secret Committees. No strangers or Members admitted to, at any time, 191.
Select Committee. See Committees, Select.
Serjeant-at-Arms:
Gives notice of House going to Prayers, to all Committees, 43—To take strangers into custody if in parts of the House appropriated to Members, 55—Introduces Legislative Councillors and Judges when attending to be examined, 227—Duties of Serjeant when Prisoner in custody at the Bar is examined, 224—To keep custody of Members adjudged guilty of contempt, 388.
Service of the House. Every Member bound to attend, unless leave of absence be given, 57, 59.
See also Attendance of Members. Leave of Absence.
Shorthand Writers. See Officers of the House.
Sickness or Infirmity. Members unable to stand from, allowed to speak sitting, 116.
Signatures to Petitions. See Petitions, Public.
Sitting of the House. Rules and Orders relative to the sitting and adjournment of the House, 39-56.
Speaker:
Absence of Speaker. On unavoidable absence of Speaker, the Chairman of Committees to perform his duties, 25.
Addresses. Duty of Speaker, when Address presented by whole House, 252, 256, 257.
Business of the House. Speaker, after Notices of Motion have been disposed of, to direct Clerk to read the Orders of the Day, without any question put, 71—Desires Members appearing at the Bar with Bills to bring them up, 297.
Committees of the Whole House. Leaves the Chair on House going into Committee, 157, 158—The Mace then put under the Table, 159—Resumes the Chair in certain cases, 161, 168, 169, 170—Puts Questions for leaving the Chair, on House going into Committee on a Bill, 306—Amendments that may be moved to such Question, 307—Resumes the Chair when difference arises in election of Chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, 379.
Counts and adjourns House. Speaker counts the House after Prayers, and if Twenty Members not present, no business proceeded with, and he adjourns the House, 44—If after the business of the Session has commenced, it appears on notice taken that Twenty Members are not present, he adjourns the House, 47—When Chairman of Committees reports that Twenty Members are not present, Speaker counts the House, and adjourns, 48—If on the count, it appears Twenty Members are present, the Committee resumes, 171—The doors of the House unlocked when Speaker is counting, 49—House not counted when it meets pursuant to Proclamation for despatch of business, 45—House not counted when summoned to attend His Excellency or the Commissioners, and on its return proceeds to business, although less than a Quorum present, until notice taken thereof, 46.
Delates. Members whilst speaking to address themselves to Speaker, 115—Speaker calls upon Members to speak when more than one rises, 119—Not to allow any Debate on the presentation of a Petition, 281.
Decisions. In cases not provided for herein, Speaker to decide according to the usage of the House of Commons, 382.
Divisions. When Question is put, Speaker states whether in his opinion the "Ayes" or the "Noes" "have it," 99—If his opinion not acquiesced in, a Division ensues, ib.—On a Division, puts the Question, and directs the "Ayes" and "Noes" to go to the Right and Left respectively, 146—If not two Tellers for one of the parties, Speaker forthwith declares the Resolution of the House, 147—The numbers reported to Speaker, who declares them to the House, 149—When equality of Votes, Speaker gives casting voice, 152.
Election of Speaker. Royal pleasure signified that House elect their Speaker on the opening of a new Parliament, 4—House proceeds to the Election of Speaker; course pursued, 7—16—Proceedings subsequent to choice of Speaker, and up to his approval, 17—19—After the commencement of a Parliament, holds a Commission, authorizing him to administer the Oath to Members, 20—Proceedings on vacancy in the office of Speaker during a Session, 23—Speaker so elected, when presented for Royal approbation, does not claim privileges, 24.
Goes to the Legislative Council; Royal Speech. With the House goes up to the Legislative Council, to hear the Royal Speech, 26—What done on returning from the Council, 27—Speaker reports, and reads the Royal Speech, 29—Part thereof again read by Speaker on House proceeding to consider the same, 35.
Messages. Reads Messages from the Crown, 246—And from the Legislative Council, 230.
Money Bills. Presents Money Bills for the Royal Assent on a Prorogation, addressing His Excellency, 36.
Order. Speaker will direct words objected to, to
Questions put; Amendments to Questions. Puts the Question to the House, 143—If not heard, will again state it, ib.—Manner in which Speaker proposes Amendments to Questions, 106,107,108.
Warrants. Speaker issues his Warrant for bringing up a Witness in custody of the Keeper of any Prison, 207.
Witnesses. Examines Witnesses at the Bar, 222, 224.
Speeches. See Debates. Reports of Speeches.
Standing Orders. Suspended, 390—To be altered or annulled only when two-thirds of the House are present, 391.
Statutes. Offensive words against any Statute not permitted unless in moving for its repeal, 130.
Strangers. To be taken into custody, if in any part of the House appropriated to Members, 55—Or if guilty of misconduct, or not withdrawing when directed, ib.—Such persons not to be discharged out of custody without Special Order, ib.—Members not to bring Strangers in, 56—May at any time be ordered to withdraw, 385—Admission of Strangers to Select Committees, 189, 191.
Supply and Ways and Means:
Motion that a Supply be granted to Her Majesty, made on the Governor's Speech being considered, 35—All Aids and Supplies the sole gift of the Representatives, 359—And may not be altered by the Legislative Council, ib.—Cases in which the House
Motion for an address to the Crown for Money, not to be entertained except in a Committee of the whole House, 365—The Governor's Speech considered, and Motion for a Supply made, 366—Committee of the whole House on the said Motion; Speech referred, and being read, Resolution for a Supply, 367—Resolution reported; further Resolution thereon, and Committee of Supply thereby constituted, 368, 369—Accounts and Estimates referred to the Committee; its functions commence, 370.
Questions for omitting or reducing Items, 371—Proposed in order of Printed Estimates, 372—No Motion to be made relating to any prior Item, 373—Question put upon original, or reduced Vote, 374.
Reports from Committees of Supply and Ways and Means ordered to be received on a future day, 375—Leave asked to sit again, and day appointed accordingly, 376—Committee of Ways and Means; period when, and how appointed, 377—Appointment of Chairman, 378—If difference in electing a Chairman should arise, 379—Course of Proceeding when Resolutions of the Committees reported, 380—No Amendment to any such Resolution permitted, whereby the charge upon the people will be increased, 381.
Supplementary Order Paper. Proposed Amendments may be printed on, 312.
Tampering with Witnesses. Penalty for, 217.
Taxes or Duties. Petitions against any Resolution or Bill imposing, may be received, 284.
Tellers. Two Tellers on a Division appointed for each party, 146—If not Two Tellers for one of the parties, no Division, 147—Every Member counted by the Tellers, 148—Tellers come to the Table and report numbers, 149.
Temporary Laws. The precise duration thereof to be expressed in a distinct clause, 331.
Thanks of the House. Precedence given to Motions for, 87.
Third Reading of Public Bills:
Proceedings thereon, 321, 325, 326—Further proceedings on Third Reading may be adjourned to a future day, 329.
Titles of Bills. Settled and agreed to, after Bill read third time and passed, 328.
Trade. Order as to Bills relating to, 294.
Unusual Expedition. Bills passed with, 330.
Verbal Messages from the Crown. How communicated to the House, 249.
Voices. Questions determined by majority of voices, "Aye" or "No," 98—Speaker states which has it; if his opinion not acquiesced in, a Division ensues, 99.
Votes (Resolutions) of the House. Reflections on any Vote not allowed, except in moving that such be rescinded, 128—See also Resolutions rescinded.
Votes of Thanks. Precedence given to Motions for, 87.
Warrants. Speaker issues Warrants for bringing up Witnesses in custody of the Keeper of any Prison, 207.
Ways and Means, Committee of. Rules and Orders relating thereto, 359-381.
See also Chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means. Supply and Ways and Means.
Withdrawal of Motions. Is permitted, if leave be granted, without any negative Voice, 91.
Waste Lands Bill. Referred to Select Committee on, after second reading, 305.
Witnesses:
How summoned, 206—How brought up when in the custody of the Keeper of any Prison, 207—How summoned by Committees, 208—Course pursued when a Witness does not attend a Committee, 209—Penalty for neglect or refusal to attend, 210—Attendance of Members to be examined, 211, 212—If Member refuses to attend, 213—Message sent to Legislative Council when the attendance of a Legislative Councillor or Officer of that House is desired, 215.
Witnesses examined pursuant to "The Parliamentary Privileges Act,
Words of Heat. Debates interrupted by, 95.
Words taken down. See Offensive Words.
I Have been induced to write the following pages from having had my attention called to some correspondence on Miracles, which recently appeared in the New Zealand Times, and which was rather suddenly stopped. I do not now intend to notice what was then said. I merely wish to offer a few remarks on a fallacy that seems to have obtained some currency—That miracles are opposed to reason.
I DO not propose to offer any arguments in support of the reality of the miracles recorded in the Bible. The divine authority of the Bible, and the consequent truthfulness of the sacred narrative, rests on its own proper evidence. Those who believe in the divine authority of the Bible accept all its statements. In making this broad assertion, I do not mean to imply that errors have not, through the carelessness of copyists, crept into ancient manuscripts, and that there is not in some instances a difficulty in determining the true reading. Errors, or imaginary errors, of this class are acknowledged by all to be fairly open to candid criticism. The correction of these must be left to scholars and learned men. But it must be borne in mind that the question of miracles is very slightly if at all affected by various readings. Those who do not acknowledge the divine authority of the Bible cannot, of course, be expected to believe the scripture miracles. Evidently the first step to be taken in reference to such persons is to convince them that the Bible is the Word of God. When convinced of this, they can hardly fail to see that miracles are an inseparable part of the Christian religion. It is, however, no part of my present object to enter into an investigation of the evidences on which Christians rely for their belief in the divine authority of Holy Scripture.
What I propose is to endeavour to show that the objection commonly advanced by persons laying
Much confusion of thought on the subject of miracles has been occasioned by ambiguous statements made in reference to them by those who thoroughly believe in them. We read of higher laws superseding lower laws. And other expedients of the same kind are proposed to obviate objections supposed to rest on scientific or intellectual grounds. I wish, therefore, to make my own meaning perfectly clear. I contend that a miracle, that is to say, a visible interruption or suspension of the order of nature for a providential purpose, is neither incredible nor repugnant to reason. I have preferred the words, interruption or suspension, to violation, sometimes used, merely because this word usually involves the notion of injury. I have used order of nature in preference to the more common expression, laws of nature, because the latter involves an ambiguity. Strictly speaking, law implies a law-giver, and an agent whose actions should be regulated by it. When applied to nature, law can only have a figurative meaning. Laws of nature can express nothing more than observed facts in their highest generalisation. If used in this restricted sense, the expression becomes equivalent to order of nature, and is perfectly admissible. It is objected that a miracle as above defined ought not to be accepted
reason. Few things are more remarkable than the readiness with which most persons, when they meet with an alleged fact or an argument which they are unable to answer or refute, avail themselves of the stock phrase, that it is contrary to reason. And yet not one in a hundred will give a rational explanation of what he means by reason, or indicate in any intelligible manner wherein the contrariety consists. If reason be used in its only legitimate sense, as the faculty by which men reason, that is, carry on the reasoning process, it is absurd to say than anything can be contrary or repugnant to this. What certainly might be shown is, that there is a flaw in the process, that some step is illogical; but the process itself could not possibly be contradictory to anything. I take it for granted that nobody will venture to contend that reason implies a repertory of all knowledge, and that every possible fact ought to find its counterpart or representative there. Contrary to reason, then, must be intended to mean contrary to facts, the truth of which has been established by means of a process of reasoning.
It is important, then, that it should be made quite clear what is meant by a miracle being contradictory to reason; it will not do to leave this question in any state of doubt or ambiguity. A miracle cannot be contradictory to an intuition of reason, for the mind can only have one intuition at a time, and there can be no contradiction between successive intuitions. For instance, I had an intuition of a house, a moment after I had an intuition of a tree; but there was no
There are, however, as is generally admitted, certain necessary truths of reason. Are miracles contradictory to these, or any one of them? If they are, there can be no possible ground on which any rational being can defend them. To contradict a necessary truth of reason, would be to stultify reason, to render all use of reason impossible. That miracles are absolutely contradictory to necessary truths of the reason, and therefore impossible, has been boldly, though somewhat rashly, asserted and maintained by objectors. A great modern writer on science has said—"No amount of attestation of innumerable and honest witnesses could ever convince any-one versed in mathematical and mechanical science that a person had squared the circle," &c. It is strange that a really great thinker and able writer should have been guilty of such an unaccountable blunder as that involved in these words. Every thinker, one might have supposed, would have been aware that the question involved in squaring the
The only necessary truths of which the human reason is cognisant are the proper Note A, Appendix.axioms of geometry. These are not dependent for their recognition as necessary truths on anything external to the mind, that is, on any observed outward fact. Their validity as necessary truths depends on the power the mind possesses of constructing for itself the objects to which they refer, without recourse to any extraneous matter. The axioms of geometry are the result of the imagination of possible objects, corresponding to actual notions. They are simple modifications of space, itself an essential condition of thought or form of the human intellect. For obvious reasons, I feel I must touch only very briefly on this subject. However necessary to my argument, it is not an aspect of the question which the general reader would care to have expanded. But the proof of the view here maintained was established nearly a century ago by Kant in his masterly Critique of the Pure Reason. If such axioms are the only necessary truths of the reason (together perhaps with conclusions legitimately drawn from them), it might be thought scarcely needful to show that inferences from observed facts, or, in other words, the results of inductive science, cannot establish a claim to be such, even though exalted and magnified by the high-sounding title of invariable and immutable laws.
It seems to be very usually taken for granted, and asserted most positively, that the order of nature is absolutely invariable and immutable, and that this being established by reason, any interruption of it is impossible. It will, therefore, be advisable to inquire carefully into the ground of this conviction so very generally entertained. Has this conviction any foundation in reason? The only answer to be given is, that it has no foundation in reason. By no process of reason can it be shown that the order of nature is immutable. That man does believe in the immutability of nature is certain; he has no doubt whatever upon the subject; he acts upon this belief every day of his life. Everything he undertakes rests on his belief that the future will be like the past. His whole conduct is guided by this conviction. He is perfectly justified in so doing; as a practical principle to guide him in life, he may place the most implicit confidence and undoubting reliance on it. But if, leaving the practical aspect of the subject, it is asked what reason can be given for our conviction that the future will resemble the past, we have no answer to give. All we can say is, that previous past recurrence of facts leads to the expectation of a similar recurrence in the future. This is quite true. But an expectation—a mere blind expectation—is not a rational answer; it is not a rational solution of the difficulty; such an expectation rests on no ground of reason, and cannot satisfy the requirements of reason. That the sun has risen every day throughout past ages leads to the expectation that it will rise to-morrow, and we all act on this belief and expectation. But if a reason is asked for this expectation, what reason can be given? None. Turn and revolve it in our minds as we may, and think of it under every conceivable aspect, still we can perceive no conceivable connection between
"When it is asked," says the philosopher Hume, "what is the foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning the relation of cause and effect, it may be replied in one word, 'experience.' But if we ask, 'what is the foundation of all conclusions from experience?' this implies a new question, which may be of more difficult solution. . . . . Experience can be allowed to give direct and certain information of those precise objects only, and that precise period of time which fell under its cognisance; but why should this experience be extended to future times and other objects? It must be acknowledged that here is a consequence drawn by the mind, that there is a certain step taken, a process of thought and an inference which wants to be explained. . . . . All inferences from experience suppose as their foundation that the future will resemble the past; it is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance. Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular, that alone, without some new argument or inference, proves not that for the future it will continue so. As an agent, I am quite satisfied on the point; but as a philosopher I want to learn the foundation of this inference. No reading, no inquiry, has yet been able to remove my difficulty."—(Enquiry, &c., § iv.)
Mr. Mill practically admits the same truth. "This assumption with regard to the course of nature, and the order of the universe is involved in every case of induction."—(Logic, vol. i., p. 316.) "The belief we entertain in the universality through-
Vol. ii., p. 97.)
Canon Mozley in his unanswered and unanswerable Bampton Lectures, observes in connection with these admissions made by these philosophers: "Thus step by step has philosophy loosened the connection of the order of nature with the ground of reason, befriending in exact proportion as it has done this, the principle of miracles. In the argument against miracles, the first objection is that they are against law; and this is answered by saying Chat we know nothing in nature of law in the sense in which it prevents miracles. Law can only prevent miracles by compelling and making necessary the succession of nature, i.e., in the sense of causation; but science has herself proclaimed the truth, that we see no causes in nature, that the whole chain of physical succession is, to the eye of reason, a rope of sand, consisting of antecedents and consequents, but without a rational link or trace of necessary connection between them. We only know of law in nature in the sense of recurrences in nature, classes of facts, like facts in nature—a chain of which, the junction not being reducible to reason, the interruption is not against reason. The claim of law settled, the next objection in the argument against miracles is, that they are against experience; because we expect facts like to those of our experience, and miracles are unlike ones. The weight, then, of the objection of unlikeness to experience, depends on the reason which can be produced for the expectation of likeness; and to this call philosophy has replied by the summary confession that we have no reason. Philosophy, then, could not have overthrown more thoroughly than it has done,
Lectures on Miracles, p. 50.)
It seems almost unaccountable that writers who profess to deal with questions most intimately connected with the profound subjects involved in the preceding extracts, should either be ignorant of them, or purposely ignore them. Many opponents of the possibility of miracles on the ground of their repugnancy to the inductive principle and the laws of nature, seem, if we may judge from their bold unqualified assertions, to be hardly aware that their information is not abreast of modern scientific thought on this subject. Few philosophical thinkers of the present day would venture to maintain that induction did more than establish a general or universal law; they would not contend that a universal proposition could be proved. An able writer, while reviewing a late edition of Hume's works, says in reference to induction—"It does not warrant a universal affirmation. No doubt there are a great many affirmations which we practically find it worth while to treat as universal; but that is a different matter, and we look back thankfully to Hume as the master who clearly pointed out the difference. The ground of all scientific affirmation is the supposition that the future resembles the past—in modern language, the uniformity of nature. Now this is itself an assumption incapable of proof. We make it because we find . . . that it enables us to to guide our conduct in life and get what we want."—(Sat. Review, not being established, the most startling apparent departures from it would be attended by no evidential effect."—(Illustrated London News,
The author of Supernatural Religion is one of the most remarkable instances of the versatility and levity just mentioned. After having based an elaborate argument for the destruction of miracles on repeated assertions as to the invariable uniformity of nature, he seems to manifest some uneasy misgivings as to whether he is not lagging behind the scientific thought of the day. But before we proceed, it may be well to see what he says as to the laws of nature. "Suspensions of the order of nature, which are also contrary to reason"—(p. 81.) "It is brought into existence by the operation of immutable physical laws"—(p. 27.) "There is no instance producible, or even logically conceivable, of any power whose effects are opposed to the ultimate riding of the laws of nature. The occurrence of anything opposed to those laws is incredible"—(p. 28.) "Our highest attainable conception of infinite wisdom and power is based upon the universality of law, and inexorably excludes, as unworthy and an-thropomorphic, any idea of its fitful suspension"—(p. 29.) "Throughout the whole inquiry into the question of miracles, we meet with nothing from theologians but mere assumptions, against which the invariability of the known order of nature steadily opposes itself"—(p. 23.) Christianity "is emphatically contradicted by the glorious perfection and invariability of the order of nature"—(p. 31.) "Universality and invariability of law . . . exclude the idea of interruption or occasional suspension of law for any purpose whatever"—(p. 33.) Having made
faith in the order of nature would be equally destructive to miracles. If we have no right to believe in a rule, there can be no right to speak of exceptions. The result in any case is this—that whether the principle of the order of nature be established or refuted, the supernatural pretensions of miracles are disallowed"—(p. 39.)
Here, then, the writer, feeling the ground to be slipping away from under his feet—feeling convinced that the invariability of the laws of nature, as a universal proposition, could no longer be maintained—feeling that this was a worn-out weapon which must henceforth, in controversy with educated men, be discarded and cast away, with inconceivable levity coolly says—"If we have no right to believe in the rule, there can be no right to speak of exceptions." His argument seems to be this—a determined sceptic must not believe in miracles. The immutability of the order of nature has hitherto seemed a good argument against them. We are now driven to admit that this is no longer philosophically tenable. Never mind; the mutability of the laws of nature will suit the sceptic just as well, in fact, better, because then an interruption of the uniformity of that which has no such characteristic, becomes impossible, and consequently no evidence can be given of a divine intervention.
But the writer seems to have completely lost sight of the subject he has undertaken to deal with. Dr. Mozley's position which he professed to refute was this—"That miracles, or visible suspensions of the order of nature for a providential purpose are not in contradiction to reason." But instead of attempting fairly to grapple with this proposition and refute
"My belief in the continuance of the observed order of natural phenomena may be perhaps explained by some law of my mental constitution; but as thus explained, it is a law of mind and not of matter." Even this understates the case, for a law of matter is not a necessary truth of reason.
The author of Note B, Appendix.Supernatural Religion in his at-tempts to discredit the reality of miracles, without professing himself to be an atheist, frequently denounces the "assumption" of the existence of a "personal God." He says—"Dr. Mozley is well aware that his assumption of a deity is not susceptible of proof." He objects to this "assumption" passim. This must strike a thoughtful reader as a very novel mode of opposing miracles. Does he for a moment suppose that any supporter of the reality of miracles would waste one further thought on their defence, or that any meaning whatever could be attached to them from a Christian's point of view
Analogy as addressed to the deist was complete; they, as atheists, rejected it. But what is the meaning of calling this belief in a personal God an "assumption"? Or what is meant by the assertion that such a belief "is not susceptible of proof"? Man cannot be more conscious of his own personal existence than he is of the existence of God.belief in conscious life in other than his own individual life, and consequently in a real world common to his life and others ... is now deeply rooted in every man's mental organism. We frankly concede that it is impossible by mere force of logic to prove to any one that there is anything real out-side his own mind."—(Sat. Review,
An objection to a miracle urged by Voltaire, and
—"Binding nature fast in fate,
Left free the human will."
It was in connection with human redemption that miracles became necessary. In elucidation of this truth, I will venture to cite (having never seen the
Note C, Appendix.and whereto all God's signs and miracles do refer."—(Bacon's Works. Montagu. Vol. vii., p. 13.)
I have said above that the objection referred to can scarcely be allowed to lay claim to any basis in reason. If any pretence to such a basis is made, it must be on the assumption that man has an absolute knowledge of the Divine Nature and attributes, and is quite competent to determine a priori how the Almighty ought to have created the world and all it contains. Only on such a presumptuous hypothesis could man be entitled to pronounce on the right of the Supreme Being to exercise again on earth creative power. For it is clear for reasons already given, that no observed facts or accumulated experiences could lead up to such a generalisation as would authorise man to criticise God's mode of procedure in governing the world. The conditions under which alone human thought is possible, namely, the forms of time and space, and the cate-
There is an argument occasionally relied upon that I must not be supposed to have ignored, although it has been implicitly answered in what has been already said, I allude to what is usually called "the correlation of forces." It is contended that the actual forces of nature are so correlated and mutually inter-dependent, that no intervention of any power can be conceived which would not utterly disturb and subvert the whole equilibrium of nature. But surely such a miraculous intervention as that implied for the purpose of suspending and interrupting some law or laws of nature, could as certainly provide against the supposed collateral and consequent disturbances arising out of that intervention, as affect the direct and primary object which constituted the miracle. If the one has been shown not to be repugnant to reason, it is perfectly clear no valid argument can be established against the other. And here, it may be remarked, that such an interference with the equilibrium of nature is not even beyond the province and power of man's free will and actions. Let me illustrate what I mean by a local circumstance. A Forestry Statute was recently enacted by the Legislature of this country on the express ground that without it man might wilfully destroy the forests, and thereby lessen the rain-fall, and thus alter and possibly permanently injure the climate of this country. But according to the principle of immutable law, what would this be but a disturbance of the atmospheric status over the whole earth?
I conclude with repeating what I began by saying, that it is no part of ray present object to enter into the consideration of any questions connected
evidence on which the miracles recorded in Holy Scripture are accepted and believed by Christians. That would have led far beyond my present scope or purpose. I desire to guard myself from any misunderstanding on this head. If a miracle had never been wrought, or even pretended, my argument would remain substantially the same; "the scientific question relates to the possibility of supernatural occurrences at all." What I have endeavoured to maintain is, that a miracle, that is to say, a visible interruption or suspension of the order of nature for a providential purpose, is neither incredible nor repugnant to reason. The task that I set before me though a difficult, was a very limited one; it was to obtain an answer to the question—"Is a miracle repugnant to reason?" I have briefly endeavored to show that it cannot be contradictory to any intuition of reason, which is concerned only with individual objects; nor to any necessary truths of reason, because these are only necessarily true within the mind itself; nor to any deduction of reason from observed facts, because the mind possesses no absolute criterion of the conformity of intellectual notions to such observed facts. I have further striven to make it clear that the invariability of the order or laws of nature, although a practical regulative truth, cannot be converted into, and established as, a universal proposition, in the sense of a truth of geometry, so that its denial should involve either a contradiction or an obvious absurdity. I have incidentally pointed out that some of the greatest modern thinkers support these views.
I would here as it were parenthetically remark, that I have not thought it needful to consider Schelling's claim for the absolute truth of that which he imagines is grasped by the "intellectual intuition" out of ordinary consciousness. This has indeed
I have no confidence in the potency of arguments such as I have used, even though advanced with ten-fold the ability to which I could lay any claim, to draw any human heart from scepticism to believe in the Christian religion, and therefore in miracles. All that I have ventured to hope I might do in these few pages is, to guard the young and unwary against being led away from the faith of the Gospel by the positive assertions, made with such astonishing audacity by many modern writers, as to the contradiction they allege exists between miracles and the human reason. The arrogant manner in which physicists and physiologists, whose writings make patent their very imperfect acquaintance with mental science, practically assert their own infallibility on psychological and metaphysical questions, although it may appear almost ludicrous to some persons, not unfrequently staggers the young, and too often leads them to acquiesce in their dogmatical assertions. My object has simply been to show that the positive statements referred to are not altogether trustworthy. If through the blessing of God, what I have written should produce even this effect in the mind of any one of my readers, "I commend him to God and the Word of His grace" for His thorough confirmation in the faith.
"The question now is as to the criterion by which we can securely distinguish a pure from an empirical cognition. Experience teaches us, indeed, that something is constituted in such and such a manner, but not that it could not be otherwise. In the first place, therefore, a proposition is met with which is conceived of at the same time with its necessity, it is then a judgment a priori; and if, besides this it is not deduced from any other, and, as itself, again holds true as a necessary proposition, it is thus absolutely a priori. In the second place, experience never gives to its judgments certain and strict universality, but only assumed and comparative (by induction); so that, strictly speaking, it must be said, so far as we have hitherto perceived, there is no exception to this or that rule."—(Kant's Critique of the Pure Reason, pp. 2, 3.)
"If therefore, we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as series."—(Mill. Ex. Sir W. H.'s Phil., pp. 212, 213.)
"Belief in the reality of self is indeed a belief which no hypothesis enables us to escape. . . . . But now, unavoidable as is this belief—established though it is, not only by the assent of mankind at large, endorsed by divers philosophers, but by the suicide of the sceptical argument, it is yet a belief admitting of no justification by reason; nay, indeed, it is a belief which reason, when pressed for a distinct answer, rejects—(H. Spencer's Principles.)
The proof of the existence of a personal God comes from within man's own soul. The following passage from Jacobi
Lect. Metaph., vol. 1, pp. 40, 41.) "But is it unreasonable to confess that we believe in God, not by reason of the nature (in contrast to the world of intelligence) which conceals, but by reason of the supernatural in man, which alone reveals and proves Him to exist?
"Nature conceals God:for through her whole domain Nature reveals only fate, only an indissoluble chain of mere efficient causes, without beginning and without end, excluding with equal necessity both providence and chance. An independent agency, a free original commencement within her sphere and proceeding from her powers, is absolutely impossible. Working without will, she takes counsel neither of the good nor of the beautiful; creating nothing, she casts up from her dark abyss only eternal transformations of herself, un-consciously and without an end; furthering with the same ceaseless industry, decline and increase, death and life—never producing what alone is of God, and what supposes liberty—the virtuous, the immortal.Man reveals God:for man by his intelligence rises above nature, and in virtue of this intelligence is conscious of himself as a power not only independent of, but opposed to, nature, and capable of resisting, conquering, and controlling her. As man has a living faith in this power, superior to nature, which dwells in him, so has he a belief in God, a feeling, an experience of His existence. As he does not believe in this power, so does he not believe in God; he sees, he experiences nought in existence but nature, necessity, fate."
Hume, while writing against miracles, states the matter thus:—"A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined."—(Philosophical Works, vol. iv., p. 133.) But it has been seen that the "firm unalterable experience" is an assumption. Let J. S. Mill reply to this—"But in order that an alleged fact should be contrary to a law of causation, the allegation must be, not simply that the cause existed without being followed by the effect, for that would be no uncommon occurrence, but that this happened in the absence of any adequate counteracting cause. Now in the case of an alleged miracle, the assertion is the exact opposite of this. It is, that the effect was defeated, not in the absence, but in consequence of a counteracting cause, namely, a direct inter-
(Logic, vol. ii., p. 159.)
Lyon and Blair, Printers, Wellington.
I Am induced to write the following critique from having had my attention called to a pamphlet by the Right Reverend the Anglican Bishop of Wellington upon the subject of miracles.
My objects in doing so are:
In the course of this work I shall endeavour to show that science, in place of being antagonistic to religious emotions, absolutely promotes and guides them aright; that she only arrays herself against those errors and absurdities ingrained in every system of belief which is built up in gross ignorance of God's works.
Before going over the Bishop's work I feel it necessary, for the sake of the large human interests I attempt to subserve and promote, to notice in general terms the character of that correspondence, which, as his Lordship indicates, led him to publish his views, as it shows the spirit in which, unfortunately, this kind of correspondence is usually carried on.
The correspondence cited rose out of a chance sentence of a reviewer, intended to support the idea that some of our highest scientific knowledge was known to the ancients, which is quite true, without being discreditable to modern scientists, as will be seen. The sentence to which I refer described the alleged miracle of the sun standing still at Joshua's command as an "eclipse."
Forthwith a letter from one signing himself (as it seems incorrectly) "A Christian" appeared, combating the reviewer more by force of abuse than of logic. The question was therefore left about where it was; but the letter remains, "even to this day," a choice sample of the true anti-Christian spirit, and of nonconformity of practice with profession. Afterwards we had the advent on this mimic battle-field, in a peaceful character, of an astronomical theologian of high standing, who, boldly stepping one foot out of orthodoxy, explained the miracle nearly away by assuming that the
I cannot, by the way, avoid thinking that the objects of his Lordship's present work are the reconversion of this erring brother to the true, the immutable faith, and the counteraction of any influence which this heretical rendering of the "Word may have had.
Besides the above-mentioned letters, several able ones appeared representing the various opinions upon the matter of those who will neither have thought enslaved, nor spare others who allow it. With the exception of the one letter by "A Christian," all are very courteous in their tone; so much for the spirit of Modern Christianity as represented in this correspondence.
I write under the thin disguise taken here, not that I fear to avow my opinions, but that they may go forth for a time free from personal considerations. It would have been more in my usual style to act otherwise, for surely no one should be ashamed to father his opinions upon debatable points, and, indeed, such a course is only due to a gentleman who has stepped out in the manful way the Bishop has done to champion popular opinion.
Should my name, however, be necessary to any one desirous to controvert this brochure, I shall be happy to furnish such an one with it. At the same time, I express my determination not to bind myself to answer anybody who, under such a disguise as the one I have taken, discards that gentle-manly deportment which Christianity inculcates.
His Lordship has begun well, and it is for the interest of every one that such combatants be not driven from the field by cowardly abuse, or abuse indeed of any kind, nor yet by unfair hitting;—let us have nothing below the belt, nor raise one angry emotion to blind our judgment. In the following critique I believe I have faithfully observed the bounds which courtesy imposes.
For the assistance of those who have not had the opportunity of reading the pamphlet I am about to criticise, I will state, as briefly as possible, the grounds upon which its author contends for a negative answer to the question, "Is a Miracle opposed to Reason."
The reverend author commences the argumentative portion of his pamphlet very appropriately by defining miracles and the more important terms used in his argument, the discussion of which will form the subject of Part I.
The argument itself is prosecuted by admitting that, if miracles are contrary to necessary truths, no rational being can defend them; then, if I understand the author correctly, he argues as follows:—
This conclusion, with all possible courtesy and respect for the learned author, I shall in Part II. endeavour to refute.
First, then, I observe that a miracle is defined as "a visible interruption or suspension of the order of nature for a providential purpose." In regard to this I would ask, why has a phenomenon to be visible ere it can be a miracle? In what sense is the term "visible" used here? Is it objectively, and if so, is man to be considered the only agent by which a miracle can be completed, or may some inferior organism, say a monkey or a mollusc, share with him the power necessary for such an operation and compete with him for a dignity so great and exalted?
Or is the term "visible" to be used in the more obscure and general sense, "that it may be seen?" If so, then by its vagueness or futility, it is useless here, and worse than useless, it is a dummy that cumbers the ground and makes progress difficult; for what indeed is this, if anything at all, but requiring a certain magnitude as a necessary quality of a miracle. But, if a miracle is possible at all, might we not have one on so minute a scale as to be incapable of recognition in any way by a finite being?
I cannot but consider the term "visible" useless here, though no doubt there are reasons for inserting it.
The next term of the definition is, that the event must be for a "providential purpose" in order to be a miracle.
I can only take this qualification as an attempt, in a spirit of weak but pardonable jealousy, to imply that creeds other than the author's own have not, as assigned, the usual miraculous basis, for I suppose that this term is used with a compound meaning—first, in the sense as implying that God is the agent, next that the event itself must be for a purpose useful to us.
"A miracle, according to its definition, is alleged to have been wrought for a providential purpose—that is, for the sake of the moral beings who inhabit the earth." Not to make light of so serious a matter, I cannot avoid thinking the word moral is not chosen with a proper regard for those unfortunate people who are liable to be troubled in their readings with suggestions arising out of, but foreign to, the idea sought to be conveyed One naturally conceives that any miracle would be performed more for the sake of immoral than moral beings. Now, the word "human" would have kept such unfortunate people to the correct idea without, as I think, taking anything from the force with which it is intended to strike them.
However, we will let this pass, and proceed with the necessary examination. Why, I would ask, why is it necessary that this visible suspension of order before it can be considered a miracle must be for a "providential purpose"? Surely if a miracle with it, it is one without it. Again, is it not evident that, if we insist upon making up the definition of a miracle with this term included, we have a condition imposed which we can never know has been complied with, so that if a miracle happened before us we could never determine it to be one? Allowing, however, that one may judge whether an event is a miracle or not, by appearances in a general way, I would ask answers to two questions for my guidance.
First: Would it not be a miracle (audible in part) were a donkey to address his rider in human speech, and to be gifted for the nonce with spiritual sight, and so be able to save his rider's life, and thus to secure his blessing for a "chosen people"?
Second: Would it be a miracle were a serpent to address in like manner a woman for her moral down-fall?
According to the term of the definition I am examining, it appears to me that the one is a miracle, the other is not. But if not, what is it? Or, to take a recorded case of unnatural development—that of serpents from rods, performed by jugglers and by a deistical priest respectively—is such to be classified as a conjuring trick or a miracle according to the purpose for which it was wrought? and does the nature of this purpose distinguish the wizard from the inspired miracle-worker?
Of course our author, by assuming that an event has to be for a providential purpose so that it may be a miracle, by implication recognises that a suspension of the order of nature may occur which is not for providential purposes. May I ask, then, how such phenomena might be defined? Does it not seem better for us to drop these qualifications altogether? If we do so we have the residue—a miracle is an interruption or suspension of the order of nature.
Taking now of this residue of the definition the term "interruption or suspension of the order of nature," I cannot feel sure of the meaning intended to be conveyed by the word "order." I cannot see how it can be "suspended." It appears easier to conceive of law being thus affected, perhaps though the author intends "order" to be used only in the sense of law, I look forward that I may get the sense in which it is used here, and find that "order of nature" is used as an equivalent for laws of nature, which latter, as owned, is the "more common expression"; and this change is effected professedly to escape ambiguity, "law of nature implying a law-giver and an agent whose action should be regulated by it." But, to my mind, order of nature implies an order-giver and an agent, etc.
However, this does not much matter now. What has to be done is to ascertain if this equivalence is observed and kept up in the argument, for I cannot
regular succession is the sole meaning attached to the word order, as will be shown in due course. It is of vital importance to distinguish between this meaning of order, and that of law as used in the exact sense it should be for any controversy of this nature. Law, as I apprehend its meaning, is simply "the formulæ of phenomena which have a constant tendency to occur," and it is failing to appreciate or overriding this difference that has, as I conceive, led the author astray. It cannot be denied he is in first-rate company, but this only makes it the more necessary for me to notice the matter. For instance, a law of matter is that it has a continuous tendency to rush to matter: we here imply no succession of events, but a continuous event, no regularity, no periodicity of incidents, but a regular immutable tendency.
It is confounding these two terms with each other, neglecting to observe this difference, and using them indiscriminately, that spoils many of the extracts appearing in the pamphlet.
"A law of nature is not an agent or an agency by which substances are coerced; it is not a creator of phenomena, but their formulæ." To argue for immutability of the order of nature in the sense of immutable periodicity of events is so excessively foolish that we cannot be expected to do it.
The author has dropped the term law, as "commonly used," to avoid an apparent ambiguity, and, in
Possibly this shirking of the term law is occasioned by a knowledge of the Biblical text, "God gave them (the works of nature) a law which cannot be broken," as it would obviously be very inconsistent for a champion of such statements to argue that this law may be broken.
So far, I think, J have clearly shown that the author's definition of a miracle is too rigorous, too exclusive a one, to be of any use. The task of identifying an event as a miracle, which seems even now an impossible feat, is, with such qualifications for it as he lays down, an infinitely more difficult one.
For man to be able to recognise an event as a miracle, does it not occur to the learned author that he must possess infinite knowledge, or else (leaving these new qualifications alone) how is he to know that the order of nature has been suspended? He can only be assured that what little he knows of this order appears to be so.
Upon logical grounds, therefore, does it not seem absurd to argue for the possibility of what we can never prove, when all scientific experience and every deduction from this points to its impossibility?
I can assure the author that were the strangest event to happen, scientific people—that is, all those who use their reason for discovering or knowing natural laws or truth—would never admit it to be a miracle. Supposing, for instance, anyone were to take a cock Moa, put him into a mesmeric trance, then remove a rib from him, and, presto! a fine adult hen bird is produced from it, completely equipped to obey the Biblical injunction, "Be fruitful and multiply." We might be very much astounded; some might lose their
cause of the phenomenon.
Theologians may continue arguing that what appears as the most impossible jugglery to us can be performed if a providential purpose is the object. It is all very well, however, to talk of providential purposes; but is there not always one on the way? This, however, is, as far as science tells us, not effected by sudden, by miraculous interventions, but by the cumulative effects of infinitely little movements over immense periods of time, and it is here, that all which is truly miraculous, or at least wonderful, lies. Are we not, in our blind eagerness for miracles, passing real wonders by in order to take up with illusions?
In concluding this part I have to notice the definition of another term, not so much in a critical spirit, but only that in the introduction to this a slur is cast upon the common sense of a large number of persona Thus, in defining the precise meaning of the term reason, the author commences by saying: "Few things are more remarkable than the readiness with which most persons, when they meet with an alleged fact, or an argument which they are unable to answer or refute, avail themselves of the stock phrase—that it is contrary to reason."
Now, is it not clear that this is an elliptical expression, one authorised by long usage on account of brevity, and as indicating, when filled in as common sense dictates, the precise and the full idea intended to be conveyed by it.
The author is quite right in defining this term of the question he discusses, but I do not see why those who use it should be spoken of in this somewhat contemptuous tone. Using the short term in this manner can hardly indicate ignorance or a lapse of judgment. If I might make an observation here, I would say that the filling in of the elliptic expression
conception of a miracle is against a deduction of reason: I conceive the author's amendment makes this one necessary. Considering he frequently expreses himself elliptically in his pamphlet, we may be sure that this shorthand way of imparting our ideas has not gone out of fashion yet; but, if he intends to indicate that the degree of this ellipse is here too great, all I would say is, that he himself makes use of a phrase exhibiting this property to a far greater extent than the one objected to does. For instance, we have in his pamphlet "the axioms of geometry are simple modifications of space"—surely this requires considerably more "padding" than the one to which he takes exception.
In the part of the Bishop's pamphlet now reached, the method employed in the argument begins to be disclosed, and the way is prepared for it by the admission that miracles cannot be "contradictory to necessary truths of reason."
Now, these truths are, as stated, "the result of the imagination of possible objects corresponding to actual notions."
Therefore, a miracle cannot affect what is, as we know, very easily affected, namely, the imagination still what appears most impossible is a mere plaything to it. Surely the author has not defined the necessary truths properly, or is it that miracles are thus limited, in order that the human will may be free; that is, both the possibility of free will and of miracles is desired, but they must not interfere with each other. If this is the
There is a point connected with the limitations thus imposed upon miracles which I must treat of: the author's admission as to the impossibility of miracles contradicting necessary truths of reason, if followed up, seems to involve him in strange dilemmas, one of which I will take the liberty of showing. It appears as a deduction from the following series of axioms or propositions, howhever we like to name them, which just occur to me.
A Universe is:
Next I have two, which being theological ones will of course pass for axiomatic truths or something more.
The Universe is God made:
Therefore, as nothing can come from nothing, God made the Universe out of Himself.
Of course this conclusion is wrong, palpably wrong. I know, we all know it to be so, and for the very sufficient reason it that, is against all reason and common sense and no doubt Christians are dad to know this
has to be contradicted by a miracle, or else Pantheism stares us in the face, becomes in fact a stern necessity; but as this doctrine is evidently absurd, miracles can contradict necessary truths, or something even bigger, so taking the author's own description of the dreadful consequences of this, our "reason is stultified, and all use of it is impossible." Thus we are brought to a truly sad state—the prospective loss of reason from disuse of it.
This position may of course be escaped by denying the correctness of proposition 2, that is, by assuming we have no evidence of the existence of a universe. In the author's own words it is alleged that this "cannot be proved;" but, any way, the Bishop either kepts in a dilemma, or, if he avoids this, it is only to occupy the absurd position of sagely arguing about what either does not or is not known to exist.
It surely will not be contended that truth is confined to abstract notions, and that whenever we take concrete quantities the very shadow of truth goes: what is this but affirming that truth is only of the mind. However, I leave the question just raised, at this interesting point, as it is sufficient that I have shown the curious consequences which follow when one sets out
We now approach the second stage of the author's argument. He has admitted that a miracle cannot be against a necessary truth, all therefore that is wanted, all that the argument has to do, is to show that there are no necessary truths in the way of a miracle (no easy task), but in place of this we have only the bare affirmation that, "The only necessary truths of which the human reason is cognizant are the proper axioms of geometry."
Now, as the author is so particular to stick to "necessary truths" for his side, it is only proper he should do so for the other. What should have been done in place of making this useless affirmation, was to prove that these axioms are the only necessary truths; the author would then have closed the argument victoriously and done something which would have worthily associated him as a discoverer with those "great men" I shall presently allude to: but in fact the author I find further on himself restates the case more favourably for us, and with some little "versatility" affirms that in effect "there may be others (necessary truths) legitimately drawn from them."
In accordance with what has been admitted, it is clear that, until it is proved that miracles cannot be against reason, it must be shewn as a necessary truth that there are no other necessary truths than those expressed in the axioms of geometry, or legitimate deductions from them excepting, of course, the limiting one then found. This of course must be exceedingly difficult to do, and I shall hazard in their appropriate places the few I shall require for the object in view: meanwhile, let us go on and see what these axioms are, which a miracle cannot affect—how they differ from what are considered as truths, truths which cannot be proved to be otherwise.
We find that truths, other than these axiomatic ones are alleged to "rest upon knowledge acquired by experience," and the author avers that "knowledge acquired in this manner cannot lay any claim whatever to be an absolute truth of reason," so, by implication, axiomatic truth is not acquired by experience. Either, the author is not himself "abreast of modern scientific thought" (to use the language he applies to sceptics) or he pooh-poohs the opinion of numerous able thinkers that experience is necessary for the attainment of axiomatic truth.
Any way it is certain that, the controversial stage being that in which this subject is, it is not right that in a work professedly logical and treating a question of great interest, the fact of the premises used in it being of a very doubtful and so debatable nature is left unnoticed; rather, I think, this should have been stated, and those reasons have accompanied the statement which induced the author to look upon the matter in the light he does; thus the public would have been placed in a position to form an opinion on the subject. As it is, the chain of logical argument is, as I conceive, completely broken off at this point.
It is not my place of course to demonstrate that experience is the basis of necessary truths, it is sufficient for me to state here my firm belief that it is so. It is a question, which is, perhaps, best left to each man to decide for himself.
I meet statements with statements, possibly quite as reliable as those I controvert; so before absolute progress can be made, it is necessary, I think, to test these, but, a controversy of this nature is not for me to initiate; the onus of proof resting as it does upon the one who first asserts. To properly state either side I should have to give numerous pages of extracts, a course which would stretch this work to undue dimensions, and besides take from it that coherence
Transactions and Proceedings of the N.Z. Institute, vol, viiis deemed requisite to the attainment of necessary truth, I quote two passages from an able paper by the Rev. R. Kidd, L.L.D., on "Induction and Necessary Truth. verify our judgments."
Returning now to the position taken up by our author in limiting necessary truths to those expressed in the geometric axioms and deductions from them, it is apparent that if experience is their common basis it will be very difficult to prove that some of the other scientific truths are not also necessary ones, considering that they also have experience for their basis. Take for instance, the one held to be axiomatic, "every effect has a cause;" this is based on experience, as it is experience which indicates that every effect we know of has had a cause, and we cannot conceive of this being contradicted when we make out of it a universal proposition, and consequently an axiom. But, if it is not an axiomatic truth, how can we distinguish it from one?
It must be considered that the Bishop's position is such, that if even one necessary truth lies outside those he cites (that is in nature) his argument fails utterly; for instance, to apply the one just stated, (an undeniable one I believe) it is in the order of nature "that every effect has a cause," but as "necessary truth" a miracle "cannot contradict it," therefore, a
There are many other truths of nature which appear valid as necessary ones, and so will be opposed to miracles, but as sufficient has I believe been adduced to overthrow the author's position, I forbear citing any of them now.
Ere I quite leave this subject however, I will just consider that portion of the pamphlet which professes especially to grapple with the question of immutability of the order (laws) of nature. The author commences his labours here by saying:—"It seems very usually taken for granted and asserted most positively, that the order of nature is absolutely invariable and immutable, and that this being established by reason, any interruption of it is impossible."
Now, this is not by any means the position a sceptic would take up; he would certainly object to making immutability of the order of nature contingent upon its "being established by reason;" but I let this pass without further comment, and proceeding, I find with feelings of great relief, that I am perfectly justified in believing that the order of nature is immutable: how then can I believe in miracles? Again, if I am to believe in them, how am I "justified" in believing the future will be like the past, how can I be justified in supposing that miracles will happen again, so that the future will be like the past? Does not the author wish to show that laws or supposed laws cannot be depended on?
I merely ring these changes to show what meshes we are involved in, when we take leave of experience, and introduce a conception of a disturbing element by assuming Divine interference with the order of nature.
But going back to the argument as regards immut-
Possibly the Bishop's idea of a "straw man" having been set up by Zetalethes is a reminiscence of the one to which I here call attention.order is used generally, if not always, by the author as an equivalent for regular recurrence, so our own proper argument does not appear, and therefore, is not met. Thus we are placed in a false position and the ridicule hurled at us falls harmless.
But as I have already pointed out, this sense of the term "order" in its present application is not the proper one, it is law, and we use it, in a sense implying its unchangeableness, which of course, is quite a different thing, and why the term order should have been substituted for that of law, I cannot yet comprehend. For this reason, we should never think of adopting as a premise, for showing the sun will rise to-morrow, the one supplied us, "he has risen a million successive days," or even that he has risen daily for a million years, which is nearer the mark. That he has risen such a number of days successively at any time is with us an argument that he will not rise to-morrow, (or, perhaps I should say, again); knowing well the mutability of nature as regards succession of events, we consider him in reality less likely to rise again, than if he had only just turned up.
The kind of argument furnished to us here, would have been the only possible one about the time of the Reformation, but we have better ones now, thanks to the unhallowed and anathematized but glorious labors of the philosophers of that epoch, in bringing to light again the precious thoughts of ancient times, from under the vile accumulations which, during centuries of religious violence, superstition and ignorance had heaped upon them.
Some of these I will now state. In doing so I take what appears to me impossible to conceive of other
1. As to the first we only know matter by its operations, that is, as manifested to us experientially, and these operations are nothing more to us nor ever will be than the play of forces. It cannot be deemed that we know anything in regard to matter except as force, and the laws or some of the laws which it observes. Further views respecting the constitution of matter are given in Note A. of the appendix to this.
2. In regard to the alleged indestructibility of force we cannot conceive of any force being absolutely lost. That any given force may be less apparent to us after another force has run counter to it, is undeniable, but in such a case the force is merely as it were spread out, or cut up, has passed into other forms, has been coerced into different directions or self-involvements. We can follow it with the eye of faith as we may a drop of water in the "ocean; we may conceive a universal degradation, as it were, of force, as regards operant power in relation to ourselves, or to any particular object, but we cannot imagine its annihilation.
3. That force requires force to affect it or divert it is undeniable. Force can neither change its mode of action nor even its direction without the determining effect of another force.
4. In regard to the fourth proposition, time surely cannot be supposed to be a factor in any kind of result; but when it appears to be so it is because natural operations have become factors in regard to what we
5. And, lastly, whatever number or kinds of forces there are, we cannot imagine, but that all possible force is as it were out, that is, in present existence, and that these have been so from all eternity. We cannot conceive of a latent force locked up for emergencies, say for the interruption or suspension of present force as would be necessary for miracles. To go further, we can never think that God himself is in any way latent. He must ever be infinitely active, He has "made all things" and "in Him we live and move and have our being;" surely this requires omnipotent action.
Science has long given up her idea of a latent power, in the sense of one gagged, repressed or concealed, and only uses it now to express a power working in a manner not so perceptible to us as when working in another manner, and science must still persist in this rendering of the term, whatever is in view. Thus we cannot conceive that any of God's power is latent in the sense stated, but must hold, as I say, that it is all in operation. What this amounts to is, that there can not be any creation of force, that all present and future results are, or will be due, at bottom, to force now in existence.
If, now, the above stated propositions are necessary truths, the legitimate deductions from them will likewise be so.
I quote from Lewes to sustain these views:—"The laws of motion have the same certainty and self-evidence when their terms are apprehended as the axioms of Geometry; neither have these characters when the terms are imperfectly apprehended; both demand that the mind should already be in possession through experience of the specified relations."
Using now these propositions, and those deductions from them which are necessary for our purpose., I maintain that the earth having at this instant a determinate axial motion, will preserve this not only for another day, but for a great number of days, and, that further, she will keep her relative position in respect to the sun, and so sunrise will be an event of the morrow. In all this, we, of course, use calculations based upon those laws of force, which we have up to this time ascertained.
We do not contend, in this as implied by the Bishop, that it is a necessary truth of reason that the sun will rise to-morrow, but merely that the chances of this happening are as a number almost infinite is to one. We further contend as a necessary truth, that were he not to rise to-morrow say, not till the day after, some physical cause would have prevented him, a cause certain to be discovered by one or other of those who retained their heads under the circumstances, and thus kept aloof from the insensate superstition which would be sure to attack the weak at such a time. If it is urged that God can surely arrest or re-direct that which he sustains and orders, we answer that this requires an absolute creation of force; and, if it is further urged that this might be accomplished by a mere withdrawal of God or His power, we would ask where the power thus withdrawn can be placed, or how it can be disposed of.
Is it not certain that God can only be present where His power is! and to imagine this power neutralized or removed, is to suppose, that the Omnipresent is not in this case present, which leads us evidently into an absurdity.
In this part I have only now to notice two or three points in the pamphlet of minor importance. In answer to the argument against miracles, "that they would utterly disturb and subvert the whole equili-
Surely it would have been the more direct process, and more likely to result in the conversion of our "youth" to the true faith, if one of these miracles had been critically examined, and the result published than to argue for an abstract principle. But at this rate of manufacture, would not miracles lose their prestige? and then what would become of those ancient writings embellished and made piquant by the recital of them, and which as to their doctrinal truths receive such support from them: surely a contempla-of the possibility of miracles being common will lead
Seriously, however, what is meant by this bugbear, man, interfering with the equilibrium of nature? And what of the equilibrium of nature itself, that which, in spite of our belief in it, is yet so easily and sensibly disturbed.
First, as to the term, equilibrium of nature, I learn that the construction put on it is that of static condition—thus the "atmospheric status" is written of as if it were always in a condition of static equilibrium—whereas, the truth is, its condition is ever being constantly disturbed.
In this sense the sun, conjointly with other powers, is constantly disturbing atmospheric equilibrium. Does the writer wish to imply that when man disturbs this, he introduces a power outside of nature? if so we have a vast subject and one which I cannot examine here.
The results of scientific knowledge, now to hand, are taken by "learned men" to indicate, if not to demonstrate, that we modify nature only by nature; that as in the case of physical exertion, so in that of mental exertion, chemical changes in our bodies are involved, and in fact, are absolutely necessary.
I merely state this theory to show that the idea thrown out about man modifying nature by something outside it, is not one upon which an argument can be constructed in a logical manner, and I therefore deprecate the introduction of it here.
After having for so long been at variance with the Bishop, it is with great pleasure I now discover statements in which I heartily concur. They are these, "that a man cannot be more conscious of his own personal existence than he is of the existence of God;" and, further, that "we cannot prove our own existence, or that of an external world." These statements,
necessary truth," or even as truth at all; the question seems to be all God or no God, and science, together with logic, holds to the former. Truly fashion and thought change along with the use of things. Formerly, faith was required in God—now it is in ourselves, or rather, I should say, in our hypothetical selves—it is hard, indeed, to find how to put it.
The quotations in the pamphlet, with one or two exceptions, do not require any notice; it would be, of course, a very easy matter in those cases where they show apparently good arguments for the author's side, to neutralize such by an insertion here of counter quotations, but I forbear taxing the reader's patience.
I observe some of the doctrines advocated by the author of Supernatural Religion, are duly advertized; and I will ask if this is not a piece of inadvertence on the Bishop's part. Who should be more fully aware than he of the fatality, to our unfortunate race, of fruit forbidden, especially when it hangs in rich clusters amidst fruit of less inviting aspect.
But this author is, I find, described as "feeling the ground to be slipping away from under his feet," because for the nonce he assumes that the order of nature is not immutable, so that he can work this position out as he has the other.
But this is certainly not a retreat, it is merely a change of front, turning the enemy's guns on him; it is not, therefore, "versatility" as alleged. Again, in reference to this, I do not suppose the author alluded to would really make such a deduction as the one attributed to him, viz., "because then an interruption of the uniformity of that which has no such characteristic (uniformity) becomes impossible." The impos-
The Bishop quotes "weighty words" from Bacon in elucidation of the supposed truth, that, as he affirms, "it was in connection with human redemption, that miracles became necessary," but, on looking up this extract, I find, the whole weight of the words lies in their being the utterance of a great man, they are simply a confession of faith, in the form of undemonstrated propositions.
I should like to have had Lord Bacon's explanation as to how Adam and Eve, and the earth, etc., before them, were formed, if not by a miracle. Redemption was not surely the object of their production; therefore, we have the singular phenomena of unnecessary miracles, performed by One who would surely not perform an unnecessary act. If any one has the hardihood to affirm that human redemption was the ultimate end of all this, let him turn to the second version of the creation of man, in the "sacred narrative," to that giving the origin of Eve, when, if I mistake not, he will find that this was evidently an after-thought, occasioned by the sight of Adam moping about in single cursedness. This shows that redemption as we have it, that is to children born in sin, or indeed, any kind of redemption, could hardly have been the current idea of that time, consequently, the miracles I have cited were, if Lord Bacon is correct, unnecessary ones. If, however, such a one is still perverse, let him explain the miracle of the talking serpent, by Lord Bacon's idea of the purpose of miracles, to my satisfaction, and I'll believe with the author, "they first became necessary in connection with human redemption." Surely, to say that the fall of Eve was necessary for human redemption, is just about the same as saying a man must be knocked down before you can pick him up.
The Bishop concludes his pamphlet by asserting
But it is not the old hardened incorrigible sceptic, nor indeed the sceptic at all, whom the author is writing for, but the "young and unwary" one, he who can be led away to another belief by the "arrogance" of the tone in which it is sought to be inculcated. For in what but arrogance can the power of a book consist, if "the very imperfect acquaintance" of the writer with the subject is "patent" in it. I will not think so poorly of our youth, or at least our thoughtful youth, as to suppose they can be converted by mere "arrogance" and dogmatism. Youth is more likely to be drawn from a proper creed by this, than charmed to a bad one.
But is it not undeniable that anyone so easy to entice or convert is not worth "powder and shot," or else the tenets the Bishop condemns, are so adapted to the form of his mind, so suited to his intellectual cravings, that it would be an uncharitable and foolish act to disturb him. God forbid that any trap should be laid for enterprising youths in their search after truth, from which traps, if they should fall into them, ten times his Lordship's power could not extricate them: His goodness forbid that the chance of reading these works should entail upon such unwary youths those dreadful and eternal consequences, which, in the Bishop's opinion, must (as I think) attach to a belief in the doctrines they inculcate. For what is this but signifying that heaven may be lost by a fluke and hell
In this connection I would fain ask the author if to fish, as he does, in the open water for small fry, This paragraph has been inserted since the appearance of Zetalethes's Reply to the Bishop i.e., the "young and unwary," is not rather an unwise act? For is there not a great probability that some one or other of the wary ones will for the interest of their kind, or in mere playfulness, so maul his net about, so work it into holes, as to render it perfectly useless. Does it not appear that the best way would have been, for the object as stated, to have cast this net in some quiet pool "where only minnows are." To leave the figurative, would not an encyclical letter addressed to those he wishes to guard from what is conceived of as a danger, have been a safer course. Owing to the re-searches and arguments of Zetalethes, re Miracles and of the newspaper correspondence which ensued.
It is no use keeping a net dangling about and vowing it to be quite sound while all the fish are just playing and popping about as if neither a net nor a Bishop were in the road, passing folks only shrugging their shoulders and laughing. I most sincerely advise the author to mend this net, or what is better still prepare a new one; on the general principle that prac-
something. No one can rightly expect much from a first trial, and really I cannot avoid thinking that for one of the Bishop's well known courage, skill and calibre, larger game than what he is now hunting might be sought for. I promise for one to pay all due attention to any effort he may make in this direction. Like the young lady who wants kissing I will try and get caught if only for a few blissful moments. In all seriousness, I really wish to be caught in this way, so that I can experience again that delightful and elevating state of wonderment with which, as a boy, I used to con over those miraculous tales as related in the "sacred narrative" and our nursery books. Were this to happen, how pleasantly we could exchange compliments—his rare logical power, and great knowledge of God's ways with nature, my judgment, soundness of heart, lively faith "which hopeth all things, believeth all things," and my inceptive capacity for the vast and harmonious truths of theology as grounded on miracles. It would altogether be so nice!
I conclude this part by summing up what I conceive to have been demonstrated in it:—
1. That (supposing miracles possible) their scope must be unbounded, or we are involved in very gross absurdities indeed, and, besides, certain alleged Biblical miracles are degraded to mere phenomena, or something very much the same.
2. That the Bishop's implication as to experience not being necessary to the acquisition of axiomatic truths does not carry any weight with it; many eminent thinkers considering that experience is necessary to us here, and, this being so, I point out the absolute need there is, before the Bishop can rightly prosecute his argument, that he should demonstrate the truth of what he has implied.
3. That the Bishop's allegation as to the only
here, numerous and very able "scholars and learned men" thinking quite differently from him on this point also.
Further, I state a natural truth outside these axioms which appears taken on all sides for a necessary one, and thus so far, to upset the author's argument, that a miracle is not against reason.
4. In regard to the immutability of the order of nature, which as to its truth, or rather, I should say, as to our knowledge of it as necessary truth, I show that the Bishop misinterprets our argument for this, by using the term "order" as synonymous with regular succession, in which sense it does not convey our meaning.
I show, further, the premises debited to those who would sustain the proposition, that the sun will rise to-morrow, is the very reverse of what they would take; and just to meet this case, and generally to show that the laws of nature are immutable, I venture a series of propositions for such tests as the Bishop may deem necessary to subject them to.
In all this I have adhered rigidly to the course prescribed by the Bishop for the argument, and thus many of our strongest points do not appear. I have endeavoured to popularize what is a very dry subject, indeed, as it seems to me, a very useless and absurd one. The results of my attempt I leave for a discriminating public, for whom I write, to determine.
There is one aspect of the question, "is a miracle opposed to reason" which I have not hitherto considered. As necessary truth is acknowledged by the Bishop to be miracle-proof, and as the human mind is certainly developing, may we not at any future time be able to know some law of nature as a necessary
is opposed to reason. I still of course maintain that we have such necessary truths now; but I just point out this aspect to show that even had we not such truths, a negative answer to the question proposed, is never safe to swear by, that is, at any time it might have to be changed for a positive one.
I append another short extract from a church dignitary, bearing upon the above. "If we thoroughly understood the nature of what we call matter, we should doubtless perceive that the supposition of matter devoid of gravitation or of other experienced qualities would be self-contradictory." Kidd on "Induction and Necessary Truth."
I now go on to discuss what the Bishop implies in the opening paragraph of his pamphlet regarding the Bible itself, viz., that it is necessary for a Christian to believe every statement of it. The subject is one which should hardly have been dragged by the Bishop into a work which is professedly a logical discussion of a different matter: but, as it is there raised, I am surely quite right here in giving my views of it also. In fact the case absolutely demands this, as it is evidently owing to the strong views which the Bishop has on this subject, that he is induced to consider the idea that miracles are against reason, is a fallacious one.
Proceeding then, I find in the words of the author it is averred that, "those who believe in the Divine authority of the Bible accept all its statements": he maintains, therefore, that a belief in the Divine authority of the Bible is contingent on a belief in all its statements; consequently to disbelieve any state-
The statement is no doubt intended to enforce belief in miracles, but surely for so insignificant an object, it is not required. The object is defeated by the means taken to effect it. I venture here to infer that, had miracles been confined to heathen faiths, we should have his Lordship fighting not for them, as now, but against them; and had nobody been foolish enough to believe he had seen one, we should not have had this question raised at all, to the exclusion of more important ones; but, of course, we must pass through all the trials and phases of our progressive life.
On proceeding, I find the Bishop himself shows signs of uneasiness about these sweeping statements, shall I say in his own words, that he—"feels himself upon slippery ground;" but, any way, knowing it is a matter of notoriety that numerous errors have crept into the Bible, and are openly allowed by his party, to be so, he says "I do not mean to imply that errors have not through the carelessness of copyists, crept into ancient manuscripts," . . . . "The correction of these errors, or imaginary errors, must be left to scholars and learned men." I suppose it is allowed that "error" applies to statements, as any other application of it here is trivial, and does not set forth the case. Here
But all this is nothing to the contradictory affirmaons implied or direct, which appear (in the Bible) not to be referrable in any way to such causes: these are so gross and palpable that it impossible believe both sides. They violate necessary truth, or else necessary faith, and thus "stultify human reason," or theological belief. For instance, it is either necessary truth or neces-
cannot contradict necessary truth? or is it that they can contradict necessary faiths in the Biblical statements, It clearly is one or the other.
I will close this part by observing, it appears to me in connection with the late newspaper correspondence here, on miracles, that the statement I have thus examined, is one intended especially for the behoof of those dignitaries of the Church, whose scientific knowledge in asserting itself leads them to make heterodoxical amendments on the Bible, when public opinion demands them. And now to digress a little here, it has been said that an honest man struggling with poverty is the noblest of God's works; well, I think, a scientific clergyman struggling with Biblical facts is the most ludicrous of His works.
It is seldom I laugh, seldom indeed that I want to, and this partly from laziness, partly from the sobering effects of the fear I have of being in the large percentage of the damned, but when I find one absolutely necessary for my health, which is about once a week, when I have leisure to enjoy one and benefit by it, I take a book suitable to the day, that is a theological work, one which attempts to reconcile the Mosaic cosmogony with scientific facts, this is a stimulus
I have, in conclusion, to make a few remarks concerning the action I have taken in this matter. The above has been written with the utmost consideration and courtesy for the reverend gentleman whose pamphlet I have here examined; if in the earnestness of any conviction and the excitement almost inseparable from controversy, I have accidentally given pain to any one, I here express my sorrow, and would assure such that nobody can have a greater regard for moral and intellectual worth than myself, and I gladly take this opportunity of tendering my most loyal respect to those who, having the fortune to possess these qualities, have further those dignities and substantialities which are their proper accompaniments. It is opinions I am alone combatting, and not individual ones either, but the opinions of a class, which are being constantly forced upon us, and at last has culminated in the production of the Bishop's pamphlet. I do this, as I have freely, because fully possessed of the feeling that errors cannot lessen moral worth, but rather enhance it by contrast; and, as regards intellectual worth errors and inconsistency are so largely and immutably associated with it in the region of orthodox theology, that really such goes for nothing to the man who has taken the trouble to acquaint himself with the benumbing effect, which as a "cold shadow falls" upon those unfortunate beings who are obliged, or choose, to traverse and confine themselves to it.
And now as regards myself more particularly. In
Regarding this book then in its literal sense, I consider, that in greater part, it simply treats of historical matters such as cruel wars, bloody massacres, and curious pedigrees, having little or no interest now, except to Jews; that it is in part a collection of professed wonders, and of broad guesses in cosmogony, all absurdly false; that it is in some parts fearfully immoral, "dangerous to youth:" in other parts blasphemous, if the act of crediting the Holy One with our base passions is blasphemy.
But, on the other hand, and here most of its present vivifying influence resides, it exhibits in its first part the yearnings of a superstitious and semi-civilized people after righteousness and the wages of it. It shows, on the part of the best of this people, that intensity to know and to love God for His own sake, which is characteristic alike of the true hearted poet, and the large souled philosopher. It gives the
It besides exhibits the behaviour of a warlike, amorous, superstitous and poetic people, progressing from a state of semi-barbarism, by aid of Monotheism, to the civilization of their neighbours, and, consequently, showing on its pages in strange contrast, sometimes appropriate, sometimes grotesque, the sacred song and the sentimental song, the war song and the song of peace, the triumphant song of victory and the wailing melancholy song of despair, in its useless invocations of the supernatural.
This part of the book really is one long history of a family amplifying to a nation by fructification and conquest, and then declining from this, and in their decline ever looking, but unsuccessfully, for a supernatural-deliverer to arrest it, and make them the dominant nation of the earth, in fact, the petted child of the universe.
The second part is infinitely superior, both in tone and structure, to the first, but still is sadly deficient in consistency, and unfortunately for the present age is thickly interspersed with miraculous tales. But all this can never obliterate the brightness of that glorious spirit of humanity which runs through it—can never to all eternity prevent him who will, seeing in its principal historic character an unique model of transcendant moral worth—a being surcharged with Divine love, and in his glorious person our highest manifestation of God, a hero indeed, battling single-handed against hypocrisy in high places, against religious shams, against all the narrow dogmas of his day, for
This as to the literal meaning of a large portion of the Bible—a book which we are called upon to believe, as to its "every statement"—a wonderful unique medley of fact and fiction, lofty poetry and the plainest, the meanest of prose, and partaking in its tone of the lowest immorality, and the highest virtue. But what if, for all this, there is a Divine element permeating it evenly throughout! if there is an infinite, a hidden meaning underlying it or enfolded in its literal sense, one which our present most popular Christian teachers have failed to comprehend, or form the least conception of! That there is this running through it as a silver thread, binding it altogether in one harmonious coherent whole, appeare certain to me, if it is a Divine book. For surely the Infinite One would never talk twaddle; a book written or inspired by Him must have an infinite meaning running through every part of it. Having these opinions, it is proper I should state them unreservedly, and I hope, that, by this, the flood of opprobrium, which has no doubt been setting strongly, but unjustly, toward me of late will be stemmed.
This internal or plenary sense, then, of the Bible is actually acknowledged, and even now promulgated by certain unpopular theologians, and creeds have been constructed in harmony with this internal sense, one of which is the Swedenborgian, Acccording to these persons, the literal sense of the Bible is quite subordinate, to this internal sense, and frequently, especially in the older portions, was never intended to be accepted as true; the whole of the Bible being said by them to have been written according to some law of correspondence, supposed to obtain between earthly and
I would not, however, like to be thought of as associating myself with doctrines so heterodox as these, or any of the same kind, but I feel compelled most respectfully and earnestly to advise our religious teachers of the popular creeds in their endeavour to preserve something of them, to study doctrines of a similar nature to these I have noted, in place of foolishly attempting to confound modern science by the use of ancient fables and allegories. I also, feel compelled to remark further, that an attempt to realize the life they inculcate would prevent those unchristian fulminations against people who cannot control their belief, and whose wretched fate therefore as doomed victims of eternal wrath, shonld rather evoke some of the commiseration and pity inculcated by a creed professedly humane than those anathemas and revilings which these unfortunate people now get.
And here, I feel bound to remark, that we can never be held to any theological creed which from structural defects is incapable of expansion or development correlative with that of the human mind, or which as to its tenets dares not or will not admit of rational, of scientific discussion; for progress is the watchword and the life of philosophy whatever direc-
fixity the watchword, the death, of such creeds.
Philosophy will not, cannot be stultified by self-immolation on the altar of dogma, from the stepping stone of fact, upon the wings of faith—a faith indeed—she flies over all those petty boundaries which formal creeds impose, and in her free and glorious career is only barred by the Infinite. Woe to any monstrous concoction of superstition and ignorance darkening the air and disputing her right to rise. For if in carrying us to those regions of upper space she has run counter to any thing of this sort, (to use the celebrated words, slightly modified, of the great Stephenson, in answer to the petty obstructionists of his time) "it would be a bad job for" her opponent.
No, philosophy leaves such unnatural and artificial limitations of thought as dogma sets, to those who dare not or cannot think; to those who prefer walking by night, and so require check ropes and safety-lights. Death to dogma is her war cry. Philosophy as now developed cannot adjust her huge form to the habiliments of any fixed creed, nor repress her growth to a determinate size, nor stay her course to suit a laggard in the race. Having broken away from these in her youth after infinite difficulty, she cannot give her hand to any such theological creed now. It is not for this she has passed through the throes of a bloody birth and left her martyrs on the road of her progress; from experience she knows what it is to be a slave, she forgives but she cannot forget. Herself comprehending the sum of all certified experience, and the faith which builds on this, the proper repertory of every fact known as fact, of every known truth—and of which theological truth forms indeed as yet, but a very minute portion—how can she say to this, or that, or indeed to any part, thou art the greater; would not this be a violation as it were of some "geometric axiom."
She stands aloof from all sects in the conscious strength which truth gives, courting no encounter, but, on the other hand, fearing none; yet, in putting away the "cursed thing," she yearns with an infinite tenderness for those who still partake of it, excusing every fault of the head, and making due allowance for accident of birth, or the enslaving effect of circumstances. No, philosophy will neither prostitute her-self to such creeds, not even the comprehensive, philosophical and moral one I have alluded to, nor go back to swaddling clothes to suit those who cannot or will not keep pace with her growth. And as to this Bible, which it has been attempted to palm upon her as a very repertory of scientific knowledge, she will not have belief in an ancient faith that violates all the experiences which have been accumulated and recorded for her, and so have science proved a delusion and a snare. Thus she rejects the literal sense of the Word as a whole, that rock ahead on to which our present creeds, like cumbrously appointed, and fated ships, are now rushing to their destruction. In doing this she cannot be passive, she is assailed upon this point, therefore she must fight on it, and in so doing this, is certainly performing for true religion a very great kindness, since if this literal sense is indeed a veil which hides an internal one, the sooner will this veil be lifted and the Divine language appear, the sooner will "the book" prove worthy of its reputed Author. When this is acomplished depend upon it she will be the first to do it homage.
And here, as the most fitting opportunity, I must beg to deprecate the strange theological fallacy that philosophy is antagonistic to true religion. She does certainly set her face mildly, but determinately against all spurious religion and its pseudo-truths; indeed, she would not be true to herself were she not to do this. But on the other hand, she yearns with an
In the high position of trust she now holds with human destiny almost in her hands, and love and duty prompting her, there is nothing suits her so well as to be like unto the faithful shepherds of old "watching their flocks by night," the first "to know the glad tidings;" nothing that pleases her so well as to be able with the wise men of Herod to lay her treasures at the feet of new-born truth and worship it. Why then these revilings of her? Wherefore this insensate conduct of theology towards her? Why does religion curse philosophy and run the terrible risk of dying by her own hand? For curses, the refuge of the weak or the venom of the malignant, have never yet been of any avail: like "chickens they always go home to roost," and those who indulge in them harbour within their breasts a spark from hell, which may, at any moment, burst into flames and consume every good feeling they possess.
In conclusion, I am aware that these opinions are not popular; were they popular, I should not have had any occasion to state them, and as I shall in all probability never appear before our little circle again in the character of a religious teacher, one which neither befits me nor is, in accordance with my tastes, I will crave my reader's kind attention a little longer for some further remarks.
I will then here state, that these opinions, however they may be spurned, are the result of careful and dispassionate inquiry; after due consideration, and with due consideration, I state them. I take upon myself the onus of their expression simply for the sake of truth, and for those noble ones who in search of it, and in the legitimate exercise of their genius, are
present phase, and science in its now truly grand development—would be cowardice indeed, a reproach to the manes of the mighty dead, dastardly behaviour to those who in the midst of tremendous labours for us have, in the serial unfolding of the results of these, to bear the burden and heat of the day, a poor acknowledgment in truth, of what we owe alike to those who have gone before, and those who now represent us. Knowing that it is the duty of a man suffering under strong religious convictions to confess them publicly ere the grave can prevent him, I have taken the opportunity which the Bishop's pamphlet afforded me of doing so. Nor has the opportunity come too soon. I am not ashamed to own I have been greatly tortured by seeing the one-sided game played, which we have had here of late, and have longed in the absence of those attacked to take it up for them, feebly equipped as I am, even though at the cost of much trouble, at some pecuniary loss, and at the risk of being misunderstood, and abused, as only a dogmatist can abuse, when under cover of a pseudonym.
I have seen every now and then in our newspaper correspondence revilings and mutterings against scientific thought and those who represent it. I have seen that characterized as "dangerous," as "infidelity," as "stuff and nonsense," which ministers directly to our material welfare and in its higher sphere positively forbids atheism, by enlarging our conceptions, by shewing the oneness of purpose and the consistency which runs throughout creation, and which as much as can be done, raises us to a knowledge of God, and does this in such a tremendous and convincing manner, in such a variety of ways, that our mind staggers
I have seen and heard a great philosopher reproached, merely because in his inaugural address to the British Association at Belfast, as the exponent of a high philosophy, in the spirit of justice and veneration for the noble far-reaching intellects of ancient times, he reproduced their thoughts in the exact langnage of modern science, and supported them by those teeming facts which this science had placed at his disposal; and because in this he had to claim for matter a more noble use, and a higher destiny than some are as yet willing to accord it: because of this, I have seen and heard such an one reviled with every opprobrious epithet: as if forsooth we, the sport of circumstances, the ephemeral creatures of the hour, as if we know all about matter, this our eldest-born, born in the earliest dawn of time; what it should be, and what it should not be; as if we
The fact of it is, we do not know what we are quarrelling about, whether, indeed, there is really anything to quarrel about; yet, as I say, a person stating an opinion upon it, other than the current one, gets into bad repute, and is lashed with the whip of scorn. Not that the lash, as applied by those mistaken people who use it, affects such men, except only as indicating on the part of these flagellators, that inappreciation of truth, that ungratefulness for favors received, which will make despondent the most powerful intellect, and the most affectionate nature; must it not seem to these men that, like illbred hounds, we snap at the hand that feeds us, and then whine for more. But the memories and the deeds of such men will live and and bear fruit, when those of their traducers will have been long forgotten, or, if remembered, remembered only to point a moral to obstructionists of the future.
Through all this, however, it must ever be a source of congratulation, an occasion for gratitude to them and to us, that the impregnable position has been won which we now have the fortune to occupy; won for us, though it has been at a fearful cost of life, and by so much suffering; that the bloody part of progress is nigh over; that the rack, the stake, and the dungeon of the inquisition are now things of the past; that we live our happy life in an age which, though using the lash freely in the figurative sense as I have shown, still, to the demands of philosophy and humanity, restricts the use of it in the literal one, to its proper object,
And now without intending any disrespect to the Bishop, in regard to the construction of the closing paragraph of his pamphlet, I would fain use it to model mine by, as with a few slight substitutions, this one very aptly conveys what I desire to close mine with. "I have no confidence in the potency of arguments such as I have used, even though advanced with ten-fold the ability to which I could lay any claim, to draw any human heart from" Appendix, B.superstition, to believe in "God as He is," and, therefore, against "miracles," knowing, as I do, how hard it is for any one cradled in superstition to trust to God and look it bravely in the face. "All that I have ventured to hope I might do in these few pages is, to guard the young and unwary against being led away from the faith of" experiential philosophy "by the positive assertions, made with such astonishing audacity, by many modern" theologians that miracles are not opposed to reason. "The arrogant manner in which," pietists and priests "whose writings make patent their very imperfect acquaintance with mental" and physical "science practically assert their own infallibility on" physico-theological questions, "although it may appear almost ludicrous to some persons, not unfrequently staggers the" simple "and too often leads them to acquiesce in their dogmatical assertions. My object has simply been to show that the positive statements referred to are not altogether trustworthy, If through the blessing of God what I have writien should produce even this effect in the mind of any one of my readers, I commend him to God," and to active, thoughtful, loving search after Him, "for His thorough confirmation in the faith"
In regard to the constitution of matter, the neuclus of it as it were which as yet no power of the imagination can enable us to conceive of as absent therefrom, I will here express an idea which just occurs to me, and enables us, I think, to remove a great part of that difficulty we now experience in forming a conception of force without a material, a solid something as it were, to give body to it.
Taking the fruitful idea of the similarity of world systems to chemical compounds as regards the motions involved; and the similarity again in this respect of the structure of these compounds to that of our so termed elementary molecules as manifested to us by chemical researches; I would suppose that each molecule itself is composed of a system of entities, every one of which has a motion of its own; these subdivisions of the hypothetical elementary molecule I again imagine to be in their turn divided, and that each further subdivision of it has a proper inter-motion of its own, and so on ad infinitum.
Thus I am able to conceive of a maximum, almost an infinity of force, with a minimum, or an infinitely little of what we at present must think of as a solid.
Thus if we must conceive of a solid at all, that is of something without inter-motion, we have it as a something we may never hope to find, a point as it were, ever receding as we attempt to approach it.
We can look upon matter practically as force infinitely intervolved, solid congeries of force. By such conceptions I think we are raised, besides, to form truer ideas of what we term matter than we can now; and so we are put on the way to consider what I believe is correct, that this world is more of a spirit-world than we now hold it to be; that it has an infinitely higher status than we now believe it to have; and that it has a nearer bond of union with God than a lifeless motionless inert mass can be supposed by us to have.
Faith, "the faith," is here written of in such a way as to imply that there is no true faith outside the fashionable
I will ask, however, if it is not a tremendous exertion of faith, a most righteous and saving one, that in spite of these fashionable creeds, and the eloquence and power with which their champions support them, in spite of the literal sense of the Word even, we believe in a God infinitely majestic, noble, just, and consistent. Should not such a faith as this be styled "the faith," rather than the one his Lordship has gone out of his way to broach!
Further, I will ask, if it is not also a tremendous exertion of faith in the infinite power of God, to give up our hereditary notions of matter for one which holds it to have even, as to its minutest portion, a proper motion of its own, one of inconceivable, rapidity—for one which holds that the minutest atom is itself an inexhaustible store of force and of the most diverse kinds.
Again, I ask, do not the development doctrines as now so profitably applied to the elucidation of nature require, of those who believe them, faith? faith to throw off the Biblical idea that God works by spurts, that is by sudden creations.
Truly it must at least be owned that these are mighty and majestic movements of faith, the most elevating and glorious of philosophical reformations, nay, of all reformations, this rising on our part to entertain these lofty ideas of God, of the infinite power of His works, and of the one grand method by which they are being eternally evolved.
Printed by James Hughes, Lambton Quay, Wellington.
The Bishop of Wellington is, I hear, very anxious that some person should reply to his "Reply." The old fighting instinct, so conspicuous in the days of Philo-Maoriism and "the three F.'s," though dormant, is not yet extinct. Well, I am not fond of controversy of this kind. I have a special horror of the odium theologicum, and I may say that I did not write any of the letters that appeared in the papers on this subject, nor did I indeed read many of them. But I read the little brochure, of the Bishop, and while it appeared to me (with one or two exceptions which I shall note) to be written with candour and moderation, it also seemed to be fairly open to very grave logical objections.
The ground of debate circumscribed by the Bishop is a very narrow one; it is not, mark, whether miracles are true—a larger question, and involving other evidence which by the definition is excluded. The question here is: "Is a miracle opposed to reason?" Let him define his ground for himself:—" What I propose is to endeavour to show that the objection commonly advanced by persons laying claim to some intellectual superiority over their neighbours, against miracles—that they are repugnant to reason—is untenable. * * I purposely
as such, incredible, or, in other words, impossible"?—(p. 5.) Again, "If a miracle had never been wrought or even pretended, my argument would remain substantially the same; the scientific question relates to the possibility of supernatural occurrences at all."—(p. 20.) Thus, then, it is clear that the only question is whether, according to the laws of the human mind in the investigation of truth and the laws or order of external nature, miracles are, ("as such," mark this,) in themselves, without regard to other evidence, more credible than otherwise? It is then plainly a question, to be determined by the tests so prescribed, of greater or lesser antecedent probability between the constancy of natural laws or order and "a visible interruption or suspension of the order of nature for a providential purpose." How can the Bishop, after putting the case on the ground of reason pretend to treat questions of greater or lesser probability as collateral? No arguments are more legitimate or better known in logic than probable arguments; surely no logician will dispute this, and as I shall show, these are the precise kind of arguments proper to this discussion. This is an inconsistency of the Bishop at the start, and there are other very grave ones besides. The Bishop gives (at page 20) a summary of his argument:—" I have briefly endeavored to show that a miracle cannot be contradictory to any intuition of reason, which is concerned only with individual objects; nor to any necessary truths of reason, because these are only necessarily true within the mind itself; nor to any deduction of reason from observed facts, because the mind possesses no absolute criterion
i.e., the interpretation of external nature, is quite illegitimate. There are, in the first part of the last quotation or elsewhere, certain expressions: "intuition of reason," "absolute truth of reason," "necessity as an absolute truth of reason," "deduction of reason," &c., on which the changes are throughout rung, and to which I shall hereafter object. But it is in the last sentence of the summary that the main argument, so far as there is any such, is indicated. "The invariability, &c., of nature "cannot be proved as a truth of geometry, &c." This invariability of nature is, then, says the Bishop, a pure assumption. Granting, for the sake of argument, (which I certainly do not in any other sense admit,) that it is an assumption, let us see how he goes about his argument. On recurring to the definition of a miracle (p. 5.) it is seen that in the very term of it: "an interruption of the order of nature
God. This the Bishop admits at p. 16. "When it is admitted that we cannot 'prove' the existence of a personal God, this admission is made just in the same sense, and in no other, in which it is admitted we cannot 'prove' our own existence or that of an external world." But then, says he, "human consciousness prevents us from calling in question the assumption of a God." With this argument from consciousness, I shall deal hereafter, but now let me point out a piece of extraordinary inconsistency. There are, by admission of both parties for the moment, two assumptions, the one the constancy of the order of nature, the other the existence of a personal God; neither of which can be "proved" geometrically. The Bishop began by marking out a very narrow circle, "are" miracles to be believed on grounds of reason alone?"—(see pp. 5, 20.) And into this circle he invites all and sundry, without reference to religious belief, to try conclusions with him on rational grounds only, and with the weapons of reason. Having got people into the ring he coolly turns upon them, and says in effect:—"By your leave—just permit me to step outside a little for a weapon of mine which I have found very convenient before;" the opponent demurs; then mark what happens. Sir, you are an atheist—do you suppose for an instant a Christian would enter into a serious discussion about miracles with an avowed atheist?" This is not merely inconsistent; it would be, if addressed to an individual, gratuitously offensive; for what right has he when any person takes him up on his own ground, to make imputations which by the conditions of battle are out of the case? Page 16 comes simply to this—that of two assumptions, the
God without being branded with an opprobious epithet.
But now let us inquire a little more carefully into the meaning of "reason" &c., as applied to investigations and interrogations of nature, and into the comparative validity of the grounds for our belief in the invariability of the order of nature, and the belief in a personal God as a sufficient cause to sanction the credibility of miracles. It is assuredly, evade the point as you may, a case of greater or lesser antecedent probability. In this inquiry I shall call the same witnesses whose testimony the Bishop has used: these are, J. S. Mill, Herbert Spencer, Dr. Thomas Brown, and to these I shall add a couple of experts of the Bishop's own cloth, viz:—Dr. Thomson, Archbishop of York, and the Rev. A. H. Killick, Fellow of University of Durham, and author of the admirable Handbook to Mill's Logic. I shall also make use of the researches of the antiquary, Sir John Lubbock.
The changes are rung so repeatedly through the first half of the pamphlet on the terms "reason," "necessary truths of reason," &c., and so much of of the argument is made to turn on the sense in which these phrases are used, that although I have not space to enter fully into the question, some notice must be taken of these definitions, and the inferences attempted to be drawn from them. We are told that there are "certain necessary truths of reason, generally accepted," that "the only necessary truths of which the human reason is cognisant, are the proper axioms of geometry—that if such axioms
Mill, Logic, i., 226. Killick, 65.) To this type it will be seen that all reasoning, that establishing the axioms of geometry, the laws of nature, and everything else, ultimately conforms. The character of necessity," says Mill, "(and even with some reservations, the peculiar certainty) attributed to mathematical truths is an illusion. As to their peculiar certainty, it only consists in this, that mathematical conclusions are not liable to be interfered with by counteracting causes. In themselves they are not more certain or exact than those of any other sciences; * * the necessity, too, of geometrical truths consists only in this,—that they necessarily follow from the granting of hypotheses from which they are deduced. Their necessity in fact is certainty of inference. The primary suppositions or hypotheses are—(1.) Definitions; (2.) Axioms. Some of these suppositions are not only not necessary, they are not even strictly true. Axioms are experimental truths; inductions from the evidence of our senses. That is, the evidence on which we believe axioms is of the same kind as the evidence on which we believe any other fact of external nature—our experience of their truth." These views of Mill have been controverted by Dr. Whewell, but he replies to all the objections, and has by far the best of the argument. In these views of the nature and ultimate grounds of mathematical truths, Mill is supported by such men as Sir John Herschell and Mr. H. Spencer.—(Logic i., 279, 294.). So much, then, for the necessary truths of reason in geometry—they rest on precisely the same grounds and on
viz: induction from experience. Now let us look into the nature and mode of proof of these laws or order of nature. "The uniformity of nature is proved by a generalisation of all our inductions, it is a conclusion by an induction per enumerationem, simplicem from a large number of inductions. Thus if we knew not whether nature were uniform or not, we could still reason that since all the men that ever lived have died, all men yet to be born will die, and, therefore, in this respect nature is uniform; so, again, we reason that because the sun has risen ever since time began it will do the same to-morrow, and again conclude that nature is uniform; so, again, we reason that since water was always found to run down hill and not up, it will, unless something intervenes to prevent it, always do so, and again nature is uniform; and thus when finally, age after age passes away and innumerable inductions are made, every one of which adds its item of proof without a single contradictory instance, the inference by one grand induction of the universality of the principle is irresistible. The condition which renders this induction from unanalyzed experience a valid process, is this:—We must know that if any exception had occurred we should be aware of it. This assurance in most cases we cannot have; yet there are certain remarkable cases where, having this certainty, an induction by simple enumeration amounts to a rigorous proof, indeed the only proof of which they are susceptible. These are—(1.) The fundamental principles of mathematics. (2.) The principle of the uniformity of nature. The axiom of the uniformity of nature is proved then by this form of induction, the principle having
Killick, pp. 97, 99; condensed from Mill.) So far then from the conviction of the constancy of natural order and law "having no foundation in reason," "no rational answer," &c., the belief according to the greatest of modern logicians rests for its validity on precisely the same grounds as the fundamental principles of mathematics. Now let us see what the Archbishop of York has to say on the subject. This eminent ecclesiastic (the second in dignity in the empire, I believe) and equally eminent logician, classifies the degrees of belief or modality of judgments, as follows: He reduces them all to three great classes, each having within it three sub-classes or degrees—(1.) "Problematical, containing (a) Possible; (6) Doubtful; (c) Probable. (2.) Assertive, with its sub-divisions, (a) morally certain for the thinker himself; (4) morally certain for a class or school; (c) morally certain for all. (8.) Demonstrable, with its degrees, (a) physically certain, with a limit; (b) physically certain, without limitation; (c) mathematically certain. The Problematical judgment is neither subjectively nor objectively true; it is mere opinion. The Assertive judgment is one of which we are fully persuaded ourselves, but cannot give grounds for our belief; it is therefore subjectively, but not objectively, certain. The Demonstrative judgment is both subjectively and objectively true." In this last he includes the laws of physical science, as the law of gravitation, of chemical affinity, &c. In another place he speaks directly of the laws of induction, whereby the uniformity of nature is proved:—"On what principleare incomplete inductions, i.e., examinations of
Law of Thought, pp. 300, 308.) Thus then it is clear that Dr, Thomson, while he believes in miracles on other evidence sufficient for him, has no sympathy with a mode of reasoning which asserts that the uniform laws of nature have no rational answer to give for themselves. According to him, so far from our belief in this conformity being "a mere blind expectation," this judgment of ours is not problematical nor even assertive, but "Demonstrative." It is not opinion merely, or belief merely, but science. Now let us hear what says the celebrated
Cause and Effect:— Ignorant as we are of the many bearings of events on each other, it appears to me that we are not entitled, in sound philosophy, to affirm of any sequence, in which the antecedent and consequent are not exactly known to us in their fixed mutual relation—that the Deity has not operated in this particular case. It may be much more likely indeed that the sequence is in conformity with the ordinary course of events; but the absolute denial of providential agency, as concerned in it, is not allowable; * * But if it be too much to say, in any particular case, that Providence has not interposed, it appears to me equally, or rather, far more unphilosophic, to pronounce positively, in any particularicase, that there has been such interposition. * * The more attentively we observe the sequences of events in nature, and the more minutely we analyse them, the more exact do we find the uniformity of the particular consequent which we trace after the particular antecedent which we have traced; and the stronger therefore does the presumption become, that if we were able to analyse with still more discriminating accuracy all the complex appearances of things, we should discover a similar uniformity in the varieties that at present are most perplexing to us. * * Therefore, he who affirms positively, in any case, that an event which is not beyond the ordinary operation of the common powers of nature, was not so produced but was the result of Divine agency, must in this very affirmation, take for granted, that he is acquainted with all the tendencies of things at the time of which he speaks, since he is able to pronounce upon their inadequacy; and that,
Cause and Effect, pp. 427, 429.) So then, this great writer, who admitted that if you assume a Divine agency as the author of miracles, there is no contradiction of the law of cause and effect, yet believed that just in direct proportion as our knowledge grows of the sequences of nature, in the same proportion is the presumption strengthened in favour of the invariable uniformity of the connexion of natural antecedent with natural consequent. So far is he from thinking the law of natural uniformity a mere assumption, he believes, like Dr. Thomson, that the vast preponderance of probability is on its side.
Having thus inquired into the validity of the grounds of our "assumption" of the constancy of natural laws, let us now turn to the other "assumption" of a personal God, and see how far the argument is valid on which it is based. The Bishop tells us:—"Mail cannot be more conscious of his own personal existence than he is of the existence of God. His assurance as to the existence of an external world is not so certain. The belief in conscious life in other than his own individual life, * * is now deeply rooted in every man's mental organism, &c."—(p. 16.) Then in a note we have a specimen of the German method of argument from consciousness. Now this argument from consciousness unluckily proves far too much for those who use it. It, like many other fine ways of accounting for difficult things, has fared badly at the hands of the historical method of investigating human phenomena. For, two things have been made clear:
God or religion. (2nd.) As consciousness is evolved and intelligence grows, his notions of God and religion undergo a steady process of development from the grosser to the less gross forms. See for the evidence of the former statement, Sir John Lubbuck's Origin of Civilization, pp. 139, 142, 236 to 240. For the general character of the lowest forms of religious ideas, if they can be called such at all, among savages, see the same work, pp. 133-4, 264, 290, 895. I have not space to indulge in these most interesting extracts, but they will well repay a reference to them. The author, at p. 137, thus classifies the stages of religious thought:—"(1. Atheism: absence of any definite ideas on the subject. (2.) Fetishism: in which man supposes he can force the Deity (if such it can be called) to comply with his wishes. (3.) Totemism: worship of natural objects as symbols of ancestors. (4.) Shamanism: superior deities more powerful than man. (5.) Idolatry, or Anthropomorphism: in which the gods become still more like man, but more powerful; being a part of nature and not creation. (6.) Deity: regarded as the author, not a part of nature; being, in this stage, first a really supernatural being. (7.) Morality at last, becomes associated with religion. (See also this subject on pp. 242, 248, 253, 256, 395.) "Gradually," says Sir J. Lubbock, "an increased acquaintance with the laws of nature enlarged the mind of man. He first supposed that the Deity fashioned the earth, raising it out of the water, and preparing it as the dwelling place of man; subsequently he realized the idea that land and water were alike created by Divine power.
God must take. Anthropomorphism is an inevitable result of the laws of thought. We cannot take a step towards constructing an idea of God without the ascription of human attributes. We cannot even speak of a Divine will without assimilating the Divine nature to our own; for we
Essays, vol. i., p. 442.) So, then, as civilization advances, as "knowledge grows from more to more," man's consciousness of God as a mode of interpreting nature, undergoes a gradual transition from the insensate Fetishism of the negro—who carries his god in his waist-cloth, takes him out to beat him when ill befalls him and puts him in, when he is about to do something naughty, that he may not see him—to the conception of an omnipotent and benificent author of nature, who governs the Cosmos through the medium of uniform laws which, however, he can and has, as assumed, for providential reasons, suspended at his sovereign will. I may here refer to the celebrated law of the three stages, whereby M. Comte has formulated this transition: (1st.) The Theological; (2nd.) The Metaphysical; (3rd.) The Positive, or Scientific. The first and third of these are the extremes, for whereas in the theological stage of the human mind, man interprets phenomena by analogies from his own nature, in the latter he recognises nothing but the "reign of law." The metaphysical stage is intermediate and transitional between the other two. I have not space to illustrate the law, but the reader who may be curious on the matter will find it beautifully expounded in Mr. Mill's book, Auguste Comte and Positivism. He will also see it most ably applied to the history of the Hellenic mind, in the magnificent 16th chapter of Part I, of Grote's History of Greece, and indeed all through the psychological parts of that superb book.
So, then, if we find this "consciousness"—this conception of personal authorship and governance of nature directly and steadily, under the pressure of growing intelligence, modifying its forms from gross to less gross—steadily, and in proportion to the
Mara, or Fates, independent of the personal rule of Zeus, acquiring ever-increasing strength and consistence from the time when the Hellenic thought, through the minds of Thales, Xenophanes and Pythagoras, first broke through the mythopæic gloom down to this time, the conclusion is the same. From that time to this all our enterprises, all our encroachments on the domain of nature, all our inductions, and deductions, and discoveries, have been just so many verifications of this assumption of the constancy of the order of nature. On this assumption we have predicted the eclipses and the return of comets; on this assumption Messrs. Leverrier, in France, and Adams, in England, reasoning on physical laws, independent and unknown to each other, searched the realms of infinite space, fixed the place in them of a planet (Neptune) the light of which never yet had reached human eye, and, acting on the instructions of M. Leverrier, on the God to be proved by other evidence. On the one side, the great negative presumption arising from the whole of what the course of nature discloses to us of the Divine government, as carried
Essays, p.p. 235, 239.) This, it will be seen, puts the case even on the assumption of the existence of a personal God. His conclusion is:—" That miracles have no claim whatever to the character of historical facts, and are wholly invalid as evidences of any revelation."
Having carried the general connected argument thus far, I shall now make certain incidental criticisms on detached portions of the pamphlet. On pages 10, 15, 21, appears a fallacy that colours the whole throughout. Hume is quoted (p. 10.) to show that there is a mental process in inductive inference, and on page 15, Dean Mansel tells us "that our belief in the constancy of natural order is explained by a law of our mental constitution, and that it is a law of mind and not of matter." Again, on page 21, the Bishop is angry with the physicists and physiologists for their ignorance, of "mental science." Now, in the first place, who denies that there is a step taken by the mind in the inductive process; in what operation of logic is not that involved? Next, it is not true that our belief in the constancy of natural order is a law of mind and not of matter. There are two sorts of inference: Objective and Subjective, or Inductive and Syllogistic. "In Objective Inference," says Killick, "the fact stated in the conclusion is a bond fide new truth, a distinct fact, and not merely a part of the same fact or facts stated in the premises. * * In all cases of Objective Inference the conclusion follows in virtue of a law of External Nature and not by a mere law of mind;
Subjective Inference, on the other hand, affords a contrast in all these respects. * * The mind being in possession of the premises can by a mere comparison of their expression in words, evolve the conclusion—the fact stated in that conclusion being really included in the fact stated in the premises."—(Preface to Handbook, p. 5.) The Bishop, all through, seems quite unaware of this most important distinction, and, therefore, the charge of arrogance and ignorance which, on page 21, he hurls at physicists, recoils on himself. Surely anyone, by force of plain sense, can understand that the proper mental processes to employ in interpreting any phenomena of nature, normal or abnormal, such as miracles, should be those which have so eminently contributed to make man the master and lord of nature, viz:—the inductive methods. The Bishop is again very angry at pages 13, 14, with Mr. Buskin and the author of Supernatural Religion, for a couple of remarks made by those gentlemen. Mr. Buskin maintains that "the uniformity of nature not being established, the most startling apparent departures from it would be attended by no evidential effect." Again the Bishop quotes from the gentleman secondly named above:—"Any argument which could destroy faith in the order of nature would be equally destructive to miracles. If we have no right to believe in a rule, there can be no right to speak of exceptions, &c." I do not wonder at the Bishop losing his mental balance when brought up short by this very neat dilemma of these two gentlemen. But really I am quite unable to give him credit in the remarks on page 14, for both candour and intelligence. Surely this dilemma is as clear as crystal. For if you deny the constancy of natural sequence, what
Deus ex machinâ as a cause for an event that might, by the supposition, happen at any moment without a cause? In my opinion the sneer of the Bishop is sadly out of place. It is one or other—eminently uncandid or silly.
On page 11 a point is made by "the unanswerable" Canon Mozley. We are told that as science has proclaimed there are no causes in nature, that the chain of physical succession is "a rope of sand consisting of antecedents and consequents, but without a rational link or trace of necessary connection between them—a chain of which the junction not being reducible to reason the interruption is not against reason." A very pretty point indeed: if this is a specimen of the unanswerable Bampton Lectures I do not think much of them. For, first, science has not said there are "no causes" in nature—she says that causation is nothing more than "the invariable, unconditional antecedents," which is a different thing. Then mark the way in which the term "rational link" is coupled by the conjunction "or" to the term "necessary connection." The word "or" in English is ambiguous: It may be= "or, which is the same thing," Latin "vel;" or it may be= "or, which is another thing," Latin "aut," the effect being quite different as the one or the other meaning is conveyed. Here the first is plainly the meaning insinuated, and the effect is to assume in this underhand way that "necessary connection"
i. e., "unavoid-ableness" as opposed to "invariableness," or constancy of sequence, immediately proceeds below to avail himself of this use of "necessary" above as a convertible term with "rational," and infers that as science has destroyed "necessary connection," (in his sense of the term,) therefore she has also removed any "rational link" (which he assumes as the equivalent) and, therefore, on her own showing, miracles can be no interruption, forsooth of a link that does not exist I A sophism, worthy only of a pettifogger in a police court.
Then on page 19 there is another little point much of a piece with this one. Is it seriously pretended that the putting into action new natural laws by the agency of human volition as, e.g., by cutting down the forests, and thus acting through second causes, is the same thing as "a miraculous suspension and interruption of some laws of nature?" Surely this fallacy could not mislead a child. See it exposed in Mill's Essay on Theism, pp. 226, 228.
Thus I have, on grounds of reason, to which he himself has appealed, combated the Bishop's propositions. I repeat, that within the limits of the question "Is a miracle reasonable?" anyone is at liberty to argue on rational grounds alone. After thus defining the ground the Bishop has no right whatever to go outside of it or to fling any imputation. This question as stated, is a challenge to rationalists, and when they meet it on the ground on which it is placed by the challenger he has no reason to complain. The question of the existence of a Personal God, let it be clearly understood, is not here discussed in any
as an independent question, it is true or false I here say nothing.
I may say that I have never read a word of Supernatural Religion, or of Hume's famous Essay on Miracles. I know nothing of the former book but what I see in the pamphlet. I deprecate wanton attacks on the unobtrusive exercise of religious faith and duties; but such great and all-absorbing questions as this are engaging the earnest reflection of thinking men everywhere, and when they are pushed forward anyone may fairly criticise them. Clergymen from the habit of treating all questions from the pulpit, without hearing the other side, are apt, above all men, to take a one-sided view and criticism is wholesome to them. I trust I have not exceeded its legitimate bounds.
Lyon and Blair, Printers, Lambton Quay, Wellington.
Zetalethes has published a criticism on my small pamphlet, entitled—"A Reply to the Question, is a Miracle opposed to Reason?" In the few observations I am about to make I have no intention of either adding to, or retracting anything I have said; nor even of either qualifying or enforcing any argument I have used. I merely wish to show that my meaning has been unaccountably missed, and that in several instances a construction has been put upon my language which it was not intended to convey, and of which I think it does not admit. I shall, therefore, confine myself to commenting upon those parts of my critic's reply in which he most obviously seems to have misunderstood me. I shall not follow him into any consideration of the theories of Compte and Lubbock, which have no tendency to establish the only point which would be fatal to my position, namely, that the immutability of the order of nature admits of demonstration, and is a necessary truth of reason. I am, so far at least as my present argument is concerned, altogether indifferent as to any collateral issues.
I most assuredly thought, when I defined a miracle in the sense I intended to use it, as "a visible suspension of the order of nature for a providential purpose," that my definition would be intelligible enough to any well-informed person. I had no suspicion that I should be misunderstood to imply that this referred to any but a divine action. I took it for granted that I should be understood to mean that this providential interference had reference to the
God who watches over his moral creatures. I candidly confess that I thought it wholly unnecessary for the information of anyone at all likely to read my pamphlet, that I should insert the words 'by Almighty God' between the words "suspension of the laws of nature" and "for a providential purpose." Indeed, a miracle, as distinguished from a marvel, involves the notion of God's action. It was therefore with some surprise that I read—"By the Bishop's own terms of combat any person has a complete right to deny, for argument's sake, the assumption of a personal God"—(p. 7); that is to say, deny that which is involved in the very idea of a miracle. Surely I was perfectly justified in saying, that the denial of that which was essential to the very idea of a miracle, would be to leave only a meaningless residium about which no one would care to argue.
At page 20 there is a passage that I am obliged to cite at length, lest I should be supposed to have misrepresented the writer. "I shall now make certain incidental criticisms on detached portions of the pamphlet. On pages 10, 15, 21, appears a fallacy that colours the whole throughout. Hume is quoted (p. 10.) to show that there is a mental process in inductive inference, and on page 15, Dean Mansel tells us 'that our belief in the constancy of natural order is explained by a law of our mental constitution, and that it is a law of mind and not of matter.' Again, on page 21, the Bishop is angry with the physicists and physiologists for their ignorance of mental science. Now, in the first place, who denies that there is a step taken by the mind in the inductive process; in what operation of logic is not that involved? Next, it is not true that our belief in the constancy of natural order is a law of mind and not of matter." I think this is one of the most remarkable specimens of criticism that has
no legitimate chain of reasoning connecting the conclusion with the premises in inductive inference. His words are—"It must be acknowledged that there is a consequence drawn by the mind, that there is a step taken, a process of thought, and an inference which wants to be explained;—as a philosopher I want to learn the foundation of this inference." Hume, in fact, contemptuously repudiates the claim of the inductive process to satisfy the requirements of reason. When, therefore, the writer goes on to ask, "Who denies that there is a step taken by the mind in the inductive process?" I am fairly puzzled, because this was the very thing that Hume did deny. It was on account of his denial of this assumption that his testimony was adduced by me. Has the writer, then, been all along criticising my argument without knowing what it really is? What I have asserted, and proved (so far as this can be proved by the candid admission of opponents of miracles, such as Hume, Kant, and Mill,) is that there is no legitimate inference in the inductive process, that the so-called inductive reasoner has jumped to his conclusion. But this evidently is an aspect of the subject with which my learned critic is not very familiar.
Notwithstanding what I have just said, I am not quite satisfied that I have rightly understood my critic. Can he possibly mean, when he says that "there is a step taken," that an inference has been legitimately drawn in spite of a missing link in the chain of reasoning? If this is what he means, then he has conceded my point, and my argument is established. He goes on to ask "in what operation of logic is not this involved If he really intends
But let me proceed. He misquotes my extract from Dean mansel: he somewhat carelessly omits the words, "as thus explained," and also substitutes "is" for "may be," very materially altering Dean Mansel's meaning, who did not make a positive assertion. This is not exactly what might have been expected from a philosophical critic. He then asserts, that "it is not true that our belief in the constancy of natural order is a law of mind and not of matter." Let us try, without having recourse to any "handbook" of philosophy, (a class of books far more likely to mislead than to benefit anyone on such subjects,) whether Dean Hansel's meaning cannot be ascertained by some process intelligible to all who will be at the pains of thinking for a few minutes. Any simple illustration will do. There is a piece of ice; it is brought near to the fire; it melts. These external visible facts are directly presented in intuition. This may be repeated a hundred times with the same result. That is all that the facts will give us. But the mind postulates a came. Mankind have, as a matter of fact, always assumed a cause. There "may be" some law of mind compelling them to
The following passage requires some notice:—"Thus I have, grounds of reason, to which he himself has appealed, combated the Bishop's proposition. I repeat, that within the limits of the question—'Is a miracle reasonable?' anyone is at liberty to argue on rational grounds alone. After thus defining the ground the Bishop has no right whatever to go outside of it to fling any imputation. This question, as stated, is a challenge to rationalists, and when they meet it on the ground on which it is placed by the challenger, he has no right to complain."—(p. 23.) How a single word of this passage applies to anything I have written, I am wholly unable to imagine. In the first place, I have proposed no such question as—"Is a miracle reasonable?" or (as is attributed to me at page 6)—"Are miracles to be believed on grounds of reason alone?" It would never have occurred to me to write in such loose ambiguous terms. The writer has been drawing on his own imagination. He has set up a man of straw to contend with. In the next place, I "challenge" on one. It is rather those who hold the opinions I do who are challenged. We are taunted with the reiterated assertion, that miracles are repugnant to reason. This is decidedly the tone adopted by a highly lauded book, Supernatural Religion, extracts from which work I gave. I am also
Cæsarem appellasti? ad Cæsarem ibis. When I strive to ascertain wherein the repugnancy to reason consists, I am told that a miracle implies a contravention of the uniformity of nature, that this is impossible, and therefore that it is repugnant to reason. I admit that the alleged consequence would follow if the uniformity of the order of nature could be established as a necessary truth of reason. I therefore ask to see the premises fairly stated, as well as the logical process by means of which the asserted conclusion is deduced from them. I can obtain no answer from the "rationalists." I ask for proof from reason, or in accordance with reason, and I am told I must be contented with "probability," for the writer says—"How can the Bishop, after putting the case on the ground of reason pretend to treat questions of greater or lesser probability as collateral?" Several eminent writers are quoted to prove (what nobody doubted) the probability of the immutability of the order of nature. He then says—"So far is he (Dr. Brown) from thinking the laws of natural uniformity a mere assumption, he believes, like Dr. Thomson, that the vast preponderance of probability is on its side." This, as everybody could see, is simply evading the point really at issue. I did not want to know what any man, however great his authority might be, believed to be highly probable, I asked for a logical proof from the "rationalists" of the immutability of nature, on which the argument for the impossibility of miracles is supposed to rest; but hitherto I have asked in vain. They tell me, after
It certainly does appear rather too bad after this utter failure, after this ignominious retreat on his part, after confessing that he has no proof to adduce, that the writer should venture to say—"I repeat * anyone is at liberty to argue on rational grounds alone." He evidently has some misgiving as to the validity of his reasoning. After all his parade of authorities, and claim to have refuted my position; after his appeal to reason and to the inductive method, as decisive of the question under discussion, in reference to the ground on which the belief in the immutability of the order of nature rested, no one could have been prepared for the following humble appeal ad misericordiam—"Surely anyone by force of plain sense, can understand that the proper mental processes to employ in interpreting any phenomena of nature," &c.—(p. 21.) Here argument seems to be deliberately abandoned; and it is assumed that "anyone" can settle by "plain sense" (whatever in this connection that may mean,) a question which had perplexed philosophers until the subtle intellect of Hume solved the difficulty. This really is, as has been before said, an abandonment of reason and an appeal to ignorant prejudice. It sounds strange as coming from one who avows that he is dealing with the question from a rationalist's point of view.
At page 21, he apparently fails to see my object in bringing forward an argument attributed to Mr. Buskin, "that the uniformity of nature not being established, the most startling apparent departures from it would be attended by no evidential effect. He seems to think this puts me in a "dilemma." Had I thought so I need hardly have brought the passage to light. And the same may be said of the other passage quoted. The writer seems to forget,
Again, Mr. Mill's authority is quoted for the purpose of invalidating my argument. His words are—"The character of necessity * * attributed to mathematical truths is an illusion." I was quite aware of Mr. Mill's opinion on this subject, and therefore cautiously qualified what I said with the words—"as is generally admitted." Mr. Mill repudiates necessary truth altogether. Nevertheless the human mind recognizes a distinction between necessary and contingent truth. The writer alludes to the discovery of the planet Neptune as an evidence of the uniformity of the laws of nature. This will illustrate the distinction I maintain. Why were astronomers so highly gratified at this discovery? Was it not that additional evidence was thus obtained in confirmation of the truth of the law of gravity? But, let me ask, is any mathematician on the look out for fresh evidence to prove that two
At page 23, there is a very strange specimen of criticism. The writer says—"Is it seriously pretended that the putting into actum new natural laws (the italics are the writer's) by the agency of human volition as, e. g., by cutting down the forests, and thus acting through second causes, is the same thing as a 'miraculous suspension and interruption of some laws of nature?' Surely the fallacy could not mislead a child." I have heard of a newly discovered law; but who ever before heard of a "new natural
law?" But passing over this novel and unintelligible mode of dealing with the subject, where, in the passage referred to, have I said that "acting through second causes is the same thing" &c.? This is such an evident misrepresentation of what I did say, while merely endeavouring to "illustrate" an argument, complete in itself, but not to add to its force, that I shall leave it to the candid consideration of any reader who may take the trouble to refer to it. If the illustration affords no help, it certainly, as an illustration only, cannot weaken the argument.
I conclude, by again reminding the reader that I have been engaged only on an intellectual question. The assertion is constantly made that the immutability of the order of nature has been so absolutely proved, that a miracle, as such, is impossible. I have not now come forward to prove that a miracle is possible; but I deny the truth of the assertion that the immutability of the order of nature can be so proved, that its denial should involve either a contradiction or an obvious absurdity. Hitherto no such proof has been given. Till such proof has been given I shall continue to deem the assertion an idle boast. Reason may, or may not, be competent to the task of rendering miracles perfectly intelligible to the human mind,—a question I do not enter upon. But reason, at any rate, up to the present time has been able to refute all arguments advanced for the purpose of proving that they are impossible. This, I am aware, may by some be deemed a mere negative result. It is one, however, I venture to think, which may be productive of very important consequences.
Lyon and Blair, Printers, Lambton Quay, Wellington.
1.—"Habit makes everything easy and casts difficulties upon the deviation from a wonted course."—Lord Brougham.
2.—"A mind trained to reflect on consequences,.......... to guide conduct, and to forego immediate enjoyment for the sake of greater good to self or others, may be produced without reading or writing, and is a far nobler product of education than the mere power to read or write, however neat the penmanship, or correct the pronunciation."—Dr. Hodgson, at the Social Science Congress,
3.—"Instruction means communicating knowledge; education implies the repetition of certain modes of action until they have become habits............ 'Train up (educate) a child in the way he should go, and when he is old, he will not depart from it, says Scripture; but it does not promise the same result from merely instructing the child."—Geo. Combe, in his Essay on Education.
4.—"The power of enjoying the present without anticipation of the future or regard of the past, is the especial privilege of the animal nature, and of human nature in proportion as it has not been developed beyond the animal."—Geo. MacDonald in Robert Falconer.
5.—"What we contend for is this, that habits of prudence and forethought in money matters are far from being common, and that to endeavour to encourage them, is one of the most practical forms, which a really thoughtful benevolence can assume,............ that a large part of the suffering which we all deplore, is caused by want of habits of economy and forethought, and that the habit of saving, so as to be beforehand with the world, if it is to be acquired at all, must be acquired early."—Lord Derby, on Thrift.
6.—"To teach habits, is the very master power of education."—Mrs. W. Gray, at the British Association for the Advancement of Science,
7.—"Education means something more than merely learning lessons out of a book; and habits, early implanted, last longer even than leases, districts, or towns."—Quoted by Dr. Hodgson from John Hollingshead in Ragged London.
8.—"Never treat money affairs with levity: money is character."—Quoted by Smiles, in Self Culture, from Sir E. Bulwer Lytton.
9.—"Action in conduct and in work, is at once the practical expression of the character and the intellect, but find little room to show FröBel's Kindergarten Schools.
10.—"Lécole ne doit pas seulement instruire, elle doit aussi élever les enfants, et nous insistons sur l'épargne, comme moyen d'éducation, comme instrument de moralisation."—La Caisse D'Epargne dans les Ecoles de Gand.
11.—"The extent to which teaching and training can create habits of saving and self-denial, will be seen by comparing the conduct of a well informed and prudent man with that of the untutored savage............. We have no hesitation in enumerating this quality (habit of saving) among the virtues, inasmuch as its prevalence is indispensable for individual and national wellbeing."—Richard Dawes, M.A., Dean of Hereford.
Mr. J. G. Fitch, of London, one of her Majesty's Inspectors of Schools, on a recent visit to Ghent, made himself familiar with the details of a remarkable experiment now being carried on in connection with the schools of that city. The results of his observations he contributed in a paper to Macmillan's Magazine, and of which, the present pamphlet is an adaptation to suit the conditions of life in the Colony, as distinguished from those in England. Here and there, remarks have been suppressed or added as occasion seemed to require; or the phraseology has been merely altered by some slight turn of language to suit existing circumstances. The paper is now published with the desire of enlisting the active sympathy of all who are interested in the grand work of education, and more especially with the earnest hope that it may be the means of diverting attention to that particular phase of it which may be called "moral," the cultivation of which, in the school—to judge from the almost entire absence of allusion to it in the usual codes—is deemed unnecessary, or at least impracticable. By the introduction of the Savings-Bank into the school, an opportunity would be presented which, from information already gathered, the more intelligent of our teachers would gladly avail themselves of, as a means by which they could foster and encourage the formation of habits that would have a life-long influence for good, in those whose training has been committed to their care.
Mr. Fitch sets out by remarking that prudential warnings against thriftlessness and waste, have become so trite, and devices for encouraging the practice of saving are now so familiar to most of us, that a little diffidence may well be felt by one who ventures to again expatiate on this well-worn subject. Not only in the chief cities of the colony, but in remote townships
practice, during a period of six or seven years, over many times that number in endeavouring by precept merely, to bring about similar results. It is, in fact, a bright and happy illustration of the favourite motto—"Deeds, not Words."
Ghent is a thriving town of about 121,000 souls; it contains a Free (i.e., a non-clerical) University and many Primary Schools, which are said to be very efficient, and are under the supervision of a Communal Council. This Council, though it sustains the schools and periodically inspects them, does not dispense with voluntary aid, and two important societies—the Socété Callier and the Cercle pour l' Encouragement de l' Instruction Primaire—co-operate with the Council, by the offer of prizes is the schools and by various forms of stimulus and help to the teachers. Some seven years ago it occurred to M. Laurent, the Professor of Civil Law in the University, that much might be done through the agency of the Primary Schools to familiarize the people while young with habits of economy and forethought. Accordingly he called the teachers of the Ghent Public Schools together, explained to them his plans, and
By these simple arrangements the opportunity of making little savings was brought closely within reach of every child of the Ghent Schools, and the moral influences of gentle and kind persuasion were brought to bear by Professor Laurent and the teachers with singular success. The response made by the children and the parents to his appeals, has been marked during the last six years by an emphasis and a steady persistence, which are well deserving the attention of all who have the future well-being of the young people of New Zealand at heart.
The public schools of the city of Ghent fall into four classes: those most numerously attended are the Free Primary Schools, maintained in great part at the expense of the Communal Council. In these there are 4,315 boys and 3,674 girls, in all 7,989. Then there are the Ecoles Payantes, primary schools of the same educational character, but not gratuitous, and designed for children of a higher social rank. In these there are 1,079 scholars. In the Ecoles Gardiennes, or Free Infant
Thus the average sum now standing to the credit of each depositor is about 35 francs. It will be seen that relatively to the numbers, the largest success has been attained in the schools of the first class, the scholars in the ordinary juvenile schools being necessarily more amenable to influences of this kind than those of the second class, older and more thoughtful than those of the third, and with habits of extravagance which, if acquired at all, are less confirmed than those of the fourth. The work has been done without Government
A mutual friend had requested Professor Laurent to forward to a correspondent in New Zealand the latest intelligence concerning his interesting work. Writing in March of the present year, he says, "II m'est impossible de donner des renseignments statistiques sur le mouvement de l'épargne, puisque il se répand partout par une action individuelle sans l' intervention du gouvernement. Je sais seulement que l' épargne á l' école fonctionne duns les Pays Bas, dans le Grand Duché de Wurtemburg, en France, en Italie et dans quelques parties de l' Allemagne." Mr. Fitch also mentions in a recent fetter, that since the publication of his paper, every day brings him letters expressive of interest and of further enquiry concerning the movement. See also the Leisure Hour, for October of last year.
Belgium abounds with associations for promoting healthy recreation and amusement, as elements which tend to foster a sound moral tone among the labouring classes. Many of these societies seek to attain their object by means of rewards and scholarships, designed to encourage children to remain longer at school; others aim at the formation of workmen's clubs for historic readings and discussions, for simple theatrical
It is surely unnecessary to dwell on the significance of these humble but useful efforts in their bearing on our own social and industrial life in the colony. Our labouring classes are better paid than those of any other country, but they are not richer, perhaps with one exception—the ploughman or yearly agricultural servant—and they do not as a rule economise their resources, and a very small proportion of them make provision for the future. The same remarks may apply to numbers of tradespeople, and many others who regard their social standing as above that of either the tradesman or artisan. Reckless spending is the rule. Compared with Great Britain or the Continent of Europe, money is a plentiful commodity with everyone, but by very many never realized or capitalized in any of those permanent forms by which the dignity of family life is established and sustained. But until a man begins to care about this and some of the many substantial comforts and blessings which accumulated savings can alone procure, he has no motive to put forth his best energies to become a first-rate workman, a respected tradesman, or a confidential and trustworthy clerk, but every temptation to degenerate into a drunkard or a gambler. The degree with which a man cares about such things forms, in fact, the measure of his prosperity, and his self-respect is the surest guarantee for his future industry and happiness. With those who receive their income in the form of weekly wages, economy and
It is not in the natural order of things for employers, even when they see the need of frugality and temperance, to take measures for urging the duty upon those they employ. In this direction, in the home country, many and various efforts have been made, some employers going so far as to offer a bonus of so much per cent, over that allowed by the banks upon all sums deposited, but nowhere has the experiment succeeded. Motives, it is supposed, were misinterpreted, and the deposits that had been made on the first impressions were generally withdrawn. Perhaps, however, the true cause of failure might be attributed to the fact that, when first yielding to the proposals, the workmen acted under persuasion, not conviction—teaching had begun with them too late in life.
There is one class of teachers who might use their power to much advantage, and these are our ministers of religion; nor are we wholly without outspoken proof that the subject does not entirely escape their attention. At a recent public meeting at Tokomairiro, Otago, the Rev. Mr. Coffey, in speaking of the vice of intemperance, recommended the practicc of saving, as tending to lessen it. He said, "the joining of a benefit society would, he thought, encourage thrift, and to encourage thrift was to discourage vice. A benefit society by inculcating habits of saving, encouraged habits of self-control." The Rev. Mr. Stanford, in introducing resolutions for the discouraging of intemperance, at the meeting of the Anglican Synod, in Dunedin, in October last, used remarks to a similar effect. It must however be owned, that gen-
Messrs. Reith and Wilkie, Booksellers, Princes-street, Dunedin, have kindly agreed to procure a supply of these books.actual practice. All experience shows that it is hard to learn it for the first time in adult life, but if it be acquired in early life it will probably never be lost. Habit is second nature, and there is as much room for its exercise in the life of a child at school as in that of a grown man who is earning wages. To him, as well as to his elders, there are temptations to waste that might be resisted; there are frequent opportunities for little acts of forethought and self-restraint which ought to be embraced. It may seem a trifle to speak of pence which children spend in sweetmeats and other trash, but economy is essentially a matter of trifles, and even of petty details. Relatively to his resources and to his wants, these are the items which make up the extravagance of a child. The boy or girl who is encouraged to deny himself or herself some immediate
It may seem like special pleading to identify very high qualities too closely with so worldly a matter as the management of money; yet in truth there is no one problem or duty of life that calls into exercise so many moral attributes, or connects itself in so many subtle ways with the growth of the whole character. He who said "that a right habit of getting, of saving, "and of spending money argued a perfect man," was scarcely guilty of exaggeration. From the very beginning of responsible life the inclination to spend the whole of what we possess, becomes a potent temptation to spend or to enjoy a little more than we possess. And the records of our law courts and our police courts show that impecuniosity and extravagance are the parents not merely of much of the crime of the world, but of shiftiness, of evasion, of falsehood, and of the sins which enfeeble and degrade men most. The best remedy for this evil is to train children very early in the habits of distinguishing between real and unreal wants. "Artificial wants," says M. Laurent in his pamphlet, "which are at once the sore and the curse of riches, are not unknown among the humbler classes." Everyone who can refuse to satisfy one of these, however slight, or who puts aside any portion, however small, of the resources of to-day to make part of his supply for future use or enjoyment, is, in a sense, a capitalist; and in this sense not only every man and woman, but every boy and girl who has the command of a single luxury, should be encouraged to become a capitalist.
It may be argued that it is cruel and unwise to interfere with the joyousness of childhood by prematurely burdening the mind with thoughts of the future; but I do not believe that the objection, however natural on a first view, would long be seriously maintained by any careful thinker. The penurious spirit, the calculating,
Such is a sketch of the simple and judicious experiment initiated and carried forward by Professor Laurent and his friends in the Belgian schools. It may be considered as having passed its time of trial. As has been previously stated, it has been introduced to the Home public by Mr. Fitch, who earnestly recommends its imitation by the thoughtful and benevolent interested in the well-being of the rising population of Great Britain. In a like spirit it is now recommended to the consideration of the same classes of persons in New Zealand; more especially could it be wished that an active interest in it would be taken by our clergymen and teachers, in whose hands rest, it may be said, the training for good or evil of the great majority of our young people. In this movement we see an engine to mould of great might and strength. With the exception of the societies alluded to at the commencement of this paper, little or nothing has been done amongst us to foster and encourage the practice of thrift. Many of the members of these societies, we are aware, feel it as no small hardship to save for their weekly or monthly payments, notwithstanding the indisputable fact that the income of all of them is more, and of most, from two to four times greater, than that of which they were in receipt at home, and this also in the face of the necessaries of life being much less expensive. It arises, no doubt, from the single circumstance that the restraint necessary to save has been begun too late in life. What is needed is to make the
Dr. Hodgson deplores that in schools the subject should be almost ignored. He says that in the few
But to return to the subject proper of this paper, and to keep more to Mr. Fitch's remarks. Some may say that there are Post-office Savings-Banks everywhere, or at least, that they increase in number as townships make way in outlying districts. This is doubtless true, but it must be remembered that these banks themselves, however numerous, can never be brought close enough to the children while the habits of their life are in process of formation. Nor is it possible that the banks should ever receive sums so small as those by which the habit of saving must be formed. Let the habit be taught in the school, and when the child grows up he is already familiar with that truly useful institution: and this is a great step, indeed, more than half the battle gained.
The last report of the Postmaster-General shows that Savings-Banks were established in New Zealand on the
That great results can be accomplished with the aid of the teachers, even with the resources at the command of the scholars in the district schools, is manifest from the fact that upwards of 10,000 children in a single town, where the earnings of the parents are far below those of the colony, have saved sums averaging 30s. each. It is probable that very little, if any, of this money would have found its way to the bank but for the agency of the school. The work is one the success of which will much depend on the spontaneous efforts of the teachers, combined with those of the school committees, and the influence brought to bear upon children individually by benevolent and thoughtful people. Each province can now boast of a well-organized system of public instruction, but even with that there is still much room for the exercise of that personal zeal and that affectionate interest in the welfare of the scholars which have always characterized both the parochial and the voluntary systems in the old country, and for the exercise of such exertions, here is one field in which the
Fergusson & Mitchell, Printers, Princes Street, Dunedin
Based on the sounds, in Preference to the Letters, of the English Language, and practically applicable not only to Verbatim Reporting, but to the general purposes of ordinary Longhand Writing.
"Who that is much in the habit of writing has not often wished for some means of expressing, by two or three dashes of the pen, that which, as things are, it requires such an expenditure of time and labor to commit to paper? Our present mode of communication must be felt to be cumbersome in the last degree, unworthy of these days of invention. We require some means of bringing the operations of the Mind and of the Hand into closer correspondence.
— English Review."Shorthand, on account of its great and general utility merits a much higher rank among the Arts and Sciences than is generally allotted to it. Its usefulness is not confined to any particular science or profession, but is universal."
— Dr Samuel Johnson.
The above extract is, perhaps, a sufficient apology for introducing a system of Shorthand which the experience of twenty-nine years, and the practice of thousands of persons in England and America, embracing both private and professional circles, have shown to be eminently successful in "bringing the operations of the mind and of the hand into closer correspondence."
That system is known as Phonography, or Phonetic Shorthand, the invention of Mr Isaac Pitman. Its peculiarity is, that by shorthand characters it represents the sounds rather than the letters of the English language,—the characters themselves having at the same time a direct relation to the sounds, according to a just and philosophical analysis of the English tongue.
In one sense, then, Phonetic Shorthand may be said to present on paper a picture of the sounds by which, in conversation, we communicate our wishes, wants, or ideas, one to another. The result of this is obvious,—we read sounds, not letters, out of which we should have to try and elicit sounds.
Thus, by a well-considered and harmonious arrangement, perfect in all its parts, and discarding altogether the use of arbitrary characters, a Phonographic writer transfers to paper analogical signs or symbols of the very utterances which the speaker offers to the ear; and he effects this by an alphabet far less complex in its forms, and by the ease with which its straight and curved lines are struck, allowing greater freedom of hand, and yielding more graceful results, than any other system at present in use.
While in principle it satisfies even the critical, the adoption of sound for a basis (as developed in the Corresponding and Reporting styles of Phonetic Shorthand) has the following advantages:—
Simplicity.—By which the mind is saved from being burdened with a variety of signs and characters.
Brevity.—Enabling a practised writer to follow the swiftest distinct articulations of a speaker, at the rate of from 120 to 200 words per minute.
Legibility.—By which whatever is thus written can be read with the same ease as manuscript longhand, written at a corresponding rate of speed.
Universality.—By reason of its suitableness for the general purposes of our present system of longhand writing, quite independently of its proved excellence for professional reporting.
It is worthy of observation that Phonography is the only system of shorthand which has ever yet achieved a literature.
Various monthly magazines are lithographed in the shorthand characters, and circulate widely. To the initiated they are as legible as common print to ordinary readers. This circumstance, once estimated and considered, renders further comment superfluous.
To literary writers Phonography holds out advantages, the value of which can hardly be estimated. Thoughts and ideas are never perfected until they are clothed in words; but when so clothed, they should be secured. The more brilliant and beautiful a thought, the more fleeting and evanescent is its nature. The thoughts of genius are oftentimes like the spires of auroral light—they shoot up, and while you gaze, they fade and disappear. To secure them, if they are secured at all, we must catch them at the moment they spring into being. If they are obliged to dribble from the nib of a slow, struggling, longhand pen, most of them die and become cold, and many are entirely lost. All this great waste of intellectual wealth would be checked if our literary writers availed themselves of Phonography. They would also save a vast amount of time now consumed in making memoranda and extracts.
Physicians, too, would find the art of shorthand of great value in making a full and exact record of the diagnosis of each case immediately on leaving the sick room. Oftentimes a physican is constantly engaged through the day, and sometimes far into the night, in making visits to his patients, so that he scarcely has time to make as full a record as he would like By using shorthand this might easily be done; and thus benefit would accrue to the public, and the cause of medical knowledge be advanced.
Again, clergymen would be entirely relieved from the drudgery of the pen if they could write their sermons in Phonography, and deliver them from the phonographic notes. This, however, has already been done so often that it no longer requires demonstration.
To Ladies, Phonography is recommended as a pleasing, useful, and improving accomplishment. The facility with which it may be written, renders it a most delightful medium for correspondence;
Like most other systems, however, when involving principles entirely new, it has met, and will perhaps yet meet, with some who, without investigation, will at first think lightly of its claims (and from among these, conviction has gained, and will yet gain, more than one apostle for the cause); but, once fairly studied, its excellence becomes apparent, and the beauty of its pervading principle delights, while its practical application confirms all the hopes which so true a theory at first excited.
Of the utility of shorthand for educational purposes, little need be said, so evident have at all times been its tendencies "in improving the memory, exciting invention, maturing the judgment, inculcating habits of regularity and order, and training the mind and hand to precision, vigilance, and perseverance."
Such are the benefits which observant minds beheld even in the imperfect systems of former days. How much more extensively may we not hope to see them developed and applied in a system, the superior excellence of which has for a considerable time been permanently established! Here again the words of Mr Moat may not be out of place. Though in his system he concentrated the result of five and thirty years' attention to the subject, he nevertheless looked forward to a time when the Art would arrive at a much higher degree of perfection than it could then pretend to. He says:—
"When such a system shall appear, it will be the nation's honor (as it must be its pride,) which gave it birth, to foster it with parental care, and make it generally useful by introducing it as a necessary branch of modern education."
Of its value, in a public point of view, each day is in itself a sufficient record. A morning paper, with the parliamentary debates of the night before continued down to, perhaps, an early hour on that same morning, is a fact too plain and palpable to require many words in proof of the assertion that "Shorthand, like a generous benefactor, bestows blessings indiscriminately on the world at large." We need only add, with Mr Gawtress:—
"Were the operations of those who are professionally engaged in exercising this art to be suspended but for a single week, a blank would be left in the political and judicial history of our country, an impulse would be wanting to the public mind, and the nation would be taught to feel and acknowledge the important purposes it answers in the great business of life."
The Reading and Writing Reform consists in the introduction of a phonetic alphabet of thirty-eight letters, to represent all the sounds of the English language. This alphabet is adapted to Shorthand and Longhand Writing, and to Printing. Phonetic Shorthand is as legible as common writing; while it is written in one-fourth of the time, and with half the labour. By means of Phonetic Printing, children and ignorant adults may be taught to read accurately in phonetic books, in from twenty to fifty hours' instruction; and a few lessons will then render them capable of reading books printed in the common spelling. The education of the poor is thus rendered not only possible, but easy.
Books of the value of 1s. and upwards are sent post free: on books under 1s., postage is charged at the rate of ½d. for 2oz.
The books recommended to the student on commencing the study of Phonetic Shorthand, are the Phonographic Teacher and Copy Book.
See Pitman's Complete Catalogue of Phonetic Publications.
London: Fred. Pitman, 20 Paternoster row, E.C.
Bath: Isaac Pitman, Phonetic Institute.
The Directors are much pleased in meeting the Shareholders, and being able again to congratulate them on the steady and satisfactory progress made by the Society, as evidenced by the annexed Balance Sheet.
Since the last Annual Meeting 771 fresh Shares have been issued. There has been advanced on mortgages, £11,211 15s.; by way of loans on security of Shares, £637; and refunded to with drawers and investing Members on becoming borrowers, £1213 1s. 11d.
After discounting accruing repayments, crediting investors with interest at the rate of 10 per cent., and providing for contingent liabilities, there remains a net profit, to be carried to credit of contingent fund, of £1319 10s. The amount to credit of this fund is now £1835 16s.
The sound position of the Society has enabled the Directors to obtain money on debentures, at the rate of 8 per cent, per annum. By this means a profit of 2 per cent, per annum has accrued to the Society on the money so borrowed, which accounts in some measure for the large surplus profit made this year.
It is also noteworthy that the entire expense of management (£244 4s.) has been covered by the commissions on loans, fines, entry money, &c., without any charge to the ordinary profits.
Great care has been exercised by your Directors in the selection of securities, and they feel confident that no loss need be apprehended through insufficient security. They have been greatly aided in their duties by the care and attention exercised by the Secretary; and considering the increase of work entailed on that officer in consequence of the increase of Members, they recommend that an advance be made in his salary.
Messrs. Bagley and Campbell are the two retiring Directors for the present year. Retiring Members are eligible for re-election.
(Established March, 1807.)
Registered under the "Building and Land Societies' Act,
Offices: Princes Street, Next Bank of Otago.
Entrance Fee, 2s. 6d. per Share; Transfer Fee, 6d. per Share.
The shares of this society will he of the ultimate value of £25, to be realised by Monthly Subscriptions of 4s. per Share, and interest thereon at the rate of ten per cent, per annum, to be accumulated till the Shares are fully realised (about seven years.)
This Society has been established on the Permanent Principle. Advances to Members are not determined by competition, nor are Borrowers charged more than will defray the cost of management, and pay Investors a fair rate of interest on the amount of their Subscriptions. The surplus Profits (if any) are carried to the credit of a Contingent Fund, and any accumulation thereof may, at the discretion of the Directors, be divided equitably and equally, at the end of every Five Years from the commencement of the Society, between Borrowers and Investors by way of Bonus. At the Annual Balance in
The Rules will be found to have been carefully compiled on the bases of similar Societies in the Home country (so far as applicable to the colony.)
The mode of taking securities for Advances to Members, while effectually securing the Society against the possibility of loss, is such as to entail the least possible expense to Borrowers. And provision has been made to enable Investors to borrow money on security of Shares of not less than two years standing.
Discount at the rate of 5 per cent, per annum will be allowed on payments made in advance for periods of not less than six months. Any Shareholder withdrawing is entitled to receive the full amount of Subscriptions and Profits standing to his credit in the books of the Society, on payment of 5s. per Share withdrawal fee.
Shares may be taken up at any time. Subscriptions to commence from date of entry; and the owners of realised Shares will be paid out in rotation, according to the dates of their respective entries.
This Society has now been established for the space of three years, during which time 2666 Shares have been taken up; and substantial securities for advances have been accepted to the extent of £19,892 10s.
A commission of 1 per cent. is charged on Advanced.
Provision has been made for the establishment of Agencies in Country Districts.
The extension and good honest management of such Societies, . . if less tainted with the spirit of realizing a large percentage, would, in a short time, greatly promote the comfort, social happiness, and independence of the working classes. If, through these Societies, by means of easy weekly payments, a freehold site for a garden and a house, and money sufficient for the erection of the latter, can be procured, what is there but the want of prudence, self-denial, and good management, to prevent many artisans from living in their own houses, digging in their own gardens, and doing that which Charles II. said was the best preservative of health—taking exercise every morning on their own land?—Chambers's Papers For The People, No. 87.
1. The Society shall be established under the provisions of an Act of the General Assembly of New Zealand, entitled "The Building and Land Societies' Act, Standard Property Investment Society, and shall have for its object the raising, by Monthly Subscriptions, a stock or fund for the purpose of enabling any Member to receive out of the same the amount or value of his shares on security of real or leasehold estate, to be secured by mortgage to the Society for the purpose of securing the repayments, &c., by these Rules provided, and to facilitate the accumulation of small sums of money for those purposes, and others provided for in the following Rules.
2. Each Member, on admission, shall pay an Entrance Fee of 2s. 6d. per share.
3. The Shares of the Society shall be of the ultimate value of £25 each.
4. Minors (with the consent of their parents or guardians) may become investing Members of the Society; but shall not be allowed to vote or hold any
5. Females (not being married) may also become Members; but shall not be entitled to vote or hold any office.
6. Each Member shall be entitled to a Certificate, in the Form No. 2, of the Share or Shares held by him, signed by two Directors, and countersigned by the Secretary.
7. Monthly Subscriptions, and all redemption payments, fines, and other payments due under these Rules, shall be paid at the office of the Society, Princes-street, Dunedin, between the hours of six and eight o'clock on the evening of the first Wednesday in each month.
8. The Subscriptions for each Share shall be four shillings per month, to commence and be paid on the first Wednesday in the month in which, or next after which, the Member shall be admitted, in respect of each Share, on which day the Subscriptions shall be deemed to be due and payable.
9. Payments may be made in advance, on which discount at the rate of five per cent, per annum will be allowed for periods of not less than six months.
10. The fines for the non-payment of monthly subscriptions shall be fourpence per share per month during the first half-year the same may be in arrears; eightpence per share per month during the second half-year; one shilling per share per month during the third half-year; and so on, increasing fourpence per share per month for every succeeding half-year. And any Shareholder continuing to neglect the payment of his subscriptions until the fines incurred thereby shall equal all the payments actually paid by him, shall thereupon cease to be a Shareholder, and shall forfeit all his interest in the Society. The fines on nonpayment of redemption payments shall be calculated in the same proportion, and increase at the same rates, as for non-payment of subscriptions.
11. All Shares on which the entry-money only has been paid shall be deemed to be forfeited in two months after the same have been taken up.
12. The business of the Society shall be conducted by the Directors, Trustees, Auditors, Solicitor, and Secretary.
13. Seven Directors shall be elected by the Shareholders at the first General Meeting of the Society, of whom two shall retire annually, but shall be eligible for re-election.
14. Any vacancy occurring in the course of the year shall be filled up by the remaining Directors, but every person elected by the Directors shall retire at the first ensuing Annual Meeting of the Society.
15. A list shall be kept by the Secretary, of the order in which Directors are elected; and the retiring Members shall be struck off from the top of the list.
16. At the first Meeting of the Directors, after their election, they shall elect one of their own body as President for the current year; and in the event of his absence at any of the subsequent Meetings of the Directors or Society, a Chairman, for the evening, shall be appointed by the Directors present.
17. Two Directors shall attend, in rotation, every subscription night, and shall keep a check on the Secretary.
18. A General Meeting of the Directors shall be held on each subscription night, but the Secretary may call a Special Meeting of the Directors at any time he may consider necessary; four shall be a quorum, and the President, or in his absence the Chairman presiding, shall have a deliberative as well as a casting vote.
19. The Directors shall have power to examine and decide upon the securities offered by any Member for an advance; to order all sums of money to be paid;
20. The Directors shall be paid for their services, and fined for non-attendance, as may be agreed to by the Shareholders.
21. Any Director may be held to have resigned his office, if absent from two consecutive Meetings of the Directory.
22. If the Directors shall deem it advantageous to the Society to borrow money for the purposes of the Society, it shall be lawful for them to do so; provided the amount so borrowed at any one time does not exceed the prospective amount of six months' receipts.
23. All monies belonging to the Society shall be lodged in the names of the Trustees of the Society, in such bank as the Directors may from time to time appoint; and all drafts on the Society's Bankers shall be countersigned by the President.
24. Thomas Dick, George Turnbull, and William Hunter Reynolds shall be the Trustees of the Society; and, in case of the death or resignation of any or all of the before-named Trustees, the Directors shall cause to be called a Special Meeting of the Shareholders, who may then appoint a Trustee or Trustees in his or their stead; and all the interest and power of
25. All deeds, writings, and securities, to and from the Society shall be made and taken in the name of the Trustees for the time being; those in favor of the Society shall be deposited in a box or iron chest, to be lodged with the Society's Bankers, or such person as the Directors may appoint.
26. The Trustees shall not be answerable for the other or others of them, or for the acts, deeds, neglects, or defaults of the other or others of them; but each of them only for his own acts, deeds, neglects, or defaults, respectively; and they or any of them shall not be accountable for any banker or other person with whom any part of the money or property belonging to this Society shall be deposited, or for any misfortune, loss, or damage which may happen in the execution of the powers and trusts herein contained, or in relation thereto, except the same shall happen by or through their own wilful default, respectively.
27. In case it shall be necessary or expedient to bring or defend any action, suit, or other proceedings, at law or in equity, touching or concerning the property or assets, rights, or claims of the Society, or
28. If upon the resignation of any Trustee or Trustees, he or they shall require a bond or other deed of release and indemnity from the Society, securing him or them from all future liability on account thereof, such bond or deed the Directors for the time being are hereby authorised to execute and deliver, signed by the President and two of their number, for and on account and behalf of all the Shareholders of this Society, and which shall be as effectual to bind the Society, as if made, executed, and delivered by each Member thereof.
29. At every Annual Meeting of the Society, one Auditor shall be appointed by the Shareholders, and one by the Directors, who shall audit the Accounts for the ensuing year. The Auditors for the first year shall be appointed by the Directors.
30. A Solicitor or Legal Agent shall be appointed by the Directors, who shall examine the title deeds of all
31. A Surveyor, or Valuator, may be appointed by the Directors, who shall examine all properties on which his opinion may be required; and within one week after he has been requested to value any property, he shall report thereon, in writing, to the Directors: he shall receive such remuneration for his services as the Directors may agree upon. Such remuneration shall be paid by the Member whose property has been examined by such Surveyor or Valuator.
32. A properly qualified person shall be appointed by the Society to act as Secretary, who shall receive such salary as the Society may appoint. He shall also act as Treasurer, pay into the bank on the day after collection all monies received by the Society, sign all cheques
33. The Directors shall, once in every year, prepare, or cause to be prepared, a General Statement of the funds and effects of the Society, specifying in whose custody the said funds or effects are then remaining, together with an account of all sums of money received and expended on account of the Society since the preceding Annual Statement; and every such Annual Statement shall be attested by the two Auditors, and countersigned by the Secretary, and every Member shall be entitled to receive a copy of such Statement.
34. The books of the Society shall be brought to a balance, and the profits ascertained as on the subscription meeting day in the month of March, in each year; such profits shall be placed to the credit of investing Shareholders to an extent not exceeding ten per cent, per annum on the amount then standing to their credit
35. The surplus of such profits, if any, shall be carried to an account, to be called The Contingent Fund, from which shall be defrayed all losses or expenses which the Society may sustain or incur; and in the event of any accumulation of such Contingent Fund, after providing for all liabilities, the same shall be appropriated and credited equitably and equally at the expiry of every five years from the commencement of the Society, between the investing and borrowing Members, by way of bonus, in proportion to the amount of the subscriptions or repayments actually paid to the Society. But if the Directors shall consider it for the wellbeing of the Society to set apart the whole, or any portion of such fund for future contingencies, they shall have the power to do so.
36. The President of the Directors shall act as Chairman of all Meetings of the Society. The Monthly Meetings, for receiving subscriptions and other payments under these Rules, will be held at the office of the Society, Princes-street, Dunedin, between the hours of 6 and 8 o'clock on the evening of the first Wednesday in each month. The Annual General Meeting of the Society shall be held at such time and place as the Directors may appoint for that pur-
37. A Special Meeting of the Society may be held from time to time, and at any time the Directors may appoint. It shall be competent for seven or more Shareholders to sign a requisition to the President to convene a Special Meeting of the Society; and the President shall do so by advertisement in two consecutive numbers of any local newspaper or newspapers. But should a majority of the Shareholders, so convened, decide that the Meeting has been called on insufficient and frivolous grounds, the parties calling it shall bear the expense thus occasioned. The object of every Special Meeting shall always be distinctly stated, both in the requisition and notice; and no business shall then be entered upon except that for which the Meeting has been convened.
38. Twenty Members shall be a quorum at any General or Special Meeting. It shall be in the power of the Society, at any such General or Special Meeting, to appoint a committee of Shareholders for any special purpose. Each Shareholder present shall have one
39. All decisions that may be come to by a majority of Shareholders present at any Meeting, provided such decisions are in conformity with these Rules, shall be binding upon all the Shareholders.
40. The Society will make advances to its Members, for terms of five, seven, ten, or twelve years, repayable by monthly, quarterly, or yearly contributions, at the rates mentioned in Rule 42.
41. Trustees obtaining advances from the Society on property which they hold in trust, shall not be in any manner personally or otherwise liable beyond the property given in security to the Society; but all fines and other payments made payable by these Rides shall be a charge on the property mortgaged.
42. Redemption payments for the Loan of £100, including Interest.
43. Upon every such advance a commission of one per cent, shall be charged.
44. All advances of Shares to Members shall be under the management of the Directors, and shall be determined at their Monthly or Special Meetings.
45. Every Member entitling himself to an advance by a written notice to the Secretary in the Form No. 3, shall thereon lodge with the Secretary a sum of One Pound per Share as a deposit, and in part payment of the monies payable on such advance; and in the event of his failing within one month (unless the time shall be extended by the Directors) from the receipt of notice from the Secretary, in writing, that the Directors have agreed to make the required advance, to execute a mortgage to the Society, the money so deposited shall be forfeited to the Society, and the Directors shall be at liberty to employ the funds, reserved for such Member making such default, in the payment of advances to other Members; and the application of such defaulting Member shall lapse.
46. Members to whom advances have been allocated may, if they think fit, continue to hold their investing Shares.
47. If any person shall be desirous of ascertaining the amount which the Directors would be willing to advance on any proposed security in the event of his
48. Whenever any property mortgaged to the Society shall be subject to any ground-rent, assessment, taxes, or other payment, the mortgagor shall produce to the Secretary a receipt or acknowledgment therefor respectively within fourteen days after the same shall have become due and payable; or in default thereof, the mortgagor shall pay a fine of five shillings. And in case any of the said payments shall not be duly made within such period as aforesaid, the Directors may order the same to be paid out of the funds of the Society, and the mortgagor shall repay the same, together with the said fine, on the next Monthly Subscription Meeting; and in default of the payment thereof accordingly, he shall be fined in addition thereto, as for an equal amount of repayments in arrear.
49. All buildings held in security by the Society shall be kept in repair by the mortgagor; and in all cases where houses or buildings are taken by the Society in security, the same shall be kept insured by
50. When any Shareholder, who has obtained an advance upon property, allows his repayments, or any disbursements made on his account, to fall three months in arrear, it shall be in the power of the Trustees or Directors to remove him from the possession or occupancy of the property on which the advance has been made, to enter into possession thereof themselves, to let the same, and to draw the rents thereof, and that by a letter under the hand of the Secretary, addressed to such Shareholder, intimating the same, without any other warning or legal process whatever; of which intimation a certificate under the hand of the Secretary, that such letter was either delivered to
51. In the event of the Trustees or Directors entering into possession, they shall have power to appoint a person to draw the rents at the expense of the Shareholder. When any Shareholder who has obtained an advance upon property allows his repayments or any disbursement made on his account to fall in arrear, he shall forfeit all his interest in, and right and claim to, the said property; and the Trustees or Directors shall be at liberty, without any process of law, forthwith to advertise the same for public sale in such paper or papers, and for such number of times, as they shall think fit, and thereafter to sell such property by public auction; the proceeds of such sale to go to liquidating all the Society's claim against such Shareholder, and any balance remaining shall be handed to the Shareholder having so forfeited the property.
52. The Directors shall not be bound to accept of partial payments on account of such arrears or disbursements.
53. Any Member desirous to redeem his property from a mortgage to the Society before the expiration of
54. The Directors may advance by way of loan to Shareholders in this Society, being investors, such sums of money as they may think fit, upon security of Shares of not less than two years' standing, for such term, at such rate of interest, and on such conditions as they may deem proper; provided that no such advance or loan shall exceed 75 per cent, of the amount standing to the credit of such. Member in respect of such Shares, and that the interest charged thereon shall not be less than 12½ per cent, per annum.
55. The Member receiving such loan shall transfer the Shares, on which such loan or advance is to be made to the joint names of the President and Treasurer of the Society for the time being, as security for the repayment of such loan or advance, and shall receive from the Secretary an acknowledgment thereof, in the Form No. 5. And in case any borrower shall make default in the repayment of such loan or any
56. So soon as any Shareholder, who has received an advance, shall have repaid the whole instalments, fines, and other payments, incurred in respect thereof, or shall redeem his property, in accordance with Rule 53, the Trustees shall deliver up to such Shareholder, or to his legal representative, the title deeds and other documents which shall have been deposited with them by such Shareholder, and shall execute, at the expense of such Shareholder, a reconveyance and release of the mortgaged property.
57. Any Shareholder holding investing Shares shall be entitled to withdraw from the Society before the full sum of £25 per Share stands to his credit in the books of the Society; and shall be entitled to receive the amount of the subscriptions actually paid by him to the Society upon such Shares, together with the profits standing to his credit in the books of the Society, as at the immediately preceding annual balance. And if a Member
58. A fee of five shillings shall be charged on each Share withdrawn, unless the Member withdrawing is about to take up an advance.
59. Applications for withdrawal shall be considered and granted by the Directors in the order of priority of the dates on which these applications shall have been received by the Secretary, and payment shall be made to such applicants as soon as the Directors shall have sufficient funds at their disposal for that purpose, and not otherwise. In calculating interest, fractional parte of pounds or months shall not be taken into account, neither will fractional parts of a penny be paid.
60. If at any time the Directors shall be unable to dispose advantageously of the Society's funds, they may appoint a ballot to take place, at such time, and in such form as they may prescribe, to determine whose investing Shares shall be withdrawn. The Shareholder on whom the lot shall fall shall be obliged to accept the amount standing to his credit, as at the
61. Shares of the Society, on which no advance has been made, shall be deemed to be personal estate; and on the death of a Shareholder holding the same, such Share or Shares shall belong to his or her executors, with all the benefits, and under all the conditions thereto attached.
62. Upon the death of a Shareholder holding Shares on which an advance has been made, the party having right to the property in respect of which the advance has been made shall be deemed to be the Shareholder, and shall be liable to fulfil the whole obligations incumbent on such deceased Shareholder at the time of his death.
63. In the event of any Shareholder (not having received an advance) becoming a lunatic, and proof of the same being furnished to the Directors, they shall instruct the Secretary to intimate to the legal guardians or representatives of such Shareholder that they are entitled to withdraw from the Society at the end of
64. Any Shareholder, with the sanction of the Directors, shall be at liberty to sell or transfer his Share or Shares, on payment of sixpence per Share Transfer Fee. All transfers must be in the Form No. 4, signed by the transferror and transferree and shall not be valid until duly recorded.
65. Three months after the Shares of Members are realised, they shall be entitled to be paid out in rotation, according to the dates of their respective entries.
66. To facilitate the admission of Members residing in the country, and the payment of their subscriptions,
67. Every application for the recognition of an Agent must be made by at least six Members in any one district, holding collectively not less than thirty Shares.
68. The Directors shall have power to make all necessary arrangements relative to such appointments, but the Society shall not be responsible for the failure of any Member's Agent to remit or account, and no monies will be entered to the credit of any Member's account until actually received by the Secretary.
69. The Books of the Society shall be open for the inspection of Members on each meeting night during the hours of receiving subscriptions.
70. Any Shareholder who may feel aggrieved by the decision of the Directors may appeal from their decision to the Annual General Meeting of the Society.
71. Every matter in dispute between the Society, or any person acting under the Society, and any Shareholder or Member thereof, or any person claiming on account of any Member, shall be referred to
72. In construing these Rules every word importing the singular number shall, where necessary, be understood to mean several persons or things, as well as one person or thing; and every word importing the masucline gender shall, where necessary, be understood to mean a female, as well as a male; the word "Directors" shall mean the Committee of Management, unless in any of these cases there be something in the context inconsistent with such meaning; the word "month" shall be held to be a calendar month; and the word "year" shall mean the Society's year ending on the first Wednesday in March.
SIR—Please register my name as a Subscriber for Shares in the above Society, for which I enclose the Entrance Fee of Two Shillings and Sixpence per Share.
This is to certify, that_______of_______is the Proprietor of_______Shares of the value of £25 each, in the Capital Stock of the Standard Property Investment Society, subject to the payment of Subscriptions and other Liabilities, according to the Rules of the Society, which may from time to time be in force.
Sir—I hereby request you to register my name as an applicant for an advance of £_______, being the value of Shares in the above Society; repayable by instalments, in_______years.
Dated this_______day of_______18
Name...........................................
Profession.............................................
Residence...............................................
What does the Property consist of?
Nature of buildings, if any?
Situation?
Tenure?
If Leasehold, amount of Ground-rent per annum?
When, and to whom Payable?
Is the Property subject to a prior Mortgage?
I_______of_______a Shareholder in the Standard Property Investment Society, in consideration of the sum of_______, paid to me by_______, of, do hereby assign and transfer to the said Executors, Administrators, and Assigns_______Share_______No._______of and in the funds of the said Society, subject to the several rules, obligations, and conditions under which I hold the same at the time of the execution hereof. And I the said do hereby agree to accept the said Share_______subject to the same rules, obligations, and conditions.
As witness our hands, this_______day of_______18
I Hereby acknowledge that_______Shares, numbered
have been this day transferred by
to the President and Treasurer of the Standard Property Investment Society, as security for the payment of the sum of £_______on the_______day of_______next, and the said Shares are subject to the provision of Nos. 54 and 55 of the Rules of the Society.
Dated this_______day of_______18
I Hereby give you notice that at a Special Meeting of the_______Members of the said Society, held on the_______day of_______instant, for the purpose of balloting for the compulsory withdrawal of Shares, the ballot fell on you for the withdrawal of one Share No._______for which you are entitled to receive the sum of £_______and I have a cheque in my hands to that amount on the Society's Bankers at your disposal.