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I present you with this Memorial of your Father's work, not only in testimony of the love I bore him and the reverence in which I hold his memory, but in the hope that it may stimulate you to emulate a career of usefulness which was curtailed only by bodily infirmity. I regret that these few papers,—clear in thought, just in judgment, and resolute in action, as they declare the writer to have been,—should still depict so feebly that greatness of character which won the admiration and trust of his intimate friends, and which, had he been granted health and long life, we doubt not the world would one day have recognised.
The following brief sketch of the subject of this volume has been taken, with few amendments, from a memoir of Mr. Godley, which appeared in the 'Press' newspaper of the 29th June, 1862, published at Christchurch in New Zealand.
Of the seventeen thousand souls who now inhabit this Province of Canterbury, not more than one fourth had made it their home, when the great man who is the subject of this memoir sailed for England in the month of December 1852. Even of that number comparatively few had had the opportunity of that personal intimacy which reveals the mind and character of a man to his friends: and yet there is probably not one amongst us to whom the name of Mr. Godley is not known, and by whom it is not revered, as the founder of the Canterbury Association and of this Province of the colony of New Zealand.
John Robert Godley was the eldest son of Mr. Godley of Killigar, a gentleman of good landed property in the country of Leitrim, in Ireland, His mother was a sister of the Right Rev. Robert Daly, Bishop of Cashel. He was born in the year 1814: and was sent first to Mr. Ward's preparatory school at Iver, and thence to Harrow, where he was the successful candidate for the Sayers Scholarship in 1831. He declined to avail himself of the honor awarded to him, as he wished to go to Oxford, and in the
After leaving the University, he studied for the law, and was called to the English bar. He held, however, but few briefs, regarding the practice of his profession with less interest than its principles, with which he was thoroughly conversant: that part, especially, of a legal education which bears upon the science of politics, he had deeply studied: politics, in the highest and widest sense of the term; not as applied to the dogmas of party in one country and in one age, but as involving the art of governing men under various circumstances and different social conditions,—this was his peculiar study; and that, not merely in the library and the office, but by personally observing the operation and effect of government in various countries. He travelled not only in those European States which most English gentlemen visit, but in Norway and Sweden; and a book which he published at an early age upon America, shewed how attentively he had observed men and things in the course of a visit to Canada and the United States.
His 'Letters from America,' which were published by Murray in 1844, speedily attracted the notice of political men on both sides of the Atlantic, from the ability and independence of thought they evinced.
The first step which brought him into notice as a public man, was the preparation of a plan for meeting the awful crisis of the Irish famine by a large scheme of emigration. His proposal was to borrow a large sum of money, we believe about ten millions; to locate a million persons in a district in Canada to be set apart for the purpose; to charge the debt upon the landed property of Ireland, and to provide for the interest by an income tax: the income tax at that time not extending to Ireland. The proposal was explained and elaborated in a memorial to the Prime Minister, which appeared in the 'Spectator,' and was much criticized by the leading journals. It obtained the extraordinary success of being approved by men of all parties, and received the signatures of a very large number of the nobles and gentry of Ireland of all creeds, and of every shade of opinion; a unanimity very rare at that time in that country. The Minister pondered over the scheme for ten days, and finally rejected it. It was too large an experiment for a government which never really believed in the full extent of the Irish famine until it came with all its horrors on that ill-fated country. Mr. Godley proposed to convey a million souls to Canada: more than a million lay down and died, and a still larger number emigrated to the United States before that terrible crisis had passed.
Mr. Godley attended zealously to all local county business when required, as a Magistrate, Grand Juror, and Poor Law Guardian, and in 1847
There was another reason why Mr. Godley's defeat may be regarded as a fortunate event. The fatal disease, which crippled his remarkable powers during the last ten years of his life, had begun to make its appearance, and an affection in the throat rendered the task of speaking in public, and often even in private, difficult and painful. Looking to his
The event which probably exercised the most important influence upon Mr. Godley's life was his introduction, we believe somewhere about this time, to that remarkable man who exercised so great an influence over all who came within the sphere of his powers—we mean Mr. Edward Gibbon Wakefield. Mr. Wakefield had already been attracted by Mr. Godley's work upon America; and Mr. Godley, on the other hand, had studied with intense admiration the vigorous writings of the most eminent writer upon colonization. The result of this acquaintance was the scheme for founding Canterbury. Mr. Wakefield—whose continued ill health and long seclusion from public life entitles us to speak of him as of one who is gone Mr. Wakefield died at Wellington, since this memoir was written, on
During the two years in which Canterbury was being created, Mr. Godley was a regular contributor to the columns of the 'Morning Chronicle,' a journal at that time esteemed the principal authority upon all colonial questions. None who remember the state of Canada
It is not our wish in this brief memoir to enter further into the history of these times than is necessary to explain the part which Mr. Godley took; but, as he was at the time subjected to some unkindly criticism for his long residence at Wellington in 1850, it is necessary to enter somewhat fully into the circumstances which led to it. The whole scheme of the Canterbury settlement was founded upon the idea that funds would be provided, by the sale, in England, of the waste lands in the colony, sufficient to provide for the engagements into which the Association had entered with the New Zealand Company on the one hand, and with the colonists on the other. The large sales of land effected at the founding of Wellington and Nelson, afforded reasonable ground to hope that there would be no difficulty in raising money in a similar manner at Canterbury. When Mr. Godley thousands and tens of thousands, to save the scheme from ruin. When we look back at those times, and ask what motive could have operated to stimulate these not foolish or imprudent men into liberality so unwonted in our commercial days—what it was, which induced men, by no means rich for their position in life, to lay down such large sums when they could have had but a very dim and uncertain prospect of any return, and when the idea of profit was never dreamt of—there is but one answer; and we
It was owing to these circumstances that the colonists, who were to have sailed in the spring, did not sail till the autumn; and that Mr. Godley, who, when he started, had no idea that the funds in the colony had been exhausted, found himself absolutely penniless, and without the power of taking any step whatever in furtherance of the object for which he had come to the colony. The order to stop all expenditure at Lyttelton was one of simple honesty; because every bill which he must have drawn must have been met out of the private resources of the members of the Association, or have been dishonored. Until the land sales began there was absolutely no means of knowing whether the colony would ever become a reality at all. Mr. Godley therefore saw that he had no duty but to wait; so he went Wellington, and there bided the course of events.
But political inaction, when there was work to be done, was an impossibility to him. The year 1850 was an important one in the history of Wellington and of the colony. Sir George Grey, the then Governor, had two years before suspended the constitution of Lord Grey, and was virtually the despotic ruler of the colony. He was conducting the government at Wellington, and had come there mainly for the purpose of inducing the people to accept a form of constitution which he had devised, and wished to propose in the place Lord Grey's, The question for or against the proposed constitution was under discussion when Mr. Godley arrived. He at once took a strong part against it. It seemed to him a sham, and that it would secure no real constitutional government to the people. The whole vigor of his mind was lent to the work of defeating the proposal of the Governor, with what success we all know: the sham constitution was rejected, and the old form of government lasted until Sir J. Pakington's Bill was passed in 1852. In November 1850 he was called from Wellington by the intelligence that the first colonists had sailed for Canterbury in the September of that year; and he at once took up his abode at Lyttelton to await their arrival.
From the 16th December, 1850, to the 1st December, 1852, when he sailed for England, he was, in all but the name, the governor of the settlement which he had originated and formed. Such a career is not granted
It would be unfair were we to avoid mentioning some of the difficulties—it may perhaps be said the mistakes which he committed—in his New Zealand career. It was a matter most deeply regretted by all, that in consequence of some disagreement between himself and Captain Thomas, the first Agent and Surveyor of the Association, Mr. Godley was compelled to remove him from his office. We mention this solely for the purpose of adding that, in 1859, Captain Thomas, who was then in London, called upon Mr. Godley at the War Office, and expressed in the most frank and generous manner his regret for his share in that disagreement. The result of that interview was a complete and entire reconciliation and a long conversation, mutually
The first step which Mr. Godley found himself called on to take in the colony was to reverse the land regulations of the Association, as regarded the occupation of unsold land for squatting purposes. The original regulations of the Canterbury Association contemplated the occupation of the land under lease, as a privelege attaching solely to the purchasers of land. No sooner had the settlers landed, than colonists from Australia began to arrive with their flocks and herds, and to claim runs, on which to depasture their stock, after the usual Australian manner. Mr. Godley felt at once that a great practical difficulty had arisen. He had no power to grant these runs, and he plainly saw that it would be ruinous to the interests of the new-born settlement to drive away the capital and the colonial intelligence and experience which was being imported from the neighbouring colonies. He took upon him at once to reverse the regulations of the Association and to establish new ones applicable to the circumstances of the colony. But even then, he would not violate the most cherished political principle of his life
Amongst other difficulties which he had to encounter and which involved him in very unpleasant duties, were those arising from the claimants to land at Akaroa, under the French Company. It was thought at the
There was indeed, one case in which he undoubtedly committed an error: we record it, as an instance of the frank and unhesitating manner in which he ever
Mr. Godley's career in the colony was not a wholly unembarrassed one. The second year of his localised, that, he conceived, admitted of no dispute or question. "I would rather," he wrote once to a friend, "be governed by a Nero on the spot, than by a board of angels in London, because we could, if the worst came to the worst, cut off Nero's head, but we could not get at the Board in London at all." The words are quoted from memory, but they are not very different from what was written. This, then, having been the point in all colonial policy upon which he had ever most earnestly insisted, it was with peculiar distress that he found the Canterbury Association pursuing a course of policy which he regarded as identical with that which he had ever most strenuously opposed. He felt that the Managing Committee in London was virtually constituting itself a new Colonial Office, and repeating in another form all the errors of that department. It would be improper, as it is unnecessary, to enter upon the question, whether he were right or wrong. We are only concerned at present with stating, what it is due to his memory to record, the views which he entertained on the subject That he nominate a board of colonists, to exercise certain of its powers in the colony still retaining in its own hands many of those powers which he thought ought to have been localized, he felt that he could no longer conscientiously continue to carry out a policy so utterly at variance with the principles and purpose of his life. So deeply did he feel this, that he was on the point at one time of sailing for England, leaving his family here, with the sole object of trying in the course of one month spent at home, to persuade the Association to alter its whole course of policy, and to place the administration of its powers in the hands of the colonists themselves. But he could not desert his post: he therefore formally resigned his office as agent of the Association, praying them to appoint a successor without delay. It is needless to say that the Managing Committee in London delayed accepting the resignation. The Association had indeed almost completed its work. Its members were strenuously engaged in pushing on the Constiution Act for New Zealand, and they took powers in
Indeed, the occasion of his difference of opinion with his friends at home had passed away. The Constitution Act was passed in the summer of 1852, and arrived in the colony about August or September in that year; and it was clear to all that the Association was about to be merged in the local government, so soon as the latter should have been constituted.
When it was known that he was about to leave, he received an address, very generally signed, requesting him to stand for the office of Superintendent; but he declined—he had made arrangements for leaving England for only three years— his work was done—the colony was formed — new powers of local government were about to be entrusted to it, and he felt entitled to obey the call of family and friends, which required his presence in England. He left us on December 22,1852. Notwithstanding the hostile criticism of the London 'Times,' Mr. Godley had become known, not as a dreamer and enthusiast, as he was sometimes spoken of when the scheme of Canterbury first appeared, but as a man of practical wisdom, who could mould a theory to the exigencies of real life,
He had not long returned to England when Mr. Gladstone offered him, unasked, a Commissionership of Income Tax, in Ireland. He was shortly after transferred to England; and, upon the remodelling of the War Office, was placed at the head of the Store Department. A fresh change found him in the Secretary's office, and before long Assistant Under-Secretary at War, which office he held, under the successive Secretaryships of Lord Panmure, General Peel, and Lord Herbert, until the time of his death.
But his connection with Canterbury did not cease with his residence amongst us. In 1854 he was appointed to be the first English agent for the province, but resigned in 1856, feeling the office to be incompatible with the duties imposed on him by his appointment in England. He never, however, refused his assistance or co-operation in anything in which Canterbury was concerned. More than once, when emigration was suspended for want of funds, he came forward and made himself personally responsible for the advances required to carry it on according to the wishes of the Provincial Government. In 1860 the disease in his throat, which had almost entirely disappeared under the genial climate of New Zealand, made its appearance again, accompanied by great loss of strength and a general failing of vital power. Early in the spring he went for a short holiday to Italy, visiting most of the Italian towns, and seeing most of the eminent men of that most stirring period of nobility of work. Even in his last illness, when confined to his bed, he had his work brought up to him from the War Office, morning and afternoon, and attended to it as regularly as if he were in his own office in Pall Mall. Like his friend, Lord Herbert of Lea, he might, no doubt, have prolonged a valuable life by the abandonment of responsible and anxious labours, and the enjoyment of luxurious repose. But with such men life is work—not to work, is to give up all that makes life worth having. In harness to the last, labouring on in the sphere in which duty called, struggling with the irritation of pain, and manfully bearing up against the lassitude of disease,—such is the evening of life with men like Lord Herbert and John Robert Godley. But they have both
His last work in life was not his least. The Report of the
As a writer Mr. Godley was not brilliant; he was not witty or imaginative, although he delighted in those qualities in others. His style was grave and somewhat severe, but concise and logical in thought, and simple in expression. As a thinker he was remarkable for the resolution with which he followed out his reasoning to its legitimate issues; and thus he often arrived at conclusions instantly, which other men adopt only after becoming habituated to an idea from which they first shrank with alarm. But his best writings unquestionably are contained in his private correspondence. That correspondence must have been very extensive, and must have included letters on public matters addressed to some of the most eminent statesmen of the day. We cannot but express a hope that this correspondence may some day be collected and given to the world.
In matters of religion he was thoroughly sincere brilliant; nor did he perhaps possess that greatest of all powers in an orator—a flow of thoroughly impassioned eloquence. Whether he were capable of using the lash of satire, we do not know; he had never the opportunity to attempt it. But one quality he possessed in a degree entirely unrivalled by any speaker we have ever listened to,
He had ever the utmost respect for the public press. The London 'Times' was sent to him regularly by every mail, whilst in New Zealand; and he read it, not rapidly and desultorily, but regularly and thoroughly—one paper every morning at breakfast time, just as he used to do in his home in London. But the 'Spectator' was his favorite paper, not only for its own sake, but out of respect for the opinions of its editor, the late Mr. Rintoul, whose valuable friendship
Upon the arrival of the New Constitution in the colony Mr. Godley never concealed his opinion that the bill had been sadly spoiled by the provision for the popular election of the Superintendents of provinces. He had seen too much of the election of executive officers in America, and had too deepseated a love for the people, and too earnest a conviction of the necessity of their taking a part in the government of the country, not to see that the door was opened wide for the destruction of popular power by popular election. His political instincts led him to a conclusion which has since then been illustrated and enforced upon all, by the adaptation of the machinery of universal suffrage to the creation of an imperial tyranny in France, and, more recently, to the sanction of a still worse form of tyranny in the United States of America.
For the first year, until Captain Simeon's arrival, Mr. Godley was Resident Magistrate as well as Agent of the Association, and after he resigned the former office, he was always elected by the magistrates to be chairman of the Bench. His education as a barrister, together with his experience as a county magistrate in Ireland, combined to make the performance of his duties on the bench somewhat different from what is often seen in the colonies. His only
In manners Mr. Godley was not always popular: he was often very thoughtful and abstracted; sometimes, for example, going on with his writing when a stranger was waiting to speak to him, and so gaining credit for a haughtiness and discourtesy which was really utterly foreign to his whole character. But it was only those who were casually and occasionally brought into contact with him, who carried away such an idea of his disposition. To those who knew him, especially to those with whom he was intimate, he was a delightful and cheerful companion and a tender and affectionate friend. Indeed his great capacity for attaching men to him is permanently written in the existence of this colony. But for the strong personal attachment of his friends, inducing so many to make pecuniary sacrifices rarely heard of in these days, the difficulties in the way of founding Canterbury could not have been surmounted. He was generous and charitable not only from disposition but from principle; and there are not a few still here, who could tell to what an extent, and with
But there was one feature in his character which was not a popular one, and which he never cared to conceal or control, and that was his unmitigated hatred and contempt for humbug of every kind: whether it appeared in the form of dishonesty in money matters, or hypocrisy in religion, or of corruption in public life, or, what is still common enough with us, of vulgar pretension, it met with little mercy at Mr. Godley's hands. Honorable himself up to the loftiest strndard of chivalry, he shrunk instinctively from anything like trickery public or private in other men. Such a man is sure to be hated and feared by some, so long as deceit and fraud shall find a resting place upon earth. What Mr. Godley was to this place we shall perhaps never fully know until the day when the secrets of all hearts shall be revealed. It is mere folly to shut our eyes to the fact that the standard of honor and of manners in a small colonial community has a tendency to fall. The tastes, habits, feelings and manners, unavoidably degenerate in a state of society where so many of the checks which custom has reared in older countries are suddenly removed. Against all this Mr. Godley's house and home was a standing witness. Men of immoral habits be excluded from his table, and in one instance adhered to the rule even where high rank would have influenced a less conscientious man to make an exception. The example and influence of such a man in so small
He had not the comprehensive intellect of a great philosopher, nor the fire and fancy of a great poet, but he had the mind of a practical statesman, clear foresight and wise judgment, with a resolute will, unimpeachable integrity, and a chivalrous sense of honor. Such was John Robert Godley, and those who knew him well will ever think that they never saw a nobler man.
A notice of Mr. Godley's colonial career would be very incomplete if it were to omit all mention of one who took no small share in his labors. Mrs. Godley's residence in the colony was not necessarily an agreeable one. It was not an enviable position for a lady who had always lived amidst the luxuries which accompany wealth, and the gentle courtesies which surround high birth, to submit to the discomfort and inconvenience inseparable from the founding of a new settlement. It has been our misfortune to hear many ladies in this country, even those who have left straightened circumstances and precarious prospects at home, for rough plenty and the promise of wealth here, grumble in no measured terms at the indignities to which they considered themselves to be
She, like her husband who is gone, could understand how the little offices of daily life become sanctified and ennobled by the name of duty. She, too, believed in the nobility of work, and what her hand found to do she did it with all her might. She left us the example, how it is possible, in the midst of harassing cares and unwonted discomfort, to be gentle and serene, and cheerful and uniformly courteous to all; and how little it needs of worldly wealth to create the purest type of an English home upon the shores of a scarcely inhabited island. Ought we thus to speak of one whose eyes these pages may one day chance to meet? or may not a separation which is probably for eternity plead forgiveness for the in trusion? Had he lived it might have been otherwise: for he ever looked forward to visiting at some future time the scene of his labors, in the company of some of those who so nobly sustained him in his work. But
On the 1st of October, 1862, the Superintendent of the Province, in opening the annual session of the Provincial Council, introduced into his speech the following words:—
"It is my intention to request your approval of the erection of a pedestal and statue commemorative of the services of the venerated founder of the Canterbury settlement."
And upon the 28th of October, the Council passed the following resolution without a dissentient voice:—
"That this Council, desiring to record its deep sense of the loss which the Province of Canterbury has sustained by the death of its founder, and deeming it right to preserve for ever amongst the inhabitants of the Province the memory of labors to which it is so deeply indebted, as well as an example of worth and excellence in private life, and of wisdom and uprightness in the administration of public affairs, resolves—that a statue of the late John Robert Godley be erected in the city of Christchurch, in such public place as his Honor the Superintendent shall direct; and that his Honor the Superintendent be respectfully requested to take such steps as may be necessary to carry this resolution into effect; and this Council undertakes to make due provision for the cost of such a work out of the public revenues of the Province."
The following letter to Mr. Gladstone was written at Plymouth the night before Mr. Godley sailed for New Zealand, and was originally published in the form of a pamphlet in London immediately after his departure.
My Dear Mr. Gladstone,—On the ere of leaving England for one of our most distant colonies, I cannot resist the desire of saying a few words before I go to the British public, on the subject of Colonial politics, under the new aspect which they have lately assumed; a subject in which I have long been speculatively interested, and in which I am now about to acquire a deep and immediate personal concern. And I have ventured, with your kind permission, to prefix your name to my observations; not from any presumed accordance between your views and my own, but simply because, as you seem to me to be the one among our leading statesmen who has most fully considered the question of colonial reform, so you are the one most likely to appreciate and encourage the humblest effort to advance that cause.
Judging, indeed, from the speeches which you have made during the last two sessions, and from the line of conduct which you think it right to adopt with reference to this question, I infer that you do not agree with me; that is, that you are far from estimating so highly as I do the danger which threatens our Colonial Empire, and the necessity of meeting it promptly by measures of thorough reform. If you did, I feel sure (from my faith in your patriotism and public spirit) that, waiving all considerations of a personal and party nature, you would stand forth as the active champion of those searching remedies by which alone the disease which is consuming our greatness can now be cured. I speak confidently, now with 'gradual instalments' of freedom. A year or two ago I thought, as perhaps you think now, that, though a system so absurd in theory, and so unsuccessful in practice as that by which our colonies are ruled, must break down sooner or later, still it might last indefinitely, for ten years to come, or perhaps for twenty; and that our efforts might safely be directed to a gradual amelioration of it. I am now convinced that I was wrong: the real danger is, not that the despotism of the Colonial Office will last ten or twenty years—not that the colonists will be oppressed by it for an indefinite time to come—but that it may last just long enough to break up the British Empire; a consummation which, at the present rate of progress, will not perhaps take a great deal more than ten or twenty months. I should be very glad now to be as sure that the flag of my country will not be hauled down during my lifetime in any part of the Queen's dominions, as I am that the hours of 'Mr. Mothercountry's' reign are numbered. The point, therefore, which I am most anxious to urge upon you, as upon all Colonial reformers, is, that whereas they have hitherto pleaded in the interests, as they thought, of suffering colonies alone, they must now plead in the interests of British honour and British supremacy; that whereas the alternatiye has hitherto appeared to lie between local self-government and the centralism of Downing Street, now it is between local self-government and national independence. Many causes have contributed to this change in the aspect of the question; but the chief of them are these—first, the increased strength of the Colonies, or rather (perhaps) their increased
On the other hand, I say, the colonists have acquired an increased confidence in their own strength—a confidence derived not only from the knowledge that their material resources are yearly increasing, but also from the moral power which is imparted by the experience of successful conflicts. Not only has the Colonial Office received many damaging defeats of late, but it has so timed its resistance and concessions, as to give precisely the utmost possible encouragement to colonial revolt. Canada, for example, gained by rebellion nearly all for the sake of which she rebelled, and which during years of peaceful agitation she had been refused; and she is now given to understand very plainly by official people, that the rest of her demands will be similarly granted, if she apply in a similar way. New South Wales, too, has more than once within the last two years repulsed the aggressions of the Colonial Minister. But the turning point of the conflict I consider to be the successful resistance of the Cape of Good Hope. It is morally impossible that the authority of Downing Street over the colonies can long survive the shock which it has just received in South Africa. That small and feeble, but high-minded dependency, has taught a lesson which others, more powerful at once and more aggrieved, will not be slow to learn. The machinery which she has employed for her special purpose may be employed by any other colony for any other purpose with respect to which the colonists shall be at issue with the Imperial Government; and, if equal energy and unanimity be
On the other hand, a political school has grown up in this country which is supposed to advocate the abandonment of colonies, on the ground that they do not "pay." I say supposed to advocate, because I do not know that the doctrine has yet been distinctly stated and fairly avowed. Still there is no moral doubt of its being in fact held, or of its being in accordance with the general tone and views proclaimed by a powerful and increasing class of English politicians. With those who entertain this anti-imperial doctrine, I need hardly tell you that I feel no sympathy; but I cannot help perceiving how formidable it is, because it falls in with the positive and material character of the age, and especially with the habits of thought prevailing among the now very powerful middle classes of this country. Moreover, I see manifold grounds for believing that statesmen of far higher position and greater mark (some from spite, and more from indolence) regard the possibility of a separation between England and her colonies without any kind of dissatisfaction. "Mr. Mothercountry" is of opinion, no doubt, that if our Colonial Empire is not to be kept as a toy for him to play with, it is not worth keeping at all. On the whole, then, it appears to me that we are on the eve of what may truly be called a revolution in our Colonial relations; and that during the nest year or two, in all probability, it will be decided whether "the British Empire" is to endure and to grow, as it has hitherto grown, for an indefinite time to come, or whether it
The best argument, perhaps, against separation, is to be found in the strength and prevalence of a moral instinct which separatists do not recognise, and which they hardly understand, though they bear a strong testimony to its truth in the remarkable reluctance which they manifest to avow their doctrines. A true patriot personifies and idealizes his country, and rejoices in her greatness, her glory, and her pre-eminence, as a loving son would exult in the triumphs of a parent. Doubtless such greatness and glory may be too dearly bought; but that is not the question. I say that, independently of reasoning, they are felt to possess a great and real, though an immaterial value, and that they are the more keenly so felt in the most heroic period of a nation's history, and by the best and noblest of its sons. Nay, I maintain, that the love of empire, properly understood—that is, the instinct of self-development and expansion—is an unfailing symptom of lusty and vigorous life in a people; and that, subject to the conditions of justice and humanity, it is not only legitimate, but most laudable. Certain I am, that the decline of such a feeling is always the result, not of matured wisdom or enlarged philanthropy, but of luxurious imbecility and selfish
But the case of those who defend the preservation of our Colonies does not rest on any such instinct alone; it rests also on perfectly tangible and material grounds. I will admit, for the sake of argument, that our trade with the colonies might not suffer by separation, though I have little doubt in fact that it would. A certain kind of emigration, too, such as that which now proceeds to the United States, would of course go on. But there would be no good colonization: no English gentlemen—indeed few Englishmen of any class who were not bad specimens of it—would deliberately renounce their allegiance, and place themselves in a position where they might be called upon, by their duty to their adopted country, to fight against the country which gave them birth. They would not consent to stand towards their friends and kindred in the relation of "foreigners;" they would never give up the name, the rights, and the privileges of Englishmen. This may be a very foolish and unphilosophical feeling; but experience as well as theory shows that it is entertained: and, consequently, by making "foreign countries" of our colonies, we should cut off on the one hand the best part of the British nation from colonization, and on the other we should abandon the plain duty of building up society in its best form throughout those wide regions which are destined to be peopled
Again, the Union of the provinces which make up the British empire constitutes a positive element of material strength. It is perhaps true, that now the value of our Colonies may he counterbalanced by their cost; but such has been the case only since the invention of the Colonial Office; that is, since we have made Colonies effeminate by our protection, and disaffected by our tyranny. The early British Colonies contributed largely, both in men and money, to the military expenses of the Imperial Treasury; they fitted out privateers to destroy the commerce of the common enemy; nor did they confine themselves to the defence of their own territory against aggression, but single handed they conquered and kept new realms for England. Why should we doubt that modern British Colonies, if allowed similar liberty, would show equal loyalty? Their Imperial patriotism is a thing of which we at home have but a faint idea. Until they are spoiled by bad Government, they delight in their connexion with England; they worship the British flag, their eyes fill with tears at the thought of "home," and their highest boast is the share they claim in the triumphs of English literature, arts, and arms.
But, notwithstanding their good natural dispositions towards us, there is one thing which colonists will not endure at our hands—and that is, being governed from Downing Street. They would not be Englishmen if they did. By a steady and persevering course of distant Government, we do succeed in destroying, to a very great extent, the love of mother country, and implanting in its place a feeling which is peculiar to colonies governed from home—a feeling made up of jealous dislike and cowardly dependence. But this is factitiously engendered, and would disappear with the causes that produced it. The normal sentiment of colonists towards England greatly resembles that felt by ourselves towards our govern us; but so long as they abstain from that, our affection for them is not only enthusiastic, hut deep and real. We rejoice in their joys, and sympathize with their sorrows, as matters in which we have a personal interest; nay, I fully believe that there are are not many individuals in this island who would hesitate to sacrifice property and life in order to save the Queen from indignity or danger. Of a like nature is the feeling which colonists cherish for an ideal England; and I would ask those who hold that its existence and maintenance are of no importance, whether loyalty such as I have described (and such as is perfectly consistent with a determination to be self-governed) does not exercise a powerful and ennobling influence on the national character and national history of England?
It may seem that I have unnecessarily insisted on the desirableness of the Colonial connexion, and that I should have better employed my time in explaining and defending the practical means which I would propose for preserving it. I do not think so, however; and I am sure time will show that I am right. I am not going to waste arguments in support of the municipal system as applied to Colonial Government, because, in fact, everything has been said that can be said on that side of the question, whilst, literally, nothing worth notice has been said on the other. Besides, we really have passed the argumentative stage in this part of the business. That the central system, whether right or wrong, will be speedily abolished, no man with a grain of political foresight can doubt. I repeat, that the only question which remains to be settled is, whether its abolition shall be the result of a dissolution of our colonial empire or not. I have therefore confined myself to urging a proposition which will be much more seriously debated—namely, that such a dissolution is neither unavoidable nor desirable, but pre-eminently the reverse.
But it is necessary for me to state what I mean by local not mean, then, mere powers of paving and lighting, and road making; nor the privilege of initiatory legislation; nor the liberty of making subordinate official appointments; I do not mean a regimen involving the reservation of civil lists, or the interposition of vetoes, or any other of those provisions in virtue of which Ministers in Downing Street are in the habit of interfering with the internal concerns of colonies. I mean by local self-government the right and power to do, within the limits of each colony respectively, without check, control, or intervention of any kind, everything that the supreme Government of this country can do within the limits of the British Islands—with one exception. I allude to the prerogative of regulating relations with foreign powers. This one prerogative, the concentration of which is essential to Imperial unity, the colonists themselves would gladly see reserved, in exchange for the privilege and the security of being identified with the empire: but more than this it is neither beneficial nor possible for us to retain. I need hardly say that my idea of self-government includes the power of making and altering local constitutions. We ought not, I am sure, to impose upon the colonists any form of government whatever, even to start with. When we shall have duly authorized them to act for themselves, our function with regard to their internal affairs should end. Paper constitutions, drawn up by amateurs without personal interest in the subject, never answer. All the best of the old colonial constitutions were framed by the colonists; and while many of them have endured, with hardly an alteration, for more than two hundred years, all of them, whether altered from the originals or not, give (being home-made) perfect satisfaction to those who live under them. I have yet to hear of a Colonial Office constitution which has lasted ten years, or given a moment's satisfaction to any one but the doctrinaires who drew it. I define, then, the proper conditions (as they appear to me) of a Colonial relation to the
As a matter of course, colonies enjoying, as those of New England did, the perfect administration of their own affairs, ought not to cost the Mother-country a shilling for their government; and I am confident that, like Massachusetts and Pennsylvania of old, they would regard total pecuniary independence of the Mother-country as an important means of preserving their municipal privileges.
There is, I suppose, little doubt that even the Colonial Office will think it necessary to "do something" in the way of colonial reform next year; nay, that what they do will be in advance on the absurd measures proposed last session; but I cannot bring myself to believe that they will do anything "thorough," and I most earnestly hope that the friends of the Colonies will not be satisfied with anything less. We must hear no more of "gradual ameliorations;" things have gone much too far for experiments and instalments; and the session after next it may be too late for reform. I conclude by repeating, that if to you at home the issue of this impending struggle be a matter of comparative indifference, I can answer for it that to British colonists it will appear one of absolutely vital moment. For my own part, I can only say, that though I might consent, in spite of reason and experience, to live in a colony permanently governed by a Minister in London, I would neither do so myself, nor ask others to do so, if the colony we founded were destined during our lifetime to be separated from the Mother-country. It is in the hope of seeing the only means adopted by which you can avert such a consummation that I now leave England.
Believe me, my dear Mr. Gladstone, yours very faithfully,
The two following letters were written by Mr. Godley on his first arrival in New Zealand:—
I have the honour to report to you my arrival at this place, after a favourable passage. The Lady Nugent came to an anchor yesterday morning, and the bags for the Woodstock, by which I intend to send this letter, are advertised to close on Thursday. The Cornelia will sail direct for London in about a fortnight, and I will write again by her, as well as send a duplicate of this letter. Information which I received at Otago as to the actual state of affairs at Lyttelton, determined me to require that the Lady Nugent should call at Port Cooper, and after having ascertained by personal observation how matters stood there, to proceed to this place and communicate with Mr. Fox. We anchored in Port Cooper on the 14th instant, and I immediately landed. The appearance of the harbour surpassed my expectations, as well as those of all on board. It is perhaps hardly necessary to add to the testimonies on this subject which have been already sent home; but as I understand that some difference of opinion has been expressed upon it, I will observe that in the opinion of our captain, an excellent practical seaman, the harbour is perfectly safe in all weathers.
On landing, I was astonished to find how much had been effected by Mr. Thomas towards making preparation for settlers. He has built an excellent jetty, extending to twelve feet water, four emigration houses, with a cook-house, capable of holding from 250 to 300 persons, two boat-sheds, an office for the chief surveyor, and a house for the chief agent. All these buildings were either completed, or on the point of being so. Adjoining and around them the site of the port town is laid off; over part of it are scattered a considerable number (about twenty) of houses, built by individuals who green, but rather that of hay), stretching from the sea towards them as far as the eye can reach, without any inequality, and almost without any variety of surface; for streams though numerous, are not large, and they are sunk between very steep banks, and the patches of wood are unfortunately both rare and small. The grass on the plain is intermixed with fern and flax. To an eye unaccustomed to moral ground, there can be no doubt that it was for the interest of the Association and its intending settlers that the works should be carried on, after the exhaustion of the original credit; and I should be very glad indeed now to have the means of prosecuting them without relaxation until decisive intelligence shall arrive. Such, however, is not the case; and the only course open to me, on learning the condition of Mr. Thomas's financial affairs, was to direct the suspension of all further outlay on his part, even at the hazard of loss and damage to the works. I enclose a copy of the letter (Enclosure No. 2), which I wrote immediately on my arrival here, and sent by a cutter which sailed this morning for Lyttelton. With the reasons which have induced Mr. Fox, as the Company's representative, to make advances to Mr. Thomas, beyond the £20,000, I have, officially, nothing to do; but I cannot forbear from stating my personal conviction, that by so doing he has acted wisely under very difficult circumstances, and consulted the interests, not of the Association only, but of the Company. When the application was made to him, it would have been impossible for Mr. Thomas to have closed his accounts, and kept within the limits of his authorized expenditure; and it is needless to point out the extreme inconvenience and evil of all kinds which would have resulted from leaving him in a position of virtual bankruptcy.
For the present, accordingly, all our operations are at a stand-still, and must remain so until fresh remittances shall arrive from England. This is very mortifying, as not only is road, nothing will then be left unfinished which is absolutely necessary for the reception of settlers. They will find temporary accommodation sufficient, I think, for 700 or 800 at a time; and a very short notice would enable us to provide more; and they will find also 300,000 acres of the best land in the district fully surveyed. To complete the entire survey of the plain will be neither tedious nor expensive. Mr. Thomas calculates the cost at only five farthings per acre; and I am informed, both by him and Mr. Fox, that Captain Stokes and Mr. Evans (of the Acheron) speak in the very highest terms of his maps, which they carefully examined. I enclose an estimate prepared by Mr. Thomas (Enclosure No. 3) of the liabilities which he calculated upon incurring before the 1st July: if the credit given to him by Mr. Fox will not carry him up to that period, he will, of course, have to wind up sooner. I enclose also a conjectural estimate of the sum required for completing the road (Enclosure No. 4),
In conclusion, I will only repeat, that if the road be made before the settlers come out, I trust that they will have nothing deserving the name of difficulty to contend with (except the expensiveness of wood); and I feel convinced that their success will depend (humanly speaking) entirely upon themselves. With respect to the supply of wood, I will add, that at present both sawn timber and fuel are cheaper at Lyttelton than Dunedin, and the latter not more expensive here than at Wellington, while there is no reason why it should not be supplied at Christchurch at a rate hardly greater than at Lyttelton, the chief source of supply to both places being the hills of Banks's Peninsula, from whence there is communication with them by boats. Settlers establishing themselves at a distance from the rivers will find it expensive, but at first, probably, such instances will not be numerous; and the Mandeville district, which is one of the best for agricultural purposes, is well supplied with wood. It is to be remembered, too, that land carriage, though always expensive, will be less so on these plains than in any other part of the islands, from the immense extent to which they are accessible without roads.
I trust the Association will, before receiving this letter, have given specific instructions to me relative to the sale of land here. I have had numerous applications already
On Thursday evening (the 11th), after a tedious day's work, beating up the northern shore of Banks's Peninsula, we came to an anchor about seven o'clock just outside the heads of Port Cooper. If we had had two hours' more daylight, we should have gone in; but our captain was very cautious, and though we bad been positively assured that nothing could possibly happen, even if we ran in blindfold, he preferred waiting till morning. At six we weighed anchor, the wind being fair, though light, and passed quietly up the bay. None of us, I believe, were prepared for the beauty of the scenery. It took us more by surprise than even at Otago, for the sketches which we had seen in England were very far from inviting. The character is very different from that of the lovely lake on the banks of which Port Chalmers lies, but I am not sure that I do not prefer it. The hills are very bold, both in face and in outline; bare for the most part—that is, with only small patches of wood at the bottom of the glens—but with much of that sublimity which is produced by extent of view and rugged wildness.
The harbour is very fine, both in a picturesque and utilitarian point of view. The captain and all the nautical men on board were delighted with it. It consists in a regularly
With this arrangement I determined not to interfere, as
There is an amphitheatre of mountains, not snow-covered, but snow-sprinkled, and a vast grassy plain, without the smallest apparent inequality on its surface, stretching between them and the sea; absolutely no other feature whatever, except a large lake close to the sea, on the south-west corner of Banks's Peninsula (or rather promontory), and several streams which, from flowing in very deep channels, make a small show at a distance. The promontory itself must contain exceedingly beautiful scenery, as its whole surface consists of hills covered with forest, broken and diversified in outline, and indented by bays, reminding me of the "fields and fiords" of Norway. The hills immediately around Port Cooper alone appear comparatively bare; their character resembles very much that of the mountains which form the "Ogwen Pass" near Bangor, or, perhaps, still more that of
The flax plant, too, which grows largely over them, exactly resembles at a distance that kind of bulrush which we call flags; so that, although in fact the presence of it denotes, as I am told, unerringly, that the soil is sound and sufficiently dry for cultivation, the appearance given by it is that of barren swamps. When we got down into the plain we soon perceived the difference between the real bulrush, which does actually grow in some spots, and the flax. We overtook several of our fellow-passengers, who had started before us, walking, and found them, unaccustomed to new countries as they were, open-mouthed about the want of luxuriant grass. We saw the country to great disadvantage, for there have been six months of almost unprecedented dry weather; but after making allowance for this, I am sure that until it shall have been either broken up or grazed over, no part of it will produce grass to be compared with a soil of equal quality in old countries. There is no difference of opinion, however, so far as I can learn, amongst those who know the country, as to the land in the Canterbury plains being of fully average quality, capable of fattening sheep and cattle, as well as of giving good crops of all kinds. When we arrived at Mr. Deans's farm we had proof of this; for his garden, which never saw or heard of manure, is producing luxuriantly every kind of vegetables and fruit. I never saw a finer show of them—apples, pears, peaches—everything, in short, flourishes. I wish I could send home a specimen of the apples; they look like wax-work.
Mr. Deans has been for several years a settler on these and 30 per cent. cheaper than at Dunedin, which is in the middle of woods: a most important fact in illustration of the cheapness of water carriage, and of the facilities which it will afford to us of remedying our deficiency in timber on that part of the plain which is within the reach of water.
The chief work now in progress at Port Cooper is a road over the hills from Lyttelton (the port) to Christchurch (the intended chief town), a distance of 10½ miles. Until this shall be completed, the only mode of conveying goods from the harbour to the plain will be by boats round the heads of the port and up the river before-mentioned, and this will of course only be available in fine weather. The completion of the road is therefore an object of primary importance, as the track over the hills is hardly practicable, even for a horseman.
On our return to the port we found our passengers and crew scattered about, loud in their praises of the progress which had been made in so short a time, as well as of the prospects held out by the settlement. They forget that Thomas has had the spending of a larger sum of money on a given spot than any other pioneer of settlement in this country has had, so that the superiority of his operations is not to be laid altogether to the account of his merits. However, certainly no body of settlers ever found so much done to smooth their path for them as ours will find. Most agricultural produce, except flour, is already cheaper than at Otago. Meat is plentiful at 5½d. per lb.; fresh butter, 1s. per 1b.; "native" cheese, 1s. per 1b.; eggs and milk, apparently varying in price, but generally reasonable enough; potatoes, 4s. 6d. per cwt. The chief supplier of the market is a man named Rhodes, who lives on the opposite side of the harbour from Lyttelton, and who is the only person, besides
On Saturday evening, Thomas having come off with the gapers which I had asked him to prepare, and two of our young gentlemen who had spent the night at his house, I reported myself to the captain as ready to sail; but the wind being foul, he gave us permission to land again, and I went off in Thomas's whale boat to see part of the road works. We pulled a couple of miles down the harbor, and landed at the Maori village, which we had seen as we sailed up. The women were squalling as usual about the doors, some wrapped up in blankets of different colours, others with nothing but coloured shifts upon them, their faces horribly tattooed, and their black thick hair shining with oil. Their huts are made of grass, and each of them has a hole in the ground before it, where they cook and bake. Thomas has brought 120 Maori laborers from the Northern Island, and considers his having induced them to come, and kept them in good humour while with him, as no small feat. Every one told him it was impossible, one great difficulty being that the tribes from which he took these men had, ten or twelve years ago, made an incursion into the Port Cooper country, when they killed and ate the greater portion of the aboriginal inhabitants, so that a feud of blood prevails between the survivors and the conquerors. It does not seem to have been prosecuted, however, and all agree—the Maoris themselves, their white superintendent, and Thomas—that the experiment has been perfectly and 1s. when sick— this last a bad arrangement, as he admits. By having these natives at his back, he gets a great pull upon the white labourers, who would otherwise have him at their mercy. He thinks, however, that the whites are, as yet, cheaper at 4s. 6d. a day than the Maoris at 2s. 6d. We climbed the hill to where the road passes over it, and looked down the other side upon the plain. It is two miles from Lyttelton to the top of the ridge, and two miles down from thence to the plain. The road is a tremendous piece of work on the harbor side—great part of it being carried through solid rock, which can only be removed by blasting. It reminds one of the steepest parts of the Holyhead road; only that the precipice here is far higher, and at the bottom there is sea instead of river. The line, to my unprofessional eye, seems very well engineered, being nowhere steeper than one in twenty—that is, what mail coachmen used to call good trotting ground; but the expense is very great, and the time which it will require must also, I fear, be considerable, the nature of the ground not allowing an unlimited application of force.
We were amused with seeing the Maoris at work. They struck, shovelled, &c., altogether, keeping time to a song, like sailors at a windlass. We spoke to several, and they seemed most civil, good-natured fellows, laughing immoderately at our questions, and chattering broken English very fast in reply. They all expressed themselves delighted with the treatment they had received, and said they were taking home "plenty money" with them. They are Christians, and, I am told, pray together regularly morning and evening, before and after leaving off work. To our eyes they appeared nearly equal to average Europeans in stature and muscular development; but they have not, in fact, the same strength and endurance, and, above all, they seem deficient in the power of steady continuous work. They do everything by fits and starts, and they must be coaxed, like children, by talking to
It will cost more than £7000 to finish the road, without which the plain can hardly be called available for settlement; and, with the labour at our disposal, a considerable time will be required, too, for its completion. However, Thomas has so evidently done his best, has spared himself so little, and has evinced so much zeal, that I thought it would be cruel, as well as useless, to find fault with him, except in the mildest form, for his errors in judgment.
The only point on which I feel not so charitably disposed towards him is the excess of expenditure over credit, inasmuch as nothing could be more explicit or imperative than his instructions on this point, and with ordinary foresight he might easily have adhered to them. There is, however, something very satisfactory, and useful too, in creating, at the earliest possible moment, that appearance of civilization and finish which young settlements are so long deficient in under our present system; and I feel sure that the advanced and prepared look of Lyttelton will materially influence the character of the colony, by encouraging and welcoming the first settlers, and producing upon their minds pleasant first impressions. Much of the deterioration in manner, costume, and even in more weighty matters, which we all see and deplore in colonists, may doubtless be traced to the coarse, rough, scrambling life which they are compelled to live during the early days of settlement, and which becomes habitual and traditionary among them. A little care and expense in preparing for them decent habitations, passable roads, and such like elements of civilization, would enable them to keep up old-country habits from the first, and perhaps modify the whole character and fortune of the growing people. These are things which ought to be done by the Government of a colonizing nation. It is in default of such performance of duty by our Government that mercantile companies and amateur associations are compelled to
We have no choice, however, and must work with such means as we have; and I think all those who see the Canterbury settlement will admit that, as I have said before, no first body of colonists from Britain have ever found so much done to prepare for and welcome them as ours will find. In fact, difficulties in the usual sense of the word, as applied to colonization, there will be none: no roads to make, no forests to clear, no want of food or lodging, or of facilities for choosing or settling upon land. Many things will, no doubt, be expensive at first; for example, wood, some articles of provisions, and labour; but every man's enterprise may be made the subject of a calculation on paper, as in an old country. Humanly speaking, there is no uncertainty or chance of disappointment to provide against. He may lose his money; but if he does (again, I say, humanly speaking) it will be his own fault, and not the result of obstacles which he could not foresee. I feel certain that a vast deal of discontent and mutual bad feeling takes its origin from the discomforts and embarrassments experienced by men thrown with their wives and children upon a bare shore, at the beginning of winter, without a road, or a clearing, or a Sign of civilization to welcome or to cheer them.
While we were absent with Thomas, the captain, with some of the passengers, had gone up to Mr. Rhodes's farm, and came back in the evening, highly delighted both with him and with what they had seen and heard. I am amused at seeing how those who had been the most inveterate sneerers and croakers about our settlement during the voyage, have changed their tone since they have been on the spot; very often, indeed, with almost as little reason as they had for their former prejudices. Even the disappointment of those
As yet it has been found impossible to make use of the Maoris for farm work. They require the stimulus of society and superintendence; but from idleness and cannibalism to gang-work and Christianity is a much longer step than from their present step to civilization—so that we may hope to see one instance at least of a reclaimed and amalgamated native race.
Thomas is very proud and happy at the successful result of the new plan of surveying. It is very cheap, not more, he assures me, than five farthings an acre for the whole district, and very accurate and satisfactory. The colonial surveyors, who began by disapproving, have all read their recantation; and Captain Stokes, of the Acheron, a most competent judge, has told him that he has seen nothing south of the line to equal the maps that Thomas has shown him. He has triangulated about 700,000 acres, and promised that by July the maps of at least 300,000 acres of the best agricultural land
The supposed discovery of bituminous coal is not confirmed; but there is undoubtedly some anthracite; and at different places, especially along the Courtenay River, considerable quantities of peat. It is very fortunate that carts can traverse the plain in every direction (except of course where rivers intervene), so that the deficiency of wood, though very important, is more easily remediable than it would be elsewhere. However, the first settlers must fence with banks and ditches, and plant gorse and quicks upon them; and they must also make up their minds to pay a high price for their fuel. This is the one drawback to what would otherwise be an incomparable district for settlement; and its existence should be known and published to prevent deception and disappointment. There are quantities of wild pigs on the plain, and quail and wild ducks innumerable; I wish I had a good pointer and retriever. Probably the Indian sport of boar-hunting with the spear on horseback will be introduced, as the country is specially fitted for it. I cannot bring myself to wish for foxes; but deer and hares we must positively have, as well as partridges and pheasants. There are a pair of partridges at Dunedin, which, after being imported with much difficulty, turned out to be both cocks; so, as I cannot hear of any others in the colony, I fear the unfortunate animals are doomed to spend the rest of their lives in cheerless celibacy. If the Association goes on and flourishes, it could not do better than send out by each ship that it charters, pairs of these animals, until it receives intelligence that a sufficient number to make the propagation of the species certain have safely landed. It is impossible, of course, to draw a general conclusion from our limited observations of the climate, but it is worth remarking that, though we have been just a month in or on the coasts of New Zealand, at the end of autumn, we have had only one wet day, and not above three or four that were showery or otherwise
Mr. Godley arrived in Wellington in April 1850. On the 19th August he was elected a member of the Settler's Constitutional Association. In the following letter to Mr. Fox, read at a subsequent meeting, he stated his reasons for declining to act on the Corresponding Committee:—
"My Dear Sir,—Will you have the goodness to state, at the next meeting of the Constitutional Association, that I have been compelled to decline acting on their Corresponding Committee. The truth is, that, while I wish to indentify myself, in the most complete manner, with the Association, as to its general principles and objects, and while I have not the active part in conducting its proceedings; and, under these circumstances, I must, in justice to myself, disclaim that responsibility, which, if I did take an active part, I should necessarily incur. I have troubled you with this explanation of my motives for publicly resigning the honor of acting on your Committee, from a (perhaps groundless) fear of misconstruction—a fear lest it he supposed that I wish to withdraw from the intimate political connexion which now, I rejoice to say, subsists between the Constitutional Association and myself. I must apologize for not having communicated with the Association to the above effect earlier; I did communicate to a similar effect with the members of the Committee immediately after my election.
On the 15th November he attended a public meeting of the Association to consider Sir George Grey's proposed Bill for a Constitution for New Zealand, and delivered the following speech in moving the first resolution:—
Sir, although incapable of addressing you for more than a very few minutes, I cannot resist the temptation of this opportunity to express my sentiments on the important question now offered for your consideration. And in doing so, I am above all things anxious to impress upon you the recollection, that the words and actions of this meeting will inevitably form the subject of careful attention and criticism at home, that, if they be wise and worthy, they will support and strengthen the hands of those who are struggling for your rights in Parliament to an extent which can hardly be over stated, whereas, if you betray either feebleness or political power; the power of virtually administering their own affairs, appointing their own officers, disposing of their own revenues, and governing their own country. Compared with this object, all questions which concern the allocation of power among different classes of colonists, fade into utter insignificance, whatever importance they may assume at the proper time and ourselves, when we shall have got the power of governing ourselves. Do not weaken your collective influence by disputing about them now. The contest in which we are now engaged, and which requires our undivided energies to conduct it successfully, is with the central authority of Downing Street, whether exercised through the medium of Governors, or of Nominees, or of Colonial Office instructions. Let us finish that before we begin to quarrel, as of course we shall quarrel like other people, among ourselves, as soon as we have got substantial power to quarrel about. But never forget that the end we aim at is the power of self-government; representative institutions are merely the most convenient and desirable means of exercising it. To give us representative institutions without full powers' is worse than a mockery and a delusion: it is a careful and deliberate provision for keeping the machine of government at a perpetual dead-lock; or; if that be avoided through the weakness of the Assembly, for constituting a political debating club of the worst kind, and investing it with the dignity and the claims of a National Legislature. I have insisted thus strongly upon this preliminary point, because it is clear to me that, if it were not for this juggle and word-play about representative institutions, nobody could have seriously proposed that you should accept such a measure as this of Sir George Grey's as the charter of your liberties. It is a measure for constituting Provincial debating-clubs; that is all. The resolution I am about to propose asks you to reject the Bill, because it does not give you the management of your own affairs: this is the ground upon which I trust that you will adopt it Those who come after me will examine, more at length than I have physical power to do, the provisions of the Bill, and will shew you its short-comings in detail. I will content myself with stating that it withholds from you the disposal of the greater part of the revenue, and consequently of all practical control over the Executive; that it compels you to conform your legislation to Colonial Office instructions;
Mr. Godley then proposed the following Resolution:—
"That the constitutional measure which Sir George Grey is understood to be about to offer to the colonists, and which has been already published by him in the shape of a draft Ordinance, does not deserve their approval or acceptance, inasmuch as it does not confer upon them an effectual control over the management of their own affairs. That the apparent liberality of its provisions with respect to the election and duration of Assemblies, is rendered completely nugatory by the limitations imposed upon their jurisdiction and powers. That while no Constitution can be said to confer real powers of self government upon a people which does not vest in their representatives the disposal of their own revenue, the Civil List reserved under the proposed measure, which amounts already to nearly one-third of the revenue, and which Sir George Grey has recommended to be increased to nearly one-half, is withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the colonists altogether; and a power is further given to a Nominee Council of taking whatever proportion of the remainder they may think fit for the purposes of the General Government; so that in fact the balance left to the disposal of the Provincial Councils will be little more than nominal. And that, lastly, the
The following words from the 'Wellington Independent,' in publishing a report of the meeting, accurately describe the impression which Mr. Godley left on his hearers:—
"The manner in which Mr. Godley expressed himself in moving the first resolution, the emphasis and sincerity with which he declared his sympathy with the Association, and the satisfaction he felt in identifying himself with it, must have carried conviction to every hearer, that his words were not mere words of compliment, but that they came direct from the heart of a staunch and honest supporter of the cause with which his name is identified, the great and sacred cause of self government."
A good deal of newspaper correspondence took place arising out of this meeting. We print the two following: the first is an instance of the extreme scrupulousness of his mind in defining exactly the position in which he wished to stand; the second as an instance of the thorough manner in which he pursued a subject to its conclusion.
I am anxious to guard myself against a misconstruction which may possibly arise as to the significancy of my presence at the meeting of the Settlers' Constitutional Association on Monday evening last; and I trust that the flattering prominence given by you to the part which I took in the proceedings on that occasion may exculpate me from the charge of presumption if I trespass, very briefly, on the attention of your readers for that purpose.
Many of the resolutions which are described as passed "unanimously," have reference to local questions, which I have not had an opportunity of considering, and on which I do not wish to express any opinion. I beg, therefore, to Say, that my object in desiring to become a member of the Association, and in attending the meeting of Monday, was simply to identify myself in the most complete manner with those
I have again to apologise for intruding upon you with a matter personal to myself; but I hold that every person who takes part in the proceedings of a public meeting, becomes responsible for the whole of its formal results, unless he expressly guards himself against such an inference.
No apology was necessary for addressing me on the subject of your letter; on the contrary, I consider it as a compliment, inasmuch as it shews that you are kind enough to set a high value on my opinion. I am very sorry that the censure on your political conduct, in which I joined, has given you pain; I cannot, however, admit that I joined in it without consideration or inquiry, or without having satisfied myself that there were good grounds for such censure. My conviction was, and is, that by accepting a seat at Sir George Grey's Council Board, you contributed towards the infliction of a most serious and irreparable injury upon the colonists of New Zealand. Through your means Sir George was enabled to carry out his anti-colonial policy; no language, therefore, on the part of the colonists can, in my opinion, too strongly express their reprobation of conduct by which they have so grievously suffered. But you complain of certain assertions contained in the fifth resolution, passed at the meeting of the 19th August, in the spirit of which I entirely concur. Those assertions are—first, that Lord Grey's despatch places the nominees in a humiliating but just light; and, second, that they are undoubtedly the puppets and obedient servants of the Governor.
Now, by both of the foregoing statements I am prepared to abide, and I think the proof of them will not be difficult. You argue that Lord Grey was wrong in denying your independence, because you took your office unfettered by any pledge of obedience or conformity; and, in fact, considering yourself independent, acted accordingly. I answer, that the circumstances under which you took office virtually rendered independence impossible. In the first place, Lord Grey, the representative of the authority from which you derived, interpreted your adhesion as an abdication of independence, and was prepared, of course, to act in conformity with that interpretation. He knows that nominees, accepting office in despite of, and in opposition to, the great body of their fellow citizens, cannot be independent: their position is too false and too weak. The idea of their standing up for the rights of a community which rejects and repudiates them, against a Government whose partizans they have declared themselves, is an anomaly and an absurdity; they would have no moral support in doing so; they could not stand for a moment, isolated and unaided, in the character of an "opposition;" the Government could do as it liked with them, and the worse and more contemptuously it treated them the better would the real "opposition"—that is, the great body of the community—be pleased. All this Lord Grey, a statesman of great official experience, knows well; and he knows also that as in theory it is to be expected, so in practice it is invariably found, that an Assembly of nominees is an Assembly of "puppets and obedient servants." With the very best intentions they cannot be otherwise; they are the slaves of their position.
But perhaps the best proof I can give of the substantial truth of the statements you impugn, is to be found in the occurrences which have given rise to this correspondence. If you were so free and independent (as you assert), if your position as a nominee was so good a one, allow me to ask—why you resigned it? According to my view, the whole affair was quite simple and natural. Sir George Grey, evidently considering you as "puppets and obedient servants," treated you with the scanty ceremony proper to such a relation; after argue as you pleased about your independence, but you felt that you were a "puppet and obedient servant;" that is to say, that it was only on the condition of being so that you were allowed to have any political existence at all. Your conduct is quite inconsistent with your arguments, and I honour you because it is so.
I trust that you will pardon my expressing myself with so much freedom, and (what you will call) severity. Tou have invited me to do so by accusing me of inconsiderately censuring the nominees. I trust I have shown that at least I had reasons for my censure—reasons which fully satisfy my own mind, though I can hardly hope that they will appear equally cogent to you.
On the 16th December, 1850, the first body of colonists arrived at Lyttelton, where Mr. Godley had taken up his abode about a month previously.
The first public meeting was held at the Mitre Hotel on the 14th of August, 1851. Sir George Grey had written to Mr. Godley to know whether the settlers at Canterbury desired to have their settlement erected into a separate Province. The meeting was called to consider that proposal; and Mr. Godley, being called to the chair, spoke as follows:—
It is my duty to open this important meeting—important as to its character, because it is the first political demonstration in this colony, and important as to its end, because it is the first political demonstration in this colony, and important as to its end, because it will probably determine the condition under which you will, for many years to come, exercise your political privileges; and I will do so by stating the objects which its conveners have had in view, and the question on which it will have to decide this day. But first, it will naturally be expected that I should take some notice of the circumstances under which Sir George Grey wrote the letter which has just been read, and of the manner in which he introduced the subject to the Legislative Council of the colony. About two months ago I addressed a letter to his Excellency, in which I brought under his consideration the understanding which had been conveyed by the Colonial Secretary to those by whom this settlement was colonized, that as soon as possible, if no unforeseen circumstances should intervene, it should be formed into a separate province. In that communication I did not raise (as it was not my business to raise) any question with respect to the boundaries of the Province which might be constituted in pursuance of Lord Grey's implied promise. I left it, as indeed I could not help doing, to the same authority which has the power of conferring a Provincial constitution, to declare how far its jurisdiction should extend. With respect to our land regulations,
Not content, however, with intimating to me his objections to comply with a request which had never been made, Sir George Grey thought proper, in his place in the Council, to found, nominally on the official letter which I have mentioned, but really, as it appeared afterwards, upon a private communication, "so far as he remembered it," made to him by me, and upon "rumours which had reached him from other sources," of a desire on the part of the Canterbury settlers to extend their block; to found, I say, upon these "remembrances" and" rumours," an elaborate and unmeasured attack upon the Canterbury Association, although the Canterbury Association at least was upon his own showing altogether guiltless of the offence which formed the text of his remarks.
Now I am not about to be betrayed by any provocation, however strong, into an unseemly personal controversy with the representative of the Queen; I am not going to bandy reproaches and insinuations with him; I will not attempt to prove that the members of the Canterbury Association are as good friends of the Church, and as well acquainted with the principles of colonization as he is; still less will I follow him into a disquisition on the good or bad effects of religious endownents: but it would not be right for me, holding the position which I do, to pass without notice so violent an attack on the body which I represent, coming from so high a quarter: I will, therefore, putting aside all personalities, make a few very brief, and I trust inoffensive remarks on the
I must begin by saying that I entirely agree with Sir George Grey in his disapproval of colonizing associations, whether they be composed of land speculators or of amateurs. I believe that their existence and functions are altogether repugnant to sound theory, and almost necessarily productive' Of great practical evils. Yet I have been an active promoter of the Canterbury Association, and I now stand here to defend it, on this ground alone: that it is better than the Government. If we had a Government able and willing to make its waste territory available for British immigration, and to give facilities to intending colonists for managing their own affairs, and colonizing on their own principles from the first, I should be prepared to admit that an amateur association like ours was an intruder. But as it is, I have no hesitation in asserting that our mission is perfectly legitimate and exceedingly beneficial.
It must have been really rather difficult for Sir George Grey's audience to keep their countenances while he denounced the Canterbury Association as an obstacle to the legitimate colonization of this district by the subjects of her Majesty: in other words as keeping people out of Canterbury. If any one else but the Governor had used such language, I should really suppose that it had been used in irony. Why, what is the fact? Most of those whom I address know, and all of them ought to know, that for seven years, that is, from 1839 to 1846, the Government, of which Sir George Grey is the representative, possessed almost unlimited powers and opportunities for colonizing these
And this leads me to a consideration of what Sir George Grey has said of our imposing onerous and prohibitive, conditions on the acquisition of land by the working classes of this settlement. Why, the working classes of this settlement would not be in existence if it were not for the Canterbury Association. What is the use of telling them that they would have got land on easier terms if it had not been for us? Why, if they had never been brought here they could not have got land at all. Neither they nor any one else got land here, I am inclined to think, while it was the demesne of the Crown. Onerous and prohibitive as our conditions may be, more land has been bought under them by working men within the last six months, than would have been bought by them or any similar class of equal numbers in ten years in England. That is the point I wish to insist upon. Our system may be a bad one; I know it is a defective and imperfect one; but it has brought the people whom I see around me here, and placed before them prospects which they could never have had at home; difficulties, hardships, perhaps distresses, they may suffer in this country, and they may be often disposed to lay these at the door of the Association; but I am not afraid of saying here, before them all, that I accept, on the part of the Association, the responsibility for their difficulties, if they will promise to give us the credit for their ultimate success. They may object, sometimes with, sometimes without justice, to many things we do; but the
I now come to the violation of conscience theory. Sir George Grey has endeavoured to make the people of Canterbury believe that we violate conscience by applying a part of our land fund to religious and educational purposes. I trust I shall not be guilty of impropriety if I say that such an argument does not deserve serious notice. In fact, it is not argument, it is mere ad captandum declamation. There is not, I venture to say, one individual in the settlement who ever dreamed of such a grievance until it was put into his head. "When a man comes to buy land, as when he comes to buy any other article, the only thing he troubles his head about is whether he gets the value of his money. "What use the seller will make of the price, whether he will build a church with it, or get drunk with it, is a matter in which, very properly, indeed necessarily, the buyer does not consider his conscience as implicated in the slightest degree. Perhaps the value of the accusation is best tested by an argumentum ad hominum. I wonder what Sir George Grey would say to any one who refused, on the plea of conscience, to pay taxes to Government, because the Colonial Chaplain is paid out of the treasury; and that is a much stronger case, because a man cannot help paying taxes, whereas no one forces him to buy land. It would really be a waste of time to dwell upon such grievances as this. But perhaps the most original and ingenious form into which it could be put is that of complaint on the part of the old settlers in Canterbury. They, it seems, are the persons whom we have most deeply injured, by forming our settlement in their neighbourhood. They are martyrs, poor men, for conscience sake! I think my friend
In considering the objections against the endowments of churches and schools, we should never forget this most material fact, that it has created the very fund out of which it is paid. If it were not for this provision, the Canterbury Association would not exist, and without the Canterbury Association neither settlement nor land fund would exist at this moment in the plains of Port Cooper. I purposely abstain from arguing for the present, as I might easily do, this question on the higher ground that our scheme of colonization is sound and right, and that in providing endowments for religion and education, out of a fund voluntarily contributed, we are right; because this is not the proper place for discussing such subjects as these, and because I know that of course there may be a legitimate difference of opinion about them. I have therefore preferred to take the lower, but more obvious ground, that by means of our plan this district has been colonized with almost unprecedented rapidity and success, and that without our plan it would not be colonized at all; and I have a right to say, that such being the case, Sir George Grey should rather address himself to shew the superiority of his system over ours, by turning to account his own great opportunities of colonization, than by depreciating and discrediting the efforts of those whom he cannot rival.
I will conclude my observations on the subject of the Canterbury Association, by saying that in my opinion its mission will have been accomplished when the settlement shall have beenfounded, and when its local government shall have been
I will now address myself directly to the practical question which this meeting has to consider this day. "We are met to declare, in compliance with the expressed wishes of the Governor of New Zealand, our opinions on the advisableness of making Canterbury a separate province. Now, I should-
But this is not all: our position among the settlements is altogether exceptional and peculiar, and requires exceptional and peculiar handling. The pastoral nature of our country, the absence of natives, the existence of a land fund, the extensive immigration from England which is going on, and above all, the presence and the influence of the Canterbury Association, all these things distinguish us so broadly from Wellington, Nelson, and Otago, that I feel convinced that for the present we had better pursue separate paths. The laws which suit us don't suit them, and vice versâ. Again, it is a natural and laudable instinct among colonizers to desire the freest possible scope for giving effect to their peculiar tendencies: religious, political, and social. They like to try their own experiment—in other words, to create something. And so it is with us. The people who have come out here have their own notions, no doubt, of the kind of laws and institutions that are best for them; and one reason with them for coming out here was that they might be able to realize
Again: I have heard it said that we are too few to govern ourselves, and that our territory is not large enough to be a province. I protest altogether against the assumption that the amount of population is in the smallest degree a test of fitness to exercise legislative powers: it has nothing at all to do with it. Local position and peculiarities, not numbers, should determine the extent of political sub-division. I see no reason why the people conveyed by the first ship to an uninhabited country should not make laws binding on themselves the day they occupy their new home. It was so at the time when America was colonized, and I can answer for it that the principle has worked well there. The first body of emigrants to New England numbered but 120 souls, and yet from the hour of their landing they exercised absolute and complete power of self-government. There were only 350 colonists in Massachusets when the charter was transferred to the colony. Rhode Island, Connecticut, Newhaven, had every one of them fewer inhabitants than the town of Lyttelton when they established their municipal independence. In the middle of the seventeenth century, a population of 20,000 souls in New England was divided into five separate and independent colonies, and I find the historian of the United
Another objection is the additional expense said to be entailed by separate Government. I really do not see why a separate Government should entail any additional expense worth talking of. I do not see that we want a Lieutenant Governor, or a new Judge, or any material addition to the number of public officers, over and above what will be demanded by the increase of population and business, if we remain a dependent settlement; what we want is a change in the nature of their powers and responsibility. Laws made by ourselves will not require more officers to execute them than laws made by other people. A Provincial Council will cost us nothing except a law officer to prepare bills, and the expense of building a council room, and that of a clerk or two. If we only try, we shall find that a few gentlemen can meet in a small room, and despatch public business very efficiently, without calling themselves by fine names or drawing high salaries. I assure you this fear of additional expense will turn out altogether unfounded, if this matter be properly managed. There are ample means a our disposal for all that we really want. Our revenue is already more than £6000 a year, and no Colonial Government in the early days of British North America cost one-half of that sum. Within twelvemonths it will be doubled, and we ought to have a surplus of £9000 or £10,000 a year from the Customs alone to spend upon our public works.
In fact, the probable existence of a surplus revenue forms
But the chief reason which influences me, I fairly confess it, in wishing for a local government, is one by advancing which I know I expose myself to be misconstrued, sneered and cavilled at; but I cannot help telling you what I know to be the truth. I want to see the people of this settlement taking an interest and a part in politics, and thereby training themselves in the exercise of those faculties which are engendered and nurtured by freedom; and I know they will not do so unless politics are brought to their doors.
I am not one of those who think that the prosecution of agriculture and commerce, and the cultivation of the domestic virtues, constitute the whole duty of man. I do not think the man who "minds his own business" only, discharges himself of all his responsibilities to Grod and to his neighbour. On the contrary, I hold that among the many advantages of free institutions, the greatest and most precious is, that they elevate and ennoble the characters of those who enjoy them, by drawing them out of the restricted circle of their private concerns into the arena of public life; by teaching them to think, to speak, and to act upon questions of universal interest, and by thus bringing into play the highest faculties and instincts of their nature. In the school of freedom are nourished patriotism, self-devotion, energy, fortitude, and all the long train of civic virtues which cannot exist without it. This language may be sneered at as high-flown and sentimental; yet I venture to say, almost every one here who thinks on that subject at all, is conscious of the practical evils to which I allude, and which I am so anxious to avert. Few,
Again: it is a great mistake to suppose that a people which interferes with politics is thereby unduly diverted from industrial pursuits. History and experience have taught me a very different lesson. They have taught me that, as a general rule, freedom and industry have gone hand in hand and that just in propertion as institutions of self-government, with their necessary consequence, political activity, have prevailed among nations, has been their progress and success in all the arts of civilized life. I need not go back into remote history for proofs of this. I will take the examples immediately before our eyes, of the countries with which we are
I have now concluded: I have laid before you to the best of my ability the various points of view from which, in my opinion, the question before you ought to be considered. I have not, I trust, exaggerated the benefits to be expected from the measure which I advocate. I have not concealed from you my conviction that there is serious danger of its being carried out so as to do more harm than good. If, notwithstanding this danger, you have the courage to ask for the measure, and after having obtained it to resist manfully any delusions and abuses which may be imposed on you under its cover, I believe you may, through its means, set a fruitful example to the British Empire and to the world—the example of a people contented and loyal, yet independent and free—of an educated people fearing God, and a self-governed people honoring the king.
On the 15th of March, 1852, a meeting of the members of the Church of England was held in the temporary church at Christchurch, for the purpose of taking into consideration the establishment of some organized government for the Church of England in New Zealand. The meeting was called by public advertisement, by the Rev. O. Mathias and the Rev. R. B. Paul, the Commissaries of the Bishop of New Zealand.
Mr. Godley proposed the first resolution, and spoke as follows:—
The resolution which I have to propose is one which may be said to express a truism. The Church in New Zealand, as elsewhere, is a society having a definite mission and certain practical ends to accomplish. Its essential principle, the very condition of its existence, is work. To my mind, the notion of an inactive or passive Church seems almost an absurdity, indeed, what I say of a Church applies more or less to every associated body. When men form or join a society, ecclesiastical or secular, the idea is almost necessarily involved of their doing something in combination which as individuals they could not or would not do; otherwise, why should they combine? But a society, in order to work, must have an organization and a government; it must have forms, laws, qualifications, executive instruments; it must have a head and hands. Accordingly, every association of men for any purpose whatever begins by constituting a government; on however small or humble may be its scale and object, whether it be a penny club, or a building society, or a political union, or a religious sect, as a matter of course it appoints its managing committee, or its president, or its synod, or whatever else it may please to call its legislative and executive organ. Through the medium of this organ it acts, and speaks, and does its business; without this organ it would be an unmeaning and objectless list of names. Therefore I call it a truism to say that it is exceedingly desirable for the Church of England in New Zealand to have a form of government. The wonder is, indeed, that at this stage of our ecclesiastical existence we should have to enunciate so
In considering this state of things, I confess it seems to me difficult to resist the conclusion that even the endurance of it implies, in a degree, paralysis; contentment under it would imply the absence of life. A society that cannot make a law for the regulation of its own affairs, or express a corporate opinion, or do a corporate act; that is unable, in short, to perform any of the functions of life, can only by a great stretch of language be said to be a living body. Whatever may be the numbers and energy of its individual members, as a society, I say, it is virtually dead. However, such being the state of the Church of England, she has sent out numerous bodies of offspring to all parts of the world—I beg your pardon, she cannot send, because, as I have explained to you, as a Church she cannot do anything—I should have said numerous bodies of her offspring have gone out from her, bearing with them the principles and traditions of their spiritual mother, and they have to adapt these as best they can to a new set of political and social circumstances. Amongst other things they have to see how they can get on without government in a state of things which urgently requires corporate action. The Colonial Church is cast on her own resources altogether; she has, generally speaking, neither influence, nor funds, nor consideration bequeathed to her, or provided for her ready made; she must obtain them as she can by personal efforts, if I may use the term. But personal efforts require, of course, a
At the same time it would be only fair to say that the Church of England in the colonies is far from being on a level with other sects as regards freedom of action. Deprived as she is of the advantages resulting (or supposed to result) from state connexion, it is believed (for such is the absurdity of the system that no one seems to know exactly what its principles or practices are, but it is believed) that she still remains fettered by the liabilities which were the incidents
I have now, Sir, attempted to show why in the words of the resolution which I am about to propose, it appears desirable that a form of government for the Church of England in New Zealand should be established with as little delay as possible. I have attempted to explain that without it she cannot properly fulfil her most ordinary and necessary functions, and that to the want of it is mainly to be attributed the apathy and helplessness which are such melancholy characteristics of our colonial churches, I will next endeavour to corroborate the view I have taken by quoting the example set to us with respect to this matter by a sister church, which found itself not very long ago in circumstances analagous to our own. I mean the Protestant Episcopal Church of America. It is often said by enemies of the English Reformed Church that she is the creature of the state, dependent on her establishment and her endowments for existence, and incapable of standing like other ecclesiastical bodies, humanly speaking, by her own strength, and working with her own means; and I confess if I were to look at the present state of our colonial churches alone, I should find it difficult to rebut the sneer. But I can show another side to the picture. When the
I have been induced to say thus much on her constitution and progress, because as presenting the only instance of an ecclesiastical body in communion of the Church of England, which possesses a regularly constituted representative government, she affords the only available precedent for our own case, and also because the signal success which has attended a career begun under such discouraging circumstances, seems to show that, in order to fulfil her mission, the Church of England does not require endowments or state connexion; she only wants to have her hands untied, "a clear stage, and no favour." Of course I do not suppose that self-government is the only cause of the success of the American Church;
Again, it may be said that self-government will lead to rash and heterodox alterations in the formularies of worship and in the discipline of the Church. And here I must not be misunderstood; I would certainly claim, on the part of the New Zealand Church, the right of managing to the fullest extent its own affairs, including of course the regulation of worship, and the control over formularies. While it is necessary and right that the formularies of the Church of England should be the basis of union among those who combine to form a constitution for a Colonial Church, I must say that after it is formed I think it would be unworthy of our position as a national church to bind ourselves to those formularies for ever. Why should we not have the same right of revising from time to time our liturgies and articles to suit our circumstances, which every national Church, and which the Church of England herself, has repeatedly claimed and exercised? Are we afraid we shall exercise that natural and obvious right à priori probable; yet it is well known that the deviations actually made are altogether unimportant, both in number and character; nay, it is remarkable, and forms a remarkable testimony in favour of our formularies, that in several instances where alterations have been actually made, the Church has subsequently returned, after experience of the change, to the more ancient usage.
The last and by far the strongest objection to representative government which I shall consider, is founded on the difficulty of settling how the lay element in the proposed governing body shall be constituted—in other words, who shall possess the church franchise. This difficulty is undoubtedly a formidable one; indeed, it is hardly susceptible of a perfectly satisfactory solution; for in which ever way it be settled by any particular class of persons, it is always open to another class to ask them—who gave you authority to settle it? But this is not properly an objection; it is only a difficulty, and difficulties are made to be overcome. Although we may never arrive at the solution of the question which shall be logically satisfactory, we may get, in a rough and approximate way, at a settlement of it, which will be sufficient for all practical purposes. For example, a plan might be proposed by the highest authority in our Church, the Bishop or Bishops, involving a settlement of the franchise question; and if that plan were accepted by the clergy, and the great
After much and anxious reflection, I can see no proper qualification for a church franchise but that of full communion; arid I say this quite irrespectively of any doctrinal opinion about the nature and effects of that Holy Sacrament. I say it because this qualification, or something strictly equivalent to it, is in consonance with invariable usage in the ancient Church, and also indeed in every Christian denomination, except our own, of which I ever heard. I say so, moreover, because we can have otherwise absolutely no guarantee that those who assume to legislate for the Church are even nominally churchmen, still less that they observe those laws, an observance of which all her members admit to be of the very essence of Churchmanship, and while I entertain what many would consider very democratic views about the participation of the laity in Church Government, it is a sine qua non with me that they should be Church laity. Now, it seems a contradiction in terms to say that a man is in communion with the Church who never communicates. The very word communion, as applied indiscriminately to Christian fellowship, and to a participation in the Lord's Supper, proves that the two ideas are, in the minds of Christians, identical. Indeed, I may be wrong, but I cannot help thinking that those who hold a different view in this matter either have hardly thought out the question, or are mainly actuated by what I conceive to be a mistaken view of expediency. Some of them fear that non-communicants would be offended; but I must say I think a man who deliberately and habitually abstains from communion with the Church, is not one to i.e., a statement of Church membership, combined with a payment; and this is the franchise which has been apparently proposed for adoption in Wellington, and it may be said in South Australia also, for seat-renting involves in some degree a profession of Churchmanship as well as a money payment. To this rule I object, in the first place, that it does not secure the real Churchmanship of the governing body; and, in the second, that pecuniary payment ought not to be mixed up with Church franchises at all. Wherever it is adopted, the best Churchmen may be excluded because poor, while persons who are notoriously not churchmen will have votes in Church matters, and assist in making Church laws. On the whole, therefore, it does appear to me that no good reason can be assigned why the Church of England should adopt a more lax rule with respect to its franchises than any other ecclesiastical body.
I trust you will pardon me for this digression, if it be one, and for having intruded my own view of this subject on you at so much length. My object in doing so is not to procure any expression of opinion on it, still less the adoption of any practical step by the meeting; but merely to bring it before the mind of the public, in the sure hope that by full consideration and free discussion the objects which we all have at heart will be best promoted. It will perhaps be expected that I should say a few words as to the relation which the proposed body would bear to the Canterbury Association. My own view is this. It is perfectly competent for the Association to make any provision it pleases for the management of its own funds, but I have not the slightest doubt that if a body be constituted which shall really represent the Church in this settlement, the Association will, as a matter of course, hand over to it the management of its ecclesiastical fund. I will conclude by saying that the practical step we propose to
The following inaugural address to the Lyttelton Colonists' Society was delivered on the occasion of opening that institution, on the 30th June, 1852:—
Ladies and Gentlemen,
The committee who were appointed to make provisional arrangements for establishing the Lyttelton Colonists' Society have requested me to explain publicly the nature and objects of the Society, in order to justify and recommend so far as may be possible, its constitution and pretensions. I purpose to do so on two separate grounds—1st, that the institution we are forming is framed after the model of those which have been tried and found useful in the mother country; and, 2nd, that it is peculiarly suited to the peculiar characteristics and tendencies of a colonial community.
Upon the first of these points I need not enlarge. Most of you are aware that institutions more or less similar in character to this, have now for a long time been established in England under the names of Mechanics' Institutes, Athenæums, Literary Associations, and various other titles; that they have attained a wide extension, and exercised a very considerable influence. It would appear, indeed, that such institutions spring naturally and necessarily out of the tendencies of modern English Society. The direction of all changes and of all progress in countries inhabited by the Anglo-Saxon race is towards conferring more and more power on the masses of the people. But all such changes must be absolutely noxious, all such progress must be from bad to worse, unless they be founded on a corresponding advance of the people themselves in knowledge and enlightenment. The instruction of the people, therefore, which was formerly a boon to one class, is now felt to be a necessity for the sake of all classes. We cannot afford to let political power fall into the hands of barbarism and ignorance. If the people are to
I wish next to state some reasons for thinking these institutions peculiarly well suited to our circumstances and wants as colonists. To begin with: I hold, paradoxical as it may-appear, that the besetting sin of all society in a new country is, not idleness, but industry; or rather (to put this proposition in a less startling form), that society suffers as much by men working too much as by their working too little. You know what the old proverb says "all work and no play" makes people, and I am always afraid of our exemplifying its truth. I am always afraid of our becoming very "dull boys." Of course, you understand me, when I talk of too much work, I do not mean work in its widest and highest sense, as embracing and operating upon the whole domain of nature and art, and as signifying the exercise of every faculty of man—his imagination, his intellect and his heart, his soul and his body. Of work, so understood, there can never be too much; for, in this sense, the secret of civilization, the key to progress, the primary law of God's universe, is work. My idea of the state of perfection towards which man ought to be tending and striving is that of a state where all should be workers and none should be drones; a state where every one in his sphere, and according to his ability, should be ever contributing to the consummation of the universal work for which man was created and made. Do not for a moment suppose then that I advocate indolence, or that I undervalue the nobleness of work. All I mean to say is, that there may be too much of merely mechanical work, of work devoted to the sole purpose of making money, and providing the body with creature comforts; that there may be too much wool growing, too much store keeping, too much wood cutting, too much digging, to the neglect and exclusion of pursuits which tend to cultivate the intellect and purify the heart. That Divine saying, "Man doth not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God," is susceptible (if I may say so without presumption) of a far wider application than at first sight appears. What, I ask can find time for; but all men can afford some time: men in a new country can afford plenty of time for objects of the character I speak of. Depend upon it your happiness will be greater, your conscience lighter, your cares fewer, if you determine to spend some portion of your time and faculties and means in communing with the spiritual world; if you will occasionally forget for a while the present, and enter into relations with the past and the future; if you will recollect at times, that what we see and hear and touch constitutes but a small part of the realities among which we live, and which shall endure when time shall be no more.
Knowing, I say, how adverse the prevailing current of tone and presentiment in a colonial community is to the view which I am advocating, I rejoice exceedingly whenever any incident occurs to interrupt the ordinary course of that current, and to force us as it were to keep a sabbath or a jubilee. For example, I appeal to those among you who were present the other day on the solemn occasion of laying the corner-stone of our first church, when there was a general suspension of business in our little town, and almost every one seemed more or less to keep a religious holiday. Did general interest; and we propose that this should be done by every legitimate and available method; by means of books, of lectures, and of discussions. We wish to lay the first stone of a great educational institution, which shall grow with our growth and strengthen with our strength; and we more
I have said that a society such as this meets the special requirements of a colonial community. It appears to me, besides, especially adapted to the circumstances of our present political position. You are all aware that we hope within a few months to enjoy the privilege of managing our own public affairs. Now, whatever effects the expected change may produce, of this at least there can be no doubt, that it will immensely increase our obligations and our responsibilities. Within a very short time almost every man here present will have to make up his mind at least on one most important point—namely, as to whom he would like to represent his opinions in the Legislature of his country. Now, to do this well, to do it decently, he ought to have some general ideas about the matters with which that representative will have to deal. Of course it is not to be expected that men living by manual labour should go very deeply into questions of government and legislation. Of course the choice of a popular constituency must be, to a great extent, a matter of personal confidence; but that confidence should be founded upon reason; those who give it should be able, in some measure, to comprehend and appreciate the arguments
Again: not only the wide extent to which political power will probably be diffused here (that is, the lowness of the qualification attached to the franchise), but yet more, the natural equality of conditions and of influence existing in this country, make the diffusion of knowledge among our people particularly necessary. In England the wealthy and educated classes are so numerous and powerful, and there are so many checks on rash and hasty legislation, that the baneful effects of popular ignorance on government are, comparatively speaking, little felt. Here the antidote is wanting. Of necessity the immigration to a distant colony of men who have had a political education, and of men commanding extensive influence by wealth, or position, or personal reputation, is proportionally small. There is necessarily, therefore, a tendency to make the power of mere numbers more felt, and other powers less felt, than in older countries. It may be doubted whether in old countries universal suffrage be not favourable to the interests of an oligarchy or a despotism. Recent events in France would seem to countenance such an expectation. But here it must mean real democracy, because no machinery exists for turning it to any other than democratical purposes. These peculiarities of our social condition, rendering it as they do morally certain that the masses (to use the modern phrase) will be the real depositaries of political power, surely constitute so many arguments for enabling the masses, by every possible means, to exercise that power with reason,
Most of you know that it was determined some little time ago by the gentlemen composing the Society of Land Purchasers to dissolve that Society, and attempt to reconstitute it upon a new basis. It is not necessary for me to offer any opinion upon the wisdom and desirableness of this course; but I cannot refrain from taking this opportunity of publicly expressing my cordial and sincere thanks to the gentlemen I have referred to, for the constant and valuable assistance I received from their advice and co-operation in carrying on the business of this settlement. Whatever might be the extent to which the body called the Society of Land Purchasers represented the people of this settlement, or any particular class of the people, and whatever opinion may be formed as to the direct advantage which the people derived from its existence, there can be no doubt at least that it comprehended most of those who took an active interest in public affairs, or who had displayed capacity for dealing with them; and I need not say how valuable to me was the opportunity of consulting periodically twelve gentlemen, such as their Council consisted of, men of intelligence and information, coming from different parts of the settlement, and in the habit of meeting people of all avocations and of various opinions. However, for reasons satisfactory to themselves, and which have been ably explained by them at different times, they thought proper to dissolve their society, and to attempt its reconstruction on the footing of a popular body formed for the sole purpose of political discussion. The à priori reason why these different classes should keep apart from each other, no reason why a man who prefers books should refuse all connexion with the news-room, or why a votary of newspapers should abjure lectures and discussion, while there are many excellent reasons for their common action. Newspapers are very good in their way, and so are books; but there are many persons most anxious to learn whose cases they will not meet, because unfortunately those persons cannot read with sufficient facility to interest their attention continuously. Besides, books, and even newspapers, are not to be procured in this country with the same facility and cheapness as at home. An institution, therefore, proposing to diffuse knowledge by means of literature alone, is in danger of becoming exclusively made use of by the cultivated and opulent classes; the classes,
I dwell on this topic because I understand that at Christchurch the attempt to form an Association for these purposes, which should embrace all classes of the population, and be truly entitled thereby to the name of "The Colonist's Society," has to a certain extent failed—that is, that two societies are to be founded to perform the functions which we propose to perform with one. It would be impertinent in me to pronounce with whom the blame of this failure rests, or whether in truth blame attaches to any one. But I may be permitted, without presumption, to say that I regret it, not merely because in a small and poor community like this, unnecessary multiplication and separation of associated bodies involve a waste of funds, of machinery, and of individuals' time; but, still more, because under existing circumstances they cannot fail to produce ill-feeling and mutual repulsion. Unless the scopes and objects of the two societies be kept perfectly distinct and apart (which I hardly think possible in the present case), they will start decidedly in opposition to each other, and perhaps lay a foundation for lasting antagonism and animosity. Especially is this to be feared if anything like a class feeling be mixed up in the matter; that is, if there be a likelihood that the two bodies will be recruited chiefly from different classes of society. It appears to me that institutions like these form a particularly good common ground on which the whole community may meet. We all want instruction of some kind; if a man learns nothing else by joining them, he learns at least to know the feelings and opinions of the community in which he lives, and moral qualification. I am sure you will not misunderstand me, or suppose that because I speak thus, I have any serious apprehension that my warning is needed; but it is my duty to give it nevertheless.
I will now consider the main objection which has been made to our proceedings, on the ground that we combine what are said to be incompatible objects—the objects of a Mechanics' Institute and those of a political society. I am not quite sure whether the objection is generally made to the admission of politics at all, or only to the treatment of politics in the way of debate and discussion. But I will assume the former to be the case, and that the admixture of politics at all, in any way, with the literary department of the institution is objected to. If so, I think I have a right to say that the burden of proof is on those who hold this view. I think they are bound to show, on very conclusive grounds, why they would attempt to exclude from a society instituted speaking about them. But suppose we try to draw this somewhat arbitrary line, we are met by another difficulty. What are politics? How will you define, for the purpose of excluding them? The term politics, if you come to consider it accurately, is only another word for "subjects of general interest," because all such subjects necessarily become, at some time or other, matters for political treatment, and are comprehended therefore in political science. It would be literally impossible, therefore, to speak on any subject with which the politician has no concern, and which therefore can properly be said to have no connexion with politics. It may be said that this reasoning is too fine-drawn, and that though it be impossible in theory to distinguish political from literary and scientific subjects, yet in practice the distinction is felt and acted upon. I do not think so—attempts are constantly made to do so, but I deny that they are successful. The distinction is not real or practical, and you cannot carry it out. In many countries the fine arts constitute an important political department, and statesmen differ and quarrel about them far more than about war and peace, democracy and despotism. In our own country questions of exact science, such as the broad and narrow guage, the application of electricity to communications, and many others which will easily suggest themselves to you, have often formed subjects of deliberation and decision for British statesmen and idea of the Athenæum in Wellington is that politics are not to be introduced. Well, it so happens that in the last Wellington paper I took up I saw a notice to the effect that a gentleman was going to lecture on "Hungary and the Hungarians." If he can manage to do that without touching on politics, I will only say he will show a very remarkable genius for metaphysical analysis. So is it always; every society of a like nature professing to exclude politics is ever doubting and disputing in the attempt to decide what ought and what ought not to be excluded under that name; in other words, in the attempt to realize a distinction which does not exist. It is true that different "subjects of general interest" may be treated more or less politically—that is, with more or less reference to legislative or governmental action upon them, and that some subjects are more likely to be so treated than others; but you will always find that the difference is in degree, not in kind, and that it is impossible to lay down, or at least to observe a definite rule on the point which would possess any practical value. I have already expressed my opinion that if any such rule could be established, and if it were effectual, its result would be to exclude from your consideration precisely the topics on which it is desirable that you should be informed, and I will not enlarge further on that point.
I have only left myself time to touch briefly on what I suppose to be the chief motive for desiring to exclude politics—a fear, namely, lest the introduction might lead to quarreling. Now, that it There had been a great dispute a few days previously in a boat race at Lyttelton as to whether a small boy could be included in the word "steersman."may lead to quarreling it would be absurd to deny, because political questions are, as I have said, precisely questions of general interest treated with a
Mr. Godley then proceeded to state in detail the arrangements that had been made for bringing the society into operation, the opening of the library, the newspapers that had been ordered, the numbers enrolled, &c. He concludod by reminding the meeting of the great opportunities of public education, both for themselves and their children, which were enjoyed by the people of this settlement compared to other infant colonies, and he earnestly invited them to avail themselves of those opportunities. He said that he trusted to see the time when it would be considered disgraceful in New Zealand to be without the rudiments at least of a good education; and that, for himself, if he could look back in after life to having contributed in the smallest degree towards so great and noble an object, he would, on that account alone, dwell with thankfulness and satisfaction on his residence at Canterbury.
The New Zealand Constitution Act was passed by the Imperial Parliament in 1852, and was brought into operation at the close of the year.
On Wednesday, November 10, a deputation consisting of the Rev. O. Mathias, Captain Simeon, Messrs. Watts Russell, FitzGerald, J. T. Cookson, Hamilton, Wakefield, Spowers, Birch, Draper, Prichard, Porter, and the Hon. J. S. Wortley, waited upon Mr. Godley, to present him with a requisition to allow himself to be put in nomination as Superintendent of this Province. The requisition was, with scarce an exception, signed by every individual in the settlement who had access to it. Mr. Godley replied as follows:—
Gentlemen,
It would be most unbecoming and most ungrateful in me to answer such an address as the one before me, presented in such a manner, and under such circumstances, in the language of ordinary compliment. The relations between you and myself are, I hope and believe, of such a nature as to justify me in talking over the matter familiarly, as with intimate friends. I have lived among the people of this settlement now for two years in habits of constant and unreserved intercourse. I am acquainted with everybody, and everybody is acquainted with me; they have had the most ample opportunities of knowing my character, public and private, as well as my views on almost every matter of public interest connected with the colony. When, therefore, having such knowledge of me, they come forward literally as one man, and press me with an affectionate earnestness which evidently comes from the heart, to remain among them, and to accept the highest civil appointment in their power to bestow, I might be pardoned if such a proposal excited in my mind pride and satisfaction of no ordinary kind. Yet, in truth, the feelings uppermost in my mind just now are not those of pride and satisfaction; they are much rather grief at being compelled to decline your offer, and a half remorseful doubt as to whether I am right in declining it. This subject has bonâ fide colonists, men who are thoroughly identified with the settlement in prospects and interests, and who do not look forward to leaving it more or less immediately for England. I had hoped until lately that I might be present at the first session of the Provincial Council, and assist at the transfer of the waste lands to that body. But, in the first place, I now find that there is no chance of the session taking place within such a period as would allow me to be present at it, and also to go to England next year, for it would be very imprudent in me to meet an English climate first in winter.
The following lecture on the provisions of the Constitution Act was delivered to the Colonists' Society at Lyttelton on the 1st December, 1852:—
The most convenient introduction to a lecture on the Constitutional Law lately enacted for New Zealand will be, I think, a very brief and general summary of the Constitution it is intended to displace—that is, under which we now live.
That Constitution is founded on an Act of Parliament, passed in 1840, by which her Majesty was authorized to erect New Zealand into an independent colony, and to constitute a form of Government for it by Letters Patent. In pursuance of this Act, Letters Patent were issued, commonly called the New Zealand Charter of 1840, by which New Zealand was made a separate colony; the executive power was entrusted to a Governor and Executive Council, and the legislative power to a Governor and Legislative Council. The Executive Council was to consist of the Colonial Secretary, Colonial Treasurer, and Attorney-General; the Legislative Council to consist of the same officers, with the addition of the three Justices of the Peace, whose names should be standing first in order in the commission of the peace, such commission being liable to be revoked and renewed at the pleasure of the Governor.
Elaborate instructions accompanied the Charter, limiting in a great many particulars the Governor's discretion in the exercise of the legislative powers vested in him by the Charter, and limiting still further the powers of the Legislative Council, as contra-distinguished from the Governor. The instructions provided that no Ordinance should be enacted unless previously proposed by the Governor, and they enumerated a long catalogue of forbidden subjects on which the Governor was prohibited from proposing or assenting to
It seems at first sight difficult to imagine why so elaborate and complicated a method for giving effect to the wishes of the Colonial Minister for the time being was devised, and what use to any body there could be in a Council selected entirely by the Governor, discussing only measures proposed by the Governor, and incapable of bringing any laws into operation until sent home to be approved or disapproved there. The only shadow or pretence of power which it had was negative—the power, that is, of refusing to pass the Governor's laws, and I leave you to imagine how much chance there was of that ever happening, when three out of the seven members were the Governor's own paid servants, and the other three nominated by him, and holding their seats at his pleasure, while he himself was to possess a casting vote in addition to his original one.
I can understand, nay, I can appreciate the advantages of a pure monarchy. For dependencies inhabited (as our penal colonies were at first) only by convicts and soldiers, or (as our Indian empire still is) by people incapable of working representative institutions, a local despotism is probably the best form of Government. Indeed, I have always considered the particular form of a Colonial Government as (although of course very important) still secondary in importance when compared with its localization. I am tempted to go the length of saying that the best possible men, governing a distant colony from England, would do more unwise and mischievous things than the worst possible men, living in the colony, and supported by no influence external to the colony. It is not then at present the power of the Governor which I am animadverting upon as pernicious. It is the absurd and anomalous mechanism by which, on the one hand, his
The Act and Charter above referred to were repealed and abrogated in 1846, but revived in 1848, with an additional provision for increasing the number of Nominee Councillors, and for enabling the Governor and Council to constitute Provincial Councils. That Act and Charter, therefore, are the instrument of Government under which you now live, for it is not worth while to describe in detail the provisions of an Ordinance establishing Provincial Councils, which Sir George Grey passed in 1848; the Constitution framed by it possessed no vitality, and practically expired after one feeble session. Still less need I discuss the second and still more futile measure carried by the Governor last year with a similar object. This latter measure, as you all know, never came into operation at all, and has just been comfortably buried out of our sight.
What I have said may suffice to introduce a consideration of the Constitutional Law which has just been enacted for New Zealand.
It is not my intention to take up your time with an enumeration and a detailed criticism of every clause and every provision in the Constitution Act. I will assume that you have made yourselves acquainted with the substance of it already, and that what you wish to hear is rather a comment upon its general spirit, illustrated by occasional reference to particular clauses—an exposition, if I may use the phrase, of the philosophy of the measure, than any attempt at a complete and exhaustive analysis. With this view of my subject, I propose to divide my observations on it into three heads, viz., those which apply to—1, the relations which will subsist, under this Constitution, between the colony and the mother country; 2, the relations between the Central and
Notwithstanding the concessions made in this Act to the improved state of public opinion in reference to colonial affairs, notwithstanding the practical advance in a right direction which it exhibits, there is still much in it of what may be called the old leaven. The concessions seem to have been rather extorted one by one from necessity, and by importunity, than dictated by an enlarged comprehension of true doctrine. I see no consistency in the construction of the scheme, no leading principle upon which some things are given, and some withheld. If the modern theory of Colonial Government, that, namely, which has been acted upon for the last eighty years, be right, we have got too much power; on the other hand, if the old theory, upon which the colonies of Rhode Island and Maryland were founded, be right, we ought to have a great deal more. I will explain what I mean: the essence of the former or modern theory is an idea that the Crown (which is the formula for expressing the Imperial authority whatever that may be) has in each colony an interest, not only distinct from, but opposed to the interest of the inhabitants of the colony. This notion pervades, colours, and shapes the whole modern policy of Great Britain towards her colonies. Those who hold it consider, of course, that their first duty, as loyal servants of the Crown, is to take care that whatever may be done for, or granted to colonists, shall be consistent with the retention, in its plenitude, of the "authority of the Crown." This is the phrase that occurs everywhere: in despatches, instructions, debates, charters, and laws. If we attempt to show that such and such a provision—say the power of disallowance of colonial laws within two years—is a practical grievance, we are met, not by an argument to show that there are practical advantages in the provision, but by the same axiomatic phrase—"the power of the Crown à priori notion of the prerogative. "They will not surrender the prerogatives of the Crown." Even in the very latest discussion of colonial affairs of which we have intelligence, Lord Grey, according to the newspaper report, refuses to consent to the demands of the Legislature of New South Wales for local self-government, because they are in his opinion "irreconcileable with monarchial institutions;" and Lord Derby expresses his adhesion to that sentiment by an emphatic cheer. But I need not multiply examples; they will easily occur to every one of you.
The practical operation of this doctrine is the establishment in all modern colonies of a system which is the converse of what we call local self-government. A system, of which the main principle is that an unlimited power of interference with and control over every matter and every person connected with the making of colonial laws, and administering colonial government, should be reserved to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Of course, this unlimited power will be exercised more or less frequently and offensively by different Ministers; but the Downing-street theory requires that they should all possess it, and be restricted in its exercise solely by their own prudence and sense of right. The system, as hitherto worked, is consistent and complete. A Governor is appointed by the Colonial Minister in the name of the Crown, and holds his office at that Minister's pleasure. It is expressly provided that he shall be subject to instructions from the Minister. His tenure of office is, speaking generally, not not necessarily according to the law by which they are appropriated, but as he pleases. This power was admittedly used in a manner directly contrary to law in 1850-1, and I presume it will be again used illegally after the present year, as the Legislature has, I believe, only appropriated the revenue up to that time. Now I can see no practical way of controlling this power; the Treasurer is responsible to the Governor, but the Governor is practically not responsible at all. If he can make sure of being "backed" at home, I can see nothing to prevent him, upon any case of asserted necessity, from appropriating as he pleases, by means of this power, the whole revenue of the colony.
On the whole, it is evident that theoretically, as well as practically, the authority of the Secretary of State (acting in the name of the Crown) over modern British colonies is uncontrolled and complete. Against his will, if he chooses to enforce it, the colonists can do absolutely nothing—cannot make a railroad, pass a vagrant act, nor dismiss a constable. It is vain to say that he does not, and will not, interfere vexatiously and oppressively; the most abject servitude is always mitigated, more or less, by the prudence or humanity or indolence of the masters. If he please he can do it universally; as a matter of fact, he does it often enough to constitute an intolerable grievance. But it is not after all his personal interference that constitutes the worst part of the system: the worst part is, that his authority, supreme and paramount, gives to his legal delegate powers of practical despotism, such as no merely local despot could safely exercise for any length of time. Upon a colonial Governor, speaking generally, the colonists have no hold at all. Their public opinion is nothing to him; their physical force he laughs at; his eyes are always turned to England. If he can make things smooth and pleasant there, he can afford to treat with supreme contempt the remonstrances of the community
This exposition of the principle which runs through and supports the central system of Colonial Government is not irrelevant. I want to show you how this principle works in an inconsistent, that is, a partial and diluted manner throughout the whole of our new Constitution. The framers of it did not recognize, perhaps did not comprehend the radical viciousness of the Constitution which they found existing; they have dealt, therefore, only with what appeared to them its practical grievances.
It is impossible not to see that the same paramount and controlling power which was reserved to the Crown by the former Constitution is also reserved by this. The Governor, subject as usual to instructions from home, appoints to executive offices, possesses the power of unlimited veto, authorizes the issue of moneys, has his civil list reserved—in short, is both theoretically and practically independent of the colonists, while both theoretically and practically he exercises an immense power in the management of their affairs. Besides this, the power of disallowance by the Crown at its pleasure, that is, at the pleasure of the Minister, is preserved.
It is true that there are two checks upon this power of the Minister and of his officer; one is the power granted within certain limits to the representatives of the people over the
It will be their business to maintain and to prove that the fundamental principle of the modern theory of Colonial Government is erroneous, inasmuch as the Crown has and can have no interest distinct from, still less opposed to that of the people of the colony, with but one exception: that is except in connection with their relations towards foreign powers. more interested in and better acquainted with the subject. It is really childish to go on repeating the formular phrase "monarchical institutions," and making the Queen as it were the scapegoat of her Ministers' sins and follies. That colonists should make laws for regulating their own affairs, and choose officers for administering them, without the assent or interference of the Crown, involves no more an undue encroachment on the prerogative than that the corporation of London, or the University of Oxford, or the East India Company should do so. If we look to precedents of constitutional law, we find that in the reigns of Charles I. and Charles II., when doctrines of prerogative were at the highest, rights such as we now claim were freely granted to the Worth American colonies. Maryland, Connecticut, and Rhode Island possessed complete legislative and executive power by charter, subject only to the vague and inoperative condition that they should make no law "repugnant to the laws of England;" and it is certainly strange to hear Lord Grey and Lord Derby in 1852 denouncing as anti-monarchical, doctrines which Wentworth and Hyde did not hesitate to apply in 1634 and 1662. The charter granted by Charles to Connecticut ordained that the Assembly should consist of a governor, deputy governor, twelve assistants, and two deputies from every town, to be chosen by the freemen. The Assembly had authority to appoint judicatories, elect officers, make freemen, establish laws, "not repugnant," &c., "according to the course of other
If, on the other hand, discarding empty names, we look to the reality of things, what becomes of the flimsy talk about the supremacy of the Crown? We all know—those know best in whose mouth the phrase is most frequently found— that the Crown means the Colonial Minister of the day, uncontrolled and unchecked, except in some extreme and rare cases, by the influence of public opinion, acting through the House of Commons. The question is not between the Crown and the people—not at all. It is between the Imperial Government and the Local Government; between the mother country and the colony. Until the Crown's power of vetoing colonial Acts and appointing to colonial offices be given up, the colonies cannot be said to possess rights of local self-government. Politically speaking, they are either practically enslaved, or at best only free by sufferance.
The next point connected with the relations between the mother country and the colony to which I will draw your attention, is the reserved schedule or civil list. By the Act, £16,000 a-year is reserved from the power of the Assembly, and appropriated in a manner partly fixed by the Act itself, and partly to be fixed by the Governor, under instructions from home. This civil list is not a large one it is true; it is a much smaller one than colonies are generally saddled with, but it is nevertheless an important grievance, both theoretically as a badge of political servitude, and practically as the British Parliament should fix their salaries, and until the people of New Zealand have some other more direct and legitimate mode of making their public servants responsible, I shall object to any tampering with the means of control which is afforded by a command of the public purse. I cannot see the slightest real difference between the grievance of an imposed civil list and the grievance for the removal of which the Americans rebelled. It is just the same under another name—taxation without representation.
The last point connected with this part of my subject which I shall mention refers to the position and functions of the Governor. There are three distinct views which may be taken of the Governor's office. It is necessary that we should make up our minds which to prefer.
One view is that which has been of late years universally applied throughout the British Empire; according to it the Governor appointed by and responsible to the Imperial Government, is altogether independent of the colonists, yet always takes an important part in administering their affairs, local officer. He was not, so far as I can make out, the organ or the representative of the Crown at all, held no commission from it, and was not subject to its instructions. In some cases he was chosen by the colonists; in others (as in the proprietary Governments), his office was hereditary. In all the cases to which I am alluding, his functions were essentially municipal, and his position completely independent of the mother country. The third view is one which has never yet been brought into complete or consistent operation, but to which there has been for some years a tendency, more or less marked, to approximate in the more powerful colonies of Great Britain. According to this view the Governor would be primarily an Imperial officer, holding his commission from the Crown, subject to its instructions, and representing its interests. With respect to the colonists, he would stand somewhat in the position now held by the Sovereign of Great Britain towards his subjects; that is, he would administer their affairs entirely through the instrumentality of advisers responsible to the representatives of the people, and possessing their confidence. Among these different theories of the Colonial Governor's office it will be necessary for you to choose when you demand, as of course you will demand, a reform of your Constitution.
Of the first, which contemplates the Governor as an Imperial officer practically governing the colonists, it is not necessary that I should speak further, most of the observations which I have already addressed to you, being directed to show that it is irremediably pernicious and bad. The second, which contemplates the Governor as a colonial officer only, has the advantage of having been carried into eminently successful operation, both in the old colonies to which I have
It is superfluous to remind you that the Government of England is administered upon the principle of the responsibility of the Ministers of the Crown to the representatives of the people. The Sovereign, or Chief Governor, reigns by hereditary right, and is therefore independent and irresponsible; but the Ministers, through whom he is obliged to act, are not only responsible de jure, but are also de facto dependent on Parliament for the means of carrying on the Government. Indirectly, therefore, the people of England exercise a complete control over the Executive, or at least a control sufficient for all practical purposes, and excluding the possibility of direct collision. This system, which is not the result of deliberate contrivance, but which has grown as it were imperceptibly out of the conflicts and struggles of British political parties, has been to a certain extent adopted in the North American colonies which still own allegiance to Great Britain; in Canada, in Nova Scotia, and I believe (though I am not sure) in New Brunswick and Newfoundland. In these colonies the executive officers are chosen by the Governor, but they are chosen from among men who possess the confidence of the Legislative Assembly, and from those only. A decisive defeat in the House on what is considered a question of confidence is fatal to the existence of the defeated Ministry, and results in the elevation of their victorious opponents. Now this system, which works very well in England, presents undoubtedly many difficulties when we attempt to apply it to her dependencies. In the first place, it is a question whether Colonial Governors, who are, be it remembered, not only Governors, but also responsible and subordinate officers of the Imperial Government, can be trusted to carry on the administration of the colony
I will next state what are, in my view, the questions which it would be right and proper to reserve from colonial jurisdiction, and place under the exclusive cognizance of the Imperial Government; and in doing so I will use the words of one of a series of resolutions moved by Mr. Adderley in the British House of Commons, as an amendment on the Australian Constitutional Bill:—"The only subjects which concern the interests and honour of the Empire with relation to these distant dependencies of her Majesty are—1st, the allegiance of the colonies to her Majesty's Crown; 2nd, the naturalization of aliens; 3rd, whatever relates to treaties between the Crown and any foreign power; 4th, all political intercourse and communications between any of the colonies and any officer of a foreign power; 5th, whatever relates to the employment, command, and discipline of her Majesty's troops and ships within the colonies, and whatever relates to
The only point connected with the relations between the colony and the mother country which it remains for me to discuss is that which regards the judiciary. It is a question whether there ought to be an appeal from the Colonial Courts
I shall now pass to the second division of my subject—viz., the relation between the General Government of New Zealand and the Provincial Governments.
There are two methods of carrying into effect the principles of what may be called a complex or aggregate system of government, by which I mean a system of government that contemplates the same people as living under two or more concurrent jurisdictions, and provides two or more sets of political institutions for them—viz., central institutions for managing that portion of affairs which may be considered to affect the whole people directly; and separate institutions for managing that portion which has only a limited and local interest. By the first method the central and the municipal governments are constituted in the relation of freedom in a co and sub-ordination. The Central Government, possessing original and supreme power, delegates certain of its functions for purposes of convenience to the muncipality, retaining, however, in its own hands an unlimited and discretionary control over the acts of its delegate. Such is the relation which exists in England between Parliament and the municipal corporations, Universities, chartered companies, &c., was so argued on behalf of the American colonies at the time of the revolution, and especially an attempt was made to draw a distinction between powers of legislation and powers of taxation; but I can find nothing in the reasoning used by the Americans which appears to me to deserve serious consideration. I most fully agree with Mr. Burke, where he says, "The Parliament of Great Britain sits at the head of her empire in two capacities: one as the local legislature, providing for all things at home and immediately; the other is what I call her imperial capacity, in which she superintends and controls all the several inferior legislatures and guides and controls them all without annihilating any. But in order to enable Parliament to answer the ends of provident and beneficent superintendence, its powers must be boundless." I need not say that I agree with him as fully when he says that this power, theoretically boundless, should be most rarely, sparely, and discriminately used; that noninterference should be the rule, interference the exception; that, "if we intemperately, unwisely, fatally, unsophisticate and poison the very source of government, by urging subtle deductions and consequences odious to those we govern, from the illimitable nature of supreme sovereignty, we shall teach them by these means to draw our sovereignty itself into question. If that sovereignty and their freedom cannot be reconciled, they will cast our sovereignty in our face, for nobody will be argued into slavery." Would that the mighty statesman's words, of which he lived to see the melancholy verification, had been graven on the hearts of those who since that time have swayed the destinies of our colonial empire!
But this is a digression. I have said that the relation of British colonies to Parliament brings them into the first category of what I have called aggregate systems of government. The second category comprises those systems of government which are formed on the principle of federation. In these it is not a supreme Central Government that delegates certain limited functions to Local Governments, but a number of independent and sovereign States agree for their mutual benefit to combine, and to delegate a certain portion of their sovereignty to a Central Government. Of course it follows from this process that instead of, as in the former case, the Central Government remaining supreme and permanent in all things over the Local Governments, the latter retain in full integrity all the powers which they have not expressly delegated, and in respect of these powers are as completely sovereign and independent as they were before the union. Such were the principles on which in ancient times the Amphictyonic and Achean, and in modern times the German and Dutch confederacies were founded. Such, too, is the relation which subsists between the separate States of the American Union and the Federal Government, and between the Cantons of Switzerland and the Government of the Helvetic League. In framing the Constitution of this colony, to which physical circumstances as well as moral considerations, made the application of one or other of these systems desirable, it lay with Parliament to determine which of the two they would give it. Were they to treat the Central Government as though it had been the original constituent authority, and to give it those paramount prevailing and controlling powers over the whole colony of New Zealand which Parliament itself possesses over the whole British Empire? Or were they to treat the provinces as integral independent units, and starting as it were from that idea, to make them give up only just so much governmental authority to the Central Government as might be considered necessary for the general good, retaining all powers not so expressly delegated?
I need not tell you that the former was the plan which the Minister proposed and Parliament adopted. Your Constitution provides that the Central Legislature of New Zealand shall have an unlimited power of making laws for New Zealand, so far, that is, as is consistent with its subordination to the mother country. There are certain subjects enumerated which the Provincial Legislatures are not to touch, with which the Central Legislature therefore alone can deal; but there is no corresponding restriction on the powers of the Central Government: on the contrary, it is enacted "that the laws made by the General Assembly shall control and supersede all laws in anywise repugnant thereto, which may have been made prior thereto by any Provincial Council, and any law made by any Provincial Council shall, so far as the same is repugnant to or inconsistent with any Act passed by the General Assembly, be null and void." Carrying out the same view, the Act makes all the legislation of the Provincial Councils to be subject to the Governor's disallowance. It enables the Governor to disallow also the election of the Superintendent, and requires that the Superintendent shall obey the Governor's instructions implicitly with regard to the exercise of all his functions. Indeed the Superintendent has no power conferred on him by the Act, except the nominal power which it hardly required the authority of Parliament to confer, of transmitting drafts of laws for the consideration of the Provincial Council, and of giving and withholding assent to Bills, in accordance with instructions from the Governor. I will consider this part of my subject in relation first to the legislative, and next to the executive powers of the Central and the Provincial authorities respectively. Upon the first question, whether the Provincial Legislature should or should not have been made by the Constitutional Act independent of the Central Legislature, I do not feel so strongly as most of those with whom I generally agree. I attach, too, more importance than I think they do to the inconvenience and evils of having these islands cut up into six or eight
Still feeling all this very strongly, I cannot see but that at present this colony is not fit for centralized government; not merely because communications are imperfect, but because you really cannot get people to make politics a profession,
The only powers which it occurs to me as essential that the Central Legislature should retain are—
The reasons for prohibiting the Provincial Legislatures from exercising most of the powers above referred to are too obvious to require enumeration. With respect to the first of them however, namely, the power of unlimited taxation given to the Central Government, it may be necessary to remind you that it is absolutely necessary, because it is quite impossible to say what emergencies the Central Government may have to provide for. In all probability, however, its requirements will be met by indirect taxation—that is, by duties on consumption, which in fact constitute the only perfectly equitable mode of taxing populations so differently placed and circumstanced as the inhabitants of the various provinces of New Zealand. The only question which appears to me at all doubtful is whether the power of making and altering the criminal laws, and of establishing civil and criminal courts of the supreme kind, should be left in the hands of the Central or Provincial Legislatures; but on the whole I am of opinion that the diversity and conflict of laws and of judicial administration, are greater evils than those incident to a centralized judiciary. Besides, at present the business and the resources of the provinces are not sufficient to occupy the time and pay the salaries of competent judicial officers. If the question of the waste lands were a fresh one, i.e., if there were no pre-existing circumstances complicating the whole matter, by affecting differently the different parts
I now come to the question of the Executive. Whatever may be the limits which the Central Legislature may consent to fix between its own jurisdiction and that of the provincial authorities, it is essential that it should carry into effect the legislative powers which it may retain by means of its own officers. You ought not, I am convinced, to think of making the officers charged with executing its mandates responsible to the provincial authorities. I have heard many people talk as though they thought it would be desirable to place the officers of the Customs and of the Postal Service, and other departments which are admitted to be Central, in the gift and under the direction of the Provincial Superintendent. Such a plan is out of the question, if the complex system is to work at all, and the Islands are not to be divided into six distinct and independent Governments. It was fully tried, to speak of no earlier instances (such as the Amphictyonic and Germanic Leagues) in the first confederation of the United States, and broke down thoroughly and hopelessly within ten years. The articles of that Confederation provided that Congress should deal only with the States, not with the individuals inhabitating the States; should impose contingents, not collect taxes; should make laws on various subjects, but not possess any machinery for executing them. The result was the utter impotence of Congress. The States refused, or rather neglected to pay its contingents, or to execute its laws, and it was helpless: it had no means of forcing or of punishing them. Under these circumstances,
On the other hand, it is not less important that the Provincial Executive should be made independent of the Central. The Constitution as it now stands leaves this part of the subject (whether from inadvertence or not I cannot say), in a strange state of confusion and anomaly. The name and the popular idea of the Superintendent would seem to point him out as the head of the Provincial Executive, but the Act confers no executive powers on him at all. He will be in fact little better than a sinecurist (and by no means a dignified one), for he will have nothing else to do, but to execute the orders of the Governor, as regards the allowance or disallowance of bills, and some other legislative proceedings of a merely formal character—orders which might be carried into effect just as well, so far as I can see, by means of a communication from the Governor to the Speaker of the Council. It is possible, no doubt, that the Governor may by
Now I cannot conceive that this system should work tolerably for one year, for one month. I cannot anticipate anything but confusion and conflict as the result of an officer elected by the people being the organ and representative of the Governor. In many of the provinces—perhaps in all— the Superintendents will, as a matter of fact, be men who have been distinguished for their opposition to the Government—certainly men between whom and the Governor there will be no mutual confidence. At any rate it may be so, now and always; and over such men, when once in office, the Governor will have no means of exercising any effectual control. It is true he will have the power of giving them instructions; but suppose they disobey those instructions, as they infallibly will do if they dislike them, what will he do? The Superintendents, backed by the people who have chosen them, who pay them, and who (I will assume) sympathize with their views, will no doubt refuse to act the anomalous and subordinate part assigned to them; and, if so, the Governor can do nothing, except either give way, or bring things to a dead lock, which will produce a chronic rebellion. I am confident, therefore, that the Assembly must at once propose that this blot in the existing system be removed, by making the Superintendents chiefs of the Provincial Executive, and supreme within the limits of their local jurisdictions. This is quite irrespective of the question treated above, as to whether the legislation of the Central Assembly should over-ride that of the Provincial Councils or not. For example, the legislation of Parliament in England can over-ride at its
I now come to a point of great importance in connection with the distribution of powers between the Central and Provincial Governments—I mean the constitution and functions of the Judiciary. However the distribution of powers may be settled, it is of primary importance that it should be settled by law, and that the law should be interpreted and enforced by an independent tribunal. We ought to know exactly what the Central Government is or is not to do, and what the Provincial Government is or is not to do. The worst distribution fixed and known is better than one depending on arbitrary caprice. As the matter stands at present, the Central Legislature can do anything it pleases, and the Governor-in-Chief anything he pleases, so far as any rights of the Provincial Legislature and Executive are concerned; so that in fact no man would be safe in acting on a Provincial law until it shall have been sanctioned and confirmed by the Central Legislature. It is essential, therefore, that, when the Central Legislature shall have formally abandoned certain powers to the Provinces, from thenceforward all questions of jurisdiction be referred to the Supreme Court of the Colony; and that this Court, moreover, shall be so constituted as not to be, nor even to appear dependent or partial. At present, in whatever estimation we may hold the character of particular Judges, the composition of the Judiciary of this colony is such as necessarily to deprive colonists (violating by the way a sound principle by naming the sum which they are to receive); but it never occurred to Parliament that it might be advisable to make them independent of the Crown and the Governor as well; that, I suppose, we should be told, would have been "inconsistent with monarchical institutions;" so the Judicial Bench is left independent of those whose occasional control might possibly be beneficial; dependent on those who, as they have no interest, ought to have no voice in the matter at all. A reform, then, in the position of the Judges of the Supreme Court ought to be one of the first to occupy the Legislature of New Zealand.
I now come to the third division of my subject—namely, the form and functions of the different departments of the Government, and the remaining features of the Act, which have not been discussed under the two previous heads.
I will take first the office of Superintendent. This functionary is to be elected by the people for a term precisely corresponding to that of the Provincial Councils' existence; his appointment is subject to the disallowance of the Governor, and he is liable to be dismissed on an address of the Provincial Council. The functions which the Act gives him are wholly concerned with the making of laws; and the provision for his their instance. So that the upper branch, of which the sole apparent use is to be a check and balance to the lower, is deliberately placed in the power as regards those important particulars, of its legislative colleague. If the Superintendent disallow a bill, forthwith the Council addresses the Governor to dismiss him. It is true that the Governor may refuse, and this is the best chance the poor man has of enjoying his office for a reasonable term, the Governor and the Council being tolerably sure to be on such a footing with respect to each other, that if he displeases the former he will be backed by the latter, and vice versâ. But if the Governor refuse to dismiss him when called upon, the Council will stop his salary, which will probably decide the question for all practical purposes, whether the Governor like it or no. On the whole I cannot imagine a public officer placed in a more perplexing and humiliating position; not knowing what he is to be or to do; in one sense the representative of the people, in another the creature of the Governor; bound by the terms of his contract to serve two masters, who
I do not think it necessary that I should add anything to what I have already said on the subject of the Provincial Legislature. I will repeat that, the only limit to its powers should be the limit of his jurisdiction. I mean that whenever the subjects on which it may legislate shall have been fixed by the Central Assembly, thenceforward upon those subjects it should be supreme; that its legislation should not be referred to the Governor for his sanction, nor be subject to be over-ridden by the concurrent jurisdiction of the Central Legislature. If the Central or Provincial Legislature exceed its powers, of course its acts, pro tanto, ought to be void, and the question whether it have done so or not in any particular case, should be decided by the Supreme Court, or whatever may be the proper judicial tribunal.
I will only say a few words in passing on the subject of the franchise, for I fear it has now ceased to be a practical question. In my opinion the qualification fixed by the Act, involving as it does almost what is vulgarly but improperly called universal suffrage, is too low. I hold that before the responsible and arduous privileges of an elector under a popular constitution be entrusted, some approximate test of reasonable competence on the part of the trustees should at least be sought for, and I do not think that every man twenty-one years old, or every occupier of a house worth £5, is capable of exercising even indirectly the functions of a legislator with advantage to the community. I think we should endeavour by some more stringent process to distinguish the more moral, more industrious, more educated, and more intelligent part of the community from the rest, and to class permanently excluded by it (that is if it were not too high); all that it would do would be to involve the necessity of a certain apprenticeship, in the case of men living by manual labour, before they could obtain the franchise, and to exclude altogether from the management of public affairs those only who should prove themselves incompetent to manage their own. Nothing has ever impressed upon me more strongly the careless and contemptuous manner in which colonial questions are treated by British statesmen, than the fact that men who would sacrifice half their estates sooner than consent to the establishment of a franchise like this in England, either contentedly acquiesce in, or actually advocate the enactment of it for New Zealand. It is really incredible that upon this all important question of the suffrage under the new Constitution, not a single observation, so far as I can discover, was made in either House of Parliament.
Independently of general reasoning, there has always appeared to me to be a special ground for desiring the establishment of a property qualification for electors in New as an individual, before you allowed him to exercise political privileges, you would probably insure that, speaking generally, your Maori constituency would be composed either of chiefs or of men who had adopted to some extent European habits, at least who had learned to practice the virtues of industry, perseverance, prudence, and self-denial. Such men would really in most cases be very useful and worthy citizens of a free state, while at the same time, without imposing any invidious distinctions, you would practically limit their numbers, so as to secure the natural and just preponderance of the white race.
As the case now stands, I regard by no means without uneasiness the possibility of the constituencies being utterly "swamped" by Maoris. I do not know exactly how the law may come to be worked, but if it be worked fairly and impartially, I foresee that in the Northern Island almost any amount of Maori votes may be created among a population wholly incapable of understanding the simplest rudiments of the questions on which their votes will be brought to bear—a population which will be a mere prey to designing Europeans. Especially, it is difficult to over-estimate the means of influence which the position of the Native population under this Act places at the disposal of the Executive
The next provision in the Act before us on which I think it necessary to comment is the composition of the Legislative Council of New Zealand. The Act provides that her Majesty, acting through the Governor, shall have power to summon such persons, being not less than ten, as her Majesty shall think fit to the Legislative Council, and that these Legislative Councillors shall hold their seats for life. To use the popular phrase, you are to have a Nominee Upper Chamber. Now, here again we have under another form, the old idea, against which so much has been already said in this lecture—the idea of keeping up the "interest of the Crown" in these colonies by means of a control over their Governments and Legislatures. Why should the Colonial Minister of England, I want to know, exercise any influence at all over your legislation? As he has no business to veto your laws, why should he appoint your legislators? Who is the better for his doing so? What conceivable interest has England in forcing into your Legislature men whom you would not yourselves choose for that purpose? And as to your own interests, surely you are the best guardians of them. It is your business to take care that the best men that can be obtained shall be obtained to make your laws. It signifies nothing to any one else. I cannot understand how any one can seriously attempt to draw a parallel between the peerage of the United Kingdom, and a chamber of colonial nominees. The comparison is ludicrous. In the first place, I think I may assume that even at home a body like the House of Peers could not à fortiori will an analogous feeling prevail here, where the acceptor of a nominee seat will be exposed to so many prejudices and to such popular odium. I am inclined, therefore, to anticipate that the nominee chamber having no real stamina or foundation will not be an active nuisance; it will rather fall speedily into impotence and contempt. If the Governor continue to exercise, as at present, a personal influence and control in the management of your local affairs, the nominees will be of no material use to him. He may possibly contrive to do through their votes what he would otherwise do openly on his own responsibility, and thus throw on them some part of the odium incident to his own position, but that is all; and I do not think you will be much worse off for the alliance.
If we must have nominees, it is undoubtedly an improvement on the old nominee system that they should be appointed for life, as they will thereby be able to preserve some degree of independence; but, on the other hand, by this provision, if the full complement which may be considered right be made up within a few years, as I have shown to be probable, all chance (even if there were otherwise a chance) of attracting into the Legislative Council from time to time the best men in the colony is excluded. In a population like ours deaths occur but rarely; and it is probable that twenty years hence the composition of the Legislative Council will be pretty much the same as next year, or the year after, neither better nor worse; your security against this, however, is that there is not much likelihood of the Constitution lasting in its present form for twenty months, to say nothing of twenty years. For my own part I am somewhat inclined, with Mr. Gladstone, to think it not improbable that the operations of the Legislative Council may come to a stand-still on the vulgar question of money payments. There is not the slightest chance that the people will consent to pay the expenses of nominees, and I
The subject of the political position in which the Native population is placed by the Act now under review has been already alluded to; but it is too important not to require some additional consideration. The Act says that the Governor may "constitute within New Zealand convenient electoral districts," &c. I am not sure whether, under this clause, the Governor has or has not power to exclude the inhabitants of any part of New Zealand from the privileges which it confers. If he has not, those large tracts of the Northern Island which are hardly ever visited by Europeans, and in which the bulk of the Natives live, must be formed into districts and elect members; if he has, as I suppose, then I must say that the precise nature and limits of a power so unconstitutional, and so capable of being abused, should in my opinion have been clearly laid down. With the principle, however, which the Act involves—the principle, namely, that the European provinces are to constitute a "pale" outside of which Native laws and customs are to prevail, I fully agree. It is in fact only recognizing and mating legal a state of things which will exist whether you will or no. But I do not at all agree with the policy of setting apart a sum for the benefit of the Natives, over which the Assembly is to have no control. As the Natives are to have their full proportionate influence in electing representatives to manage the general expenditure, it is unfair that they should have a special provision besides. Nor do I see why it is to be supposed that the Assembly would show any reluctance to give whatever might be required for Native purposes; while I think the disposal of it would be much more properly and safely vested in their hands than in that of the Governor. There is a popular notion, which Colonial Governors, I observe, take great pains to foster, that colonists are the natural enemies, the Government, and nothing is more remarkable in the history of the early colonization of this country than the amicable relations which prevailed between the settlers and the Maoris, so long as Government did not interfere, and the immediate disturbance of those relations when it did. Again: when I look to the history of other countries, I find an analogous result. I cannot discover that the policy of the North American colonists (who were practically independent of England) towards Natives was either less humane or less successful than that which has been pursued at the Cape, in Australia, and in Van Diemen's Land, where the mother country has exercised despotic power. I hold, therefore, that the relations of colonists with neighbouring savage tribes, like every other matter of primarily local interest, ought to be left exclusively to the colonists themselves. The old policy—the North American policy—was right in this, as in almost every other point.
On Saturday the 18th December 1852 a farewell breakfast was given to Mr. and Mrs. Godley, on the eve of their departure for England. It took place in Hagley Park, in a capacious marquee which, had been erected for the Horticultural Exhibition. One hundred and fifty persons, comprising all classes of the community, assembled to do honor to the occasion, and to testify their respect and esteem for their guests. A most excellent entertainment was provided, and Captain Simeon took the chair at 1 o'clock. After the usual toasts the Chairman read, and afterwards presented to Mr. Godley, the following Address.—
Canterbury Settlement, New Zealand
Sir,—We, the undersigned inhabitants of the Canterbury Settlement, having learnt with deep regret that your departure, which we had hoped would have been long deferred, is about to take place, desire to express in the warmest terms the high sense we entertain of the many and important services, both public and private, which you have rendered to the Settlement during your residence amongst us from the time of its foundation.
"We are anxious to convey to you this Public Testimony of the uniform urbanity, zeal, and earnest regard for the interests of all, with which you have for two years discharged a very responsible and difficult position; and to assure you, that, both by the ability and integrity with which you have administered public affairs, as well as by the example which you have set in private life, you have won our confidence and esteem.
"It is a matter of sincere and just congratulation, that you have been permitted to witness the undertaking, of which you were one of the chief promoters, crowned with so great a measure of success; and, especially, that the Government of this Settlement, and of the whole Colony, has been at length established, to a great extent in accordance with those principles which you have ever steadily advocated.
"We should deeply regret to think that the connection between us were now to be wholly severed; but we are persuaded you will never cease to feel a lively interest in the welfare of a Settlement with which your name has been so closely linked; and that, in any future measures which may be contemplated in England affecting its prosperity, we may rely upon a
"We desire at the same time to offer our acknowledgments of the part, in private life, which Mrs. Godley has borne with yourself, by influence and example, in conducing to the friendly feeling existing throughout our young community. We are at a loss how to pay a just tribute to her worth, but we cannot do less than convey to her the very sincere expression of our regret at her departure, and of the high esteem in which her name is held by all classes.
"In conclusion, we beg to offer, both to yourself and to Mrs Godley, our warmest and heartiest wishes for your future happiness and prosperity; and to assure you that, should you ever return amongst us, you will be welcomed back with the same cordial feelings of affection and respect with which we now bid you farewell."
After the reading of the Address, which was received with loud expressions of approbation, the Chairman called upon the ladies and gentlemen there assembled to prove, by the manner in which they would receive the toast he was about to propose, how entirely they concurred with him in the sentiments he had expressed to their departing guests. He then proposed" The health of Mr. and Mrs. Godley, and may health, happiness, and every blessing, ever attend them." He begged that this toast might be drunk with nine times nine, and as many more cheers as they chose to give.
Mr Godley, after the cheering had subsided, rose and said:—Ladies and Gentlemen,—It is at best a miserable thing to say farewell. That must be a desolate and cheerless spot, which a man with a heart in his bosom, after having long lived in it, can look upon for the last time without regret; and those must indeed be uninteresting or unamiable people of whom such a man, when he has mixed with them for years in familiar intercourse, can think without a pang that he will never see them again. How much more, then, must I feel, I to whom Canterbury has become a second home, dearer if possible than the first, I, in whose affection so many of its inhabitants have placed themselves beside my oldest and most intimate friends,
I have said that Canterbury is to me a second home. Have I not a right to say so? It is true that I have never possessed, and probably never shall possess, an acre of land in it, and that I cannot be said, therefore, to have a stake in the country, in the ordinary, vulgar, sense of the word; yet I venture to say that no man ever had in a more true and living sense a stake in a country than I have in this. For the last five years, ever since the plan of founding a settlement of Church people in New Zealand was first suggested to me, I think I may almost say without exaggeration that the thought of it has hardly been for a moment out of my mind; I have become, for the time at least, a man of one idea, to which everything else, public and private, has been made subordinate. Almost every intimate friend I have in the world has been induced by me to take a part in this enterprize; whatever reputation I may enjoy, or look to enjoying, is bound up with its success; indeed, I have often felt as though if this Colony had proved a failure, I could never no, to people who thought they had a right to yes. Then, too, besides these unavoidable clashings and differences, I know I have many short-comings and faults to plead guilty to. I say so, not in the conventional language of one who is fishing for a complimentary contradiction, but solemnly and sorrowfully. There are many even here present to whom I ought to apologise for hasty words and inconsiderate recriminations; for indolence, carelessness, and ill-temper; many whose presence here is doubly grateful to me as an earnest of their forgiveness. But what I have been coming to is this; notwithstanding that I have held a position so invidious and so productive of occasions of offence and misconception, I declare to you that, on a careful retrospect of my intercourse with all of you, I can hardly call to mind one single expression of unkind or angry feeling towards myself personally. The allowance that has been made for me—the consideration shown to me, have, I assure you, often appeared to me almost incredible, nay, have often and often put me to the blush from feeling how little I deserved them. I take advantage, then, of this public opportunity of thanking most not return. Experience shows, that when a man, especially a young man, leaves England, and remains for a few years in a new country, he does not care to go back again for good; somehow or other a new set of habits have been generated, not necessarily worse habits, but different ones, which make the thought of a permanent residence in an old country distasteful to him, and he will rather seek for the blessings of order and civilization, if he can get them, in a neighbouring colony, than in the old world, from which he has with such an effort uprooted himself. It is to be remembered, too, that precisely the best people among the immigrants into
It is impossible for me, my friends, altogether to abstain on such an occasion as this from some allusion to the colonizing association which I have represented in this country. The Canterbury Association has not escaped the ordinary fate of colonizing bodies in two respects at least; it has exceeded its means, and it has incurred considerable unpopularity in the Settlement it has founded. This result seems to be inseparable from the nature of such bodies; they generally manage badly, and they are always disliked for managing at all. Yet, without them, many of our noblest colonies would never have been founded, so that embarrassment and unpopularity are to be taken, I suppose, as part of the necessary burden which those who embark in the glorious work of founding colonies must be content to bear, and for my part, I will willingly take the one with the other; I am content to bear a share of the burden, if I may be permitted to bear a hand in the work. I am not about to defend the Association's policy in detail, but this at least you will pardon me for saying, (and I say so with the utmost confidence), that no body of men ever engaged in a public enterprise with higher or purer motives, or ever prosecuted it with greater zeal, energy, or disinterestedness. They have made plenty of mistakes no doubt; that, as I have said, was inseparable from their constitution as a distant governing body, and nobody has protested against what I believed their errors more strongly than I have; but if they have made such mistakes, the leading members of the Association have nobly done their best to redeem them by voluntary personal sacrifices, which no one had a right to demand at their hands. I know those men
I must just say one word about your new Constitution. I rejoice to see so lively and intelligent an interest taken in its working, but I clearly foresee that there will be a re-action and that there will be great disappointment with it at first. I clearly foresee that a great many of you, probably the best people among you, will be disgusted with the turmoil and agitation and strife inseparable from the working of a popular constitution, and disappointed because its beneficial results will in all probability not become very obviously or rapidly visible. But you must fight against this feeling. You must remember that we were never meant to enjoy quiet lives. Quiet lives are for beings of a higher or a lower nature than man's; for beatified spirits, or the brute creation. It is the business of man, and most of the noblest men, to work, to struggle, and to strive. Life is a battle, not a feast; and those conditions of existence are the best and the most wholesome, which must tend to strengthen and harden us for the combat. It is in this light that I have learned to regard and value political liberty; not primarily because it tends to promote material prosperity, ease, and enjoyment, but because by providing a
I must now offer my best and most cordial thanks, on behalf of my wife, for the manner in which you have received her to-day. She bids me say that she has to thank the people of Canterbury for two of the happiest years of her life; she bids me ask you not to forget her, as she can never forget you; she bids me say that she never could have believed she would have felt such sorrow as she now feels, in parting from any country but her native country, from any people but her own people. But it is time for me to stop—if I were to go on till I had said all that I want and should like to say, till I had expressed all the fulness of my heart, I feel as if I should hardly ever come to a conclusion. But the parting word must come—that word which I have been dreading to pronounce—farewell. God bless you and prosper you. God grant, if it be His pleasure, that we may meet again on earth, and that whether we meet on earth or not, we may meet in the everlasting mansions of His kingdom.
Mr. Godley resumed his seat amidst loud cheers, a great portion of the company being deeply affected by his parting words.
Mr. and Mrs. Godley, accompanied by several personal friends, embarked on board the "Hashemy" on Wednesday morning soon after 7 o'clock; it was not, however, until the following morning that the "Hashemy" left the harbour, having been detained by a contrary wind and calms.
The following letter to the Secretary of the Land Purchasers' Society was written in answer to one addressed to Mr. Godley by the Council from London. The Land Purchasers arrived in the Colony on the 16th December, and Mr. Godley answers the letter on the spot on the following day:—
I have received a letter from you dated 1st August, in which you inform me officially of the appointment of a Colonists' Council, and request me to enter into communication with it as the organ of the wishes of the body of colonists. In acknowledging your letter I take the opportunity, in the first place, of expressing the satisfaction with which I have received the above intelligence; and in the second, of explaining to you the views which I hold generally upon the matter to which it refers.
I consider myself, as I need hardly say, to be placed here, not merely to act on behalf of the Association as I may think best for the interests of the colonists, but to do so subordinately to their expressed wishes. I hold not merely that the interests of the Association are identical with yours, but that, as a general rule, it is for you and not for me to determine how these common interests may best be consulted; while I am ready, therefore, to bear the full weight of responsibility which properly devolves upon me as an executive officer: and further to exercise my discretion as to the cases which may possibly arise in which I may be compelled to act independently of you, I repeat, as a general rule admitting of very rare exceptions, that I shall guide myself by your directions, so long as I shall be satisfied that your body does really and adequately represent the land purchasers of the Settlement.
Although the explanations which I am now about to mate have no immediate connection with the special subject of this letter, you will, I am sure, allow me, as I am now addressing you for the first time, to say a few words upon what has been done, as well as on what is proposed to be done, by the Association here. Personally my responsibility may almost be said to date from your arrival only, as until that time I have had neither means nor opportunities of effecting anything, or hardly anything, except the stoppage of an expenditure which had exceeded its proper limits. But I should not be acting fairly or generously towards my predecessor if I forebore to express my opinion that in most difficult circumstances he exercised generally a wise discretion in the conduct of his operations: of course to every detail of his management I cannot pledge myself; but I repeat that, speaking generally, I can hardly find language strong enough to do justice to his merits,—merits which it requires some experience of the difficulties of getting work done in a new country adequately to appreciate. In connection with this matter, there are one or two points of detail which I understand have caused some discussion among the colonists, and on which I wish to make a few observations. One, is the limited amount of lodging accommodation available for the passengers of the ships chartered by the Association: the other is the difficulty of procuring means of conveyance to the Plains. Now, with respect to the
If a fire or an earthquake had destroyed the Barracks before your arrival, no one would have accused the Association of not
The other point to which I refer is the difficulty of procuring boats. I have been repeatedly asked why the Association did not provide boats, and charge freight for goods, so as to prevent exorbitant charges. Now, the answer which I have been compelled to make involves a general principle of great importance. I cannot attempt to enter into the carrying trade with public funds unless I am prepared to undertake the whole of it; no axiom in mathematics is more certain than that private parties would never enter into competition with an amateur Association, dealing with public money: no exertion would be made to procure boats by any body else, if the Association were to engage that boats should be procured without exertion. I had therefore to determine whether I would leave the whole matter to private speculation, or undertake to convey all the goods of the Settlement between the Port and the Plain. Now, I have calculated that within the next few months there will probably be a demand for the freight of at least 10,000 tons of goods per month between this place and the Plain, and I certainly did not feel myself justified in embarking upon a speculation so extensive, so costly, and so hazardous. I had no means for it, I had not boats nor crews, nor money to buy and hire them; if I had had them I should necessarily have done the thing very badly, and I should have squandered means on which there are plenty of more legitimate demands. I thought it far better to let it be known that in the matter of freight as in that of provisions, wood, and every other necessary for the Settlement, I would not interfere, but would leave prices to find their own level, confident that nothing but temporary difficulty, and consequent high price,
The only Public Works which I think it at present desirable to undertake besides the Road, are a Land and Survey Office and a small Immigration Barrack at the chief town.
I have now, I think, treated of all the points which have
I cannot conclude without thanking you most heartily and sincerely for the kind manner in which you speak of myself personally, and expressing a cordial hope that our intercourse may continue to the end unclouded and friendly as it has begun.
P.S.—I did not think it necessary to say anything in the former part of this letter upon the question of the Reserves laid off for the Association in this town, because I do not believe that it has been raised among the colonists here; but as some stress seems to have been laid upon it by the Association at home, I think it may be well not to leave it unnoticed.
The Committee, while leaving with me a discretionary power with respect to the whole matter, intimate generally their wish that I should allow the land on which their buildings—i.e., the immigration barracks, the store, the boat-houses, and the agents' house are erected, to be given up for selection. After consulting some of the leading colonists on this point, I consider it so clearly for the public interest that the land should foe retained that I have determined to take the responsibility of retaining it; nor do I think it a point which it would be fair or proper to refer to the whole body of colonists after the orders of choice are drawn and known, because the question being obviously between the interests of the two or three first holders and the rest of the purchasers, to appeal upon it to a
If I had permitted one or two persons to select the land on which the Association's buildings are erected, the result would simply have been that they might have made their own terms with us; we should have been completely in their power; the land is necessary for the conduct of our operations, a large sum of money bas been laid out on the hypothesis that it was to be reserved, and, knowing all this, they would have at once perceived that we should have been compelled to pay them any rent they chose to ask sooner than, at such a time as this, permit our buildings to be pulled down. I do not believe that there is a single land purchaser who would wish that the funds of the Settlement should be thus permanently burdened for the sake of assuring an exorbitant income to one or two fortunate individuals. On the other hand, the Reserves as they now stand are public property, which may be sold and the proceeds applied to the general good, if at any future time it may cease to be required for the present purposes.
Out of a large number of Dispatches written to the Chairman and Secretary of the Managing Committee of the Canterbury Association in London upon miscellaneous subjects connected with the public business of the Settlement, the following extracts have been selected which may serve to explain Mr. Godley's views upon matters of more general interest, political and social:—
I think I have not sufficiently explained the grounds on which I acted in acceding to the desire of the colonists, and declaring Christchurch the capital. In the first place that desire was unanimous and clearly expressed, and I agree with the Committee in thinking that on such a point the colonists' opinion ought to prevail. Again, the site of Lyttelton affords and chief town cut off and isolated from the port. But the fact is that whatever distribution and arrangement of localities we may make, the road is an object of urgent and primary necessity. Without it, as I have repeatedly stated, this district can hardly be considered as fit for settlement, and I do think we are bound, in justice to the colonists who have come out believing that the Plain is easily accessible from the port, to find means, if by any possibility we can do so, for its completion. I do not see the necessity of making at present any large addition to our public buildings, in consequence of the site of the capital being fixed at Christchurch. A land survey office, and a small barrack, part of which may be used as a store, are all that we want for the conduct of our operations, and both would be necessary in the Plain, although the chief town were situated on the harbour. A school and a church will be required, no doubt, but only because there will be, or, rather, if there be, a considerable population there, a population which
It is impossible for me as yet to say whether there will be a sufficient number of labourers for the capital of the Settlement, because, until purchasers shall be in possession of their land, the amount of the demand cannot be ascertained; but I do not anticipate any deficiency in the supply. Nor can I describe accurately the exact extent of road now finished, partially it is finished the whole way to Sumner, but there are impassable spots remaining at intervals, so that there is no part except the first half mile out of town available for transport. So essentially necessary do I consider the Christchurch road to the prosperity of the Settlement, that if the local Government had not pressed me for a re-payment of the advances made two months ago, I should have ventured to proceed with it, even at the risk of spending more money than the amount of sales would under other circumstances justify me in spending; but, that re-payment having been insisted on, my funds are too much exhausted to permit of so large an expenditure, unless the ships now due bring a further remittance.
I have devoted one Immigration Barrack altogether to the purposes of a temporary school and place of worship. It seems peculiarly well adapted for them, and will save the necessity of any immediate outlay on permanent buildings. The Bishop of New Zealand has expressed his disapprobation of the plan of making Nelson a part of this diocese. He wishes that a third diocese should be formed, to include the Nelson and Wellington districts, and that in the meantime the Southern Diocese should commence at the northern extremity of the Canterbury Block. In all other respects he has evinced the most cordial approbation of and sympathy for all our proceedings, and has formed apparently a highly favourable opinion as to the future progress of the Settlement.
I have already intimated that the Governor-in-Chief
There is, however, one point on which the Committee will perhaps pardon me if I make a few observations. It has reference to the franchise. I have observed, with considerable regret, that the Wellington and Nelson settlers have expressed an opinion in favour of universal suffrage. Now, it appears to me that to a country like this, which on the one hand is so much frequented by some of the very worst kind of population in the world; and where, on the other, every man who exercises ordinary industry and intelligence may acquire property in a very short time; a moderate property qualification is peculiarly applicable as a test of fitness to possess political privileges. Nor do I think that its adoption at the first introduction of self-government would lead to discontent in any class of the population, although I do think it would be impossible to raise the franchise after an opposite system had been
There is hardly a chance of letting pasturage, except, perhaps, in a very few specially favoured localities, on such terms as I am bound to propose. In the first place the rent is too high; but secondly and chiefly, there is no security whatever for improvements. Now, if there were such security, possibly stock-keepers might be induced to pay the high rent, but without the security, I really feel a difficulty even about asking it. Immediately outside our block as much land as is required may be had without any payment, or at a merely nominal rent, and unless we have some special inducement to offer, we cannot expect that any one will prefer our side of the boundary. I submit to the Association that it is quite impossible for them living in England to fix the proper terms and conditions of pasturage licenses in New Zealand, they do not know the quality of the land to be let, or its position, or (what is of more importance still), the comparative inducements to stock holders which other accessible districts offer, in short, any of the circumstances which determine the market value of the pasturage. These are matters which it would be far better to leave for determination here, either by their agent average land will not be worth more, and to prevent jobbing as well as for other reasons, it is better to have a fixed rent for the whole.
I have made two exceptions of no great importance or amount to my general rule of not engaging in any mercantile adventure. One is the purchase of a small schooner which I have made with a view of reducing the exhorbitant fares between Lyttelton and Sumner; fares which, though I have now left them to the ordinary course of trade for nearly three months, have showed no tendency. Twenty shillings per ton are now charged for taking round goods about six miles, i.e. nearly half as much as is paid from London to New Zealand.
This case has appeared to me so flagrant as to constitute an exception to ordinary rules, and there is not the smallest doubt but that, barring accidents, the schooner will pay herself in a year.
The other speculation I have made is in coals, which I had a good opportunity of bringing down under the ordinary price in a cattle ship, and which it is exceedingly desirable to bring before the notice of the people here immediately, as wood will be excessively dear in the winter; and I have seen no probability of coals being introduced in the ordinary course of
The Committee have so repeatedly done me the honour of requesting that I would give them my opinion freely upon the political and social questions with which this Settlement is concerned, that I hope I need make no apology for writing to them at some length and with considerable freedom on the most important of those questions, namely, the relation which now exists, and which ought to exist between the Association and the colonists. I do so in the full recollection of the minute dated May 24, 1850, which treated of the same subject, and my object is rather to press for a speedy and complete application of the principles therein contained, than to suggest any important change in or abnegation of them. To the objection that may possibly be raised, that in mooting a question so delicate and so momentous I am unnessarily disturbing a quiet and satisfactory state of affairs, I answer that my main reason for mooting the question now is that everything is quiet and satisfactory; that so far as I know no complaints have been as yet made with respect to the administration of the colonist's affairs; and that, consequently, it may be considered in a calm, impartial, and friendly spirit. I also think it infinitely better that the discussion should originate with me than with the colonists. If it had been otherwise they would have found it very difficult to avoid at least the appearance of complaint and opposition, whereas, coming from the agent of the Association, the discussion will appear in its true light as one on the practical details of carrying out a principle on which both the parties are fully agreed.
You will see from the various dispatches and documents which I have sent home that I endeavour, as far as were so satisfied, for I should consider their satisfaction as a symptom of unfitness and inability to do for themselves what they were content to let others do for them. Every day, too, I feel more and more strongly the inexpediency, not to say absurdity, of the attempts which are made in one form or another at home to direct the government of colonies from a distance, and in ignorance, and without either personal interest or the part of the governors, or responsibility to those who have it.
That the detailed regulations for the disposal of land and pasturage, the statutes of colleges and schools, the arrangements of courts of justice, the investment and distribution of
That the state of affairs at Canterbury should continue to exemplify the evils of distant government would be felt by me as peculiarly humiliating. We are deeply pledged to the principles of local administration, and we have no right to forget that those principles are violated quite as much by the Canterbury Association as by the Colonial Office. I am aware that the financial position of the Association, complicated as it is by private guarantees, has hitherto afforded a valid reason for preserving in the hands of those who have provided pecuniary resources a control over their expenditure. But I am anxious that the Association should recognise and avow that as the sole ground for the maintenance of a distinct Government, and resolve that at the very first moment when its public assets shall cover its liabilities the Charter shall be transferred to the colony. Its mission was to found the Settlement, not to govern it; to constitute sources of revenue, but not to administer or dispose of that revenue. In short, from the
It is unnecessary for me to show how easily the transfer of the Association's powers to a local Government would solve the financial complications to which I have alluded should they unfortunately still exist at the time of such transfer. The property of the Canterbury Association in the Settlement alone, independently of the valuable privileges which it would have to give up, is quite sufficient to meet its own liabilities; and the local government would most willingly discharge all the liabilities in consideration of obtaining the property and the privileges. If for any unforeseen reason the establishment of a municipal
I feel sure that in considering this vital question the Association will not be led away by the notion that the colonists are not ripe or fit for self-government. This is a delusion which cannot too soon be got rid of; they are perfectly fit to manage their own affairs now, at least infinitely more so than a London corporation can possibly be, whatever may be the talents and goodness of its members; but I think it very probable that they may become comparatively unfit for it if left long without it. The same evils which have become so fatally notorious in all dependencies governed under the central system will not fail to appear here; indeed I see already manifold signs of their approach. We shall be divided into factions of a kind peculiar to colonies (if a complete change of system do not take place), in spite of every effort on my part to avoid giving ground for such a division. We shall see the old drama enacted of an irresponsible party in place on the one hand, and on the other an opposition gradually enlisting the great mass of the people in its favour; so that when the ultimate abdication of the central power, which circumstances must render necessary, takes place, it will be, if postponed, compulsory and ignominious, instead of being, as it would now be, the spontaneous assertion of a great principle.
In writing on the general question of self-government, it is
It is plainly out of the question that the General Government should become the trustee of these endowments, as we can have no assurance that it would, in its corporate capacity, have any sympathy with the Church, or evince any care of its interests. If, therefore, the Association could find no better assignee of its present powers and duties relative to the Church In the Settlement, it could have no alternative but to retain them in its own hands even after the abdication of its secular functions. But it seems to me that the time of such an abdication should form a most fitting opportunity for effecting a great and practical reform which has become essentially necessary on other accounts, namely, the establishment of an independent ecclesiastical corporation with a proper constitution. There will be here, if nothing unforeseen occur to prevent it, a very considerable, perhaps a very large amount, of property devoted to church purposes, the disposal and control of which will carry with them a corresponding influence, not only in ecclesiastical affairs, but in every part of our social system. If things remain as they now are the whole of this influence will practically reside with the Bishop of the Diocese. The only person competent to exercise any check upon his absolute will is the agent of the Association; and I entirely agree with the Committee in considering that, except as regards the amount of expenditure permitted by disposable means, it would be highly improper for the agent to interfere in the administration of ecclesiastical affairs. The only ground upon which he could, in my opinion, attempt to justify such interference would be the assumption of his representing the body of Churchmen in the Settlement in the absence of any better representative; and this assumption would, I think, be entirely unfounded while the relation between the Association and the colonists remains on its present footing. It is only, therefore, i.e. so long as the expenses exceed the revenue derivable from fixed ecclesiastical endowments, that the agent of the Association will or ought to have any voice or right to interfere in Church matters at all. Ultimately I repeat, and I hope soon, the disposal of funds and the exercise of patronage, in other Words, all the influence accruing to the Church from secular sources, will be in the hands of the Bishop alone, because he will be the only organ or representative of the Church. But I am perfectly certain that a regimen involving permanently this result would be iminently unsatisfactory to the colonists, and very prejudicial to the welfare of the Church. Nearly all the reasons which induce me to wish that the administration of secular affairs and the disposal of the miscellaneous fund be immediately handed over by the agent of the Association to the settlers themselves, enforce the desirableness of giving to the Churchmen among the settlers a corresponding control over Church affairs and Church revenues. Of course in any scheme for carrying out this view, care should be taken to give the Bishop a large, perhaps the largest, share in the government of the Church. I am arguing not against episcopal authority but against episcopal absolutism, and in doing so I am actuated quite as much by a regard for the interests of the Episcopate itself, as by a jealousy for the rights of those subject to its jurisdiction. It is exceedingly satisfactory to me to feel convinced that the general views which I have here attempted to express are approved of by the Bishop of New Zealand and by the Bishop Designate of Lyttleton, both of whom have seen this dispatch and expressed their approval of its contents. Not only, therefore, as a necessary incident to any plan for transferring the Charter of the Association to the colony, but as an urgently needed measure of internal Church Reform, I would impress on the Association the extreme desirableness of procuring for the Church in Canterbury a Charter of ecclesiastical liberties. For so doing, as I before said, the surrender of the
An incidental advantage of great importance which would accrue to the Settlement from placing the land fund under the control of the local Government would be, that thereby the system and regulations now governing the disposal of land within the Canterbury Block might in that case be extended over the whole Province of which Canterbury would be centre, and which would of course embrace very much wider limits than those of our district. I already feel the inconveniences and evils of the narrow scope within which our jurisdiction prevails, and as the district becomes filled up our operations will be very seriously impeded by the immediate neighbourhood of land administered and disposed of on totally different principles. In order that this anomaly may be removed, if for no other reason, it is highly desirable that a constitution of our Province should be made, and uniformity of land regulations established over it, before the land outside and adjoining our block shall have found its way to any considerable extent into the market.
In the foregoing observations I have abstained from offering any suggestions as to the precise form or mode in which the transfer of the Association's powers ought to be made. In fact, without more legal knowledge than I possess, suggestions on this head would be of little value. I will just remark, however, that the plan apparently contemplated in the "Minute" of keeping the Association in existence after the constitution of a local Government, for the purpose of watching over the application of it's land fund to their proper objects by the Government, does not appear to me the best plan that could be devised for effecting the object aimed at. It would involve, in the first place, the preservation of a cumbrous and expensive machinery; and in the second, the existence of that discretionary power in the distant authority which I have before remarked as operating so prejudicially on the reality
With respect to the case of transfer to a local body not being a government, the best plan perhaps for such a temporary and provisional arrangement would be that of simply making all land purchasers members of the Association, and allowing them to hold their meetings here instead of in London. The Association would then continue to exist precisely as it does now as regards form, only that the seat of management would be local instead of distant. This plan, however, though it might answer for a time, would be liable to grave objections, inasmuch as it would tend to produce a very dangerous antagonism between the land purchasers and the other inhabitants of the Settlement: the only satisfactory mode of removing all difficulties will be to merge the Association in the Government. In either case the constitution of a trusteeship for Church purposes ought to form an essential part of the scheme.
In conclusion, I have only to repeat that I consider the immediate and complete settlement of this question the most pressing want of our young colony; more pressing, indeed, even than that of political Government, inasmuch as the funds administered by the Association, and the power exercised by its officers, are greater than those which the Government possesses, or is likely to possess, for some time to come.
I beg that you will lay before the Committee of Management the determination at which I have, not without the most careful and anxious deliberation, arrived with respect to the future administration of the affairs of the Canterbury Association. Every day's experience convinces me more and more strongly that the evils necessarily incident to distant government very far exceed those to which the Settlement may become exposed if the Government be transferred to the colony, by the comparative inexperience of its inhabitants in affairs, by their possible inferiority in legislative and administrative ability, or by the risk of losing to some extent that weight and influence which the Canterbury Association, as at present constituted, possesses in public estimation. It is impossible, I fear, for anybody living in England to appreciate fully the extent of inconvenience, embarassment, and bad feeling engendered by such a relation as now exists between the colonists and the Association. I assure you I open each bundle of dispatches that arrives with fear and trembling, not knowing whether they may not convey to me an intimation of some regulation having been made which it would be most inexpedient to enforce, or some contract entered into which I should be unable to fulfil. On the other hand, it is most difficult for the dispatches of an officer called upon to carry out under such circumstances as mine the instructions of a distant authority to be otherwise than a series of remonstrances and complaints, and this even though there may be, as in the present case, the most entire and well-grounded confidence in the ability, disinterestedness, and zeal of the members composing the governing body. On the other hand I feel perfectly certain that the Committee must constantly feel a want of the materials for legislation, caused by defective information from their agents in the colony. This will always be the case; people on the spot are generally so much engaged with the administrative business of the moment that they forget to report many things which those at a distance would
The question of pasturage regulations becomes every day more pressing. Already the discouraging, indeed prohibitory, nature of those which we have published, taken in connection with the far more reasonable terms offered by Government, has had the most prejudicial effect on the prosperity of the Settlement. Several stockholders have come from Australia with a view of settling here, but not one of them admits the possibility of establishing a station, or taking an extensive run on the terms offered by the Association. If no better are offered, our district would soon apparently be, so far as stock is concerned, an unoccupied waste in the midst of pastures teeming with cattle and sheep. Mr. Rhodes has just driven 5000 of his sheep to a run immediately outside our block, and several of the Canterbury settlers who are going to invest in stock meditate following his example. The subject is felt by every one here to be so important that I will make no apology for once more endeavouring to make its difficulties and requirements clear to the Committee. The terms proposed by Government have now been made public; it will charge one penny per head for sheep, allowing, as I understand, a run sufficient for five years' increase. Thus, supposing a run to carry a sheep to every two acres, and supposing that a squatter intending to stock a run of 20,000 acres fully in five years put 2000 sheep upon it the first year, which is the ordinary calculation, he would only have to pay a rent of £8 6s. 8d. at first, increasing gradually as his means of payment increased, until when his run should be fully stocked with 10,000 sheep he would pay about £40 a year. Under our regulations he would have to pay £200 a year from the first, a rent which no possible profit from his sheep in the early years would approach to defraying, and which would be far too heavy to the last. Besides this, the expenses of forming a station are very considerable, especially in a country where timber is excessively scarce, and there is no security whatever for his improvements without buying the land. The mere statement of these
I need not call the special attention of the Committee to the minute prepared by the colonists on the subject of permanent investments for the clergy of the Settlement, which
I have in obedience to the instructions of the Committee Written to the Governor-in-Chief on the subject of erecting Canterbury into a separate province. Ton will see by the New Zealand newspapers that a Bill for remodelling the Constitution of these Islands is now before the General Council; this Bill, if passed into a law, will only have the effect of altering the form under which the irresponsible authority of the Governor is now exercised, and not of limiting that authority in any effectual manner; it excites no interest whatever in this country. I earnestly trust that the Association will exert all its efforts to procure for the people of this country the full power of managing their own affairs; but, in the meantime, I cannot but urge that the most effectual mode by which it can further that object is by its example, i.e. by giving up to them the management of those funds which are now disposed of irresponsibly by itself.
I wish to draw the special attention of the Committee to the number of persons entirely unfit for a colonial career who have emigrated under their auspices. I do not allude at present to individuals of wild and dissipated habits, sent out
Before concluding this letter I would once more urge upon the Committee the desirableness of directing the attention of intending colonists to pastoral pursuits more than has hitherto been done. It is a remarkable fact, and one very much to be regretted, that not one of the colonists from England, with the single exception of Mr. Russell, has formed a sheep station. The rest have contented themselves with settling on their respective sections, apparently with the intention of cultivating on a small scale. Now, it is notorious that in a new country agriculture does not pay an employer of labour after the first year or two of settlement, owing to the fall in the price of produce consequent on extended cultivation, and the high price of labour which is usually maintained. The market then comes to be supplied by small farmers, cultivating their lands with their own hands. On the other hand, stock feeding with ordinary good fortune and ordinary care, can hardly fail to be successful and lucrative; and it is just the sort of pursuit which a gentleman can engage in, and make a pleasant occupation of. Nor does it by any means involve in this country the isolation and dispersion which have caused so many social evils in Australia. There is no reason why a gentleman should not with his family reside upon his farm within a few miles of
I am particularly anxious that the question of glebes should be settled, and beg that you will communicate with me as soon as possible on the subject. My own opinions with reference to them is this. If we had funds sufficient to provide for
I have received a copy of the Report of the Managing Committee to the Canterbury Association, dated April 25, 1851, and have read with much interest the able paper on the subject of Ecclesiastical and Educational affairs contained in the appendix to that document. It is unnecessary for me to give my opinion with respect to the various details embraced by the "Scheme for the Administration of the Ecclesiastical Fund," and the "Plan for the College," &c., but I cannot help urging upon the Committee that it would be most inexpedient to commit the Association definitively to any such elaborate scheme, until it shall have become virtually a local, colonial body. It is utterly impossible that the people of this Settlement should accept or be satisfied with plans, (however ably drawn up) for the management of their affairs, with framing which they, the parties chiefly interested, have bad nothing to do. The only result, therefore, of any attempt to establish work better, because the people like them better. I trust that the Committee will particularly observe the unanimity of feeling in favour of local self-government which has lately been displayed in this Settlement, and will remember that it will extend itself equally to all departments of affairs in which the colonists are interested, ecclesiastical and educational, as well as those with which the general Government is concerned.
I enclose a copy of a letter which I have received from His Excellency the Governor-in-Chief, on the subject of the Provincial Revenues of New Munster. You will observe that His Excellency intimates that the existing Province is to be divided into four, of which Canterbury is to be one.
I confess I was not prepared for the promptitude with which Sir George Grey has acted on the recommendations sent out to him by the Colonial Secretary of State. His having done so simplifies exceedingly the course which the Canterbury Association ought, in my opinion, to adopt with reference to the disposal of the Land Fund. The Miscellaneous and Emigration Funds may at once be handed over to the local Legislature, and the Association itself may be transformed into a local body, administering the Ecclesiastical Fund until a regular ecclesiastical corporation shall be constituted. The primary duty of the Association as at present constituted (if my views on this subject be approved of), will be to fix
The Committee having expressed their opinion definitely on the subject of the alterations in pasturage regulations which were proposed by me, it is unnecessary for me to argue the question farther. The Committee knowing, as they must do, the feelings and wishes of intending purchasers in England, have, I dare say, exercised a sound discretion in what they have done. I trust that the provisional arrangement entered into by me, of which I have already sent home the outline, and now send full particulars in the letter of which a copy is enclosed, will be found by them so far satisfactory that it does not interfere with the full liberty of choice offered by the terms of purchase to purchasers. That arrangement, contrary in a great measure to my expectation, have given satisfaction to both purchasers and licensees, and, I think consequently the Committee need not now in any way interfere further than if they see no objection to ratify it. I had thought that it would be desirable to have the Act of Parliament altered, but unless the Committee think that the agreement which I have entered into contradicts the Act, I now think it better to leave the latter untouched in this particular. You will observe that I have introduced into it a clause requiring the deposit of a sum of money in cases where the run is not immediately stocked; this provision is intended to prevent the taking up of runs by mere speculators who may have no intention of stocking them at all. There is one point connected with this subject which I think it is desirable to notice. An impression seems to prevail in England that there is a danger of establishing a squatting interest too strong for the law. I do not think there is the slightest ground for such
I have to report the arrival of the "Canterbury" after a passage of 121 days; all well on board. I regret to say that considerable dissatisfaction appears to be felt by many of the passengers who have come out in this vessel and in the "Midlothian," and loud and general complaints that the agents of first obligation is to take care that no false impression of the actual facts should be conveyed through our means to anybody. Now, undoubtedly the impression that agriculture can be made a permanently profitable occupation by a gentleman in this country is false. A man, therefore, who is not a manual labourer, and who has not some independent source of income, which enables him to dispense with the profit of the capital expended by him in land, would be better off if he had not bought land. On the other hand, a person with small capital can invest it here, not in land at first, but in innumerable other ways, so as to derive from it eight or ten times the profit which it would produce in England. By degrees the land will be bought by men, especially working men, who have made money either by wages or investments; but the only persons who, in my opinion, ought to be advised to buy land at first, are those who can afford to do without the interest of its price for the present, or at least to be content with a small and problematical return in the shape of rent, looking to the future for a sure and large increase in the value of their property. I have often laid these views before the Committee, and every day's experience convinces me more and more of their truth.
With reference to your dispatch on the subject of my laying the colonial accounts of the Canterbury Association before the colonists for approval and audit, and expressing dissatisfaction with such a course, I have to say that the words "for approval," which occurred in my dispatch were not strictly correct. I am in the habit of laying the accounts before the land purchasers formally, and of offering them for public inspection on payment of a small fee, not as acknowledging any theoretical responsibility, still less as requiring an audit, but simply as a free offer of submission to the utmost possible publicity, for the purpose of securing public confidence. In doing so I follow the example of the Bishop, who regularly offers his ecclesiastical accounts for public inspection, with, as he informs me, the best possible effect. As to the audit by the Board of Trade, it is altogether impossible that the people of this country should regard it as any guarantee for the proper expenditure of the public money by the Association, inasmuch as neither the Board of Trade nor indeed the Committee of the Association, can have any but the most insufficient data for judging of the propriety of colonial expenditure, or indeed of the honesty of those who control it.
I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th August, in which you request me to offer suggestions upon several points connected with the transfer of the Association's powers and functions to this country.
I regret exceedingly to hear that in the opinion of the Committee the proposal of transferring all those powers and functions immediately, in the form suggested by me in March last, would be equivalent to an abandonment of all the objects for which the Association was founded. I think the form suggested by me may very possibly be a bad one, or not the best; but if the Committee mean to imply generally that the administration of the land fund by an independent local body would be equivalent to an abandonment of their objects, I confess I think they should have stated their reasons for so thinking. For my own part, I cannot see how that can be the case, except upon the assumption either that local administrators are incompetent, or that they would be unwilling to carry out those objects; and as I think the Committee cannot have intended to imply the former alternative, I am compelled to suppose that their opinion, as above stated, is founded on a belief in the latter; m other words, I suppose the Committee believe that a local constituency would be unwilling to carry out the objects of the Association. I do not myself think there is any ground whatever for this belief; I think a local association, properly constituted, would carry out those objects more satisfactorily and efficiently that a distant one; but if such were not the case, I have no hesitation in saying that it would only prove the abandonment of them to be right and necessary. For the inference would seem to be that the inhabitants of the Settlement, being the parties most interested and most qualified to judge, disapproved of the scheme, and wished it to be given up. I cannot regard an enterprise of this kind, with reference to its abstract or theoretical merits, if it is not good for the people of the country which it affects, nay more, if they do not think it good for them after
I do not see how the clause in the Act lately passed meets the necessities of the case at all; the committee, of which it provides for the appointment, would be nominated by, and dependent upon, and responsible to, the central governing body; it would be, in fact, merely what the agent is now, i.e., a servant of the Association. I should have thought that a simple power of attorney would have effected all that the clause purports to effect, namely placed the agency in commission, supposing that a change so trivial were all that we wanted. Nay, the clause seems rather to restrict than to extend existing facilities for the delegation of powers, inasmuch as you inform me that the delegates appointed under it must first be made members of the Association by name. This seems inconsistent with the principle of local election, for no local constituency would consent to elect a committee of which the names should go home for approval, and be sent out, if approved, a year afterwards. Before that time half of them, or all of them, might have died, or left the colony, or might not choose to act, or might have become unacceptable to the constituency. In a country like this, where the circumstances are changing, and of which the population is growing with incalculable rapidity, unless there were an annual election of the managing committee, it would be
With reference to your dispatch of the same date, in which you comment upon the formation of an Ecclesiastical Corporation for Canterbury, I am rather inclined to think that the best way of provisionally dealing with the ecclesiastical portion of the land fund would be to hand it over to the Bishop in trust to administer it with the consent of the clergy and laity of the Church. I speak with hesitation on this point, but I think the Bishop, in whom, as being a corporation, the fund would vest, might be bound by a declaration of trust to any mode of administration which might seem fit; and, further, might be bound to give it up to any ecclesiastical corporation which might be formed hereafter on a broader basis. I cannot think there is any difficulty in constituting a trusteeship either in that or in some other analagous form, such as exists in the case of other religious bodies on whom endowments are bestowed. I am by no means without hopes that the Provincial Legislature of this Settlement may be induced to constitute ecclesiastical corporations within its jurisdiction, but this of course must be doubtful for the present.
Another suggestion which I have already made to the Committee would point to the preservation of the Canterbury Association locally constituted as a Church body for the administration of the ecclesiastical portion of the land fund alone, and providing by a bye-law for the handing over the remainder to the Government.
This plan involves the difficulty of investing very large powers in a body, which, if it were so constituted as to make it a perfectly fit administrator of the Church fund, would be too exclusive to be permitted to exercise the secular functions of the Association. On the other hand, it has the advantage of providing a definite legal organisation for the churchmen of the Settlement, an organisation which might be used provisionally with great benefit. To either of these plans, however it would be essential that the Association, however constituted
In conclusion, I must repeat that I am at a loss to see any difficulty in localising the Association. The Charter provides full power of making bye-laws regulations, &c, &c, for the admission of members, limited only by their being members of the Church of England; why then should not a bye-law be passed at a General Meeting, providing that on and after such a day every man possessing so much land in the Settlement, and signing a declaration that he is a member of the Church of England, shall be a member of the Association, and appointing Christchurch in New Zealand as the place for the next General Meeting after that day? For my own part, I am comparatively indifferent as to the precise mode of transfer and as to the franchise. I think the present Association has better means than we have of ascertaining the former, and
I am at a loss how to deal with the question of the pecuniary liabilities undertaken by individual members of the Association, inasmuch as I have no knowledge either official or private of their precise nature or extent. I have understood, however, from some of those personally interested in the matter, that there is little if any chance of those liabilities being practically enforced; and I have not the slightest doubt whatever that the colonists, so soon as the case shall have been put before them, will gladly and thankfully
My despatch of 23rd December in reply to one on the same subject to Mr. Alston, will put your Lordship sufficiently in possession of my views with respect to the questions of which your letter of 10th September treats. There are, however, some points in that letter to which it is necessary for me to refer especially. In the first place, I wish to observe that your Lordship in considering the suggestions thrown out in my letter of March in the nature of a matured plan, and proceeding to criticise them as such, is not quite doing me justice. I hold, and I think you will agree with me, that, whenever authority is to be transferred from the mother country to a colony, it is the special business of the person or corporation in whose hands that authority resides, to decide how its transfer is to be effected, and to constitute the new depositaries of it. In matters of colonial government, I hold that the duty of the Imperial Parliament is to call into existence a governing power in the colony, in other words, to create a constituency, and then to leave that local government to do its own work. So, in the case of the Association, I never considered it as my business, nor as the business of the colonists, to settle how, or to whom the powers of the Association as now constituted, should be transferred. What we wished was i.e., the principle of immediate localisation. Now, upon this point my opinions are so strong, that, as you will long ago have known, I cannot undertake to carry on the business of
I have next to observe on what your Lordship says of the constitution and claims of the Council of Land Purchasers. I am quite aware that the constitution of that Council is provisional and defective, and I should strongly oppose any claim on its part to be considered as representing the opinions of the whole community. I have felt the impossibility of forming a regular and complete organisation of the colonists, because I had no power to fix a franchise for such a purpose. I therefore took the organisation which I found existing and
On the 29th of May 1852 the following letter appeared in the 'Lyttelton Times':—
Sir,—I think it due to the people of this settlement that I should make public the reason which induced me to tender my resignation to the Managing Committee of the Canterbury Association, and the grounds upon which I have now determined to retain my office for the present. When I first accepted that office, I was under the impression that the London Managing Committee, though of course formally paramount, would practically leave the administration of affairs in the colony to their Colonial Agent, controlled (as he is controlled to a certain extent) by the public opinion of the colony. I need hardly say that I never thought that this would have been a good arrangement; but I did think that, however defective in theory, it would have been just tolerable as a makeshift, until better institutions could be established. during the present session of Parliament, for an Act which shall transfer their functions to the Provincial Government about to be constituted. Some constitutional legislation for New Zealand there must be this session, and there is every reason to hope that it may confer upon us tolerably complete powers of local self-government. At any rate the Canterbury Association is pledged to an immediate abdication of its anomalous
Upon returning to England Mr. Godley was invited to a public dinner at which. Lord Wharnecliffe presided, and which was attended by a great number of his friends. Amongst them were Lord Monteagle, Lord Lyttelton, Right Hon. Sir J. Pakington, M.P., Right Hon. C. B. Adderley, M.P., Sir W. James, Bart., Sir John Simeon, Bart., Sir Horace St. Paul, Bart., Sir F. Hopkins, Bart., Hon. Mr. Chapman, Hon. J. Daly, Hon. E. Twisleton, Hon. Captain Denman, R.N., Messrs. W. Monsell, M.P., A. Stafford, M.P., R. Palmer, M.P., J. Ball, M.P., M. Higgins, Blachford, Aytoun, T. Cholmondeley, W. Forsyth, W. H. Gregory, Logan, S. Lucas, R. S. Rintoul, Edward Wakefield.
In responding to the toast of his health,
Mr. Godley, after expressing in the warmest language his thanks for the manner in which he had been received, asked permission to pass to matters of a public nature, and to give some account of the present condition of the Canterbury Settlement. He proceeded:—I have heard a good deal in this country about the Settlement's being a failure, and I think it worth while to show that such is not the case; not for the sake of those who founded it, for to them personally it signifies very little whether they be considered to have failed or not; but in the first place, for the sake of the colony, which ought not to be discredited; and in the second, lest future enterprises of a noble and disinterested kind should be damaged by the supposed precedent of our want of success. The best way in which I can meet assertions of failure is by giving you a very short and simple account of the actual condition of the colony, with a statement of what has been done there; and if any one should think I am likely to mis-state, or over-colour, I can only say I made statements to the same effect six months ago, in the presence of 200 people, at Canterbury, and they, who know best whether I told the truth, sanctioned what I said by their unanimous applause. I am happy, too, to see here several gentlemen whose friendship I was so fortunate as to acquire in New Zealand, and before whom I could hardly venture upon any great exaggeration, even if I were so
As regards agriculture, I assert unhesitatingly that no body of first colonists ever set to work with so little delay and so much success to provide food from their own soil. The obstacles to cultivation in a new country are such as generally to extend longer than you would deem possible the period of imported subsistence. New South Wales did not feed itself, I think, for twenty years; Wellington does not feed itself now. Well, the people of Canterbury raised last season potatoes enough for their consumption. There were 500 acres under wheat, which will give about two-thirds of the consumption. After next harvest, the Settlement will cease to import the main articles of subsistence. This is a true picture of the state of the colony as regards its industry and its commerce. I ask you, does it look like a failure? And now let any fairminded man just take up any number of the Lyttelton Times—let him observe, in the first place, its tone and style; in the second, the number of its advertisements; then the varied record that it exhibits of the sayings and doings of the colony—let him at the same time remember that that colony was only two years old, and contained little more than 3,000 people, and then let him say whether it is possible to come to any other conclusion than that the community of which it is the organ must be not only advancing and flourishing in a material point of view, but also intelligent, moral, and civilised in a very high degree. Where will you find a rural parish in this country, of eqnal population—aye, though such a parish, by being placed in the midst of an old and rich country, would have immense advantages over a colony, that could produce a newspaper like this I hold in ray hand? I brought it because
But it may be asked, assuming the colony to be as you say, how much of all this is due to the Canterbury Association? Now this is, strictly speaking, beside the present question, my object being not to defend or extol the Association, but to describe the actual state of the colony. But I will, nevertheless, in a few words, tell you what the Association has done. In the first place, its agent explored and selected the site, which, up to that time, had been utterly neglected, and almost unknown; it set on foot a survey, which Captain Stokes told me was unparalleled for excellence in the Southern Hemisphere; it organised, with vast labour, one of the best bodies of colonists that ever left these shores; it conveyed those colonists with comfort and security to New Zealand; it provided for them accommodation so ample, that the hardships ordinarily suffered by newly-arrived immigrants have been unknown; it secured for them a cheap and secure title to their land, and made such arrangements for giving them possession, that within two months the whole of the first body were actually in occupation; and it has effectually represented the interests of the colony in this country, especially as regarded the acquisition of constitutional rights. On the subject of what has been done in the way of roads, and of ecclesiastical provision, it is necessary that I should speak a
I will now speak of ecclesiastical and educational institutions. There are four churches in the Settlement, built partly by the Association, partly by subscription, in which Sunday service is performed; in one of these there is service every day, in another on alternate days. Besides these regular places of worship, Divine service is performed from time to time at private houses in various parts of the Settlement. There is a day school at Lyttelton, and another at Christchurch, both excellently taught and well attended. I tried the experiment of having schools in two other localities, but found the population so scattered and so busy that the attendance was not such as to justify my keeping them up. At Christchurch there is a grammar school conducted by the Rev. Mr. Jacobs, at which there are twenty boys of the upper and middle classes. Now this may appear not to be much, and I fully admit that it is not as much as was intended—but, on the other hand, I maintain that it is as much as there is an effective demand for. I must again remind you that the population is smaller, and, collectively, far poorer than that of many villages in England. Now, apply this fact to the question of education. Over estimating, as we always did, the
I have now said nearly all that I have to say about the state of the colony. I do not wish to depict it as a Utopia, either physically or socially; hut I say that, taking it as a new country, and comparing it with other new countries, it is, on the whole, the best and most desirable I have seen or heard of. It is always a misfortune to he obliged to emigrate, but if I were obliged to emigrate myself, I would go to Canterbury, and it is the place to which I should always recommend any one, in whom I had an interest, to go, if compelled to leave England. He will find a healthy, though not always a pleasant climate; agreeable society; most, if not all, of the essential elements of civilisation; and—I have no doubt whatever—the best investment for a small capital now to be had in the world. I repeat that, taking the rate of profit and the absence of risk together, a capital of from £1500 to £5000 cannot in my opinion be so advantageously invested in any other way as in dairy-farming or in sheep-keeping on the plains of New Zealand.
I will now make a few remarks on the part which I took in the politics of New Zealand, especially as I understand that in some quarters I have incurred blame for it. While I was at Wellington waiting for the means of prosecuting the Canterbury enterprise, Sir George Grey came from Auckland and published a Bill for the establishment of municipal institutions in the Provinces of New Zealand. These were intended to be the preparation for, and basis of, a permanent central constitution, founded on similar principles. It became of course a most serious question whether the colonists should accept this measure, in satisfaction of their claims, or refuse to have any thing to say to it, and endeavour to get something else. I will not detain you by stating my reasons for objecting to the measure—for considering it, in fact, a mere mockery of freedom. It is sufficient to say that I did so consider it, and that therefore, as an honest man, deeply interested in the welfare of New Zealand in general, and of Canterbury in particular, I could not refuse to raise my voice against it.
And now, will you pardon my presumption, if I, on the ground that I am half a colonist, and have made colonial affairs my special study, venture to give, even to such men as I see around me, men so superior to myself in ability and position, one word of advice on the subject of colonial policy? Many of you have the power of exercising, directly and indirectly, great influence on the affairs of British colonies. May I earnestly and solemnly impress upon those the one great fundamental maxim of sound colonial policy—it is to let your colonies alone; not chiefly because your interference will probably be of an injudicious kind in this or that particular matter—still less because it will be costly and troublesome to yourselves—but because it tends to spoil, corrupt, and to degrade them; because they will never do any thing, or be fit
On the 9th July 1856 about thirty gentlemen, formerly members of this Association, dined together at the Trafalgar Tavern, Greenwich, in congratulation of the satisfactory settlement of the claims of the Association on the colony. Lord Lyttelton presided, and there were present the Bishops of Oxford and St. David's, Lord Courtenay, Sir Thomas Tancred, Bart., Sir Walter James, Bart., Sir John Simeon, Bart., The
Mr. Godley's health having been proposed by the Chairman in connection with the toast "Prosperity to the Canterbury Settlement," spoke as follows:—
My Lord Lyttelton and Gentlemen—I was not aware until within the last few moments that you intended to do me the honour of coupling my name with the toast of "Prosperity to the Canterbury Settlement," therefore if I were otherwise capable, I am wholly unprepared to make a speech, or to dilate at any length upon the circumstances that have brought us together. Perhaps, however, it is not altogether unsuitable that I, whom the colonists have chosen as their agent and representative, and who am bound to them by stronger ties of personal interest and affection than any other person in this country can be, should stand up here and return thanks for the honour you have done them. It is just three years ago that, upon the occasion of my return from New Zealand, a good number of my personal friends honoured me with an invitation to dinner in this house, and I should be one of the most ungrateful of men if I did not look upon that day, which was marked by the greatest good feeling and harmony, as one of the happiest of my life. Still it was impossible to avoid feeling on that occasion that there was one subject a little difficult to deal with—one subject that it was necessary to pass over lightly—and that was the losses and sacrifices which had been incurred by individual members of the Association. It is true that the money has been well spent, and far be it from me to say that it was grudgingly given, but it is nevertheless not generally a pleasant impression that one derives from finding that a large sum of money intended by those who gave it for one purpose is expended upon another. And it was to a certain extent undoubtedly a sign of failure that the Canterbury Association had to go to private persons to help it out of its difficulties; and that gave rise to taunts
Last year the total number of persons in the colony of Canterbury was 4,000, or rather less. Upon this small population a claim was made of about £31,000, to satisfy what was a debt of honour. To meet this claim of £31,000 in part, certain property was offered, producing an annual income of £800, thus leaving a balance to be made up of £1,100 a-year. That is, after the revenue of the property so allocated was deducted, £1,100 a-year was what the people of the colony engaged to meet by taxation. This would average 5s. a-head on the whole population, and would be equal to taxes to the amount of £7,000,000 a-year imposed upon the population of the United Kingdom. Everybody must admit that this was a great burden, and a great sacrifice for a young country that
Having said so much on this matter of the debt I will claim your indulgence while I say a few words upon the position and the prospects of the colony. I will not weary you with statistics, with which you must be already pretty familiar, and which go to prove the great progress the colony has made in material prosperity, and the prospect of the continuance of that material prosperity for the future. I believe there can be no doubt—and in confirmation of this opinion I may refer
Perhaps I may now be permitted to say a word or two, and a word or two only, in reference to my own connection with the Canterbury Association. This, as your Lordship has observed, is the last time at which the members of the Association will meet in anything like a corporate capacity, and I cannot address them as a corporation for the last time, without thanking them earnestly for the great kindness and confidence and personal regard that has been evinced towards me both by the members of the Association and the colonists. I cannot trust myself to speak upon this part of the subject as I ought to speak. My feelings will not allow me to express myself in other than in a most imperfect and unsatisfactory manner: I will therefore leave this topic, and I will only add, in conclusion, that I hope the members of the Canterbury Association, now that their official connection with the colony has come to an end, will not lose their interest in a Settlement that owes its existence to them; certain as I am that they will carry to their graves the conviction, that never have they employed their time and their labour and their money in an undertaking that will conduce more to the happiness of their fellow-creatures, or redound more to their own honour.
At a dinner to the late Superintendent of the Province of Canterbury, at the Albion Tavern on the 23rd November 1858, Mr. Godley was again called on to respond to a toast in which his name was connected with the Colony of Canterbury, and spoke in reply as follows:—
My Lords and Gentlemen—It is with very hearty feelings of satisfaction and pleasure that I find myself year after year attending these social meetings of the friends of Canterbury—such meetings as I believe no other colony can show—meetings eminently characteristic of the social, genial, and friendly feelings which have always marked the efforts of the friends of
No doubt there are great drawbacks in the colonial life of Canterbury which we are endeavouring to correct. These are principally the want of labour and the want of education. To meet the first of these drawbacks—the want of labour—Mr. FitzGerald is sending out ships freighted with emigrants, at the rate of a 1,200-ton ship a month; and to such an extent has the introduction of labour in this way gone on, that from March 1858 to March 1859 the population will have been increased by 2,000 people, or 20 per cent. I see, too, that great efforts are making to remove the other great drawback—the want of education—by the organisation and establishment of a higher school, a grammar-school and college, and by the exertions which the Bishop has made, in his own energetic manner, to organise a staff of clergy to visit the various stations at regular intervals. Therefore I think I may say that the moral progress which Canterbury presents corresponds with its material progress.
I will now say one word on the special topic of this evening. There is no person present, I believe, who has had so much to do with, or seen so much of, Mr. FitzGerald, in both his public and private capacity, as I have. Therefore I may speak with the force and authority of an eye-witness of his work in the colony. Upon this part of the subject others have spoken of what they have heard and read; I speak of what I have actually seen. Mr. FitzGerald was the first who landed in Canterbury after the Settlement was founded, and I never shall forget the emotion with which I threw myself into his arms when he landed. Both of us, I am sure, will look back on that moment as one of the most affecting and memorable of our lives. When he came out he had special duties to perform in connection with me, which he performed with that energy which he brings to bear upon everything in which he Lyttelton Times of that day will agree with me that no newspaper was ever conducted with loftier aspirations or with a more honest desire to elevate and raise the tone of the people amongst whom it circulated. There is nothing for which the colonists have to thank Mr. FitzGerald more than that great work, which was mainly instrumental in introducing that tone and feeling which have remained the characteristics of social life in Canterbury ever since. So far as I know, the colony of Canterbury affords the only instance of a small community where there are two newspapers which do not abuse each other. I read them both regularly, and can assure you that they actually praise each other, and I believe that to be a miracle without parallel. I read the Canterbury Standard and the Lyttelton Times, and I do not believe that I have ever found in either a word of abuse against the other, I attribute that, and the good feeling that prevails amongst the colonists generally, to the manner in which the Lyttelton Times was conducted by its first editor; and I have remarked that in all the public affairs of the colony Mr. FitzGerald has always dealt with them in such a way as showed that he was ever conscious of the moral dignity of his position. There is no position on earth where men of similar capacity and means—men of that class to which our colonists generally belong—can exercise such immense influence and acquire such immense power as that in which those who first go out to a new colony, and become the seed-plot and nursery of a new nation, find
The following papers are included in this publication because they were Mr. Godley's work. It was at his instigation that the subject was taken up by the War Office, in which he then held an important post: The Departmental Committee appointed to investigate the subject of Military Defences for Colonies consisted of himself, Mr. Hamilton, the Under Secretary for the Home Department, and Mr. Elliott, the Assistant Under Secretary for the Colonies. Mr. Elliott's separate Report is added in order that Mr. Godley's Memorandum which follows it may be intelligible. The evidence given by Mr. Godley before the Committee of the House of Commons appointed to consider the Reports is also added to complete the subject. The latter may be said to have been the last public work in which he was engaged before his death in five months afterwards.
I am directed by Secretary Major-General Peel to request that you will represent to Secretary Sir E. B. Lytton that so great is the difficulty and embarrassment occasioned to this Department by the absence of any fixed and recognised principle for the guidance of the Secretary of State in determining the numerous questions of military expenditure which are continually arising in most of the Colonies, that Major-General Peel feels it to be highly desirable that steps should be at once taken for coming to an understanding with the several Colonies concerned on the subject.
So long as the Secretary of State for War was also Secretary of State for the Colonies, the inconvenience referred to was of course less seriously left, inasmuch as the Minister who filled the joint offices possessed means of information as to the actual requirements of the Colonies, and their ability or not to defray the cost involved, which enabled him readily to decide for himself how far it would be proper to grant or to refuse
That such arrangements are practicable, and, where they do exist, are found to work satisfactorily, is proved by the example of Malta, Mauritius, the Ionian Islands, and Ceylon, which pay a contribution into the Exchequer in aid of military funds; and again by the example of New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia, which pay for military buildings and defences, and which are to defray the pay and allowances of any troops whom they may require beyond a specified number maintained from the Imperial Exchequer. Major-General Peel would now propose to extend the principle of those arrangements to the rest of the Colonies, with such modifications as the variety of their circumstances may render necessary.
The general principle to be borne in view in negotiating with Colonial Governments on this subject would be, as General Peel conceives:—1st, that England should assist in the defence of her Colonies against aggression on the part of foreign civilised nations, and (in a less proportion) of formidable native tribes; but in no case, except where such Colonies are mere garrisons kept up for Imperial purposes, should she assume the whole of such defence. On the contrary, she should insist, as a condition of her aid, that the Colony should
These being the general principles on which General Peel conceives that the arrangement to be entered into with the respective Colonial Legislatures should be based, he would, in the event of their being concurred in and adopted by the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury (to whom a corresponding communication has been made), suggest that the business of preparing for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government a scheme for the application of them to each Colony, should be confided to a committee, consisting of three members, one to be nominated by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, one by the Lords of the Treasury, and one by the Secretary of State for War.
In obedience to the instructions which we have received, we have inquired into and considered the relations of the Colonies of Great Britain to the mother country, as regards the expenditure on their military defence.
The duties imposed on us were explained in a letter from General Peel, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 14th March 1859, in consequence of which the committee was appointed. A copy of the letter is appended. In that communication General Peel states:—
That he feels great difficulty and embarrassment from the absence of any fixed and recognised principle for the guidance of the Secretary of State for War, in determining the numerous questions of military expenditure which are continually arising in most of the Colonies; that he considers it highly desirable that steps should be at once taken for coming to an understanding with the several Colonies on the subject, and that it appears to him that the adoption of arrangements which should define the respective liabilities of the War Department and the various Colonial Governments in respect of military expenditure would relieve the Secretary of State from the difficulties in question, and would at the same time be more conducive to the interest and convenience of the Colonies themselves.
The principles suggested by General Peel as the basis of such arrangements are as follows:—
General Peel concludes by proposing that a committee shall be appointed to prepare a scheme for the application of these principles to each Colony.
In conformity with these views, which were concurred in generally by the Lords of the Treasury and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, we submit the following Report:—
We desire to state at the outset, that while willing to apply our best judgment and means of information, in obedience to the instructions of Her Majesty's Government, we feel sensibly the peculiar difficulties of the task imposed upon us. Few political questions involve greater difficulties and matter of more grave consideration than the relations between England and her colonial possessions—relations to which, as a whole, whether we consider the extent of those possessions, the diversities of race, interests, position, and circumstances which they comprise, or the various titles of conquest, treaty, and colonisation by which we hold them, there appears nothing even remotely analogous in the history of the world.
In suggesting therefore, changes of an important character in those relations, we feel that we are dealing with questions of policy which properly belong to the higher departments of Government, and that our plans may be open to practical objections of which we have no means of estimating the force.
But though conscious of our disadvantages in this respect, we have thought it our duty not to shrink from stating fully and plainly our own conclusions, however imperfect, on the matter referred to us, especially as Her Majesty's Government will have no difficulty in applying to them the necessary qualifications.
The first point to which it is our duty to call attention is the fact that the Colonies of Great Britain may be said, speaking generally, to have been free from the obligation of contributing, either by personal service or money payment, towards their own defences—a state of things which we It is worth while to note, as showing by contrast the liberality with which England treats her Colonies, the financial relations between those of the only two European nations besides ourselves which possess Colonies of any importance, and the mother countries. In Ministerial Statement in the, Dutch Chambers; (Journal of the Hague, November 9, 1859Anuario Econumico-Msiradistico de Espana for
We subjoin a return of the military force and the expenditure for military purposes in our Colonies for 1857-8, the last year for which we have complete accounts. See note at the end of this Report.
We consider that this immunity, throwing as it does the defence of the Colonies almost entirely on the mother country, is open to two main objections. In the first place, it imposes an enormous burden and inconvenience on the people of England, not only by the addition which it makes to their taxes, but by calling off to remote stations a large proportion of their troops and ships, and thereby weakening their means of defence at home. But a still more important objection is, the tendency which this system must necessarily have to prevent the development of a proper spirit of self-reliance amongst our Colonists, and to enfeeble their national character. By the gift of political self-government, we have bestowed on our Colonies a most important element of national education; but the habit of self-defence constitutes a part hardly less important of the training of a free people, and it will never be
Next to the inadequacy of the contributions of our Colonies towards their defences, the most conspicuous defect in the present system is its inequality as among the Colonies themselves. For example, the colony of Victoria paid in 1857-58 about two-thirds of its ordinary military expenditure, and has this year in addition voted large sums for fortifications. In the same year, Ceylon paid about two-fifths, and Canada one-fifth part respectively, of their whole military expenditure; while Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Tasmania, New Zealand, and many other Colonies paid nothing at all. Above all, there is the gigantic anomaly of the expenditure on the Cape. We cannot avoid calling the especial attention of Her Majesty's Government to the drain on British resources which has resulted from our undertaking the defence of this Colony, and to the inadequacy of the benefits resulting to British interests. As affording a field of emigration, a supply of our wants, or a market for our produce, our connection with the Colony has not been, comparatively speaking, of any considerable advantage to us; in fact, the only direct object of Imperial concern, is the use of the roadsteads at Table and Simon's Bays. Yet in 1857-58, a period of exceptional tranquility, we had at the Cape, including the German Legion, a garrison, or rather an army, of 10,759 regular troops, and the military expenditure alone was £803,687, equal to more than one-fifth of the expenditure on the whole of the Colonies, including the Mediterranean garrisons. Since that time the force has been materially reduced, but this year new works have been begun (at the expense of the Imperial Treasury); and the general officer commanding has informed the Governor that if they are to be completed, manned, and armed, he will require an additional force to be placed at his disposal of at least four regiments of infantry, 850 artillery, 400 cavalry, and a proportion of engineers. On the other hand, the whole contribution of the Colony to the enormous cost of its defence consisted in
Nor is the inequality in our mode of treating our Colonies less remarkable than that of their contributions. For example, though the people of Victoria contribute, as we have shown, most liberally and largely, we have lately, at great expense and inconvenience, removed part of the regiment quartered there, on the express ground that Victoria refused to pay for more than four companies, to Tasmania, which not only does not pay for those troops, but contributes nothing in any shape to military purposes. Again, we have removed the troops from Antigua, on the ground that the Colony would not provide barracks for them, to Barbadoes, where we provide barracks for them ourselves Again, Canada is the first British Colony which has set the example of organising a militia; she has done this entirely at her own expense, including the arming and clothing of the men, and we have refused to contribute anything towards it, going so far as to demand payment for some great-coats and smooth bore muskets, which happened to be in store on the spot, and which we issued to them. Yet at the same time, we are distributing, gratis, from the store at Quebec, a large quantity of the best Enfield rifles to Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland, for the use of volunteers, although we have never been able to induce those Colonies to organise a militia, or to contribute one farthing, in any shape, towards their own defence.
A further anomaly exists as regards the issue of "colonial allowances" to Her Majesty's troops. In some Colonies, viz., Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia, Ceylon, and Mauritius, very liberal allowances are given by the Colonial Governments to the officers, and, in the three first cases, to the men, over and above what they are entitled to by regulation. The results of this exceptional liberality are,—
It is not surprising that a state of things so anomalous and irregular should lead to disputes and confusion. Not a year passes without the occurrence of difficulties and discussions with regard to the respective liabilities of the Imperial and the Colonial Governments in every part of the world; and it is to be observed, that such questions are never settled; they are adjourned for the moment, leaving behind them often much soreness on both sides, and the Imperial Government almost invariably yielding the points at issue; but the next year, or the year after they are raised again, there being no recognised principles of mutual relations to which appeal can be made, or upon which a permanent settlement can be founded.
Having pointed out, as above, the evils of the present system, we proceed to submit our proposals for altering it. Before doing so, it will be convenient to state the general principles on which we believe such alteration should be founded.
In the first place, while we recognise to the full extent the obligation which devolves on Great Britain of assisting her Colonies to defend themselves against foreign enemies, we maintain also that this obligation is discharged by doing, or
In the second place, we submit that a system of defence, based upon the presence of Imperial garrisons, in every part of the empire, is as inefficient as it is burdensome; and that the right system would be one based on local efforts and local resources.
All history shows (what is indeed evident à priori) that the maintenance of dominion over scattered and distant territories depends either on the nature of the countries and their population, or upon the command of the sea. It is not physically possible, even if it were desirable, to maintain in fifty Colonies expensive fortifications and garrisons, adequate to stand regular sieges against powerful expeditions. With great efforts and at enormous expense, for what are supposed to be great objects, a few such garrisons are maintained out of Imperial resources at military posts, and with them we do not suggest any interference; at least they are calculated to effect the objects for which they are intended. But no nation could carry out such a system all over the world; no nation, in fact, has ever carried it so far as this country now does in the exceptional instance to which we have referred. The retention of the rest of our Colonies must depend not upon their garrisons, but upon the other means of defence which we have mentioned. The principal defence of such Colonies, so far as it depends upon the mother country at all, consists in her naval superiority; the real question as regards those which have no inherent powers of resistance being, not which power
Colonial garrisons (when not very large, and in first-class fortresses,) have always found themselves in traps, and at the mercy, of naval expeditions. Take the case of the Cape in the revolutionary war, when it had only 20,000 European inhabitants. For many years the Dutch had had a large garrison there, kept up at great expense, with a view, of course, to its defence in war. In 1795 a British expedition landed, and almost without resistance, the garrison laid down its arms. We restored the Cape to the Dutch at the peace of Amiens, and, untaught by experience, they sent another garrison there. When the second war broke out the same thing happened, and we got a second batch of prisoners of war. In short, our fleets employed themselves, during the first years of the war, in sweeping up, as it were, into a net all the colonies belonging to all other nations, in every part of the world, and in making prisoners of their garrisons; and there is hardly a single instance where there was resistance, worthy of the name. In the event of another war, if we retained the command of the sea, we could take Java, Martinique, and Gruadaloupe, whenever we thought it worth while. On the other hand, we should lose all our Colonies which do not possess natural and internal means of defence, if we had for our antagonist a power, or a combination of powers, able to command the sea and desirous of taking them.
The condition, then, of a successful attack on any such Colony, would be either permanent command of the seas, or such a temporary command as would enable the enemy to land an expeditionary force powerful enough to conquer the country, and hold it against any subsequent attacks on our part. In neither of such contingencies would the present
It is true that these garrisons, though insufficient to stand regular sieges, may sometimes be able to repel what are called "insults," i.e., aggression by flying squadrons or partisan bands. But such an object is not worth the expense of keeping up permanent garrisons in open towns. It is inconsistent with the practice of modern warfare to plunder private property, and the Government property at such places is hardly ever worth plundering. Indeed, fortifications and garrisons, unless really strong, are more likely to do harm than good, the towns being more likely to suffer m the engagement than if they were totally undefended. Besides, these are contingencies which local efforts should meet, both at home and abroad. The general Government has enough to do in providing for the defence of the country at its vital points. It is obviously incapable of protecting every commercial harbour and colonial capital. It is to be remembered that the question is one of comparative advantages and claims. Deducting the garrisons of the Mediterranean stations, and of the other Colonial possessions which are simply military posts, in 1857-58 about 27,000 regular troops were employed, and more than £2,000,000 of money was spent on the military defence of the rest of the Colonies; and we cannot but feel convinced that those troops, and that money might be more usefully employed, indeed more usefully for the Colonies themselves, because in a manner more conducive to the general security and welfare of the Empire. There are between four and five thousand men, for example, scattered about, in detachments of a few companies each, in the West Indies; and yet there is not a post in the whole command which they could hold for a week against a hostile expedition. It seems to us clear that that
We have said that, so far as assistance from the mother country is concerned, the chief thing which most of our Colonies must look to for defence against foreign enemies is our navy. But a more efficient safeguard for most of them is to be found in their situation, and in the numbers and character of their population. Take, for example, the case of the provinces of British America, which are the only Colonies exposed to aggression by land. Of these the whole question of the successful defence depends on the wishes and feelings of the people themselves. If they were ill-affected, or even indifferent, no possible military efforts on our part could defend them in the case of war with America. On the other hand the Americans could never subdue and retain in subjection the British provinces, so long as the latter are determined not to accept their dominion. It is quite true that we could assist the Colonists very materially, but it is not necessary to keep up garrisons in time of peace for that purpose. No invasion of Canada by any power but the Americans is even conceivable; and no serious invasion of Canada by the Americans can be made without many months of preparation. They have no machinery or organisation for such an enterprise; while in much shorter time we could send troops there, if we wished it and could spare them. Against incursions by "filibusters" or "sympathisers," the Canadians ought to be, and are, quite able to protect themselves. Indeed, it is a remarkable fact, that no Colony having more than 20,000 European inhabitants has ever been conquered by a foreign enemy, except in the single instance of Canada itself, of which the population, at the time of its conquest, was 60,000; but which was in the singularly unfavourable position of being the only French colony in that part of the world, and attacked, therefore, not
We repeat, then, that the real and sufficient protection to the independence of our Colonies consists, either first, in their remote and insulated positions, which make it highly improbable that any power could or would organise naval and military expeditions sufficiently powerful to take and keep them, or, secondly, in local circumstances, such as the nature of the country and the character and numbers of the population, which render it practically impossible to invade and conquer them, at any rate before assistance would arrive from this country. The West Indian Islands come under the first category; British North America under the second; Australia, New Zealand, Tasmania, and the Cape under both.
We have said enough to explain and illustrate the proposition which we began by laying down, viz., that it is not necessary or desirable for the interests of the Empire generally, nor in reality of the Colonies themselves, to undertake their defence by small and scattered Imperial garrisons. We now come to practical recommendations. Two plans only have suggested themselves for obtaining from the Colonies a reasonable contribution towards their military defence.
One is the extension to all the Colonies of an arrangement made by Lord Grey (and modified by Mr. Labouchere) with New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia. By that arrangement it was provided that the Imperial Government should maintain in each of the Colonies referred to, such a body of troops as it considered to be, in Mr. Labouchere's words, "sufficient for Imperial purposes," and that the Colonies should pay for all military buildings and other local defences, as well as for any troops beyond the force above specified, which they might ask for and obtain.
This arrangement has undoubtedly many advantages, and, as regards the Colonies in question, it has been very favourable to the British Exchequer, inasmuch as they pay by far the
Secondly, we do not understand how any arrangement founded on these principles could be made equally applicable to the fluctuating circumstances of different periods, especially to peace and war. If it be held, for example, that four companies are necessary "for Imperial purposes" at Sydney in time of peace, it seems to follow that a larger number would be necessary in time of threatened war, and a larger still in time of actual hostilities; in short, that the number required would fluctuate in proportion to the danger; while, whenever the force was augmented or diminished, a fresh negotiation would have to be entered into for the purpose of determining the respective proportions in which the expense should be defrayed.
Thirdly, we dissent from the argument founded on joint interest. If England was considered bound to contribute towards the defence of her Colonies merely because she is interested in their defence, it might fairly be argued that the
Finally, we believe that if we take upon ourselves the initiative in the defence of our Colonies, by assigning to them garrisons, however small, those garrisons will be taken as symbols of our responsibility, and their presence will tend to perpetuate the main evil of the present system, namely, the dependence of the Colonies on the mother country for defence, and their neglect of local efforts.
Having come for these reasons to the conclusion that it is not desirable to confirm and extend the arrangement referred to, we submit, as the result of careful and anxious deliberation, the following plan for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government:—
We propose to divide the Colonies (so called) into two classes. The first class would consist of military posts, in which, for objects altogether independent of and distinct from the defence of the particular countries in which they are situated, the Imperial Grovernment thinks it necessary to maintain garrisons—such as Malta, Gibraltar, Corfu, Bermuda, and a few more of similar character. So long as these posts are held at all, they should be adequately fortified and garrisoned, but we are of opinion that as the garrisons of them are maintained without reference to the wants and wishes of the inhabitants, they should be dealt with exceptionally, and not included in any general scheme of Colonial contribution.
The second class would comprise all the rest of the Colonies, that is, all those where troops are stationed primarily, if not exclusively, for the defence of the lives, liberties, and sine qua non of our incurring any expense in the defence of a Colony of the class now under consideration. If it were adopted, some Colonies might choose to form a militia or to have corps enlisted for local service, like e.g. the "Canadian Rifles." In these cases they would organise and pay their forces as they might think fit, and the Imperial contributions would be paid into the Colonial exchequer without further interference than would be necessary to satisfy ourselves that they were expended in accordance with the agreement. Other Colonies might prefer being garrisoned by troops of the line, and paying their fixed share of the entire expense of such troops. In these cases the Imperial Government would first consider whether it could spare them; and would assure itself that the number asked for was sufficient for its purpose, and not open to the objections which exist to small and scattered garrisons, and also that the force would be adequately provided for as regards pay, allowances, and barracks; and it would only send the troops in case of their being no objection on any of these grounds. It would also be necessary to have a clear understanding that all the troops so sent would be at the disposal of the Imperial Government in case any emergency should require them to be withdrawn.
We find that a plan very similar to this was proposed by
"Her Majesty's former advisers therefore came to the "opinion (from which, as far as I have yet been able to consider "the subject, I see no reason to dissent), that for the "present it was better not to alter the present system."
It will be seen that the refusal of the Secretary of State to
There is one objection which is likely to be urged against our plan, which we think it better to notice by anticipation. We mean an objection to laying down a uniform rate of joint contribution. It may possibly be said that one Colony is more exposed to foreign aggression, or less able, through poverty or the nature of its population, to provide against it than another, and that we ought to apportion our aid to the wants of each, not to the amount of its own efforts. The objection in question is founded on a different view of the nature and ground of the obligations of the mother country from that which we entertain and have endeavoured to express. We consider those obligations to be founded on the peculiar relation
It is almost needless to say, that while persuaded of the feasibility as well as of the advantages of the plan which we recommend, we are not insensible of the difficulties which Her Majesty's Government will meet with in applying it. Nor do we for a moment suppose that it can be brought into full operation at once by a circular dispatch followed by the withdrawal of Her Majesty's troops. If it be adopted at all, it should be carried out with undeviating impartiality and firmness, and the Colonies should be made to understand from the first that the decision of the Government on the subject is final and irreversible. But it should also be carried out considerately and with caution; the Colonies will require time to organise systems of local self-defence, and in the meanwhile bona fide accepted the arrangement proposed, and are preparing to act upon it. We venture further to suggest that it would be wise and just to show the utmost liberality to them in making the preliminary arrangements. For example, the Imperial Government possesses in every Colony considerable and often very valuable property, which has been acquired and retained for purposes of defence; when the responsibility of that defence is transferred to the Colonies, it is clearly right that the property should be transferred to them also. The same course might be pursued (though on different grounds) with respect to the armament of forts and batteries, and even to the stores which might happen to be on the spot, and appropriated to local purposes. In short, every possible pains should be taken to let the Colonies see that the course decided upon is adopted with a view to the permanent advantage of themselves as well as of the mother country, and that there is no wish on the part of the latter to drive what is called a hard bargain with them.
In conclusion, the principal advantages of the plan which we recommend are as follows:—It would involve a great saving to the Imperial Exchequer, not only through the direct contribution of the Colonies, but also, as above intimated, by the general reduction of Colonial garrisons which would inevitably follow. At the same time on inordinate burden would be imposed upon the Colonies, seeing that it would rest with themselves to determine the amount of their respective armaments.
It would be equally applicable to peace and war; a Colony finding itself exposed to danger, would increase its military force, either by asking us for more troops, or by local measures of defence, of which the mother country would bear its fixed share of the expense.
It would stimulate the patriotism, self-reliance, and military spirit of the Colonists, by throwing on them the responsibility of directing their own military affairs.
Above all, it would convey, in the most marked and emphatic way, the determination of the mother country, that the Colonies should be governed through and for their own people. It would show that we rely on their loyalty and attachment, and on nothing else; that we have no wish to preserve our connection with them by force; and that, therefore, we regard not only without jealousy, but with sympathy and pride, the growth of their military strength, and the cultivation of that martial spirit which is their best defence. It is in this point of view particularly that we consider the question, whether, in the organisation of Colonial defences, the mother country or the Colonies should take the initiative (that is, whether we should defend them with their assistance, or they defend themselves with ours), to be of the utmost importance; to depend, in fact, upon whether one or other of two opposite views of colonial policy be deliberately adopted; and we emphatically repeat, that it is mainly with reference to these fundamental principles, and not to a calculation of how much money we can obtain from the Colonies, or save to Great Britain, that we recommend the plan proposed and explained in this report.
One member of the Committee, Mr. Elliot, finding himself unable to agree in the whole of our Report, and consequently to sign it, has appended a Memorandum, explaining to what extent he differs from us, and his reasons for doing so.
[The following is the Return referred to in page 260, showing the Force stationed in the Colonies, and the Expenditure incurred for their defence, by the Imperial and Colonial Governments respectively, during the year ended 31st March 1858.]
I greatly lament that I cannot join with my colleagues in their Report on the military expenditure in the Colonies. If we have not been able to agree upon every portion of our inquiries, it has not been for want of an unfailing cordiality in their pursuit, nor of a perfectly frank interchange of all our opinions and information. But the truth perhaps is, that the topics of the Report, involving as they do some of the deepest and most debateable points in the relations of Colonies to a mother country, could hardly be expected to command an undivided judgment. These are questions on which no doctrines have yet attained the rank of established principles, and on which different opinions will probably long prevail. I hope that this may somewhat alleviate my responsibility as an unwilling dissentient from part of the Report; for even had it been unanimous, these large and delicate questions could still never have been settled otherwise than by the direct examination and authority of the Queen's Government.
Considering the importance of the subject, and the number of years during which it has been my duty to watch Colonial affairs, I hope I may not err in believing it right to lay before Her Majesty's Government, for what they may be worth, the grounds of my dissent, and the nature of the opinions which I should have been prepared to submit.
Three main principles appear to me to be laid down in the Report; first, that we cannot expect our Colonial possessions to be made defensible at all points, and at all times; secondly, that some few posts, especially valuable for Imperial purposes, should be dealt with exceptionally, and not included in any general scheme of colonial contribution; but, thirdly, that the
In the first of these propositions I cordially concur. No success in war, hut rather disaster, would he likely to ensue from scattering the land forces of the Empire over the numerous outlying possessions of a great maritime and colonising State, such as Great Britain. Her Colonial dominion rests on her naval supremacy. The mistress of the seas is mistress of whatever Colonies she pleases to hold or to take; and if ever she ceases to be mistress of the seas it is not forts or garrisons which will save her Colonies.
To that important section of the Report, in which these views are illustrated and enforced, I fully subscribe. It appears to me the more material, inasmuch as, should it meet with approval, it must discourage schemes of Colonial fortification, which I cannot help believing to be often extravagant. The Government offices are, at the present moment, full of such projects. I will take the liberty to quote two which have recently fallen within my own observation.
When the Emperor of the French and the Emperor of Austria went to war in Italy, it was immediately proposed that we should construct new batteries at the Cape of Good Hope, demanding a large additional garrison. The particulars appear in the Report. This was a proposal to strengthen England in the event of her being involved in a European war, by locking up, in addition to the present force, 800 artillerymen, and four regiments of the line, at the furthest extremity of South Africa.
The different channels through the Bahamas form considerable outlets from the Gulf of Mexico, and in time of war commerce will be liable to suffer in them from the cruisers of any hostile naval power. This is a motive for endeavouring to keep, as far as other claims will admit, a naval superiority in that region; but the islands themselves are of no value. We must not for a moment be misled by the importance of the
In these remarks, I am not so presuming or unjust as to impugn the merits of the officers by whom the projects have been prepared. If called upon for plans of land defences, they must furnish such plans; and I doubt not that they have drawn them with the best professional skill. What I am desirous to submit is, that such extensive land defences are in themselves inappropriate and unadvisable.
The second proposition states that the military posts are exceptional, but does not state whether it is meant that they ought to be exempt from contribution. On this point, however, an expression of opinion seems to me desirable, and I will venture to offer one. All of the following appear to me places, which, irrespectively of any intrinsic value as Colonies, may be deemed stations important to the general strength of the Empire:—
In the year 1857, these places contributed the following sums towards their military expenses:—
My opinion is, that we are not called upon to strike off this class of receipts from the British Exchequer. There appears to me no injustice in accepting a contribution from such of these places as contain prosperous communities, so long as the amount falls short of the cost of the number of troops which they would require for their own purposes. Mauritius, for instance, is one of the most flourishing Colonies which we possess, tenanted by an immense fluctuating population of coloured labourers of various races. There seems to be no good reason why this wealthy island should not contribute, as it does, a moderate quota towards the expense of troops which are indispensable to its internal security.
From the third proposition I am compelled to differ. I cannot think that the same fixed proportion ought to be contributed by all Colonies whatsoever, regardless of their inherent differences.
Suppose that some of the richer Colonies, such as those in Australia, particularly require troops, and are willing to contribute two-thirds of the expense, must we reject the offer if others contribute only one half? Or, again, suppose that some of the minor Colonies urgently need troops, but are unable to contribute more than a quarter of their expense, must we either refuse the troops, or reject the contribution, merely because other Colonies pay more?
Uniformity is good, where circumstances are uniform; but where they differ it seems to me reasonable that practice
Now, nothing can be more diversified, and, especially more unequal, than the condition of the British Colonies; they are exposed, some more, some less, to foreign invasion; some more and others less to perils from natives; the population in one hind of Colonies is dense, in another scattered, in some it is peaceful, in others troublesome, and in a few it sprang from convicts sent out for the convenience of this country; again, in certain Colonies this population is British, in others foreign; in part of them it is wholly white, in part almost wholly coloured, and in many it consists of a large proportion of both; above all, some are rich, and some are poor; is it surprising with Colonies of such an infinite variety of condition, that both their demands for military assistance should be different, and their power of contribution unequal?
"We are not bound, it is said, to equalise their advantages and disadvantages; poor nations, like poor individuals, must be content to be less well off than rich ones. This is perfectly true; but then the Colonies, especially the lesser Colonies, which must call for assistance, are not separate nations; they are members of one immensely powerful and wealthy nation, from which they believe that they are entitled to some share of general protection. The question is what that share should be.
The Report admits, in handsome terms, the claims of the Colonies to receive aid in their defence, but rests it solely on the ground that the Imperial Government has the control of peace and war, and is, therefore, bound in honour to assist in guarding others from suffering by its policy. I cannot think that this is the only ground, and that we must discard that of interest. Suppose that one of our Colonies should yield the long-desired advantage of a field for the supply of cotton, would not England have a direct interest in its defence, even though it did not contribute a shilling or a man towards the struggle of a European war? Nor is it necessary to take only
Without dwelling further, however, on abstract discussions, it may be more fruitful of practical consequences to examine a little more closely some of the facts in the Colonies which bear on their military requirements. For this purpose, the Colonies may, perhaps, be roughly divided into the following classes:—
I think it will be seen at a glance, that it would be difficult to frame any general rule which should be equally applicable to all of such dissimilar societies. It seems to me very doubtful whether they ought, on account of any abstract principle, or for mere convenience, to contribute equally to their military expenditure; it is certain that they could not do so in point of fact. If we lay down any rate of contribution which may be equitable for the first or the second of the above classes, and say that the West Indies must either pay the same or else part with the troops, we may as well send the order for their return to-morrow. We know perfectly well that most of those impoverished Colonies cannot find the money. The question then is, whether there is anything in the presence of troops there so essential to the fundamental wants of society that, in default of local resources, the ruling authority is bound to supply the demand. I freely admit that poorer communities will have inferior roads and landing places, schools, gaols, and hospitals, and that the deficiency is not to be supplied from, the Imperial purse. But if, in these islands, the very existence of society depends on having a small military force, may not the provision of it be fairly deemed a duty of the sovereign power? I do not believe that the Government or the people of this country would endure that any places should be called British, and yet fall into a state of helpless, and perhaps sanguinary anarchy.
And this compels me to a short digression on the ends and objects of a military force. I think that we must not assume that their use is to repel a foreign enemy alone; although this, undoubtedly, is their main use. But whilst I entirely agree that troops ought not to be employed in the ordinary duties of police, I cannot help thinking that in almost every country, respect for the civil force is secured by a knowledge, that
The views above submitted upon the West Indies apply, with slight modifications, to the settlements on the Western Coast of Africa. Those settlements are maintained for the sake of one of the most cherished objects of English policy. They are too puny to be able to defray even their civil expenditure without assistance from British funds. It appears certain, then, that they could not afford to pay for troops for themselves, whilst without troops it can hardly be supposed that they could subsist in the midst of lawless Europeans pursuing an almost piratical trade, and numerous warlike African tribes. Be this as it may, however, the real question for the Government must be, I apprehend, whether the troops can be reduced, or altogether discarded, but not whether these small settlements can pay any material proportion of their cost.
The foregoing are reasons for which, I think, that an equal rate of contribution from all Colonies is not just, expedient, or practicable, and that any efficient attempt to enforce it would be attended with the risk of serious misfortunes. I prefer the other plan by which Her Majesty's Government determines the amount of force which it deems reasonable to allot to the different Colonies, at British charge, as being required by the duties of the Sovereign State, whilst the Colonies themselves must pay for an additional number of troops which they may
These great countries contain three millions of people, and are for thousands of miles conterminous with the United States. It is evident that no forces sent from home can be supposed to undertake the defence of this vast line of territory. The security of the inhabitants rests chiefly on their own patriotism and valour, of which they have already, whenever required, afforded brilliant and successful examples. The principle was propounded by Earl Grey in 1854, and was repeated by the Duke of Newcastle, as Secretary for War, and Sir George Grey, as Colonial Secretary in 1854, that in Canada the fortified city of Quebec, and the fort of Kingston, with perhaps one or two outlying posts between Montreal and the frontier, should be garrisoned by the general troops of the Empire, but that no more ought to devolve on the General Government. This proposition was acquiesced in by the authorities of Canada without a murmur, and they have set about active measures, at a considerable charge to themselves, for rendering their militia efficient. The harbour of Halifax is as much a station important to the general power of the nation as any of the places which have been enumerated in the list of military posts. It is only just that its garrison should be provided for out of Imperial funds; nor could the province of Nova Scotia, which is far from wealthy, be expected to tax
In this group, and although dwelling in different Colonies, yet the majority of them in close neighbourhood, there are now no less than one million of settlers. It is needless to say that they can be in no danger of subjugation. That European power would be very strong which undertook to conquer a million of Englishmen living at the antipodes. But they very properly desire to protect themselves against partial descents, and injury to their homes and property, and since the rumours of European war they have shown great ardour and resolution on the subject. It would be the greatest mistake, in my opinion, to doubt the spirit and the self-reliance of any of our large European settlements.
In the Australian Colonies the principle has been laid down, that after fixing a number of troops to be assumed as the quota required for Imperial purposes, all additional force sought for by the local governments should be paid for (provided that this country can spare them) by the Colonies themselves. Accordingly, four companies have been assigned to New South Wales and four to Victoria, and those Colonies
Setting aside convict settlements, this is the only Colony connected with the Australian group to which the principle has not been applied, that an English quota being fixed, all additional troops are to be defrayed from local sources. New Zealand has hitherto been less wealthy than the others, and is in peculiar circumstances on account of its aboriginal inhabitants The proportion of Europeans to Maories is, however, continually increasing, and the longer that our rule is maintained in tranquillity, the more must the natives be supposed to become confirmed in habits of peace and order. This would be a reason, for reducing the Imperial garrison, and for entrusting the security of the European inhabitants chiefly to their own prudence and justice in dealing with the natives in time of quiet, and to their spirit in case of disturbance. On the other hand, if a premature or excessive diminution of troops should be followed by disaster to our countrymen in New Zealand, public opinion would probably condemn the measure. Between these conflicting considerations, it appears to me to be the task of statesmen to divine the course which may be best suited to the circumstances of the time at which they have to form their decision.
These speak for themselves; they are garrisoned for Imperial purposes. The Ionian Islands are bound by convention, executed under the Treaty of Paris, to contribute a yearly sum of 25,000l. towards their military expenses, and Malta contributes a sum of 6,200l.
On this group I have stated by anticipation some of the general views which seem to me to deserve consideration. The West Indian Colonies are divided into two military commands: first, Jamaica, and secondly, the Windward and Leeward Islands. Jamaica must, I apprehend, be admitted as falling more or less within the category of places of which the occupation conduces to the general strength of the Empire abroad. The regular troops in it ought, doubtless, to be reduced within the smallest compass which Her Majesty's Government, assisted by professional advisers, may consider compatible with safety; but so long as a Colonial system is upheld at all, I should think it could not be denied that this great island ought to be the seat of some Imperial forces, maintained at the national charge. In the Windward and Leeward Islands, I quite admit that the troops ought not to be scattered about for purposes of police; but I think that there ought to be some small central force sufficient to protect any arsenals that we possess in this region, and also to be moved in case of need to any scene of insurrection or civil disturbance.
Ceylon appears to have contained, in 1857, about 2,386 troops. The War Office Return appended to the Report exhibits the charges at home for the troops serving in the Colonies, including a proportion of the whole dead weight of the British army, the cost of transport, and the military expenditure on the spot. This last amounted, for Ceylon, in l., or an ample half. Whether it should be required to increase this contribution must be a question for Her Majesty's Government. This Colony at present is spending large sums on railways and other reproductive works. The more, of course, that it may be judged proper to take for military purposes, the less will remain for those other objects which promote the development of wealth.
Mauritius.—The force in 1857 was 850; the military expenditure on the spot, 74,215l.; the contribution of the Colony, 17,705l., which has since been increased. The island could probably afford more, and if symmetry be thought a desirable object, when practicable, this Colony might be able to contribute, as Ceylon has done, a sum equal to about half the cost on the spot of providing for its defence and internal security.
Hong Kong.—The force in 1857 was 826; the expenditure on the spot, 67,180l. This Colony has only recently been able to defray its civil expenditure, it has contributed nothing towards its military expenditure; and I suppose that the garrison will always be within the limit of the amount deemed indispensable for general national objects.
On the settlements in this part of the world I have submitted, at an earlier stage, some general observations. The force in 1857 was 1,012; the expenditure on the spot was 58,946l., of which 699l. was locally contributed. It would certainly appear desirable that the forces on this coast should be kept within the smallest amount, consistent with the objects for which they are employed. Whether they can be reduced, and to what extent, is a military question, that can only be dealt with by the Government, with the aid of such military advice as it may deem it necessary to take,
One considerable Colony alone has not been noticed in the l., being nearly two-thirds of a million. In the same year was voted one of a series of annual grants of 40,000l., for civilizing the Kaffirs, and averting disputes with the natives. It is true that these efforts have given us the satisfaction of being able to say that we have not had a Kaffir war, but nine or ten thousand troops constitute such an army as England seldom has to spare for less favoured spots. The direct objects of Imperial concern at the Cape, in a military point of view, are the harbours of Table Bay and Simon's Bay. The subjoined Table will exhibit some of its leading statistics:—
It is for Her Majesty's Government to determine the relative claims of different parts of the empire to the assistance of the mother country; but supposing that some reduction of the military expenditure abroad is judged indispensable, it seems a grave fact that a Colony of which the population is
One remark is essential on this Colony. It is commonly said that the Colonists would be willing enough to undertake their own protection, provided that they might deal with the Kaffirs as they themselves consider best, but that this would entail a mode of warfare which would not be tolerated by public opinion in England. On the other hand, so long as British authority restrains the settlers from defending themselves in their own way, it is bound to find some efficient substitute. The result has been to produce an excessive drain of British resources for a single Colony; the expenditure, as above shown, is enormous, and it is not likely ever to be materially reduced except by a radical change of policy. Such a change would relieve this country from a heavy burthen, and, so far as concerns the demands both for men and money, would be a palpable gain. Whether it would be opposed to any just claims of philanthropy, or to the general duties of sovereign States towards their subjects, and whether also it would be irreconcilable with public opinion, are questions of a different kind, lying beyond our province. They can only be determined by statesmen engaged in the actual conduct of affairs.
This completes a review of the principal groups of Colonies. The following results may, I think, be drawn from it:—
First, That in British North America and Australia, being the chief assemblages of European communities, a general and intelligible principle about military expenditure is already established.
Secondly, That in the West Indies and on the Coast of Africa the Colonies can neither pay towards the cost of troops, nor yet exist without them, and hence that if such possessions
Thirdly, That it is quite fair that the richer tropical settlements should contribute towards the expense of their garrisons, but that Ceylon and Mauritius are for the present the only Colonies which come within this category, and that both of these may perhaps, if it is thought of importance, be treated alike.
Fourthly, That the most difficult questions must arise with regard to large European settlements in contact with warlike neighbours, such as New Zealand and the Cape, but that each of these again must be dealt with according to its own condition; the chief of which have been above stated.
I think that the contribution should always be in money and not in kind, such as rations, stores, or barrack accommodation. This plan is shown by former examples to be unsatisfactory, and a fertile source of dispute.
Even if the contribution be calculated as a proportion of the whole military expenditure, I think that the amount should be fixed for periods of some continuance, since practical inconvenience and occasions of difference would arise from its constant fluctuation.
I cannot agree that the defences ought to be placed generally, and as a system, under local management. In the first place, the subject does not admit of being conveniently treated in detached portions; military and naval operations, and the preparations to be made for them, require an extended survey. In the next place, the welfare of the Queen's troops in time of peace, and the provision to be made for the success of the national arms in time of war, appear to me precisely examples of the subjects for which the Imperial Government must remain responsible, and which ought to be dealt with by the authority of the Governor, as Her Majesty's representative, and of the officer commanding the forces.
In conclusion, I must express my regret for the length of
The Imports and Exports are compiled from the Returns of the Board of Trade; the Population of the Colonics from the Blue Books; and of the United States from the Almanac published in 1858.
The leading feature of Mr. Elliot's memorandum is, that while it exposes and condemns the results of the present system, it proposes no practical alteration in that system; consequently, the anomalies and abuses which General Peel points out, and for which he wishes that a remedy he provided, will continue in full force if Mr. Elliot's views be adopted. The Committee was appointed to "prepare a "scheme" for the application of certain principles to each. Colony; but this task Mr. Elliot, as I contend, does not perform. It is true that he expresses an abstract opinion against scattering our troops in small garrisons, and it is true also that "he prefers the plan by which Her Majesty's" "Government determines the amount of force which it deems "reasonable to allot to different Colonies, as being required by "the duties of the Sovereign State, whilst the Colonies themselves "must pay for any additional number of troops which" they may ask for and obtain." But practically this is nothing else than the present system put into words, inasmuch as Her Majesty's Government now "allots the amount of "force which it thinks reasonable," &c.; and if it does not, it can, whenever it pleases, increase or diminish that force.
I do not deny that it would be consistent with the literal terms of Mr. Elliot's definition to throw as much of the responsibility and burden of self-defence on the Colonies as the Report recommends, or even more, for the Imperial Government might say that "the duties of the Sovereign "State" do not "require any force to be allotted" to any Colony, with or without the exception of the half-dozen military posts enumerated in the Report; but that is not the way in which the plan ever has been worked or will be worked; nor is it the way in which Mr. Elliot conceives its working. That I am right in supposing him not to advocate a change of system is shown by his selection of the North American There," he says, "it is already in operation," and consequently, "a "general and intelligible principle is established." Now, it so happens that there is no group of Colonies with which the War-office has been engaged in more constant and irritating correspondence, or about which we have more inconsistent decisions, or which exhibits more marked inequality as regards the plans of defence adopted, the contributions of the various Colonies, and the assistance we have given them, than those of North America. Indeed, it is to this group that I should most naturally recur for illustrations of the present system, involving, as it does, what General Peel calls "the absence of any fixed and recognised principle in determining questions of "military expenditure." Moreover, the practical result, as exemplified in British America, of the system which Mr. Elliot desires to see in general operation is, that in Canada alone has any attempt been made at self-defence; and there it is a feeble and inadequate one; in the other Colonies, comprising, as they do, some of the oldest, most numerous, most prosperous, and most energetic of our colonial communities, not one farthing is expended or one man raised and trained for the defence of their own lives and properties against foreign enemies. I can hardly conceive that he considers this to be a desirable state of things, or one which ought not only to continue indefinitely in British America, but to be extended over the whole Empire.
Nor can I agree with Mr. Elliot that any distinction can be drawn between the system pursued in British America and that pursued at the Cape. In both his principle prevails, for (to use his own words) "the Government determines the amount of force which it deems reasonable to allot to the "Colonies respectively, as being required by the duties of the "Sovereign State." At the Cape, as we all know, the practical result of this has been what Mr. Elliot calls the "grave fact," and what the Report calls the "gigantic anomaly," of an expenditure in one year of £830,000.
These and similar facts lead to the conclusion that no permanent reduction of expense to this country, and no effective stimulus to colonial exertions, will be the result of merely recommending, as Mr. Elliot has done, to Government, the desirableness of reconsidering the distribution of the army in the Colonies. This has been done over and over again, and nothing has come of it. We have, with trifling exceptions, the same extravagance on our side, the same helplessness on theirs; the same confusion, inconsistency, and disputation which has prevailed more or less for the last century in our military policy towards our Colonies.
I will now proceed to consider Mr. Elliot's principal objections to the Report.
His first objection is to a uniform rate of joint contribution. It will be remembered that the two main principles of the plan proposed in the Report are—(1) colonial responsibility and management; (2) joint contribution, at a uniform rate. Of these, the former is infinitely the more important; and, if it be admitted, the precise mode in which the mother country should assist the colony is comparatively immaterial. It must necessarily be by a contribution of some kind, either in men or money, and I feel assured that a uniform rate for such contribution will be found both more fair and more likely to answer practically than any other arrangement. If it be objected to, we must adopt a rate varying according to some other intelligible and definite principle; and I can conceive no other than one varying according either to the capacity of the different Colonies, or according to their exposure to danger. Now, the application of either of these tests would lead to a result far more anomalous and unsatisfactory than the adoption of a uniform rate. It is absolutely impossible to gauge, even approximately, the comparative capacities of resources of different countries; you cannot do it according to revenue, because that depends on willingness quite as much as on ability to support taxation; (for example, Austria has a larger revenue than the United States, but no one supposes she has
According to the former, which is the course recommended in the Report, the whole system of defence, including the amount of force, would be decided on by the Colony, as the most competent and most interested party, and to the expense of that system the mother country would contribute. According to the latter, which is the course recommended by Mr. Elliot, neither party would have the power or the obligation to provide for the whole defence of a Colony; but the mother country would provide for Imperial interests, or leave them unprovided for.
Of the latter system the fruits are before us in the fact that we incur an enormous outlay for what Mr. Elliot admits to be, in a military point of view, a most imperfect and inadequate result; while the Colonies do virtually nothing. Of the former system we have also had experience, and I will now endeavour to show how it worked as regards military efficiency, not insisting for the present on its more obvious recommendations of justice and economy.
For 150 years after we had colonised North America, the principle of Colonial self-defence prevailed there almost exclusively. The British Colonists found themselves in contact with native nations, more numerous, more warlike, and better organised than any which modern Colonists have had to deal with. They were also surrounded by, and intermingled with, the Colonies of several European nations, each of which separately was in the habit of meeting England in war on equal terms, both by sea and land, viz., the French, the Spaniards, and the Dutch. In all our Colonies there were "Imperial interests" to be protected, that is, there were points of great strategical and commercial importance, such as Boston, New York, Charlestown, and many others. Yet in those days it was not considered by the mother country that it was her interest to garrison her Colonies, nor did it ever occur to the Colonists that when for their own objects they sought by emigrating an asylum of freedom, or a new field of enterprise and profit, they were entitled thereby to claim immunity from the responsibility of self-defence, which devolves on the members of every other organised community in the world. On the contrary, they were content to know that with the greater advantages of a new country, they must meet greater hardships and dangers. They never thought that they were to take the former, and to be protected at other people's expense from the latter.
Until the year 1754 I can only find two instances when regular soldiers were sent to British America. One was in 1664, in the case of the army which took New York, and the
Let us see how this system (the idea of applying which, in a modified form, and under circumstances beyond comparison more favourable, appears now so rash and ruinous) actually worked. In the first place, the British Colonies not only successfully established themselves and resisted all attacks on them, but they attacked and conquered foreign possessions, and handed them over to the British Crown; secondly, they attained great prosperity, their increase as regards commerce and population from the commencement of the 18th century to the declaration of independence, being as great as any recorded in history, except that of Australia and California, since the discovery of gold; thirdly, they produced and trained a race of statesmen and soldiers who proved themselves at least equal to the greatest of their European contemporaries. "What I have said is illustrated in almost everv page of early Colonial history, and I know of no history more fruitful in the record of heroic deeds. For example, in 1710 the American Colonists conquered Nova Scotia from the French without any help from England. In 1745, three New England States? Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Connecticut, of which the whole population at that time was only about 300,000, organised and equipped a naval and military expedition against Louisburg, a fortress described by a contemporary historian as "of prodigious strength," garrisoned by 600 regulars and 1300 militia, and took it after a regular siege, with 49 days of open trenches, its fall involving the surrender of the whole of Cape Breton. The expense, amounting to £200,000, was defrayed in the first place by the Colonists, and only repaid to them by England after the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, by which Louisburg was restored to France.
It would have seemed strange to the men who executed such military operations as these to be told (as Mr. Elliott says of the people of Nova Scotia) that they "could not be expected" to provide for the defence of their own capitals. Yet the population of the three Colonies which conquered Cape Breton was not so large, collectively, as that of Nova Scotia alone, nor was their commerce so great, nor were they, like her, within eight days steaming of the aid of the mother country. If there had been a British garrison in those days at Boston, a place as "important to the general power of the Empire" as Halifax is now, the people of New England would soon have found out that they too "could not bo expected" even to contribute towards defending it.
I next come to the consideration of Mr. Elliot's opinion, that the dependence of the Colonies is not the only ground for our undertaking to defend them, and his argument that the interest we have in their defence constitutes alone a sufficient ground for such undertaking. This view may be perhaps best tested by considering a case where we have "interest" without "dependence." We have a strong interest in the defence of Belgium, if for no other reason, because we are bound by treaty to protect it; indeed, I think it will hardly be denied that there is no British Colony of which the security against foreign conquest is more important to us, and certainly, there is not one in half as much danger of being conquered. Yet it would seem very strange if Belgium proposed that we should undertake the expense of fortifying Antwerp and the maintenance of its garrison. "We should of course reply that though we had an interest in the security of Belgium, that of the Belgians was so much more powerful and direct, that it was for them and not for us to provide for it. We should probably add the expression of our opinion, that the business would be better done if they managed it by themselves, and in their own way than if we interfered; and this is precisely what we ought to say to the Colonies, except that, as was said in the Report, their dependence on us imposes on us an obligation to give
Although I consider that this is a sufficient answer to the whole argument about "interest," I cannot pass by without remark the illustrations by which Mr. Elliot endeavours to show the importance to England of the political connection with the Colonies. I do so the more willingly because the fallacy (as I conceive it to be) which he employs is one very generally received.
Mr. Elliot argues that the fact of Australia taking our exports to the amount of "nearly £12" a-head of her population, while the United States take them only at the rate of "less than £1," "shows how much larger in proportion is the "commerce with countries which remain part of the Empire." I might with equal justice and greater plausibility (the cases being far more analogous) argue, that because the United States take, in proportion to population, a greater amount of our exports than Canada, that fact "shows how much larger is "the commerce with countries which do The population of the United States may be estimated, at 28,000,000 for the year not remain part of the "Empire."
The truth is that in neither the one case nor the other have the political conditions of the respective countries anything to do with the matter. It is governed to a certain extent perhaps at first by origin, but mainly and permanently by economical conditions, i.e., on the one hand by the purchasing power, and, on the other, by the varying productions and wants of their people respectively. In the first place, Australia, having, like all young countries, a very imperfect division of labour, produces very few kinds of articles, and of course imports almost everything that she consumes, while the United States, with a vast population, and a territory embracing every variety of
1. The difference between the tariff of the United States and that of Canada (as regards the present question) is just this, that in the former British manufactures are charged with a duty of 24 per cent., and in the latter of 20 per cent., with the exception of leather and clothes, which, on account of some special interest, are charged at 25 per cent. Such is the exact amount of the difference in the obstacles which our trade meets with in our own dependency and the neighbouring foreign state respectively, the result being, as I have shown, that we export more to the foreigner than to the colonist.
And it is further to be observed that the present American tariff is less, the Canadian tariff more, protective than the last, showing that while the Canadians are following the old path, and protecting in proportion as the interests which demand protection grow powerful, the Americans are beginning to see the folly of restrictive tariffs, and show a tendency at least towards greater freedom of trade.
2. I have compared the statistics of our trade with the United States before and after their independence, with the The statistics in the text are taken from the Tables in Pitkin's "History of the "Commerce of the United States."
It is true, as Mr. Elliot says, that "the habit of resorting to "a particular market" has a considerable effect upon commerce, but he has not explained what that has to do with the politicial connection, which is the only relevant question; and I have shown, on the contrary, that, in the case of the only available precedent, the habit of resorting to a particular market survived the change from dependence to independence, nor is there any ground whatever for supposing that it could cease to operate on the Australians, merely because their political connection with England was dissolved.
Mr. Elliot concludes his memorandum by making a division of the Colonies into groups; not, however, with the view of proposing specific arrangements with respect to military expenditure to suit the circumstances of each group, but merely, as I understand, in order to show the dissimilarity of the Colonies inter se, and the consequent injustice of applying a uniform rule, as regards military expenditure, at all. "Surely," he says, "it is quite as unjust to apply a uniform "rule to different cases as to apply a varying rule to cases "which are alike." He supports this view by describing the unlike each other materially and socially, but that they are like each other, while differing from all the rest of the world, in their exceptional right to make other people pay for protecting them. It is strange how completely in this discussion the fact is ignored that we are not proposing to apply a new and untried principle to British Colonies, but merely suggesting an approach, in a gradual and modified form, to a "uniformity of rule" which has always prevailed, under infinitely varying circumstances, everywhere else, and to which they form the sole and monstrous exception.
The only group on which Mr. Elliot's observations appear to call for special remark from me is that of the West Indies. Here he deserts the ground of defence against foreign aggression, and lays down broadly our obligations to keep troops there for the purpose of preserving "the existence of society," intimating that without such a force they would be in danger
At any rate, the principle laid down by the Secretary of State for War in the letter on which the appointment of the Committee was founded, (and concurred in by the Lords of the Treasury and the Secretary of State for the Colonies), was, that "military expenditure for purposes of internal police "should be defrayed by local funds"—a principle which would go even farther than that suggested in the Report, inasmuch as it would deprive the West Indies of any claim even for Imperial contribution towards a force kept for the purposes of preventing internal disturbance.
I must add that it is difficult to understand why, upon any view of the subject, we keep black troops in the West Indies; as, in the case of a negro insurrection (the only alleged danger to "society,") they would not only be untrustworthy, but formidable; and no one, I suppose, believes that they would be capable of meeting French or American troops in the field.
In conclusion, I wish emphatically to repeat, that the real question is not whether the arrangements which we make for the defence of our Colonies are capable or not of being improved, by re-distribution of force here, or reduction of force there, but whether they are not radically wrong, i.e., based on a theory fundamentally erroneous. The view which I believe
Chairman: I believe you are Assistant Under Secretary of State for War?—I am.
Were you a member of the Departmental Committee, to whom was committed the task of preparing a scheme on the military defences in the Colonies in the year 1859?—Yes.
Are you responsible for the Report of that Committee?—I am.
You have also, I believe, written for private circulation, a paper containing remarks on Mr. Elliot's Memorandum, appended to the Committee's Report? Will you put that in?—Yes, with Lord Herbert's sanction.
Those papers, I think, express your opinions upon the subject?—Yes.
I wish to ask you for some explanations on some passages in those papers. Do you not see a difficulty in carrying out the system of a uniform rate of contribution as applied to such differently circumstanced communities as our Colonies?—For my own part, I think it a fair practical compromise; but if anyone thinks otherwise, and proposes a plan for apportioning the joint contribution in a different way, I should make no objection; certainly it docs not form an essential or even an doctrinaire, but a working soldier, and one as little likely as anybody to be carried away by a specious theory. I would add, also, that the plan adopted with the old American Colonies, of making the Colonies pay for the whole of their expenditure was equally uniform with that which I propose, and that all the objections to uniformity of joint contribution apply equally to it.
Who is the Governor to whom you refer?—Sir William Denison.
What do you consider the leading and essential principle of your plan for the defence of the Colonies?—Colonial responsibility and management, and, as a rule, the contribution of the Imperial Government, if any, in the shape of money only. This was the system pursued with the old American Colonies; Parliament having been hi the habit of voting sums of money to compensate them for any disproportionate expenditure incurred by them in the common cause.
Do you think that, if Great Britain left it to the Colonies to defend themselves, there would be great danger of the defence being neglected?—If we judge either by our knowledge of human nature, or by history, we shall come, I think, to a different conclusion. Englishmen have never shown themselves slow in defending themselves, and as a matter of fact, the old American Colonies, to whom the responsibility of defending themselves was entirely left, did successfully defend themselves, so that there was not one of them conquered during the period during which that system was pursued.
Are not the Colonies to be considered as military posts, essential to the interests of the Empire, and which, therefore, the Empire cannot afford to risk the loss of?—I have already said that I think the plan of throwing the responsibility of defending themselves on the Colonists, is the most effectual way of defending them, and that they are less effectually
You insist much on the contrast afforded by the system pursued with the old American Colonies; do you not think their circumstances were so different from those of the present day, as to prevent the analogy from being a correct one?—No; I think the analogy is complete as regards the present question.
Did they not treat the Indians more unjustly and aggressively than would be tolerated in England now; and were not wars more frequent then?—I do not think that there is any evidence of their dealing with the Indians more cruelly or aggressively than was not only tolerated, but was the custom at that time; on the contrary, their treatment of them was rather exceptionally fair and just, and they dealt with them more effectually, certainly. The consequence was, that I find only one record of an Indian war in the history of New England, for the first half-century after the New England Colony was founded.
Do you not think a nucleus of British soldiers an important element in the defence of the Colonies, to train, and drill and encourage the militia?—Very possibly; and if the Colonists think so, my plan provides that they should be able to carry such a plan into effect, provided England could spare the troops.
Do you not think that the withdrawal of the troops would cause great irritation and excitement, and perhaps run the risk of causing a separation of the Colony from the mother country?—I think that there would be much loud talking and violent writing, because the Colonists, having long been
How do you think that any change could he effected practically in the present system?—In the same way in which Lord Grey effected the change in the plan of defending the Australian Colonies, which in that case produced no permanent discontent.
Do you think that the Colonies generally would acquiesce in such an arrangement?—They would, of course, have to acquiesce, if the same plan which Lord Grey pursued was pursued generally; and I think after a little time they would consider it as the old Colonists did, a matter of pride and privilege to defend themselves.
Mr. Ellice: You are acquainted with the Colony of North America?—Yes.
You know the state of the defences in Canada?—No, I do not.
Do you believe that if the English Government were to withdraw the garrisons from the forts of Quebec and Kingston, the inhabitants of Canada would undertake the defence of them?—I think they would.
Do you know anything of the expense of stores and artillery required for the defence of those forts?—No, I do not.
Generally speaking, do you think that the inhabitants of Canada, if the garrisons were withdrawn, would undertake the defence of the large forts now in existence in Canada?—I do not know whether they would undertake the defence of those particular forts, but I think they would take steps for effectually defending the province against foreign aggression.
But if they did not undertake the defence of those forts, is it your opinion that they should be abandoned by this country?—Yes.
Chairman: Do you think, if negotiations were opened with the different Colonies to obtain their consent, the result would be likely to be satisfactory?—No, quite the contrary.
Will they not strongly protest against the change which would involve throwing upon them the responsibility and cost of their own defence?—Most Colonies undoubtedly would, and probably refuse to negotiate on the subject at all.
If it is not to be done by negotiation, in what way, practically, would you have the overtures made by the Imperial Government to the Colonies, with a view to carry out any arrangement?—I have always said I would do what Lord Grey did in dealing with the Australian Colonies, that is, propose the conditions on which the Imperial Government would give assistance, and say, that if they were not accepted, the troops would be withdrawn. I may add, that a similar intimation has since been made to the Government of New Zealand.
Mr. Ellice: And do you think that the Colonies of North America were in the same relative condition with respect to the military defences with the Colonies of Australia and New Zealand?—There are various differences between them, undoubtedly; but I do not know exactly to what differences you refer.
Have not the North American Colonies, especially Canada, an immense length of frontier to defend against a thickly populated country in the immediate neighbourhood?—Yes; but, on the other hand, they have much greater resources of a military kind from their superior population.
Against what danger have the Australian and New Zealand Colonies to defend themselves?—The danger of an attack by a hostile expedition from a nation with which they might be at war, say France, or America, or Russia.
Have not the North American Colonies to defend themselves against the same danger of an attack by land on an extended frontier?—Yes.
Chairman: Do you not think that, in the case of war, there are some Colonies which would afford valuable stations for coaling and refitting our ships, such as the Bahamas; is it not worth while to retain such places as the Bahamas, for instance?
I see that in one of your papers, you say that no British Colony, left to defend itself, has ever been conquered; and that, on the other hand, no Colony, of which the defence was entrusted to the mother country, has ever successfully resisted a hostile expedition. Is that actually the case?—As far as I recollect, it is.
Do you think that the presence of the British flag on these stations all over the world adds to the prestige, and consequently to the power of England?—I believe that it adds very much to our weakness. I have never seen a foreign criticism upon the power and troops of England, without observing that the writer considered the necessity of protecting Colonies all over the world as the main element of our weakness.
Do you not think that the circumstances of the West Indies are such as to call for special assistance from the mother country?—I do not think they are such as to call for the necessity of our paying for their police, any more than we are called upon to pay for making their roads, or paying their civil officers.
Is there any rule in the War Department, as to granting, gratuitously or otherwise, stores to the Colonies?—I believe there is no rule.
Mr. T. G. Baring: This is a question which the Director of Stores would probably be able to answer?—I think I know as much about it as he does.
Chairman: As you know something about it, do you think you could procure for the Committee any information upon the subject, or can you inform us, in order to ascertain the point, whether in some instances stores are given gratuitously, in others payment being exacted for them, without any rule being laid down on the subject?—I believe so, but you can no doubt obtain full information if Lord Herbert chooses to give it.
Mr. Baxter: Do you advocate the entire withdrawal of British troops from the Colonies of this country?—Not necessarily; I should leave that for the Colonists themselves to settle.
Provided the Colonies are willing to defray the larger proportion, if not the whole, of the expenditure, you would not object to British troops being scattered over the world, as they are at present?—I should not think it a good plan; but if we could spare the troops I should acquiesce in it, in deference to the general principle of letting the Colonists settle for themselves what is the best way of defending themselves.
Why do you not think it a good plan?—Because I think it would be better for them to arm and train their own people; but that is more a military question, and is not one upon which my opinion is worth having.
Your main object is to diminish the Imperial expenditure in respect to the military defences of the Colonies?—No; my main object is to throw upon the Colonists the habit and responsibility of self-defence; it is a secondary but very important object to diminish the Imperial expenditure.
Have not the Australian Colonies acted very liberally in their negotiations upon the subject of contributions?—Most remarkably so; I think they have paid more than their full share.
Then your former remarks with reference to the difficulty of treating by negotiation do not apply to the Australian
In point of fact, no such difficulties as those to which you have adverted have occurred in regard to the Australian Colonies?—Not at all.
Chairman: Do I understand you to draw a distinction between negotiation and that mode of action which you suggested on the part of the Imperial Government?—Yes.
Do you characterise the communication which passed between Lord Grey and the Government of the Australian Colonies as negotiation?—No.
Mr. Fortescue: It is the case, is it not, that a dependency of the Empire has no control over its foreign policy, but that all its relations with foreign powers are settled for it by the mother country?—Yes.
Does not that fact appear to you to be one of the most important in discussing this question, as giving a dependency a strong claim upon the mother country for protection against those dangers which are produced by her policy?—Certainly; it is the only one that makes it a question at all.
Then are we to understand you fully to admit that amount of claim?—I fully admit it as a claim to the protection of the mother country.
You think that a dependency has a claim to the advantages, as it must submit to the disadvantages, of its dependent position?—Certainly.
Then admitting that claim on the part of the Colonists, and the corresponding duties on the part of the mother country, is it your meaning that the mother country should afford her proper amount of protection to a Colony, not by the supply of Imperial troops but by a contribution of Imperial money
Do you think that the local forces raised in our numerous Colonies, many of which are very small, many inhabited by foreign and mixed races, can ever be brought up to anything like the efficiency of Imperial troops?—Certainly not; by which I mean that undisciplined militia will not be so good as Imperial troops; but if they choose, I have no doubt they could raise, train, and drill, at a certain expense, as good troops as we have; it is a mere question of money. I do not think it would be a good plan for them to do so.
Do you think it possible, at all events in the smaller dependencies of the Empire, that local forces should be created which should attain to anything like the efficiency and esprit de corps of the British regiments?—I think it highly improbable that they ever should do so; but I do not think it impossible. I repeat, I should consider it an exceedingly inexpedient plan, for the smaller Colonies at any rate, to attempt.
Then you confine your proposal to the larger Colonies?—Not at all; I should leave it to the Colonies themselves to settle the details of their responsibility and management. I simply propose to acquiesce in their arrangements.
These local forces would, of course, be confined to the Colonies in which they were raised?—That would depend upon the Colonies themselves. In the times of the old Colonies of North America they were not so confined, but made war on the king's enemies in other parts of the world, West Indies as well as in other parts of America.
Do you think it would be a good bargain for the Imperial Government to contribute sums of money towards the expense of local forces throughout the Colonies, which you admit must be inferior to the Imperial troops, and which, at all events, as a general rule, must be confined to their own Colony, and could not admit of being moved and handled by the Imperial Government for the general purposes of the Empire?—I should
Do you think that the entire withdrawal of the presence of British soldiers from any part of the Colonial Empire would not mainly tend to check and lessen the Imperial feeling in our different Colonies?—I do not think so.
Are you aware that in many cases the Colonists themselves entirely differ with you upon that point?—My only surprise is that all do not differ from me; people generally do differ from every one who asks them to pay.
Are you aware that when the question has been put to the Australian Colonies whether they preferred to raise a local force, or to pay for a certain quota of Imperial troops, they have given reasons, entirely irrespective of the party who is to pay, in favour of the presence of a small body of Imperial troops rather than of an attempt to raise a local corps?—I am quite aware of it, and my plan provides that they should be able to do so if they like.
You said just now that Englishmen are never slow to defend themselves; has it escaped your notice that a considerable portion of our dependencies are inhabited mainly, not by Englishmen, but by people of foreign races, either European or aboriginal, and do you think that one uniform scheme can equally apply to dependencies of such different origins?—I have not proposed that it should; in those places which are not properly Colonies, but only garrisons, I have proposed that the whole expense should be defrayed from the Imperial Exchequer. I allude to such places as Malta, Bermuda, and others.
Would you be prepared to withdraw the Imperial garrison from such a Colony as the Mauritius, in case the Colony of Mauritius declined to accede to the proposed scheme?—The Mauritius is another doubtful case upon which a military opinion would be more useful than mine; but my own opinion
Supposing the dependencies of the Empire, finding themselves left without that amount of protection from the mother country to which they consider themselves equally entitled in all the dangers that may be created by the policy of the mother country, should be prepared to place themselves under the protection of some other power, do you think that in that case the mother country would be fairly in a position to refuse her consent to that course?—I do not think it would ever be expedient or desirable for the mother country to retain her dominion over any Colony that deliberately wished to withdraw itself from it.
But in the case I suppose, would not the inclination to transfer themselves from this country to another, have been directly produced by the policy of the mother country herself?—I think the motive does not signify at all, if any Colony deliberately, and after proper means of consideration were given, desired to separate itself from this country, I do not think it would be desirable to retain its allegiance by force. I do not of course speak of garrisons, such as Malta or Bermuda.
Although that inclination not now existing would, in the case supposed, have been produced by our own policy?—By whatever motive it might have been produced. I must guard myself, however, from being supposed to admit that it would be the effect of the plan I am proposing.
Do you not think that most of our Colonies are, in the very nature of things, dependencies, and if not dependencies upon
Do you think that the small Colonies could ever answer as independent communities, or must they become the dependencies of some other power if they are not retained as ours?—I think that there are very few of them that any other power would take on condition of having to defend them. The Mauritius is almost the only exception I know.
Are two of our Colonies, at least, in the peculiar position of being liable to great and sudden danger, not from foreign forces, but from formidable native tribes within their borders or within their frontier, New Zealand and the Cape?—Yes.
Would you not look at the case of these two Colonies as a peculiar one?—In that respect they are peculiar.
Are you prepared to advise that the defence of such Colonies should be looked upon as a matter of internal police, or of protection against foreign danger?—I think that at the Cape it might be looked upon as protection against foreign danger, but in New Zealand as matter of police. In New Zealand the tribes in theory are, and practically might be made to be, subjects of Her Majesty; at the Cape the Kafirs are foreign nations; but I do not admit, practically, the effect of your question.
Are you not aware that the tribes of New Zealand are, to a great degree, semi-independent?—They are; but they need not be.
Do you think it possible to treat those dangers as a matter exclusively of Colonial arrangement, just as you treat protection against the danger of internal disturbances in an ordinary English community?—I have already drawn a distinction between New Zealand and the Cape. In New Zealand they say, "Give the Colonists the power exclusively, and without "interference from home of dealing with the native question." There I think the responsibility and expense of dealing with the natives may be entirely left to them.
Do you think that the duty of keeping order amongst the foreign and mixed communities which constitute many of our Colonies, such as the West India Islands and the Mauritius, could be treated simply as a matter of police in a homogeneous English community?—I think it should be so treated, upon condition that the Colony is not interfered with in its management of such races from home.
Mr. Adderley: You say that the relation of a Colony to foreign powers, depending upon the mother country, gives that Colony a claim upon the mother country?—It is the only thing which gives them any claim.
I presume you do not mean that it gives them a claim to the entire protection of the mother country?—Of course not.
It gives them only a limited claim?—A claim to such protection as the mother country may think it right and fair to afford.
In answer to a question just now, you stated that Canada was more exposed to danger than Australia. Do you think that that fact gives Canada a larger claim to the protection of the mother country than Australia?—No.
You do not think that the greater exposure to danger is a ground upon which the claim might be calculated?—No; I think that is one of the necessary incidents to every community of its geographical position, and an evil that it must bear with, and cannot expect some one else to bear. In the case of Canada, if the danger is greater, the means of resisting it are greater too.
The greater exposure to danger does not, in your opinion, increase the claim of the Colony upon the mother country?—I have already answered that.
Would not the present plan of Colonial defence, undertaken by England, require us to increase very much the fortifications and garrisons of the various parts of the Colonies, if it is to be carried out effectually?—Undoubtedly.
Then you think that, to make the present plan of Colonial defence complete, a large expense must be incurred?—Yes.
It would be a part of that plan to increase the dispersion of British troops in distant parts of the world?—I do not say that; it would increase the force of the garrisons.
And it would increase the number of British troops dispersed through the world in distant places?—Yes.
What would be the effect of that dispersion upon the resources of England, in case of a general war?—Of course it would weaken it.
Would it not amount to England, having a large portion of her forces looked up in distant parts of the world, and her own resources for any general war proportionately diminished?—Yes.
In your opinion, did the plan of scattering troops, during the Russian war, in garrisons of distant Colonies, lead to England being obliged to levy foreign mercenaries to supply the requirements of her own army?—It led to a dimunition of her military powers, and that was one way in which she endeavoured to supply it.
Do you think, that if the garrisons of England in Colonial forts at that time could have been made available, they would have rendered foreign legions needless?—I cannot answer that question.
They would have gone so far towards it?—To that extent they would have strengthened the British army.
Can you state what number of troops England had in South Africa when the Indian mutiny broke out?—I do not know exactly, but, speaking roughly, and from recollection, I think it was about 13,000 of all arms and ranks, but that may be exactly ascertained.
Upon the news of the Indian mutiny arriving at the Cape, does it appear that the troops, at that time in South Africa, were made available towards its suppression?—I do not remember the dates exactly; a considerable number of troops were sent.
You have stated that, under the Colonial system of England in the last century, the Colonies of America undertook their own defence, both internal and external?—Yes.
Do you see any reason why the Colonies of England, at the present moment, should not act exactly in the same manner?—Absolutely none; all the same arguments which apply to the Colonies now, applied to the Colonies then.
There is no reason to suppose that English Colonists now are degenerated in spirit from the English Colonists of the last century?—No.
Have American Colonists kept in check all attacks upon them by the American Indians?—Yes.
And also sometimes from the regular armies of France?—Yes.
Are you aware that during the Spanish Succession War the English Colonists added Nova Scotia and Newfoundland to the possessions of the English Crown?—Yes.
Are you aware that in the subsequent Austrian Succession War of 1745 the Colonial troops reduced the great fortress of Louisbourg?—Yes.
Are you aware that in the Seven Years' War the French regular army attacked the Virginian Settlement, and that the Virginian militia alone repulsed them?—Yes.
Can you state when English troops were first sent to the assistance of Colonial forces in America?—The first time I recollect to have observed that was in the expedition that took New York in 1654. I have given these instances at large in the paper which has been put in, and I would rather refer to that than speak from recollection.
Can you say when it became the habit of England to send troops there?—When Braddock went to America in 1757; I think that was the commencement of the system of keeping standing armies in America; and, just at that time, the provisions of the Mutiny Act were extended to America.
Which of those considerations tended most, in your opinion,
Do you think that the Colonists, before the introduction of the Munity Act, being still entitled to the defence of their own Colony, any discontent was produced which led to the final separation of the Colonies?—Absolutely none; there is not the remotest particle of evidence of it. They considered it a privilege to provide for their own defence, and considered the presence of a British army a grievance.
What was the feeling of the Colonists towards England when the war first broke out?—That of enthusiastic loyalty.
Can you state at all with regard to the Colony with which you are personally acquainted, New Zealand, whether the action of the troops there recently in connection with the local force, has been satisfactory?—Very much the reverse, as my own accounts lead me to believe. I was going to ask leave just now in answer to a question that was put to me, to read an extract from a letter which I have received from Mr. FitzGerald, who is Superintendent of Canterbury, and was Prime Minister of the Colony at one time.
Will you read that extract?—It is to this effect: "Government "formally declines our offer to volunteer to the Taranaki "war. The Queen's army is hanging like an incubus on the "Colony, doing nothing itself, and preventing any one else." That is the opinion of a very intelligent Colonist.
Do you believe that that Colony would be both willing and able to develope volunteer forces to a large extent?—I am quite sure it is able, but I do not say that it is willing, unless we make it imperative.
Chairman: Do you know whether the force in the Province of Canterbury has been paid for out of the funds of the province, or entirely by private efforts?—I am not quite certain; I think it has been armed by the province, but I am not sure that it has been so paid.
Mr. Adderley: Supposing the evidence to be true, which we have heard from the two Governors of the West India Islands, that the British troops in those Islands are utterly valueless against external attack, and can only be of any use in preserving internal peace both against the population, and against the doubtful fidelity of the black troops, would your views upon Colonial policy lead you to recommend the entire withdrawal of the British troops from those islands?—Certainly.
Do you see the necessity for retaining troops in any one of them, in Jamaica, for instance?—No.
When you said that if the West Indian Islands ceased to be dependent upon England, they would probably become dependent upon some other powers; I conclude that that opinion was given upon the assumption that other powers had gained the command of the seas?—I did not say that they would be dependencies upon other powers.
Do you think that they would?—I think that the West India Islands would be likely, under any circumstances, to prefer connection with the English to connection with any other power, nor do I believe that even if their connection with England terminated, they would attach themselves to another power.
Do you think that any power could hold the West India Islands against us without the command of the seas if we chose to take them?—I am quite sure they could not.
Have you stated your views as to the value in an Imperial point of view of the garrison of Halifax?—I have not; but the observations I have made generally apply to Nova Scotia as well as to other places. The Nova Scotians are perfectly
We have it in evidence that Halifax, as a strong post upon the American coast, is important to Imperial interests. Supposing we retained Bermuda, and effectually garrisoned her, would it not sufficiently answer these Imperial purposes?—That is hardly a question I can answer; that is a question for naval and military men; but I think that Bermuda could not defend itself, and I think Nova Scotia could.
I see in Mr. Elliot's portion of the Report, in which you have taken a share, that one reason assigned for England contributing towards the expenses of the defence of Ceylon is, that there are large works going on in Ceylon for railways and other purposes, and that if money was defrayed to pay their defences they would have less for their public works. To your mind, does that seem a good reason why the military expenditure in the defence of Ceylon should fall upon this country?—No; that is equivalent to saying that we ought to contribute towards the railways.
I have an extract from a speech which Sir George Grey, the Governor of the Cape, made in the City of London, before his recent return to that Colony, in which he expresses his opinion that the Colony sufficiently contributes towards the military expenditure of England in its defence, by purchasing commodities from England, which by the taxation on the export brings money into the English Exchequer. Is that a view of the subject which you consider reasonable?—I think it might as well be said that they contributed to the expense of the French army, because when they purchase commodities from France they pay taxes in France.
In fact nothing would satisfy your view of Colonial policy, short of the Colonies themselves undertaking the first responsibility of their own defence, and we contributing such a quota towards their external defences as may be reasonable on the ground that they are involved in England's foreign policy?—That is what I propose.
Is there not some consideration the other way for England, in the way that England is involved in warfare by Colonial interests and relations?—Undoubtedly, and that should never be forgotten. Within the last twenty years we have been three or four times on the verge of war with America, upon purely Colonial questions in which this country was not interested. I refer to the Maine boundary question, the Fisheries of Newfoundland, and many others.
Should you not say that, in the long run, England incurs as many liabilities by her Colonial relations as the Colonies do by their implication in English foreign policy?—No, I should think not.
In the case of the Cape, where you say you think that the Kafirs may be looked upon to a certain extent as foreign enemies, the expense of all the wars which have been created by the relation of the Cape with the mother country has fallen upon the English Exchequer?—Yes.
Many millions have been so spent?—Yes.
To what extent should you say that the proper claim of the Cape upon England for protection goes towards England defraying the expense of such wars?—I cannot say to what extent. I should be sorry to bind myself to any particular proportion of contribution. I have already said that I think half and half is a fair rough compromise, but I do not adhere to that very particularly. It is quite impossible upon any system to make a theory of joint contribution. You must have a practical compromise, and in the case of the Cape, I should be satisfied to make such a practical compromise.
Do you see any difference in the question as it relates to the Kafir frontier, and as it relates to the garrisoning of Cape Town?—Yes, there is a difference, of course.
Do you think that England is more properly liable to the expense of garrisoning Cape Town than to the expense of defending the frontier?—So far as the Colony has more the means of procuring or avoiding war in one case than in the other.
Do you see any danger in England undertaking, as she does, with the exception of one force, the whole defence of the frontier of the Cape, leading to extravagance in such wars?—Yes.
Do you see, also, any danger in the way of its keeping up the recurrence of such wars?—I think so.
Mr. Fortescue: With respect to Mr. FitzGerald's letter, do you think that the people of the Northern Islands, who are exposed to those native dangers from which Mr. FitzGerald is free, would agree with him that the presence of an Imperial force is a mere incubus?—I dare say they would not; many of them would he glad to have the Imperial troops do everything. I am only quoting the opinion of Mr. FitzGerald as a pectator.
Mr. FitzGerald does not mean to say that he does not wish the authority of the Queen to be asserted, and the Colonists to be protected in some way from native dangers?—Certainly not; but he means to say that it would be better done if left to the Colonists themselves.
But those who are really exposed to the dangers in question, you think would not agree with him?—Very likely not; I cannot say to what extent that opinion is held; but I know that all the Colonists are dissatisfied with the way the war has been carried on.
You said just now that we have been several times on the brink of war with the United States, arising out of purely Colonial relations; is it not the case that, upon those occasions, the policy to be pursued was entirely a question for the Imperial Government?—It was wholly for the Imperial Government; but it was a question that had reference solely to Colonial interests.
But whether it was worth while to carry on such a controversy, or to maintain such a claim as might result in war with the United States, was entirely a matter within the discretion of the Imperial Government?—Of course.
Do I understand you to say that, In allotting a certain amount of Imperial protection to the Colonies, the actual danger to which any Colony is exposed ought not to be any element in the calculation?—I do not think you could estimate that with any precision, especially as the means the Colony might possess of resisting danger would have in that case to he considered too.
So that you would contribute the same amount of protection, and no more, to the Cape, with its formidable native tribes, and to Victoria, where there are none?—I have already explained, that I do not consider the rate of contribution on the part of the Imperial Government essential or even important; and therefore if it is considered better to allow a varying rate, I should be quite satisfied with it; but, as I said before, the essential principle, in my opinion, is that the Colony should be responsible primarily, and that the assistance of the Imperial Government should be only given in the shape of a contribution. Upon the question upon what principles or in what ratio that contribution should be given, I think that half and half is a fair compromise; but I should be quite satisfied with any other ratio of contribution that might be considered more fair.
You say that that is not to vary with the danger to which a particular Colony is exposed?—My opinion is that it should not; but I do not consider that question as at all an essential or important one.
You think, for instance, that the existence upon the frontier of Canada of a first-class foreign power, with which Canada is liable to be involved in war, not by her own act, but by the policy of the Home Government, should be no element in calculating the amount of assistance to be afforded to Canada?—My opinion is that it should not. I have already explained why I think Canada would be better defended without our assistance, as given at present.
Do you think that there is no difference between the date of things now existing in America, and the condition of things in those times, to which allusion has been made, when that great foreign power in the United States was a dependency?—On the contrary, I think that you had then, as an immediate neighbour, a far more formidable power, viz., the French; and on the other side a more formidable naval and military power, the Spaniards; so that in fact, I think that the danger of our New England Colonies from foreign aggression, was infinitely greater than the danger of Canada from foreign aggression by the United States.
Was not the French power in America at that time insignificant?—On the contrary, it was most formidable.
Was it anything to be compared with the power of the United States?—Certainly; it far exceeded it for aggressive purposes, although not for defensive purposes.
With respect to the practical steps which you would advise should be taken, do I understand you to mean that the Imperial Government is to make up its mind as to the amount of assistance which it will afford to the several Colonies, to say to each of those Colonies that that is the determination, and to abide by that determination irrespective of the effect that may be thereby produced upon the feeling of attachment of the Colonists?—Yes, as Lord Grey did with the Australian Colonies, and with the most complete success.
Do you think that the case you have just alluded to affords at all a parallel to what would be the consequence of such an announcement throughout the various Colonies of the Empire?—I have already explained what I think the consequences would be.
But whatever the consequences may be with respect to the feelings, or the allegiance of the Colonies, that is the course which you think the Imperial Government ought to take?—Yes, as the only practical course.
Mr. Adderly: Can you draw any such distinction between the case of India, and that of other dependencies, as would justify our requiring India to pay its own military expenses, whilst we pay those of other Colonies?—No; I think there is none.