The Pamphlet Collection of Sir Robert Stout: Volume 67

Part II.—The Remedy

Part II.— The Remedy.

Most readers of the foregoing will, doubtless, from the condition of things described, clearly perceive that under our present electoral system, while the majority (though not always) may secure representation of an uncertain kind, the people as a whole cannot. Under the best of circumstances, at present, nearly half of the whole persons voting are disfranchised, and those who do succeed in forming the majority are so hampered in their choice of candidates, by being bound to vote for or against those put forward in the localities where individual voters reside, as to be practically cheated of free choice altogether—a picking out of the least evil being but too frequently the position into which voters are forced. Much more than has been adduced in support of this contention might easily be brought forward, but it appears unnecessary, and, therefore, we enter upon the consideration: Can a remedy for the evils deplored be found, and is such remedy one which in practice will recommend itself to the people of the Colony?

An examination of the different modes existing by which the best representation of the people in Parliament is sought for leads to one clear conclusion—that no system based upon the want of principle involved in the generally accepted dogma "the will of the majority in the electorate must rule" can ever be relied upon to give expression to the true will of the people through the members thus sent to Parliament. No mode can come near perfection or justice which does not admit of every section of the electors being represented by their own free chosen men in proportion to their numbers. Nothing can be further from wisdom than to look for good representatives or good legislation in a Parliament elected by petty districts, actuated by local greed, and degraded by parish politics.

Proportional Representation the Remedy.

The adoption of what is known in England and Europe as "Proportional Representation," (for the furtherence of which a very powerful organisation, with Sir John Lubbock at its head, and numbering among its members some of the most prominent members of the House of Commons on both sides, has been at work educating the community during the last few years.) appears the true remedy to apply.

What is it?

From the publications of the "Proportional Representation Society," and articles in standard periodicals on the subject, the following description of the system is collated. The Society has for its main object the adoption of such an electoral system as will secure, as far as may be:
( a) That every vote cast shall have equal power and value in the election of members;
( b) That the waste of voting power, now so large, from minorities failing to obtain any representation, and the number of votes needlessly cast for popular candidates in districts where one or other of the political parties are in a great majority, shall be reduced to a minimum;
( c) That the fullest choice shall be allowed to every voter in deciding who shall be his personal (not locality) representative.

The Single Transferable Vote.

To this feature of the system we owe the terra—"Single transferable vote"—which is the title given to the vote cast by the elector, who, in casting it, knows that, under all circumstances, his vote will count for some one of the names which he marks in the order of his preference, after the men he has placed higher have been elected (having received the quota), without his vote being required, or after it has been found impossible to declare them elected, not having, from all sources, received a number equal to the quota. In all cases every elector has the satisfaction, after the election, of pointing at a successful man for whom he voted as representing his views, whether the vote was in the first, second, or further order of preference.

Treatment of Voting Papers.

This result is reached thus: The returning officer having sorted each candidate's papers (those with their names marked first) into heaps, he commences with the candidate's who has received most first votes, and taking out first those papers in his heap on which no second vote is marked (as, of course, this would occur), and adding to them from the candidate's heap, haphazard, till the quota is reached, when he stops counting for candidate A, declares him elected, and puts the balance of his papers aside for further use. This he does with the papers of every candidate who, upon the first counting, proves to have more first votes than the required quota. The balance of A's papers, and those of similar over-quota candidates, are distributed by the officer into the heaps of the other candidates whose names are marked second on the surplus papers of A and the others already elected, and for whom counting has stopped; their names being struck out of the surplus papers, the names marked second come up into first place, and as other candidates by these additions obtain their quotas they in turn are declared elected, their names dropped, and all further surplus papers used in a still higher power. This course is pursued until all the surplus papers belonging to the candidates elected have become exhausted, when, if it so happens, as it may, that all the seats are not filled, the papers belonging to the candidate who has received the lowest number of first votes are lifted; he is declared not elected, his name dropped, and his papers distributed in the same way as the surplus papers of the elected men; and by this process of exhaustion all the seats will be filled, each man elected by the same number of votes, and there will be no waste votes except what, being under the quota, cannot carry the election of a single representative.

The Quota—what Based Upon.

Applying this system to New Zealand, with the facts and figures before enumerated, as furnished by the late general election, it will be of interest to note its effect., and in the noting exemplify the mode of operation of the system. Before doing so, it may be well to explain that the meaning of the rule laid down for finding the elective quota, in which the number of votes cast is divided by the number of seats, plus one. The object of the plusage is to prevent the possibility of there being a number of votes to spare at the close of the election equal to a quota, after all the seats are filled, which might occur were the quota found by dividing the votes cast by the exact number of seats to be filled. For example: Suppose an election at which 8,000 votes are given for three seats; 8,000 divided by 3+l is 2,000, and the quota will be 2,001, by the rule taking the next highest number to the quotient as the quota, Any candidate receiving 2,001 votes must be elected, because 2,001×3=6,003, leaving only 1,997 for the remaining man or men—not a quota.

Comparative Waste of Votes.

The waste of votes under the proportional system is found by multiplying the "quota," ascertained in the manner here shown, by the exact number of seats to be filled in the contested electorate, and subtracting the result from the total number of votes cast in the whole electorate; the balance will in all cases be found to be less than the quota, and therefore, not being sufficient to secure the election of a member, must be treated as waste. In the case of treating the Colony as a whole as one electorate, the quota 1287×86 (the number of European seats contested)= 110,682, which, subtracted from 111,911 (the number of votes cast in the Colony), leaves 1,229—not a single quota—as waste.

A careful study of these figures will repay the student who is anxious to arrive at a conclusion upon the question whether our present electoral system should be continued as the nearest approach to perfection attainable; or whether the enormous waste of voting power which it here exhibits should not be sufficient to cause a new plan to be devised, which will, in some adequate degree, permit of the people being really represented?

Assuming each of the provincial districts to be under the proposed proportional representation system to form one electoral district, then the gain in the saving from waste of voting power is exactly represented by the difference between the two columns on the right-hand side of the table. If, approaching nearer perfection, each Island Were treated as one electorate, the saving would be still greater—being the difference, in the North, between 1,317 votes, the waste under the proposed system, and 27,400, the waste which under the present system has actually taken place: in the South Island the difference would be as between 1,212 and 32,652. If perfection were aimed at in point of avoidance of waste, then, the whole Colony being one electorate, the saving would be represented by the difference between 1,229 votes, under the proposed system, and 60,052 votes actually wasted last election under our present system of single electorates. If these facts are not sufficient to startle electors into action which will eventuate in a radical reform, then it is difficult, to conceive what would be deemed sufficient to awake them.

Present System Inherently Bad.

Having in mind the reflections entered into, and principles laid down, at the commencement of this pamphlet, as those which should underlie any electoral system aiming at the true representation of the mind of the people in Parliament, and attaching to the facts and figures revealed by this analysis of the voting at the late general election their fair significance, it will surely be patent to the most careless of people, at all interested in the purity of our political institutions, that the present plan of obtaining the mind of the community upon any public question is about as bad as bad can be.

Conditions of Acceptance.

But, though the remedy may be adequate, its adoption will altogether depend, or very largely, upon what the electors of the Colony in their real thoughts desire in their Parliament, If that body is in the future to continue as during the last fifteen or sixteen years—a huge Board of Works, to which every petty locality must look, through petty local members, for petty monetary votes, for all their needs—whether in relation to their roads or railways, law or liquor, police or paupers, schools or scavengering, births or burials—then our present system is just the thing; its potentiality for jobbers and jobbing is complete;—but we would fain hope the end of these things is looked and longed for. Proportional representation, on the other hand, implies the purification of our Parliament from those inducements to misgovernment which have been so prolific in the past, and have raised a crop of evils which the body politic will have much difficulty in eradicating, even when a reformed governing body, elected by and truly representing the whole people, shall have been called into existence in the form of proportional representation, which is, as Mr. Mill has truly said, "not only the most complete application of the democratic principle that has yet been made, but its greatest safeguard."

Conclusion.

To a very large proportion of the electors of the Colony the proposal to substitute personal for local representation will come as a new thing. Though the agitation for the substitution in England has now been persisted in for some years by some of the ablest public men there, and the public mind is beginning to be formed upon the subject, and though the system itself has been in practical operation in a European State for nearly a quarter of a century, here the idea has not as yet been laid hold of or explained in a popular form. The object of this pamphlet is to assist in laying the foundation of popular acquaintance with the merits of the proposal, in the hope that, ere long, such a demand for reform in the direction here indicated will force the acceptance of the principle involved upon Parliament. The intention is, as has been well stated by Sir John Lubbock, "to secure for voters, not merely the right of recording a vote, but of doing so in such a manner as may give to it all just and reasonable effect. To get Parliament to give effect to a great principle, and thus (through it) secure for the first time a really representative assembly. The system of proportionate representation is to be recommended, because it would give its just political weight to the vote of every elector; it would insure the return of leading and trusted statesmen, as well as of those who are most favourably known in their own districts; it would elevate and purify the whole tone of electoral contests; it would obtain for the minority a fair hearing; and last, not least, because it is the only mode of securing for the majority that preponderance to which, of course, they are justly entitled."

Every Community in the Colony Should at once Initiate a Proportional Representation Society, for the Advocacy of the Principle of Personal Representation.

Printed at the Evening Bell Office, Wyndham Street, Auckland.