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The Vatican Decrees In their Bearing on Civil Allegiance
By Henry Edward
Archbishop of Westminster
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Preface.

A TASK both difficult and unlooked for has suddenly fallen to my lot; that is, to gain a fair hearing on subjects about which the opinions, and still more the feelings, of so many men are not only adverse, but even hostile. I must, therefore, ask for patience from those who may read these pages.

The topics here treated have not been chosen by me. They have been raised by Mr. GLADSTONE, and perhaps, in all the range of Religion and Politics, none can be found more delicate, more beset with misconceptions, or more prejudged by old traditionary beliefs and antipathies. Some of them, too, are of an odious kind; others revive memories we would fain forget. And yet, if Mr. GLADSTONE'S appeal to me is to be answered, treated they must be. My reply to the argument of the Expostulation on the Vatican Council will be found in the first, second, and fifth chapters; but as Mr. GLADSTONE has brought into his impeachment the present conflict in Germany, and has reviewed his own conduct in respect to the Revolution in Italy, I have felt myself obliged to follow him. This I have done in the third and fourth chapters. Apart from this reason, I felt myself bound to do so by the terms of the two letters printed at the opening of the following pages. I hold myself pledged to justify their contents. Moreover, these two topics fall within the outline of the subject treated by Mr. GLADSTONE, which is, the relation of the Supreme Spiritual Power of the Head of the Christian Church to the Civil Powers of all countries. So much for the matter of these pages.

As for the manner, if it be faulty, the fault is mine: and yet there ought to be no fault imputed where there has been no intention to wound or to offend. I can say with truth that, to avoid offence, I have weighed my words, and if there be one still found which ought not to have been written, I wish it to be blotted out. The subject-matter is beyond my control. I can blot out words, but I cannot blot out truths. What I believe to be truth, that I have said in the clearest and calmest words that I could find to give to it adequate expression.

January 25, 1875.

Contents.

The Vatican Decrees in their Bearing on Civil Allegiance.

Introduction.

MR. GLADSTONE, in his Expostulation with the Catholics of the British Empire on the Decrees of the Vatican Council, writes as follows:—

'England is entitled to ask and to know in what way the obedience required by the Pope and the Council of the Vatican is to be reconciled with the integrity of Civil Allegiance.

The Vatican Decrees in their Bearing on Civil Allegiance. By the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, p. 43.

When I read these words, I at once recognised the right of the English people, speaking by its legitimate authorities, to know from me what I believe and what I teach; but in recognising this right I am compelled to decline to answer before any other tribunal, or to any other interrogator. If, therefore, I take the occasion of any such interrogation, I do not address myself to those who make it, but to the justice and to the good sense of the

Christian people of this country.

Mr. Gladstone followed up this demand upon his Catholic fellow-countrymen by an elaborate argument to prove that it is impossible for Catholics, since the Vatican Council, to be loyal except at the cost of their fidelity to the Council, or faithful to the Council except at the cost of their loyalty to their country. I therefore considered it to be my duty to lose no time in making the subjoined declaration in all our principal journals.

'SIR,—The gravity of the subject on which I address you, affecting, as it must, every Catholic in the British Empire, will, I hope, obtain from your courtesy the publication of this letter.

'This morning I received a copy of a pamphlet, entitled "The Vatican Decrees in their Bearing on Civil Allegiance." I find in it a direct appeal to myself, both for the office I hold and for the writings I have published. I gladly acknowledge the duty that lies upon me for both those reasons. I am bound by the office I bear not to suffer a day to pass without repelling from the Catholics of this country the lightest imputation upon their loyalty; and, for my teaching, I am ready to show that the principles I have ever taught are beyond impeachment upon that score.

'It is true, indeed, that in page 57 of the pamphlet Mr. Gladstone expresses his belief "that many of his Roman Catholic friends and fellow-countrymen are, to say the least of it, as good citizens as himself." But as the whole pamphlet is an elaborate argument to prove that the teaching of the Vatican Council renders it impossible for them to be so, I cannot accept this grateful acknowledgment, which implies that they are good citizens because they are at variance with the Catholic Church.

'I should be wanting in duty to the Catholics of this country and to myself if I did not give a prompt contradiction to this statement, and if I did not with equal promptness affirm that the loyalty of our civil allegiance is, not in spite of the teaching of the Catholic Church, but because of it.

'The sum of the argument in the pamphlet just published to the world is this:—That by the Vatican Decrees such a change has been made in the relations of Catholics to the civil power of States, that it is no longer possible for them to render the same undivided civil allegiance as it was possible for Catholics to render before the promulgation of those Decrees.

'In answer to this it is for the present sufficient to affirm—

- *That the Vatican Decrees have in no jot or tittle changed either the obligations or the conditions of civil allegiance.*
- *That the civil allegiance of Catholics is as undivided as that of all Christians, and of all men who recognise a Divine or natural moral law.*
- *That the civil allegiance of no man is unlimited; and therefore the civil allegiance of all men who believe in God, or are governed by conscience, is in that sense divided.*
- *In this sense, and in no other, can it be said with truth that the civil allegiance of Catholics is divided. The civil allegiance of every Christian man in England is limited by conscience and the law of God; and the civil allegiance of Catholics is limited neither less nor more.*

'The public peace of the British Empire has been consolidated in the last half century by the elimination of religious conflicts and inequalities from our laws. The Empire of Germany might have been equally peaceful and stable if its statesmen had not been tempted in an evil hour to rake up the old fires of religious disunion. The hand of one man, more than any other, threw this torch of discord into the German Empire. The history of Germany will record the name of Dr. Ignatius von Döllinger as the author of this national evil. I lament, not only to read the name, but to trace the arguments of Dr. von Döllinger in the pamphlet before me. May God preserve these kingdoms from the public and private calamities which are visibly impending over Germany. The author of the pamphlet, in his first line, assures us that his "purpose is not polemical but pacific." I am sorry that so good an intention should have so widely erred in the selection of the means.

'But my purpose is neither to criticise nor to controvert. My desire and my duty, as an Englishman, as a Catholic, and as a pastor, is to claim for my flock and for myself a civil allegiance as pure, as true, and as loyal as is rendered by the distinguished author of the pamphlet, or by any subject of the British Empire.

&c. &c.

'November 7, 1874.'

Subsequently, in reply to questions proposed to me, I further wrote as follows:—

To the Editor of *The New York Herald*.

'Dear Sir,—

In answer to your question as to my statement about the Vatican Council, I reply as follows:

'I asserted that the Vatican Decrees have not changed by a jot or a tittle the obligations or conditions of the civil obedience of Catholics towards the Civil Powers. The whole of Mr. Gladstone's pamphlet hangs on the

contrary assertion; and falls with it. In proof of my assertion I add:—

- That the Infallibility of the Pope was a doctrine of Divine Faith before the Vatican Council was held. In the second and third parts of a book called "Petri Privilegium" (Longmans, 1871), I have given more than sufficient evidence of this assertion.
- That the Vatican Council simply declared an old truth, and made no new dogma.
- That the position of Catholics therefore in respect to civil allegiance, since the Vatican Council, is precisely what it was before it.
- That the Civil Powers of the Christian world have hitherto stood in peaceful relation with an Infallible Church, and that relation has been often recognised and declared by the Church in its Councils. The Vatican Council had, therefore, no new matter to treat in this point.
- That the Vatican Council has made no decree whatever on the subject of the Civil Powers, nor on civil allegiance.

'This subject was not so much as proposed. The civil obedience of Catholics rests upon the natural law, and the revealed law of God. Society is founded in nature, and subjects are bound in all things lawful to obey their rulers. Society, when Christian, has higher sanctions, and subjects are bound to obey rulers for conscience sake, and because the Powers that be are ordained of God. Of all these things the Vatican Decrees can have changed nothing because they have touched nothing. Mr. Gladstone's whole argument hangs upon an erroneous assertion, into which I can only suppose he has been misled by his misplaced trust in Dr. Döllinger and some of his friends.

'On public and private grounds I deeply lament this act of imprudence, and but for my belief in Mr. Gladstone's sincerity I should say this act of injustice. I lament it, as an act out of all harmony and proportion to a great statesman's life, and as the first event that has overcast a friendship of forty-five years. His whole public life has hitherto consolidated the Christian and civil peace of these kingdoms. This act, unless the good providence of God and the good sense of Englishmen avert it, may wreck more than the work of Mr. Gladstone's public career, and at the end of a long life may tarnish a great name.

&c. &c.

'Westminster, Nov. 10, 1874.'

Having thus directly contradicted the main error of Mr. Gladstone's argument, I thought it my duty to wait. I was certain that two things would follow: the one, that far better answers than any that I could make would be promptly made; the other, that certain nominal Catholics, who upon other occasions have done the same, would write letters to the newspapers.

Both events have come to pass.

The Bishops of Birmingham, Clifton, and Salford have abundantly pointed out the mistakes into which Mr. Gladstone has fallen on the subject of the Vatican Council; and have fully vindicated the loyalty of Catholics.

The handful of nominal Catholics have done their work; and those who hoped to find or to make a division among Catholics have been disappointed. It is now seen that those who reject the Vatican Council may be told on our fingers, and the Catholic Church has openly passed sentence on them.

Having made these declarations, I might have remained silent; but as in my first letter I implied that I was prepared to justify what I had asserted, I gave notice that I would do so. Having passed my word, I will keep it; and in keeping it I will endeavour to deserve again the acknowledgment Mr. Gladstone has already made. He says that, whatever comes, so far as I am concerned, it will not be 'without due notice.' I will be equally outspoken now; not because he has challenged it, but because, so far as I know, I have always tried to speak out. In all these years of strife I have never consciously kept back, or explained away, any doctrine of the Catholic Church. I will not begin to do so now, when my time is nearly run. I am afraid that in these pages I shall seem to obtrude myself too often, and too much. If any think so, I would ask them to remember that Mr. Gladstone has laid me under this necessity in these three ways:—

- He has made me the representative of the Catholic doctrine since 1870, as Bishop Doyle, he says, was in better days.
- He has quoted my writings four times in censure.
- He has appealed to me as 'Head of the Papal Church in England;' I may also add as 'The Oracle.' My words, however, shall not be ambiguous.

The two letters given above contain four assertions.

First, that the Decrees of the Vatican Council have changed nothing in respect to the civil obedience of Catholics.

Secondly, that their civil obedience is neither more nor less divided than that of other men.

Thirdly, that the relations of the Spiritual and Civil Powers have been fixed from time immemorial, and are

therefore after the Vatican Council what they were before.

Fourthly, that the contest now waging abroad began in a malevolent and mischievous intrigue to instigate the Civil Powers to oppress and persecute the Catholic Church.

The two first propositions shall be treated in the first chapter, the third in the second chapter, and the last in the third.

I will therefore endeavour to prove the following propositions, which cover all the assertions I have made:—

- That the Vatican Decrees have in no jot or tittle changed either the obligations or the conditions of Civil Allegiance.
- That the relations of the Catholic Church to the Civil Powers of the world have been immutably fixed from the beginning, inasmuch as they arise out of the Divine Constitution of the Church, and out of the Civil Society of the natural order.
- That any collisions now existing have been brought on by changes, not on the part of the Catholic Church, much less of the Vatican Council, but on the part of the Civil Powers, and that by reason of a systematic conspiracy against the Holy See.
- That by these changes and collisions the Civil Powers of Europe are destroying their own stability.
- That the motive of the Vatican Council in defining the Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff was not any temporal policy, nor was it for any temporal end; but that it defined that truth in the face of all temporal dangers, in order to guard the Divine deposit of Christianity, and to vindicate the divine certainty of faith.

Chapter I. Meaning and Effect of the Vatican Decrees.

I. IN setting out to prove my first proposition—namely, 'that the Vatican Decrees have in no jot or tittle changed either the obligations or the conditions of Civil Allegiance'—I find myself undertaking to prove a negative. The *onus* of proving that the Vatican Decrees have made a change in our civil allegiance rests upon those who affirm it. Till they offer proof we might remain silent. It would be enough for us to answer that the Vatican Council in its Dogmatic Constitution on the Church has simply affirmed the revealed doctrine of the Spiritual Primacy, and of the Infallibility of the Visible Head of the Christian Church; that the relations of this Primacy to the Civil Powers are in no way treated; and that the civil obedience of subjects is left precisely as and where it was before the Vatican Council was convened.

(1) However, I will first examine what proofs have been offered to show that the Vatican Council has made the alleged change; and I will then give positive evidence to show what the Vatican Council has done. From these things it will be seen that it has neither changed, nor added to, nor taken away anything from the doctrine and discipline of the Church, but has only defined what has been believed and practised from the beginning.

The arguments to prove a change are two.

First. Mr. Gladstone has argued from the third chapter of the Constitution on the Roman Pontiff, that his powers have received a great extension. Mr. Gladstone, so far as I am aware, is the first and only person who has ever ventured on this statement.

His argument is as follows:—

He dwells with no little amplification upon the 'introduction of the remarkable phrase,' 'ad disciplinam et regimen Ecclesiæ,' into the third chapter; that is, 'non solum in rebus quæ; ad fidem et mores pertinent, sed etiam in iis quæ ad disciplinam et regimen Ecclesiæ; per totum orbem diffusa; pertinent.' He says, 'Absolute obedience, it is boldly declared, is due to the Pope, at the peril of salvation, not only in faith and in morals, but in all things which concern the discipline and government of the Church' (p. 41). Submission in faith and morals is 'abject' enough, but 'in discipline and government' too is intolerable. 'Why did the astute contrivers of this tangled scheme,' &c. . . . (p. 39). 'The work is now truly complete' (p. 40). This he calls 'the new version of the principles of the Papal Church.' When I read this, I asked, 'Is it possible that Mr. Gladstone should think this to be anything new? What does he conceive the Primacy of Rome to mean? With what eyes has he read history? Can he have read the tradition of the Catholic Church?' As one of 'the astute contrivers,' I will answer that these words were introduced because the Pontiffs and Councils of the Church have always so used them. They may be 'remarkable' and 'new' to Mr. Gladstone, but they are old as the Catholic Church. I give the first proofs which come to hand.

Nicholas I., in the year 863, in a Council at Rome, enacted: 'Si quis dogmata, man data, interdicta, sanctiones vel decreta pro Catholica fide, pro ecclesiastica disciplina, pro correctione fidelium, pro emendati-one sceleratorum, vel interdictione imminentium vel futurorum malorum, a Sedis Apostolicæ Præsidente

salubriter promulgata contempserit: Anathema sit.'

Labbe, *Concil.* tom. x. p. 238, ed. Ven. 1730.

This was an 'iron gripe' not less 'formidable' than the third chapter of the Vatican Constitution.

It may be said, perhaps, that this was only a Pontiff in his own cause; or only a Roman Council.

But this Canon was recognised in the Eighth General Council held at Constantinople in 869.

Ibid. tom. x. p. 633. See *Petri Privilegium*, 2nd part, p. 81.

Innocent III. may be no authority with Mr. Gladstone; but he says, what every Pontiff before him and after him has said, 'Nos qui sumus ad *regimen* Universalis Ecclesiæ, superna dispositione vocati.'

Corpus Juris Canon. *Decret. Greg.* lib. ii. cap. xiii. Novit.

Again, Sixtus IV., in 1471, Writes: 'Ad Universalis Ecclesiæ *regimen* divina disponente clementia vocatis,'

Corpus Juris Canon. *Extrav. Comm.* lib. i. tit. ix. cap. i.

&c.

If this be not enough, we have the Council of Florence, in 1442, defining of the Roman Pontiff that 'Ipsi in Beato Petro pascendi, *regendi ac gubernandi* Universalem Ecclesiam a Domino nostro Jesu Christo plenam potestatem traditam esse.'

Labbe, *Concil.* torn. xviii. p. 527, ed. Yen. 1732.

Finally the Council of Trent says:—'Unde merito Pontifices Maximi pro Suprema potestate sibi in Ecclesia universa tradita,'

Sess. xiv. cap. vii.

&c.

I refrain from quoting Canonists and Theologians who use this language as to regimen and discipline. It needed no astuteness to transcribe the well-known traditional language of the Catholic Church. It is as universal in our law books as the forms of the Courts at Westminster. The Vatican Council has left the authority of the Pontiff precisely where it found it. The whole, therefore, of Mr. Gladstone's argument falls with the misapprehension on which it was based.

What, then, is there new in the Vatican Council? What is to be thought of the rhetorical description of 'Merovingian monarchs and Carlovingian mayors.' but that the distinguished author is out of his depth? The Pope had at all times the power to rule the whole Church not only in faith and morals, but also in all things which pertain to discipline and government, and that whether infallibly or not.

Such is literally the only attempt made by Mr. Gladstone to justify his assertions. But what has this to do with Civil Allegiance? There is not a syllable on the subject, there is not a proposition which can be twisted or tortured into such a meaning. The government of the Church, as here spoken of, is purely and strictly the Spiritual government of souls, both pastors and people, as it was exercised in the first three hundred years before any Christian State existed.

But next, if the Vatican Council has not spoken of the Civil Powers, nevertheless it has defined that the Pope, speaking *ex cathedra*, is infallible: this definition, by retrospective action, makes all Pontifical acts infallible, the Bull *Unam Sanctam* included; and, by prospective action, will make all similar acts in future binding upon the conscience.

Certainly this is true. But what is there new in this? The Vatican Council did not make the Pope infallible. Was he not infallible before the Council? He is, therefore, not more infallible after it than before. If a handful of writers, here and there, denied his infallibility, the whole Church affirmed it. Proof of this shall be given in its place. For the present, I affirm that all acts *ex cathedra*, such as the Bull *Unam Sanctam*, the Bull *Unigenitus*, the Bull *Auctorem Fidei*, and the like, were held to be infallible as fully before the Vatican Council as now.

To this it will be said, 'Be it so; but nobody was bound under Anathema to believe them.' I answer that it is not the Anathema that generates faith. The infallibility of the Head of the Church was a doctrine of Divine Faith before it was defined in 1870, and to deny it was held by grave authorities to be at least proximate to heresy, if not actually heretical.

Petri Privilegium, part i. pp. 61-66, and notes.

The Vatican Council has put this beyond question; but it was never lawful to Catholics to deny the infallibility of a Pontifical act *ex cathedra*. It is from simple want of knowledge that men suppose every doctrine not defined to be an open question. The doctrine of the Infallibility of the Church has never been defined to this day. Will any man pretend that this is an open question among Catholics? The infallibility of the Pope was likewise never defined, but it was never an open question. Even the Jansenists did not venture to deny it, and the evasion of some of them, who gave 'obsequious silence' instead of internal assent to Pontifical acts, was condemned by Clement XI. The definition of the Vatican Council has made no change whatsoever except in the case of those who denied or doubted of this doctrine. No difference, therefore, whatsoever has been made in the state of those who believed it. If the integrity of their civil allegiance was unimpeded before 1870, it is unimpeded now. But Mr. Gladstone admits that it was unimpeded before. His contention is that it is impeded

now. But this is self-contradictory, for they believed the same doctrine of infallibility both then and now. If Mr. Gladstone means that the Vatican Council has made a difference for the few who denied the doctrine, and for the authors of *Janus* and *Quirinus*, and the professors of 'obsequious silence,' his contention is most true. But then he must change his whole position. The title of his pamphlet must be amended and stand. 'The Vatican Decrees in their Bearing on the Civil Allegiance of those who before 1870 denied the Infallibility of the Pope.' But this would ruin his case; for he would have admitted the loyalty of Catholics who always believed it before the definition was made.

We are next told that there are some twelve theories of what is an act *ex cathedra*. We have been also told that there are twenty. But how is it that Mr. Gladstone did not see that by this the whole force of his argument is shaken? If the definition has left it so uncertain what acts are, and what acts are not, *ex cathedra*, who shall hold himself bound to obedience? Are the eighty condemnations indicated in the Syllabus *ex cathedra*? By this showing it is 12 to 1 that they may not be. It is an axiom in morals '*Lex dubia non obligat.*' But if it be doubtful whether the Syllabus is *ex cathedra*, I am not bound to receive it with interior assent. Again, Mr. Gladstone thinks to aggravate the case by adding that the Pope is to be the ultimate judge of what acts are *ex cathedra*. And who else should be? *Ejus est interpretari cujus est condere* is a principle of all law. Mr. Gladstone has been acting upon it all his life. But, perhaps it may be said, why did not the Council put beyond doubt what acts are *ex cathedra*? Well, the Council has done so, as I hope to show; and has done it with as great precision as the subject matter will admit. It has given five tests, or conditions, by which an act *ex cathedra* may be distinguished.

But it may be said that doubts may still exist, and that doubts may still be raised as to this or that Pontifical act whether it be *ex cathedra* or not. Surely common sense would say, consult the authority which made the law; the legislator is always at hand, always ready to explain his own meaning, and to define the limits of his intention. If there be any thing unreasonable in this, all jurisprudence, including the British Constitution, labours under the same uncertainty, or rather the same inevitable imperfection.

I am surprised that Mr. Gladstone should have quoted the second paragraph of the chapter in the Vatican Constitution; and that he should have passed over the fourth paragraph, in which there are indeed the words 'potestatis sæcularis placito.' This is the only recognition of secular powers in the whole Constitution. In that paragraph two things are affirmed: the one that the free exercise of the supreme Spiritual power of the Head of the Christian Church may neither be intercepted, nor hindered, nor excluded from any part of the Church by any human authority; and, secondly, that all such acts of his Spiritual power are valid and complete in themselves, and need, for that end, no confirmation or *placitum* of any other authority. This independence is claimed for Christianity by everyone who believes in a revelation. Here is indeed a reference to Civil Powers; but, lest the Vatican Council should be held guilty of such innovations, I will add that such was the contention of St. Thomas of Canterbury against Henry II. in the case of the Constitutions of Clarendon, which were not 'cursed,' as Mr. Gladstone delicately expresses it, but condemned by Alexander III. in the year 1164. This, then, has not changed the Civil Allegiance of Catholics since 1870.

But I am not undertaking to prove a negative. I hope that I have shown that the evidence offered to prove that the Council has made the alleged change is *nil*. I affirm, then, once more that the Vatican Council has not touched the question of Civil Allegiance, that it has not by a jot or a tittle changed the relations in which the Church has ever stood to the Civil Powers; and that, therefore, the Civil Allegiance of Catholics is as full, perfect, and complete since the Council as it was before. These are affirmations capable of proof, and before I have done I hope to prove them. For the present it will be enough to give the reason why the Vatican Council did not touch the question of the relations of the Church to the Civil Powers. The reason is simple. *It intended not to touch them*, until it could treat them fully and as a whole. And it has carefully adhered to its intention. I will also give the reason why it has been so confidently asserted that the Council did touch the Civil Powers. It is because certain persons, a year before the Council met, resolved to say so. They wrote the book *Janus* to prove it; they published circulars and pamphlets before and during the Council to reassert it. They first prophesied that the Council would interfere with the Civil Powers, and now they write scientific history to prove that it has done so. I am not writing at random; I carefully collected at the time their books, pamphlets, and articles. I read them punctually, and bound them up into volumes, which are now before me. Mr. Gladstone has reproduced their arguments. But for this systematic agitation before the Council, no one, I am convinced, would have found a shadow of cause for it in its Decrees. Now, that I may not seem to write this as prompted by the events of the present moment, I will repeat what I published in the year 1869, before the Council assembled, and in the year 1870, after the Council was suspended.

Before the Council met I published these words:

'The Œcumenical Council and the Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff,' *Petri Privilegium*, part ii. pp. 131-5. (Longmans, 1871.)

'Whilst I was writing these lines a document has appeared purporting to be the answers of the Theological Faculty of Munich to the questions of the Bavarian Government.

'The questions and the answers are so evidently concerted, if not written by the same hand, and the animus of the document so evidently hostile to the Holy See, and so visibly intended to create embarrassments for the supreme authority of the Church, both in respect to its past acts and also in respect to the future action of the Œcumenical Council, that I cannot pass it over. But, in speaking of it I am compelled, for the first time, to break silence on a danger which has for some years been growing in its proportions, and, I fear I must add, in its attitude of menace. The answers of the University of Munich are visibly intended to excite fear and alarm in the Civil Powers of Europe, and thereby to obstruct the action of the Œcumenical Council if it should judge it to be opportune to define the Infallibility of the Pope. The answers are also intended to create an impression that the theological proofs of the doctrine are inadequate, and its definition beset with uncertainty and obscurity. In a word, the whole correspondence is a transparent effort to obstruct the freedom of the Œcumenical Council on the subject of the Infallibility of the Pontiff; or, if that doctrine be defined, to instigate the Civil Governments to assume a hostile attitude towards the Holy See. And this comes in the name of liberty, and from those who tell us that the Council will not be free.

'I shall take the liberty, without further words, of dismissing the Bavarian Government from our thoughts. But I must declare, with much regret, that this Munich document appears to me to be seditious.

'Facts like these give a certain warrant to the assertion and prophecies of politicians and Protestants. They prove that in the Catholic Church there is a school at variance with the doctrinal teaching of the Holy See in matters which are not of faith. But they do not reveal how small that school is. Its centre would seem to be at Munich. It has, both in France and England, a small number of adherents. They are active, they correspond, and for the most part write anonymously. It would be difficult to describe its tenets, for none of its followers seem to be agreed in all points. Some hold the Infallibility of the Pope, and some defend the Temporal Power. Nothing appears to be common to all, except an animus of opposition to the acts of the Holy See in matters outside the faith.

'In this country, about a year ago, an attempt was made to render impossible, as it was confidently but vainly thought, the definition of the Infallibility of the Pontiff by reviving the monotonous controversy about Pope Honorius. Later, we were told of I know not what combination of exalted personages in France for the same end. It is certain that these symptoms are not sporadic and disconnected, but in mutual understanding and with a common purpose. The anti-Catholic press has eagerly encouraged this school of thought. If a Catholic can be found out of tune with authority by half a note, he is at once extolled for unequalled learning and irrefragable logic. The anti-Catholic journals are at his service, and he vents his opposition to the common opinions of the Church by writing against them anonymously. Sad as this is, it is not formidable. It has effect almost alone upon those who are not Catholic. Upon Catholics its effect is hardly appreciable; on the Theological Schools of the Church it will have little influence; upon the Œcumenical Council it can have none.

'I can hardly persuade myself to believe that the University of Munich does not know that the relations between the Pope, even supposed to be infallible, and the Civil Powers have been long since precisely defined in the same acts which defined the relations between the Church, known to be infallible, and the Civil Authority. Twelve Synods or Councils, two of them Œcumenical, have long ago laid down these relations of the Spiritual and Civil Powers.

Bellarmin. Opuscula adv. Barclaium, p. 845, ed. Col. 1617.

If the Pope were declared to be infallible to-morrow, it would in no way affect those relations.

'We may be sure . . . that this intellectual disaffection, of which, in these last days, we have had in France a new and mournful example, will have no influence upon either the Œcumenical Council or the policy of the Great Powers of Europe. They will not meddle with speculations of theological or historical critics. They know too well that they cannot do in the nineteenth century what was done in the sixteenth and the seventeenth.

'The attempt to put a pressure upon the General Council, if it have any effect upon those who are subject to certain governments, would have no effect but to rouse a just indignation in the Episcopate of the Church throughout the world. They hold their jurisdiction from a higher fountain, and they recognise no superior in their office of Judges of Doctrine, save only the Vicar of Jesus Christ. This preliminary meddling has already awakened a sense of profound responsibility and an inflexible resolution to allow no pressure or influence, or menace or intrigue, to cast so much as a shadow across their fidelity to the Divine Head of the Church and to His Vicar upon earth.

'Moreover, we live in days when the "Regium Placitum" and "Exequaturs" and "Arrêts" of Parliament in Spiritual things are simply dear. It may have been possible to hinder the promulgation of the Council of Trent; it is impossible to hinder the promulgation of the Council of the Vatican. The very liberty of which men are proud will publish it. Ten thousand presses in all lands will promulgate every act of the Church and of the Pontiff, in the face of all Civil Powers. Once published, these acts enter the domain of faith and conscience, and

no human legislation, no civil authority, can efface them. The two hundred millions of Catholics will know the Decrees of the Vatican Council; and to know them is to obey. The Council will ask no civil enforcement, and it will need no civil aid. The Great Powers of Europe have long declared that the conscience of men is free from civil constraint. They will not stultify their own declarations by attempting to restrain the acts of the Vatican Council. The guardians and defenders of the principles of 1789 ought to rise as one man against all who should so violate the base of the political society in France. What attitude lesser Governments may take is of lesser moment.'

(2) I will now state positively what the Council has defined on the subject of the Roman Pontiff. The history then of the Definition of the Infallibility is as follows:—

1. Two *Schemata*, as they were called, or treatises, had been prepared: the one on the nature of the Church; the other on its relations to the Civil State.

The first alone came before the Council; the second has never yet been so much as discussed.

In the schema on the nature of the Church, its Infallibility was treated; but the Infallibility of its Head was not so much as mentioned. His Primacy and authority alone were treated. In the end, the chapter relating to the Primacy and authority was taken out, and subdivided into four. The subject of the Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff was then introduced.

The reasons for this change of order were given in 1870, as follows:—

In all theological treatises, excepting indeed one or two of great authority, it had been usual to treat of the Body of the Church before treating of its Head. The reason of this would appear to be that in the exposition of doctrine the logical order was the more obvious; and to the faithful, in the first formation of the Church, the Body of the Church was known before its Head. We might have expected that the Council would have followed the same method. It is, therefore, all the more remarkable that the Council inverted that order, and defined the prerogative of the Head before it treated of the constitution and endowments of the Body. And this, which was brought about by the pressure of special events, is not without significance. The schools of the Church have followed the logical order; but the Church in Council, when for the first time it began to treat of its own constitution and authority, changed the method, and, like the Divine Architect of the Church, began in the historical order, with the foundation and Head of the Church. Our Divine Lord first chose Cephas, and invested him with the primacy over the Apostles. Upon this rock all were built, and from him the whole unity and authority of the Church took its rise. To Peter alone first was given the plenitude of jurisdiction and of infallible authority. Afterwards, the gift of the Holy Ghost was shared with him by all the Apostles. From him and through him therefore all began. For which cause a clear and precise conception of his Primacy and privilege is necessary to a clear and precise conception of the Church. Unless it be first distinctly apprehended, the doctrine of the Church will be always proportionately obscure. The doctrine of the Church does not determine the doctrine of the Primacy, but the doctrine of the Primacy does precisely determine the doctrine of the Church. In beginning, therefore, with the Head, the Council has followed our Lord's example, both in teaching and in fact; and in this will be found one of the causes of the singular and luminous precision with which the Council of the Vatican has, in one brief Constitution, excluded the well-known errors on the Primacy and Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff.

The reasons which prevailed to bring about this change of method were not only those which demonstrated generally the opportuneness of defining the doctrine, but those also which showed specially the necessity of bringing on the question while as yet the Council was in the fulness of its numbers. It was obvious that the length of time consumed in the discussion, reformation, and voting of the *Schemata* was such that, unless the Constitution *De Romano Pontifice* were brought on immediately after Easter, it could not be finished before the setting in of summer should compel the bishops to disperse. Once dispersed, it was obvious they could never again reassemble in so large a number. Many who with great earnestness desired to share the blessing and the grace of extinguishing the most dangerous error which for two centuries had disturbed and harassed the faithful, would have been compelled to go back to their distant sees and missions, never to return. It was obviously of the first moment that such a question should be discussed and decided, not, as we should have been told, in holes and corners, or by a handful of bishops, or by a faction, or by a clique, but by the largest possible assembly of the Catholic Episcopate. All other questions, on which little divergence of opinion existed, might well be left to a smaller number of bishops; but a doctrine which for so long had vexed both pastors and people, the defining, not the truth, of which was contested by a numerous and organised opposition, needed to be treated and affirmed by the most extensive deliberation of the bishops of the Catholic Church. Add to this the many perils which hung over the continuance of the Council, of which I need but give one example. The outbreak of a war might have rendered the definition impossible. And in fact the Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff was defined on the eighteenth of July, and war was officially declared on the following day.

With these and many other contingencies fully before them, those who believed that the definition was, not only opportune, but necessary for the unity of the Church and of the Faith, urged its immediate discussion.

Events justified their foresight. The debate was prolonged into the heats of July, when, by mutual consent, the opposing sides withdrew from a further prolonging of the contest, and closed the discussion. If it had not been already protracted beyond all limits of reasonable debate—for not less than a hundred fathers in the general and special discussions had spoken chiefly, if not alone, of Infallibility—it could not so have ended. Both sides were convinced that the matter was exhausted.

Petri Privilegium, part iii. pp. 51-54.

2. In order to demonstrate, if possible, more abundantly that the Vatican Council has not so much as touched the relations of the Church to the Civil Power, I will give a brief analysis of its Definitions in what is called the First Dogmatic Constitution on the Church of Christ.

It is, as I have said, a portion of the Schema or treatise on the Church, taken out and enlarged into a Constitution by itself. There would have been only one Constitution treating of both the Body and the Head of the Church. Now there are two. The first, treating of the Head, has been completed; the second, treating of the Body, yet remains.

Now of the First Constitution there are four chapters.

The first treats of the Institution of the Apostolic Primacy in Saint Peter. The sum of it is that Our Lord appointed Peter to be Head of the whole Church, and gave him immediately a Primacy, not of honour only, but of jurisdiction. There is here not a word of anything but the Pastoral or Spiritual power.

The second declares the Primacy to be perpetual. It affirms two things: the one that Peter has a perpetual line of successors, and that the Roman Pontiff is the successor of Peter in that Primacy.

The third affirms the jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff to be full and supreme in all things of faith and morals, and also in discipline and government of the Church; and that this jurisdiction ordinary and immediate over all Churches and persons.

The fourth chapter treats of the Infallibility of the *Magisterium*, or the teaching authority of the Roman Pontiff. This chapter affirms that a Divine assistance was given to Peter, and in Peter to his successors for the discharge of their supreme office. It affirms also that this is a tradition received from the beginning of the Christian Faith. They, therefore, who tell us that the Vatican Council has brought in a new doctrine show that they do not know what the Vatican Council has said, and what it is that they must refute before their charge of innovation can be listened to.

Now it is to be observed:

- That the Council declares that the Roman Pontiff, speaking *ex cathedra*, has a Divine assistance which preserves him from error.
- That he speaks *ex cathedra* when he speaks under these five conditions: (1) as Supreme Teacher (2) to the whole Church. (3) Defining a doctrine (4) to be held by the whole Church (5) in faith and morals.

If disputants and controversialists had read and mastered these five conditions, we should have been spared much senseless clamour.

3. Lastly, it is to be observed that the Council has not defined the limit of the phrase 'faith and morals.' This well-known formula is plain and intelligible. The deposit committed to the Church is the Revelation of Divine Truth, and of the Divine Law. The Church is the guardian and witness, the interpreter and the expositor, of the Truth and of the Law of God. Such is the meaning of 'faith and morals.' It is a formula well known, perfectly clear, sufficiently precise for our spiritual and moral life. If questions may be raised about the limits of faith and morals, it is because questions may be raised about anything; and questions will always be raised by those who love contention against the Catholic Church more than they love either faith or morals. All argument against the Vatican Council as to the limits or extent of this formula is so much labour lost. It has not so much as touched the extent or the limits.

Such, then, is the whole of the first Constitution *De Ecclesia Christi*. It does not contain a syllable of the relation of this Primacy to the Civil or Political State, except to say that no human authority is needed for the validity of its acts, nor may any human power hinder their exercise. But these are truths as old as the day when St. Peter said before the council in Jerusalem, 'If it be just, in the sight of God, to hear you rather than God, judge ye.'

Acts iv. 19.

I hope, then, I have justified my assertion that the Vatican Council has not changed by a jot or a tittle the civil allegiance of Catholics. It is as free and perfect now as it was before.

As I have affirmed that the doctrine of the Infallibility of the Head of the Church was a doctrine of Divine Faith before the Council, and that the denial of it was confined to a small school of writers, I might be expected here to offer the historical proof of this assertion.

But I have already done so in the year 1869, before the Council assembled. I would therefore refer to the second part of 'Petri Privilegium'

Part ii. pp. 63-107.

for, as I believe, a sufficient proof. I will, however, in few words give the outline of what was then said.

It is acknowledged by the adversaries of the doctrine that from the Council of Constance in 1414 to this day the doctrine has been the predominant belief of the Church. I gave evidence of its existence from the Council of Constance upwards to the Council of Chalcedon in 445.

Next I traced the history of the growth of the opinions adverse to the Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff from the Council of Constance to the year 1682, when it was, for the first time, reduced to formula by an assembly of French ecclesiastics under the influence of Louis XIV.

Lastly, I showed how this formula was no sooner published than it was condemned in every Catholic country by bishops and universities, and by the Holy See. The sum of the evidence for the first period was then given as follows:—

Gallicanism is no more than a transient and modern opinion, which arose in France, without warrant or antecedents in the ancient theological schools of the French Church; a royal theology, as suddenly developed and as parenthetical as the Thirty-nine Articles, affirmed only by a small number out of the numerous Episcopate of France, indignantly rejected by many of them; condemned in succession by three Pontiffs; declared by the Universities of Louvain and Douai to be erroneous; retracted by the bishops of France; condemned by Spain, Hungary, and other countries; and condemned over again in the Bull *Auctorem Fidei*.

From this evidence it is certain:—

- That Gallicanism has no warrant in the doctrinal practice or tradition of the Church, either in France or at large, in the thousand years preceding the Council of Constance.
- That the first traces of Gallicanism are to be found about the time of that Council.
- That after the Council of Constance they were rapidly and almost altogether effaced from the theology of the Church in France, until their revival in 1682.
- That the Articles of 1682 were conceived by Jansenists, and carried through by political and oppressive means contrary to the sense of the Church in France.
- That the theological faculties of the Sorbonne, and of France generally, nobly resisted and refused to teach them.

Petri Privilegium, part ii. p. 56.

But Gallicanism was the only formal interruption of the universal belief of the Church in the Infallibility of its Head. The Vatican Council extinguished this modern error.

II. Having thus far offered proof of the first proposition in my first letter, I will now go on to the second.

I there affirmed that the Civil Allegiance of Catholics is as undivided as that of all Christians, and of all men who recognise a divine or natural moral law.

Mr. Gladstone requires of us 'solid and undivided allegiance.'

P. 44. D

I must confess to some surprise at this demand. The allegiance of every moral being is 'divided,' that is, twofold; not, indeed, in the same matter nor on the same plane, but in two spheres, and on a higher and a lower level, so that no collision is possible, except by some deviation or excess. Every moral being is under two authorities—human and divine. The child is under the authority of parents, and the authority of God; the subject is under the authority of the Civil State, and the Divine authority of natural or revealed religion. Unless we claim Infallibility for the State, its acts must be liable to revision, and to resistance by natural conscience. An unlimited obedience to parents or to States would generate a race of unlimited monsters. Surely these are truisms. Our Lord Himself taught this division when He said, 'Render therefore to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's.' But this all men admit when they think. Unfortunately, when they attack the Catholic Church or the Vatican Council they seldom think much.

Put the objection in this form: 'We non-Catholics acknowledge two authorities as you Catholics do. Our allegiance to the civil law is revised and checked by our consciences, guided by the light of nature and by the light of revelation. We refuse to receive religious doctrine or discipline from the State. We allow the Society of Friends, for conscience sake, to refuse to take an oath of allegiance, and even to fight for their country, for conscience sake; and yet these two are among the natural duties of subjects which the civil authority may most justly both require and enforce. We therefore leave every man free to refuse obedience to civil laws if his conscience so demands of him. But you Catholics put your conscience into the hands of the Pope. You are bound to follow his interpretation of the civil law; and he tells you when your conscience ought to refuse obedience whether you see it or not; worse than this, the Pope may wrongly interpret our civil laws, or he may even so interpret them as to serve his own interests; and then your moral and mental freedom is at the mercy of another. You must choose between your religion and your country.' I think I have not understated the argument of our adversaries.

To this the answer is twofold. First, that the non-Catholic doctrine is more dangerous to the Civil State than the Catholic. If any individual conscience may dispense itself from civil obedience, then almost all men will

obey only 'for wrath' and not for 'conscience sake.'

Rom. xiii. 5.

And such, in fact, is the condition of millions of men. I could wish that the mental state of the masses were better known. I wish it were possible to ascertain, by letting down a thermometer into the deep sea of our population, what notions remain of loyalty or allegiance. No doubt, in an insular population like ours, the traditional custom of inert conformity with law maintains a passive compliance which passes for Civil Allegiance. But take the population of countries where the so-called rights of the political conscience of individuals have had their legitimate development. A law is a law so far as it is accepted; a man is bound by the law so far as he had a hand in making it. If you once admit that the ultimate decision as to civil obedience is in the individual, each political conscience is a law-giver and a law to itself. You cannot fly principles with a string as boys fly kites. Once enunciated they have nothing to control them. If every man has the ultimate right of refusing obedience to the law upon the dictates of his own conscience, then we are in a state of unlimited license, which is potentially a state of unlimited revolution. And such, in truth, since 1789 has been the state of the west of Europe. It is in a state of chronic instability and continuous change. More than forty revolutions have sprung from this essential lawlessness.

Secondly, according to the doctrine of the Catholic Church, the rights of individual conscience are secured not only against external coercion, but against its own aberrations. The obedience of Catholic subjects to their Civil Rulers is a positive precept of religion. The rising against legitimate authority is forbidden as the sin of rebellion. The Syllabus has condemned the propositions:—

'Authority is nothing else but the result of numerical superiority and material force.'—Prop. 60.

'It is allowable to refuse obedience to legitimate Princes, and also to rebel against them.'—Prop. 63.

The political conscience of Catholics is not left to the individual judgment alone. It is guided by the whole Christian morality, by the greatest system of ethical legislation the world has ever seen, the Canon Law and the Moral Theology of the Catholic Church. Not only all capricious and wilful resistances of the Civil Law, but all unreasonable and contentious disobedience is condemned by its authority. It is a doctrine of faith that legitimate sovereignty exists not only in the unity of the Church, but outside of the same; and not only among Christian nations, but also among the nations that are not Christian.

Rom. xiii. 1-4.

Moreover, that to all such legitimate sovereigns subjects are bound by the Divine Law
St. Peter ii. 13-15.

to render obedience in all lawful things. It is certain, therefore, that Catholics are bound to Civil Allegiance by every bond, natural and supernatural, as absolutely as their non-Catholic fellow-countrymen; and, I must add, more explicitly. And further, that they can hardly be reduced to the necessity of using their private judgment as to the lawfulness of obeying any law. In all matters of ordinary civil and political life, the duty of Catholics is already defined by a whole code which enforces obedience for conscience sake. In the rare case of doubt which may arise in times of religious persecution, political revolution, civil wars, or wars of succession, Catholic and non-Catholic subjects are alike in this,—they are both compelled to choose their side. But the non-Catholic subject has hardly law or judge to aid his conscience: the Catholic has both. He has the whole traditional moral law of Christendom, which has formed and perpetuated the civil and political order of the modern world, and he has a multitude of principles, maxims, and precedents on which to form his own judgment. Finally, if he be unable so to do, he can seek for guidance from an authority which the whole Christian world once believed to be the highest judicial tribunal and the source of its civil order and stability. And is this to place 'his mental and moral freedom at the mercy of another?' As much as, and no more than, we place ourselves 'at the mercy' of the Christian Church for our salvation. Let us take an example. It is certain, by the natural and Divine Law, that every man may defend himself, and that every people has the right of self-defence. On this all defensive wars are justifiable. But if the Sovereign levy war upon his people, have they the right of self-defence? Beyond all doubt. But at what point may they take up arms? and what amount of oppression justifies recourse to resistance? For the non-Catholic there can only be these answers. 'He must go by the light of his own conscience, or he must be guided by the judgment of the greater number, or by the wiser heads of his nation.' But the greater number may not be the wiser; and to judge who are the wiser throws the judgment once more upon himself. The Catholic subject would use his own judgment, and the judgment of his countrymen, but he would not hold himself at liberty to take up arms unless the Christian law confirmed the justice of his judgment. But from whom is this judgment to be sought? He would ask it of all those of whom he asks counsel in the salvation of his soul. If this is to be at the mercy of another, we are all at the mercy of those whom we believe to be wiser than ourselves.

Let us take an example. The Italian people have been for twenty years spectators of a revolution which has overthrown the Sovereigns of Naples and Tuscany. I will ask two questions. First, would any Italian place himself at the mercy of another, if he should ask of the head of his religion what course as a Christian he ought

to pursue?

And, secondly, what has been the action of the Pope in respect to the Italian revolution? He has said that to co-operate in the Italian revolution is not lawful. Surely, if Italians are free to form their conscience on the doctrines of the revolution, they are equally free to form their conscience on the doctrines of their religion. To deny this is to have two weights and two measures. The non-Catholic theory tells us that the conscience of subjects is the ultimate test. Be it so; my conscience tells me that it is right to obey my religion rather than the revolution. If this be a divided allegiance, then it is Christianity which has introduced it, and not the Church. It was our Lord Himself who, by instituting His Church, separated for ever the two powers, Civil and Spiritual, thereby redeeming the conscience and the religion of men from the dominion of princes, and conferring upon the Civil Power the consecration by which it is confirmed, and the higher law by which its sphere is defined. It is all this, and not

Expostulation, p. 52.

'our old friend the deposing power alone,' which I have described as teaching obedience to subjects and moderation to princes.

Temporal Power of the Pope, pp. 44-46, second ed. 1862.

In all conflicts between the Civil and Spiritual, the consciences of Christians will be decided by the Christian law.

I conclude, therefore, this part of the subject by reasserting:—

- That the relations of the Church to the State were never so much as proposed for discussion in the Vatican Council.
- That in its Constitutions or Definitions it has in no way touched the subject.
- That the Definitions of the Council are 'declaratory' of doctrine already of Divine Faith, and that no new 'enactment' whatsoever was made.
- That the relations of the Church to the Civil Power were left by the Vatican Council as they were known and declared by the Council of Trent and all previous Councils.

I will therefore answer Mr. Gladstone's questions in page 44 of his 'Expostulation.' He tells us that 'what is not wanted is vague and general assertion of whatever kind, and howsoever sincere. What is wanted, and that in the most specific form and in the clearest terms, I take to be one of two things, that is to say, either—

- A demonstration that neither in the name of faith, nor in the name of morals, nor in the name of the government or discipline of the Church, is the Pope of Rome able, by virtue of the powers asserted for him by the Vatican decree, to make any claim upon those who adhere to his communion of such a nature as can impair the integrity of their Civil allegiance; or else,
- That if, and when such claim is made, it will even, although resting on the definitions of the Vatican, be repelled and rejected.'

The Vatican Decrees, p. 44.

I have shown that the Pope is not able, by the Vatican Council, to make any claim in the name of faith, nor in the name of morals, nor in the name of the government or discipline of the Church, which he was not able to make before the Vatican Council existed.

To Mr. Gladstone's first question, therefore, I answer, that neither in virtue of the Vatican Decrees, nor of any other decrees, nor of his supreme authority as Head of the Christian Church, can the Pope make any claim upon those who adhere to his communion of such a nature as can impair the integrity of their Civil Allegiance.

To his second question, therefore, the answer is already given. I have no need to declare myself ready to repel and reject that which the Pope cannot do. He cannot do an act contrary to the Divine Law; but to impair my Civil Allegiance would be contrary to the Law of God.

It is strange to me that so acute a reasoner should have begged the question, which is this: By whom are the limits of Civil Allegiance to be determined? If Mr. Gladstone should say by the State, I would ask—Does he mean that the State is infallible in morals? or that subjects have no conscience, or that the State may coerce their conscience, or that the State can create a morality which all consciences must obey? Some of these postulates are inevitably assumed in his question, if it has any meaning.

My reasons for saying this will be seen in the following chapter.

Chapter II. The Relations of the Spiritual and Civil Powers.

WE will now go on to my second proposition, that the relations of the Catholic Church to the Civil Powers have been fixed immutably from the beginning, because they arise out of the Divine constitution of the Church

and of the Civil Society of the natural order.

I. Inasmuch as the natural and civil society existed before the foundation of the Christian Church, we will begin with it; and here my concessions, or rather my assertions, will, I hope, satisfy all but Cæsarists.

1. The civil society of men has God for its Founder. It was created potentially in the creation of man; and from him has been unfolded into actual existence. The human family contains the first principles and laws of authority, obedience, and order. These three conditions of society are of Divine origin; and they are the constructive laws of all civil or political society.

2. To the Civil Society of mankind supreme authority is given *immediately* by God; for a society does not signify mere number, but number organised by the laws and principles which its Divine Founder implanted in the human family. Sovereignty, therefore, is given by God immediately to human society; and *mediately*, or *mediante societate*, to the person or persons to whom society may commit its custody and its exercise. When once the supreme power or sovereignty has been committed by any society to a king, or to consuls, or to a council, as the case may be—for God has given no special form of Civil Government—though it be not held by those who receive it by any Divine right, as against the society which gave it, nevertheless it has both a Divine sanction and a Divine authority. For instance, it has the power of life and death. God alone could give to man this power over man. God gave it to man for self-defence. It passes to society at large, which likewise has the right of self-defence. It is committed by society to its chief executive. But, inasmuch as the supreme power is still given by God to the Civil Ruler, even though it be *mediately*, it has a Divine sanction; and so long as the Civil Ruler does not deviate from the end of his existence, the society has no power to revoke its act. For example: the Civil Ruler is for the defence of the people; but if he should make war upon the people, the right of self-defence would justify resistance. I am not now engaged in saying when or how; but the right is undeniable. Manslaughter is not murder, if it be in self-defence; wars of defence are lawful; and just resistance to an unjust prince is not rebellion. All this is founded upon the Divine sanctions of the civil and political society of man, even in the order of nature. It has, then, God for its Founder, for its Legislator, and by His divine Providence for its supreme Ruler.

3. The laws of such society are the laws of nature. It is bound by the natural morality written on the conscience and on the heart. The ethics which govern men become politics in the government of states. Politics are but the collective morals of society. The Civil Ruler or Sovereign is bound by the laws: the subject within the sphere of these laws owes to him a civil allegiance. The Civil Ruler may bind all subjects by an oath of allegiance. He may call on all to bear arms for the safety of the State.

4. The State has for its end, not only the safety of person and property, but, in its fullest sense, the temporal happiness of man. Within the sphere of natural morality, and in order to its end, the State is supreme: and its power is from God. This is the meaning of St. Paul's words:—

'Let every soul be subject to higher powers: for there is no power but from God; and those that are, are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God; and they that resist, purchase to themselves damnation. . . . For he is God's minister to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, fear, for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. Wherefore be subject of necessity, not only for wrath but also for con-science sake.'

Romans xiii. 1-5.

The State, then, is a perfect society, supreme within its own sphere, and in order to its own end: but as that end is not the highest end of man, so the State is not the highest society among men; nor is it, beyond its own sphere and end, supreme. I have drawn this out in greater fulness to show that the Church is in the highest degree conservative of all the natural authority of rulers, and of the natural allegiance of subjects. It is mere shallowness to say that between the Civil authority, as Divinely founded in nature, and the spiritual authority of the Church there can be opposition.

Now, as to the Divine institution of the Civil Society of the world and of its independence in all things of the natural order, what I have already said is enough. The laws of the order of nature are from God. So long as a father exercises his domestic authority according to the law of God, no other authority can intervene to control or to hinder his government. So likewise of the Prince or Sovereign power, be it lodged in one or in many. There is no authority upon earth which can depose a just sovereign or release such subjects from their obedience.

'Etiam nocentium potestas non est nisi a Deo.'—St. Augustine, *De Natura Boni contra Manich.* cap. xxxii.

II. There is, however, another society, the end of which is the eternal happiness of mankind. This also has God for its Founder, and that immediately; and it has received from God its form and constitution, and its rulers receive their authority immediately,

Suarez, *Defensio Fidei*, lib. iii. cap. ii. sect. 5, 15, 16.

with a special Divine sanction and authority, from God.

Two things follow at once from this:—

- That the society which has for its end the eternal happiness of man is of an order higher than the society which aims only at the natural happiness of man.
- That as the temporal and the eternal happiness of man are both ordered by Divine laws, these two societies are, of necessity, in essential conformity and harmony with each other. Collision between them can only be if either deviates from its respective laws.

The natural society of man aims *directly* at the temporal happiness of its subjects, but *indirectly* it aims also at their eternal happiness: the supernatural society aims *directly* at their eternal happiness, and *indirectly* at their temporal happiness, but always in so far only as their temporal happiness is conducive to their eternal end.

From this, again, two other corollaries follow:—

- That the higher or supernatural society is supreme because it has no other society, above it or beyond it, with an end higher than its own.
- That the office of the supernatural society is to aid, direct, and perfect the natural society; that its action upon it is always *in ædificationem non in destructionem*, inasmuch as it is governed by the same Divine Lawgiver, and it is directed to an end which includes and ensures the end of the natural society also.

To put this briefly. The State has for its end the temporal happiness of its subjects; the Church has for its end their eternal happiness. In aiming directly at temporal happiness, the State aims also indirectly at the eternal; for these things are promoted by the same laws. In aiming at eternal happiness, the Church also indirectly aims at the temporal happiness of men.

III. The Divine Founder of the Christian Church said: 'To thee I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven. And whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed also in heaven.'

St. Matthew xvi. 19.

And again: 'All power is given to me in heaven and in earth. Going therefore, teach all nations,' . . . 'teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you.'

Ibid, xxviii. 18, 19.

If these two commissions do not confer upon the Christian Church a supreme doctrinal authority, and a supreme judicial office, in respect to the moral law, over all nations, and over all persons, both governors and governed, I know not what words could suffice to do so.

That authority and that office are directive and preceptive, so long as Princes and their laws are in conformity with the Christian law; and judicial, *ratione peccati*, by reason of sin, whensoever they deviate from it.

If any man deny this, he would thereby affirm that Princes have no superior upon earth: which is the doctrine of the heathen Cæsarism.

But no man will say that Princes have no superior. It is unmeaning to say that they have no superior but the law of God: for that is to play with words. A law is no superior without an authority to judge and to apply it.

To say that God is the sole Lawgiver of Princes is a doctrine unknown, not only to the Catholic Church, but to the Constitution of England. When we say, as our old Jurists do, *Non Rex facit legem*, but *Lex facit Begem*, we mean that there is a will above the King; and that will is the Civil Society, which judges if and when the King deviates from the law. But this doctrine, unless it be tempered by vigorous restraint, is chronic revolution. What adequate restraint is there but in a Divine authority higher than the natural society of man?

The Supreme Judicial Power of the Church has no jurisdiction over those that are not Christian; and the entire weight of its authority, if it were applied at all to such a state, would be applied to confirm the natural rights of sovereignty and to enforce the natural duty of allegiance: and that, upon the principle that the supernatural power of the Church is for edification, not for destruction; that is, to build up and to perfect the order of nature, not to pull down a stone in the symmetry of the natural society of man. St. Thomas says:

'Power and authority are established by human right; the distinction between the faithful and those who do not believe is established by Divine right. But the Divine right, which comes by grace, does not destroy the human right, which is in the order of nature.'

St. Thomas, 2da 2dæ, quast. x. art. 10.

Let us suppose that the Sovereign Power of a heathen people were to make laws contrary to the law of God, would the Church intervene to depose such a sovereign? Certainly not, on the principle laid down by the Apostle, 'What have I to do to judge those that are without?'

1 Cor. v. 12.

Such a people is both individually and socially outside the Divine jurisdiction of the Church. The Church has therefore, in this respect, no commission to discharge towards it except to convert it to Christianity.

But if it be the office of the Church to teach subjects to obey even Heathen Rulers, as the Apostle did, how much more, in the case of Christian Princes and their laws, is it the office of the Church to confirm, consecrate, and enforce by the sanctions of religion and of conscience, of doctrine and of discipline, the whole code of

natural and political morality, and all laws that are made in conformity with the same.

If Christian Princes and their laws deviate from the law of God, the Church has authority from God to judge of that deviation, and by all its powers to enforce the correction of that departure from justice. I do not see how any man who believes in the Revelation of Christianity can dispute this assertion: and to such alone I am at present speaking.

Mr. Gladstone has quoted a passage from an 'Essay on Cæsarism and Ultramontanism,' in which I have claimed for the Church a supremacy in spiritual things over the State, and have made this statement:—

'Any power which is independent and can alone fix the limits of its own jurisdiction, and can thereby fix the limits of all other jurisdictions, is, ipso facto, supreme. But the Church of Jesus Christ, within the sphere of revelation—of faith and morals—is all this, or is nothing or worse than nothing, an imposture and an usurpation; that is, it is Christ or Antichrist.'

Cæsarism and Ultramontanism, p. 36.

It is hardly loyal to take the conclusion of a syllogism without the premises. In the very page before this quotation I had said:—

'In any question as to the competence of the two powers, either there must be some judge to decide what does and what does not fall within their respective spheres, or they are delivered over to perpetual doubt and to perpetual conflict. But who can define what is or is not within the jurisdiction of the Church in faith and morals, except a judge who knows what the sphere of faith and morals contains, and how far it extends? And surely it is not enough that such a judge should guess or opine, or pronounce upon doubtful evidence, or with an uncertain knowledge. Such a sentence would be, not an end of contention, but a beginning and a renewal of strife.'

'It is clear that the Civil Power cannot define how far the circumference of faith and morals extends. If it could, it would be invested with one of the supernatural endowments of the Church. To do this it must know the whole deposit of explicit and implicit faith; or, in other words, it must be the guardian of the Christian revelation. Now, no Christian, nor any man of sound mind, claims this for the Civil Power. . . . If, then, the Civil Power be not competent to decide the limits of the Spiritual Power, and if the Spiritual Power can define with a Divine certainty its own limits, it is evidently supreme. Or, in other words, the Spiritual Power knows with Divine certainty the limits of its own jurisdiction; and it knows therefore the limits and the competence of the Civil Power. It is thereby in matters of religion and conscience supreme.'

Cæsarism and Ultramontanism, pp. 34, 35.

If the Church cannot fix the limits of its jurisdiction, then either nobody can or the State must. But the State cannot unless it claim to be the depository and expositor of the Christian Revelation. Therefore it is the Church or nobody. This last supposition leads to chaos. Now if this be rejected, the Church alone can: and if the Church can fix the limits of its own jurisdiction, it can fix the limits of all other jurisdiction; at least, so far as to warn it off its own domain. But this was my conclusion; and though I have seen it held up to odium, I have not yet seen it answered.

But the Church being the highest society, and independent of all others, is supreme over them, in so far as the eternal happiness of men is involved.

From this, again, two consequences follow:—

- First, that in all things which are purely temporal, and lie *extra finem Ecclesiæ*, outside of the end of the Church, it neither claims nor has jurisdiction.
- Secondly, that in all things which promote, or hinder, the eternal happiness of men, the Church has a power to judge and to enforce.

IV. Such propositions are no sooner enunciated than we are met by a tumult of voices, such as those of *Janus*, *Quirinus*—and I lament to detect the tones of a voice, hitherto heard in behalf of the authority of Christianity and of the Christian Church,—affirming that the Church of Rome and its Pontiffs claim supreme temporal

Expostulation, p. 27.

power, and that direct, over all Temporal Princes and things; to be used at their discretion even to the deposing of Kings, to the absolution of subjects from allegiance, to the employment of force, imprisonment, torture, and death.

If such be the state of our highest minds, we cannot regret that this discussion has been forced upon us. It has come not by our act. It has arisen in its time appointed. It will for awhile raise alarm and suspicion; it will kindle animosity and encourage bigotry: but it will manifest the truth with a wider light than England has seen for three hundred years. I will therefore freely and frankly enter upon this debate; and, in order to be clear, I will treat the subject under the following propositions:—

- The authority of Princes and the allegiance of subjects in the Civil State of nature is of Divine ordinance; and therefore, so long as Princes and their laws are in conformity to the law of God, the Church has no

power or jurisdiction against them, nor over them.

- If Princes and their laws deviate from the law of God, the Church has authority from God to judge of that deviation, and to oblige to its correction.
- The authority which the Church has from God for this end is not *temporal*, but *spiritual*.
- This spiritual authority is not direct in its incidence on temporal things, but only indirect: that is to say, it *directly* promotes its own *spiritual* end; it *indirectly* condemns and declares not binding on the conscience such *temporal* laws as deviate from the law of God, and therefore impede or render impossible the attainment of the eternal happiness of man.
- This spiritual authority is inherent in the Divine constitution and commission of the Church; but its exercise in the world depends on certain moral and material conditions, by which alone its exercise is rendered either possible or just.

I have affirmed that the relations of the Catholic Church to the Civil Powers are fixed primarily by the Divine constitution of the Church and of the Civil Society of men. But it is also true that these relations have been declared by the Church in acts and decrees which are of infallible authority. Such, for instance, is the Bull of Boniface VIII., *Unam Sanctam*. As this has become the text and centre of the whole controversy at this moment, we will fully treat of it. This Bull, then, was beyond all doubt an act *ex cathedra*. It was also confirmed by Leo X. in the Fifth Lateran Œcumenical Council. Whatever definition, therefore, is to be found in this Bull is to be received as of faith. Let it be noted that the *Unam Sanctam* does not depend upon the Vatican Council for its infallible authority. It was from the date of its publication an infallible act, obliging all Catholics to receive it with interior assent. Doctrines identical with those of the *Unam Sanctam* had been declared in two Œcumenical Councils—namely, in the Fourth Lateran in 1215, and the First of Lyons in 1245.

Bellarmin. *De Potest. Papæ*, in præf. p. 844, Cologne, 1617.

On this ground, therefore, I have affirmed that the relations of the Spiritual and Civil Powers were immutably fixed before the Vatican Council met, and that they have been in no way changed by it.

V. We will now examine, (1) the complete text of the *Unam Sanctam*; (2) the interpretations of its assailants and its defenders; (3) the interpretation which is of obligation on all Catholics.

1. The Bull was published by Boniface VIII., in 1302, during the contest with Philip le Bel of France.

Before the Bull was published, the Regalists or partisans of the King declared that the Pope had claimed, as Mr. Gladstone also supposes, to be supreme over the King, both in spiritual and in temporal things. The Chancellor Flotte made this assertion in the year 1301, at Paris, in the Church of Notre Dame. The cardinals sent by Boniface declared that the Pope made no such claim; that he claimed no temporal, but only a spiritual power.

Döllinger's *Church History*, vol. iv. p. 90.

Nevertheless this prejudice, once created, before the publication of the *Unam Sanctam*, ensured its being misinterpreted when it was issued. Boniface, by the Bull *Ausculta Fili*, had promptly exposed this misinterpretation. But the prejudice was already established.

Ibid. p. 91.

I will now give the whole text of the Bull, before commenting upon it. It runs as follows:—

'We are hound to believe and to hold, by the obligation of faith, one Holy Church, Catholic and also Apostolic; and this (Church) we firmly believe and in simplicity confess: out of which there is neither salvation nor remission of sins. As the Bridegroom declares in the Canticles, "One is my dove, my perfect one, she is the only one of her mother, the chosen of her that bore her:"

Cant. vi. 8.

who represents the one mystical Body, the Head of which is Christ; and the Head of Christ is God. In which (the one Church) there is one Lord, one Faith, one Baptism.

Epliesians iv. 5.

For in the time of the Flood the ark of Noe was one, prefiguring the one Church, which was finished in one cubit,

Genesis vi. 16.

and had one governor and ruler, that is Noe; outside of which we read that all things subsisting upon earth were destroyed. This also we venerate as one, as the Lord says in the Prophet, "Deliver, O God, my soul from the sword: my only one from the hand of the dog."

Psalm xxi. 21.

'For He prayed for the soul, that is, for Himself; for the Head together with the Body: by which Body He designated the one only Church, because of the unity of the Bridegroom, of the Faith, of the Sacraments, and of the charity of the Church. This is that coat of the Lord without seam,

St. John xix. 23, 24.

which was not rent but went by lot. Therefore of that one and only Church there is one body and one Head,

not two heads as of a monster: namely, Christ and Christ's Vicar, Peter and Peter's successor; for the Lord Himself said to Peter, "Feed my sheep."

St. John xxi. 17.

Mine, He says, generally; and not, in particular, these or those: by which He is known to have committed all to him. If, therefore, Greeks or others say that they were not committed to Peter and his successors, they must necessarily confess that they are not of the sheep of Christ, for the Lord said (in the Gospel) by John, that there is "One fold, and one only shepherd."

St. John x. 16.

By the words of the Gospel we are instructed that in this his (that is, Peter's) power there are two swords, the spiritual and the temporal. For when the Apostles say, "Behold, here are two swords,"

St. Luke xxii. 38.

that is, in the Church, the Lord did not say, "It is too much," but "it is enough." Assuredly, he who denies that the temporal sword is in the power of Peter, gives ill heed to the word of the Lord, saying, "Put up again thy sword into its place."

St. Matthew xxvi. 52.

Both, therefore, the spiritual sword and the material sword are in the power of the Church. But the latter (the material sword) is to be wielded On Behalf of the Church; the former (the spiritual) is to be wielded By the Church: the one by the hand of the priest; the other by the hand of kings and soldiers, but at the suggestion and sufferance of the priest. The one sword ought to be subject to the other, and the temporal authority ought to be subject to the spiritual power. For whereas the Apostle says, "There is no power but from God; and those that are, are ordained of God;"

Romans xiii. 1.

they would not be ordained (or ordered) if one sword were not subject to the other, and as the inferior directed by the other to the highest end. For, according to the blessed Dionysius, it is the law of the Divine order that the lowest should be guided to the highest by those that are intermediate. Therefore, according to the order of the universe, all things are not in equal and immediate subordination; but the lowest things are set in order by things intermediate, and things inferior by things superior. We ought, therefore, as clearly to confess that the spiritual power, both in dignity and excellence, exceeds any earthly power, in proportion as spiritual things are better than things temporal. This we see clearly from the giving, and blessing, and sanctifying of tithes, from the reception of the power itself, and from the government of the samethings. For, as the truth bears witness, the spiritual power has to instruct, and judge the earthly power, if it be not good; and thus the prophecy of Jeremias is verified of the Church and the ecclesiastical power: "Lo, I have set thee this day over the nations and over, kingdoms," &c.

Jeremiah i. 10.

If, therefore, the earthly power deviates (from its end), it will be judged by the spiritual; but if a lesser spiritual power transgresses, it will be judged by its superior: but if the supreme (deviates), it can be judged, not by man, but by God alone, according to the words of the Apostle: "The spiritual man judges all things; he himself is judged by no one."

1 Corinthians ii. 15.

This authority, though given to man and exercised through man, is not human, but rather Divine—given by the Divine voice to Peter, and confirmed to him and his successors in Him whom Peter confessed, the Rock, for the Lord said to Peter: " whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth, it shall be bound also in heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven."

St. Matthew xvi. 19.

'Whosoever therefore resists this power that is so ordered by God, resists the ordinance of God,

Romans xiii. 2.

unless, as Manichæus did, he feign to himself two principles, which we condemn as false and heretical; for, as Moses witnesses, "God created heaven and earth not in the beginnings, but in the beginning."

Genesis i. 1.

Moreover, we declare, affirm, define, and pronounce it to be necessary to salvation for every human creature to be subject to the Roman Pontiff.'

2. We will next take the interpretations. They may be put into three classes:—

(1) First, of those who assailed it at the time.

The theologians and doctors of the school at Paris had always taught by a constant tradition that the Popes possessed a spiritual and indirect power over temporal things. John Gerson may be taken as the representative of them all. He says the ecclesiastical power does not possess the dominion and the rights of earthly and of heavenly empire, so that it may dispose at will of the goods of the clergy, and much less of the laity: though it must be conceded that it has in these things an authority (*dominium*) to rule, to direct, to regulate, and to ordain.

Joann. Gerson, *De Potest. Eccles.* Consid. xii. Bianchi, *Della Potestà et della Politia della Chiesa*, tom. i. lib. i. cap. xi.

Such was the doctrine of Almain, Alliacus, John of Paris, and of the old Sorbonne. It was also the doctrine of the theologians of the Council of Constance; who are always quoted as opponents of the Infallibility of the Pope, because they held that, though the See of Rome could not err, he that sat in it might err. They likewise held the deposing power, which alone is enough to show how little the definition of the Infallibility has to do with the deposition of Kings.

When the *Unam Sanctam* was published, Egidius Romanus, the Archbishop of Bourges, wrote against it, being deceived into a belief that Boniface claimed a direct temporal power over the King of France, over and above that power which had always been admitted in France according to the Bull *Novit* of Innocent III.—viz. an indirect spiritual power in temporal matters when involving sin.

Bianchi, lib. i. cap. x.

The same course was taken by other French writers.

Boniface had already declared in a Consistory in 1302 that he had never assumed any jurisdiction which belonged to the King; but that he had declared the King to be, like any other Christian, subject to him only in regard to sin.

Döllinger's *History of the Church*, vol. iv. p. 91.

(2) Secondly, the Regalists once more assailed the *Unam Sanctam* in the reign of Louis XIV.

Bianchi says that there is not to be found a writer in France, before Calvin, who denied this indirect spiritual power; that the denial was introduced by the Huguenots about the year 1626; that the Sorbonne began to adhere to it, and reduced it to a formula in 1662.

Lib. i. cap. xiii.

Bossuet endeavours to fasten on the *Unam Sanctam* the old Regalist interpretation, and affirms that it was withdrawn by Clement V.: which statement is contrary to the fact. Clement V., on the contrary, interprets the Bull in the true sense, as Boniface had done, declaring that Boniface did not thereby subject the King, or the Kingdom of France, in any greater degree to the authority of the Pontiff than they had been before, that is, according to the Bull of Innocent III. *Novit*, and the doctrines of the old Sorbonne.

In the Appendix A will be found in full the Text of the three Pontifical Acta, *Novit*, *Unam Sanctam*, *Meruit*.

The history of the Four Gallican Articles, and of the writers who defended them, is too well known to need repetition.

(3) We come, lastly, to those who have assailed it at this time.

It is not a little wearisome to read the same old stories over again; and to be told as 'scientific history' that Boniface VIII. claimed to have received both swords as his own, to be held in his own hand, and wielded by him in direct temporal jurisdiction over temporal princes. We have all this raked up again in *Janus*. From *Janus* it goes to newspapers, magazines, and pamphlets. Anybody can interpret a Pope's Bull. There is no need of a knowledge of contemporary facts, or of the terminology of the Civil or Canon Law, or of Pontifical Acts, or of the technical meaning of words. A dictionary, and a stout heart to attack the Popes, is enough. Such men would have us believe, against all the Popes, that they have claimed temporal power, properly so called, over temporal Princes.

VI. I will, therefore, now give what may be affirmed to be the true and legitimate interpretation of the *Unam Sanctam*.

It cannot be better stated than in the words of Dr. Döllinger.

Hist. iv. p. 91.

He writes thus;—

'Boniface opened the council, at which there were present from France four archbishops, thirty-five bishops, and six abbots, in November 1302. One consequence of this council appears to have been the celebrated decretal Unam Sanctam, which was made public on the 18th of November, and which contains an exposition of the relations between the spiritual and temporal powers. In the Church, it says, there are two powers, a temporal and spiritual, and as far as they are both in the Church, they have both the same end: the temporal power, the inferior, is subject to the spiritual, the higher and more noble; the former must be guided and directed by the latter, as the body is by the soul; it receives from the spiritual its consecration and its direction to its highest object, and must therefore, should it ever depart from its destined path, be corrected by the spiritual power. It is a truth of faith that all men, even kings, are subject to the Pope; if, therefore, they should be guilty of grievous sins, in peace or in war, or in the government of their kingdoms, and the treatment of their subjects, and should thus lose sight of the object to which the power of a Christian Prince should be directed, and should give public scandal to the people, the Pope can admonish them, since in regard to sin they are subject to the spiritual power; he can correct them; and, if necessity should require it, compel them by censures to remove such scandals. For if they were not subject to the censures of the Church, whenever they

might sin in the exercise of the power entrusted to them, it would follow that as kings they were out of the Church; that the two powers would be totally distinct from each other; and that they were descended from distinct and even opposed principles, which would be an error approaching to the heresy of the Manichees. It was therefore the indirect power of the Church over the temporal power of kings which the Pope defended in these Bulls; and he had designedly extracted the strongest passages of them from the writings of two French theologians, St. Bernard and Hugo of St. Victor.'

The interpretation given here by Dr. Döllinger is undoubtedly correct. All Catholics are bound to assent to the doctrines here declared; for though they are not here defined, yet they are certainly true. The only definition, properly so called, in the Bull is contained in the last sentence.

Now, upon the doctrines declared by the Bull it is to be observed:—

- That it does not say that the two swords were given by our Lord to the Church; but that the two swords are *in potestate Ecclesiae*, 'in the power of the Church.'
- That it at once goes on to distinguish, 'Both (swords) are *in the power* of the Church, the spiritual, that is, and the material. But this (the material) is to be used *for* the Church; that (the spiritual) is to be used *by* the Church. This, indeed (by the hand) of the Priest; that, by the hand of kings and soldiers, but at the bidding and sufferance of the Priest.'
- That though both swords are *in* the Church, they are held in different hands, and to be used by the subordination of the one to the other. *Oportet autem gladium esse sub gladio*: the one sword must be subordinate to the other, the lower to the higher.
- That Boniface VIII., in this very Bull *Unam Sanctam*, expressly declares that the power given to Peter was the '*Suprema Spiritualis potestas*,' not the Temporal, or a mixed power, but purely Spiritual, which may judge all Powers, but self is judged of God alone.

Now, on the principles already laid down, there ought to be no difficulty in rightly and clearly understanding this doctrine.

- For first the Material Sword is as old as human society. It was not given by grace, nor held by grace, which is a heresy condemned in Wiclif by the Council of Constance; but it belongs to the Civil Ruler in the order of nature, as St. Paul, speaking of the heathen empire, says: 'He beareth not the sword in vain; for he is the minister of God to execute wrath.'

Nothing but want of care or thought could have led men to forget this, which is a truth and fact of the natural order.

When any prince by baptism became Christian, he became subject to the law of God and to the Church as its expositor. He became subject, not only as a man, but as a prince; not only in the duties of his private life, but in the duties of his public life also. But this did not deprive him of the civil sword, nor of any of the rights of the natural order.

Bianchi, lib. i. cap. iv.

Oportet autem gladium esse sub gladio. The Bull declares that the Material Sword which he brought with him when he was baptized ought to be subject to the Spiritual Sword. But it nowhere says that the Material Sword was given to the Church, or that the Church gave it to the Imperial Ruler. It is *in* the Church, because he that bears it is in the Church. It is the office of the Church to consecrate it, and (*instituere*) to *instruct* it. But it belongs essentially to the natural order, though it is to be exercised according to the supernatural order of faith.

- When it is said that both Swords are '*in the power of the Church*,' it means that the Church in a Christian world includes the natural order in its unity. The conception of the Church included the whole complex Christian Society, made up of both powers, united in a complete visible unity.

Mr. Bryce, in his excellent work on the Holy Roman Empire, says:—

'Thus the Holy Roman Church, and the Holy Roman Empire are one and the same thing in two aspects; and Catholicism, the principle of the universal Christian Society, is also Romanism: that is, rests upon Rome as the origin and type of universality, manifesting itself in a mystic dualism which corresponds to the two natures of its Founder. As Divine and eternal, its head is the Pope, to whom all souls have been entrusted; as human and temporal, the Emperor, commissioned to rule men's bodies and acts.'

The Holy Roman Empire, p. 108. (Macmillan., 1871.)

Mr. Bryce has here clearly seen the concrete unity of the Christian world; but he has missed the order which creates that unity. His description is what Boniface VIII. calls 'a monster with two heads.' Mr. Bryce quotes this saying in a note. If he had mastered the spiritual element as he has mastered the political, Mr. Bryce's book would have ranked very high among great authors.

Mr. Freeman, in an article on Mr. Bryce's book, is nearer to the true conception. He writes as follows:

'The theory of the Mediæval Empire is that of an universal Christian Monarchy. The Roman Empire and the Catholic Church are two aspects of one Society.' . . . 'At the head of this Society, in its temporal character as an Empire, stands the temporal chief of Christendom, the Roman Cæsar; at its head, in its spiritual

character as a Church, stands the spiritual chief of Christendom, the Roman Pontiff. Cæsar and Pontiff alike rule by Divine right.

Freeman's Historical Essays, pp. 136-137. (Macmillan, 1872.)

Now here are two things to be noted. First, that the Emperor holds an office of human creation; the Pontiff an office of Divine creation. Secondly, that the office of Divine creation is for a higher end than the office which is of human origin. The former is for the eternal, the latter for the earthly happiness of man.

But, as I have said before, the office of Divine creation, ordained to guide men to an eternal end, is higher than the office of human origin, directed to an earthly and temporal end; and in this the perfect unity and subordination of the whole is constituted and preserved.

Nevertheless, both Mr. Bryce and Mr. Freeman bring out clearly what Boniface means when he says that the two swords are *in Ecclesia*, in the Church, and *in potestate Ecclesiæ*, in the power of the Church.

To this I may add the following passage from the late Cardinal Tarquini, who states the whole subject with great precision:—

'The Civil Society of Catholics is distinguished from others by this—that it consists of the same assemblage of men as the Church of Christ, that is, the Catholic Church, consists of: so that it in no way constitutes a real body diverse and separate from the Church; but both (societies) together have the character of a twofold federative association and obligation inhering in the same multitude of men, whereby the Civil Society under the government of the Civil Magistrate exerts its powers to secure the temporal happiness of men, and, under the government of the Church, to secure eternal life; and in such wise that eternal life be acknowledged to be the last and supreme end to which temporal happiness and the whole temporal life is subordinate; because if any man do not acknowledge this, he neither belongs to the Catholic Church, nor may call himself Catholic. Such, then, is the true notion of the Civil Society of Catholics. It is a society of men who so pursue the happiness of this life as thereby to show that it ought to be subordinate to the attainment of eternal happiness, which they believe can be attained alone under the direction of the Catholic Church.'

Tarquini, Juris Eccl. Publici Institutiones, p. 56. (Rome, 1873.)

We have here the full and genuine doctrine of the *Unam Sanctam*—the one body, the two swords, the subordination of the material to the spiritual sword, the indirect power of the spiritual over the temporal whensoever it deviates from the eternal end.

Dr. Döllinger's interpretation, then, is strictly correct—namely, 'It was therefore,' he says, 'the indirect power of the Church over the temporal power of Kings which the Pope defended in these Bulls;' but that power of the Pope is itself Spiritual.

VII. From this doctrine Cardinal Tarquini draws the following conclusions:—

- In things temporal, and in respect to the temporal end (of Government), the Church has no power in Civil society.

The proof of this proposition is that all things merely temporal are (*præter finem Ecclesiæ*) beside, or outside of, the end of the Church. It is a general rule that no society has power in those things which are out of its own proper end.

- In whatsoever things, whether essentially or by accident, the spiritual end, that is, the end of the Church, is necessarily involved, in those things, though they be temporal, the Church may by right exert its power, and the Civil State ought to yield.

Tarquini, Juris Eccl. Publici Institutiones, p. 57.

In these two propositions we have the full explanation of the indirect spiritual power of the Church. I give it in Cardinal Tarquini's words—

'Directly the care of temporal happiness alone belongs to the State, hut indirectly the office also of protecting morals and religion; so, however, that this he done dependency on the Church, forasmuch as the Church is a society to which the care of religion and morals is directly committed.

'That which in the Civil Society is indirect and dependent, is direct and independent in the Church; and, on the other hand, the end which is proper and direct to the Civil State, that is, temporal happiness, falls only indirectly, or so far as the spiritual end requires, under the power of the Church.

'The result of all this is—

- *That the Civil Society, even though every member of it be Catholic, is not subject to the Church, but plainly independent in temporal things which regard its temporal end.*
- *That the language of the Fathers, which seems to affirm*

Tarquini, Juris Eccl. Publici Institutiones, p. 55 and note.

an absolute independence of the Civil State, is to be brought within this limit.'

VIII. I will now give a summary of this matter in the words of Suarez, and also his comment on the terminology used by Canonists and theologians on this subject.

He says that the opinion which gives to the Pontiff *direct temporal* power over all the world is false.

Next, he sets aside the opinion that the Pontiff has this direct temporal power over the Church.

He then gives as the true opinion that which has been affirmed—namely, that the Pontiff has not *direct temporal* power, except in those States of which he is Temporal Prince; but that he has a *spiritual* power *indirectly* over temporal things, in so far as they affect the salvation of men or involve sin.

Suarez, *De Legibus*, lib. iii. c. vi.

One chief cause of the confusion of Regalists and our non-Catholic adversaries has been the uncertain use of language, and the want of a fixed terminology until a certain date.

The word *Temporal* was used in two senses. It was used to signify the power of Civil Rulers in the order of nature. And in this sense the Church has never claimed it for its head. It was used also to signify the *spiritual* power of the Pontiff *when incident indirectly upon temporal things*. The spiritual power, then, had a temporal effect, and took, so to speak, its colour and name from that use, remaining always spiritual as before.

For instance, we speak of 'the Colonial power' of the Crown, meaning the Imperial power applied to the government of the Colonies; in like manner the Spiritual power of the Pope, applied indirectly to temporal things, was (*improprie*) improperly called Temporal, and this *usus loquendi* gave rise to much misinterpretation.

What I have here stated was the judgment of Bellarmine, who, in his answer to Barclay, writes as follows:—

'Barclay says that there are two opinions among Catholics (on the power of the Pontiff). The one, which most Canonists follow, affirms that in the Supreme Pontiff, as Vicar of Christ, both powers, Spiritual and Temporal, exist: the other, which is the common opinion of Theologians, affirms that the power of the Supreme Pontiff, as Vicar of Christ, is strictly spiritual in itself; but that, nevertheless, he may, by the same, dispose temporal things so that they be ordered for spiritual ends.'

Bellarmino, *De Potestate Summi Pontificis*, cap. i. p. 848 A, Cologne, 1617.

Barclay argued that the power of the Pope in temporal things was a free and open opinion among Catholics: Bellarmine, in replying, says:—

'That this power is in the Pope is not opinion but certitude among Catholics, though there be many discussions as to what and of what quality the power is: that is to say, whether it be properly and in itself of a temporal kind, or whether it be not rather spiritual, but by a certain necessary consequence, and in order to spiritual ends, it dispose of temporal things.'

Ibid. cap. iii. p. 852 A.

Bellarmino states his own opinion in these words:

'Temporal Princes, when they come to the family of Christ, lose neither their princely power nor jurisdiction; but they become subject to him whom Christ has set over His family, to be governed and directed by him in those things which lead to eternal life.'

Ibid. cap. iii. p. 858 A.

Now, from these passages it would appear that in Bellarmine's judgment the opinions of the Canonists and the Theologians practically came to one and the same thing, though their language was different. By Temporal Power some earlier Canonists may perhaps have intended a power temporal in itself; but the later Canonists did not intend more than a Spiritual power over temporal things: which the Theologians also asserted. But this use of the word *temporal* seemed to imply that the *quality* of the power was not *spiritual*, as the Theologians asserted. This ambiguity is the source of the misunderstandings which we daily read in attacks upon the Catholic Church. I can the more readily believe the good faith of those who so misconceive it, because I can remember that I was misled by the same mistake for many years. For instance, the Canonists affirm that the whole world is the territory of the Pontiff (*Territorium Pontificis*). But they do so in answering the objection, that where the Pontiff acts spiritually in the territory of any temporal Prince, he is invading the territory of another. The meaning is evident: namely, that the Pontiff has universal jurisdiction over the whole world. But this does not say that his jurisdiction is temporal. It affirms only that it runs into all the world. It merely affirms that it is universal: and the same writers assert that in itself it is only Spiritual.

Tarquini, p. 46.

We have been told that Bellarmine's book was put upon the Index. But, after a judicial examination, it was removed by order of the Holy See, and its perfect soundness acknowledged.

Suarez lays down precisely the same doctrine as Bellarmine. He says:—

'Those authors who teach absolutely that the Pope has Supreme Power, and that temporal, in the whole world, mean this, "that the Pontiff, in virtue of his Spiritual Power and jurisdiction, is superior to Kings and temporal Princes, so as to direct them in the use of their temporal Power in order to Spiritual ends."'

He then goes on:—

'For though they sometimes speak indistinctly, and without sufficient clearness, or even (improprie) incorrectly—because the power of the Pope is not temporal but spiritual, which contains under itself things

temporal, and is exercised about them indirectly, that is, for the sake of Spiritual things—nevertheless they often make this sense clear, and lay down their distinctions either expressly or virtually; for they affirm that the Pontiff can do some things indirectly, but deny that he can do them directly.

Suarez, *Defensio Fidei Catholicae*, tom. xxiv. lib. iii. c. xxii. 2nd ed. Paris, 1869.

But if the Pope had temporal power properly so called, he could do all things directly. This negative proves that the power of which they spoke was only Spiritual.

Suarez further says:—

'Subjection is of two kinds—direct and indirect. Subjection is called direct when it is within the end and limits of the same power: it is called indirect when it springs from direction to a higher end, which belongs to a higher and more excellent power. The proper Civil Power in itself is directly ordained for the fitting state and temporal happiness of the human commonwealth in time of this present life; and therefore the power itself is called temporal. The Civil Power, therefore, is then called supreme in its own order when within the same, and in respect to its end, the ultimate resolution (of power) is made within its own sphere.' . . . 'The chief ruler is, then, subordinate to no superior in order to the same end of Civil Government. But, as temporal and civil happiness are related to that which is spiritual and eternal, it may happen that the matter of Civil Government must be otherwise ordered and directed, in order to spiritual welfare, than the Civil policy alone seems to require. And then, though the temporal Prince and his power do not directly depend in their acts upon any other power in the same (i. e. the temporal) order, which also regards the same end only, nevertheless it may happen that it needs to be directed, helped, and corrected in the matter of its government by a superior power, which governs men in order to a more excellent and eternal end; and then this dependence is called indirect, because that higher power is not exercised in respect to temporal things (per se) of its own nature, nor for its own sake, but indirectly, and for another end.'

Suarez, *Defensio Fidei*, &c. lib. iii. cap. v. sect. 2.

It will be seen here:—

- That the superior power cannot be temporal, or its jurisdiction would be direct.
- That, if temporal, it would not be of a higher, but of the same order.
- That, therefore, the claim of indirect power is an express exclusion of temporal power, properly so called, from the spiritual supremacy of the Head of the Church.

Suarez states, but rejects, the opinion of certain early Canonists and Jurists who taught that the power of the Pontiff over any temporal thing was also temporal in itself. He then states and proves that this indirect power is Spiritual only. After speaking of the power of the Keys, he says:—

'In no other place did Christ imply that He gave to Peter or to the Church temporal dominion, or a proper and direct royalty; nor does Ecclesiastical tradition show this, hut rather the reverse.'

Suarez, *Defensio Fidei*, &c. lib. iii. cap. v. sect. 14.

With these authorities before us, there can be little difficulty in explaining the texts usually quoted by adversaries, who desire to fasten on the *Unam Sanctam* and upon the Catholic Church a claim to temporal power, that is, temporal in its root and in itself.

The passages usually quoted from Pope Nicholas, St. Bernard, St. Thomas, Alvarez, Hugo of St. Victor, St. Bonaventura, Durandus, and others, are fully discussed and proved by Bellarmine to affirm no more than Spiritual power; and that indirectly over temporal matters, when they involve the Spiritual end of the Church.

This may be seen in his *Controversia de Summo Pontifice*, cap. v.; and in Bianchi's work, *Della Potestà*, tom. i. p. 91, lib. i. ch. x. xi.

IX. I hope sufficiently to prove hereafter what I asserted—namely, that though a supreme spiritual authority be inherent in the Divine constitution and commission of the Church, its exercise in the world depends on certain moral and material conditions, by which alone its exercise is rendered possible or just. This shall be shown by treating the subjects raised by the 'Expostulation;'

Expostulation, p. 26.

namely, the deposing power, and the use of political force or penal legislation in matters of religion. I hope, and I believe, that I am able to show that the moral condition of the Christian world made justifiable in other ages that which would be unjustifiable in this; and that the attempt to raise prejudice, suspicion, and hostility against the Catholic Church at this day and in England by these topics, is an act essentially unjust; from which a real science of history ought to have preserved Mr. Gladstone. I must repeat here again that between the Vatican Council and these subjects there is no more relation than between jurisprudence and the equinox. Some fifteen Councils of the Church, of which two are General, have indeed recognised and acted upon the supremacy of the Spiritual authority of the Church over temporal things; but the Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff is one thing, his supreme judicial authority is another. And the Definition of Infallibility by the Vatican Council has in no way, by so much as a jot or tittle, changed or affected that which was infallibly fixed and declared before. But, as I will go on to show, even infallible laws cease to apply when the subject matter is

wanting, and the necessary moral conditions are passed away.

I must acknowledge, therefore, that the following words fill me with surprise. Speaking of Dr. Doyle and others, he says:—

'Answers in abundance were obtained, tending to show that the doctrines of deposition and persecution, of keeping no faith with heretics, and of universal dominion, were obsolete beyond revival.

Expostulation, p. 26.

This passage implicitly affirms what I hope explicitly to prove. How can laws become *obsolete*, but by the cessation of the moral conditions which require or justify their exercise? How can laws, the exercise of which is required by the permanent presence of the same moral conditions which called them into existence, become obsolete? I pass over the 'no faith with heretics,' which is an example of the injustice which pervades the Pamphlet. I should have thought it impossible for Mr. Gladstone not to know the true meaning of this controversial distortion: but I am willing to believe that he did not know it; for if he had, it would have been impossible for such as he is to write it.

The moral principles on which the exercise of supreme powers and rights was justifiable in the age of Boniface VIII. exist no longer in the nineteenth century in England. Let no one cynically pretend that this is to give up or to explain away. I read the other day these words:—

'The Pope has sent forth his prohibitions and his anathemas to the world, and the world has disregarded them. The faithful receive them with conventional respect, and then hasten to assure their Protestant friends that Papal edicts can make no possible difference in the conduct of any human being.'

Times, Wednesday, December 30, 1874, in leading article on the Pope.

Nothing can be less true. The first principles of morals forbid the exercise of the supreme judicial power of the Church on such a civil order as that of England. When it was *de facto* subject to the Church, England had by its own free will accepted the laws of Christendom. It can never be again subject to such laws except on the same condition—namely, by its own free will. Till then the highest laws of morality render the exercises of such Pontifical acts in England impossible.

Mr. Gladstone has called on Pius IX. to repudiate such powers.

Expostulation, p. 26.

But Pius IX. cannot repudiate powers which his predecessors justly exercised, without implying that their actions were unjust. He need not repudiate them for himself, for the exercise of them is impossible, and, if physically possible, would be morally impossible, as repugnant to all equity, and, under correction, I will say to natural justice. The infallible witness for justice, and equity, and charity among men, cannot violate these laws which unerringly govern his office.

X. The command of our Lord to the Apostles: 'Go ye into the whole world and preach the Gospel to every creature: he that believeth and is baptised shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be condemned'

St. Mark xvi. 15, 16.

—clearly invests the Church with authority to baptise every creature. But the exercise of this right was suspended upon a moral condition. It conveyed no right to baptise any man against his will; nor without an act of faith on his part. But an act of faith is a spontaneous and voluntary act of submission, both of intellect and will, to the truth, and to the teacher who delivers it. The absolute and universal authority therefore of the Church to baptise depends upon the free and voluntary act of those who believe, and, through their own spontaneous submission, are willing to be baptised.

The Church so regards the moral conditions on which its acts depend, that as a rule it will not even suffer an infant to be baptised unless at least one of the parents consents.

In like manner the power of absolution, which has no limit of time or of subject, can be exercised only upon those who are willing. Confession and contrition, both voluntary acts of the penitent, are absolutely necessary to the exercise of the power of the Keys.

This principle will solve many questions in respect to the Spiritual authority of the Church over the Civil State.

First, it shows that, until a Christian world and Christian Rulers existed, there was no subject for the exercise of this spiritual authority of judgment and correction. Those who amuse themselves by asking why St. Peter did not depose Nero, will do well to find out whether people are laughing with them or at them. Such questions are useful. They compendiously show that the questioner does not understand the first principles of his subject. If he will find out why St. Peter neither baptised nor absolved Nero, he will have found out why he did not depose him. Until a Christian world existed there was no *apta materia* for the supreme judicial power of the Church in temporal things. Therefore St. Paul laid down as a rule of law that he had nothing to do in judging those that were without the unity of the Church.

But when a Christian world came into existence, the Civil society of man became subject to the Spiritual direction of the Church. So long, however, as individuals only subjected themselves, one by one, to its

authority, the conditions necessary for the exercise of its office were not fully present. The Church guided men, one by one, to their eternal end; but as yet the collective society of nations was not subject to its guidance. It is only when nations and kingdoms become socially subject to the supreme doctrinal and judicial authority of the Church that the conditions of its exercise are verified. When the senate and people of the Roman Empire were only half Christian, the Church still refrained from acts which would have affected the whole body of the State. When the whole had become Christian, the whole became subject to the Divine Law, of which the Roman Pontiff was the supreme expositor and executive.

It would be endless to state examples in detail. I will take, therefore, only one in which the indirect spiritual power of the Church over the temporal State is abundantly shown. Take, for instance, the whole subject of Christian Matrimony: the introduction of the Christian law of the unity and indissolubility and sacramental character of marriage; the tables of consanguinity and of affinity; the jurisdiction of the Church over matrimonial cases. This action of the Pontifical law upon the Imperial law, and the gradual conformity of the Empire to the Church, exhibits in a clear and complete way what is the power claimed by the Church over the temporal laws of Princes.

The Council of Trent reserves matrimonial causes to the Ecclesiastical Tribunals; and in the Syllabus the proposition is condemned that they belong to the Civil jurisdiction.

Sess. xxiv. De Ref. can. xii.

In like manner, in prohibiting duels, the Council declares temporal penalties against not only the principals, but those also who are guilty of permitting them.

Sess. xxv. cap. xix.

In like manner, again, the Christian law of faith and morals passed into the public law of Christendom. Then arose the Christian jurisprudence, in which the Roman Pontiff was recognised as the supreme Judge of Princes and of People, with a twofold coercion: spiritual by his own authority, and temporal by the secular arm. These two acted as one. Excommunication and deposition were so united in the jurisprudence of Christendom, that he who pronounced the sentence of excommunication pronounced also the sentence of deposition; as before the repeal of our Test Acts, if a member of the Church of England became Catholic, or even Nonconformist, he was *ipso facto* incapable of sitting in Parliament or holding office of State. And by the first of William III. the heir to the Crown, if he become Catholic, or marry a Catholic, *ipso facto* forfeits the succession. Nothing is more certain upon the face of history, and no one has proved more abundantly than Dr. Döllinger, that in every case of deposition, as of Philip le Bel, Henry IV. of Germany, Frederic II., and the like, the sentence of the Electors, Princes, States, and people, and the public opinion and voice of nations, had already pronounced sentence of rejection upon those tyrants before the Pontiffs pronounced the sentence of excommunication and deposition. It was only by the faith and free will of nations that they became socially subject to this jurisprudence; it was by their free will that it was maintained in vigour; and it was in conformity with their free will that it was exercised by the Pontiffs. Their free sentence preceded the Pontifical sentence. It was at their prayer, and in their behalf, that it was pronounced. The moral condition of spontaneous acceptance, and the material conditions of execution, were alike present, rendering these supreme Pontifical acts legitimate, right, lawful, wise, and salutary.

XI. And here I shall be met with the answer: 'You justify, then, the deposition of princes, and therefore you hold that the Pope may depose Queen Victoria.' Such, I am sorry to say, is the argument of the 'Expostulation;' for if it be not, why was it implied? I altogether deny the argument, or inference, or call it what you will. I affirm that the deposition of Henry IV. and Frederic II. of Germany were legitimate, right, and lawful; and I affirm that a deposition of Queen Victoria would not be legitimate, nor right, nor lawful, because the moral conditions which were present to justify the deposition of the Emperors of Germany are absent in the case of Queen Victoria; and therefore such an act could not be done.

This is not a mere personal opinion of my own, or even a mere opinion of theologians. What I have affirmed has been declared by the authority of Pius VI. In a letter from the Congregation of Cardinals of the College of Propaganda, by order of His Holiness Pius VI., addressed to the Roman Catholic Archbishops of Ireland, dated Rome, June 23, 1791. we read as follows:—

'In this controversy a most accurate discrimination should be made between the genuine rights of the Apostolical See and those that are imputed to it by innovators of this age for the purpose of calumniating. The See of Rome never taught that faith is, not to be kept with the heterodox—that an oath to kings separated from Catholic communion can be violated—that it is lawful for the Bishops of Rome to invade their temporal rights and dominions. We, too, consider an attempt or design against the life of kings and princes, even under the pretext of religion, as a horrid and detestable crime.'

I may add that this passage was not unknown to Dr. Döllinger, who quotes it at p. 51 in his work on 'The Church and the Churches.'

But lest any one should reply that this was said when Catholics were under penal laws, and with a view to

blinding the English Government, I will add that no one has more frankly and forcibly expressed this than Pius IX., in the very text of which Mr. Gladstone has quoted a part. The Holy Father, on July 20, 1871, thus addressed a Literary Society in Rome:—

'In the variety of subjects which will present themselves to you, one appears to me of great importance at this time; and that is, to defeat the endeavours which are now directed to falsify the idea of the Infallibility of the Pope. Among all other errors, that is malicious above all which would attribute (to the Infallibility of the Pope) the right of deposing sovereigns, and of absolving people from the obligation of allegiance.

'This right, without doubt, has been exercised by the Supreme Pontiffs from time to time in extreme cases, but it has nothing to do with the Pontifical Infallibility; neither does it flow from the Infallibility, but from the authority of the Pontiff.

'Moreover, the exercise of this right in those ages of faith which respected in the Pope that which he is, that is to say, the Supreme Judge of Christendom, and recognised the benefit of his tribunal in the great contentions of peoples and of sovereigns, was freely extended (by aid, as was just, of public jurisprudence, and the common consent of nations) to the gravest interests of States and of their rulers.'

So far Mr. Gladstone quoted from what was before him. Unfortunately, he appears not to have known what followed. Pius IX. went on to say:—

'But altogether different are the conditions of the present time from the conditions (of those ages); and malice alone can confound things so diverse, that is to say, the infallible judgment in respect to truths of Divine Revelation with the right which the Popes exercised in virtue of their authority when the common good demanded it. They know better than we, and everybody can discern the reason why such an absurd confusion of ideas is stirred up at this time, and why hypothetical cases are paraded of which no man thinks. It is because every pretext, even the most frivolous and furthest from the truth, is eagerly caught at, provided it be of a kind to give us annoyance, and to excite civil rulers against the Church.

'Some would have me interpret and explain even more fully the Definition of the Council.

'I will not do it. It is clear in itself, and has no need of other comments and explanations. Whosoever reads that Decree with a dispassionate mind has its time sense easily and obviously before him.'

Discorsi di Pio Nono, July 20, 1871, p. 203, Rome, 1872.

Now, the Holy Father in these words has abundantly shown two things: first, that they who connect Infallibility with the Deposing Power are talking of what they do not understand; and, secondly, that the moral conditions which justified and demanded the deposition of tyrannical Princes, when the mediæval world was both Christian and Catholic, have absolutely ceased to exist, now that the world has ceased to be Catholic, and has ceased to be even Christian. It has withdrawn itself socially as a whole, and in the public life of nations, from the unity and the jurisdiction of the Christian Church. In this it differs altogether from the mediæval world. And it differs also from the ancient world. For, the ancient world had never yet believed the faith; the modern world has believed, but fallen from its faith. The ancient world was without the unity of the Christian Church *de facto et de jure*. The modern world is without *de facto*; and this has changed all the moral conditions of the subject. The Church never, indeed, loses its jurisdiction *in radice* over the baptised, because the character of baptism is indelible; but unless the moral conditions justifying its exercise be present, it never puts it forth. As Mr. Gladstone has cited the example of Queen Elizabeth, implying that he sees no difference between Queen Elizabeth and Queen Victoria, I will add that Queen Elizabeth was baptised a Catholic; that she was crowned as a Catholic; that she received Holy Communion in the High Mass of her consecration as a Catholic; that she was both *de jure* and *de facto* a subject of the Catholic Church; that the majority of the people of England were still Catholic. What one of all these conditions is present in the case which I refuse to put in parallel? The English Monarchy has been withdrawn for three centuries from the Catholic Church; the English people are wholly separate; the Legislation of England has effaced every trace of the jurisprudence which rendered the Pontifical acts of St. Gregory VII. and Innocent IV. legitimate, just, and right. The public laws of England explicitly reject and exclude the first principles of that ancient Christian and Catholic jurisprudence. Not only is every moral condition which could justify such an act absent, but every moral condition which would render such an act unjustifiable, as it would seem to me. is present.

Appendix B.

This is a treatment of history which is not scientific, but shallow; and a dangerous use of inflammatory rhetoric, when every calm dictate of prudence and of justice ought to forbid its indulgence. 'The historic spirit,' *Expostulation*, p. 14.

commended in the 'Expostulation,' would have led to such a treatment of this question as Mr. Freeman wisely recommends.

'The cause of all this diversity and controversy—a diversity and controversy most fatal to historic truth—is to be traced to the unhappy mistake of looking at the men of the twelfth century with the eyes of the nineteenth; and still more of hoping to extract something from the events of the twelfth century to do service in the

controversies of the nineteenth.'

Freeman's Historical Essays, 'St. Thomas of Canterbury and his Biographers,' p. 80.

XII. For the same reasons I deplore the haste, I must say the passion, which carried away so large a mind to affirm or to imply that the Church at this day would, if she could, use torture, and force and coercion, in matters of religious belief. I am well aware that men of a mind and calibre as far removed from Mr. Gladstone as almost to constitute a different species, have at times endeavoured to raise suspicion and animosity against Catholics, by affirming that if they became the majority in this country—a danger certainly not proximate—they would use their power to compel men to conform to the Catholic faith. In the year 1830 the Catholics of Belgium were in a vast majority, but they did not use their political power to constrain the faith or conscience of any man. The 'Four Liberties' of Belgium were the work of Catholics. This is the most recent example of what Catholics would do if they were in possession of power. But there is one more ancient and more homely for us Englishmen. It is found at a date when the old traditions of the Catholic Church were still vigorous in the minds of men. It will therefore show that in this at least we owe nothing to modern progress, nor to the indifference of Liberalism. If the modern spirit had any share in producing the Constitution in Belgium, it certainly had no share in producing the Constitution of Maryland. Lord Baltimore, who had been Secretary of State under James I., in 1633, emigrated to the American Plantations, where, through Lord Strafford's influence, he had obtained a grant of land. He was accompanied by men of all minds, who agreed chiefly in the one desire to leave behind them the miserable religious conflicts which then tormented England. They named their new country Maryland, and there they settled. The oath of the Governor was in these terms: 'I will not, by myself or any other, directly or indirectly, molest any person professing to believe in Jesus Christ, for or in respect of religion.' Lord Baltimore invited the Puritans of Massachusetts, who, like himself, had renounced their country for conscience' sake, to come into Maryland. In 1649, when active persecution had sprung up again in England, the Council of Maryland, on the 21st of April, passed this Statute: 'And whereas the forcing of the conscience in matters of religion hath frequently fallen out to be of dangerous consequence in the Commonwealth where it has been practised, and for the more quiet and peaceable government of the Province, and the better to preserve mutual love and amity among the inhabitants, no person within the Province professing to believe in Jesus Christ shall be anyways troubled, molested, or discountenanced for his or her religion, or in the free exercise thereof.'

Bancroft's History of the United States, vol. i. pp. 233, 235, 255, &c.

The Episcopalians and Protestants fled from Virginia into Maryland. Such was the Commonwealth founded by a Catholic upon the broad moral law I have here laid down—that faith is an act of the will, and that to force men to profess what they do not believe is contrary to the law of God, and that to generate faith by force is morally impossible. It was by conviction of the reason and by persuasion of the will that the world-wide unity of faith and communion were slowly built up among the nations. When once shattered, nothing but conviction and persuasion can restore it. Lord Baltimore was surrounded by a multitude scattered by the great wreck of the Tudor persecutions. He knew that God alone could build them up again into unity; but that the equity of charity might enable them to protect and to help each other, and to promote the common weal.

I cannot refrain from continuing the history. The Puritan Commonwealth in England brought on a Puritan revolution in Maryland. They acknowledged Cromwell, and disfranchised the whole Catholic population. 'Liberty of conscience' was declared, but to the exclusion of 'Popery, Prelacy, and licentiousness of opinion.' Penal laws came of course. Quakers in Massachusetts, for the first offence, lost one ear; for the second, the other; for the third, had their tongue seared with a red-hot iron. Women were whipped, and men were hanged, for religion. If Catholics were in power to-morrow in England, not a penal law would be proposed, nor the shadow of constraint be put upon the faith of any man. We would that all men fully believed the truth; but a forced faith is a hypocrisy hateful to God and man. If Catholics were in power to-morrow, not only would there be no penal laws of constraint, but no penal laws of privation. If the Ionian Islands had elected, some years ago, to attach themselves to the Sovereignty of Pius IX., the status of the Greek Church separate from Catholic Unity would have been tolerated and respected. Their Churches, their public worship, their Clergy, and their religious rites would have been left free as before. They were found in possession, which was confirmed by the tradition of centuries; they had acquired Civil rights, which enter into the laws of political justice, and as such would have been protected from all molestation.

Our older writers, such as Bellarmine and Suarez, when treating of this subject, had before their eyes a generation of men who all had been in the unity of the faith. Their separation therefore was formal and wilful. Their separation from the unity of the Church did not release the conscience from its jurisdiction. But if Bellarmine and Suarez were living at this day, they would have to treat of a question differing in all its moral conditions. What I have here laid down is founded upon the principles they taught, applied to our times. Cardinal Tarquini, in treating the same matter, has dealt with it as it has been treated here.—*Juris Eccl. Publ Institutiones, p. 78.*

I have drawn this out, because a question absolutely chimerical has been raised to disturb the confidence of the English people in their Catholic fellow-countrymen. And I have given the reason and the principle upon which, if the Catholics were to-morrow the 'Imperial race' in these Kingdoms, they would not use political power to molest the divided and hereditary religious state of our people. We should not shut one of their Churches, or Colleges, or Schools. They would have the same liberties we enjoy as a minority. I hope the Nonconformists of England are prepared to say the same. As we are in days when some are 'invited,' and some are 'expected,' and some are 'required' to speak out, I will ask my fellow-countrymen of all religious kinds to be as frank as I am.

XIII. I have now given, I hope, sufficient evidence to prove the assertion made in the second letter quoted at the outset of these pages; namely:—

'That the relations of the Catholic Church to the Civil Powers have been fixed immutably from the beginning, because they arise out of the Divine constitution of the Church and of the civil society of the natural order.'

And we have also seen how far from the truth are the confident assertions put forward lately, that the Church ascribes to its head Supreme Temporal as well as Supreme Spiritual Power.

Expostulation, &c. p. 27.

Further, we have seen with what strange want of reflection and of depth the Pontifical acts of the old Catholic world are transferred *per saltum* to a world which has ceased, in its public life and laws, to be Catholic, I may almost say, to be even Christian.

Finally, I have shown, I hope, what are the relations of the Church to the Civil Powers of the world; and I have given evidence to prove that those relations have been fixed from the beginning by reason of the Divine constitution of the Church, and have been declared by Councils, not only before the Council of the Vatican, but before the Council of Trent; and, therefore, that to charge upon the Vatican Council a change in these relations is not only an assertion without proof, but an assertion contrary to historical fact.

Chapter III. Aggressions of the Civil Power.

MR. GLADSTONE says:—

'It is the peculiarity of Roman theology that, by thrusting itself into the temporal domain, it naturally, and even necessarily, comes to be a frequent theme of political discussion. To quiet-minded Roman Catholics it must be a subject of infinite annoyance that their religion is on this ground more than any other the subject of criticism; more than any other the occasion of conflicts with the State and of civil disquietude. I feel sincerely how much hardship their case entails, but this hardship is brought upon them altogether by the conduct of the authorities of their own Church.'

Vatican Decrees, p. 9.

His pamphlet from beginning to end bristles with the same accusations against the Catholic Church. His whole argument might be entitled, 'Reasons to show that in all Conflicts the Christian Church is always in the wrong, and the Civil State always in the right;' or, 'On the outrageous Claims'

Ibid. p. 11.

and 'Exorbitances of Papal Assumptions,

Ibid. p. 25.

contrasted with the Innocence and Infallibility of Civil States.' This seems to me to be history read upside down; and not history only, but also Christianity. I can hardly persuade myself that Mr. Gladstone would contend that even in the Constitutions of Clarendon

Mr. Gladstone says, upon what evidence I do not know, 'The Constitutions of Clarendon, cursed from the Papal Throne, were the work of the English Bishops.'

Vatican Decrees, pp. 57, 58.

St. Thomas himself says that 'Richard de Luci and Jocelin de Balliol, the abettors of the Royal tyranny, were the fabricators of those heretical pravities.'

Ep. St. Thomæ, tom. iii. p. 12, ed. Giles, 1845.

Herbert of Bosham, who was present at Clarendon, says that they were the work of 'certain nobles (*proceres*) or chiefmen of the kingdom.'

Vita St. Thomæ, tom. vii. p. 115, ed. Giles.

The Bishops were indeed terrified into submitting to them, but the Constitutions were in no sense their work.

St. Thomas of Canterbury was the aggressor, and Henry II. was within the law; or that either the Pope or Archbishop Langton began the conflict with the 'Papal minion John;' or, again, that in the question of

Investitures and Ecclesiastical Simony, the Emperors of Germany were on the side of law and justice, and St. Gregory VII. and Innocent III. were aggressors. And yet all this is necessary to his argument. If he is not prepared to maintain this, the whole foundation is gone. But I do not know how any man who believes in the Divine office of the Christian Church can maintain such a thesis. And I have always believed that Mr. Gladstone does so believe the Christian Church to have a Divine office, which, within some limit at least, is independent of all human authority.

But as the contention before us is not of the past so much as of the present, I will come to the facts of the days in which we live. My third proposition, then, is, that any collisions now existing between the Catholic Church and the States of Europe have been brought on by changes, not on the part of the Church, much less of the Vatican Council, but on the part of the Civil Powers, and that by reason of a systematic conspiracy against the Holy See. No one will ascribe to the Vatican Council the Revolution in Italy, the seizure of Rome in 1848, the invasion of the Roman State in 1860, the attacks of Garibaldi against Rome, ending with Montana. And yet there are people who ascribe to the Vatican Council the breach at the Porta Pia, and the entry of the Italians into Rome. Such reasoners are proof against history, chronology, and logic. If anybody will persist in saying that the two and twenty years of aggression against the Holy See, from 1848 to 1870, were caused by Pius IX., I must address myself to other men. That Pius IX. has been in collision with those who attacked him is true enough. So is every man who defends his own house. Who, I ask, began the fray? From the Siccardi laws down to the laws of the Guarantees, who was the aggressor? But where the Pope is concerned logic seems to fail even in reasonable men. The other day Prince Von Bismarck told the Catholics of the Reichstag that they were accomplices of Kulmann, and therefore, as he implied, his assassins. Moreover, he affirmed that the war of France against Prussia was forced on the French Emperor by the Pope and the Jesuits. How providentially, then, though altogether fortuitously, no doubt, had Prussia been for three years massing its munitions of war and putting France in the wrong by intrigues in Spain, and fables from Ems. Nevertheless, all these things, are believed. Prince Von Bismarck has said them. But surely they belong to the Arabian Nights.

Now, I have already shown that, before the Vatican Council assembled, there was an opposition systematically organised to resist it. It was begun by certain Professors at Munich. The Munich Government lent itself as an agent to Dr. Döllinger, and endeavoured to draw the other Governments of Europe into a combined attempt to hinder or to intimidate the Council. And this was done on the plea that the Council would not be free. I well remember that at one time we were told in Rome, that if the Council persevered with the Definition of the Infallibility, the French troops would be withdrawn. That is to say, that the Garibaldians would be let in to make short work of the Definition. It was said that the presence of the French troops was an undue pressure on the freedom of the Council, and that their departure was essential to its true liberty. There was a grim irony amounting to humour in this solicitude for the liberty of the Council.

I will now trace out more fully the history of this conspiracy, in order to put beyond question my assertion that the plan of attack was prepared before the Council met, and that the Falck Laws are a deliberate change made by the Civil Power of Prussia, the status of the Catholic Church in Germany being still unchanged.

I will here ask leave to repeat what I stated two years ago:—

In the year 1869 it was already believed that the Bavarian Government, through Prince Hohenlohe, had begun a systematic agitation against the Council. It was known that he had addressed a circular note to the European Governments. But the text of that note was not, so far as I know, ever made public. I am able now to give the text in full. It affords abundant proof of the assertion here made, that a deliberate conspiracy against the Council was planned with great artifice and speciousness of matter and of language. Moreover, the date of this document shows how long before the opening of the Council this opposition was commenced. The Council was opened on December 8, 1869. Prince Hohenlohe's note is dated on the 9th of the April preceding, that is to say, about eight months before the Council began. It runs as follows:—

"Monsieur,—It appears to be certain that the Council convoked by His Holiness Pope Pius IX. will meet in the month of December next. The number of prelates who will attend it from all parts of the world will be much greater than at any former Council. This fact alone will help to give to its decrees a great authority, such as belongs to an Œcumenical Council. Taking this circumstance into consideration, it appears to me indispensable for every government to give it their attention, and it is with this view that I am about to address to you some observations.

"It is not probable that the Council will occupy itself only with doctrines appertaining to pure theology; there does not exist at this moment any problem of this nature which requires a conciliar solution. The only dogmatic thesis which Rome would wish to have decided by the Council, and which the Jesuits in Italy and Germany are now agitating, is the question of the Infallibility of the Pope. It is evident that this pretension, elevated into a dogma, would go far beyond the purely spiritual sphere, and would become a question eminently political, as raising the power of the Sovereign Pontiff, even in temporal matters, over all the princes and peoples of Christendom. This doctrine, therefore, is of such a nature as to arouse the attention of all those

Governments who rule over Catholic subjects.

"There is a circumstance which increases still more the gravity of the situation. I learn that among the commissions delegated to prepare matter, which later on is to be submitted to the deliberations of the Council, there is one which is occupied only on mixed questions, affecting equally international law, politics, and canon law. All these preparations justify our believing that it is the fixed intention of the Holy See, or at least of a party at present powerful in Rome, to promulgate through the Council a series of decrees upon questions which are rather political than ecclesiastical. Add to this that the Civiltà Cattolica—a periodical conducted by the Jesuits, and bearing an official character through the brief of the Holy Father—has just, demanded that the Council shall transform into conciliar decrees the condemnations of the Syllabus, published on December 8, 1864. Now, the articles of this encyclical being directed against principles which are the base of modern public life, such as we find it among all civilised nations, it follows that Governments are under the necessity of asking themselves if it is not their duty to invite the serious consideration both of the Bishops who are their subjects, and of the future Council, to the sad consequences of such a premeditated and systematic overturning of the present relations between Church and State. It cannot, indeed, be denied that it is a matter of urgency for Governments to combine, for the purpose of protesting, either through their agents in Rome, or in some other way, against all decisions which the Council may promulgate without the concurrence of the representatives of the secular power, in questions which are at the same time of a political and religious nature.

*"I thought that the initiative in so important a matter should be taken by one of the great Powers; but not having as yet received any communication on this subject, I have thought it necessary to seek for a mutual understanding which will protect our common interests, and that without delay, seeing that the interval between this time and the meeting of the Council is so short. I therefore desire you to submit this matter to the Government to which you are accredited, and to ascertain the views and intentions of the Court of * * * in respect to the course which it deems advisable to follow. You will submit, for the approbation of M. * * *, the question whether it would not be advisable to fix beforehand the measures to be taken, if not jointly, at least identically, in order to enlighten the Holy See as to the attitude which the Governments of the Continent will assume in reference to the Œcumenical Council; or whether conferences composed of representatives of the States concerned would not be considered as the best means to bring about an understanding between their Governments.*

*"I authorise you to leave a copy of this despatch with the Minister for Foreign Affairs at * * *, if he desires it; and I wish you to inform me as early as possible of the manner in which this communication may be received.*

"I have the honour, etc.,

"HOHENLOHE.

"Munich,

April 9, 1869."

No one could fail to see that this Circular had not Prince Hohenlohe for its author. We shall hereafter trace it to its legitimate origin.

'The indictment of the Council was no sooner published than the well-known volume called Janus appeared. It was said to be the work of many hands, and of various nations—of two at least. The chief object of its animosity was Rome, and its detailed hostility was levelled against the Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff and the Syllabus. The book was elaborately acrimonious and extravagantly insolent against Rome. Its avowed aim was to rouse the Civil Governments against the Council. The Sovereign Pontiff had, with great wisdom and justice, dealt with the Governments of Europe on the ground chosen by themselves. They had renounced the Catholic relations of union hitherto subsisting between the Civil and Spiritual Powers. Pius IX. took them at their word. He convened the Spiritual Legislature of the Church; he did not invite those who have gloried in their separation from it. This, again, sharpened the jealousy and suspicion of the Governments. At this time came forth certain publications—to which I will not more explicitly refer—avowedly intended to excite the Civil Powers to active opposition.

'About the month of September 1869, as I have already said, a document containing five questions was proposed by the Bavarian Government to the Theological Faculty at Munich. No one could for a moment doubt by what hand those interrogatories also were framed; they were intended to elicit the answer, that the action of the Council, if it were to define the Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff, would be irreconcilable not only with Catholic doctrine, but with the security of Civil Governments. In due time the answers appeared, leaving no

doubt that both the questions and the replies were inspired by one mind, if not written by one and the same hand.

'We have already seen that Prince Hohenlohe, President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs in Bavaria, addressed a letter to the French and other Catholic Governments, calling on them to interfere and to prevent the "fearful dangers" to which the Council would expose the modern world. Next, the Spanish Minister, Olozaga, hoped that the Council would not meet, or at least would "not approve, sanction, or ratify the Syllabus, which is in contradiction with modern civilisation." He then threatened the Church with the hostility of a league formed by the Governments of France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Bavaria. An Italian infidel then took up the game, and proposed an Anti-Œcumenical Council to meet at Naples. A French infidel was invited, who promised that his soul should be present, and said: "It is an efficacious and noble idea to assemble a council of ideas to oppose to the council of dogmas. I accept it. On the one side is theocratic obstinacy, on the other the human mind. The human mind is a divine mind, its rays on the earth, its star is above. . . . If I cannot go to Naples, nevertheless I shall be there. My soul will be there. I cry, Courage! and I squeeze your hand." The reader will forgive my repeating this trash, which is here inserted only to show how the liberals and infidels of Europe rose up at the instigation of Dr. Döllinger to meet the coming Council.

'About the month of June, in 1869, another despatch had been addressed by Prince Hohenlohe to the other Governments, inviting them to make common cause against the Council. It was extensively believed to be inspired by Prussia, the policy of which was thought to be, to put in contrast the liberty accorded to its own Catholic subjects in respect of the Council with the pedantic meddling of the Bavarian Government. At this time General Menabrea, under the same inspiration, addressed a circular to his diplomatic agents, proposing to the Powers to prevent the assembling of the Council, on the ground of their not having been invited to it. It was supposed at that time that this policy also was secretly supported by Berlin. A joint despatch was sent by Prince Hohenlohe and the Italian Government to the French Government, urging the withdrawal of the French troops from Rome during the Council, to insure its freedom of deliberation.'

These preparations to oppose the Council were made before it had assembled. It met on December 8, 1869. In the following January, Dr. Döllinger received the freedom of a German city, in reward for his attacks on the Holy See.

'When the well-known postulatium of the Bishops, asking that the definition of the Papal Infallibility should be proposed to the Council, was made public, Dr. Döllinger openly assailed it; and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Darn, addressed a letter to the Holy See with a view to prevent the definition. Rome was at that time full of rumours and threats that the protection of the French army would be withdrawn. I had personally an opportunity of knowing that these threats were not mere rumours.

'At the same moment, while France was attacking the definition of the Pope's Infallibility, the Protestant Chancellor of Austria, Count Yon Beust, addressed himself to the Canons of the Schema published in the Augsburg Gazette, which he declared would "provoke deplorable conflicts between the Church and State." Every European Government from that time put a pressure more or less upon the Council to prevent the definition.

'The source of this opposition, then, was Munich. The chief agent, beyond all doubt, was one who in his earlier days had been greatly venerated in Germany and in England. Truth compels me to ascribe to Dr. Döllinger the initiative in this deplorable attempt to coerce the Holy See, and to overbear the liberty of the Bishops assembled in Council. Prince Hohenlohe is assuredly no theologian. The documents published by him came from another mind and hand. Such was the opposition before and during the Council.

'What I have hitherto said to prove the conspiracy of certain European Governments, and the intrigues of the Old Catholics against the Council, both before the assembling and during its sessions, would not have been needed if the Diary of the Council by Professor Friedrich had sooner come into my hands. I have been feeling in the dark for proofs which he brings to light by a series of astounding confessions. I had always believed in the conspiracy; but I never knew how systematic and how self-confident it was. I had always known that the Gnostic vainglory of German scientific historians was its chief instigator; but I never before imagined the stupendous conceit or the malevolent pride of its professors. A critique of Professor Friedrich's Diary, by some strong German hand, has appeared lately in one of our journals, and I cannot refrain from giving certain passages in final confirmation of what I have said above.

'And first as to the Governments. Professor Friedrich puts into the mouth of a diplomatist the following words: "The means by which the greatest amount of influence might be brought to bear on the Council would be a determined and plain manifestation of the public opinion of Europe in favour of the minority. Clearly the Curia could not prevent this; and it would add strength and numbers to the opposition, by giving it the assurance that, if at the last moment it found itself obliged to protest and appeal to the nation, the Governments and all intelligent laymen would support it. This measure would also secure 'weak and doubtful Bishops'" (Diary, p. 184). On the 26th of December, 1869, Friedrich wrote, "That he was considered by many persons to

be residing in Rome as the representative of an approaching schism, if the majority obtained the upper hand in the Council" (p. 41). He says in another place: "It would not be the first time in the history of the Church that a schism had broken out. Church history recounts many such, besides that of the Greeks" (p. 196). The critic of Professor Friedrich's book writes as follows: "The alliance between 'German science' and diplomacy was not productive of all the results which at first had been looked for. Friedrich expresses himself very bitterly on this point; nevertheless he endeavoured all the more to excite German science to fresh efforts." Under date of the 27th of March (p. 202) he writes: "The Governments are by degrees acting an almost ridiculous part towards the Council—first boasts; then embarrassment connected with meaningless threats; and at last the confession that the right time has passed by, and that the Curia has command of the situation. If German science had not saved its position, and been able to establish a firm opposition in the Council, even in contradiction to its own will, and kept it alive; and if our Lord God had not also set stupidity and ignorance on the side of the Curia and of the majority, the Governments would have been put to shame in the sight of the whole world. Prince Hohenlohe, in fact, is the only statesman possessed of a deeper insight in this question, and by degrees he has come to be looked upon as belonging to the minority."

'Of all the foreign sources from which the English newspapers drew their inspiration, the chief perhaps was the Augsburg Gazette. This paper has many titles to special consideration. The infamous matter of Janus first appeared in it under the form of articles. During the Council it had in Rome at least one English contributor. Its letters on the Council have been translated into English, and published by a Protestant bookseller in a volume by Quirinus.'

A distinguished bishop of Germany, one of the minority opposed to the definition, whose cause the Augsburg Gazette professed to serve, delivered at the time his judgment on Janus, and the letters on the Council.

Preface to Vol. III. *Sermons on Ecclesiastical Subjects*, p. xxv. &c.

'Bishop Yon Ketteler of Mainz publicly protested against "the systematic dishonesty of the correspondent or the Augsburg Gazette." "It is a pure invention," he adds, "that the Bishops named in that journal declared that Döllinger represented, as to the substance of the question (of Infallibility), the opinions of a majority of the German Bishops." And this, he said, "is not an isolated error, but part of a system which consists in the daring attempt to publish false news, with the object of deceiving the German public, according to a plan concerted beforehand." . . . "It will be necessary one day to expose in all their nakedness and abject mendacity the articles of the Augsburg Gazette. They will present a formidable and lasting testimony to the extent of injustice of which party-men, who affect the semblance of superior education, have been guilty against the Church." Again, at a later date, the Bishop of Mainz found it necessary to address to his diocese another public protest against the inventions of the Augsburg Gazette. "The Augsburg Gazette," he says, "hardly ever pronounces my name without appending to it a falsehood." . . . "It would have been easy for us to prove that every Roman letter of the Augsburg Gazette contains gross perversions and untruths. Whoever is conversant with the state of things here, and reads these letters, cannot doubt an instant that these errors are voluntary, and are part of a concerted system designed to deceive the public. If time fails me to correct publicly this uninterrupted series of falsehoods, it is impossible for me to keep silence when an attempt is made with so much perfidy to misrepresent my own convictions."

'Again, Bishop Hefele, commenting on the Roman correspondents of the Augsburg Gazette, says: "It is evident that there are people not bishops, but having relations with the Council, who are not restrained by duty and conscience." We had reason to believe that the names of these people, both German and English, were well known to us.

'Now the testimony of the Bishop of Mainz, as to the falsehoods of these correspondents respecting Rome and Germany, I can confirm by my testimony as to their treatment of matters relating to Rome and England. I do not think there is a mention of my own name without, as the Bishop of Mainz says, the appendage of a falsehood. The whole tissue of the correspondence is false.'

Petri Priv. part iii. pp. 4-7.

I have quoted all this to show the small chance the people of England had of knowing the truth as to the state and acts of the Council, and also how systematic was the opposition organised against it in Germany.

After the suspension of the Council, the action of this conspiracy, hitherto secret, became open. Dr. Von Döllinger and certain Professors openly rejected the Vatican Council, accusing it of innovation. They therefore either took, or were called by, the name of 'Old Catholics.' This schism has never been in one stay. Its development has had three progressive stages. At first the Old Catholics professed to hold by the Council of Trent, and to reject only the Council of the Vatican. As such they claimed to be recognised by the Prussian law. But next, at a meeting at Augsburg, a large infusion of German Rationalists compelled them to enlarge their comprehension, and to include those who rejected most of the doctrines of the Council of Trent.

Lastly, at Cologne and Bonn, they received the accession of Anglicans, American Episcopalians, Greeks,

and various Protestants.

The Old Catholic schism, therefore, has lost its meaning and its character, and has become a body without distinctive creed. Dr. Von Döllinger, at Bonn, last September, declared (if the report be correct) that Old Catholics are not bound by the Council of Trent.

In the sphere of theology and religion the movement is already paralysed, and has no future; but in the sphere of politics it has a great power of mischief, I have already shown how the first acts of the diplomatic and political hostility to the Council began at Munich. There can be little doubt that it reached Berlin through the Circular of Prince Hohenlohe, the present German Ambassador at Paris. The Berlin Government supported the Old Catholic Professors who rejected the Vatican Decrees, on the plea that the Council of Trent was known to the law in Prussia, but that the Council of the Vatican was not known to it. It was *exlex*. Therefore the Government recognised the legal status of the Old Catholics who held to the Council of Trent. How they will still recognise them as Old Catholics, now that they have rejected the Council of Trent at Bonn, it is not so easy to say. However, Dr. Reinkens was consecrated Bishop by a Jansenist Prelate, and received from the Berlin Government, both legal recognition and a good salary. We shall see hereafter that the Government would thereby try to tempt the Catholic Clergy to its friendship, and to use the 'Old Catholic' schism as a weapon against the Catholic Church. The 'Old Catholic' schism has an attraction for certain minds in which there is a strong hankering after the Catholic Church without the courage to suffer for the truth's sake. An attempt, we have been told, was made to set up an 'Old Catholic' Church in London, but it met with little encouragement.

There is not a doubt that the Berlin Government aims at changing all the Catholics in Germany into Old Catholics.

The Old Catholics, in their appeal to the Civil Power, are doing what the Arians did after the Council of Nicæa. They have been, and they will be, the instigators of persecution against the Catholic Church. But they are blindly doing God's will. When the Church has been purified, their place will know them no more.

To return to the politicians and diplomatists. What was believed as to the conspiracy at Munich before the Council met has since been confirmed by the letters of Count Arnim, which ascribe his own action to the instigation of Dr. Döllinger. The Berlin Correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*,

Tablet Newspaper, Oct. 31, 1874, p. 546.

after noticing the discrepancy between the despatch of Count Arnim, published by Prince Bismarck, and his 'Pro Memoria,' which appeared in the *Vienna Presse*—the first 'treating the dogma of Infallibility as a mere theological dissertation,' and the second, 'seeing in it an event that must overthrow Catholicism and the peace of Catholic States'—proceeds to explain the contradiction thus:—

'When Prince Hohenlohe, as leader of Bavarian foreign affairs, sent his well-known Circular to different Powers, explaining the dangers of that dogma, the German Chancellor applied to Count Arnim, who answered that the Bavarian Minister exaggerated the danger, being influenced by Döllinger. After this answer was sent to Berlin, Count von Arnim went on his holidays, and in passing Munich visited Prince Hohenlohe. There they spoke about Infallibility, and Prince Hohenlohe acknowledged that the Circular was written under Döllinger's inspiration. The Prince asked the Count to visit Döllinger, which he did. Döllinger convincingly explained to Arnim the importance of the dogma; and, on his return, Arnim tried everything to prevent the result of the Council by repeatedly advising Prince Bismarck to interfere; so the change, in Arnim's opinion, must be traced to Döllinger.'

Before we enter upon the present conflict in Germany, so carelessly touched and dismissed by Mr. Gladstone, it is necessary to record the fact that, in the year 1849, the 15th Article of the German Constitution affirmed, that 'Every religious Society shall order and manage its own affairs independently, but shall remain subject to the general power of the State.' The Prussian Constitution also recognised this independence. Such was the law until 1872. Under this law the Catholics were loyal, peaceful, and of unimpeachable allegiance to the State. They served it in peace; they fought for it in war. They helped to found the Empire in their blood. Who made the change? The Government of Berlin. The laws of 1849 have been violated, and a series of laws, which I will hereafter describe, have been forced upon the Catholics of Prussia. The conflict was thus begun, not by the Catholics nor by the Church, but by the Civil Power. Prince Von Bismarck is so conscious of this fact, that he has spared no accusation, how wild soever, against the Catholics to disguise and to mask it. The laws resisted now by the Bishops and Catholics of Prussia are not the old laws of their country, but innovations, intolerable to conscience, newly introduced, and inflicted upon them by the fine and imprisonment of five Bishops and 1,400, it is even said 1,700, clergy. Surely the day is past when anyone believes that the Falck Laws were caused by the Vatican Council. The French war was scarcely ended when Prince Von Bismarck accused the Catholics of Germany of disloyalty and conspiracy against the Empire. They had not even had time to be disloyal or to conspire. The Catholic blood shed in the war was not yet dry. He said then, as he said the other day, that he had secret evidence. Not a particle has ever been produced. For a time Englishmen were perplexed. They did not know what to believe. They could not conceive that Prince Von Bismarck would make

such charges without evidence; but, little by little, the truth has come out. The Old Catholic conspiracy has been laid, open to the world. The manly and inflexible constancy of the Catholic Bishops, Priests, and people of Germany has roused the attention of Englishmen, and they have come to know that no body of men were more gladly loyal to the Prussian Government than the Catholic on the basis of the laws of their country from 1848 to 1872; that no change whatsoever, by a jot or tittle, was made on their part; that, on the part of Government, a new and elaborate legislation, anti-Catholic and intolerable to conscience, was introduced in 1872. The whole innovation was on the part of Government. The new laws excluded the Clergy from the schools; banished the religious orders; made Government consent necessary to the nomination of a Parish Priest; fined and imprisoned Bishops for the exercise of their Spiritual office; subjected to the State the education of the Clergy, even to the examination for orders; and established a final tribunal of Ecclesiastical appeal in Berlin. And yet men were found who had still the hardihood to say that the Church had begun the conflict. At last, Dr. Friedberg, Professor of Law at Leipsic, and one of the chief advisers of Government in its Ecclesiastical policy, let out the real cause. With an incautious candour he has told us the truth.

I will take the account of Dr. Friedberg's book, 'The German Empire and the Catholic Church,' from a pamphlet of the Bishop of Mayence, entitled, 'The New Prussian Bills on the Position of the Church in reference to the State.'

A translation made in Germany has been published by Messrs. Burns & Oates, 17 Portman Street.

Bishop Ketteler begins by asking, 'What could prompt the Liberal party to denounce as Ultramontane presumption, and as a surrender of the essential rights of the State, that which, in the years 1848-1850, it had acknowledged as the necessary "consequence of its own principles"' (p. 9)?

Bishop Ketteler answers, 'The true reason of the thorough systematic change of the Liberal party, as well as of all those measures aimed against the lawful rights of the Church, is "the spiritual power of the Church based upon the foundation of freedom"' (p. 11).

He then quotes an Address of Dr. Friedberg, in which he says, 'The Doctrinaires will still tell us that the all-sufficient remedy of this is the separation of the Church from the State; but, on the contrary, under actual circumstances, this would be a very injurious measure, *for the Church has become too much united to the people.*'

He then shows that wherever the Church is free, as in the United States, it is powerful, because it is the Church of the people. 'What would be the consequence,' he asks, 'with us if the Church were freed from the control of the State?' 'On the contrary,' says Dr. Friedberg, 'as the whole question has become now *one of main force*, the State must go so far as to deprive the Church of her influence over the people, in order that its own power may be firmly established' (pp. 10, 11).

Dr. Newman, more than thirty years ago, said that Governments establish and endow Churches as people cut the wings of magpies, that they may hop upon the lawn and pick up worms. 'Liberals love a tame Church.'

I quote this in answer to those who have been taunting the German Bishops with complaining of persecution and of yet holding to their legal status: Pharaoh has taught all oppressors 'not to let the people go.'

'Our crime as endangering the State,' says Bishop Ketteler, 'consists in this—that wheresoever the people and the Church are free, the people turn to the Church, and not to the doctrines of the Liberal party' (p. 13).

'Here we have the whole undisguised truth. To separate the Christian people from the Church, to deprive it of freedom, to subjugate it by force to Liberal Statecraft and human wisdom, thus reducing it to a Liberal State-religion—this is the triumph of modern science and knowledge which Liberalism and its professors offer to the German people' (p. 14).

Bishop Ketteler then goes on to give Dr. Friedberg's argument: 'The Protestant Church is, at this day, *an essential political agent*—solely by its opposition to Catholicism.'

Dr. Yon Holzendorff says of the Protestant Church, that 'it has no intellectual unity, because a short-sighted orthodoxy has sown and fostered indifference towards the Church; and also from the fact that the Protestant Church did not create a constitution suited to its own spirit. Who could count upon the High Consistory Court of Berlin outliving for a day the separation of the Church from the State? or that the fiercest party strife would not break it up into sects? But what an opportunity for the compact mass of the Catholic Church as opposed to these dismembered elements,' &c.

Year-Book of the German Empire. By Dr. F. von Holzendorff, Leipzig, p. 478, 1872.

This lets in light.

Bishop Ketteler then sums up: 'These confessions of a pretended Liberal deserve notice.

'First, the Protestant Church is "an essential political agent," and especially so by her opposition to Catholicism.

'Secondly, the Protestant Church cannot endure freedom and independence. "After separation from the State it would be 'dismembered.' The High Consistory of Berlin would scarcely survive a day."

'Thirdly, out of these dismembered elements an increase would fall to the Catholic Church. Principles truly

Liberal. No longer shall the power of truth under the protection of equal freedom decide between the different creeds. In the hands of the Liberals the Protestant Church is to become a "political agent," "a tool of the State," to fight against Catholicism. Even liberty of conscience on the part of the people is to be destroyed to avert the danger of their turning to the Catholic Church.

'Lastly, Dr. Friedberg refused to separate the Church from the State, because it would be "a severity and an injustice," forsooth, to the Old Catholics. If the Church were set free, the Government would lose "an immediate support and a *co-operation so necessary to the State for the internal reform of the Church.*"'

The Bishop then sums up as follows:—The Government has changed its relations to the Catholic Church, 'not because the Catholic Church is dangerous to the State, nor because it is hostile to the Empire, nor because it will overbear the State; these are not the motives, though they are daily expressed in Parliament and in the press by the Liberal party, to show that the Catholic Church must be robbed of her liberty, but because the German people must be torn away by force from the Church; and in order to attain this end, the Protestant State Church and the "Old Catholics" are to be used as weapons to fight the Catholic Church, and to destroy it internally,' &c. (p. 17).

Such is the end and aim: now for the means. Dr. Friedberg says, 'One must first attempt to draw off the waters carefully, letting them flow into other channels, and conducting them into reservoirs; what remains will then be easily absorbed into the air' (p. 19). In other words, dry up the Church; draw from it all intellectual, moral, and spiritual influence over the people; paralyse the action of its Pastors; substitute Bureaus, Registrars, Professors, State Teachers, and State Officials; make its worship a State Ritualism, a ceremonial of subjective feelings, not of objective Truth, This done, religion will soon evaporate. The sum of all, Bishop Ketteler says, is that

'The State will regard the Church as a historical established institution, which may be very useful to the State by fulfilling its peculiar and necessary mission for the civilisation of the German people, but which, on the other hand, may become dangerous to the State, and has become so.'

'For the first reason the Church shall be not only tolerated but also be authorised by the State. For the second reason, it is to be rendered harmless.'

'This will dry up the stream, and the rest will evaporate.'

After this I think even an English Nonconformist would read the *Unam Sanctam* with new eyes.

Now, the proximate means of accomplishing this draining of the Pontine Marshes is 'the inward and outward release' of the Clergy from all dependence on powers 'outside our nation,' and 'strangers to our national consciousness;' that is to say, a spiritual blockade against the Church throughout the world, or 'our German consciousness' against Christianity.

The inward release of the Clergy is to be effected 'through their education' (pp. 29, 30). Their education is to be as follows:—

- Every Priest is to go through an examination at a German College.
 - He is to study Theology for three years in a German *State University*.
- All independent seminaries and religious colleges for boys are interdicted.
- He is finally to be examined in the presence of a Commissary of the Government.
 - The State has the superior direction of all instruction of the Clergy.
 - It fixes the method of their teaching.
 - It decides the qualification of their teachers.

The Bishop is to be, in all these relations, dependent on the State; the State forms the Catholic Clergy to its own fashion; and the Bishop has only to receive them and to give them cure of souls.

The Bishop of Mayence justly says: 'A Clergy inwardly deprived of faith, falling under the bondage of unbelief and the spirit of the times, would, no doubt, become the perfect ideal of national education' (pp. 35, 36).

Next for the 'outward release' of the Clergy.

First it means that the State will regulate the appointment and deposition, and the correctional discipline of the Clergy by local Civil authorities, and partly by a Supreme Royal court for Clerical affairs.

The Clergy are therefore perfectly released:

First, from the jurisdiction of the Head of the Church.

Secondly, from the jurisdiction of their own Bishops.

The effect of this release is:

First, that any fit and worthy Priest may be kept out of the cure of souls and all spiritual offices by the veto of the State.

Second, that any unfit or unworthy, any immoral or heretical. Priest may be supported in defiance of his Bishop, to the scandal of the Church and the perdition of Souls.

An unlimited veto is an unlimited right of patronage.

What kind of man will grow up out of the soil of State Universities, and under the sun of State Patronage? What Priest of fidelity to the Church and of personal dignity of character will sell or lend himself to such a despotism?

We have read lately a little too much of the 'pliancy and servility' and 'degradation' of the Catholic Episcopate. What is the ideal of a Bishop in those who assail the Vatican Council and sympathise with the Old Catholics? By these laws the Clergy and Bishops are *liberated* or released from the foreign oppression of Rome. The Pope cannot suspend one of them. But the Royal Court may depose them all. Is Dr. Reinkens, with his sixteen thousand thalers a year, under the Falck Laws, independent, high-minded, and manly? Is the Archbishop of Posen, in his prison, pliant, servile, and degraded? This seems to me to 'put light for darkness, and dark-ness for light.' It would be an anxious sign of our time and state if an inverted moral sense should grow upon us.

The Bishop of Mayence finally sums up this external release of their Clergy as follows:

These laws amount to—

- Separation of the Church in Germany from Rome.
- Annihilation of the powers of the Bishops.
- The breaking up of all authority and discipline over the Clergy and people.
- Unlimited control of the State over the Clergy, and over religion.
- Universal moral corruption of the whole Church.
- Introduction and encouragement of every form of error contrary to faith and to Christianity among the teachers.
- Loss of Christian faith among the people.

The Bishop then protests against these laws as—

'A violation of all Christian liberties, and of all Constitutional rights; as an attempt to force on the Catholic Church the Royal Supremacy of the Protestant Reformation; as a violation of the Divine constitution and authority of the Catholic Church; and, finally, as leading men back again into the Cæsarism of the Pagan world, in which the temporal and spiritual sovereignty were united in one person. The separation of the two powers which the Divine Founder of Christianity has introduced for the protection of the liberties of human life in faith, conscience and religion, would be once more extinguished in Germany. It would then be easy to overthrow, one after another, the other safeguards of the freedom of the people. The army, the official State press, or State school, or State Church, all united together would transplant the old despotism of the Pagans to German soil' (p. 49).

He concludes in these words:—

'Finally, these laws are in their whole substance revolutionary, and a denial of the historical positive development of the rights, and an uprooting of all the constitutional privileges, of the people. They will bring about a conflict with the Catholic Church, with its essential constitution and its doctrines; they attempt to force upon the Catholic Church a constitution similar to that of the Protestant Church. By placing all earthly power in the hands of one man they introduce the system of the heathen despotism into Germany.

'May God guard our German Fatherland from the disastrous consequences of such laws.'

Before this noble protest was published these Bills became law. I hope no Englishman will now say that the conflict in Germany was brought on by the Church. The pretext of Vatican Council is as transparently false as the plea of the wolf against the lamb. Such, then, are the Falck Laws; and I have read no part of Mr. Gladstone's 'Expostulation' with more sadness than the following words:—

'I am not competent to give any opinion upon the particulars of that struggle. The institutions of Germany, and the relative estimate of State power and individual freedom, are materially different from ours.'

The Vatican Decrees, &c. p. 48.

Are faith and conscience 'institutions' to be 'estimated' 'relatively'? Is religious freedom, to the vindication of which Mr. Gladstone has given a long public life, a matter to be measured by geographical or political conditions? I do not recognise this voice.

It may, I think, with safety be affirmed, that in the lamentable conflict now waging in Germany, the Berlin Government, urged on by the conspiracy of the 'Old Catholics,' aided, no doubt, at a later stage, by the pseudo-Liberals of Prussia, has been the aggressor.

The same could be abundantly proved in respect to the persecution of the Church in Switzerland. I have before me full and authentic evidence of the aggression of the Cantonal Governments of Bale, Soleure, and Berne and others. But I will not prolong this chapter by a recital. The proof will be found in the Appendix C.

It would be as easy also to show that in Brazil the Government was the aggressor. The Bishop of Olinda is at this moment in penal servitude, for refusing religious rites at the burial of an excommunicated person.

This will, I hope, be deemed a sufficient proof of my third proposition, which in sum is this, that the present collisions between the Civil and Spiritual Powers have not been caused by the Church. There is

everywhere a party aiming at the subversion of Christianity. The great barrier in their way is the Catholic Church. They are now openly conspiring for its overthrow.

In England our old craters are extinct and the mountains are quiet. Such a conflict has, happily, not yet been rekindled among us. No change on the part of the Catholic Church, of a kind to provoke such a conflict, either has been or will be made. The declining to accept a scheme of education based on principles dangerous to Catholic Faith is certainly no such cause. To reject a tempting gift is no aggression. If we are again to be distracted by religious conflicts, the responsibility will rest undividedly upon the head of anyone who shall break our present public confidence and peace. And that misdeed would be indelibly written in our history.

Chapter IV. True and False Progress.

I WILL now go on to the fourth proposition—that by these collisions with the Church the Civil Powers everywhere are at this time destroying the first principle of their own stability.

Mr. Gladstone has represented me as saying that the civil order of all Christendom is the offspring of the Temporal Power, and has the Temporal Power for its keystone; that on the destruction of the Temporal Power "the laws of nations would at once fall in ruins."

Understood as I wrote these words I fully affirm them; understood as they may be in this garbled form, they have an exaggeration which is not mine. I was speaking strictly of the Temporal Power of the Pope over his own State: whereby, as a King among Kings, he sustained the Christian character of Sovereignty. I was not speaking of Temporal power over the Temporal Government of Princes. And I was speaking in defence at a time when every journal in the country, with hardly an exception, was day after day assailing, and I must add misrepresenting, the origin and office of the Temporal Government of the Pope. My own words were as follows:—

'Now, the last point on which I will dwell is this: that as the Church of God has created—and that specially through the action of the Supreme Pontiffs in their civil mission to the world—this vast and fair fabric of Christian Europe, so it has perpetually sustained it. I ask, what has given it coherence? What is it that has kept alive the governing principle among men, but that pure faith or knowledge of God which has gone forth from the Holy See, and has filled the whole circumference of Christendom? What has bound men together in the respect due to mutual rights, but that pure morality which was delivered to the Church to guard, and of which the Holy See is the supreme interpreter? These two streams—which, as St. Cyprian says in his treatise on the unity of the Church, are like the rays that flow from the sun, or like the streams that rise and break from the fountain—illuminated and inundated the whole Christian world. Now, I ask, what has preserved this in security', but the infallibility of the Church of God vested chiefly and finally in the person of the Vicar of Jesus Christ? It will rather belong to the next lecture to note how, by contrast, this may be proved, and how those nations, which have separated themselves from the unity of the Catholic Church, and therefore are in opposition to the temporal sovereignty of Rome, have lost these two great principles of their preservation. I ask, then, what has preserved Christian Europe, but the principle of obedience—the precept of submission, which has been taught throughout the whole of its circuit by the Church of God, especially through the mouths of its Pontiffs? By them subjects have been taught obedience and rulers have learned justice. What, I ask, has limited monarchy? What has made monarchy a free institution, and supreme power compatible with the personal liberty of the people, but the limitations which the Holy See, acting through its Pontiffs, has imposed upon the Princes of the world? Does anybody doubt these two propositions? To them I would say, the Pontiffs, with their temporal power, have been accused of despotism; at least, then, let us give them the credit of having taught the people to submit. They have been also accused of tyranny over Princes: at least let us give them the honour of having taught Kings that their power is limited. The dread chimera at which the English people especially stands in awe,—the deposing power of the Pope,—what was it but that supreme arbitration, whereby the highest power in the world, the Vicar of the Incarnate Son of God, anointed high-priest and supreme temporal ruler (i.e. as Sovereign in his own State), sat in his tribunal impartially to judge between nation and nation, between people and prince, between sovereign and subject? The deposing power grew up by the providential action of God in the world, teaching subjects obedience and princes clemency.

'Now, in this twofold power of the Popes, which has been, I may say, the centre of the diplomacy of Christian Europe, we see the sacerdotal and royal powers vested in one person, the two powers of king and priest, which are the two conservative principles of the Christian world. All Christian kings and all Christian priests stand related to the one person who bears in fulness that twofold character; and it is by adherence to that one person as the centre of the civil and spiritual system, which grew up under his hand, that Christian Europe is preserved. I should say further, that, vast and solid as Christendom may seem, like a vault of stone, the temporal power of the Pope is the keystone; strike it out, and the family of nations would at once fall in

ruins.'

Temporal Power of the Popes, lecture ii. pp 44-47. (Burns, 1862.)

In the very same chapter from which Mr. Gladstone has quoted, at page 46, the following statements occur at pages 32 and 33:—

(1) 'Our Divine Lord committed to His Church and to His Vicar—the head on earth of that Church—His *Spiritual* sovereignty, reserving to Himself His *Temporal* or providential sovereignty. . . . Therefore the *Spiritual sovereignty* of the Church is a Divine institution, and has a power *directly* ordained of God. (2) There are other powers in the world which are indirectly ordained of God—viz. all temporal sovereignties. . . . (3) By an indirect but Divine providence our Divine Lord has liberated His Vicar upon earth, in the plenitude of His *Spiritual* sovereignty, from all civil subjection. . . . (4) By the same Providence—indirect, indeed, but nevertheless Divine—our Lord clothed His Vicar with the possession of a patrimony. . . . (5) Upon the basis of this temporal possession our Lord has raised a temporal power by His indirect operation, and therefore the temporal power of the Pope is a Divine ordinance, having a Divine sanction, at least equally with every other sovereignty in the world.'

Temporal Power of the Popes, pp. 32, 33.

It may not be amiss to add, lest it should be thought that this statement is merely a private opinion, that the text from which I quote was translated into Italian, in Home, in 1862, was examined by the censorship, and printed at the Propaganda press.

This is still my unchanged belief, confirmed by the twelve years since these words were spoken, and by the shattered state of Christian Europe in 1875. Now I am not afraid of defending the condensed statement of Donoso Cortes: 'The history of Civilisation is the history of Christianity; the history of Christianity is the history of the Church; the history of the Church is the history of the Pontiffs.' St. Augustine's work *De Civitate Dei* is enough to prove that the civilisation of the old world had run itself out by incurable corruption, and that the civilisation of the modern world is the new creation of Christianity. Two other witnesses would also prove this: St. Paul in his first chapter to the Romans, and Dr. Döllinger in his work on 'The Jewish and the Gentile Nations.' I am indeed one of those who still believe that we owe Christian homes to Christian marriage, that we owe Christian men to Christian homes, that we owe Christian nations to Christian men, and that the transmission of national Christianity depends on Christian education. We owe, therefore, the civilisation of Europe to Christian nations, and we owe the whole, not to 'modern thought,' but to Christianity.

Moreover, I know of no agent by which Christianity was thus brought to bear upon mankind but the Christian Church; and, lastly, the heads of the Christian Church were the chief legislators, guides, judges, and protectors of this Christian civilisation. I cannot think that Mr. Gladstone would deny this, or that we have read history, all this while, in an inverted sense.

But there is another sense in which the Temporal Power of the Popes—that is, their local sovereignty—has in an especial manner created modern Europe. To them and to the Civil Government of the Patrimonies of the Church, when the Byzantine Empire had ceased to protect the West, may be ascribed the Christendom of which Charlemagne was the first Temporal Head. From that germ the Christian civilisation of Europe has been propagated by Christian marriage, Christian education, and Christian faith. Until 'Luther's mighty trumpet' was blown it was bound together by unity of faith, unity of worship, and unity of jurisdiction under one Head, and that Head united in himself the twofold character of Christian Pontiff and Christian King. Luther's blast has brought this down at last. First, by regalism in Protestant nations; and, secondly, by revolution in Catholic states. The principles of 1789 are Lutheranism applied to politics. We have already reached the time of civil marriage, of secular education, and of States in their public life without Christianity. But let us not think that we have reached our place of rest. Luther's blast, I fear, has yet more to do. Faith is dying out of the public life and action of all Governments. There is hardly a Catholic or a Christian Government left. The people they govern are divided in religion, and 'the religious difficulty' forces them to become simply secular in legislation and in action. So long as there was a Christian world, the Head of the Christian Church was recognised as the Vicar of a Divine Master, and had a Temporal Power among Christian Sovereigns, and a sovereignty of his own; but now that the nations have become secular, and no longer recognise his sacred office, his direction in temporal things is rejected by their rejection of faith. I am not arguing or lamenting, but explaining our actual state. And what is now the state and condition of the Christian world? Where are the Christian laws which formed it in the beginning? I was not far wrong in saying that the Temporal Power of the Head of the Christian Church was the keystone of a world which has crumbled from its Christian unity into a dismembered array of secular and conflicting nations, of armed camps and retarded maturity. And it is with this 'progress and modern civilisation that the Roman Pontiff is invited to conform and to reconcile himself.' This is the sum and exposition of 'modern thought,' save only that it omits the Agnostic theology. *De Deo non existente*, and the anthropology of Apes. Mr. Gladstone quotes this condemned proposition, recited in the Syllabus, as a *gravamen* against the Pope and the Catholics of these kingdoms. We have no desire to see the Christian Commonwealth of England

decompose before our eyes under Luther's blast. We are content with the English Monarchy, founded and consolidated by our Catholic forefathers; and with our English Constitution, of which the solid and unshaken base and the dominant constructive lines are Christian and Catholic. We Englishmen were once perfectly one in faith. Luther's blast has given us nearly three hundred years of penal laws, bitter contentions, a 'bloody reign of Mary,' a relentless shower, indeed, between two seas of blood, in the reigns of her father and her sister; and when these horrors relaxed, streams of blood still flowed on for another hundred years. For nearly three centuries we have been divided in politics, because politics were mixed up with religion. Our Legislature teemed with penal laws such as the world had never seen, and that against nearly a half of the English population. We were weakened because we were divided; haunted by suspicions of conspiracy, and scared by fancied dangers, because we were consciously doing wrong, as Prussia is at this day. But now for fifty years we have had peace, because we have common interests, and a solid common weal. The three Kingdoms are without anxiety and without fear. And why? Because we have eliminated religious conflicts from our Legislation, because we have learned to be just, because we have learned also that the Civil Ruler may punish what men do, but not what men think, unless they issue in acts against the State. All men, so far as conscience and faith extend, are now equal before the law. No man is molested for his religion. Although this is not the golden age of unity in truth, which the Christian Church once created and Pius IX. declares to be the only civilisation and the only progress to which he can conform himself, though he tolerates what he cannot cure; nevertheless, it is a silver age in which we can peacefully accept what we cannot either justify as the will of God, or extol as the normal state of the Christian world. In our shattered state of religious belief and worship there is no way of solid civil peace, but in leaving all men free in their amplest liberty of faith. It is because this is vital to our welfare as an Empire, and because, as it seems to me, the late sudden and needless aggression on the Catholic religion is dangerous to the social and political tranquillity of these Kingdoms, that I have pointed to Germany, as a warning. A monarchy of a thousand years is a majestic thing in this modern world of fleeting dynasties and of chronic revolutions. We possess a royal lineage the least broken and the most closely united to the people that the world has ever seen, save one. The line of Pontiffs ruled before the crowned heads of to-day came into existence. It has been the vital chord of the Christian people of the world. Next after the line of Pontiffs, there is nothing in history more time-honoured or grander than the Monarchy of Alfred, which reigns to this day. Does Mr. Gladstone think that the Vatican Council binds me to desire its overthrow? Next to seeing again the laws and the faith of good King Edward restored throughout the land, we desire to see the Sovereign of England reigning by equal laws over a people united at least in everything that is right and just and lawful in this world, if indeed they must still be in higher laws and truths divided.

One thing is most certain, Catholics will never lend so much as a finger or a vote to overturn by political action the Christianity which still lingers in our public laws. They will cherish all of it that remains in our popular education. If we could see the tradition of our national Christianity healed of its wounds and taken up into the full life and unity of perfect faith by the spiritual forces of conviction and of persuasion, as that supernatural unity was created in the beginning, we should rejoice with thanksgiving; but no Catholic will diminish by a shade the Christianity which still survives. We cannot, indeed, co-operate by any direct action to uphold what we believe to be erroneous; but it will find no political hostility in us. They who wish its overthrow would pull it down not for what we think erroneous in it, but for what is true; and what is true in it we revere as the truth of God. In our divided religious state the public revenues, once paid into the treasury, have passed beyond the individual conscience. Thenceforward they fall under the impartial administration of our mixed commonwealth. I am not responsible for the application of them. My conscience is not touched if public revenues are given to a Presbyterian or to a Baptist School. My conscience is not ill at ease even if grants are made to a school in which no religion at all is taught. A people divided in religion pays its taxes, and a Parliament divided in religion votes the public money by an equitable balance for our manifold uses in the midst of our manifold divisions. No one has a right to control this mixed administration to satisfy his private conscience, or to claim to have it all his own way. No Secularist can regard my schools with more aversion than I regard his; but I am passive when he receives his share of the public money. I trust the day will never come when any one section or sect among us shall gain a domination over the equities which render tolerable our divided state. I hope no Puritans will rise up again to do in England, by the help of Secularists and unbelievers, what they did in Maryland. There they destroyed the fairest promise of peace that a wrecked world ever saw. England at this time is Maryland upon an imperial scale. He who shall break our religious peace will go down to history with those whose names Englishmen try to forget.

It is for this reason that I lament when six millions of British subjects are told by a voice of great authority that they are loyal indeed, but in spite of their religion. When men are so taught they are very apt to learn the lesson. They will be ready to say, if by my whole life I am loyal, but by my religion. I ought, as I am told, to be disloyal, I am, therefore, either a traitor or a heretic. If I am a heretic I shall lose my soul; but for imputed treason I can only lose my life. If men of Mr. Gladstone's age and fame say these things, the masses will be

very apt to believe them. And if he should also say that Pius IX. and the whole Episcopate, and the Vatican Council, and the Clergy of England and Ireland, so believe and teach, I can hardly find fault with a plain man who says, 'Your arguments and quotations are above me, but I know that the Pope and the Church cannot mislead me; they must know the Catholic faith better than you. At all costs I must believe them.' I could not blame such a man in refusing for so obvious a reason to listen to Mr. Gladstone when he expostulates with the Vatican Council. Indeed, I can conceive that it will not promote loyalty in England or Ireland to hold up passages from books written even by me in proof that Catholics must choose between their loyalty and their religion. They may be more likely to choose to err even with me than to correct their faith at the voice of any politician. Moreover, they may even be tempted to think that if I am not loyal they need not be. It is a dangerous thing to tell a flock of many millions that the Pastors they trust are, or ought to be, disloyal. They will be apt to say, 'We do not understand it; but if it be true, there must be some very strong and sufficient reason.' I can conceive that the Catholic peasants in Germany may have argued in this plain way, even before they understood the merits of the cause. They saw the Archbishop of Posen carried off to prison. Depend upon it their confidence went with him. This is playing with edged tools, and in a matter where it is hardly moral to play at all. Great public disasters might be caused by the game, and the costs of the game would fall, not upon the gamester, but upon innocent men, and women, and children.

I could not refrain from saying thus much of England. But I have little fear that the stream of our equal legislation will be turned aside, much less turned back; or that our public peace will be broken. The destinies of the British Empire are in strong hands, guided by calm heads, and supported by a balanced and steady public opinion, which in the last two months has manifested a self-command and an equity which do honour to our country.

As to Germany I shall say no more. Luther's mighty trumpet has already rung twice through Germany. It rang long and loud from 1535 to 1542, and again longer and louder from 1618 to 1648. The old Germany that heard it has ceased to exist.

See Archbishop Trench's *Gustavus Adolphus*, pp. 88, 89, 161.

God grant that it may not give such notes again. Everyone who bears a human heart, and a love for the Christian world and a good-will to Germany, will share in this desire.

But if the conflicts of Governments against the Church are fatal to the public peace and to themselves, as assuredly they would be to the British Empire if our accusers should rekindle old strifes, and as they assuredly will be in the German Empire, whether the policy of Prince Von Bismarck fail or succeed, there can be found no sadder example of this disastrous imprudence in statesmen than in the case of Italy. For eight and twenty years a wanton and mischievous aggression against the Holy See has been carried on. I say wanton, because it has been without a cause. I say mischievous, because it has retarded and endangered the unity and independence of Italy, and the public and private prosperity of the Italian people. As Mr. Gladstone has reviewed his relation to the Italian question in its bearing on his Expostulation, I may do the same.

At the outset of their task of unifying and vindicating the independence of Italy, the Italian politicians began by assailing the principle of all unity among men. They engaged all the pride and all the passion of Italy in a deadly conflict with the special source of all its greatness. Had they worked from that centre of their moral life, Italy at this day would have been united, peaceful, and strong. These are, indeed, my convictions, but not my words. Neither the present party which rules Italy, nor the party which has encouraged them in this country, will, perhaps, listen to me. But they will listen, I hope, to one who was an Italian, and a lover of the unity and independence of Italy. Vincenzo Gioberti, in his 'Primato degli Italiani,' after proving that religion is the source of all civilisation, says:—

'If, then, the whole culture of a people has its impulse and origin from religion, how can we treat of its culture without speaking of its religion? If the culture of Europe in general, and that of Italy in particular, were the work of the New Rome and of its belief, how is it possible to discuss this twofold argument, and to be silent about Catholicism and about the Pope? In writing a book upon Italy I protest that I desire to speak of the living and real Italy as it exists at this day, not of the Italy that is dead these fourteen hundred years, nor of an abstract allegorical Italy that is not to be found in the outward world, but only in the brain of some philosopher.' . . . 'Italy is differenced from the Gentile nations by its Christianity; from those that are in heresy and schism by its Catholicism; and from the other nations which are Catholic by the fact that it is placed in the centre of Catholicism, and not in the outline or circumference.' 'But among the Catholic populations, the Italian has the privilege of occupying the first place, because it possesses in its heart the first See.

'I hope that these suggestions will be enough to justify the small amount of theology that I have put into this book. . . . Two facts seem to me conspicuous in the political (civile) world at this day' . . . 'the first is the exclusion of the Theology of Revelation from the field of the Encyclopedia of human knowledge; the second is the removal of the Catholic clergy from the influence in civil affairs.' . . . 'I count it to be the duty of a writer, above all if he be a philosopher, Catholic and Italian, to combat these two grand aberrations of modern

civilisation, and to recall things to their first principles; endeavouring to restore the universal primacy of religion in the circle of things and of knowledge.' . . . 'I therefore do not believe that I deceive myself in affirming that every scientific reform is vain, if it do not make chief account of religion, and that every scheme of Italian renovation is null, if it have not for its base the cornerstone of Catholicism.'

Gioberti, Primato degli Italiani, vol. ii. pp. 28-31.

After a contrast of the theoretical abstractions of the Ghibelline party and the practical and popular policy of the Guelphs, Gioberti continues:—

'The Italy of that day was not the Italy of the ancient Latins, corrupted by the incapacity of the later Emperors, and destroyed by the ferocity of the northern barbarians. In its stead a new Rome had been created, under the auspices, not of Romulus, but of Peter, not of the Conscript Fathers of old Rome, but of the Episcopate, and of the councils which are the Patrician order and the Senate of the universal Christendom. The Guelphs, therefore, did not separate the civil constitution of Italy from the Pontificate, and, without confounding the human order with the divine, they believed that God, having privileged the Peninsula with the first See of the faith, mother of all others . . . it ought to exercise the chief part in the political order of Italy.' . . . 'But in this day many think otherwise, and in their opinion the Pope has about as much to do with the national condition of Italy as he has with that of China. This comes from the weakness into which foreign influences have led the Papacy, and from the springing up again for the last century of the ancient spirit of the Nominalists and the Ghibellines, under the form of Gallicanism, Jansenism, Cartesianism, Voltairianism, or under the disguise of rationalism and German pantheism, prompted by the same principles, and springing from the same countries respectively as those former heresies. And the evil will last as long as men persist in substituting a heathen or chimerical Italy in the place of a real and a Christian Italy, which God, and a life of eighteen hundred years, has created; that is to say, a French or German Italy in the place of an Italy of the Italians. But I cannot understand how men can ascribe the civilisation of Europe in general to Christianity (of which there is at this day no writer of any force who doubts), and not award in particular the culture of our Peninsula to the Holy See; for the Pope is to the universal Church that which the civilisation of Italy is to that of Europe.'

Gioberti, Primato degli Italiani, vol. ii. pp. 66, 67.

I will add but one more passage, which will enunciate in the words of an Italian patriot the affirmation I have made:—

'The separating of the national personality of Italy from its religious principle, and from the dignity which spreads throughout it from the Christian monarchy of which it is the home (residenza), is not, in my opinion, the least of the causes which, for many centuries, weakens the minds of Italians. This error sprung in part from the habit of arguing and judging of Christian Italy after the manner of pagans, and in part from the custom of reasoning, according to the canons of a philosophy which is governed, not by rational ideas nor by living and concrete facts, but by empty abstractions.'

Ibid. 60.

Such was the estimate of a man who loved Italy with all his heart, and desired to see it united, and independent of all foreign dynasties.

This is no mere speculation as to what the Catholic religion and the Pope may be to Italy, but a strict historical fact. The Pontiffs have been for fourteen hundred years the chief popular power in Italy. I say popular, not dynastic; not despotic, but Guelf. In the fifth century the Pontiffs saved Italy from the Gothic invasions. St. Innocent I. saved Ravenna and Rome. St. Leo saved Italy from Attila, and Rome from Genseric. In the sixth and seventh centuries St. Gregory was the chief defender of Italy and Rome against the Lombards. The same is true in the time of Gregory II. and Adrian I. In the ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries the Pontiffs Leo IV. and Gregory IV. saved Italy from the Saracens. So also John VIII., John X., Benedict VIII. beat back the Saracens, and finally drove them from Sardinia. The Crusades of Urban II. and St. Pius V. saved Italy and Europe from the Mohammedan Power. In the great contest about Investitures, the Pontiffs, from Gregory VII. to Calistus II., saved the Church from subjection to the Empire, and Italy from subjection to Germany. The ecclesiastical and political liberties of Italy were both at stake, and were both vindicated together by the action of the Pontiffs. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the liberty of the Italian Communes was saved from the feudal despotism of the Hohenstaufen by the Popes. Alexander III. and the Lombard League defended popular liberty against Frederick Barbarossa. The City of Alexandria is to this day the monument of the gratitude of the Lombard people. The City of Cæsarea has ceased to exist. Innocent III. and the Tuscan League saved the liberties of Central Italy. Gregory IX. and Innocent IV. resisted the tyranny of Frederick II., and finally saved the independence of Italy from the Imperial despotism. Then came the contest of the people and the Empire, the Guelfs and the Ghibellines. In these conflicts the Popes and the people were indivisible. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the Popes were the soul and the strength of the Italian Leagues, whereby the people and their liberties were protected from the enormities of tyrants and adventurers and Free Companies. In the fifteenth

century Nicholas V. maintained peace among the Princes and people of Italy, and drew Naples, Milan, Florence, Venice, and Genoa into a Confederation to maintain the Italian independence.

Pius II. protected, in like manner, the liberty of Italy from the intrusions of France. Paul II. leagued together all the Princes of Italy in defence of Italian freedom. Julius II. laboured to drive all foreign domination out of Italy. Leo X. made it his chief policy to liberate Italy from all foreign dominion, and to unite all the Princes of Italy in a Confederation of independence.

Paul IV., though unsuccessful, was the champion of the independence of Italy against the Spaniards. From that time onwards the Pontiffs were ever in conflict against Spain or France to save the liberties of Italy and of the Church. The histories of Pius VI. and Pius VII. are too well known to need recital.

It is therefore too late in the day to go about to persuade men that the Pontiffs were ever opposed to Italian unity, Italian freedom, Italian independence. These three things have been the aim and the work of the whole line of Popes, down to Pius IX. Even Mr. Gladstone acknowledges that Pius IX. is 'an Italian.'

Expostulation, p. 49.

Beyond all doubt there is not one in the long line I have quoted who has loved Italy more than he. There is not one who had at heart more ardently the unity, freedom, and independence of Italy. His first act was to set free every political prisoner with a full pardon. By that act he showed that he recognised the misdirected love of country in those who had been seduced into false or unlawful ways of seeking the unity and the liberties of their country.

In 1847 Pius IX. invited all the Princes of Italy to a League of Customs, by which the principle of Federal Unity would have been established. From this germ the National Unity would have steadily grown up, without shock or overthrow of right or justice. Once confederated, there was no identity of interests, no unity of power, which might not have grown solid and mature. This and the Supreme Council for the Government of the Pontifical State are proof enough of his desire for Italian unity, and of the far-reaching foresight with which he aimed at the elevation of Italy. And as for Italian independence, let the following letter, written by himself to the Emperor of Austria on the 2nd of May, 1848, suffice:—

Your Imperial Majesty, this Holy See has been always wont to speak words of peace in the midst of the wars that stain the Christian world with blood; and in our Allocution of the 29th of last month, while we declared that our paternal heart shrunk from declaring war, we expressly declared our ardent desire to restore peace. Let it not be displeasing, therefore, to your Majesty that we turn to your piety and religion, and exhort you with a father's affection to withdraw your armies from a war which, while it cannot reconquer to the Empire the hearts of the Lombards and Venetians, draws after it the lamentable series of calamities that ever accompany warfare, and are assuredly abhorred and detested by you. Let it not be displeasing to the generous German people, that we invite them to lay aside all hatreds and to turn a domination which could not be either noble or happy while it rests only on the sword, into the useful relations of friendly neighbourhood. Thus we trust that the German nation, honourably proud of its own nationality, will not engage its honour in sanguinary attempts against the Italian nation, but will place it rather in nobly acknowledging it as a sister, as indeed both nations are our daughters, and most dear to our heart; thereby mutually withdrawing to dwell each one in its natural boundaries with honourable treaties and the benediction of the Lord. Meanwhile, we pray to the Giver of all lights and the Author of all good to inspire your Majesty with holy counsels, and give from our inmost heart to you and Her Majesty the Empress, and to the Imperial family, the Apostolic benediction.

'Given in Rome at Santa Maria Maggiore, on the third day of May, in the year 1848, the second of our Pontificate,
'PIUS PP. IX.'

The following passage, from an impartial observer, will attest what were the intentions and desires of Pius IX.:—

The opposition of Austria has been constant and intense from the moment of his election. The spectacle of an Italian Prince, relying for the maintenance of his power on the affectionate regard and the national sympathies of his people; the resolution of the Pope to pursue a course of moderate reform, to encourage railroads, to emancipate the press, to admit laymen to offices in the State, and to purify the law; but, above all, the dignified independence of action manifested by the Court of Rome, have filled the Austrians with exasperation and apprehension. There is not the least doubt that the Cabinet of Vienna is eager to grasp at the slightest pretext for an armed intervention south of the Po. If such a pretext do not occur, it is but too probable that it may be created; and any disturbances calculated to lead to such a result would at once betray their insidious origin. Meanwhile, the Pope is menaced in Austrian notes, which have sometimes transgressed the limits of policy and decorum; and the minor Princes of Italy are terrified by extravagant intimations of hostile designs entertained against them by the National Party, headed by the Pope and the House of Savoy, in order to persuade them that their only safeguard is the Austrian army. These intrigues may be thought necessary to the defence of the tottering power of Austria south of the Alps, for every step made in advance by Italy is a step

towards the emancipation of the country.'

Times, March 28, 1847.

But the evil genius of revolution had begun to work. Across the field of the Christian and Catholic traditions of Italy, a chimerical theory of a Communistic State, a Republic without Christianity, a democracy without King or Pontiff, forced itself.

Mazzini had been crying for years, 'The Papacy is extinct, Catholicism is a corpse, and the Pope knows this. . . . Read the Encyclical Letter.'

Life and Writings of Mazzini, vol. i. p. 248.

He had taught Young Italy the three degrees, of Guerilla Bands, Insurrection, Revolution.

Ibid. p. 108, and Appendix, 1864.

The mine was charged and the fuse already lighted. This widespread Secret Association covered the face of Italy. What followed all men know: the murder of Rossi, the siege of the Quirinal Palace, the wreck of all authority, the Socialist Revolution, the Roman Republic, impunity of sacrilege, and a reign of terror.

Now, let us suppose that in the period of our history, when the unity of the English people was gradually consolidating, some organised Apostleship of Socialism had begun to whisper in private and to preach in public such doctrines of conspiracy as these, and to teach that the people could never be free so long as King or Priest existed; that all monarchical power and ecclesiastical authority were enemies of the public weal; that the overthrow of the Monarchy and the extinction of the Church were the only remedies of present evils, the only means of future progress. Such a foreign element of discord, mistrust, conspiracy would have divided the hearts, intellects, and wills of the people of England, and rendered its unification impossible. The unity of religion in faith and worship, the unity of the Spiritual authority which spoke to the reason and the will of men, was then, as it is at this hour, the only principle of unity. Without this, legislation is merely mechanical; a dynamic power is wanted to bind men into one people. Our forefathers had it, and the English Monarchy of a thousand years is its fruit. The Italians have it at this hour in great vividness; but Philosophers and Doctrinaires, Conspirators and Communists, are perverting the intellect and dividing the wills of the rising men of Italy. If such a conspiracy had crossed our early unification, we should have been, it may be, at this day, I will not say a Heptarchy, but assuredly a divided people, with a paralyzed national will. May God save Italy from this danger. It is not too late. It was said in an eloquent speech, the other day, that a people which breaks with its past is doomed to division and to instability. The rupture of France with its ancient traditions in 1789 has generated the brood of political parties, which, from month to month, thwart and defeat each other's action, like palsied limbs. If Italy should break with its past; if it should forget the labours, and sufferings, and dangers which united its Pontiffs and its people in the wars of its independence, freedom, and unity; if it should forget the confederations wrought by the Pontiffs, by which they made all the divisions of Italy work together for the liberties of the whole Peninsula, from the Alps to its foot—then, indeed, I should despair of its future. It could have no other in store than a chronic warfare of parties, and the final sway of some successful soldier.

Of the population of 26,000,000 Italians not three millions have launched themselves in the revolution of the last twenty years. The great bulk of the people are, as they have always been, Christian, Catholic, and loyal. The Electoral body who have votes to return the Italian Parliament do not exceed in number some half million. Of these hardly one-half record their vote. The Italian Deputies are, therefore, chosen by one-hundredth part of the population. The whole Chamber is, therefore, revolutionary, and may be divided into two parties—the moderate revolution and the extreme revolution. The Catholic voters abstain from all participation in such a state. They are not revolutionists, either extreme or moderate. They could elect no deputy but one of their own principles; and no such deputy could sit, because to take his place he must bind himself by oath to the existing state of things, including, therefore, the violation of the sovereignty of the Pontiff. More than this, the existing state of the law has invaded the liberties and jurisdiction of the Church. It has abolished religious orders and institutions, it has harshly turned out their inmates upon a pittance, which, if paid, would not suffice for food. It has confiscated property, seized upon colleges, abolished theology from the universities, and the Christian doctrine from schools. And all this, be it remembered, not to meet the distracted state of a people who have lost their religious unity, and must be provided with civil marriage and secular education, but in the midst of a population absolutely and universally Catholic. This, and not what Mr. Gladstone, with a strange want of accuracy, supposes, is what the Syllabus condemns. It nowhere condemns the civil policy which is necessary for a people hopelessly divided in religion. For us this may be a necessity. In Italy it is a doctrine of the Doctrinaires. To force upon the united people of Italy that which is necessary for the divided people of England is a senseless legislation, and a mischievous breaking with the glorious past of Italy. I do not now stay to dwell upon the unpatriotic and un-Italian agitation of men who for twenty-five years have threatened Pius IX. with violence, and assailed him as the Vampire, the Canker, the Gangrene of Italy. Such men, from Aspromonte to this day, have been the chief hindrance to the unification and pacification of Italy. And those who in this country have encouraged and abetted those agitators—not that they knew anything but that Garibaldi was

fighting against the Pope—have been among the worst friends of Italy; I might say among the unconscious but most mischievous enemies. It is strange how this one taint of bigotry will pervert everything. Garibaldi was raising insurrection in Sicily and Naples against a lawful sovereign; and those who put us now to question about our loyalty cheered and aided him by all moral influence. More than this, when the leader of rebellion came to England he was received with royal honours, and red carpets were spread for him at the threshold of aristocratic houses, until his name was found to be contagious. Then, in twenty-four hours he was sped from England with the profuse facilities of departure which wait upon an unwelcome guest. In my judgment—and I have formed it not in London from newspaper correspondents, but in Home during many a long residence, extending in all over seven years—those who have encouraged this chronic agitation against the religion of Italians and the independence of Rome, have been among the chief causes of the present disorders of Italy. They could put no surer bar to its unity or to the solution of the Roman question which they confidently believe to be settled. They are keeping it open by encouraging the Government of the day to persist in quarreling with the Catholic Church and with its Head. But this part of the subject has outgrown its proportion. I return, therefore, to the proposition I set out to prove,—that by the collisions which now exist between the Civil Powers and the Church, the Governments of Europe are destroying the main principle of their own stability. And I must add that they who are rekindling the old fires of religious discord in such an equal and tempered Commonwealth as ours, seem to me to be serving neither God nor their country.

Chapter V. The Motive of the Definition.

MY last proposition is that the motive of the Council of the Vatican for defining the Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff was not any temporal motive, nor was it for temporal ends; but that the Definition was made in the face of all temporal dangers, in order to guard the Divine deposit of Christianity, and to vindicate the Divine certainty of Faith.

I have read many things in Mr. Gladstone's pamphlet which are unlike himself, but none seems more so to me than this question, 'Why did that Court, with policy for ever in its eye, lodge such, formidable demands for power of the vulgar kind in that sphere which is visible, and where hard knocks can undoubtedly be given as well as received?'

Expostulation, p. 47.

Would it not have been more seemly and more dignified if the question had been couched in some such words as these: 'Why has the Catholic Church, in a moment of great peril, when a revolution is at the gates of Rome, and the Civil Powers of the world are uniting, not only to forsake it, but even to threaten it with opposition—why has it at such a time, in spite of every inducement of policy, and every motive of interest, and in defiance of every pleading of worldly wisdom, persisted in defining the Infallibility of the Pope—a doctrine which is sure to bring down upon the Church the animosities of all its enemies without, and the conspiracies of all its faithless members within?' Even Mr. Gladstone can see that this was most impolitic. Why, then, will he accuse the Church of always having policy in its eye? By his own confession it is not always so: for he is witness that it is not so in this case. Why, then, would he not say so? I will gladly answer the question he has put.

The reasons, then, why the Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff ought to be defined were publicly stated as follows, in 1869, before the Vatican Council met; and some or all of them, I believe, prevailed in determining the Council to make that definition:—

'Those who maintain that the time is ripe, and that such a definition would be opportune, justify their opinion on the following reasons:—

- Because the doctrine of the Infallibility of the Vicar of Jesus Christ, speaking *ex cathedra*, in matter of faith and morals, is true.
- Because this truth has been denied.
- Because this denial has generated extensive doubt as to the truth of this doctrine, which lies at the root of the immemorial and universal practice of the Church, and therefore at the foundation of Christianity in the world.
- Because this denial, if it arose informally about the time of the Council of Constance, has been revived, and has grown into a formal and public error since the closing of the last General Council.
- Because, if the next General Council shall pass it over, the error will henceforward appear to be tolerated, or at least left in impunity; and the Pontifical censures of Innocent XI., Alexander VIII., Innocent XII., and Pius VI. will appear to be of doubtful effect.
- Because this denial of the traditional belief of the Church is not a private, literary, and scholastic opinion; but a patent, active, and organised opposition to the prerogatives of the Holy See.

- Because this erroneous opinion has gravely enfeebled the doctrinal authority of the Church in the minds of a certain number of the faithful; and if passed over in impunity, this ill effect will be still further encouraged.
- Because this erroneous opinion has at times caused and kept open a theological and practical division among pastors and people; and has given occasion to domestic criticisms, mistrusts, animosities, and alienations.
- Because these divisions tend to paralyse the action of truth upon the minds of the faithful *ad intra*; and, consequently, by giving a false appearance of division and doubt among Catholics, upon the minds of Protestants and others *ad extra*.
- Because, as the absence of a definition gives occasion for these separations and oppositions of opinion among pastors and people, so, if defined, the doctrine would become a basis and a bond of unity among the faithful.
- Because, if defined in an (Ecumenical Council, the doctrine would be at once received throughout the world, both by those who believe the Infallibility of the Pontiff and by those who believe the Infallibility of the Church, and with the same universal joy and unanimity as the definition of the Immaculate Conception.
- Because the definition of the ordinary means whereby the faith is proposed to the world is required to complete the treatise "De Fide Divina."
- Because the same definition is required to complete the treatise "De Ecclesia, deque Dotibus ejus."
- Because it is needed to place the Pontifical Acts during the last three hundred years, both in declaring the truth, as in the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, and in condemning errors, as in the long series of propositions condemned in Baius, Jansenius, and others, beyond cavil or question; and still more, to make manifest that the active Infallibility of the Church, between council and council, is not dormant, suspended, or intermittent; and to exclude the heretical supposition that infallible decrees are left to the exposition and interpretation of a fallible judge.
- Because the full and final declaration of the divine authority of the Head of the Church is needed to exclude from the minds of pastors and faithful the political influences which have generated Gallicanism, Imperialism, Regalism, and Nationalism, the perennial sources of error, contention, and schism.

'For these, and for many more reasons which it is impossible now to detail, many believe that a definition or declaration which would terminate this long and pernicious question, would be opportune; and that it might for ever be set at rest by the condemnation of the propositions following:—

- That the decrees of the Roman Pontiffs in matter of faith and morals do not oblige the conscience unless they be made in a General Council, or before they obtain at least the tacit consent of the Church.
- That the Roman Pontiff, when he speaks in matter of faith and morals, as the universal Doctor and Teacher of the Church, may err.'

Petri Privilegium, part ii. pp. 119-122. (Longmans, 1869.)

I will now, as briefly as I can, state what the Definition is. The greater part of the excitement and alarm on this subject arises from a want of just and clear perception of what the doctrine of Infallibility signifies.

'The fourth and last chapter of the "Constitution on the Church" defines the infallible doctrinal authority of the Roman Pontiff as the supreme teacher of all Christians.

'The chapter opens by affirming that to this supreme jurisdiction is attached a proportionate grace, whereby its exercise is directed and sustained.

'This truth has been traditionally held and taught by the Holy See, by the *praxis* of the Church, and by the Ecumenical Councils, especially those in which the East and the West met in union together; as, for instance, the fourth of Constantinople, the second of Lyons, and the Council of Florence.

'It is then declared that, in virtue of the promise of our Lord, "I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not," St. Luke xxii. 31, 32.

a perpetual grace of stability in faith was Divinely attached to Peter and to his successors in his See.

'The definition then affirms "that the Roman Pontiff, when he speaks *ex cathedra*—that is, when in discharge of the office of Pastor and Doctor of all Christians, by virtue of his supreme Apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine regarding faith or morals to be held by the Universal Church—by the Divine assistance promised to him in Blessed Peter, is possessed of that Infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer willed that His Church should be endowed for defining doctrine regarding faith and morals; and that, therefore, such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves, and not from the consent of the Church.

'In this definition there are six points to be noted:

'First, it defines the meaning of the well-known phrase, *loquens ex cathedra*', that is, speaking from the seat, or place, or with the authority of, the supreme teacher of all Christians, and binding the assent of the Universal Church.

'Secondly, the subject-matter of his infallible teaching; namely, the doctrine of faith and morals.

'Thirdly, the efficient cause of Infallibility; that is, the Divine assistance promised to Peter, and in Peter to his successors.

'Fourthly, the act to which this Divine assistance is attached; namely, the *defining* of doctrines of faith and morals.

'Fifthly, the extension of this infallible authority to the limits of the doctrinal office of the Church.

'Lastly, the dogmatic value of the definitions *ex cathedra*; namely, that they are in themselves irreformable, because in themselves infallible, and not because the Church, or any part or member of the Church, should assent to them.

'These six points contain the whole definition of Infallibility.

'I. First, the definition limits the Infallibility of the Pontiff to the acts which emanate from him *ex cathedra*. This phrase, which has been long and commonly used by theologians, has now, for the first time, been adopted into the terminology of the Church, and in adopting it the Vatican Council fixes its meaning. The Pontiff speaks *ex cathedra* when, and only when, he speaks as the Pastor and Doctor of all Christians. By this all acts of the Pontiff as a private person, or a private doctor, or as a local bishop, or as sovereign of a State, are excluded.

Cardinal Sfondrati, writing in 1684, explained this truth as follows:—"The Pontiff does some things as man, some as prince, some as doctor, some as pope; that is, as head and foundation of the Church; and it is only to these (last-named) actions that we attribute the gift of Infallibility. The others we leave to his human condition. As, then, not every action of the Pope is papal, so not every action of the Pope enjoys the papal privilege. This, therefore, is to act as Pontiff, and to speak *ex cathedra*, which is not within the competency of any (other) doctor or bishop."—*Regale Sacerdotium*, lib. iii. sec. 1.

In all these acts the Pontiff may be subject to error. In one and one only capacity he is exempt from error: that is, when, as teacher of the whole Church, he teaches the whole Church in things of faith and morals.

'Our Lord declared "Super Cathedram Moysi sederunt Scribæ et Pharisei—the Scribes and Pharisees have sat in the chair of Moses." The seat or *cathedra* of Moses signifies the authority and the doctrine of Moses; the *cathedra Petri* is in like manner the authority and doctrine of Peter. The former was binding by Divine command, and under pain of sin, upon the people of God under the Old Law; the latter is binding by Divine command, and under pain of sin, upon the people of God under the New.

'I need not here draw out the traditional use of the term *cathedra Petri*, which in St. Cyprian, St. Optatus, and St. Augustine, is employed as synonymous with the successor of Peter, and is used to express the centre and test of Catholic unity. *Ex cathedra* is therefore equivalent to *ex cathedra Petri*, and distinguishes those acts of the successors of Peter which are done as supreme teacher of the whole Church.

'The value of this phrase is great, inasmuch as it excludes all cavil and equivocation as to the acts of the Pontiff in any other capacity than that of supreme Doctor of all Christians, and in any other subject-matter than the matters of faith and morals.

'II. Secondly, the definition limits the range, or, to speak exactly, the object of Infallibility, to the doctrine of faith and morals. It excludes, therefore, all other matter whatsoever.

'The great commission or charter of the Church is, in the words of our Lord, "Go ye therefore and teach all nations . . . teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world."

St. Matt, xxviii. 19. 20.

'In these words are contained five points:

'First, the perpetuity and universality of the mission of the Church as the teacher of mankind.

'Secondly, the deposit of the Truth and of the Commandments, that is, of the Divine Faith and Law entrusted to the Church.

'Thirdly, the office of the Church, as the sole interpreter of the Faith and of the Law.

'Fourthly, that it has the sole Divine jurisdiction existing upon earth, in matters of salvation, over the reason and the will of man.

'Fifthly, that, in the discharge of this office, our Lord is with His Church always, and to the consummation of the world.

'The doctrine of faith and the doctrine of morals are here explicitly described. The Church is infallible in this deposit of revelation.

'And in this deposit are truths and morals both of the natural and of the supernatural order; for the religious truths and morals of the natural order are taken up into the revelation of the order of grace, and form a part of the object of Infallibility.

'The phrase, then, "faith and morals" signifies the whole revelation of faith; the whole way of salvation through faith; or the whole supernatural order, with all that is essential to the sanctification and salvation of man through Jesus Christ.

'This formula is variously expressed by the Church and by theologians; but it always means one and the same thing.

'The Fourteenth Œcumenical Council of Lyons in 1274 says, "If any questions arise concerning faith, they are to be decided by the Roman Pontiff."

'Si quæ subortæ fuerint quæstiones de fide, suo (i.e. Rom. Pont.) debent judicio definiri.'—Labbe, *Concil.* tom. xiv. p. 512, Venice, 1731.

'The Council of Trent uses the formula "In things of faith and morals pertaining to the edification of Christian doctrine."

'In rebus fidei et morum ad ædificationem doctrinæ: Christianæ) pertinentium.'—Sess. iv. *Decret. de Edit, et Usu Sac. Lib.*

.....

'The object of Infallibility, therefore, is the whole revealed Word of God; and all that is so in contact with revealed truth, that without treating of it the Word of God could not be guarded, expounded, and defended. As, for instance, in declaring the Canon, and authenticity, and true interpretation of Holy Scripture, and the like.

'Further, it is clear that the Church has an infallible guidance, not only in all matters that are revealed, but also in all matters which are opposed to revelation. For the Church could not discharge its office as the Teacher of all nations, unless it were able with infallible certainty to proscribe doctrines at variance with the Word of God.

'From this, again, it follows that the *direct* object of Infallibility is the Revelation, or Word, of God; the *indirect* object is whatsoever is necessary for its exposition or defence, and whatsoever is contrariant to the Word of God, that is, to faith and morals. The Church, having a Divine office to condemn errors in faith and morals, has therefore an infallible assistance in discerning and in proscribing false philosophies and false science.

'Further, the Church, which, together with the Apostolic office of teaching, has received a charge to guard the deposit of faith, derives from God the right and the duty of proscribing false science, lest any should be deceived by philosophy and vain deceit (Coloss. ii. 8).'—*Constitution on the Catholic Faith*, chap. iv. 'Of Faith and Reason.'

.....

'I will not here attempt to enumerate the subject-matters which fall within the limits of the Infallibility of the Church. It belongs to the Church alone to determine the limits of its own Infallibility. Hitherto it has not done so except by its acts, and from the practice of the Church we may infer to what matter its infallible discernment extends. It is enough for the present to show two things:—

'Firstly, that the Infallibility of the Church extends, as we have seen, directly to the whole matter of revealed truth, and indirectly to all truths which, though not revealed, are in such contact with revelation that the deposit of faith and morals cannot be guarded, expounded, and defended without an infallible discernment of such unrevealed truths.

'Secondly, that this extension of the Infallibility of the Church is, by the unanimous teaching of all theologians, at least theologically certain; and, in the judgment of the majority of theologians, certain by the certainty of faith.

'Such is the traditional doctrine respecting the Infallibility of the Church in faith and morals. By the definition of the Vatican Council, what is traditionally believed by all the faithful in respect to the Church is expressly declared of the Roman Pontiff. But the definition of the extent of that Infallibility, and of the certainty on which it rests, in matters not revealed, has not been treated as yet, but is left for the second part of the *Schema de Ecclesia*.

'Again, the definition declares the efficient cause of Infallibility to be a Divine assistance promised to Peter, and in Peter to his successors.

'The explicit promise is that of our Divine Lord to Peter, "I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not; and thou, being once converted, confirm thy brethren."

St. Luke xxii. 32.

'The implicit promise is in the words, "On this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it."

St. Matt. xvi. 18.

.....

'The Divine assistance is therefore a *charisma*, a grace of the supernatural order, attached to the Primacy of Peter, which is perpetual in his successors.

'I need hardly point out that between the *charisma*, or *gratia gratis data*, of Infallibility and the idea of impeccability there is no connection. I should not so much as notice it, if some had not strangely obscured the subject by introducing this confusion. I should have thought that the gift of prophecy in Balaam and Caiaphas,

to say nothing of the powers of the priesthood, which are the same in good and bad alike, would have been enough to make such confusion impossible.

'The preface to the Definition carefully lays down that Infallibility is not inspiration.

'The Divine assistance by which the Pontiffs are guarded from error, when as Pontiffs they teach in matters of faith and morals, contains no new revelation. Inspiration contained, not only assistance in writing, but sometimes the suggestion of truths not otherwise known. The Pontiffs are witnesses, teachers, and judges of the revelation already given to the Church; and in guarding, expounding, and defending that revelation, their witness, teaching, and judgment are by Divine assistance preserved from error.'

Petri Privilegium, part iii. pp. 56-60, 66, 78, 84. (Longmans, 1870.)

I will now answer Mr. Gladstone's question—why the Definition was made. The Vatican Council, then, defined the Infallibility of the Head of the Church, because, if it had failed to do so, the doctrinal authority of the Church would have been weakened throughout the world. Every motive of worldly policy would have tempted the Council to compromise, and to shrink from defining it; but the peremptory obligations of Divine Truth compelled it in defiance of all policy to define it. Necessity was laid upon the Council, and it could not recede. Universal doubt and scepticism are pervading men and nations: therefore the Church defined the Infallibility of its Head, which is the confirmation of its own. As a Divine witness, it declared his commission, and the powers given for its exercise. The Vicar of Jesus Christ testified to the world, wearied with doubt and sick with religious contentions, that the promise of his Master, 'He that heareth you heareth Me,' has not failed. The definition of the Infallible teaching of the Church by its Head affirms that there is still a divine certainty of faith upon earth; and that, as God is the sole Fountain of all Truth, so the Church is the only channel of its conveyance and custody among men. No other policy prompted the Definition. And even though the combined hostility of Civil Powers, as we now see it, had been heated sevenfold hot before its eyes, the Council would not have swerved from declaring, whether politic or not, the truth delivered to its charge. If I speak without hesitation, it is because I am able to speak of that which I saw with my own eyes, and heard with my own ears.

I hope I shall not violate any confidence which ought to be sacred, or any reserve the delicacy of which I fully recognise, in going on to state a fact of which I am able to give personal testimony.

One day, during the deliberations of the Council, when the pressure of Diplomats, and Governments, and journals was at its highest, the Holy Father said, 'I have just been warned that if the Council shall persist in making this definition, the protection of the French army will be withdrawn.' After a pause he added, with great calmness, 'As if the unworthy Vicar of Jesus Christ could be swayed by such motives as these.' I can with perfect certainty affirm that 'policy' had as little influence on the Council of the Vatican as it had on the Council of Nicæa; and that to ascribe the Definition to policy is as strange an aberration of judgment as to ascribe to the Definition the occupation of Rome, or the Franco-German war to the Jesuits and to the Pope. When men say these things, can they believe them?

It needs but little of the historic spirit to perceive that if the Vatican Council, for such motives as these, ought to have abstained from defining the Infallibility of the Head of the Christian Church, the Council of Nicæa ought also to have abstained from defining the *Homöousion*. There was violence all round about it. There was the certainty of a schism. After the Council eighty Bishops apostatised. They appealed, as all heretics ever do, to the Civil Powers. The Arian Schism was formed; it was protected by Emperor after Emperor. Arianism became a State tool against the Catholic Church. It infected Constantinople; it spread into Italy and Spain; it lasted for centuries. But where is it now? And where now is the Creed of Nicæa? The *Homöousion* is at this day in the heart of the whole Church throughout the world. So will it be with the Council of the Vatican. What the Council of Florence implicitly declared, and the Council of Trent assumed as of faith, that the Council of the Vatican explicitly defined. It is very true that since, the Council of Constance, that is, since the great schism of the West, when the Civil Powers of Europe, for a time, shook the visible unity of the Church by endeavouring to lessen the authority of its Head, the power of the Roman Pontiff has steadily consolidated itself in the intellect and the will of the Church. What was believed from the beginning has been now forced into explicit declaration. But while the Church has thus been more and more defining its faith with a Divine precision, the world has wandered off farther and farther into the wilderness of unbelief. The Council of Trent defined the particular doctrines denied by Luther's Reformation. But it did not deal with the master principle on which it rested. The chief character of the sixteenth century was the denial of the Divine authority of the Church, secured to it in virtue of a perpetual assistance of the Spirit of Truth. Three hundred years have unfolded the consequences of this denial. It is nearly complete in the rationalism and infidelity of Germany. The '*Centuria prærogativa*' has a mournful privilege of precedence in the Comitia of unbelievers. It has run its course, too, in Switzerland; and I must add, with sadness, it is running its course in the widespread doubt which is undermining the Christianity of England. Day after day I hear the words, 'I wish I knew what to believe, and why to believe anything!' and this from some of the noblest and most masculine natures, who recoil from the incoherence and contradiction of teachers who gainsay one another. But here is a subject on which I have no

desire to enter. If I were asked to say what is the chief intellectual malady of England and of the world at this day, I should say, ubiquitous, universal doubt, an uncertainty which came in like a flood after the rejection of the Divine certainty of Faith. This uncertainty has already led multitudes to an entire rejection of Christianity; and they have not rested even in Deism. They have gone on to the rejection even of natural religion. They have no certainty that they have a conscience, or a will, or a soul, or a law of morality, or that there is a God. Three hundred years hence, when men look back upon the Council of the Vatican, as they now look back upon the Council of Trent—I will say even thirty years hence, when the noise and dust of the present conflict is laid,—they who have faith left in them will recognise the Divine guidance under which the Council of the Vatican declared the existence of God, with all the truths radiating from it, as resting upon the witness of the visible world; and also the Divine certainty of the Faith, as resting upon the witness of the Visible Church, and finding its perpetual and infallible expression in the voice of its Visible Head.

But it is now more than time to sum up what I hope has been sufficiently proved.

My first answer to the charge that the Vatican Council has made it impossible for Catholics to render a loyal civil allegiance, is that the Vatican Council has not touched our civil allegiance at all; that the laws which govern our civil allegiance are as old as the revelation of Christianity, and are regulated by the Divine constitution of the Church and the immutable duties of natural morality. We were bound by all these obligations before the Vatican Council existed. They are of Divine institution, and are beyond all change, being in themselves unchangeable. I have shown, I hope, that in the conflicts of the Civil Powers with the Church, the causes have arisen, not from acts of the Church, but from such acts as the Constitutions of Clarendon, the claim of Investitures, the creation of Royal Courts of final appeal, and the like; that these invasions of the Spiritual domain ever have been from the attempts of Governments to subject the Church to their own jurisdiction; and now more than ever, from an universal and simultaneous conspiracy against it. A leader of this conspiracy said the other day, 'The net is now drawn so close about the Church of Rome that if it escape this time I will believe it to be Divine.' If God grant him life, I have hope of his conversion. For, that the Church of Rome will escape out of the net is certain, and that for two reasons: first, for the same reason why its Divine Head rose again from the grave—'it was not possible that He should be holden by it;'

Acts ii. 24.

and next, because the Civil Governments, that are now conspiring against it, are preparing for their own dissolution. Finally, I have given the true and evident reason why, when some six hundred Bishops from the ends of the Church were gathered together, they defined the Infallibility of their Head—'*Visum est Spiritui Sancto et nobis.*'

Conclusion.

AND now there only remains for me the hardest and saddest part of the task, which has not been sought by me, but has been forced upon me. A few months ago I could not have believed that I should have ever written these pages. I have never written any with more pain, and none of them have cost me so much as that which I am about to write.

Thus far I have endeavoured to confine myself to the subject-matter of Mr. Gladstone's pamphlet; but before I end, I feel bound by an imperative duty to lay before him, in behalf of his Catholic fellow-countrymen, the nature of the act which he has done.

He has not only invited, but instigated Catholics to rise against the Divine authority of the Catholic Church. He has endeavoured to create divisions among them. If Mr. Gladstone does not believe the authority of the Catholic Church to be Divine, he knows that they do.

If he thinks such a rising to be 'moral and mental freedom,' he knows that they believe it to be what his own Litany calls 'schism, heresy, and deadly sin.' If he believes religious separations to be lawful, he knows that they believe them to be violations of the Divine law. I am compelled therefore to say that this is at least an act of signal rashness.

No man has watched Mr. Gladstone's career as a statesman with a more generous and disinterested good-will than I have. No one has more gladly appreciated his gifts; no one has more equitably interpreted certain acts of his political life, nor has hailed his successes with greater joy. But when he casts off the character of a statesman, for which he has shown so great capacity, to play the Canonist and Theologian, for which he has here shown so little, and that with the intent of sowing discord and animosities among six millions of his fellow-countrymen—and, I must moreover add, with an indulgence of unchastened language rarely to be equalled—I feel bound to say that he has been betrayed into an act for which I can find no adequate excuse. I must tell him that if he would incline the Catholics of the Empire to accept the ministries of his compassion, he must first purify his style both of writing and of thinking. Catholics are not to be convinced or persuaded by

such phrases as 'the present perilous Pontificate;' 'the Papal chair, its aiders and abettors;' 'the great hierarchic power and those who have egged it on;' 'the present degradation of the Episcopal order;' 'the subserviency or pliability of the Council;' 'hideous mummies;' 'head-quarters;' 'the follies of Ecclesiastical power;' 'foreign arrogance;' 'the myrmidons of the Apostolic Chamber;' 'the foreign influence of a caste.' I transcribe these words from his pages with repugnance; not, indeed, for our sake against whom they are levelled, but for the statesman who has thought them fitting. Mr. Gladstone can do many things; but he cannot do all things He has a strong hand; but there is a bow which he cannot bend. He has here tried his hand at a task for which, without something more than mere literary knowledge, even his varied gifts will not suffice. This Expostulation is, as I have already said, an act out of all harmony and proportion with a great statesman's life.

I have written these words with a painful constraint; but, cost what it may, duty must be done, and I believe it to be my duty to record this judgment, in behalf of the Catholics of this country, on an act unjust in itself, and therefore not only barren of all good result, but charged with grave public dangers.

But, I cannot break off with a note so cheerless. If this Expostulation has cast down many hopes both of a public and a private kind, we cannot altogether regret its publication. If such mistrusts and misconceptions existed in the minds of our fellow-subjects, the sooner and the more openly they were made public the better. We are not content to be tolerated as suspect or dangerous persons, or to be set at large upon good behaviour. We thank Mr. Gladstone for gaining us the hearing which we have had before the public justice of our country; and we are confident that his impeachment will be withdrawn. His own mind is too large, too just, and too upright to refuse to acknowledge an error, when he sees that he has been misled. It is also too clear and too accurate not to perceive that such is now the fact. I see in this the augury of a happier and more peaceful future than if this momentary conflict had never arisen. We shall all understand each other better. Our civil and religious peace at home will be firmer by this trial.

If the great German Empire shall only learn in time, thirteen millions of contented Catholic subjects, reconciled as they still may be by a return of just laws, will give a support to its unity which nothing can shake.

If Italy shall only come to see that the 'Roman question' is, and for ever will be, a source of weakness, contention, and danger to its welfare; and, seeing this, shall solve it peacefully, as Italy alone can do, by undoing its un-Catholic and therefore un-Italian policy, then its unity and independence will be secured by the spontaneous cooperation of a united people, gathered around the centre of all its Christian glories. Such a solution would then be consecrated by the highest sanctions of its faith. If wise counsels prevail, and wise friends of Italy shall gain its ear, it may be again what once it was, the foremost people in the Christian world.

And, lastly, for ourselves, our world-wide Empire cannot turn back upon its path without disintegration. It is bound together, not by material force, but by the moral bond of just laws and the glad consent of a free people. But justice and freedom cannot be put asunder. They flow from one source; they can be kept pure only by the same stream. They have come down to us from our Christianity. Divided as we are, we are a Christian people still. By religious conflict our Christianity will waste away as a moth fretting a garment. By religious peace, all that is true, and wise, and just, and Christian, will be perpetually multiplied, binding indissolubly in one all men and all races of our Imperial Commonwealth.

Appendices.

Appendix A.

INNOCENTIUS III. PRÆLATIS PER FRANCIAM CONSTITUTIS. A.D. 1200.

NOVIT Ille, qui nihil ignorat: *et infra.*

Non putet aliquis, quod jurisdictionem illustris Regis Francorum perturbare, aut minuere intendamus, cum ipse jurisdictionem nostram nec velit, nec debeat impedire. Sed cum Dominus dicat in Evangelio, 'Si peccaverit in te frater tuus, vade et corripe eum inter te et ipsum solum: si te audierit, lucratus eris fratrem tuum: si te non audierit, adhibe tecum unum vel duos, ut in ore duorum vel trium testium stet omne verbum. Quod si te non audierit, die Ecclesiæ: si autem Ecclesiam non audierit, sit tibi sicut ethnicus et publicanus.'

Matt, xviii. 15-17.

Et Rex Angliæ sit paratus sufficienter ostendere, quod Rex Francorum peccat in ipsum, et ipse circa eum in correctione processit secundum regulam Evangelicam, et tandem quia nullo modo profecit, dixit Ecclesiæ. Quomodo nos, qui sumus ad regimen universalis Ecclesiæ superna dispositione vocati, mandatum divinum possumus non exaudire, ut non procedamus secundum formam ipsius? Nisi forsitan ipse coram nobis, vel Legato nostro, sufficientem in contrarium rationem ostendat. *Non enim intendimus judicarc de feudo, cujus ad ipsum. spectat judicium: nisi forte jure communi per speciale privilegium, vel contrariam consuetudinem aliquid sit detractum: sed discernere de peccato, cujus ad nos pertinet sine dubitamine censura, quam in*

quemlibet exercere possumus et debemus. Cum enim non humanæ constitutioni sed divince potius innitatur, quia potestas nostra non est ex homine, sed ex Deo, nullus qui sit sanæ mentis ignorat, quin ad officium nostrum spectet de quocunque mortali peccato corripere quemlibet Christianum: et si correctionem contempserit, per districtiorem ecclesiasticam coercere. Sed forsitan dicetur, quod aliter cum regibus et aliter cum aliis est agendum. Cæterum scriptum novimus in lege divina: 'Ita magnum judicabis ut parvum; nec erit apud te acceptio personarum.'

Deut. i. 17.

—Corpus Juris Canonici, *Decret. Gregor.* lib. ii. tit. i. cap. xiii.

BONIFACIUS VIII., AD PERPETUAM REI MEMORIAM. A.D. 1302.

Unam Sanctam Ecclesiam Catholicam et ipsam Apostolicam urgente fide credere cogimur et tenere. Nosque banc firmiter credimus et simpliciter confitemur: extra quam nec salus est, nec remissio peccatorum, Spouso in Canticis proclamante, 'Una est columba mea, perfecta mea: una est matri suæ; electa genitrici suæ:'

Cant. vi. 8.

quæ unum corpus mysticum repræsentat, cujus caput Christus, Christi vero Deus. In qua unus Dominus, una fides, unum baptisma.

Eph. iv. 5.

Una nempe fuit Diluvii tempore arca Noe, unam Ecclesiam præfigurans, quæ; in uno cubito consummata, Gen. vi. 16.

unum, Noe videlicet, gubernatorem habuit et rectorem, extra quam omnis subsistentia super terram legimus fuisse deleta. Hanc autem veneramur et unam; dicente Domino in Propheta, 'Erue a framea, Deus, animam meam et de manu canis unam meam;'

Psalm xxi. 21.

pro anima enim, id est, pro seipso capite simul oravit et corpore: quod corpus unam scilicet Ecclesiam nominavit, propter sponsi, fidei, sacramentorum et charitatis Ecclesiæ unitatem. Hæc est unica illa Domini inconsutilis,

Joann. xix. 23, 24.

quæ scissa non fuit sed sorte provenit. Igitur Ecclesiæ unius et unice unum corpus, unum caput, non duo capita quasi monstrum, Christus videlicet, et Christi vicarius Petrus Petrique successor; dicente Domino ipsi Petro, 'Pasce oves meas,'

Joann. xxi. 17.

'meas,' inquit, et generaliter non singulariter has vel illas, per quod commississe sibi intelligitur universas. Sive ergo Græci, sive alii se dicant Petro ejusque successoribus non esse commissos, fateantur necesse se de ovibus Christi non esse; dicente Domino in Joanne 'unum ovile et unicum esse pastorem.'

Joann. x. 16.

In hac ejusque potestate duos esse gladios, spirituales videlicet et temporales, Evangelicis dictis instruimur. Nam dicentibus Apostolis, 'Ecce gladii duo hic,'

Luc. xxii. 38.

in Ecclesia scilicet, cum Apostoli loquerentur, non respondit Dominus nimis esse sed satis. Certe qui in potestate Petri temporalem gladium esse negat, male verbum attendit Domini proferentis, 'Converte gladium tuum in vaginam.'

Matt. xxvi. 52.

Uterque ergo est in potestate Ecclesiæ, spiritualis scilicet gladius et materialis. Sed is quidem pro Ecclesia, ille vero ab Ecclesia exercendus. Ille sacerdotis, is manu regum et militum, sed ad nuncium et patientiam sacerdotis. Oportet autem gladium esse sub gladio et temporalem auctoritatem spirituali subjici potestati: nam cum dicat Apostolus, 'Non est potestas nisi a Deo, quæ autem sunt a Deo ordinata sunt:'

Horn. xiii. 1.

non autem ordinata essent, nisi gladius esset sub gladio, et tanquam inferior reduceretur per alium in supra. Nam secundum beatum Dionysium, lex divinitatis est, infima per media in supra reduci. Non ergo secundum ordinem universi omnia toque ac immediate, sed infima per media et inferiora per superiora ad ordinem reducuntur. Spirituales autem et dignitate et nobilitate terrenam quamlibet præcellere potestatem, oportet tanto clarius nos fateri quanto spiritualia temporalia antecellunt. Quod etiam ex decimarum datione, et benedictione, et sanctificatione, ex ipsius potestatis acceptione, ex ipsarum rerum gubernatione claris oculis intuemur. Nam veritate testante, spiritualis potestas terrenam potestatem instituere habet et judicare, si bona non fuerit, sic de Ecclesia et ecclesiastica potestate verificatur vaticinium Hieremiæ: 'Ecce constitui te hodie super gentes et regna,'

Hier. i. 10.

et cætera quæ sequuntur. Ergo si deviat terrena potestas, judicabitur a potestate spirituali, sed si deviat

spiritualis minor a suo superiori: si vero suprema, a solo Deo, non ab homine poterit judicari, testante Apostolo, 'Spiritualis homo judicat omnia, ipse autem a nemine judicatur.'

1 Cor. ii. 15.

Est autem hæc auctoritas, etsi data sit homini et exerceatur per hominem, non humana, sed potius divina, ore divino Petro data, sibique suisque successoribus in ipso, quem confessus fuit petra firmata, dicente Domino ipsi Petro, 'Quodcunque ligaveris,'

Matt. xvi. 19.

etc. Quicumque igitur huic potestati a Deo sic ordinatæ resistit, Dei ordinationi resistit,

Eom. xiii. 2.

nisi duo sicut Manichæus fingat esse principia: quod falsum et hæreticum judicamus: quia testante Moyse, non in principiis, sed in principio cælum Deus creavit et terram.

Gen. i. 1.

Porro subesse Romano Pontifici omn humanæ creaturæ declaramus, dicimus, definimus et pronunciamus omnino esse de necessitate salutis.

Datum Laterani xiv kal. Decembris, pontificatus nostri anno octavo.

Corpus Juris Canonic. *Extravag. Commun. lib. i. De Majoritate et Obedientia*, cap. i.

CLEMENTIS V. DIPLOMA, A.D. 1306.

Clemens Episcopus, etc. Ad perpetuam rei memoriam.

Meruit carissimi filii nostri Pliilippi regis Francorum illustris sinceræ devotionis ad nos et Ecclesiam Romanam integritas, et progenitorum suorum præclara merita meruerunt, meruit insuper fida regnicolarum pietas, ac devotionis sinceritas, ut tam regnum quam regem favore benevolo prosequamur. Hinc est quod nos dicto regi et regno per definitionem seu declarationem bonæ memoriæ Bonifacii PP. VIII. pradecessoris nostri, quæ incipit *Unam sanctum*, nullum volumus vel intendimus præjudicium generari. Nec quod per illam rex, regnum, regnicolæ pnælibati amplius Ecclesiæ sint subjecti quam antea existebant. Sed omnia intelligantur in eodem esse statu quo erant ante definitionem prafatam, tam quantum ad Ecclesiam quam etiam quod regem et regnum superius nominatos.

Datum Lugduni kalendis Februarii, pontificatus nostri anno primo.

Labbe, *Concilia, sub ann. 1305*, torn. xiv. p. 1374, ed. Ven. 1731.

Appendix B.

Extract from the Encyclical Letter of Gregory XVI. 'Mirari Vos,' August 15, 1832.

As we have learned that certain writings spread abroad among the people publish doctrines which destroy the loyalty and submission due to princes, and kindle everywhere the torch of civil discord, we have to take especial care that the nations may not be deceived thereby, and led away from the right path. Let all bear in mind, according to the words of the Apostle, that 'there is no power but from God, and those that are ordained of God; therefore he that resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God, and they that resist purchase to themselves damnation.'

Rom. xiii. 2.

Wherefore both divine and human laws cry out against those who, by basely plotting civil discord and sedition, abandon their allegiance to their princes and unite to drive them from their thrones.

For this reason, to avoid so base a crime, it is a well-known fact that the first Christians, in the midst of persecutions, rendered meritorious service to their Emperors and to the safety of the Empire. This they showed by the clearest proofs, not only in fulfilling with all loyalty and promptitude all that was commanded them not contrary to their religion, but by persevering therein even to shedding then blood in battle for them.

'Christian soldiers,' says St. Augustine, 'served an unbelieving Emperor, but when the cause of Christ was in question, they acknowledged only Him who is in Heaven. They distinguished between the Eternal Lord and a temporal lord, and were nevertheless subject to the temporal for the sake of their Eternal Lord.'

St. August, in *Psalm cxxiv. n. 7.*

St. Maurice, the invincible martyr, the captain of the Theban Legion, had this before his eyes when, as St. Eucherius relates, he gave his answer to the Emperor:—'We are your soldiers, O Emperor, but nevertheless, we are free to confess, the servants of God. . . . And now we are not driven into rebellion, even to save our lives, for here we have arms in our hands, and we do not fight, because we have the will to die rather than to slay.'

This loyalty of the first Christians to their princes is the more conspicuous if we consider with Tertullian, that Christians at that time 'were not wanting in numbers and strength if they had wished for open war. We are but of yesterday, and we are found everywhere among you, in your cities, islands, strongholds, towns, public places, in your camps, your tribes, your companies, in your palaces, your senate, and your forum. . . . For what warfare should we not have been able and willing, even at great odds, who so readily offer ourselves to death, if

our religion did not oblige us rather to die than to slay? ... If we, so large a number as we are, had broken away from you and gone to some distant corner of the world, the loss of so many citizens, even such as we are, would have put your empire to shame, nay, would have punished you by the very loss. Without doubt you would have been daunted in your solitude. . . . You would have asked over whom you were ruling: more enemies would have been left than citizens: but now you have fewer enemies, owing to the number of Christians.'

Tertullian in *Apolog.* cap. xxxvii.

These luminous examples of immovable loyalty to princes, which necessarily followed from the holy precepts of the Christian religion, at once condemn the detestable pride and wickedness of those who, boiling with unbridled lust for an inordinate liberty, are wholly engaged in destroying and tearing to pieces all the rights of princes in order to reduce the nations to slavery under pretence of liberty.—See *Recueil des Allocutions des Souverains Pontifes*. Paris, Le Clère, 1865, pp. 165-6.

Appendix C.

For the accuracy of the following statement I have direct evidence:—

FOR several years past the Radical authorities of the Diocese of Basle have persecuted the Catholic Church, as they still continue to do. Formerly the persecution was carried into effect, partly by violence and partly by underhand means; but it was always specious and very injurious to religion. It was invariably carried on in the name of progress, liberty, and the welfare of the people, whom it pretended to free from the tyranny of the priesthood and the despotism of Rome.

The Catholic populations were thus oppressed by the so-called omnipotence of the State, and, incredible as it would seem under a republican form of government, the State, or rather a few individuals acting in its name, supported by a non-Catholic majority, and backed by the Radical element, have succeeded in monopolising power, and in maintaining themselves in it by terrorism and bribery for a length of years, assuming to themselves the functions of the Holy See and the Episcopate, and so adding to their temporal rule the spiritual government of souls. Not only have they possessed themselves of the direction of all public schools, and of the administration of all pious foundations, but they have destroyed all monastic, capitular, and ecclesiastical institutions, claimed the right to regulate the parochial system, the preaching of the Gospel, catechizing, confessions, first communions of children, the celebration of public worship, processions, burials and benedictions, and even extended their jurisdiction to matrimonial causes. More than this, by the Federal Constitution, which the recent revolutionary laws have just extended to the Catholic cantons, contrary to the will of the populations as expressed by the vote of an immense majority, the State has virtually and insidiously suppressed the Catholic Church by the introduction of that article of the Federal Code by which the ecclesiastical jurisdiction is abolished. (Art. 58.)

Finally, in five cantons of the Diocese of Basle, the Catholic populations have lost all liberty of worship in a more or less degree.

Since the Council of the Vatican more especially, the war against the Church has been waged with greater acrimony in the Diocese of Basle, and since the victories of Prussia, our enemies have acted more openly. The five governments of Soleure, Argovie, Basle-Campagne, Berne, and Thurgovie have sent their delegates to an assembly calling itself a Diocesan Conference, composed not of ecclesiastics, but in great part of Protestants, and of lay-Catholics notoriously hostile to the Church. Such a body of course possessed no legal authority, but notwithstanding its patent incapacity, it committed, among many other illegal and unjust acts, that of pronouncing a sentence of deprivation against the Bishop of Basle, on the 29th of January, 1873. The principal offence imputed to him was, that of having published the definition of Papal Infallibility in his diocese, and of having refused to withdraw the publication. Several minor accusations were brought against him; but it may be remarked that the authorities were unable to prove that he had violated a single law during the whole course of his episcopate. He was therefore deprived of his see solely because he had fulfilled the duties of a Catholic bishop, and because he would not separate himself from the unity of the Holy See, by refusing to publish the decrees of the Vatican Council.

Since the above attack on the liberties of the Catholic populations, the Holy See, and the Church, a series of laws favouring schism and apostasy have been passed by the five cantonal governments in question. They have forbidden the Bishop of Basle to exercise his episcopal charge throughout the five cantons composing his diocese; and they have also forbidden the clergy to maintain any official relations with him, so that the faithful suffer grievous injury in their most sacred rights, and in their most urgent religious needs, in common with the whole Catholic priesthood, which has been punished in all the cantons for having protested against these unjust acts.

But it is the Protestant Canton of Berne which has signalised itself beyond all others by its despotism and its cruelty. It has suspended all the parish priests of the canton from their pastoral functions, and has since then deprived them, as well as all their curates, to the number of sixty-nine. Its next pronounced sentence of exile on

the whole clergy, ninety in number, only excepting five or six aged priests, who were, however, forbidden to say mass save in their own rooms, or in any way to exercise their sacred ministry. The government then drove all the priests out of their churches and presbyteries, and confiscated all their benefices and revenues, so that they are deprived of all means of subsistence. Before the sentence of exile was carried out, many of them were moreover punished by fine and imprisonment. The Catholic laity has suffered there, and still has to suffer from every kind of injustice: fines, imprisonment, dismissal from public employment, are common occurrences, and men, women, nuns, and even children have been imprisoned for their faith.

There are, at the present moment, more than 60,000 Catholics in the Canton of Berne, who are deprived, as far as State influence can effect it, of all religious help, whether in life or in death, the exiled priests of the Bernese Jura being arrested and cast into prison if discovered within the cantonal limits.

The immense majority of the people, however, remain firmly attached to their pastors. In many parishes not a schismatic is to be found, and in others, containing a numerous population, the exceptions are very few. In a word, the Catholics of the Bernese Jura maintain their fidelity to the faith of their fathers, and the only partisans of the schism are apostates or persons long notoriously hostile to the Church.

But the most revolting feature of the present persecution is that the Government of Berne has sought in every part of Europe foreign priests in order to replace the lawfully appointed clergy of the Jura. It has succeeded in finding a certain number of suspended or apostate priests, who have consented to act as the instruments of State persecution. During the fourteen months which have witnessed the exile of the sixty-nine faithful parish clergy, twenty-five strangers have been brought to replace them. These men are of the worst moral antecedents. The government, notwithstanding, has imposed them on the parishioners, gives them profuse supplies of money, makes over the churches and presbyteries to them, and supports them in every way, while the native clergy are despoiled and exiled.

The Catholics of the Jura being thus deprived of their pastors, meet in farms or outhouses for common worship; and yet even this liberty is not always conceded to them. It is only in profound secret they can receive the sacraments, or hear mass, and they even bury their own dead without the assistance of a priest. It is thus that religious animosity, making common cause with Radicalism, tyrannises over its fellow-citizens, who commit no offence against the public peace, and who bear their proportionate share of the public burdens!

By the course it has pursued the Government of Berne has violated the treaties and constitutions which protect Catholic liberties within the cantons. In order to give a colour of legality to future persecutions, it has voted a new Ecclesiastical Constitution, expressly framed against the interests of the Catholic Church in Switzerland, and which it has imposed, against their will, on the Catholics of Berne by a preponderant non-Catholic majority.

One consolation remains to us, namely, the fidelity of the entire body of clergy to the Catholic Church. They have freely chosen to lose all rather than betray the faith.

In order to perpetuate the supply of schismatic or 'Old-Catholic' priests, the government has recently established a faculty of theology in Berne. It has brought professors from Germany, either Protestants or apostate priests, and has induced a small number of students to follow the courses, by paying them highly for their attendance.

In Soleure, too, the Radical authorities carry on the same persecution of the Catholics of the cantons. The government has succeeded in placing three schismatical priests in as many parishes. It has suppressed and confiscated the celebrated and ancient abbey of the Benedictines at Mariastein and the Chapters of Schöennenwerth and of the Bishopric of Basle at Soleure. In the other mixed cantons, where the anti-Catholic Radicals are in a majority, the Catholics have much to suffer.

The Diocese of Basle includes seven cantons—viz. Soleure, Argovie, Thurgovie, Basle-Campagne, Berne, Lucerne, and Zug. The two last-named cantons are Catholic, and possess a just government. In the other cantons the majority is Protestant. To these must be added the city of Basle and the canton of Schaff hausen, both of which form part of the same diocese.

The Diocese of Basle comprises 430,000 Catholics and 800,000 Protestants and other denominations. It contains 800 priests, only seven of whom have become Old Catholics. The so-called Diocesan Conference has pushed its pretensions to the point of prescribing what authors are to be used by ecclesiastical students in the seminary! The bishop was not even free to appoint the superior and his assistants, but was obliged to obtain the 'Placet' of the State for such nominations, as well as for his Pastoral Letters.

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The Vatican Decrees In their Bearing on Civil Allegiance: A Political Expostulation
By the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P.
Australia Edition
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(By Authority and on Account of Mr. John Murray, of London)

Contents.

The Vatican Decrees in their Bearing on Civil Allegiance.

I. THE OCCASION AND SCOPE OF THIS TRACT.

IN the prosecution of a purpose not polemical but pacific, I have been led to employ words which belong, more or less, to the region of religious controversy; and which, though they were themselves few, seem to require, from the various feelings they have aroused, that I should carefully define, elucidate, and defend them. The task is not of a kind agreeable to me; but I proceed to perform it.

Among the causes, which have tended to disturb and perplex the public mind in the consideration of our own religious difficulties, one has been a certain alarm at the aggressive activity and imagined growth of the Roman Church in this country. All are aware of our susceptibility on this side; and it was not, I think, improper for one who desires to remove everything that can interfere with a calm and judicial temper, and who believes the alarm to be groundless, to state, pointedly though briefly, some reasons for that belief.

Accordingly I did not scruple to use the following language, in a paper inserted in the number of the "Contemporary Review" for the month of October. I was speaking of "the question whether a handful of the clergy are or are not engaged in an utterly hopeless and visionary effort to Romanize the Church and people of England."

"At no time since the bloody reign of Mary has such a scheme been possible. But if it had been possible in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries, it would still have become impossible in the nineteenth; when Rome has substituted for the proud boast of *semper eadem* a policy of violence and change in faith; when she has refurbished, and paraded anew, every rusty tool she was fondly thought to have disused; when no one can become her convert without renouncing his moral and mental freedom, and placing his civil loyalty and duty at the mercy of another; and when she has equally repudiated modern thought and ancient history."

"Contemporary Review," Oct., 1874, p. 674.

Had I been, when I wrote this passage, as I now am, addressing myself in considerable measure to my Roman Catholic fellow-countrymen, I should have striven to avoid the seeming roughness of some of these expressions; but as the question is now about their substance, from which I am not in any particular disposed to recede, any attempt to recast their general form would probably mislead. I proceed, then, to deal with them on their merits.

More than one friend of mine, among those who have been led to join the Roman Catholic communion, has made this passage the subject, more or less, of expostulation. Now, in my opinion, the assertions which it makes are, as coming from a layman who has spent most and the best years of his life in the observation and practice of politics, not aggressive but defensive.

It is neither the abettors of the Papal Chair, nor any one who, however far from being an abettor of the Papal Chair, actually writes from a Papal point of view, that has a right to remonstrate with the world at large; but it is the world at large, on the contrary, that has the fullest right to remonstrate, first with His Holiness, secondly with those who share his proceedings, thirdly even with such as passively allow and accept them.

I therefore, as one of the world at large, propose to expostulate in my turn. I shall strive to show to such of my Roman Catholic fellow-subjects as may kindly give me a hearing that, after the singular steps which the authorities of their Church have in these last years thought fit to take, the people of this country, who fully believe in their loyalty, are entitled, on purely civil grounds, to expect from them some declaration or manifestation of opinion, in reply to that ecclesiastical party in their Church who have laid down, in their name, principles adverse to the purity and integrity of civil allegiance.

Undoubtedly my allegations are of great breadth. Such broad allegations require a broad and a deep foundation. The first question which they raise is, Are they, as to the material part of them, true? But even their truth might not suffice to show that their publication was opportune. The second question, then, which they raise is, Are they, for any practical purpose, material? And there is yet a third, though a minor, question, which

arises out of the propositions in connection with their authorship, Were they suitable to be set forth by the present writer?

To these three questions I will now set myself to reply. And the matter of my reply will, as I conceive, constitute and convey an appeal to the understandings of my Roman Catholic fellow-countrymen, which I trust that, at the least, some among them may deem not altogether unworthy of their consideration.

From the language used by some of the organs of Roman Catholic opinion, it is, I am afraid, plain that in some quarters they have given deep offence. Displeasure, indignation, even fury, might be said to mark the language which in the heat of the moment has been expressed here and there. They have been hastily treated as an attack made upon Roman Catholics generally, nay, as an insult offered them. It is obvious to reply, that of Roman Catholics generally they state nothing. Together with a reference to "converts," of which I shall say more, they constitute generally a free and strong animadversion on the conduct of the Papal Chair, and of its advisers and abettors. If I am told that he who animadverts upon these assaults thereby, or insults, Roman Catholics at large, who do not choose their ecclesiastical rulers, and are not recognized as having any voice in the government of their Church, I cannot be bound by or accept a proposition which seems to me to be so little in accordance with reason.

Before all things, however, I should desire it to be understood that, in the remarks now offered, I desire to eschew not only religious bigotry, but likewise theological controversy. Indeed, with theology, except in its civil bearing, with theology as such, I have here nothing whatever to do. But it is the peculiarity of Roman theology that, by thrusting itself into the temporal domain, it naturally, and even necessarily, comes to be a frequent theme of political discussion. To quiet-minded Roman Catholics, it must be a subject of infinite annoyance, that their religion is, on this ground more than any other, the subject of criticism; more than any other, the occasion of conflicts with the State and of civil disquietude. I feel sincerely how much hardship their case entails. But this hardship is brought upon them altogether by the conduct of the authorities of their own Church. Why did theology enter so largely into the debates of Parliament on Roman Catholic Emancipation? Certainly not because our statesmen and debaters of fifty years ago had an abstract love of such controversies, but because it was extensively believed that the Pope of Rome had been and was a trespasser upon ground which belonged to the civil authority, and that he affected to determine by spiritual prerogative questions of the civil sphere. This fact, if fact it be, and not the truth or falsehood, the reasonableness or unreasonableness, of any article of purely religious belief, is the whole and sole cause of the mischief. To this fact, and to this fact alone, my language is referable; but for this fact, it would have been neither my duty nor my desire to use it. All other Christian bodies are content with freedom in their own religious domain. Orientals, Lutherans, Calvinists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Nonconformists, one and all, in the present day, contentedly and thankfully accept the benefits of civil order; never pretend that the State is not its own master; make no religious claims to temporal possessions or advantages; and, consequently, never are in perilous collision with the State. Nay more, even so I believe it is with the mass of Roman Catholics individually. But not so with the leaders of their Church, or with those who take pride in following the leaders. Indeed, this has been made matter of boast:—

"There is not another Church so called" (than the Roman), "nor any community professing to be a Church, which does not submit, or obey, or hold its peace, when the civil governors of the world command."—"The Present Crisis of the Holy See," by H. E Manning, D.D. London, 1861, p. 75.

The Rome of the Middle Ages claimed universal monarchy. The modern Church of Rome has abandoned nothing, retracted nothing. Is that all? Far from it. By condemning (as will be seen) those who, like Bishop Doyle in 1826,

Lords' Committee, March 18th, 1826. Report, p. 190.

charge the mediæval Popes with aggression, she unconditionally, even if covertly, maintains what the mediæval Popes maintained. But even this is not the worst. The worst by far as that whereas, in the national Churches and communities of the Middle Ages, there was a brisk, vigorous, and constant opposition to these outrageous claims, an opposition which stoutly asserted its own orthodoxy, which always caused itself to be respected, and which even sometimes gained the upper hand; now, in this nineteenth century of ours, and while it is growing old, this same opposition has been put out of court, and judicially extinguished within the Papal Church, by the recent decrees of the Vatican. And it is impossible for persons accepting those decrees justly to complain, when such documents are subjected in good faith to a strict examination as respects their compatibility with civil right and the obedience of subjects.

In defending my language, I shall carefully mark its limits. But all defence is reassertion, which properly requires a deliberate reconsideration; and no man who thus reconsiders should scruple, if he find so much as a word that may convey a false impression, to amend it. Exactness in stating truth according to the measure of our intelligence, is an indispensable condition of justice, and of a title to be heard.

My propositions, then, as they stood, are these:—

- That "Rome has substituted for the proud boast of *semper eadem* a policy of violence and change in

faith."

- That she has refurbished, and paraded anew, every rusty tool she was fondly thought to have disused.
- That no one can now become her convert without renouncing his moral and mental freedom, and placing his civil loyalty and duty at the mercy of another.
- That she ("Rome") has equally repudiated modern thought and ancient history.

II. THE FIRST AND THE FOURTH PROPOSITIONS.

Of the first and fourth of these propositions I shall dispose rather summarily, as they appear to belong to the theological domain. They refer to a fact, and they record an opinion. One fact to which they refer is this: that, in days within my memory, the constant, favourite, and imposing argument of Roman controversialists was the unbroken and absolute identity in belief of the Roman Church from the days of our Saviour until now. No one, who has at all followed the course of this literature during the last forty years, can fail to be sensible of the change in its present tenour. More and more have the assertions of continuous uniformity of doctrine receded into scarcely penetrable shadow. More and more have another series of assertions, of a living authority, ever ready to open, adopt, and shape Christian doctrine according to the times, taken their place. Without discussing the abstract compatibility of these lines of argument, I note two of the immense practical differences between them. In the first, the office claimed by the Church is principally that of a witness to facts; in the second, principally that of a judge, if not a revealer of doctrine. In the first, the processes which the Church undertakes are subject to a constant challenge and appeal to history; in the second, no amount of historical testimony can avail against the unmeasured power of the theory of development. Most important, most pregnant considerations, these, at least for two classes of persons: for those who think that exaggerated doctrines of Church power are among the real and serious dangers of the age; and for those who think that against all forms, both of superstition and of unbelief, one main preservative is to be found in maintaining the truth and authority of history, and the inestimable value of the historic spirit.

So much for the fact; as for the opinion, that the recent Papal decrees are at war with modern thought, and that, purporting to enlarge the necessary creed of Christendom, they involve a violent breach with history, this is a matter unfit for me to discuss, as it is a question of Divinity; but not unfit for me to have mentioned in my article; since the opinion given there is the opinion of those with whom I was endeavouring to reason, namely, the great majority of the British public.

If it is thought that the word violence was open to exception, I regret I cannot give it up. The justification of the ancient definitions of the Church which have endured the storms of 1,500 years, was to be found in this, that they were not arbitrary or wilful, but that they wholly sprang from, and related to theories rampant at the time, and regarded as menacing to Christian belief. Even the Canons of the Council of Trent have in the main this amount, apart from their matter, of presumptive warrant. But the decrees of the present perilous Pontificate have been passed to favour and precipitate prevailing currents of opinion in the ecclesiastical world of Rome. The growth of what is often termed among Protestants Mariolatry, and of belief in Papal Infallibility, was notoriously advancing, but it seems not fast enough to satisfy the dominant party. To aim the deadly blows of 1854

Decree of the Immaculate Conception.

and 1870 at the old historic, scientific, and moderate school, was surely an act of violence; and with this censure the proceeding of 1870 has actually been visited by the first living theologian now within the Roman Communion, I mean, Dr. John Henry Newman; who has used these significant words, among others: "Why should an aggressive and insolent faction be allowed to make the heart of the just sad, whom the Lord hath not made sorrowful?"

See the remarkable Letter of Dr. Newman to Bishop Ullathorne, in the "Guardian" of April 6, 1870.

III. THE SECOND PROPOSITION.

I take next my second Proposition: That Rome has refurbished, and paraded anew, every rusty tool she was fondly thought to have disused.

Is this then a fact, or is it not?

I must assume that it is denied; and therefore I cannot wholly pass by the work of proof. But I will state in the fewest possible words, and with references, a few propositions, all the holders of which have been *condemned* by the See of Rome during my own generation, and especially within the last twelve or fifteen years. And, in order that I may do nothing towards importing passion into what is matter of pure argument, I will avoid citing any of the fearfully energetic epithets in which the condemnations are sometimes clothed.

- Those who maintain the Liberty of the Press. Encyclical Letter of Pope Gregory XVI., in 1831; and of

Pope Pius IX., in 1864.

- Or the liberty of conscience and of worship. Encyclical of Pius IX., December 8, 1864.
- Or the liberty of speech. "Syllabus" of March 18, 1861. Prop, lxxix. Encyclical of Pope Pius IX., December 8, 1864.
- Or who contend that Papal judgments and decrees may, without sin, be disobeyed, or differed from, unless they treat of the rules (*dogmata*) of faith or morals. Ibid.
- Or who assign to the State the power of defining the civil rights (*jura*) and province of the Church. "Syllabus" of Pope Pius IX., March 8, 1861. Ibid. Prop. xix.
- Or who hold that Roman Pontiffs and Ecumenical Councils have transgressed the limits of their power, and usurped the rights of princes. Ibid. Prop, xxiii.
(*It must be borne in mind, that "Ecumenical Councils" here mean Roman Councils, not recognized by the rest of the Church. The Councils of the early Church did not interfere with the jurisdiction of the civil power.*)
- Or that the Church may not employ force. (*Ecclesia vis inferenæ potestatem non habet.*) "Syllabus," Prop. xxiv.
- Or that power, not inherent in the office of the Episcopate, but granted to it by the civil authority, may be withdrawn from it at the discretion of that authority. Ibid. Prop. xxv.
- Or that the civil immunity (*immunitas*) of the Church and its ministers, depends upon civil right. Ibid. Prop. xxx.
- Or that in the conflict of laws civil and ecclesiastical, the civil law should prevail. Ibid. Prop. xlii.
- Or that any method of instruction of youth, solely secular, may be approved. Ibid. Prop, xlviii.
- Or that knowledge of things philosophical and civil, may and should decline to be guided by Divine *and Ecclesiastical* authority. Ibid. Prop. lvii.
- Or that marriage is not in its essence a Sacrament. Ib. Prop. lxvi.
- Or that marriage, not sacramentally contracted, (*si sacramentum excludatur*) has a binding force. Ibid. Prop. lxxiii.
- Or that the abolition of the Temporal Power of the Popedom would be highly advantageous to the Church. Ibid. Prop, lxxvi. Also lxx.
- Or that any other religion than the Roman religion may be established by a State. Ibid. Prop. lxxvii.
- Or that in "Countries called Catholic," the free exercise of other religions may laudably be allowed. "Syllabus," Prop, lxxviii.
- Or that the Roman Pontiff ought to come to terms with progress, liberalism, and modern civilization. Ibid. Prop, lxxx.

For the original passages from the Encyclical and Syllabus of Pius IX., see Appendix A.

This list is now perhaps sufficiently extended, although I have as yet not touched the decrees of 1870. But, before quitting it, I must offer three observations on what it contains.

Firstly. I do not place all the Propositions in one and the same category; for there are a portion of them which, as far as I can judge, might, by the combined aid of favourable construction and vigorous explanation, be brought within bounds. And I hold that favourable construction of the terms used in controversies is the right general rule. But this can only be so, when construction is an open question. When the author of certain propositions claims, as in the case before us, a sole and unlimited power to interpret them in such manner and by such rules as he may from time to time think fit, the only defence for all others concerned is at once to judge for themselves, how much of unreason or of mischief the words, naturally understood, may contain.

Secondly. It may appear upon a hasty perusal, that neither the infliction of penalty in life, limb, liberty, or goods, on disobedient members of the Christian Church, nor the title to depose sovereigns, and release subjects from their allegiance, with all its revolting consequences, has been here re-affirmed. In terms, there is no mention of them; but in the substance of the propositions, I grieve to say, they are beyond doubt included. For it is notorious that they have been declared and decreed by "Rome," that is to say by Popes and Papal Councils; and the stringent condemnations of the Syllabus include all those who hold that Popes and Papal Councils (declared ecumenical) have transgressed the just limits of their power, or usurped the rights of princes. What have been their opinions and decrees about persecution I need hardly say; and indeed the right to employ physical force is even here undisguisedly claimed (No 7).

Even while I am writing, I am reminded, from an unquestionable source, of the words of Pope Pius IX. himself on the deposing power. I add only a few italics; the words appear as given in a translation without the original:—

"The present Pontiff used these words in replying to the address from the Academia of the Catholic Religion (July 21, 1873):—

"There are many errors regarding the Infallibility: but the most malicious of all is that which includes, in

that dogma, the right of deposing sovereigns, and declaring the people no longer bound by the obligation of fidelity. This right has now and again, in critical circumstances, been exercised by the Pontiffs: but it has nothing to do with Papal Infallibility. Its origin was not the infallibility, but the authority of the Pope. This authority, in accordance with public right, which was then vigorous, and with the acquiescence of all Christian nations, who revered in the Pope the supreme Judge of the Christian Commonwealth, extended so far as to pass judgment, even in civil affairs, on the acts of Princes and of Nations"

"Civilization and the See of Rome." By Lord Robert Montagu, Dublin, 1874. A Lecture delivered under the auspices of the Catholic Union of Ireland. I have a little misgiving about the version: but not of a nature to affect the substance.

Lastly. I must observe that these are not mere opinions of the Pope himself, nor even are they opinions which he might paternally recommend to the pious consideration of the faithful. With the promulgation of his opinions is unhappily combined, in the Encyclical Letter, which virtually, though not expressly, includes the whole, a command to all his spiritual children (from which command we the disobedient children are in no way excluded) to hold them.

"Itaque omnes et singulas pravas opiniones et doctrinas singillatim hisce literis commemoratas auctoritate nostrâ Apostolicâ reprobamus, proscribimus, atque damnamus; easque ab omnibus Catholicæ Ecclesie filiis, veluti reprobatas, prosriptas, atque damnatas omnino haberi volumus et mandamus." Encycl. Dec. 8, 1864.

And the decrees of 1870 will presently show us, what they establish as the binding force of the *mandate* thus conveyed to the Christian world.

IV. THE THIRD PROPOSITION.

I now pass to the operation of these extraordinary declarations on personal and private duty.

When the cup of endurance, which had so long been filling, began, with the Council of the Vatican in 1870, to overflow, the most famous and learned living theologian of the Roman Communion, Dr. von Döllinger, long the foremost champion of his Church, refused compliance, and submitted, with his temper undisturbed and his freedom unimpaired, to the extreme and most painful penalty of excommunication. With him, many of the most learned and respected theologians of the Roman Communion in Germany underwent the same sentence. The very few, who elsewhere (I do not speak of Switzerland) suffered in like manner, deserve an admiration rising in proportion to their fewness. It seems as though Germany, from which Luther blew the mighty trumpet that even now echoes through the land, still retained her primacy in the domain of conscience, still supplied the *centuria prærogativa* of the great *comitia* of the world.

But let no man wonder or complain. Without imputing to anyone the moral murder, for such it is, of stifling conscience and conviction, I for one cannot be surprised that the fermentation, which is working through the mind of the Latin Church, has as yet (elsewhere than in Germany) but in few instances come to the surface. By the mass of mankind, it is morally impossible that questions such as these can be adequately examined; so it ever has been, and so in the main it will continue, until the principles of manufacturing machinery shall have been applied, and with analogous results, to intellectual and moral processes. Followers they are and must be, and in a certain sense ought to be. But what as to the leaders of society, the men of education and of leisure? I will try to suggest some answer in few words. A change of religious profession is under all circumstances a great and awful thing. Much more is the question, however, between conflicting, or apparently conflicting, duties arduous, when the religion of a man has been changed for him, over his head, and without the very least of his participation. Far be it then from me to make any Roman Catholic, except the great hierarchic Power, and those who have egged it on, responsible for the portentous proceedings which we have witnessed. My conviction is that, even of those who may not shake off the yoke, multitudes will vindicate at any rate their loyalty at the expense of the consistency, which perhaps in difficult matters of religion few among us perfectly maintain. But this belongs to the future; for the present, nothing could in my opinion be more unjust than to hold the members of the Roman Church in general already responsible for the recent innovations. The duty of observers, who think the claims involved in these decrees arrogant and false, and such as not even impotence real or supposed ought to shield from criticism, is frankly to state the case, and by way of friendly challenge, to intreat their Roman Catholic fellow-countrymen to replace themselves in the position which five-and-forty years ago this nation, by the voice and action of its Parliament, -declared its belief that they held.

Upon a strict re-examination of the language, as apart from the substance of my fourth Proposition, I find it faulty, inasmuch as it seems to imply that a "convert" now joining the Papal Church, not only gives up certain rights and duties of freedom, but surrenders them by a conscious and deliberate act. What I have less accurately said that he renounced, I might have more accurately said that he forfeited. To speak strictly, the claim now made upon him by the authority, which he solemnly and with the highest responsibility acknowledges, requires him to surrender his mental and moral freedom, and to place his loyalty and civil duty at the mercy of another.

There may have been, and may be, persons who in their sanguine trust will not shrink from this result, and will console themselves with the notion that their loyalty and civil duty are to be committed to the custody of one much wiser than themselves. But I am sure that there are also "converts" who, when they perceive, will by word and act reject, the consequence which relentless logic draws for them. If, however, my proposition be true, there is no escape from the dilemma. Is it then true, or is it not true, that Rome requires a convert, who now joins her, to forfeit his moral and mental freedom, and to place his loyalty and civil duty at the mercy of another?

In order to place this matter in as clear a light as I can, it will be necessary to go back a little upon our recent history.

A century ago we began to relax that system of penal laws against Roman Catholics, at once pettifogging, base, and cruel, which Mr. Burke has scathed and blasted with his immortal eloquence.

When this process had reached the point, at which the question was whether they should be admitted into Parliament, there arose a great and prolonged national controversy; and some men, who at no time of their lives were narrow-minded, such as Sir Robert Peel, the Minister, resisted the concession. The arguments in its favour were obvious and strong, and they ultimately prevailed. But the strength of the opposing party had lain in the allegation that, from the nature and claims of the Papal power, it was not possible for the consistent Roman Catholic to pay to the crown of this country an entire allegiance, and that the admission of persons, thus self-disabled, to Parliament was inconsistent with the safety of the State and nation; which had not very long before, it may be observed, emerged from a struggle for existence.

An answer to this argument was indispensable; and it was supplied mainly from two sources. The Josephine laws,

See the work of Count dal Pozzo on the "Austrian Ecclesiastical Law." London: Murray, 1827. The Leopoldine Laws in Tuscany may also be mentioned.

then still subsisting in the Austrian empire, and the arrangements which had been made after the peace of 1815 by Prussia and the German States with Pius VII. and Gonsalvi, proved that the Papal Court could submit to circumstances, and could allow material restraints even upon the exercise of its ecclesiastical prerogatives. Here, then, was a reply in the sense of the phrase *solvitur ambulando*. Much information of this class was collected for the information of Parliament and the country.

See "Report from the Select Committee appointed to report the nature and substance of the Laws and Ordinances existing in Foreign States, respecting the regulation of their Roman Catholic subjects in Ecclesiastical matters, and their intercourse with the See of Rome, or any other Foreign Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction." Printed for the House of Commons in 1816 and 1817. Reprinted 1851.

But there were also measures taken to learn, from the highest Roman Catholic authorities of this country, what was the exact situation of the members of that communion with respect to some of the better known exorbitances of Papal assumption. Did the Pope claim any temporal jurisdiction? Did he still pretend to the exercise of a power to depose kings, release subjects from their allegiance, and incite them to revolt? Was faith to be kept with heretics? Did the Church still teach the doctrines of persecution? Now, to no one of these questions could the answer really be of the smallest immediate moment to this powerful and solidly compacted kingdom. They were topics selected by way of sample; and the intention was to elicit declarations showing generally that the fangs of the mediæval Popedom had been drawn, and its claws torn away; that the Roman system, however strict in its dogma, was perfectly compatible with civil liberty, and with the institutions of a free State moulded on a different religious basis from its own.

Answers in abundance were obtained, tending to show that the doctrines of deposition and persecution, of keeping no faith with heretics, and of universal dominion, were obsolete beyond revival; that every assurance could be given respecting them, except such as required the shame of a formal retraction; that they were in effect mere bugbears, unworthy to be taken into account by a nation, which prided itself on being made up of practical men.

But it, was unquestionably felt that something more than the renunciation of these particular opinions was necessary in order to secure the full concession of civil rights to Roman Catholics. As to their individual loyalty, a State disposed to generous or candid interpretation had no reason to be uneasy. It was only with regard to requisitions, which might be made on them from another quarter, that apprehension could exist. It was reasonable that England should desire to know not only what the Pope

At that period the eminent and able Bishop Doyle did not scruple to write as follows: "We are taunted with the proceedings of Popes. What, my Lord, have we Catholics to do with the proceedings of Popes, or why should we be made accountable for them?"—"Essay on the Catholic Claims." To Lord Liverpool, 1826, p. 111.

might do for himself, but to what demands, by the constitution of their Church, they were liable; and how far it was possible that such demands could touch their civil duty. The theory which placed every human being, in things spiritual and things temporal, at the feet of the Roman Pontiff, had not been an *idolum specûs*, a mere theory of the chamber. Brain-power never surpassed in the political history of the world had been devoted for

centuries to the single purpose of working it into the practice of Christendom; had in the West achieved for an impossible problem a partial success; and had in the East punished the obstinate independence of the Church by that Latin conquest of Constantinople, which effectually prepared the way for the downfall of the Eastern empire, and the establishment of the Turks in Europe. What was really material therefore was, not whether the Papal chair laid claim to this or that particular power, but whether it laid claim to some power that included them all, and whether that claim had received such sanction from the authorities of the Latin Church, that there remained within her borders absolutely no tenable standing-ground from which war against it could be maintained. Did the Pope then claim infallibility? Or did he, either without infallibility or with it (and if with it so much the worse), claim an universal obedience from his flock? And were these claims, either or both, affirmed in his Church by authority which even the least Papal of the members of that Church must admit to be binding upon conscience?

The two first of these questions were covered by the third. And well it was that they were so covered. For to them no satisfactory answer could even then be given. The Popes had kept up with comparatively little intermission, for well nigh a thousand years their claim to dogmatic infallibility; and had, at periods within the same tract of time, often enough made, and never retracted, that other claim which is theoretically less but practically larger; their claim to an obedience virtually universal from the baptized members of the Church. To the third question it was fortunately more practicable to prescribe a satisfactory reply. It was well known that, in the days of its glory and intellectual power, the great Gallican Church had not only not admitted, but had denied Papal infallibility, and had declared that the local laws and usages of the Church could not be set aside by the will of the Pontiff. Nay, further, it was believed that in the main these had been, down to the close of the last century, the prevailing opinions of the Cisalpine Churches in communion with Rome. The Council of Constance had in act as well as word shown that the Pope's judgments, and the Pope himself, were triable by the assembled representatives of the Christian world. And the Council of Trent, notwithstanding the predominance in it of Italian and Roman influences, if it had not denied, yet had not affirmed either proposition.

All that remained was, to know what were the sentiments entertained on these vital points by the leaders and guides of Roman Catholic opinion nearest to our own doors. And here testimony was offered, which must not, and cannot, be forgotten. In part, this was the testimony of witnesses before the Committees of the two Houses in 1824 and 1825. I need quote two answers only, given by the Prelate, who more than any other represented his Church, and influenced the mind of this country in favour of concession at the time, namely, Bishop Doyle. He was asked,

Committees of both Lords and Commons sat; the former in 1825, the latter in 1824-5. The References were identical, and ran as follows: "To inquire into the state of Ireland, more particularly with reference to the circumstances which may have led to disturbances in that part of the United Kingdom." Bishop Doyle was examined March 21, 1825, and April 21, 1825, before the Lords. The two citations in the text are taken from Bishop Doyle's evidence before the Commons' Committee, March 12, 1825, p. 190.

"In what, and how far, does the Roman Catholic profess to obey the Pope?"

He replied:—

"The Catholic professes to obey the Pope in matters which regard his religious faith: and in those matters of ecclesiastical discipline which have already been defined by the competent authorities."

And again:—

"Does that justify the objection that is made to Catholics, that their allegiance divided?"

"I do not think it does in any way. We are bound to obey the Pope in those things that I have already mentioned. But our obedience to the law, and the allegiance which we owe the sovereign, are complete, and full, and perfect, and undivided, inasmuch as they extend to all political, legal, and civil rights of the king or of his subjects. I think the allegiance due to the king, and the allegiance due to the Pope, are as distinct and as divided in their nature as any two things can possibly be."

Such is the opinion of the dead Prelate. We shall presently hear the opinion of a living one. But the sentiments of the dead man powerfully operated on the open and trustful temper of this people to induce them to grant, at the cost of so much popular feeling and national tradition, the great and just concession of 1829. That concession, without such declarations, it would, to say the least, have been far more difficult to obtain.

Now, bodies are usually held to be bound by the evidence of their own selected and typical witnesses. But in this instance the colleagues of those witnesses thought fit also to speak collectively.

First, let us quote from the collective "Declaration," in the year 1826 of the Vicars Apostolic, who, with Episcopal authority, governed the Roman Catholics of Great Britain:—

"The allegiance which Catholics hold to be due, and are bound to pay, to their Sovereign, and to the civil authority of the State, is perfect and undivided"

"They declare that neither the Pope, nor any other prelate or ecclesiastical person of the Roman Catholic Church has any right to interfere directly or indirectly in the Civil Government nor to oppose in any

manner the performance of the civil duties which are due to the King.'

Not less explicit was the Hierarchy of the Roman Communion in its "Pastoral Address to the Clergy and Laity of the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland," dated January 25, 1826. This address contains a Declaration, from which I extract the following words:—

"It is a duty which they owe to themselves, as well as to their Protestant fellow-subjects, whose good opinion they value, to endeavour once more to remove the false imputations that have been frequently cast upon the faith and discipline of that Church which is intrusted to their care, that all may be enabled to know with accuracy their genuine principles."

In Article 11:—

"They declare on oath their belief that it is not an article of the Catholic Faith, neither are they thereby required to believe, that the Pope is infallible."

and, after various recitals, they set forth

"After this full, explicit, and sworn declaration, we are utterly at a loss to conceive on what possible ground we could be justly charged with bearing towards our most gracious Sovereign only a divided allegiance."

Thus, besides much else that I will not stop to quote, Papal infallibility was most solemnly declared to be a matter on which each man might think as he pleased; the Pope's power to claim obedience was strictly and narrowly limited; it was expressly denied that he had any title, direct or indirect, to interfere in civil government. Of the right of the Pope to define the limits which divide the civil from the spiritual by his own authority, not one word is said by the Prelates of either country.

Since that time, all these propositions have been reversed. The Pope's infallibility, when he speaks *ex cathedrâ* on faith and morals, has been declared, with the assent of the Bishops of the Roman Church, to be an article of faith, binding on the conscience of every Christian; his claim to the obedience of his spiritual subjects has been declared in like manner without any practical limit or reserve; and his supremacy, without any reserve of civil rights, has been similarly affirmed to include everything which relates to the discipline and government of the Church throughout the world. And these doctrines, we now know on the highest authority, it is of necessity for salvation to believe.

Independently, however, of the Vatican Decrees themselves, it is necessary for all who wish to understand what has been the amount of the wonderful change now consummated in the constitution of the Latin Church, and what is the present degradation of its Episcopal order, to observe also the change, amounting to revolution, of form in the present as compared with other conciliatory decrees. Indeed, that spirit of centralisation, the excesses of which are as fatal to vigorous life in the Church as in the State, seems now nearly to have reached the last and furthest point of possible advancement and exaltation.

When, in fact, we speak of the decrees of the Council of the Vatican, we use a phrase which will not bear strict examination. The Canons of the Council of Trent were, at least, the real Canons of a real Council: and the strain in which they are promulgated is this:—*Hæc sacrosancta, ecumenica, et generalis Tridentina Synodus, in Spiritu Sancto legitimè congregata, in eâ præsidentibus eisdem tribus apostolicis Legatis, hortatur, or docet, or statuit, or decernit*, and the like; and its canons, as published in Rome, are "*Canones et decreta Sacrosancti ecumenici Concilii Tridentini*,"

"Romæ: in Collegio urbano de Propaganda Fide." 1833.

and so forth. But what we have now to do with is the *Constitutio Dogmatica Prima de Ecclesiâ Christi, edita in Sessions tertiâ* of the Vatican Council. It is not a constitution made by the Council, but one promulgated in the Council.

I am aware that, as some hold, this was the case with the Council of the Lateran in A.D. 1215. But, first, this has not been established: secondly, the very gist of the evil we are dealing with consists in following (and enforcing) precedents from the ago of Pope Innocent III.

And who is it that legislates and decrees? It is *Pius Episcopus, servus servorum Dei*: and the seductive plural of his *docemus et declaramus* is simply the dignified and ceremonious "We" of Royal declarations. The document is dated *Pontificatûs nostri Anno XXV*: and the humble share of the assembled Episcopate in the transaction is represented by *sacro approbante concilio*. And now for the propositions themselves.

First comes the Pope's infallibility:—

"*Docemus, et divinitus revelatum dogma esse definimus, Romanum Pontificem, cum ex Cathedra loquitur, id est cum, omnium Christianorum Pastoris et Doctoris munere fungens, pro supremâ suâ Apostolicâ auctoritate doctrinam de fide vel moribus ab universâ Ecclesiâ tenendam definit, per assistentiam divinam, ipsi in Beato Petro promissam, eâ infallibilitate pollere, quâ Divinus Redemptor Ecclesiam suam in definiendâ doctrinâ de fide vel moribus instructam esse voluit: ideoque ejus Romani Pontificis definitiones ex sese non autem ex consensu Ecclesiæ irreformabiles esse.*"

"*Constitutio de Ecclesiâ*," c. iv.

Will it, then, be said that the infallibility of the Pope accrues only when he speaks *ex cathedrâ*? No doubt this is a very material consideration for those, who have been told that the private conscience is to derive comfort and assurance from the emanations of the Papal Chair; for there is no established or accepted definition of the phrase *ex cathedrâ*, and he has no power to obtain one, and no guide to direct him in his choice among some twelve theories on the subject, which, it is said, are banded to and fro among Roman theologians, except the despised and discarded agency of his private judgment. But while thus sorely tantalized, he is not one whit protected. For there is still one person, and one only, who can unquestionably declare *ex cathedrâ* what is *ex cathedrâ* and what is not, and who can declare it when and as he pleases. That person is the Pope himself. The provision is, that no document he issues shall be valid without a seal: but the seal remains under his own sole lock and key.

Again, it may be sought to plead, that the Pope is, after all, only operating by sanctions which unquestionably belong to the religious domain. He does not propose to invade the country, to seize Woolwich, or burn Portsmouth. He will only, at the worst, excommunicate opponents, as he has excommunicated Dr. von Döllinger and others. Is this a good answer? After all, even in the Middle Ages, it was not by the direct action of fleets and armies of their own that the Popes contended with kings who were refractory; it was mainly by interdicts, and by the refusal, which they entailed when the Bishops were not brave enough to refuse their publication, of religious offices to the people. It was thus that England suffered under John, France under Philip Augustus, Leon under Alphonso the Noble, and every country in its turn. But the inference may be drawn that they who, while using spiritual weapons for such an end, do not employ temporal means, only fail to employ them because they have them not. A religious society, which delivers volleys of spiritual censures in order to impede the performance of civil duties, does all the mischief that is in its power to do, and brings into question, in the face of the State, its title to civil protection.

Will it be said, finally, that the Infallibility touches only matter of faith and morals? Only matter of morals! Will any of the Roman casuists kindly acquaint us what are the departments and functions of human life which do not and cannot fall within the domain of morals? If they will not tell us, we must look elsewhere. In his work entitled "Literature and Dogma,"

Pages 15, 44.

Mr. Matthew Arnold quaintly informs us—as they tell us nowadays how many parts of our poor bodies are solid, and how many aqueous—that about seventy-five per cent, of all we do belongs to the department of "conduct." Conduct and morals, we may suppose, are nearly co-extensive. Three-fourths, then, of life are thus handed over. But who will guarantee to us the other fourth? Certainly not St. Paul; who says, "Whether therefore ye eat, or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do *all* to the glory of God." And "Whatsoever ye do, in word or in deed, do *all* in the name of the Lord Jesus."

1 Cor. x. 31; Col. iii. 7.

No! Such a distinction would be the unworthy device of a shallow policy, vainly used to hide the daring of that wild ambition which at Rome, not from the throne but from behind the throne, prompts the movements of the Vatican. I care not to ask if there be dregs or tatters of human life, such as can escape from the description and boundary of morals. I submit that Duty is a power which rises with us in the morning, and goes to rest with us at night. It is co-extensive with the action of our intelligence. It is the shadow which cleaves to us go where we will, and which only leaves us when we leave the light of life. So then it is the supreme direction of us in respect to all Duty, which the Pontiff declares to belong to him, *sacro approbante concilio*; and this declaration he makes, not as an otiose opinion of the schools, but *cunctis fidelibus credendam et tenendam*.

But we shall now see that, even if a loophole had at this point been left unclosed, the void is supplied by another provision of the Decrees. While the reach of the Infallibility is as wide as it may please the Pope, or those who may prompt the Pope, to make it, there is something wider still, and that is the claim to an absolute and entire Obedience. This Obedience is to be rendered to his orders in the cases I shall proceed to point out, without any qualifying condition, such as the *ex cathedra*. The sounding name of Infallibility has so fascinated the public mind, and riveted it on the Fourth Chapter of the Constitution *de Ecclesiâ*, that its near neighbour, the Third Chapter, has, at least in my opinion, received very much less than justice. Let us turn to it.

"Cujuscunque ritûs et dignitatis pastores atque fideles, tam seorsum singuli quam simul omnes, officio hierarchicæ subordinations veræque obedientiæ? obstringuntur, non solum in rebus, quæ ad fidem et mores, sed etiam in iis, quæ ad disciplinam et regimen Ecclesiæ per totum orbem diffusæ pertinent . . . Hæc est Catholicæ vritatis doctrina, a quit deviare, salvâ fide atqne salute, nemo potest. . . ."

"Docemus etiam et doclaramus eum esse judicem supremum fidelium, et in omnibus causis ad examen ecclesiasticum spectantibus ad ipsius posse judicium recurri: Sedis vero Apostolicæ, cujus auctoritate major non est, judicium a nemine fore retractandum. Neque cuiquam de ejus licere judicare judicio."

"Dogmatic Constitutions," &c, c. iii. Dublin, 1870, pp. 30-32.

Even, therefore, where the judgments of the Pope do not present the credentials of infallibility, they are

unappealable and irreversible: no person may pass judgment upon them; and all men, clerical and lay, dispersedly or in the aggregate, are bound truly to obey them; and from this rule of Catholic truth no man can depart, save at the peril of his salvation. Surely, it is allowable to say that this Third Chapter on universal obedience is a formidable rival to the Fourth Chapter on Infallibility. Indeed, to an observer from without, it seems to leave the dignity to the other, but to reserve the stringency and efficiency to itself. The Fourth Chapter is the Merovingian Monarch; the third is the Carolingian Mayor of the Palace. The fourth has an overawing splendour; the third, an iron gripe. Little does it matter to me whether my superior claims infallibility, so long as he is entitled to demand and exact conformity. This, it will be observed, he demands even in cases not covered by his infallibility; cases, therefore, in which he admits it to be possible that he may be wrong, but finds it intolerable to be told so. As he must be obeyed in all his judgments though not *ex cathedrâ*, it seems a pity he could not likewise give the comforting assurance that, they are all certain to be right.

But why this ostensible reduplication, this apparent surplusage? Why did the astute contrivers of this tangled scheme conclude that they could not afford to rest content with pledging the Council to Infallibility in terms which are not only wide to a high degree, but elastic beyond all measure?

Though they must have known perfectly well that "faith and morals" carried everything, or everything worth having, in the purely individual sphere, they also knew just as well that, even where the individual was subjugated, they might and would still have to deal with the State.

In mediæval history, this distinction is not only clear, but glaring. Outside the borders of some narrow and proscribed sect, now and then emerging, we never, or scarcely ever, hear of private and personal resistance to the Pope. The manful "Protestantism" of mediæval times had its activity almost entirely in the sphere of public, national, and state rights. Too much attention, in my opinion, cannot be fastened on this point. It is the very root and kernel of the matter. Individual servitude, however abject, will not satisfy the party now dominant in the Latin Church: the State must also be a slave.

Our Saviour had recognized as distinct the two provinces of the civil rule and the Church: had nowhere intimated that the spiritual authority was to claim the disposal of physical force, and to control in its own domain the authority which is alone responsible for external peace, order, and safety among civilized communities of men. It has been alike the peculiarity, the pride, and the misfortune of the Roman Church, among Christian communities, to allow to itself an unbounded use, as far as its power would go, of earthly instruments for spiritual ends. We have seen with what ample assurances

See further, Appendix B.

this nation and Parliament were fed in 1826; how well and roundly the full and undivided rights of the civil power, and the separation of the two jurisdictions, were affirmed. All this had at length been undone, as far as Popes could undo it, in the Syllabus and the Encyclical. It remained to complete the undoing, through the subserviency or pliability of the Council.

And the work is now truly complete. Lest it should be said that supremacy in faith and morals, full dominion over personal belief and conduct, did not cover the collective action of men in States, a third province was opened, not indeed to the abstract assertion of Infallibility, but to the far more practical and decisive demand of absolute Obedience. And this is the proper work of the Third Chapter, to which I am endeavouring to do a tardy justice. Let us listen again to its few but pregnant words on the point:

"Non solum in rebus, quæ ad fidem et mores, sed etiam in iis, quæ ad disciplinam et regimen Eeclesiæ per totum orbem diffusæ pertinent."

Absolute Obedience, it is boldly declared, is due to the Pope, at the peril of salvation, not alone in faith, in morals, but in all things which concern the discipline and government of the Church. Thus are swept into the Papal net whole multitudes of facts, whole systems of government, prevailing, though in different degrees, in every country of the world. Even in the United States, where the severance between Church and State is supposed to be complete, a long catalogue might be drawn of subjects belonging to the domain and competency of the State, but also undeniably affecting the government of the Church: such as, by way of example, marriage, burial, education, prison discipline, blasphemy, poor relief, incorporation, mortmain, religious endowments, vows of celibacy and obedience. In Europe the circle is far wider, the points of contact and of interlacing almost innumerable. But on all matters, respecting which any Pope may think proper to declare that they concern either faith or morals, or the government or discipline of the Church, he claims, with the approval of a Council, undoubtedly Ecumenical in the Roman sense, the absolute obedience, at the peril of salvation, of every member of his communion.

It seems not as yet to have been thought wise to pledge the Council in terms to the Syllabus and the Encyclical. That achievement is probably reserved for some one of its sittings yet to come. In the meantime it is well to remember, that this claim in respect of all things affecting the discipline and government of the Church, as well as faith and conduct, is lodged in open day by and in the reign of a Pontiff, who has condemned free speech, free writing, a free press, toleration of nonconformity, liberty of conscience, the study of civil and

philosophical matters in independence of the ecclesiastical authority, marriage unless sacramentally contracted, and the definition by the State of the civil rights (*jura*) of the Church; who has demanded for the Church, therefore, the title to define its own civil rights, together with a divine right to civil immunities, and a right to use physical force; and who has also proudly asserted that the Popes of the Middle Ages with their councils did not invade the rights of princes: as for example, Gregory VII., of the Emperor Henry IV.; Innocent III., of Raymond of Toulouse; Paul III., in deposing Henry VIII.; or Pius V., in performing the like paternal office for Elizabeth.

I submit, then, that my fourth proposition is true; and that England is entitled to ask, and to know, in what way the obedience required by the Pope and the Council of the Vatican is to be reconciled with the integrity of civil allegiance?

It has been shown that the Head of their Church, so supported as undoubtedly to speak with its highest authority, claims from Roman Catholics a plenary obedience to whatever he may desire in relation not to faith but to morals, and not only to these, but to all that concerns the government and discipline of the Church: that, of this, much lies within the domain of the State: that, to obviate all misapprehension, the Pope demands for himself the right to determine the province of his own rights, and has so defined it in formal documents, as to warrant any and every invasion of the civil sphere; and that this new version of the principles of the Papal Church inexorably binds its members to the admission of these exorbitant claims, without any refuge or reservation on behalf of their duty to the Crown.

Under circumstances such as these, it seems not too much to ask of them to confirm the opinion, which we, as fellow-countrymen, entertain of them, by sweeping away, in such manner and terms as they may think best, the presumptive imputations which their ecclesiastical rulers at Rome, acting autocratically, appear to have brought upon their capacity to pay a solid and undivided allegiance; and to fulfil the engagement which their Bishops as political sponsors, promised and declared for them in 1825.

It would be impertinent, as well as needless, to suggest what should be said. All that is requisite is to indicate in substance that which (if the foregoing argument be sound) is not wanted, and that which is. What is not wanted is vague and general assertion, of whatever kind, and however sincere. What is wanted, and that in the most specific form and the clearest terms, I take to be one of two things; that is to say, either—

- A demonstration that neither in the name of faith, nor in the name of morals, nor in the name of the government or discipline of the Church, is the Pope of Rome able, by virtue of the powers asserted for him by the Vatican decree, to make any claim upon those who adhere to his communion, of such a nature as can impair the integrity of their civil allegiance; or else,
- That, if and when such claim is made, it will, even although resting on the definitions of the Vatican, be repelled and rejected; just as Bishop Doyle, when he was asked what the Roman Catholic clergy would do if the Pope intermeddled with their religion, replied frankly, "The consequence would be, that we should oppose him by every means in our power, even by the exercise of our spiritual authority."

"Report," March 18, 1826, p. 191.

In the absence of explicit assurances to this effect, we should appear to be led, nay, driven, by just reasoning upon that documentary evidence, to the conclusions:—

- That the Pope, authorized by his Council, claims for himself the domain (*a*) of faith, (*b*) of morals, (*c*) of all that concerns the government and discipline of the Church.
- That he in like manner claims the power of determining the limits of those domains.
- That he does not sever them, by any acknowledged or intelligible line, from the domains of civil duty and allegiance.
- That he therefore claims, and claims from the month of July, 1870, onwards with plenary authority, from every convert and member of his Church, that he shall "place his loyalty and civil duty at the mercy of another:" that other being himself.

V. BEING TRUE ARE THE PROPOSITIONS MATERIAL?

But next, if these propositions be true, are they also material? The claims cannot, as I much fear, be denied to have been made. It cannot be denied that the Bishops, who govern in things spiritual more than five millions (or nearly one-sixth) of the inhabitants of the United Kingdom, have in some cases promoted, in all cases accepted, these claims. It has been a favourite purpose of my life not to conjure up, but to conjure down, public alarms. I am not now going to pretend that either foreign foe or domestic treason can, at the bidding of the Court of Rome, disturb these peaceful shores. But though such fears may be visionary, it is more visionary still to suppose for one moment that the claims of Gregory VII., of Innocent III., and of Boniface VIII., have been disinterred, in the nineteenth century, like hideous mummies picked out of Egyptian sarcophagi, in the interests of archaeology, or without a definite and practical aim. As rational beings we must rest assured that only with a

very clearly conceived and foregone purpose have these astonishing re-assertions been paraded before the world. What is that purpose?

I can well believe that it is in part theological. There have always been, and there still are, no small proportion of our race, and those by no means in all respects the worst, who are sorely open to the temptation, especially in times of religious disturbance, to discharge their spiritual responsibilities by *power of attorney*. As advertising Houses find custom in proportion, not so much to the solidity of their resources as to the magniloquence of their promises and assurances, so theological boldness in the extension of such claims is sure to pay, by widening certain circles of devoted adherents, however it may repel the mass of mankind. There were two special encouragements to this enterprise at the present day: one of them the perhaps unconscious but manifest leaning of some, outside the Roman precinct, to undue exaltation of Church power; the other the reaction, which is and must be brought about in favour of superstition, by the levity of the destructive speculations so widely current, and the notable hardihood of the anti-Christian writing of the day.

But it is impossible to account sufficiently in this manner for the particular course which has been actually pursued by the Roman Court. All morbid spiritual appetites would have been amply satisfied by claims to infallibility in creed, to the prerogative of miracle, to dominion over the unseen world. In truth there was occasion, in this view, for nothing, except a liberal supply of Salmonean thunder:—

"Dum flammæ Jovis, et sonitus imitatur Olympi."

Æn. vi. 586.

All this could have been managed by a few Tetzels, judiciously distributed over Europe. Therefore the question still remains, Why did that Court, with policy for ever in its eye, lodge such formidable demands for power of the vulgar kind in that sphere which is visible, and where hard knocks can undoubtedly be given as well as received?

It must be for some political object, of a very tangible kind, that the risks of so daring a raid upon the civil sphere have been deliberately run.

A daring raid it is. For it is most evident that the very assertion of principles which establish an exemption from allegiance, or which impair its completeness, goes, in many other countries of Europe, far more directly than with us, to the creation of political strife, and to dangers of the most material and tangible kind. The struggle, now proceeding in Germany, at once occurs to the mind as a palmary instance. I am not competent to give any opinion upon the particulars of that struggle. The institutions of Germany, and the relative estimate of State power and individual freedom, are materially different from ours. But I must say as much as this. First, it is not Prussia alone that is touched; elsewhere, too, the bone lies ready, though the contention may be delayed. In other States, in Austria particularly, there are recent laws in force, raising much the same issues as the Falck laws have raised. But the Roman Court possesses in perfection one art, the art of waiting; and it is her wise maxim to fight but one enemy at a time. Secondly, if I have truly represented the claims promulgated from the Vatican, it is difficult to deny that those claims, and the power which has made them, are primarily responsible for the pains and perils, whatever they may be, of the present conflict between German and Roman enactments. And that which was once truly said of France, may now also be said with not less truth of Germany: when Germany is disquieted, Europe cannot be at rest.

I should feel less anxiety on this subject had the Supreme Pontiff frankly recognized his altered position since the events of 1870; and, in language as clear, if not as emphatic, as that in which he has proscribed modern civilization, given to Europe the assurance that, he would be no party to the re-establishment by blood and violence of the Temporal Power of the Church. It is easy to conceive that his personal benevolence, no less than his feelings as an Italian, must have inclined him individually towards a course so humane; and I should add, if I might do it without presumption, so prudent. With what appears to an English eye a lavish prodigality, successive Italian Governments have made over the ecclesiastical powers and privileges of the Monarchy, not to the Church of the country for the revival of the ancient, popular, and self-governing elements of its constitution, but to the Papal Chair, for the establishment of ecclesiastical despotism, and the suppression of the last vestiges of independence. This course, so difficult for a foreigner to appreciate, or even to justify, has been met, not by reciprocal conciliation, but by a constant fire of denunciations and complaints. When the tone of these denunciations and complaints is compared with the language of the authorized and favoured Papal organs in the press, and of the Ultramontane party (now the sole legitimate party of the Latin Church) throughout Europe, it leads many to the painful and revolting conclusion that there is a fixed purpose among the secret inspirers of Roman policy to pursue, by the road of force, upon the arrival of any favourable opportunity, the favourite project of re-erecting the terrestrial throne of the Popedom, even if it can only be re-erected on the ashes of the city, and amidst the whitening bones of the people.

Appendix C.

It is difficult to conceive or contemplate the effects of such an endeavour. But the existence at this day of the policy, even in bare idea, is itself a portentous evil. I do not hesitate to say that it is an incentive to general

disturbance, a premium upon European wars. It is in my opinion not sanguine only, but almost ridiculous to imagine that such a project could eventually succeed; but it is difficult to overestimate the effect which it might produce in generating and exasperating strife. It might even, to some extent, disturb and paralyse the action of such Governments as might interpose for no separate purpose of their own, but only with a view to the maintenance or restoration of the general peace. If the baleful Power which is expressed by the phrase *Curia Romana*, and not at all adequately rendered in its historic force by the usual English equivalent "Court of Rome," really entertains the scheme, it doubtless counts on the support in every country of an organized and devoted party; which, when it can command the scales of political power, will promote interference, and, when it is in a minority, will work for securing neutrality. As the peace of Europe may be in jeopardy, and as the duties even of England, as one (so to speak) of its constabulary authorities, might come to be in question, it would be most interesting to know the mental attitude of our Roman Catholic fellow-countrymen in England and Ireland with reference to the subject; and it seems to be one, on which we are entitled to solicit information.

For there cannot be the smallest doubt that the temporal power of the Popedom comes within the true meaning of the words used at the Vatican to describe the subjects on which the Pope is authorized to claim, under awful sanctions, the obedience of the "faithful." It is even possible that we have here the key to the enlargement of the province of Obedience beyond the limits of Infallibility, and to the introduction of the remarkable phrase *ad disciplinam et regimen Ecclesiae*. No impartial person can deny that the question of the temporal power very evidently concerns the discipline and government of the Church—concerns it, and most mischievously as I should venture to think; but in the opinion, up to a late date, of many Roman Catholics, not only most beneficially, but even essentially. Let it be remembered, that such a man as the late Count Montalembert, who in his general politics was of the Liberal party, did not scruple to hold that the millions of Roman Catholics throughout the world were copartners with the inhabitants of the States of the Church in regard to their civil government; and, as constituting the vast majority, were of course entitled to override them. It was also rather commonly held, a quarter of a century ago, that the question of the States of the Church was one with which none but Roman Catholic Powers could have anything to do. This doctrine, I must own, was to me at all times unintelligible. It is now, to say the least, hopelessly and irrecoverably obsolete.

Archbishop Manning, who is the head of the Papal Church in England, and whose ecclesiastical tone is supposed to be in the closest accord with that of his headquarters, has not thought it too much to say that the civil order of all Christendom is the offspring of the Temporal Power, and has the Temporal Power for its keystone; that on the destruction of the Temporal Power "the laws of nations would at once fall in ruins;" that (our old friend) the deposing Power "taught subjects obedience and princes clemency."

"Three Lectures on the Temporal Sovereignty of the Popes," 1860, pp. 34, 46, 47, 58-9, 63.

Nay, this high authority has proceeded further; and has elevated the Temporal Power to the rank of necessary doctrine.

"The Catholic Church cannot be silent, it cannot hold its peace; it cannot cease to preach the doctrines of Revelation, not only of the Trinity and of the Incarnation, but likewise of the Seven Sacraments, and of the Infallibility of the Church of God, and of the necessity of Unity, and of the Sovereignty, both spiritual and temporal, of the Holy See."

"The present Crisis of the Holy See." By H. E. Manning, D.D. London, 1861, p. 73.

I never, for my own part, heard that the work containing this remarkable passage was placed in the 'Index Prohibitorum Librorum.' On the contrary, its distinguished author was elevated, on the first opportunity, to the headship of the Roman Episcopacy in England, and to the guidance of the million or thereabouts of souls in its communion. And the more recent utterances of the oracle have not descended from the high level of those already cited. They have, indeed, the recommendation of a comment, not without fair claims to authority, on the recent declarations of the Pope and the Council; and of one which goes to prove how far I am from having exaggerated or strained in the foregoing pages the meaning of those declarations. Especially does this hold good on the one point, the most vital of the whole—the title to define the border line of the two provinces, which the Archbishop not unfairly takes to be the true criterion of supremacy, as between rival powers like the Church and the State.

"If, then, the civil power be not competent to decide the limits of the spiritual power, and if the spiritual power can define, with a divine certainty, its own limits, it is evidently supreme. Or, in other words, the spiritual power knows, with divine certainty, the limits of its own jurisdiction: and it knows therefore the limits and the competence of the civil power. It is thereby, in matters of religion and conscience, supreme. I do not see how this can be denied without denying Christianity. And if this be so, this is the doctrine of the Bull Unam Sanctam

On the Bull Unam Sanctam, "of a most odious kind;" see Bishop Doyle's Essay, already cited. He thus describes it.

and of the Syllabus, and of the Vatican Council. It is, in fact, Ultramontanism, for this term means neither

less nor more. The Church, therefore, is separate and supreme.

"Let us then ascertain somewhat further, what is the meaning of supreme. Any power which is independent, and can alone fix the limits of its own jurisdiction, and can thereby fix the limits of all other jurisdictions, is, ipso facto, supreme.

The italics are not in the original.

But the Church of Jesus Christ, within the sphere of revelation, of faith and morals, is all this, or is nothing, or worse than nothing, an imposture and an usurpation—that is, it is Christ or Antichrist."

"Cæsarism and Ultramontanism." By Archbishop Manning, 1874, pp. 35-6.

But the whole pamphlet should be read by those who desire to know the true sense of the Papal declarations and Vatican decrees, as they are understood by the most favoured ecclesiastics; understood, I am bound to own, so far as I can see, in their natural, legitimate, and inevitable sense. Such readers will be assisted by the treatise in seeing clearly, and in admitting frankly that, whatever demands may hereafter, and in whatever circumstances, be made upon us, we shall be unable to advance with any fairness the plea that it has been done without due notice.

There are millions upon millions of the Protestants of this country, who would agree with Archbishop Manning, if he were simply telling us that Divine truth is not to be sought from the lips of the State, nor to be sacrificed at its command. But those millions would tell him, in return, that the State, as the power which is alone responsible for the external order of the world, can alone conclusively and finally be competent to determine what is to take place in the sphere of that external order.

I have shown, then, that the Propositions, especially that which has been felt to be the chief one among them, being true, are also material; material to be generally known, and clearly understood, and well considered, on civil grounds; inasmuch as they invade, at a multitude of points, the civil sphere, and seem even to have no very remote or shadowy connection with the future peace and security of Christendom.

VI. WERE THE PROPOSITIONS PROPER TO BE SET FORTH BY THE PRESENT WRITER?

There remains yet before us only the shortest and least significant portion of the inquiry, namely, whether these things, being true, and being material to be said, were also proper to be said by me. I must ask pardon if a tone of egotism be detected in this necessarily subordinate portion of my remarks.

For thirty years, and in a great variety of circumstances, in office and as an independent Member of Parliament, in majorities and in small minorities, and during the larger portion of the time

From 1847 to 1865 I sat for the University of Oxford.

as the representative of a great constituency, mainly clerical, I have, with others, laboured to maintain and extend the civil rights of my Roman Catholic fellow-countrymen. The Liberal party of this country, with which I have been commonly associated, has suffered, and sometimes suffered heavily, in public favour and in influence, from the belief that it was too ardent in the pursuit of that policy; while at the same time it has always been in the worst odour with the Court of Rome, in consequence of its (I hope) unalterable attachment to Italian liberty and independence. I have sometimes been the spokesman of that party in recommendations which have tended to foster in fact the imputation I have mentioned, though not to warrant it as matter of reason. But it has existed in fact. So that while (as I think) general justice to society required that these things which I have now set forth should be written, special justice, as towards the party to which I am loyally attached, and which I may have had a share in thus placing at a disadvantage before our countrymen, made it, to say the least, becoming that I should not shrink from writing them.

In discharging that office, I have sought to perform the part not of a theological partisan, but simply of a good citizen; of one hopeful that many of his Roman Catholic friends and fellow-countrymen, who are, to say the least of it, as good citizens as himself, may perceive that the case is not a frivolous case, but one that merits their attention.

I will next proceed to give the reason why, up to a recent date, I have thought it right in the main to leave to any others, who might feel it, the duty of dealing in detail with this question.

The great change, which seems to me to have been brought about in the position of Roman Catholic Christians as citizens, reached its consummation, and came into full operation in July, 1870, by the proceedings or so-called decrees of the Vatican Council.

Up to that time, opinion in the Roman Church on all matters involving civil liberty, though partially and sometimes widely intimidated, was free wherever it was resolute. During the Middle Ages, heresy was often extinguished in blood, but in every Cisalpine country a principle of liberty, to a great extent, held its own, and national life refused to be put down. Nay more, these precious and inestimable gifts had not infrequently for their champions a local prelacy and clergy. The Constitutions of Clarendon, cursed from the Papal throne, were

the work of the English Bishops. Stephen Langton, appointed directly, through an extraordinary stretch of power, by Innocent III., to the See of Canterbury, headed the Barons of England in extorting from the Papal minion John, the worst and basest of all our Sovereigns, that Magna Charta, which the Pope at once visited with his anathemas. In the reign of Henry VIII., it was Tunstal, Bishop of Durham, who first wrote against the Papal domination. Tunstal was followed by Gardiner; and even the recognition of the Royal Headship was voted by the clergy, not under Cranmer, but under his unsuspected predecessor Warham. Strong and domineering as was the high Papal party in those centuries, the resistance was manful. Thrice in history, it seemed as if what we may call the Constitutional party in the Church was about to triumph: first at the epoch of the Council of Constance; secondly, when the French Episcopate was in conflict with Pope Innocent XI.; thirdly, when Clement XIV. levelled with the dust the deadliest foes that mental and moral liberty have ever known. But from July 1870, this state of things has passed away, and the death-warrant of that Constitutional party has been signed, and sealed, and promulgated in form.

Before that time arrived, although I had used expressions sufficiently indicative as to the tendency of things in the great Latin Communion, yet I had for very many years felt it to be the first and paramount duty of the British Legislature, whatever Rome might say or do, to give to Ireland all that justice could demand, in regard to matters of conscience and of civil equality, and thus to set herself right in the opinion of the civilized world. So far from seeing, what some believed they saw, a spirit of unworthy compliance in such a course, it appeared to me the only one which suited either the dignity or the duty of my country. While this debt remained unpaid, both before and after 1870, I did not think it my province to open formally a line of argument on a question of prospective rather than immediate moment, which might have prejudiced the matter of duty lying nearest our hand, and morally injured Great Britain not less than Ireland, Churchmen and Nonconformists not less than adherents of the Papal Communion, by slackening the disposition to pay the debt of justice. When Parliament had passed the Church Act of 1869 and the Land Act of 1870, there remained only, under the great head of Imperial equity, one serious question to be dealt with—that of the higher Education. I consider that the Liberal majority in the House of Commons, and the Government to which I had the honour and satisfaction to belong, formally tendered payment in full of this portion of the debt by the Irish University Bill of February, 1873. Some indeed think, that it was overpaid: a question into which this is manifestly not the place to enter. But the Roman Catholic prelacy of Ireland thought fit to procure the rejection of that measure, by the direct influence which they exercised over a certain number of Irish Members of Parliament, and by the temptation which they thus offered—the bid, in effect, which (to use a homely phrase) they made, to attract the support of the Tory Opposition. Their efforts were crowned with a complete success. From that time forward I have felt that the situation was changed, and that important matters would have to be cleared by suitable explanations. The debt to Ireland had been paid; a debt to the country at large had still to be disposed of, and this has come to be the duty of the hour. So long, indeed, as I continued to be Prime Minister, I should not have considered a broad political discussion on a general question suitable to proceed from me; while neither I nor (I am certain) my colleagues would have been disposed to run the risk of stirring popular passions by a vulgar and unexplained appeal. But every difficulty, arising from the necessary limitations of an official position, has now been removed.

VII. ON THE HOME POLICY OF THE FUTURE.

I could not, however, conclude these observations without anticipating and answering an inquiry they suggest. "Are they, then," it will be asked, "a recantation and a regret; and what are they meant to recommend as the policy of the future?" My reply shall be succinct and plain. Of what the Liberal party has accomplished, by word or deed, in establishing the full civil equality of Roman Catholics, I regret nothing, and I recant nothing.

It is certainly a political misfortune that, during the last thirty years, a Church so tainted in its views of civil obedience, and so unduly capable of changing its front and language after Emancipation from what it had been before, like an actor who has to perform several characters in one piece, should have acquired an extension of its hold upon the highest classes of this country. The conquests have been chiefly, as might have been expected, among women; but the number of male converts, or captives (as I might prefer to call them), has not been inconsiderable. There is no doubt, that every one of these secessions is in the nature of a considerable moral and social severance. The breadth of this gap varies, according to varieties of individual character. But it is too commonly a wide one. Too commonly, the spirit of the neophyte is expressed by the words which have become notorious: "a Catholic first, an Englishman afterwards." Words which properly convey no more than a truism; for every Christian must seek to place his religion even before his country in his inner heart. But very far from a truism in the sense in which we have been led to construe them. We take them to mean that the "convert" intends, in case of any conflict between the Queen and the Pope, to follow the Pope, and let the Queen shift for

herself; which, happily, she can well do.

Usually, in this country, a movement in the highest class would raise a presumption of a similar movement in the mass. It is not so here. Humours have gone about that the proportion of members of the Papal Church to the population has increased, especially in England. But these rumours would seem to be confuted by authentic figures. The Roman Catholic Marriages, which supply a competent test, and which were 4.89 per cent, of the whole in 1854, and 4.62 per cent, in 1859, were 4.09 per cent, in 1869, and 4.02 per cent, in 1871.

There is something at the least abnormal in such a partial growth, taking effect as it does among the wealthy and noble, while the people cannot be charmed, by any incantation, into the Roman camp. The original Gospel was supposed to be meant especially for the poor; but the gospel of the nineteenth century from Rome courts another and less modest destination. If the Pope does not control more souls among us, he certainly controls more acres.

The severance, however, of a certain number of lords of the soil from those who till it, can be borne. And so I trust will in like manner be endured the new and very real "aggression" of the principles promulgated by Papal authority, whether they are or are not loyally disclaimed. In this matter each man is his own judge and his own guide: I can speak for myself. I am no longer able to say, as I would have said before 1870, "There is nothing in the necessary belief of the Roman Catholic which can appear to impeach his full civil title; for, whatsoever be the follies of ecclesiastical power in his Church, his Church itself has not required of him, with binding authority, to assent to any principles inconsistent with his civil duty." That ground is now, for the present at least, cut from under my feet. What then is to be our course of policy hereafter? First let me say that as regards the great Imperial settlement, achieved by slow degrees, which has admitted men of all creeds subsisting among us to Parliament, that I conceive to be so determined beyond all doubt or question, as to have become one of the deep foundation-stones of the existing Constitution. But inasmuch as, short of this great charter of public liberty, and independently of all that has been done, there are pending matters of comparatively minor moment which have been, or may be, subjects of discussion, not without interest attaching to them, I can suppose a question to arise in the minds of some. My own views and intentions in the future are of the smallest significance. But, if the arguments I have here offered make it my duty to declare them, I say at once the future will be exactly as the past: in the little that depends on me, I shall be guided hereafter, as heretofore, by the rule of maintaining equal civil rights irrespectively of religious differences; and shall resist all attempts to exclude the members of the Roman Church from the benefit of that rule. Indeed I may say that I have already given conclusive indications of this view, by supporting in Parliament, as a Minister, since 1870, the repeal of the Ecclesiastical Titles Act, for what I think ample reasons. Not only because the time has not yet come when we can assume the consequences of the revolutionary measures of 1870 to have been thoroughly weighed and digested by all capable men in the Roman Communion. Not only because so great a numerical proportion are, as I have before observed, necessarily incapable of mastering, and forming their personal judgment upon, the case. Quite irrespectively even of these considerations, I hold that our onward even course should not be changed by follies, the consequences of which, if the worst come to the worst, this country will have alike the power and, in case of need, the will to control. The State will, I trust, be ever careful to leave the domain of religious conscience free, and yet to keep it to its own domain; and to allow neither private caprice nor, above all, foreign arrogance to dictate to it in the discharge of its proper office. "England expects every man to do his duty;" and none can be so well prepared under all circumstances to exact its performance as that Liberal party, which has done the work of justice alike for Nonconformists and for Papal dissidents, and whose members have so often, for the sake of that work, hazarded their credit with the markedly Protestant constituencies of the country. Strong the State of the United Kingdom has always been in material strength; and its moral panoply is now, we may hope, pretty complete.

It is not then for the dignity of the Crown and people of the United Kingdom to be diverted from a path which they have deliberately chosen, and which it does not rest with all the myrmidons of the Apostolic Chamber either openly to obstruct, or secretly to undermine. It is rightfully to be expected, it is greatly to be desired, that the Roman Catholics of this country should do in the Nineteenth century what their forefathers of England, except a handful of emissaries, did in the Sixteenth, when they were marshalled in resistance to the Armada, and in the Seventeenth when, in despite of the Papal Chair, they sat in the House of Lords under the Oath of Allegiance. That which we are entitled to desire, we are entitled also to expect; indeed, to say we did not expect it, would, in my judgment, be the true way of conveying an "insult" to those concerned. In this expectation we may be partially disappointed. Should those to whom I appeal, thus unhappily come to bear witness in their own persons to the decay of sound, manly, true life in their Church, it will be their loss more than ours. The inhabitants of these Islands, as a whole, are stable, though sometimes credulous and excitable; resolute, though sometimes boastful: and a strongheaded and soundhearted race will not be hindered, either by latent or by avowed dissents, due to the foreign influence of a caste, from the accomplishment of its mission in the world.

Appendices.

Appendix A.

The numbers here given correspond with those of the Eighteen Propositions given in the text, where it would have been less convenient to cite the originals.

- "Ex quâ, omnino falsâ socialis regiminis ideâ haud timent erroneam illam fovere opinionem, Catholicæ Ecclesiæ, animarumque saluti maxime exitialem, a rec. mem. Gregorio XIV. prædecessore Nostro *deliramentum* appellatam (eâdem Encycl. 'Mirari'), nimirum, libertatem conscientiæ et cultuum esse proprium cujuscunque hominis jus, quod lege proclamari, et asserti debet in omni recte constitute societate, et jus civibus inesse ad omnimodam libertatem nulla vel ecclesiasticâ, vel civili auctoritate coarctandam, quo suos conceptus quoscumque sive voce sive typis, sive aliâ ratione palam publiceque manifestare ac declarare valeant."—*Encyclical Letter*.
- "Atque silentio præterire non possumus eorum audaciam, qui sanam non sustinentes doctrinam 'illis Apostolicæ sedis judiciis, et decretis, quorum objectum ad bonum generate Ecclesiæ, ejusdemque jura, ac disciplinam spectare declaratur, dummodo fidei morumque dogmata non attingat, posse assensum et obedientiam detrectari absque peccato, et absque ullâ Catholicæ professionis jactura.'"—*Ibid*.
- "Ecclesia non est vera perfecta que societas plane libera, nec pollet suis propriis et con stantibus juribus sibi a divino suo Fundatore collatis, sed civilis potestatis est definire quæ sint Ecclesiæ jura, ac limites, intra quos eadem jura exercere queat."—*Syllabus v*.
- "Romani Pontifices et Concilia æcumenica a limitibus suæ potestatis recesserunt jura Principum usurpârunt, atque etiam in rebus fidei et morum definiendis errârunt."—*Ibid*, xxiii.
- "Ecclesia vis inferendæ potestatem non habet, neque potestatem ullam temporalem directam vel indirectam."—*Ibid*. xxiv.
- "Præter potestatem episcopatus inhærentem, alia est attributa temporalis potestas a civili imperio vel expressè vel tacitè concessa, revocanda propterea, cum libuerit, a civili imperio."—*Ibid*. xxv.
- "Ecclesiæ et personarum ecclesiasticarum immunitas a jure civili ortum habuit."—*Ibid*. xxx.
- "In conflictu legum utriusque potestatis, jus civile prævalet."—*Ibid*. xlii.
- "Catholicis viris probari potest ea juventutis instituendæ ratio, quæ sit a Catholicâ fide et ab Ecclesiæ potestata sejuncta, quæque rerum dumtaxat, naturalium scientiam ac terrenæ socialis vitæ fines tuncummodo vel saltern primarium spectet." —*Ibid*, xlvi.
- "Philosophicarum rerum morumque scientia, itemque civiles leges possunt et debent a divinâ et ecclesiasticâ auctoritate declinare."—*Ibid*. lvii.
- "Matrimonii sacramentum non est nisi contractui accessorium ab eoque separabile, ipsumque sacramentum in unâ tantum nuptiali benedictione situm est."—*Ibid*. lxxvi.
"Vi contractus mere civilis potest inter Christianos constare veri nominis matrimonium; falsumque est, aut contractum matrimonii inter Christianos semper esse sacramentum, aut nullum esse contractum, si sacramentum excludatur."—*Ibid*. lxxiii.
- "De temporalis regni cum spirituali compatibilitate disputant inter se Christianæ et Catholicæ Ecclesiæ filii."—*Syllabus lxxv*.
- "Abrogatio civilis imperii, quo Apostolica Sedes potitur, ad Ecclesiæ libertatem felicitatemque vel maxime conduceret."—*Ibid*, lxxvi.
- "Ætate hac nostra non amplius expedit religionem Catholicam haberi tanquam uni cam status religionem, cæteris quibuscumque cultibus exclusis."—*Ibid*, lxxvii.
- "Hinc laudabiliter in quibusdam Catholici nominis regionibus lege cautum est, ut hominibus illuc immigrantibus liceat publicum proprii cujusque cultus exercitium habere."—*Ibid*, lxxviii.
- "Romanus Pontifex potest ac debet cum progressu, cum liberalismo et cum recenti civilitate sese reconciliare et componere."—*Ibid*. lxxx.

Appendix B.

I have contented myself with a minimum of citation from the documents of the period before Emancipation. Their full effect can only be gathered by such as are acquainted with, or will take the trouble to refer largely to the originals. It is worth while, however, to cite the following passage from Bishop Doyle, as it may convey, through the indignation it expresses, an idea of the amplitude of the assurances' which had been (as I believe, most honestly and sincerely) given.

"There is no justice, my Lord, in thus condemning us. Such conduct on the part of our opponents creates in our bosoms a sense of wrong being done to us; it exhausts our patience, it provokes our indignation, and

prevents us from reiterating our efforts to obtain a more impartial hearing. We are tempted, in such cases as these, to attribute unfair motives to those who differ from us, as we cannot conceive how men gifted with intelligence can fail to discover truths so plainly demonstrated as,

"That our faith or our allegiance is not regulated by any such doctrines as those imputed to us;

"That our duties to the Government of our country are not influenced nor affected by any Bulls or practices of Popes;

"That these duties are to be learned by us, as by every other class of His Majesty's subjects, from the Gospel, from the reason given to us by God, from that love of country which nature has implanted in our hearts, and from those constitutional maxims, which are as well understood, and as highly appreciated, by Catholics of the present day, as by their ancestors, who founded them with Alfred, or secured them at Runnymede."—*Doyle's "Essay on the Catholic Claims,"* London, 1826, p. 38.

The same general tone as in 1826, was maintained in the answers of the witnesses from Maynooth College before the Commission of 1855. See, for example, pp. 132, 161-4, 272-3, 275, 361, 370-5, 381-2, 394-6, 405. The Commission reported (p. 64), "We see no reason to believe that there has been any disloyalty in the teaching of the College, or any disposition to impair the obligations of an unreserved allegiance to your Majesty."

Appendix C.

Compare the recent and ominous forecasting of the future European policy of the British Crown, in an article from a Romish Periodical for the current month, which has direct relation to these matters, and which has every appearance of proceeding from authority.

"Surely in any European complication, such as may any day arise, nay, such as must ere long arise, from the natural gravitation of the forces, which are for the moment kept in check and truce by the necessity of preparation for their inevitable collision, it may very well be that the future prosperity of England may be staked in the struggle, and that the side which she may take may be determined, not even by justice or interest, but *by a passionate resolve to keep up the Italian kingdom at any hazard.*"—The "Month" for November, 1874: "Mr. Gladstone's Durham Letter," p. 265.

This is a remarkable disclosure. With *whom* could England be brought into conflict by any disposition she might feel to keep up the Italian kingdom? Considered as States, both Austria and France are in complete harmony with Italy. But it is plain that Italy has some enemy; and the writers of the "Month" appear to know who it is.

Appendix D.

Notice has been taken, both in this country and abroad, of the apparent inertness of public men, and of at least one British Administration, with respect to the subject of these pages. See Friedberg, "Gränzen zwischen Staat und Kirche," Abtheilung iii. pp. 755-6; and the Preface to the Fifth Volume of Mr. Greenwood's elaborate, able, and judicial work, entitled "Cathedra Petri," p. iv.

"If there be any chance of such a revival, it would become our political leaders to look more closely into the peculiarities of a system, which denies the right of the subject to freedom of thought and action upon matters most material to his civil and religious welfare. There is no mode of ascertaining the spirit and tendency of great institutions but in a careful study of their history. The writer is profoundly impressed with the conviction that our political instructors have wholly neglected this important duty: or, which is perhaps worse, left it in the hands of a class of persons whose zeal has outrun their discretion, and who have sought rather to engage the prejudices than the judgment of their hearers in the cause they have, no doubt sincerely, at heart."

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Protestantism and Catholicism, In their Bearing upon the Liberty and Prosperity of Nations.

A Study of Social Economy.

By Émile de Laveleye,

Member of the "Institut de Droit International," of the Royal Academies of Belgium, Madrid, and Lisbon;

Correspondent of the "Institut de France;" "Officier D'Académie" of the University of France. Etc.

With an Introductory Letter

By The Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P.

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Contents.

Prefatory Letter.

MY DEAR M. DE LA VELEYE,

I thank you for your prompt assent to my request that your Tract on the relations of Reformed and unreformed Christianity respectively, in the West of Europe, to the liberty and prosperity of nations, might be translated into English.

I need hardly say to any, least of all to you, that this request did not imply adoption of your precise point of view, or of each of your opinions in detail. You have not, I believe, been governed by theological partialities in the judgment at which you have arrived; nor have I, in the desire to give currency in this country to a Tract which includes your rather unfavourable estimate of its Church in comparison with the other Reformed Communion. But I have felt that desire very strongly, because, within a compass wonderfully brief, you have initiated in a very vivid manner, and have even advanced to a certain point, the discussion of a question which heretofore can hardly be said to have been presented to the public mind, and which it seems to me high time to examine. That, question is, whether experience has now supplied *data* sufficient for a trustworthy comparison of results, in the several spheres of political liberty, social advancement, mental intelligence, and general morality, between the Church of Rome on the one hand, and the religious communities cast off by or separated from her on the other.

Mr. Hallam stated, many years ago, the difficulty of arriving at a conclusion on the ethical section of this question: but much, which in his day remained obscure, has been considerably elucidated by recent experience. And I trust that the brief but significant and weighty indications of your pamphlet, especially if they should not be followed by a fuller treatment from your own pen, may turn the thoughts of other students of history and observers of life to a thorough examination of this wide and most fruitful field.

There are other features in your mode of handling the case, from which England in particular may derive much instruction. With reference to the political and social fruits of religion, we have been accustomed to regard Belgium as the one choice garden of the Roman Church: and it has afforded a ready answer to many who entertained strong suspicion of her workings. It will be well for us to have a few words on this subject from a Belgian of known liberality and tolerance, who knows what, and under what difficulties, the wisdom of two successive kings has done for Belgium; and who is too acute either to undervalue the power and fixed intentions of the Ultramontane conspiracy, or to find comfort in the visionary notion that any security is afforded to European society against that conspiracy by any system of mere negotiations in religion. This last-named error is widely prevalent in England. There is an impression, which is not worthy to be called a conviction, but which holds the place of one, that the indifferentism, scepticism, materialism, and pantheism which for the moment are so fashionable, afford, among them, an effectual defence against Vaticanism. But one has truly said that the votaries of that system have three elements of real strength, namely, faith, self-sacrifice, and the spirit of continuity. None of the three are to be found in any of the negative systems; and you have justly and forcibly pointed out that these systems, through the feelings of repugnance and alarm which they excite in many religious minds, are effectual allies of the Romanism of the day. The Romanism of the day in a measure repays its obligation, by making its censure of these evils sincere no doubt, but only light and rare in comparison with the anathemas which it bestows upon liberty and its guarantees, most of all when any tendency to claim them is detected within its own precinct.

I remain, my dear M. de Laveleye, Most faithfully yours,

W. E. GLADSTONE.

LONDON: 23, CARLTON HOUSE TERRACE,

May 26th, 1875.

Protestantism and Catholicism in their Bearing

Upon the Liberty and Prosperity of Nations.

A Study of Social Economy.

I.

WE hear much at the present day of the decay of the Latin races. It is said that they decline rapidly, and that the future belongs both to the Germanic and to the Slavonic race.

I do not believe that the Latin races are condemned to decline on account of the blood which flows in their veins, that is to say, in consequence of any fatal destiny, fatal, as no people can change its nature or modify its physical constitution; but the fact that Catholic races advance much less rapidly than those which are no longer Catholic, and that, relatively to these latter, they even seem to go back, appears to be proved both by history, and more particularly by contemporary events. This fact is so manifest, that the very bishops themselves, and the *Univers*, their organ in France, make it a text of their reproaches to unbelieving Catholics.

Different reasons prevent my attributing this undeniable fact to influences of race. Undoubtedly, the fate of nations depends partly on their physical constitution. Even if we turn back to the origin of things, two causes only can be found capable of explaining the different destinies of various nations, viz., race, and surrounding circumstances;—on the one hand, the constitution of man, on the other, the influence of external nature—the climate, the geographical position, the products of the soil, the aspect of the country, the food. But in point of fact, when the question relates to nations of such mixed blood as that of Europeans, who, moreover, descend from a common stock, it is very difficult to connect the social conditions with the influence of race with any degree of scientific certainty.

The English understand the parliamentary system and the exercise of practical liberty better than the French. Is this owing to the influence of blood? I do not think so; for until near the sixteenth century, France, Spain, and Italy possessed provincial liberties of a very similar character to English liberties. The only notable difference was, that the English had a single parliament, and a centralised system, which proved strong enough to hold its own against royalty. The Norman Conquest having united England, an united parliament was the result; and royalty being very powerful, nobles and commons combined to resist it, whereas elsewhere they were constantly at strife.

The destinies of France and England only become entirely different from the beginning of the sixteenth century, when the Puritans had defeated the Stuarts, and when Louis XIV., by expelling the Protestants from France, had extirpated the last remnants of local autonomy, and the sole important elements of resistance, with which despotism might have been opposed.

When Protestants of Latin race are seen to rise superior to Germanic, but Catholic populations; when, in one and the same country, and one and the same group, identical in language, and identical in origin, it can be affirmed that Protestants advance more rapidly and steadily than Catholics, it is difficult not to attribute the superiority of the one over the other to the religion they profess.

Sectarian passions or anti-religious prejudice have been too often imported into the study of these questions. It is time that we should apply to it the method of observation, and the scientific impartiality of the physiologist and the naturalist. When the facts are once established, irrefragable conclusions will follow.

It is admitted that the Scotch and Irish are of the same origin. Both have become subject to the English yoke. Until the sixteenth century Ireland was much more civilised than Scotland. During the first part of the Middle Ages, the Emerald Isle was a focus of civilisation, while Scotland was still a den of barbarians.

Since the Scotch have embraced the reformed religion, they have outrun even the English. The climate and the nature of the soil prevent Scotland being as rich as England; but Macaulay proves that, since the seventeenth century, the Scotch have in every way surpassed the English. Ireland, on the other hand, devoted to Ultramontanism, is poor, miserable, agitated by the spirit of rebellion, and seems incapable of raising herself by her own strength.

What a contrast, even in Ireland, between the exclusively Catholic Connaught, and Ulster, where Protestantism prevails!

Ulster is enriched by industry, Connaught presents a picture of desolation.

I will not allow myself to establish any comparison between the United States and the States of South America, or between the nations of the North and those of the South of Europe. The differences which are to be

observed might be explained by the influence of climate or of race. But let us go to Switzerland, and compare the condition of the Cantons of Neuchâtel, Vaud, and Geneva (more particularly before the recent immigration of the Savoy Catholics), with that of Lucerne, Haut-Valais, and the forest Cantons. The former are extraordinarily in advance of the latter in respect of education, literature, the fine arts, industry, commerce, riches, cleanliness, in a word, civilisation in all its aspects, and in all its senses.

The first are Latin, but Protestant: the second German, but subject to Rome. Surely it is religion, and not race, which is the cause of the superiority of the former.

Let us now turn to a single Canton, that of Appenzell, inhabited throughout by an entirely identical Germanic population. The very same contrast presents itself between the Catholic "Rhodes intérieures" and the Protestant "Rhodes extérieures," as exists between the inhabitants of Neuchâtel and those of Lucerne or Uri. On the one hand, education, activity, industry, relations with the outer world, and by necessary consequence, wealth. On the other, inertia, routine, ignorance and poverty.

See Mr. Hepworth Dixon, whose judgment is certainly uninfluenced by any sectarian prejudice. He says in his recent book on Switzerland: "A Liberal puts an Evangelical district in the scale against a Catholic district—such as Appenzell-outer-Rhoden against Appenzell-inner-Rhoden—and demands a verdict on the evidence of eye and ear.

"In outer aspect these half-Cantons have the differences of Canton Berne and Canton Valais. In the lower country, though the village may be built of frames, the style is pretty, the arrangement neat. A fountain and a running water occupy the centre. Near it stand the village church, the council-chamber, and the primary school. Each cottage has a garden to itself. A creeper climbs up every stair and hangs from almost every roof. The click and whirr of looms are heard from every open window, and the little folk go singing on their way to school. The streets are clean, the markets well supplied, and every one you meet is warmly clad. But in the upper country things look poor and bare. Few villages are seen. The people dwell in scattered huts, with styes and stables on the ground, and sleeping rooms above them, like the folks in Biscay and Navarre. These huts, though strongly knit, are rudely planned and roughly built. Each herdsman lives apart from all his fellows whom he only meets at mass, at wrestling-match, and public house. The lads can read and write, for they are Switzers, subject to the Cantonal law; but books and journals are unknown among them, saving here and there some lives of saints, and popular sheets, containing scraps of old wives' lore in place of general and exciting news.

"The Protestant half-Canton grows in wealth and numbers, while the Catholic half-Canton lingers on in poverty and weakness: for the first takes in all strangers, irrespective of their creed, gives ready welcome to ideas on all subjects, and adopts without delay improvements in the loom, her chief domestic engine; while the second shuts her gates to all the world—on Protestants of every country and on Catholics who are not natives of the Canton—keeps her antique sports and dress, retains her shepherd industries as they existed in the Middle Ages, keeps her feast-days and her wrestling-matches, feeds on coarse rye-bread and acid curds, and holds in proud contempt the arts by which her neighbours thrive."

Wherever the two religions exist together in the same country, the Protestants are more active, more industrious, more economical, and consequently richer, than the Catholics.

"In the United States," says Tocqueville, "the greater part of the Catholics are poor."

In Canada, all important concerns, manufactures, commerce, and the principal shops in the towns, are in the hands of Protestants.

M. Audiganne, in his remarkable studies on "the working classes of France," observes the superiority of Protestants in industrial enterprise, and his evidence is the more trustworthy that he does not attribute this superiority to Protestantism. "The majority of the operatives of the town of Nismes," he says, "notably the silk weavers, are Catholics, while the leaders of industry and commerce, in a word the capitalists, belong in general to the reformed religion."

"When a single family has divided itself into two branches, the one remaining in the bosom of its ancestral faith, the other enrolling itself under the banner of the new doctrines, you may nearly always remark in the one case increasing embarrassments, in the other, growing wealth." "At Mazamet, the Elbœuf of the South of France," says again M. Audi-ganne, "all the leaders of industry, except one, are Protestant, while the great majority of workmen are Catholic. There is less education among these latter, than among the working families of the Protestant class."

Before the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the Protestants took the lead in all branches of labour, and the Catholics, unable to compete with them on equal terms, caused them to be forbidden the exercise of various industries in which they excelled, by several successive edicts, dating from 1662. After their banishment from France, the Protestants brought into England, Prussia, and Holland their spirit of enterprise and thrift, and enriched every district in which they settled. It is partly to reformed Latins that the Germans owe their progress. The refugees of the Revocation introduced various manufactures into England, that of silk among others; and the disciples of Calvin were the civilisers of Scotland.

If we compare the quotations on the Exchange of the public funds of Protestant and Catholic States, we shall find a great difference. The English 3 per cents, are above 92; the French 3 per cents, average 60. The Dutch, Prussian, Danish, and Swedish funds are at least at par; in Austria, Italy, Spain, and Portugal they are lower by 30 or 50 per cent.

Throughout Germany, at the present day, the trade in intellectual works—such as books, reviews, maps, newspapers—is almost entirely in the hands of Jews and Protestants.

In the presence of all these concurring facts, it is difficult not to confess that it is religion, and not race, which is the cause of the extraordinary prosperity of certain nations.

The Reformation imparted to those countries which adopted it a force which history can hardly explain.

Take the Low Countries: we have there two millions of men upon a soil half sand, half marsh: they resist Spain at a time when she holds Europe in her hand, and no sooner are they freed from the Castilian yoke, than they cover all the seas with their flag, they lead the van of the intellectual world, they possess as many ships as all the rest of the Continent put together, they become the soul of all the great European coalitions, they hold their own against the allied powers of England and France, they present to the United States that type of federal union which gives scope to the indefinite growth of the great Republic, and they set the example of those financial combinations which contribute so powerfully to the actual development of wealth—banks of issue and joint stock companies.

Sweden, with her million of men, and her rocky soil buried in snow for six months of the year, intervenes on the Continent, under Gustavus Adolphus, with heroic might, defeats Austria by the hand of her marvellous strategists, Wrangel, Torstenson, and Banner, and saves the cause of the Reformation. At the present day, England is the mistress of the seas, the first among industrial and commercial nations; in Asia, she rules over two hundred millions of men, and covers the globe with swarms from her own hive. Sir Charles Dilke's fine book 'Greater Britain,' presents the reader with a picture of Anglo-Saxon power throughout the world. The United States increase with bewildering rapidity. They reckon forty-two million inhabitants. Towards the end of the century, their population will be one hundred millions. Already, they are the richest and most powerful people on the face of the globe.

Protestant Prussia has defeated two empires, each containing twice her own population, the one in seven weeks, the other in seven months. In two centuries, America, Australia, and Southern Africa, will belong to the heretical Anglo-Saxons, and Asia to the schismatic Slaves.

The nations subject to Rome seem stricken with barrenness; they no longer colonise,

Here is an example taken at random. The Comte de Beauvoir arrives at Canton. There he sees the islet of Sha-Myen, ceded to France and England, situated in the midst of the river. The traveller is struck with the contrast between the part ceded to England and that which belongs to France. "In six years' time (1867) there have sprung up a little English village, a Protestant church, a cricket-ground, a training-ground for race-horses, spacious villas, and magnificent *go-downs* for the great tea houses of China. A pathway separates the British from the French territory. On our territory there are clumps of uncultivated trees, filth, stray dogs, cats, moles, but not a single house."—'Voyage autour du monde,' vol. ii. p. 427.

they have no powers of expansion. The expression employed by M. Thiers to depict their religious capital, Rome, *viduitas et sterilitas*, might be also applied to themselves. Their past is brilliant, but their present is gloomy, and their future disquieting. Can there be a sadder situation than that of Spain? France, which has rendered such services to the world, is also greatly to be pitied, not because she has been conquered on the field of battle—military reverses may be repaired—but because it seems her fate to be ceaselessly tossed to and fro between despotism and anarchy. Even now, at the moment when, in order to recover herself, she requires the harmonious action of all her sons, the extreme parties are contending for pre-eminence, at the risk of another outburst of civil war. Ultramontanism is the cause of the misfortunes of France; this it is which has weakened the country by that baneful course of action which we will analyse further on. This it was which, through the Empress Eugenie, an organ of the clerical party, brought about the Mexican expedition in order to raise up the Catholic nations of America, and the Prussian war in order to impede the progress of the Protestant States of Europe.

So it was recently asserted by Prince Bismarck from the tribune at Berlin. The Empress in July, 1870, said, "This is my war." The decision in favour of war, in the Supreme Council of Saint Cloud, on the 14th of August, was her doing; the Emperor was well aware of the danger, and reluctant to the last.

Italy and Belgium appear more prosperous than France and Spain; but is liberty definitely established in those countries? Able minds doubt it. Recently, a Roman journal, *Il Diritto*, published a remarkable work on the situation of Italy, with the significant title, 'L'Italia nera.' "The nations subject to the Pope are either dead already or dying," exclaims the author with consternation: "I popoli di religione papale o sono già morti o vanno morendi." "If," he adds, "Italy appears less sickly, the reason is, that the clergy, expecting the restoration of the Pope, first by means of Austrian, now by means of French inter-vention, have not as yet attacked liberty

and the constitution from within. The clerical party held aloof during the elections; but all this will be changed. The clergy have already entered the arena at Naples, Rome, and Bologna. The Church covers the country with associations inspired by the Jesuits, and the congregations seize upon the rising generation, whom they bring up in the hatred of Italy and her institutions." This view is just. Italy is at present in the condition in which France found herself after 1789, and Belgium after 1830: the breath of liberty is carrying before it the whole nation, even the clergy. Patriotism, the hope of a brilliant future, the enthusiasm of progress—these inflame all hearts and efface all dissensions; but before long incompatibility must break out between modern civilisation and Roman ideas. The clergy, and especially the Jesuits, in obedience to the voice of Rome, are already setting to work to undermine the barely established edifice of political liberty. This is precisely what has happened in Belgium since 1840.

One of the authors of the Belgian constitution, perhaps the most distinguished among them, said to me lately, with heartfelt sorrow: "We believed that all that was necessary to found liberty, was to proclaim it, by separating Church and State. I begin to think that we deceived ourselves. The Church, relying on the country districts, seeks to impose her absolute power. The great cities which have given in their adhesion to modern ideas will not let themselves be enslaved without attempting resistance. We are tending, like France, towards civil war. We are already in a revolutionary position. The future appears to me big with troubles." The last elections of 1874 have begun to bring the danger to light. The elections for the Chambers have strengthened the clerical party, while those for the Communes have given power to the liberals in all the large towns. Antagonism between the towns and the provinces, which is one of the causes of civil war in France, begins already to show itself in Belgium also. As long as the government remains in the hands of prudent men, who are more disposed to serve their country than to obey the bishops, grave disorders need not be apprehended. But if the fanatics, who openly accept the *Syllabus* as their political programme, should attain to power, terrible shocks would follow.

The Catholic countries, on both sides of the Atlantic, are thus a prey to internal struggles which consume their strength, or at least prevent them from advancing as steadily and rapidly as Protestant nations.

Two centuries ago, supremacy belonged incontestably to the Catholic States. The others were only powers of the second order. Now, put on one side France, Austria, Spain, Italy and South America, and on the other, Russia, the Empire of Germany, England and North America,—clearly the predominance has passed over to the heretics and schismatics. M. Levasseur read of late before L'Institut a curious work, in which he shows that, in 1700, France alone represented 31 per cent., or one-third, of the force of the five great Powers together; whereas now, counting six great European Powers, she possesses no more than 15 per cent., or one-sixth part, of their total force.

'Comptendu des séances de l'Institut,' by M. Vergé, November number, 1872. The population of France was increasing very slowly. In the last quinquennial period, it diminished by 366,000, without counting, of course, the loss of Alsace and Lorraine.

To the eye of every man who desires to consult facts without a foregone conclusion, it is thus manifest that Protestantism is more favourable than Catholicism to the development of nations. We must now find the causes of this fact. I think it is not difficult to point them out.

II.

It is nowadays universally admitted that the diffusion of enlightenment is the first condition of progress. Labour is productive in proportion to the intelligence with which it is carried on. Civilised man derives his wealth from the application of science, under all its forms, to production. The miserable destitution of the savage is the result of his ignorance. Thus, economic progress will be in proportion to the application of scientific discoveries to industry.

The general spread of education is also indispensable to the exercise of constitutional liberty. In lands where power is conferred by election, electors must needs be sufficiently enlightened to choose their representatives well, or the country will be ill-governed, will fall from bad to worse, and will march to its ruin. In a despotic State, education is useful, but it is not indispensable. In a great State which is free, or which desires to be free, education is of absolute necessity, under penalty of decadence from inertia or disorder. In short, education is the basis of national liberty and prosperity. Now, up to the present moment, Protestant States alone have contrived to secure instruction to all. Vainly do Catholic States declare education to be obligatory, as in Italy, or spend large sums for the same object, as in Belgium; they do not succeed in dispelling ignorance.

With regard to elementary instruction, Protestant States are incomparably more advanced than Catholic. England alone is no more than on a level with the latter, probably because the Anglican Church, of all the reformed forms of worship, has most in common with the Church of Rome. All the Protestant countries, such as Saxony, Denmark, Sweden and Prussia, lead the van, having few, if any, illiterate children; the Catholic

countries fall far behind, having a third part of the population ignorant, as in France and Belgium, or three-fourths, as in Spain, Italy, or Portugal.

What a difference in Switzerland, with respect to this point, between the Catholic and Protestant Cantons! The purely Latin Cantons of Neuchâtel, Vaud, and Geneva are on a line with the Germanic Cantons of Zurich and Berne, and are greatly superior to those of Tessin, the Valais, or Lucerne.

For the facts, see my book, 'L'Instruction du peuple.'

The cause of the contrast is evident, and has been often pointed out. The Reformed religion rests on a book: the Bible; the Protestant, therefore, must know how to read.

During the war of 1870, it was ascertained that the Protestant soldiers were much better instructed than the Catholic. In the ambulances and hospitals, the former, as they began to recover from their wounds, asked for books; the latter, for a game of cards.

Accordingly Luther's first and last words were:—"Teach the children; that is the duty of parents and magistrates: it is one of God's commandments." Catholic worship, on the contrary, rests upon Sacraments, and certain practices, such as confession, masses, sermons, which do not necessarily involve reading. It is therefore unnecessary to know how to read; indeed it is dangerous, for it inevitably shakes the principle of passive obedience on which the whole Catholic edifice rests;—reading is the road that leads to heresy. The manifest consequence is, that the Catholic priest will be hostile to education, or will at all events never make such efforts to extend it as the Protestant minister will do. The organization of popular education dates from the Reformation. Education being highly favourable to the practice of political liberty and the production of wealth, and Protestantism favouring the diffusion of education, we have here an evident cause of the superiority of Protestant States.

M. de Candolles demonstrates by facts the superiority of the scientific production of Protestant nations over that of Catholic States, in his remarkable book, 'Histoire des sciences et des savants depuis deux siècles.'

III.

It is agreed on all sides that the power of nations depends on their morality. Everywhere is found the maxim, which is almost become an axiom of political science, that where morals are corrupted the State is lost. Now it appears to be an established fact that the moral level is higher among Protestant than among Catholic populations. Religious writers confess this themselves, and explain it by the fact that the former remain more faithful to their religion than the latter, which explanation I believe to be the true one. If we read the literary works of France, if we are present at the pieces most in vogue in the various theatres, we shall find that they are alike founded upon adultery in all its varieties and forms. The novels and plays which have proved successful ought to be strictly banished from the circle of any respectable family. In England and Germany this is not the case. Those literary works which do not bear the stamp of foreign imitation are written in a tone and style not alarming to modest ears.

See the book recently published by M. Potvin: 'De la corruption du gout littéraire en France.'

As to French literature, the evil dates from afar. The people of Provence inherited Gallo-Roman corruption, and under the name of gallantry their songs produced a relaxation of morals and irregular amours, and made them attractive. Gallantry has thus become in France the keynote of all the works of imagination, and one of the traits of the national character. The king "Vert Galant" is the most popular of French sovereigns. In the countries which have adopted the Reformation, the puritan spirit has curbed this licence of morals, and has brought about in its place a strictness which may have seemed excessive, but which has given an incomparable moral tone.

In Catholic countries, those who have purposed to combat the omnipotence of the Church have taken their weapons, not from the Gospel, but from the spirit of the Renaissance and from paganism. There are two ways by which the Church may be attacked: either by showing that she has wandered from the doctrine of Christ, and by preaching a purer and more severe Christianity than hers, or by attacking her dogmas with irony, and inciting men's understandings against her moral dictates. Luther, Calvin, Knox, Zwinglius, have taken the first course, Rabelais and Voltaire the second. It is clear that the one, relying on the Gospel, must strengthen the moral sentiment, while the other can only succeed by ruining it. Hence it comes that almost all the French authors who have endeavoured to emancipate the minds of men have borne an immoral mark. Would anyone, without misgiving, put into the hands, I will not say of a young girl, but even of a young man, the complete works of Rabelais, Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, Courier, Béranger? The authors who respect morals, and who are given to the youth of France to read—Bossuet, Fénelon, Racine—are almost always devoted to the Church, and saturated with absolutist doctrine. Hence comes the profoundly Catholic tone of the greater number of non-revolutionists in France.

In England and America things are different: the most decided partisans of liberty are at the same time

those who profess the most severe morality—namely, the Puritans and the Quakers. While Bossuet was formulating the theory of Absolutism, Milton was writing that of the Republic, and it was the Puritans who founded liberty in England and in the United States. In the one case the writers who are religious and moral preach slavery, whilst those who advocate liberty respect neither religion nor morals: in the other, on the contrary, the same men stand up at once for religion, morals, and liberty.

See the consequences. Compare the private life of the authors of the Revolution of 1648 in England, or of the founders of the American Republic, with that of the men of the French Republic. The former are all of irreproachable lives, of spotless probity, of an almost exaggerated severity of principle; the latter, with the exception of some fanatics such as Saint Just and Robespierre, are for the most part very lax in morals. The most powerful amongst them, the true representative of the French Revolution, that great genius and magnificent orator, Mirabeau, sells himself to the Court, writes obscene books, and carries depravity to its utmost limits. Turn to the austere Calvinists who conquered despotism, and founded liberty in England and in America, and observe the contrast! Edgar Quinet remarks, in his admirable book on the French Revolution, that the men of that period, so full of enthusiasm at the outset, soon wearied of the effort, and ere long sought, or at all events submitted to, the repose of slavery under the Empire. The "Gueux" of Holland struggled for a much longer time, and passed through far other trials without allowing themselves to be discouraged. Their towns were taken by storm, whole populations were massacred. A mere handful of men, they struggled with an adversary who had the treasures of both worlds at his disposal. They felt neither lassitude nor discouragement, and they conquered in the end; and why?—they had faith.

Pride, overweening selfishness and vanity, brought the partisans of the French Revolution into mortal and fratricidal conflict: they cut each other's throats instead of uniting to found a republic. Those who were engaged in freeing their country from tyranny, succeeded in Holland, in England, in America, under the influence of a certain spirit of charity, humility and mutual support, in coming to an understanding in order to consolidate their work. For the foundation of a State, the Christianity of Penn and of Washington is a better cement than the philosophy of "Vergniaud, of Robespierre, and of Mirabeau. Without judging the two doctrines, it is easy to observe the results which they have produced.

When the religious sentiment is weakened, the point of honour, vanity, love of approbation, act as the motive power for good deeds, and the spring of moral life. Alfred de Vigny has shown this in eloquent terms in a chapter of his book, 'Grandeur et servitude militaires.' Musset has repeated it in these energetic lines,—

"L'orgueil . . .

C'est ce qui reste encore d'un peu beau dans la vie."

M. Taine says, in his 'Notes sur l'Angleterre':—"In France the moral principle is founded on the sentiment of honour, in England on the idea of duty. Now the former is arbitrary; its bearing varies according to the individual."

In the *France Nouvelle*, Prévost-Paradol writes as follows:—"In the eyes of every clear-sighted and honest observer, our country now presents the almost unique spectacle of a society in which the point of honour is become the principal guarantee of good order, and ensures the performance of the greater number of those duties and sacrifices which religion and patriotism have lost the power of accomplishing. If the laws are generally respected, if the young soldier obediently rejoins his standard, and remains faithful to it, if the responsible agent respects the public exchequer, if, in short, the Frenchman duly acquits himself of his duty to the State and to his fellow-citizens, it is to the point of honour that it is due. It is not owing to respect for the Divine law, which long since has passed into the region of problem; nor from philosophic devotion to an uncertain duty, still less to that abstract being, the State, upset and discredited as it has been by so many revolutions;—it is the fear of having to blush publicly for any action held to be disgraceful, which alone maintains among us the effective desire to do right." How faithful and distressing is this picture, which Prévost-Paradol traces in the anguish of his soul, above all when he adds, "That there should be nothing left but the point of honour to lean upon, and that even that should bend in one's grasp like the fragile reed mentioned in Scripture!"

Read in France the proclamations to the people and to the army, when their ardour is to be excited, or their enthusiasm raised; it is to the point of honour, or to vanity, that appeal is made. Listen to Napoleon:—"From the height of the Pyramids, forty centuries observe you." "Soldiers, when returned home, you will be able to say, 'I was at Jena, at Austerlitz!'" Either to speak of oneself or to be in the mouths of others, is the aim and the motive. Nelson, at Trafalgar, says simply, "England expects every man to do his duty."

In the sayings of the men of the Revolution of the Low Countries, or the United States of America, appeal is made to the love of country, to duty, to the Divine law. It is clear that these springs of action are surer than the other ones. In truth, to be talked about is but a hollow advantage. The point of honour loses its efficacy as a rule of conduct as soon as a man has strength of mind enough to grasp it. Moreover, public opinion may be perverted, and in such a case cannot be invoked in favour of virtue.

Nearly all French writers have exalted the Renaissance at the cost of the Reformation, because, being broader in its views, it brought more complete emancipation to humanity. The facts do not bear this out. The countries which have embraced the Reformation are decidedly in advance of those which have stopped short at the Renaissance. This is because the Reformation had within itself a moral force which was denied to the Renaissance. Now moral force, coupled with science, is the source of the prosperity of nations. The Renaissance was a return to antiquity, the Reformation a return to the Gospel. The Gospel, being superior to the tradition of antiquity, was sure to yield better fruits.

IV.

The Reformation has favoured the progress of the nations which have adopted it, by permitting them to found free institutions, while Catholicism leads to despotism or anarchy, and often alternately to both. Representative government is the natural government of Protestant populations. Despotic government is the congenial government of Catholic populations. As long as they remain subject to it they are at peace; they have the polity which suits them; when they try to shake it off they fall into confusion and are weakened, being in a state at variance with their nature. So argue *L'Univers* and *La Civiltà Cattolica*, organs of the Roman court, and the facts seem to warrant their judgment.

It has often been asked why the Revolution of the Low Countries, of England, and of America, succeeded, while the French Revolution seems to have failed. M. Guizot has even published a special treatise to elucidate this question, which in fact, contains the secret of our destinies. I answer without hesitation, it is because the former took place in Protestant countries, the latter in a Catholic country. Voltaire had already perceived this. He asks himself, how it has happened that the Governments of France and England have come to differ from each other as entirely as those of Morocco and Venice? "Is it not," says he, "by reason of the fact that, having always complained of the Roman court, the English have entirely cast off its shameful yoke, while a people of greater levity has borne it, affecting to laugh at it, and dancing in its chains?" Voltaire spoke truly; but was it not he who provoked the laugh and led the dance?

To-day we can prove to demonstration that which men of intellect in the eighteenth century were only beginning to perceive. The decisive influence which forms of worship bring to bear on political life and political economy had not hitherto been apparent. Now it breaks forth in the light, and is more and more clearly seen in contemporary events.

The action of religion on the minds of men is so profound, that they are always led to give to the organization of the State forms which they have borrowed from that of religion.

Wherever the sovereign is held to be the representative of Divinity, liberty cannot establish itself, inasmuch as the power of him who speaks and acts in the name of God is necessarily absolute. The mandates of Heaven cannot be discussed. Simple mortals have only to bow and obey. I know of no exception to this rule. In the ancient empires of Asia, as in those of the present day, in Mahometan States, as in Catholic countries where kings reigned by right divine, the people have been completely enslaved. They were free at Athens and at Rome, because those who governed, elected by their fellow-citizens, did not give themselves out to be representatives of Divinity. The priesthood was not a caste, and exerted but little influence in the State.

Primitive Christianity could not but favour the establishment of free and democratic institutions in no ordinary degree. Doubtless on its ascetic side it detached man from his worldly interests, and did not lead him to claim his privilege as a citizen; but by purifying and raising morals, it qualified him more for self-government and consequently for a life of liberty. Great equality existed in the bosom of the Christian societies of the first centuries, and all power emanated from the people. Freedom of speech and opinion were the mainsprings of government. The primitive Christian Churches were true democratic republics. Accordingly, when the Presbyterians of the sixteenth century re-established the ancient organization of the Church, they were compelled to establish republican institutions in the State.

The supporters and the adversaries of the Roman Church alike confound Christianity with Catholicism. Those who attack Christianity attribute to it the principles, the abuses, and the crimes of the Roman Church; while those who uphold the Roman Church invoke the merits, the virtues, and the benefits of Christianity. There is error on both sides. Christianity is favourable to liberty; Catholicism is its mortal enemy: so affirms its infallible head, the Pope.

The history of the institutions of the Church shows us constant progress towards an increasing concentration of power. She has departed from the equal and representative democracy of the first centuries, and, through the proclamation of Papal Infallibility, has arrived, in the nineteenth century, at the most concentrated absolutism. A Democratic Republic at the outset, she became aristocratic at the period when the bishops effected an extension of their power without losing their independence in relation to the Pope. As long as councils exercised supreme control she was still a constitutional monarchy. At the present time she realises

the ideal of a theocracy, and of the most absolute despotism imaginable. If civil society, as facts show, tends to mould itself on religious society, Catholics must be subjected to a purely despotic government. In fact, it is in this sense that the partisans of the Church understand it. Bossuet, in his 'Politique tirée de l'Écriture Sainte,' traces the condition of the government which suits a purely Catholic country—"God establishes kings as His ministers, and reigns through them over the nations." "Royal authority is absolute." "The prince is not accountable to any one for his orders." "Obedience must be rendered to princes as to Justice herself. They are gods, and in a measure participate in the Divine independence." "Subjects have only respectful remonstrance to oppose to the violence of princes, and must neither mutiny nor murmur." Thus, logically, in a Catholic country government ought to be despotic;

See in what pompous and vigorous language Bossuet gives us the definition of monarchy, such as it springs from Roman Catholic tradition, and such as it is handed down from Imperial and Papal Rome:—

"Obedience must be rendered to princes as unto Justice herself. They are gods, and in a measure, participate in the Divine independence; as in God all perfection is concentrated, so is all the power of individuals in the person of the prince. Were God to withdraw His hand, the world would relapse into nothingness; were authority to cease in the kingdom, all would be in confusion. Consider the prince in his closet: thence emanate the orders which cause magistrates and captains, provinces and armies to act in concert with each other. We have here the image of God, who, sitting on His throne in the highest heavens, sustains the course of nature. In vain do the wicked seek to hide themselves, the light of God follows them everywhere. Thus God puts it in the power of the prince to discover the most secret plots; he has eyes and hands everywhere, the birds of heaven tell him what is going on. He has even received from God a certain penetration, which appears like divination, to assist him in the management of affairs. If he has discovered intrigue at work, his long arms seize hold of his enemies at the extremities of the earth, they disinter them from the uttermost depths: there is no asylum safe from such might as this."

first, because such is the government of the Church which serves as its type; next, because kings hold their power directly from God or the Pope, which power can neither be limited nor controlled.

The Reformation, on the contrary, being a return towards primitive Christianity, engendered every where a spirit of liberty and of resistance to absolutism. It tended to bring into existence republican and constitutional institutions. The Protestant recognises in religion but one authority, the Bible. He does not bow to the authority of man, as does the Catholic; he examines and discusses for himself. Calvinists and Presbyterians having re-established republican organization in the Church, the Protestant, by a logical sequence, transported the same principles and the same habits into political society. The accusation levelled at the Reformation by Lamennais is completely true:—"All power," he says, "had been denied to religious society; it was necessary also to deny it to political life, and to substitute the will and reason of each individual for the will and reason of God; from that time every one depending on himself alone could not but enjoy entire liberty, and be Master, King, God to himself." Montesquieu says also:—"The Catholic religion is best suited to a monarchy; the Protestant adapts itself best to a republic."

Luther and Calvin do not preach resistance to tyranny;—they rather condemn it, and proclaim obedience. Neither do they admit full liberty of conscience. But, in spite of them, the principle of political and religious liberty, and that of the Sovereignty of the People, is the logical result of the Reformation. The proof consists in the fact that everywhere this has been its natural fruit. The writers of the reformed faith claim the rights of the people, and wherever Protestants triumph, there they establish free institutions. In this their enemies have not been deceived; they have announced this connection between the Reformation and liberty, as an evil.

"The Reformers," says a Venetian envoy in France in the sixteenth century, "preach that the king has no authority over his subjects. This tends," he adds, "to a government similar to that which exists in Switzerland, and to the ruin of the monarchical constitution of the kingdom."

See, on the political ideas of the Reformation, the instructive work of M. Laurent, 'La Revolution Francaise,' t. i. sect. ii. § 3.

"It was announced from the pulpit," says Montluc, "that kings could have no authority but that which pleased the people; others said that the nobility were no better than themselves."

'Blaise de Montluc.' Collection des Mémoires de Fetitot. 1 Série, t. xxii. p. 26.

This is in fact the free and levelling breath of Calvinism. Tavannes often reverts to the democratic spirit of the Huguenots. "They are," he says, "republics within monarchical states, having their resources, soldiers, and separate finances, and intending to establish a popular and democratic government."

'Tavannes.' Same collection, t. xxiii. p. 72.

Dumoulin, the great jurist, denounced the Protestant pastors to the Parliament, saying "that they had no other purpose but to reduce France to a popular State, and to make of her a republic similar to that of Geneva, from whence they had expelled the Count and the Bishop, and that they were similarly striving to abolish the right of primogeniture, purposing to put the nobles on an equality with the plebeians, and the younger on an

equality with the elder, as being all sons of Adam, and equal by divine and natural right." These are evidently the ideas of the French Revolution, and if France had adopted the Reformation in the sixteenth century, she would from that time have enjoyed, and she would have preserved, liberty and self-government. In the year 1622, Gregory XV wrote to the King of France to induce him to have nothing more to do with Geneva, that hotbed of Calvinism and republicanism. In France, after the death of Henry IV., the Duke de Rohan, a Huguenot, wished to "establish a republic," saying that the time of kings had passed away.

The Protestant nobility have been taxed with the wish to divide France into small republican states, as in Switzerland, and it has been considered a merit on the part of the League that it maintained French unity. What the Huguenots in fact aimed at was local autonomy, decentralisation, and a federal polity which should secure communal and provincial liberties. This it is which France still in vain seeks to establish, and it is the Catholic passion for unity and uniformity which has been the cause of the failure of the Revolution, and which always brings back despotism.

Calvin holds that "the minister of the Holy Gospel should be elected with the consent and approbation of the people: the clergy presiding over the election." This is the government which the Calvinists wished to introduce into France. "In the year 1620," says Tavannes, "their State was truly popular, all authority, of which they only appeared to yield a part to their nobility, being lodged in the mayors of the towns and the ministers, so much so that, had they attained their object, the State of France would have arisen, like that of Switzerland, out of the ruin of princes and gentry."

As soon as the Reformation had in Germany placed the Gospel in the hands of the peasantry, they claimed abolition of serfdom, and the recognition of their ancient rights, in the name of "Christian liberty." The Reformation everywhere inspired energetic demands for the restitution of the natural rights,—liberty, toleration, equality of right, the sovereignty of the people. They are inscribed in a great number of the writings of the time, amongst others in the celebrated pamphlet of Languet: 'Junii Bruti Celtæ, Vindiciæ contra tyrannos, de principe in populum populique in principem, legitima potestate,' and in the dialogue, 'De l'autorité du prince et de la liberté des peuples.'

'Memoires do l'Etat de France sous Charles IX.,' t. ill., pp. 57-64. See Laurent, 'Révolution Francaise,' t. i. p. 345.

These ideas, which form the basis of modern liberty, have always found eloquent defenders among Protestants. The Minister, Jurieu, defended them against Bossuet in a well-known controversy, and Locke has set them forth under a scientific form. They were borrowed from Locke by Montesquieu, Voltaire, and the political writers of the eighteenth century, and from these same ideas the French Revolution sprang. But long before this they had been applied, with constant success, in the Protestant States, first in Holland, then in England, and above all, in America.

The famous Edict of the 16th July, 1581, by which the States-General of the Low Countries proclaimed the dethronement of the King of Spain, explicitly sanctions the sovereignty of the people. In order to dethrone a king, they were necessarily obliged to invoke the following principle: "Subjects are not created by God for the prince, in order that they should obey him in all that he may please to command, but rather the prince for his subjects, without whom he cannot be prince, in order that he may govern them according to right and reason." The Edict adds that the inhabitants, in order to withdraw themselves from the tyranny of the king, have been compelled to withdraw from their allegiance to him. "No other means remains to them whereby to preserve and defend their ancient liberty, and that of their wives, children, and posterity, for whom, according to the law of nature, they are obliged to risk their lives and their worldly goods." The authors of the English Revolution of 1648 appealed to the same principles. Milton and the other republicans of the period defended them with admirable force of spirit and of character.

We are in the habit of giving the credit of the famous principles of '89 to the French Revolution. This is a grave historical error. In France eloquent speeches were made on the subject; but liberties were never respected, not even the most sacred of all, liberty of conscience.

On this subject a very instructive article by Prévost-Paradol, in the *Revue des deux Mondes*, 15th Sept., 1858, should be read, in which he shows that neither law nor magistrates have brought liberty of worship into Franco. It does not yet exist there.

The Puritans and the Quakers have proclaimed and practised them in America for the last 200 years, and it is from thence and from England that Europe first adopted the idea towards the end of the eighteenth century.

Even as early as the year 1620, the constitution of Virginia established representative government, trial by jury, and the principle that taxes should be voted by those who pay them.

From its first origin Massachusetts established compulsory education, and complete separation of Church and State. The different sects lived free under the common law, and themselves chose their own ministers. Representative democracy existed there as fully then as in our own day. The judges themselves were annually chosen by the citizens. But one still more important fact comes to light. A man arises (in the year 1633),

claiming not only toleration, but complete religious equality in the eye of the civil law, and on this principle he founds a State. This man is Roger Williams, a name little known on our continent, but which deserves to be inscribed amongst those of the benefactors of mankind. In a world which 4000 years of intolerance had bathed in blood, even before Descartes had established free research in philosophy, he was the first to sanction religious liberty as a political right. "Persecution for conscience sake," he repeats, "is manifestly and lamentably opposed to the teaching of Jesus Christ." "He who commands the bark of the State can maintain order on board and bring her into harbour, although all the crew be not obliged to assist at divine service." "The civil power has dominion only over men's bodies and worldly goods, it cannot interfere in matters of faith, even to prevent a Church from falling into apostasy or heresy." "By shaking off the yoke of tyranny from our souls, we not only do an act of justice to oppressed nations, we also found public liberty and peace on the interest of the conscience of all men."

It would be well to read, in the admirable history of Bancroft, how Roger Williams founded the town of Providence and the State of Rhode Island upon these principles, then little understood throughout Europe, except in the Protestant Low Countries. When a constitution was formed in 1641, all the citizens were summoned to vote upon it. The founders themselves called it a democracy, and such it certainly was in all the force of the term and in the sense in which Rousseau understood it. The people were directly self-governed. All citizens, without distinction of creed, were equal before the law; and every law had to be ratified in the primary assemblies. It was the most radical form of self-government that human societies had known; and for two centuries it has lasted without disturbance or revolution.

The Quakers of Pennsylvania and New Jersey founded their State on similar principles. "We put the power in the people"—this is the basis of the constitution of New Jersey. The following are its principal provisions: "No man, and no assembly of men possesses power over conscience. No one, at any time, by any method, or under any pretext, shall ever be prosecuted or injured, upon any ground whatever, for religious opinions. The general assembly shall be elected by secret ballot. Every man shall be qualified to elect and to be elected. Electors shall give obligatory instructions to their deputies. If the deputy does not fulfil his obligations, he may be prosecuted. Ten commissaries, elected by the assembly, exercise executive powers. Judges and constables are elected by the people for a term of two years. The judges preside over the jury, but judicial power is exercised by the twelve citizens who constitute the jury. No one shall be imprisoned for debt. Orphans shall be brought up at the charge of the State. Education is a branch of public service paid for out of the common treasury."

Nearly the same principles are laid down in Pennsylvania and Connecticut.

These ideas of man's self-ownership and freedom; of his immunity from service or taxation without his own express consent—this idea that government, justice, and all other powers emanate from the people—this aggregate of principles which modern societies struggle to enforce, is undeniably derived from Germanic tradition, and may even be found at its source among most races before the development of royal power. But if these principles, stifled as they were by feudalism during the Middle Ages, and by centralised and absolute monarchy dating from the fifteenth century, have revived in Switzerland, England, Holland and the United States, it is owing to the democratic breath of the Reformation; and only in Protestant countries have they maintained themselves, and secured order and prosperity to the people. If France had not persecuted, strangled, and banished those of her children who had become Protestants, she might have developed those germs of liberty and of self-government which had survived in the provincial States. This fact has been completely established by M. Gustave Garrison.

Revue des Deux Mondes, 10th February, 1848.

Every year contemporary studies and events bring fresh corroborative proofs. In the assemblies of La Rochelle and Grenoble, and in the States-General of Orleans, the spirit of liberty and the parliamentary spirit are as powerful as in the English parliament; and in them may be heard the strong, clear language of Calvin, so admirably fitted for the treatment of the great interests of religion and politics.

"We shall know how to defend our cities against the king, without a king," said the Huguenots, and there is no doubt that if they had triumphed, they would have founded a constitutional monarchy as in England, or a federal Republic as in the Low Countries. Had the French nobility preserved the spirit of independence and of lawful resistance which they had borrowed from Protestantism, they would have imposed limits on the royal power, and France would have escaped that oriental despotism of Louis XIV. and his successors, which ruined the character of the nation.

M. Quinet, in his book on the Revolution, pronounces the following severe but just judgment on the French nobility of that period: "They had sold their religious faith—how could they be capable of founding political faith? During the Fronde they had shown a spirit of intrigue without ambition. While rebelling against Mazarin, they crouched before the King as soon as he appeared. Thus did their utter hollowness become apparent; they had never led the French in the direction of liberty."

Francis I., in giving the signal for the persecution of the Reformed,

"Francis I.," said Napoleon, at St. Helena, "was really in a position to adopt Protestantism at its birth, and declare himself its leader in Europe. Thus he would have spared France her terrible religious convulsions. Unfortunately, Francis I. understood nothing of the matter; for he could never allege scruples as his excuse, since he entered into alliance with the Turks and brought them into our midst. The plain truth is, that he was shortsighted. Stupidity of the times—feudal dulness! Francis I. was, after all, a mere tourney hero, a carpet knight, a pigmy of a great man!"—('Memorial,' 17th Aug. 1816.)

and Henry IV. in abjuring Protestantism, betrayed the true interests of France, as the nobles had done. The saying, "Paris is well worth a mass," in which most French historians find a proof of practical sense, is a revolting cynicism. To sell oneself—to deny one's faith for material advantages—is surely an act to be branded by all honest men. France bears the punishment of this to the present day, as she still suffers from the fatal consequences of those two great outrages to liberty of conscience—the massacre of St. Bartholomew and the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. France is above all things in want of men, who, without breaking with tradition, are willing to accept new ideas. The republicans are generally hostile or indifferent to all religious ideas, and, like their ancestors, the revolutionists of the last century, they lack a foundation on which any solid edifice can be raised. Those again who uphold religious ideas, wish to reanimate the old system, and oppose all reform. At this moment, France has an opportunity of founding free institutions. But the partisans of monarchy will either prepare the way for the return of a Napoleon, or they will plunge the country into anarchy by dint of their blind self-will. Under Louis Philippe, in 1850, and again at present, the conservatives ruin their country by their attachment to worn-out forms of government. A republic is now the only possible government for France, and the republicans will prevent its taking root, because Catholicism has saturated them with the spirit of intolerance

The intolerance of the French is probably due to their Catholic education. Paris took part with the League. At the time of Voltaire, the people were still full of hatred of Protestants and sceptics. "We can ill bear contradiction in matters near our heart," says a very sensible French writer. "The rashest or the most absurd opinion is, in our eyes, a dogma outside of which is no salvation. Each party insists on being a Church, and will admit of no doubt as to its infallibility. The most liberal-minded seek to shut out by subterfuges from dissenters the liberty they claim for themselves. Hence the facility with which dictatorships are established, and with which are perpetuated, at the hands of the various parties, as in turn they rise and fall, the self-same methods of coercion."—(Emile Beaussire, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1st May, 1871.)

and despotism. France will hardly escape a fresh restoration of absolute power. The Roman religion has not fitted the French to live in freedom, to tolerate each other, and to govern themselves.

Toleration may occasionally be found among Catholic nations in their laws, but never in their habits of life. Woe to him who, desiring to avail himself of liberty of conscience, decides upon following the dictates of his own! He is even more derided by his kindred, and by the indifferent, than by believers. Sceptics find it more convenient to compound matters by bending before the priest on all the important occasions of life, while they scruple not to ridicule or to attack him. Resigned to the yoke of orthodoxy, to which they submit while they deride it, they have no toleration for those who, finding it too heavy, have the courage openly to throw it off. By means of intimidation and ridicule, uniformity is enforced, and liberty is but a name.

All modern nations are striving to establish representative and constitutional government. This system, which took its rise in England, on the soil of ancient Germanic institutions watered by Protestantism, seems incapable of taking durable root in Catholic countries; the fact being, that the chief of a State, be he king or president, cannot be a true constitutional sovereign if he is a devotee, and confesses as an obedient penitent. He is governed by his confessor, who is subject to the Pope. By means of the confessional the Pope is accordingly the real sovereign, unless it be the Jesuits, who direct the Pope. The prerogatives granted by the constitution to the depositary of the executive power, are in such cases exercised by a foreign Power, and to the detriment of the country. Examples abound in history. Too docile to the demands of their confessors, we see Louis XIV. revoking the Edict of Nantes, James II. of England and Charles X. of France losing their crown, and Louis XVI. both crown and life, Ferdinand and Leopold of Austria ruining their country by the most frightful persecution, Augustus and Sigismund of Poland paving the way to the partition of that country, by bringing into it Jesuits and intolerance. Under a pious sovereign given to confession, the constitutional system is either a fiction or a fraud, for it enslaves the country to the will of an unknown priest, the organ of his Church's pretensions, or else, when the land refuses to bear the humiliating yoke, it produces a revolution. In Austria the Emperor Francis Joseph only preserved his constitutional monarchy by resisting his confessor. In Protestant lands the constitutional system flourishes naturally, being on its native soil; while on Catholic soil, being an heretical importation, it is undermined by the priest unless it serves to secure his dominion, and thus it is either perverted by the clericals, or overthrown by the revolutionists.

V.

Another cause of inferiority among Catholic populations lies in the fact that the religious sentiment is weaker amongst their intelligent and governing classes than in Protestant countries. This fact is, I think, denied by no one. The episcopal writings affirm it daily, and claim for religion the same respect which she enjoys in England and America. The enemies of all religion upbraid the Americans and the English with what they call their narrow bigotry: the strict observance of Sunday rest, the public prayers and fasts, and lastly their rigid piety.

Two causes explain why religion preserves more life and authority among the enlightened classes of Protestantism.

First, Catholicism, by reason of its multiplied dogmas, its occasionally puerile ceremonies, its miracles, and its pilgrimages,

Agassiz, in his 'Voyage au Brésil,' writes thus on the subject of the influence of Catholicism in that country: "The priest is the instructor of the people. He must cease to believe that the mind can be contented to be nourished exclusively on grotesque processions, with coloured saints, lighted tapers, and cheap nosegays. As long as the people do not demand another sort of religious instruction, they will continue in their downward course, or will not be able to improve."

places itself outside the atmosphere of modern thought, while Protestantism, by reason of its simplicity, and its various forms, capable as they are of indefinite improvement, can adapt itself thereto. M. Renan says very well, "The formation of new sects, which Catholics bring as a mark of weakness against Protestants, proves on the contrary that the religious sentiment still lives amongst the latter, since it is creative. There is nothing more dead than that which is motionless."

The apathy with which two new dogmas have recently been accepted, which formerly would have roused the strongest opposition and have led to schism, is a sign of an incredible enfeeblement of all intellectual life in the bosom of Catholicism. The excesses of superstition lead inevitably to infidelity. The challenge thrown down to reason by the Church leads those who refuse to abdicate their use of it, to reject all religious worship. A French writer, M. Géruzet, has portrayed this situation in an incisive sketch: "The father of a family, who believes in God without believing in St. Cupertin, is in great difficulty between his religious daughters and atheistic sons. The Lord deliver us from atheism and from the worship of St. Cupertin!"

In tracing the biography of Géruzet, Prévost-Paradol quotes an irreverent but striking saying of his: "The nations which neglect themselves are covered with monks—they are the vermin of the social body." On this point, however, some reserve might, perhaps, be called for.

Evidently "the worship of St. Cupertin" engenders Atheism, and the two have brought France to the position in which we behold her, because there is no longer room for a reasonable religion.

Catholicism produces such complete indifference in religious matters, that even the strength requisite honestly to leave the Church is wanting. We see Protestants becoming Catholics, because, preserving some religious faith, they seek the true religion and believe that Rome offers it to them. Few Catholics become Protestants, because they have become hostile or indifferent to every species of religion. This indifference again is useful to the Church, because it prevents men from withdrawing themselves completely from her authority, and she always ends by recovering the children of her adversaries.

The second motive which leads Catholic populations to infidelity and *priestophobia* is, that, as the Church See letter to the Editor of the *Times*, printed at the end.

shows herself to be hostile to modern ideas and liberties, all those who are attached to the latter are led, often against their own wishes, to hate and resist her. Voltaire's cry of hatred, "Écrasons l'infâme," becomes logically and everywhere the avowed or unavowed word of command of liberalism. The liberal attacks, and must attack, priests and monks without intermission, because they wish to enslave society to the Pope, and to his delegates, the Bishops. He cannot respect the dogma by means of which he is to be deprived of liberty.

We have established the fact and its causes, let us now see its consequences.

The first is, that the efforts to free from Roman dominion the countries which have revolted from her, in the name of a simple negation or of a reasoning scepticism, cannot be successful. No nation has ever made a more violent effort to succeed in this enterprise than France. She has employed all the means in her power with incomparable vigour and brilliancy: the reasoning of philosophy and the banter of fiction, the satire of comedy and the eloquence of the Forum, the torch of the incendiary, the stealthy sap of the miner, and the guillotine.

At this moment clericalism reigns in France; it hands over all instruction to the Jesuits, and prepares the return of a monarchy wholly devoted to the Church. Her influence increases rapidly, and, as in Belgium, seems to become irresistible. This follows from the fact that, in religious matters, we can destroy nothing but what we replace. If, in politics, as in natural science, reverence were paid to the lessons of experience, this truth would

be admitted as an axiom by all unprejudiced people. Free-thought will not break down the dominion of the Church; on the contrary, it will rather strengthen it by the terror which it inspires, for it does not satisfy the deep desires of the human heart.

Thus the attempt to destroy Catholicism without replacing it does not attain its end, but gives rise to the revolutionary spirit. See how this spirit characterises all Catholic populations, in America as in Europe, whilst observers are struck by its absence even among the radical democracies of the United States. Protestants respect both law and authority. Catholics, unable either to found liberty, or to do without it, make despotism necessary, and yet will not submit to it. Hence arises an ever active leaven of rebellion. When the evil reaches its final limit, the country oscillates between anarchy and despotism, consuming all its strength in this struggle of irreconcilable parties. This is the picture presented to our eyes by Spain, and by other States which are arriving at a similar condition. Whence comes the evil? I believe the cause to be as follows.

Regulated liberty is not possible without good morals. Now the ministers of public worship are in reality the only persons who speak of morality and of duty to the people. If these men be discredited in the minds of the great mass of the population, who will replace them in this, their indispensable office? Certainly it will not be the free-thinkers. Guizot has admirably said, that Christianity is a great school of respect. If, in order the better to defend liberty, the spirit of liberal Voltairianism shakes the authority of Catholicism, as it must do, the respect even for legitimate authority disappears, and gives place to a spirit of opposition, of disparagement, of hatred and insurrection. Thus is produced the revolutionary temperament of Catholic populations.

M. Deschanel has recently written in the *National*, "For us Frenchmen, liberty and revolution are synonymous, because authority and oppression have too often been so."

Only by complete submission to Rome, as was formerly the case with Spain, and now with the Tyrol, do they live in peace. If they attempt to emancipate themselves, they escape with difficulty from anarchy.

VI.

With the assistance of the clergy, everything in matters of social reforms is easy: without such help, or in spite of it, all is difficult and at times impossible. See how this holds with reference to primary instruction.

Enact compulsory education with the co-operation of the minister, as among Protestant countries, you will accomplish your end. But if, on the contrary, the priest is hostile or indifferent, as in Catholic countries, the law is not observed. You need only refer to the statistics of schools in Italy. If the priest be allowed to enter the school by virtue of his office, as in Belgium, he prepares the triumph of theocracy. If he be expelled, he destroys the school, for he causes it to be deserted. Moreover, in your normal schools, will you infuse a spirit of resistance and of hostility to the clergy into your teachers in order that they may transmit it to their pupils? You will inevitably destroy the religious sentiment, and create an atheistic people. Logic drives, and "free-thought" invites you to it. Are you prepared for this? In Protestant countries, in America and in Holland, you have non-sectarian lay schools, but they are entirely penetrated by the Christian spirit. In a Catholic country, lay schools will only be able to exist by dint of a violent struggle with the clergy, who will wish to destroy them; they must therefore inevitably be anti-religious.

As for the formidable social questions, which produce conflict between the working classes and the capitalists, Christianity provides us with their solution, for, by means of the brotherhood and self-denial which it advocates, it leads mankind to the reign of justice. Between really Christian masters and men no difficulty could arise, for equity would preside over the division of profits. We feel but too keenly the frightful void caused by the weakening of religious sentiment, which results from the forced opposition to the only form of worship which we knew.

In Protestant countries, on the contrary, the ministers of public worship are highly esteemed among all classes of society, and through their mediation, and the Christian influences of which they are the respected organs, strifes lose some of their bitterness.

In his fine work on the French Revolution, Quinet proves that if this colossal effort of emancipation has not been successful, it has been in consequence of religious opposition, and hence he concludes it to be impossible thoroughly to reform the civil and political constitution of a country without also reforming its public worship. The reason is that civil and political society tends to take the forms of religious society.

The priest has so great a hold on souls that he imposes his ideal on them, unless you root out the religious sentiment by means of which he governs them. Now, in such an attempt as this, nations run the risk of perishing.

Steady progress is very difficult in Catholic countries, because the Church, aiming at establishing her dominion throughout, the living energies of the nation are almost exclusively employed in repelling the pretensions of the clergy. See what is taking place in Belgium. All party efforts are concentrated on this one question, and other interests, even those of our national defences and of our independent existence, are

subordinated to it. The struggle is so keen that we have twice already been on the eve of a violent commotion, and it is due only to the wisdom of the Sovereign that we have twice escaped the danger. The forces employed in struggling against the clerical party are forces lost to progress, for even when they prevail, the victory has no other result but that of preventing us from falling under the yoke of the bishops.

The celibacy of the priests, the absolute submission of all the ecclesiastical hierarchy to one single will, and the multiplication of monastic orders, constitute among Catholics a danger unknown to Protestant countries.

I admire a man who, in order to devote himself to his fellow-men and to truth, renounces the joys of family life. St. Paul is right: he who has a difficult mission to fulfil should not marry. But, when all priests are bound to celibacy, a great danger accrues to the State, in addition to that which threatens morals. These priests form a caste, having a special interest differing from that of the nation.

The true home of the Catholic clergy is Rome—as they themselves announce. They will therefore sacrifice their country, if need be, to the welfare or to the dominion of the Pope, the infallible head of their religion and the representative of God upon earth. *First Catholic, then*, if the good of Catholicism permit it, Belgian, French, or German; this is the only patriotism from a Catholic point of view.

When the Liberal party was in power in Belgium, and Napoleon III., before the Italian war, assumed the attitude of defender of the Church, I was told by more than one of the Flemish priests, "Deliverance will come from the South." At the present day the German Ultramontanes openly profess that, in the interest of the Church, they would betray Germany. Has not a Bavarian deputy said in open Parliament, "In vain you raise new regiments; if they are Catholic they will pass over to the enemy!"

The monk acknowledges a country still less than the priest. Slave to the Papacy, detached from local ties, he lives only in the Church, which is universal, and he has no other prospect but that of her rule, which will also be his. How shall the State preserve its independence in presence of the clergy and of the monks, both of whom wish to have the upper hand, and who hold the masses in subjection by the most powerful and irresistible means of action? In Protestant countries the clergy are married, and have children; they have thus the same interests and the same mode of life as other citizens. They are divided into a great number of sects; therefore they do not obey the same word of command. They are not hierarchically subject to the will of a foreign chief who is pursuing the dream of universal dominion. They are national, because their Church is a national Church. They are independent of the State as in America, subject to the State as in England; but they do not aim at being masters of the State, as in France or in Belgium,

Separation of Church and State is a principle which it is universally sought to establish. In Protestant countries this may succeed, as we see in America, because the clergy submit to it. But in Catholic countries it will be vain to enact it. The Church, asserting as she does that temporal things should be subject to spiritual, as the body is to the soul, will only accept this system of separation so far as she can profit by it in order to attain her end. This separation will therefore be either a snare or a fraud. You cannot, in the same man, separate the believer from the citizen, and it is usually the sentiments of the former which influence the actions of the latter. The ministers of public worship exert a much greater authority than the representative ministers of the State, over those who believe them to be the interpreters of the Deity; for the priest promises eternal happiness, and threatens never-ending hell-torments, while the layman disposes only of earthly and temporary punishments and rewards. Through the confessional the priest has in his power the Sovereign, the magistrates, and through the electors, the Houses of Parliament. As long as he dispenses the sacraments, the separation of Church and State is therefore only a dangerous illusion.

To govern with the clergy is to subject the nation to their dominion, and to govern in opposition to them is to imperil all authority. To govern side by side, while ignoring them, would be the wisest course; but that they will not permit. He who is not for me is against me, they say. It is necessary, therefore, to resign oneself either to obey or to resist them, and I do not know which of the two is the safer course.

The Catholic nations of the Continent have borrowed principles and institutions from England and America, which, having sprung from Protestantism, lead under its influence to good results. But on the Continent we already begin to see whither they tend, when they are opposed or turned to account by an Ultramontane clergy. They end in disorder, when the masses lose their faith, as in Spain or in France, or in the reign of episcopacy, when they retain it, as in Belgium.

The attentive and disinterested study of contemporary facts seems then to lead us to the dreary conclusion, that Catholic nations will not succeed in preserving the liberties which sprang from Protestantism. In submitting to the absolute dominion of the Church, they might perhaps, if they were isolated, enjoy a peaceful kind of happiness and a life of gentle mediocrity. But a danger from without seems to threaten them, and that soon, unless they refuse to obey episcopal commands.

Buckle considers indifferentism to be one of the merits of our age, inasmuch as it preserves us from religious wars. This advantage, if it be one, our epoch is not likely long to maintain. Everything seems to be leading up to a great conflict, of which religion will be one of the chief causes. Already, in the year 1870,

Ultramontanism has declared war on Germany. If Henry V. or Napoleon IV. ever reach the throne, it will be with the concurrence of the clergy, who will push on a new crusade in order to deliver their persecuted brethren beyond the Rhine, on whose future assistance they will reckon. The States in which the clerical party will prevail will probably be dragged into the religious war. This is the policy which is preached in France by *L'Univers*, and elsewhere by the other organs of the Roman *Curia*. The restoration of the legitimate sovereigns in the three Latin countries, Spain, Italy, and France; Protestant Prussia crushed in the dust; Germany given over to Austria; Rome restored to the Pope, and supreme power to the Church; the return to the true principles of Government, that is to say, to those proclaimed by the *Syllabus* and by Catholic tradition—this is the grand scheme, the realisation of which is everywhere in preparation by the Ultramontanes. Will they succeed? Who can say? But, if they fail in this assault against Germanic Protestantism, what will be the fate of the vanquished? We may tremble when we reflect on the calamities in store for Europe through the dream of the restoration of universal dominion to the Church, which at this moment she claims with greater audacity and obstinacy than ever.

'TIMES,' DECEMBER 14TH, 1874.

Ultramontanism in Belgium.

A Monsieur le Rédacteur du 'Times'

MONSIEUR.

Lord Arundell de Wardour dit "that during the last two centuries no Pope has trenched upon the political ground;" et Lord Acton, tout en prouvant jusqu'à quels excès ont été portées les doctrines Ultramontaines, croit néanmoins qu'il n'en peut résulter actuellement aucun danger.

Permettez-moi de montrer combien le danger est réel et grand, en rappelant certains faits empruntés à l'histoire de mon pays, la Belgique.

En 1815, le Roi Guillaume du Pays-Bas voulut donner à son royaume une Constitution qui consacrait toutes les libertés modernes. L'Épiscopat Beige condamna cette Constitution dans un *jugement doctrinal*, au nom de l'Église, et la fit rejeter dans l'Assemblée des Notables par 798 voix contre 527. Il est utile de reproduire les termes de ce *jugement doctrinal*, parce qu'ils montrent clairement que les vrais Catholiques ne doivent pas maintenir les libertés modernes quand ils peuvent les supprimer:—

"C'est donc pour remplir un des devoirs les plus essentiels de l'Épiscopat, pour nous acquitter envers les peuples, sur lesquels le Saint-Esprit nous a établis évêques pour gouverner l'Église de Dieu (Act. 20, v. 28), de l'obligation qui nous a été strictement imposée par l'Église, que nous avons jugé nécessaire de déclarer qu'aucun de nos diocésains respectifs ne peut, sans trahir les plus chers intérêts de sa religion, sans se rendre coupable d'un grand crime, prêter les différents serments présents par la Constitution, par lesquels on s'engage à maintenir la nouvelle loi fondamentale, ou à concourir au maintien et à l'observation de la dite loi.

"En effet, ou s'oblige par les dits serments à observer et à maintenir tous les articles de la nouvelle Constitution et, par conséquent, ceux qui sont opposés à l'esprit et aux maximes de la religion Catholique, ou qui tendent évidemment à opprimer et à asservir l'Église de Jésus Christ.

"Or, tels sont les articles suivants:

"Art. 190. La liberté des opinions religieuses est garantie à tous.

"Art. 191. Protection égale est accordée à toutes les communions religieuses qui existent dans le royaume.

"Art. 192. Tous les sujets du Roi, sans distinction de croyance religieuse, jouissent des mêmes droits civils et politiques, et sont habiles à toutes dignités et emplois quelconques.

"Art. 193. L'exercice public d'aucun culte ne peut être empêché, si ce n'est dans le cas où il pourrait troubler l'ordre et la tranquillité publique.

"Art. 196. Le Roi veille à ce que tous les cultes se contiennent dans l'obéissance qu'ils doivent aux lois de l'État.

"Art. 226. L'instruction publique est un objet constant des soins du Gouvernement. Le Roi fait rendre compte tous les ans aux États-Généraux de l'état des écoles supérieures, moyennes et inférieures.

"Art. 145. Les États (provinciaux) sont chargés de l'exécution des lois relatives à la protection des différents cultes et à leur exercice extérieur, à l'instruction publique, &c.

"Art. 2.—Additional.—Toutes les lois demeurent obligatoires jusqu'à ce qu'il y soit autrement pourvu."

"Nous nous bornerons à faire sur chacun de ces articles quelques courtes observations.

"Art. 190 et 191.—1. Jurer de maintenir la liberté des opinions religieuses et la protection égale accordée à

tons les cultes, qu'est-ce autre chose que de jurer de maintenir, de protéger l'erreur comme la vérité; de favoriser le progrès des doctrines anti-Catholiques; de semer, autant qu'il est en son pouvoir dans le champ du père de famille, l'ivraie et le poison qui doivent infecter la génération présente et les générations futures; de contribuer ainsi, on ne peut plus efficacement, à éteindre peu à peu dans ces belles contrées le flambeau de la vraie foi? L'Église Catholique, qui a toujours repoussé de son sein l'erreur et l'hérésie, ne pourrait regarder comme ses vrais enfants ceux qui oseraient jurer de maintenir ce qu'elle n'a jamais cessé de condamner. Il est notoire que cette dangereuse nouveauté n'a été introduite, pour la première fois, dans un pays Catholique, que par les révolutionnaires de France, il y a environ vingt-cinq ans, et qu'à cette époque le chef de l'Église la condamna hautement.

"La religion,' d'itil, 'a déjà été fortement attaquée par les décrets qui sont émanées de cette Assemblée Nationale. Des maux que nous déplorons ont été occasionnés par les fausses doctrines qu'on a répandues depuis longtemps dans une multitude d'écrits empoisonnés qui se trouvent dans les mains de tout le monde; et c'est afin que cette funeste contagion se propageât avec plus de hardiesse et de rapidité par les moyens de la presse, qu'une des premières opérations de l'Assemblée Nationale a été de décréter la liberté de penser ce qu'on voudrait en matière de religion, d'exprimer librement et impunément ses opinions à cet égard, de ne suivre, en un mot, d'autres règles et d'autres lois en cette matière que celles qu'on voudrait se prescrire.

"Informés de ces événements, pouvons-nous garder le silence sur tant de maux, et ne pas élever notre voix Apostolique contre ces funestes décrets qui ont pour objet d'anéantir la religion?' (Allocution du 29 Mars 1790.)

"Art. 192.—2. Jurer de maintenir l'observation d'une loi qui rend tous les sujets du Roi, de quelque croyance religieuse qu'ils soient, capables à posséder toutes les dignités et emplois quelconques, ce serait justifier d'avance et sanctionner les mesures qui pourront être prises pour confier les intérêts de notre sainte religion dans les provinces, si éminemment Catholiques, à des fonctionnaires Protestants.

"Art. 196.—4. Jurer d'observer et de maintenir une loi, qui suppose que l'Église Catholique est soumise aux lois de l'État et qui donne au souverain le droit d'obliger le clergé et les fidèles à obéir à toutes les lois de l'État, de quelque nature qu'elles soient, c'est s'exposer manifestement à coopérer à l'asservissement de l'Église Catholique. C'est au fond soumettre, suivant l'expression de notre Saint Père le Pape, la puissance spirituelle aux caprices de la puissance séculière. (Bulle du 28 Juin 1809.)

"Art. 226.—5. Jurer d'observer et de maintenir une loi qui attribue au souverain, et à un souverain qui ne professe pas notre sainte religion, le droit de régler l'instruction publique, les écoles supérieures, moyennes et inférieures, c'est lui livrer à discrétion l'enseignement public dans toutes ses branches, c'est trahir honteusement les plus chers intérêts de l'Église Catholique. Le pouvoir qu'ont les évêques de surveiller l'enseignement de la foi et de la morale Chrétienne dans toute l'étendue de leurs diocèses, comme celui de remplir toutes les autres fonctions de leur ministère, émane de la volonté et de l'autorité de Jésus-Christ lui-même. On ne peut le leur ôter ni le diminuer sans soumettre la doctrine de la foi et toute la discipline ecclésiastique à la puissance séculière, sans renverser, par conséquent, tout l'édifice de la religion Catholique.

"Art. 145.—6. Jurer d'observer et de maintenir une loi qui autorise les États provinciaux à exécuter les lois relatives à la protection des différents cultes, à leur exercice extérieur, à l'instruction publique, n'est-ce pas confier les plus grands intérêts de la religion à des laïcs qui n'ont et ne peuvent avoir aux yeux de l'Église Catholique aucune qualité, soit pour reconnaître la justice ou l'injustice des lois de ce genre qui leur seront envoyées, soit pour en diriger l'application, soit pour en ordonner l'exécution dans les diocèses respectifs?

"Art. 2 addit.—7. Jurer de regarder comme obligatoires jusqu'à ce qu'il y soit autrement pourvu, et de maintenir toutes les lois qui sont maintenant en vigueur, ce serait co-opérer évidemment à l'exécution éventuelle de plusieurs lois anti-Catholiques et manifestement injustes, que renferment les Codes Civil et Pénal de l'ancien Gouvernement Français, et notamment de celles qui permettent le divorce, qui autorisent légalement des unions incestueuses condamnées par l'Église, qui décernent contre les ministres de l'Évangile, fidèles à leurs devoirs, les peines les plus sévères, &c.—toutes lois qu'un vrai Catholique doit avoir en horreur.

"Il est encore d'autres articles qu'un véritable enfant de l'Église ne peut s'engager par serment à observer et à maintenir, et dont l'urgence des circonstances ne nous permet pas de nous occuper en ce moment; tel est, en particulier, le 227 me, qui autorise la liberté de la presse, et ouvre la porte à une infinité de désordres, à un déluge d'écrits anti-Chrétiens et anti-Catholiques. Il nous suffit d'avoir prouvé que la nouvelle loi fondamentale contient plusieurs articles opposés à l'esprit et aux maximes de notre sainte religion, et qui tendent évidemment à opprimer et à asservir l'Église de Jésus-Christ; que, par conséquent, il ne peut être permis aux fidèles Catholiques de s'engager par serment à les observer et à les maintenir.

"Le Prince† MAURICE DE BROGLIE, Évêque de Gand.

†CHARLES FRANCOIS JOSEPH PISANI DE LA GAUDE, Evêque de Namur.

†FRANCOTS JOSEPH, Évêque de Tournay.

"J'adhère au jugement doctrinal cidessus porté par Messieurs les Évêques du Royaume de Pays-Bas.

"J. FORGEUR, Vicaire-Général de l'Archêvché de Malines.

"J'y adhère également.

"J. A. BARRETT, *Vicaire-Général, cap. de Liège.*"

Voici donc un fait qui prouve que, de nos jours encore, l'Église peut faire refuser à un peuple les libertés les plus nécessaires.

A peine la Constitution de 1830 eut-elle consacré en Belgique, avec le concours des Catholiques libéraux, les principes condamnés en 1815 par l'Épiscopat, que le Pape les foudroya dans sa fameuse Encyclique de 1832.

On ne peut nier que l'Église condamne, par exemple, la liberté de conscience. Écoutons sur ce point Bossuet, dont l'autorité ne sera pas suspecte, car dans l'écrit dont je vais citer un passage il réclamait une certaine tolérance pour les Protestants:—

"Je déclare (dit-il) que je suis et que j'ai toujours été du sentiment, premièrement, que les princes peuvent contraindre par des lois pénales tous les hérétiques à se conformer à la profession et aux pratiques de l'Église Catholique. Deuxièmement, que cette doctrine doit passer pour constante dans l'Église, qui non-seulement a suivi, mais encore demandé de semblables ordonnances des princes. En établissant ces maximes comme constantes et incontestables parmi les Catholiques," etc.

Si donc les Catholiques disposés à obéir aux décisions du Pape deviennent un jour les maîtres en Belgique, ils supprimeront la liberté. Les journaux des Évêques ne le nient plus depuis qu'ils espèrent voir leur parti rester au pouvoir.

Chaque fois que le Pape actuel a conclu un Concordat avec un gouvernement prêt à lui obéir, il a stipulé l'intolérance absolue à l'égard des dissidents. Comme type de ces Concordats je citerai celui conclu le 22 Avril 1863, avec la République de l'Équateur, dont l'Article I. porte:—

"La religion Catholique, Apostolique et Romaine continue d'être la religion de la République de l'Équateur. En conséquence, on ne pourra jamais permettre dans la République l'exercice d'aucun culte ni l'existence d'aucune société qui auraient été condamnés Par l'Église."

Quand le Pape actuel stipule que tout Protestant, tout franc-maçon sera inexorablement proscrit d'un État, Lord A. Russell peut-il dire que "no Pope has trod upon the political ground?"

Supposez l'Irlande séparée de l'Angleterre et gouvernée par des vrais Ultramontains, ceux-ci seraient tenus de faire un Concordat semblable à celui de l'Équateur. N'est-ce pas ainsi que les derniers Protestants ont été expulsés du Tyrol?

Recevez, Monsieur, &c.,

Émile de Laveleye.

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The Church of England and Ritualism.

By the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M. P.,

Reprinted from "The Contemporary Review" and revised.

epigraph

PINDAR.

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To this reprint of two articles from the *Contemporary Review*, on subjects which have much disturbed the Church of England, I prefix an observation on a single point, that of attaching doctrinal significance to external usages.

I have nowhere questioned that there are outward usages, which may and must be of doctrinal significance. My proposition is simply this, that where external usages have become subjects of contention, and that contention is carried to issue in courts of law, the field should not be unnecessarily widened; and the usage should not be interpreted for judicial purposes with reference to this or that particular dogma, so long, and of course only so long, as it naturally and unconstrainedly bears (p. 51) some sense not entailing such a consequence.

Within the last few weeks has been taken from amongst us the venerated Dean Hook, the greatest parish priest of his age. I believe he had taken his part, in a decided and public manner, against the prohibition of the eastward position of the consecrator in the celebration of the Lord's Supper. I am glad to have an opportunity of

showing, as I think conclusively, how little it was in his mind hereby to exclude the laity from their full participation in the solemn act, by citing a passage from a private letter which he addressed to a young clergyman in 1842, when questions of outward usage were debated among us with what all now see to have been a needless heat and violence. "I am afraid that many in their zeal for the Church forget Christ, and in maintaining the rights of the Clergy forget the rights of the laity; who are, as well as the Clergy, priests unto the Most High God, and who indeed have as large a portion of the Sacrifice of Prayer and Praise assigned to them in the Prayer-Book as the Clergy."

I seek to show, by this extract, how innocent must have been, in the mind of this admirable man, the usage of the eastward position, and how unwise and unjust it would have been, in his case among others, to attach to it the 'doctrinal significance' of an intention to exclude the laity from their share in the Eucharistic offering.

I believe it may be stated with confidence that there have been times, when the northward position has been recommended, with authority and learning, as being *more* adapted than the eastward one to give full effect to the teaching of the Sacrifice in the Lord's Supper.

The notes appended to this reprint are in brackets.

W. E. G.

12th November, 1875.

Ritual and Ritualism.

From *The Contemporary Review* for October, 1874.

FOR some months past, and particularly during the closing weeks of the Session of Parliament, the word Ritualism has had, in a remarkable degree, possession of the public ear, and of the public mind. So much is clear. The road is not so easy, when we proceed to search for the exact meaning of the term. And yet the term itself is not in fault. It admits, at first sight, of an easy and unexceptionable definition. Ritualism surely means an undue disposition to ritual. Ritual itself is founded on the Apostolic precept, "Let all things be done decently and in order;" Greek quote in right, graceful, or becoming figure, and by fore-ordered arrangement, 1 Cor. xiv. 40. The exterior modes of divine service are thus laid down as a distinct and proper subject for the consideration of Christians.

But the word Ritualism passes in the public mind for something more specific in terms, and also for something more variable, if not more vague, in character. In a more specific form it signifies such a kind and such a manner of undue disposition to ritual as indicate a design to alter at least the ceremonial of religion established in and by this nation, for the purpose of assimilating it to the Roman or Popish ceremonial; and, further, of introducing the Roman or Papal religion into this country, under the insidious form, and silent but steady suasion, of its ceremonial.

All this is intelligible enough; and, if we start with such a conception of Ritualism, we, as a people, ought to know what we think, say, and do about it. But there is another and a briefer account which may be given of it. There is a definition purely subjective, but in practice more widely prevalent than any other. According to this definition, Ritualism is to each man that which, in matter of ritual, each man dislikes, and holds to be in excess. When the term is thus used, it becomes in the highest degree deceptive; for it covers under an apparent unity meanings as many as the ripples of the smiling sea; as the shades of antagonism to, or divergence from, the most overloaded Roman ceremonial. When the term is thus employed, sympathy flies, as if it were electricity, through the crowd; but it is sympathy based upon the sound and not upon the sense. Men thus impelled mischievously but naturally mistake the strength of their feeling for the strength of their argument. The heated mind resents the chill touch and relentless scrutiny of logic. There could be no advantage, especially at the present time, in approaching such a theme from this point of view.

But perhaps it may be allowable to make an endeavour to carry this subject for a few moments out of the polemical field into the domain of thought. I have but little faith in coercion applied to matter of opinion and feeling, let its titles be ever so clear. But a word spoken in quietness, and by way of appeal to the free judgment and reason of men, can rarely fail to be in season. I propose, accordingly, to consider what is the true measure and meaning of Ritual, in order thus to arrive at a clear conception of that vice in its use which is designated by the name of Ritualism.

Ritual, then, is the clothing which, in some form, and in some degree, men naturally and inevitably give to the performance of the public duties of religion. Beyond the religious sphere the phrase is never carried; but the thing appears, and cannot but appear, under other names. In all the more solemn and stated public acts of man, we find employed that investiture of the acts themselves with an appropriate exterior, which is the essential idea

of ritual. The subject-matter is different, but the principle is the same: it is the use and adaptation of the outward for the expression of the inward.

It may be asked, Why should there be any such adaptation? Why not leave things to take their course? Is not the inward enough, if it be genuine and pure? And may not the outward overlay and smother it? But human nature itself, with a thousand tongues, utters the reply. The marriage of the outward and the inward pervades the universe.

They wedded form with artful strife,
The strength and harmony of life.

And the life and teaching of Christ Himself are marked by a frequent employment of signs in which are laid the ground, and the foreshowing, both of Sacraments and of Ritual.

True indeed it is that the fire, meant to warm, may burn us; the light, meant to guide, may blind us; the food, meant to sustain, may poison us; but fire and light and food are not only useful, they are indispensable. And so it is with that universal and perpetual instinct of human nature which exacts of us, that the form given externally to our thoughts in word and act shall be one appropriate to their substance. Applied to the circle of civilized life, this principle, which gives us ritual in religion, gives us the ceremonial of Courts, the costume of Judges, the uniform of regiments, all the language of heraldry and symbol, all the hierarchy of rank and title; and which, descending through all classes, presents itself in the badges and the bands of Foresters' and Shepherds' Clubs and Benefit Societies.

But if there be a marriage—ordained by Providence and pervading Nature—of the outward and the inward, it is required in this, as in other marriages, that there be some harmony of disposition between the partners. In the perception of this harmony, a life-long observation has impressed me with the belief that we as a people are, as a race, and apart from special training, singularly deficient. In the inward realms of thought and of imagination, the title of England to stand in the first rank of civilized nations need not be argued, for it is admitted. It would be squally idle to offer any special plea on its behalf in reference to all classes of developments purely external. The railway and the telegraph, the factory, the forge, and the mine; the highways beaten upon every ocean; the first place in the trade of the world, where population would give us but the fifth; a commercial marine equalling that of the whole of Continental Europe: these may be left to tell their own tale. When we come to pure Art, we find ourselves beaten by great countries, and even, in one case at least, by small.

Belgium.

But it is not of pure Art that I would now speak. It is of that vast and diversified region of human life and action, where a distinct purpose of utility is pursued, and where the instrument employed aspires at the same time to an outward form of beauty. Here lies the great mass and substance of the *Kunstleben*—the Art-life, of a people. Its sphere is so large, that nothing except pure thought is of right excluded from it. As in the Italian language scarcely a word can be found which is not musical, so a music of the eye (I borrow the figure from Wordsworth) should pervade all visible production and construction whatever, whether of objects in themselves permanent, or of those where a temporary collocation only of the parts is in view. This state of things was realized, to a great extent, in the Italian life of the middle ages. But its grand and normal example is to be sought in ancient Greece, where the spirit of Beauty was so profusely poured forth, that it seemed to fill the life and action of man as it fills the kingdoms of Nature: the one, like the other, was in its way a *Kosmos*. The elements of production, everything embodied under the hand or thought of man, fell spontaneously into beautiful form, like the glasses in a kaleidoscope. It was the gallant endeavour to give beauty as a matter of course, and in full harmony with purpose, to all that he manufactured and sold, which has made the name of Wedgwood now, and I trust for ever, famous. The Greeks, at least the Attic Greeks, were, so to speak, a nation of Wedgwoods. Most objects, among those which we produce, we calmly and without a sigh surrender to Ugliness, as if we were coolly passing our children through the fire to Moloch. But in Athens, as we know from the numberless relics of Greek art and industry in every form, the production of anything ugly would have startled men by its strangeness as much as it would have vexed them by its deformity; and a deviation from the law of Taste, the faculty by which Beauty is discerned, would have been treated simply as a deviation from the law of Nature. One and the same principle, it need hardly be observed, applies to material objects which are produced once for all, and to matters in which, though the parts may subsist before and after, the combination of them is for the moment only. The law that governed the design of an amphora or a lamp, governed also the order of a spectacle, a procession, or a ceremonial. It was not the sacrifice of the inward meaning to the outward show: that method of proceeding was a glorious discovery reserved for the later, and especially for our own, time. Neither was it the sacrifice even of the outward to the inward. The Greek did not find it requisite: Nature

had not imposed upon him such a necessity. It was the determination of their meeting-point; the expression of the harmony between the two. It is in regard to the perception and observance of this law that the English, nay, the British people, ought probably to be placed last among the civilized nations of Europe. And if it be so, the first thing is to bring into existence and into activity a real consciousness of the defect. We need not, if it exist, set it down to natural and therefore incurable inaptitude. It is more probably due to the disproportionate application of our given store of faculties in other directions. To a great extent it may be true that for the worship of beauty we have substituted a successful pursuit of comfort. But are the two in conflict? And first of all, is the charge against us, as we are, a just one?

To make good imputations of any kind against ourselves is but an invidious office. It would be more agreeable to leave the trial to the impartial reflection and judgment of each man. But one of the features of the case is this, that so few among us have taken the pains to form, in such matters, even a habit of observation. And, again, there are certain cases of exception to the general rule. For example, take the instance of our rural habitations. I do not speak of their architecture, nor especially do I speak of our more pretentious dwellings. But the English garden is proverbial for beauty; and the English cottage garden stands almost alone in the world: Except where smoke, stench, and the havoc of manufacturing and mining operations have utterly deformed the blessed face of Nature, the English cottager commonly and spontaneously provides some little pasture for his eye by clothing his home in the beauty of shrubs and flowers. And even where he has been thus violently deprived of his lifelong communion with Nature, or where his lot is cast in huge cities from which he scarcely ever escapes, he still resorts to potted flowers and to the song of caged birds for solace. This love of natural objects, which are scarcely ever without beauty or grace, ought to supply a basis on which to build all that is still wanting. But I turn to another chapter. The ancient ecclesiastical architecture of this country indicates a more copiously diffused love and pursuit of beauty, and a richer faculty for its production, in connection with purpose, than is to be found in the churches of any other part of Christendom. Not that we possess in our cathedrals and greater edifices the most splendid of all examples. But the parish churches of England are as a whole unrivalled; and it has been the opinion of persons of the widest knowledge, that they might even challenge without fear the united parish churches of Europe, from their wealth of beauty in all the particulars of their own styles of architecture.

Still, it does not appear that these exceptions impair the force of the general proposition, which is that as a people we are, in the business of combining beauty with utility, singularly uninstructed, unaccomplished, maladroit, unhandy. If instances must be cited, they are not far to seek. Consider the unrivalled ugliness of our towns in general. Or put Englishmen to march in a procession, and see how, instead of feeling instinctively the music and sympathy of motion, they will loll, and stroll, and straggle; it never occurs to them that there is beauty or solemnity in ordered movement, and that the instruction required is only that simple instruction which, without speech, Nature should herself supply to her pupils.

Quid facerent, ipsi nullo didicere magistro.

Take again—sad as it is to strike for once at the softer portion of the species—the dress of Englishwomen, Which, apart from rank and special gift or training or opportunity, is reputed to be the worst in the 'European world, and the most wanting alike in character and in adaptation. Take the degraded state, in point of beauty, at which all the arts of design, and all industrial production, had arrived among us some fifty years ago, in the iron age of George IV., and before the reaction which has redeemed many of them from disgrace, and raised some to real excellence.

But, indeed, in too many cases, our repentance is almost worse than our transgressions. When we begin to imbibe the conception that, after all, there is no reason why attempts should not be made to associate Beauty with usefulness, the manner of our attempts is too frequently open to the severest criticism. The so-called Beauty is administered in portentous doses of ornamentation sometimes running to actual deformity. Quantity is the measure, not quality, nor proportion. Who shall now compete with the awakened Englishwoman for the house of hair built upon her head, or for the measureless extension of her dragging train? Who shall be the rival of some English architects plastering their work with an infinity of pretentious detail in order to screen from attention inharmonious dimension and poverty of lines? Or—that I may without disguise direct the charge against the mind and spirit of the nation, embodied in its Parliament and its Government—what age or country can match the practical solecisms exhibited in the following facts and others like them? Forty years ago we determined to erect the most extensive building of Pointed architecture in the world; namely, our Houses of Parliament, or, as they are called, the Palace of Westminster. We entrusted the work to our most eminent Italian architect. Once was pretty well; but once was not enough. So, twenty years ago, we determined to erect another vast building in the Italian style; namely, a pile of public offices, or, as some would call it, a Palace of

Administration; and we committed the erection of it to our most experienced and famous architect in the Pointed species. Thus each man was selected for his unacquaintance with the genius of the method in which he was to work. Who can wonder, in circumstances like these, that the spirit and soul of style are so often forgotten in its letter; that beauty itself unlearns itself, and degenerates into mere display; that for the attainment of a given end, not economy of means, but profusion of means, becomes our law and our boast; that, in the Houses of Parliament, dispersion of the essential parts over the widest possible space marks a building where the closest concentration should have been the rule; and that the Foreign Office, which is a workshop, exhibits a Staircase which no palace of the Sovereign can match in its dimensions?

If from the work of creation we turn to the world of action, the same incapacity of detecting discord, and the same tendency to solecism will appear. In what country except ours could (as I know to have happened) a parish hall have been got up in order to supply funds for procuring a parish hearse?

I shall not admit that, in these remarks, I have gone astray from the title and subject of the paper. What is Ritualism? It is unwise, undisciplined reaction from poverty, from coldness, from barrenness, from nakedness; it is overlaying Purpose with adventitious and obstructive incumbrance; it is departure from measure and from harmony in the annexation of appearance to substance, of the outward to the inward; it is the caricature of the Beautiful; it is the conversion of helps into hindrances; it is the attempted substitution of the secondary for the primary aim, and the real failure and paralysis of both. A great deal of our architecture, a great share of our industrial production has been or is, it may be feared, very Ritualistic indeed.

Let us now trace the operation of the same principle in the subject-matter of religion. We encounter the same defects, the same difficulties, the same excesses; the same want of trained habits of observation; the same forgetfulness of proportion; the same danger of burying it under a mass of ornament.

It must be admitted that the state of things, from which the thing popularly known as Ritualism took historically its point of departure, was dishonouring to Christianity, disgraceful to the nation; disgraceful most of all to that much-vaunted religious sentiment of the English public, which in impenetrable somnolence endured it, and resented all interference with it. Nakedness enough there was, fifty and forty years ago, of divine service and of religious edifices, among the Presbyterians of Scotland, and among the Nonconformists of England. But, among these, the outward fault was to a great extent redeemed by the cardinal virtues of earnestness and fervour. The prayer of the minister was at least listened to with a pious attention, and the noblest of all the sounds that can reach the human ear was usually heard in the massive swell, and solemn fall, of the united voices of the congregations. But within the ordinary English Parish Church of town or country, there was no such redeeming feature in the action of the living, though the inanimate treasure of the Prayer-book yet remained. Its warmth was stored, like the material of fire in our coal seams, for better days. It was still the surviving bed or mould, in which higher forms of religious thought and feeling were some day to be cast. But the actual state of things, as to worship, was bad beyond all parallel known to me in experience or reading. Taking together the expulsion of the poor and labouring classes (especially from the town churches), the mutilations and blockages of the fabrics, the baldness of the service, the elaborate horrors of the so-called music, with the jargon of parts contrived to exhibit the powers of every village roarer, and to prevent all congregational singing; and above all, the coldness and indifference of the lounging or sleeping congregations, our services were probably without a parallel in the world for their debasement; and as they would have shocked a Brahmin or a Buddhist, so they hardly could have been endured in this country had not the faculty of taste, and the perception of the seemly or unseemly, been as dead as the spirit of devotion. There were exceptions, and the exceptions were beginning slowly to grow in number: but I speak of the general state of things, such as I can myself recollect it. In some places the older traditions and spirit of the Church had survived all the paralysing influences of the first Hanoverian generations; in others they were commended to the people by the lofty spirit and English pluck of men like Dr. Hook; in many cathedrals, with stateliness, a remnant of true dignity was preserved; and in a third class of cases the clergy known as Evangelical had infused into their congregations a reverent sense of the purpose for which they met together. For this and other services they were pointed at with the finger of scorn by the very same stamp of people as those who are now most fervid in denouncing the opposite section. And it was for reasons not very different; both were open to the charge that they did not thoroughly conform to the prescriptions of the Prayer-book; both were apt to slide into the attitude and feeling of a clique; both rather abounded in self-confidence, and were viewed askance by authority; both, it must be added, were zealous, and felt, or held, to be troublesome. But of the general tone of the services in the Church of England at that time I do not hesitate to say, it was such as when carefully considered would have shocked not only an earnest Christian of whatever communion, but any sincere believer in God, any one who held that there was a Creator and Governor of the world, and that His creatures ought to worship Him. And that which I wish to press upon the mind of the reader is, that this state of things was one with which the members of the Church generally were quite content. It was not by lay associations with long purses that the people were with difficulty and with much resistance awakened out of this state of things. It was

by the reforming Bishops and Clergy of the Church of England. And, though the main source of the evil without doubt lay deeper, such an amount of effort could hardly have been needed, had the faculties and life of Art been more widely diffused in the country.

Had we, as a people, been possessed in reasonable measure of that sense of harmony between the inward and the outward, of which I have been lamenting the weakness, it could not indeed have supplied the place of a fervent religious life; but Divine worship, the great public symbol and pledge of that life, never could have fallen so low among us. And I think it has been in some measure from the same defect that, during the exterior revivals of the last forty years, there has been so much misapprehension and miscarriage, so much dissatisfaction and disturbance. More than thirty years have passed since agitation in London, and riot in Exeter, were resorted to for the purpose, as was conscientiously believed, of preserving the purity of the Reformed Religion against the use of the surplice in the pulpit, and of the Prayer for the Church Militant. In vain the bishops and the clergy concerned made their protests, and averred that they were advising, or acting, in simple "obedience to the law." The appeal to that watchword, now so sacred, was utterly unavailing: Popery, and nothing less than Popery, it was insisted, must be the meaning of these changes. To me it appeared at the time that their introduction, however legal, was, if not effected with the full and intelligent concurrence of the flocks, decidedly unwise. But as to these particular usages themselves, I held then, and hold now, that their tendency, when calmly viewed, must have been seen to be rather Protestant than Popish; that Popery would have led to the use of a different and lower garb in preaching, not to the use of the same vestment which was also to be used for the celebration of the Eucharist; and that no prayer in the Prayer-book bears so visibly the mark of the Reformation, as the Prayer for the Church Militant. Be that as it may, I recollect with pain a particular case, which may serve as a sample of the feeling, and the occurrences, of that day. An able and devoted young clergyman had accepted the charge of a new district parish in one of our largest towns, with trifling emoluments, and with large masses of neglected poor, whom he had begun steadily and successfully to gather in. Within a year or two an agitation was raised, not in his parish, but in the town at large; it had grown too hot to hold him; and he was morally compelled to retire from his benefice and from the place, for the offences of having preached the morning sermon in the surplice, read the Prayer for the Church Militant, and opened his church for Divine service, not daily, but on all festivals. The inference to be drawn from this is not an inference of self-laudation: not the Greek quote

II, iv. 405.

but an inference in behalf of a little self-mistrust, and a great deal of deliberation and circumspection in these important matters. For, from a view of the modes which have become usual for the celebration of Divine service, in average churches not saddled with a party name, there appears this rather startling fact, that the congregations of the Church of England in general now practise without suspicion, and the Parliament, representing the general feeling out of doors, is disposed to enforce, by the establishment of more stringent procedure, what thirty years ago was denounced, and rather more than denounced, as Ritualism.

The truth is, that, in the word Ritualism, there is involved much more than the popular mind seems to suppose. The present movement in favour of ritual is not confined to ritualists, neither is it confined even to Churchmen. It has been, when all things are considered, quite as remarkable among Nonconformists and Presbyterians; not because they have as much of it, but because they formerly had none, and because their system appeared to have been devised and adjusted in order to prevent its introduction, and to fix upon it even *in limine* the aspect of a flagrant departure from first principles. Crosses on the outside of chapels, organs within them, rich painted architecture, that flagrant piece of symbolism, the steeple, windows filled with subjects in stained glass, elaborate chanting, the use of the Lord's prayer, which is no more than the thin end of the wedge that is to introduce fixed forms, and the partial movements in favour of such forms already developed, are among the signs which, taken all together, form a group of phenomena evidently referable to some cause far more deep and wide-working than mere servile imitation, or the fashion of the day. In the case of the organ, be it recollected that many who form part of the *crème de la crème* of Protestantism have now begun to use that which the Pope does not hear in his own Chapel or his sublime Basilica, and which the entire Eastern Church has ever shrunk from employing in its services.

With this I will mention a familiar matter, though it may provoke a smile. It is the matter of clerical costume; on which I will not scruple to say that, in my judgment, the party of costume is right. A costume for the clergy is as much connected with discipline and self-respect as an uniform for the army, and is no small guarantee for conduct. The disuse of clerical costume was a recent innovation; but thirty-five or forty years ago the abuse had become almost universal. It was consummated by the change in lay fashions—a very singular one—to a nearly exclusive use by men of black. The reaction began in the cut of the waistcoat, which, as worn by the innovators, was buttoned all the way up to the cravat. This was deemed so distinctly Popish, that it acquired the nickname of "The Mark of the Beast;" and it is a fact that, among the tailors of the west-end of London, this shape of waistcoat was familiarly known as "the M. B. waistcoat." Any one who will now take the

pains to notice the dress of the regular Presbyterian or Dissenting minister will, I think, find that, in a great majority of instances, he too, when in his best, wears, like the clergyman, the M. B. waistcoat.

True the distance between these Presbyterian and Nonconforming services, and those of the Church of England, in point of ritual, remains as great, or perhaps greater, than before; but that is because one and the same forward movement has taken possession of both, only the speeds may have been different. I will give a case in point. Five and thirty years ago hardly any one had dreamt of a surpliced choir in a parish church. When such an use came in, it was thought to be like a sign of the double surperlative in High Churchmanship, and was deemed the most violent experiment yet made upon the patience of the laity. How stands the matter now? As the purity of Welsh Protestantism is well known, I will take an instance from Wales. In a Welsh town, of no great size, the clergyman of the parish was moved, not long ago, to introduce the surplice for his choir. He determined upon a *plebiscite*; and placed printed slips of paper about the seats, requesting a written aye or no. Near two hundred and fifty answers were given: and of the answers more than four-fifths were ayes.

[Another case almost exactly similar has recently been reported in the newspapers at East Harborne, near Birmingham.]

In truth, there is a kind of ritual race; all have set their faces the same way, and none like to have their relative backwardness enhanced, while the absolute standing- point is continually moved forward.

This is matter of fact, and of the very widest reach, compassing a field of which but a little corner was covered by the recent Act of Parliament; and now the question rises to the lip, Ought this matter of fact, which will scarcely be disputed, to be viewed with satisfaction or with displeasure?

In my opinion this is a question extremely difficult to answer; and I will not affect to be able to give it a complete reply. It seems to me that ritual is, in what amount I do not attempt now to inquire, a legitimate accompaniment, nay, effect, of the religious life; but I view with mistrust and jealousy all tendency, wherever shown, either to employ ritual as its substitute, or to treat ritual as its producing cause. All, however, that I have thus far endeavoured to insinuate is, that the subject is a very large one—that it cannot be dealt with offhand—that it is exceedingly significant and pregnant in the manifestations it supplies. If we do not live in one of the great thinking ages, we live in an age which supplies abundant materials of thought; and with the many problems, which we shall leave to our children for solution, we may hand down to them the cordial wish that they may make more profitable use of these materials than we have done.

If we survey the Christian world, we shall have occasion to observe that ritual does not bear an unvarying relation to doctrine. The most notable proof of this assertion is to be found in the Lutheran communion. It is strongly and, except where opinion has deviated in the direction of rationalism, uniformly Protestant. But in portions of the considerable area over which it stretches, for example, in Denmark, in Sweden and Norway, even on the inhospitable shores of Iceland, altars, vestments, lights, (if not even incense) are retained: the clergyman is called the priest, and the Communion Office is termed the Mass. But there is no distinction of doctrine whatever between Swedish or Danish, and German Lutherans: nor, according to the best authorities, has the chain of the Episcopal succession been maintained in those countries. Even in this country, there are some of those clergy who are called Broadchurchmen, some who have a marked indifference to doctrine, and something like a hatred of dogma, yet who also are inclined to musical ornament, and other paraphernalia of Divine service. From these facts, as well as from the growing ritual of the non-Episcopal Christians of this country, we may perceive that the unqualified breadth with which the argument has been drawn from ritual to doctrine in our discussions has evinced something of that precipitancy to which, from the narrow and insular character of his knowledge, as well as from the vigour of his will, the Englishman is particularly liable. Here also, from that deficiency which I have noted in the faculty of adapting the outward to the inward, he is apt to blunder into confounding what is appropriate and seemly with what partakes of excess or invidious meaning. At the same time, an important connection between high doctrine and high ritual is to be traced to a considerable extent in the Church of England, and in commenting on over-statement I do not seek to understate. This connection is, however, for the present hopelessly mixed with polemical considerations, and therefore excluded from the field of these remarks.

But there is a question, which it is the special purpose of this paper to suggest for consideration by my fellow-Christians generally, which is more practical and of greater importance, as it seems, to me, and has far stronger claims on the attention of the nation and of the rulers of the Church, than the question whether a handful of the clergy are or not engaged in an utterly hopeless and visionary effort to Romanise the Church and people of England. At no time since the sanguinary reign of Mary has such a scheme been possible. But if it had been possible in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries, it would still have become impossible in the nineteenth; when Rome has substituted for the proud boast of *semper eadem* a policy of violence and change in faith; when she has refurbished and paraded anew every rusty tool she was fondly thought to have disused; when no one can become her convert without renouncing his moral and mental freedom, and placing his civil loyalty and duty at the mercy of another; and when she has equally repudiated modern thought and ancient

history. I cannot persuade myself to feel alarm as to the final issue of her crusades in England, and this although I do not undervalue her great powers of mischief. But there are questions of our own religious well-being that lie nearer home. And one of them is whether, as individuals, we can justly and truly say that the present movement in favour of ritual is a healthy movement for each of us; that is whether it gives or does not give us assistance in offering a more collected act of worship, when we enter the temple of the Most High, and think we go there to offer before Him the sacrifice of praise and prayer, and thanksgiving? Of one thing we may be quite certain, and it is this. To accumulate observances of ritual is to accumulate responsibility. It is the adoption of a higher standard of religious profession; and it requires a higher standard of religious practice. If we study, by appropriate or by rich embellishment, to make the Church more like the ideal of the House of God, and the services in it more impressive, by outward signs of His greatness and goodness, and of our littleness and meanness, all these are so many voices, audible and intelligible, though inarticulate, and to let them sound in our ears unheeded, is an offence against His majesty. If we are not the better for more ritual, we are the worse for it. A general augmentation of ritual, such as we see on every side around us, if it be without any corresponding enhancement of devotion, means more light, but not more love.

Indeed, it is even conceivable, nay far from improbable, that augmentation of ritual may import not increase but even diminution of fervour. Such must be the result in every case where the imagery of the eye and ear, actively multiplied, is allowed to draw off the energy, which ought to have its centre in the heart. There cannot be a doubt that the beauty of the edifice, the furniture, and the service, though their purpose be to carry the mind forward, may induce it to rest upon those objects themselves. Wherever the growth and progress of ritual, though that ritual be in itself suitable and proper, is accepted, whether consciously or unconsciously, and whether in whole or in part, by the individual, as standing in the stead of his own concentration and travail of spirit in devotion, there the ritual, though good in itself, becomes for him so much formality, that is so much deadness. Now there are multitudes of people who will accede at once to this proposition, who will even hold it to be no more than a truism, but with a complacent conviction, in the background of their minds, that it does not touch their case at all. They may be Presbyterians or Noncon-formists; or they may be Churchmen whose clergyman preaches against Popery open or concealed, or who have themselves subscribed liberally to prosecute the Rev. this, or the Rev. that, for Ritualism. No matter. They, and their clergyman too, may nevertheless be flagrant Ritualists. For the barest minimum of ritual may be a screen hiding from the worshipper the Object of his worship: nay, will be such a screen, unless the worshipper bestirs himself to use it as a help, and to see that it is not a snare.

In the class of cases supposed, the ready acquiescence of a few moments back has by this time probably been converted into a wondering scepticism. And there is at first sight something of paradox in the assertion that all ritual, not only elaborate but modest, not only copious but scanty, has its dangers. It seems hard to preach suspicion and misgiving against what is generally approved or accepted by the most undeniable Protestants. But the very same person who errs by making his own conscience in ritual a measure for the consciences of other men, lest they should run to excess, may be himself in surfeit while he dooms them to starve, for what is famine to them may be to him excess: what they can assimilate may be to him indigestible. It is difficult, I think, to fix a maximum of ritual for all times and persons, and to predicate that all beyond the line must be harmful; but it is impossible to fix a minimum, and then to say, up to that point we are safe. No ritual is too much, provided it is subsidiary to the inner work of worship: and all ritual is too much, unless it ministers to that purpose.

If there be paradox in this assertion, the explanation of it is not far to seek. It will be found in the removal of a prevailing and dangerous error in kindred subject-matter. It is too commonly assumed that, provided only we repair to our church or our chapel, as the case may be, the performance of the work of adoration is a thing which may be taken for granted. And so it is, in the absence of unequivocal signs to the contrary, as between man and man. But not as between the individual man and his own conscience in the hour of self-review. If he knows anything of himself, and unless he be a person of singularly-favoured gifts, he will know that the work of Divine worship, so far from being a thing of course even among those who outwardly address themselves to its performance, is one of the most arduous which the human spirit can possibly set about. The processes of simple self-knowledge are difficult enough. All these, when a man worships, should be fresh in his consciousness: and this is the first indispensable condition for a right attitude of the soul before the footstool of the Eternal. The next is a frame of the affections adjusted on the one hand to this self-knowledge, and on the other to the attributes, and the more nearly felt presence, of the Being before Whom we stand. And the third is the sustained mental effort necessary to complete the act, wherein every Christian is a Priest; to carry our whole selves, as it were with our own hands, into that nearer Presence, and, uniting the humble and unworthy *prophora* with the one full perfect and sufficient Sacrifice, to offer it upon the altar of the heart: putting aside every distraction of the outward sense, and endeavouring to complete the individual act as fully, as when in loneliness, after departing out of the flesh, we shall see eternal things no longer through but without a veil.

Now, considering how we live, and must live, our common life in and by the senses, how all sustained mental abstraction is an effort, how the exercise of sympathy itself, which is such a power in Christian worship, is also a kind of bond to the visible; and, then, last of all, with what feebleness and fluctuation, not to say with what wayward duplicity, of intention we undertake the work, is it not too clear that in such a work we shall instinctively be too apt to remit our energies, and to slide unawares into mere perfunctory performance? And where and in proportion as the service of the body is more careful, and the exterior decency and solemnity of the public assembling more unimpeachable, these things themselves may contribute to form important elements of that inward self-complacency which makes it so easy for us, whenever we ourselves are judge and jury as well as 'prisoner at the bar,' to obtain a verdict of acquittal. In other words, the very things, which find their only sufficient warrant in their capacity and fitness to assist the work of inward worship, are particularly apt to be accepted by the individual himself as a substitute for inward worship, on account of that very capacity and fitness, of their inherent beauty and solemnity, of their peculiar and unworldly type. So that ritual, because it is full of uses, is also full of dangers. Though it is clear that men increase responsibility by augmenting it, they do not escape from danger by its diminution: nothing can make ritual safe except the strict observance of its purpose, namely, that it shall supply wings to the human soul in its callow efforts at upward flight. And, such being the meaning of true ritual, the just measure of it is to be found in the degree in which it furnishes that assistance to the individual Christian.

The changes, then, in our modes of performing Divine service ought to be answers to the inward call of minds advancing and working upwards in the great work of inward devotion. But when we see the extraordinary progress of ritual observance during the last generation, who is there that can be so sanguine as to suppose that there has been a corresponding growth of inward fervour, and of mental intelligence, in our general congregations? There is indeed a rule of simple decency to which, under all circumstances, we should strive to rise—for indecency in public worship is acted profanity, and is grossly irreligious in its effects. But when the standard of decency has once been attained, ought not the further steps to be vigilantly watched, I do not say by law, but by conscience? There are influences at work among us, far from spiritual, which may work in the direction of formalism through the medium of ritual. The vast amount of new made wealth in the country does not indeed lead to a display as profuse in the embellishment of the house of God, as in our own mansions, equipages, or dresses. Yet the wealthy, as such, have a preference for churches and for services with a certain amount of ornament: and it is quite possible that no small part of what we call the improvements in fabrics and in worship may be due simply to the demand of the richer man for a more costly article, and thus may represent not the spiritual growth but the materializing tendencies of the age. Again, there is a wider diffusion of taste among the many, though the faculty itself may not, with the few, have gained a finer edge; and, with this, the sense of the incongruous, and the grotesque, cannot but make some way. Here is another agency, adapted to improving the face and form of our religious services, without that which I would contend is the indispensable condition of all real and durable improvement—namely, a corresponding growth in the appreciation of the inward work of devotion. But a third and very important cause, working in the same direction, has been this. The standard of life and of devotion has risen among the clergy far more generally, and doubtless also more rapidly, than among the laity. It is more than possible that, in many instances, their own enlarged and elevated conception of what Divine service ought to be in order to answer the genuine demands of their own inward life, may have induced them to raise it in their several churches beyond any real capacity of their congregations to appreciate and turn it to account.

Even in the theatres of our day, the spectacle threatens to absorb the drama; and show, which should be the servant, to become the master. Much more is the danger real in the sanctuary, for the function of an audience is mainly passive, but that of a congregation is one of high and arduous, though unseen, activity.

But it is time to draw together the threads of this slight discourse upon a subject very far indeed from slight. Whatever may be said of the merits of authoritative and coercive repression in matters of ritual—and I am not very sanguine as to its effects—assuredly they never can dispense with the necessity, or perform the office, of the moral restraints of an awakened conscience. Some may be found to dispute the proposition that their gripe is hard, where a tender touch is needed; but who can question that they will reach but few, where many require a lesson? Attendance on religious services is governed among us to a great extent, especially in towns, and most of all in the metropolis, by fashion, taste, and liking: but no preference is really admissible in such a matter, except the strict answer of the conscious mind to the question, What degree and form of ritual is it that helps me, and what is it that hampers and impedes me, in the performance of the work for which all congregations of Christians assemble in their several churches?

If we consider the nature of Divine Service altogether at large, the presumption is against alteration, as such, in the manner of it. For the nature of God and the nature of man, and the relation of the one to the other, are constant; and in this solemn subject-matter, mere fashion, which is a principle of change questionable even in other departments, and which may be defined as change for its own sake, ought to have no place whatever.

The varieties required by local circumstances or temperaments can be no novelties, and will probably in the lapse of time have asserted themselves sufficiently in the subsisting arrangements.

But if we limit and regulate our consideration of the case by a careful reference to our own time and country, the presumption is much weakened, possibly in one sense even reversed. For we have been emerging from a period in which the public worship of God had confessedly been reduced to a state of great external debasement. In this state of things a Reformation was necessary. Happily it came, and it surmounted the breakers and floods of prejudice. There was therefore a presumption not against, but in favour of change of some kind. When, however, the further question was reached of what kind the change ought to be, it remained true that each particular change required to be examined on its own merits, and to make its own case. The tests to be applied would, in language rather popular than correct, be such as the following questions might supply:—

- Is it legally binding? an inquiry, in which the element of desuetude cannot be absolutely excluded from the view of a clergyman or of his flock.
- Is it in its own nature favourable to devout and intelligent adoration of God in the sanctuary?
- Will it increase, or will it limit, the active participation of the flock in the service?
- Is it conformable to the spirit of the Prayer-Book?
- Is it agreeable to the desires of this particular congregation?
- Is it adapted to their religious and their mental condition; and likely to bring them nearer to God in the act of worship, or to keep them further from Him; to collect or to disperse their thoughts, to warm or to freeze their affections?

It seems to me that, as a general rule, an answer to all these questions should be ready before a change in ritual is adopted: and that, where law interposes no impediment, still, if any of them has to be answered in the negative, such changes can hardly be allowable.

Except in the single case where the standard of decency has not been reached, I am wholly at a loss to conceive any excuse for contravening the general sense of a congregation by optional changes in ritual. If the clergyman thinks the matter to be one of principle, should he not instruct them? If he sees it to be one of taste and liking, should he not give way to them? Should he not be the first to perceive and hold that unsettlement in matters of religion is in itself no small evil: and to reflect that, by making precipitately some change which he approves, he may prepare the way and establish the precedent for a like precipitancy in other changes which he does not approve? Especially, what case can there be (except that of decency, and such a case can hardly be probable) in which he will be justified in repelling and dispersing his congregation for the sake of his service? Doubtless it is conceivable, that Divine Service may be rendered by careful ritual more suitable to the dignity of its purpose. But let us take, on the other hand, a church where a ritual thus improved has been forced upon a congregation to whom its provisions were like an unknown tongue, and whom it has therefore banished from the walls of the sanctuary. Is it conceivable that such a spectacle can be a pleasing one in the sight of the Most High? Did Christianity itself come down into the world in abstract perfection and in full development? or was it not rather opened on the world with nice regard to the contracted pupil of the human eye which it was gradually to enlarge, unfolding itself from day to day, in successive lessons of doctrine and event, here a little and there a little? The jewels in the crown of the Bride are the flocks within the walls of the temple; and men ever so hard of hearing are better than an empty bench.

I will, however, presume to express a favourable inclination towards one class of usages, with a corresponding aversion to their opposites. I heartily appreciate whatever, within the limits of the Prayer Book, tends to augment the active participation of the laity in the services: as for example their joining audibly in the recital of the General Thanksgiving; or the aid they may give the clergyman (often so valuable even in a physical point of view) by reading the Lessons.

[I notice with pleasure that this practice has not yet suffered the blight of association with party. It is observed truly that there is no pointing of the clauses in the General Thanksgiving, as there is in the General Confession. But the epithet general, used in both cases, appears to suggest like practice in each; though I admit it may also mean a thanksgiving for blessings generally, as distinguished from particular blessings. Without presuming to give an opinion, I may be allowed to hope the practice is not illegal.]

Again, if ritual be on the increase among us, ought it not to receive at once its complement and (in one sense) its counterpoise, in a greater care, fervency, and power, of preaching? Nothing, in my opinion, is of more equivocal tendency than high ritual with a low appreciation of Christian doctrine. But if there be high ritual and sound doctrine too, these will not excuse inadequate appreciation or use of the power of the pulpit. If ritual does its work in raising the temper of devotion, it is a preparation for corresponding elevation in the work of the preacher: and if the preacher is able to warm, to interest, and to edify his hearers, then he improves their means of profiting by ritual, and arms them against its dangers.

But if self-will and want of consideration for others have been, and, in a diminished degree are still, a snare

to the clergy, have not we of the laity the same infirmities with far less excuse? Is it not strange to see with what tenacity many a one of us will, when he casually attends a church other than his usual one, adhere to some usage or non-usage perfectly indifferent, but with the effect either of giving positive scandal or of exciting notice, that is, of distracting those around him from their proper work? How is this like the Apostle's ride, who was all things to all men? Or have we found out that the rules of Scripture were made, as well as the discipline of the Church, for the clergy alone? But even if it be the layman's privilege at once to rule the Church and to disobey it at his will, how is it that he does not respect the feelings of other laymen by decently conforming in all matters indifferent to the usages of the congregation to which he has chosen for the nonce to attach himself? It is much to be feared that when the clergyman has unlearned his own unreasonableness, he may still have to endure much from the unreasonableness of some handful of units among his flock. But if he be indeed worthy of his exalted office, he will see in the first place how little charity to the recalcitrant there will be in forcing on them even improvements which to them can only be stumblingblocks. Next, if he put on the armour of patience and of love, he will soon become aware of its winning efficacy. Lastly, there is an expedient which is in his own hands, and to which he cannot be prevented from resorting. Those defective perceptions of the outward manner of things, which I take to be national, must often make their mark on the clergy as well as on us of the laity. I remember long ago hearing a clergyman (who left the Church of England a few days later) complain of a want of reverence in his choir boys, with a demeanour, though it was in his beautiful church, fit for a tavern. The first, and last, and most effective article of ritual is deep reverence in the clergyman himself. Nothing can supply its place; and it will go far to supply the place of everything. It abhors affectation; and it does not consist in bowings and genuflexions, or in any definite acts: *nequeo monstrare, et sentio tantum*. The reason why this reverence is the most precious part of ritual, is because ritual in general consists *ex vi termini* in symbol; but reverence means, together with a sign, a thing signified. It lives and moves and has its being in a profound sense of the Divine presence, expressing itself through a suitable outward demeanour. But if the demeanour be without the sentiment, it is not reverence, it is only the husk and shell of reverence. The clergyman is necessarily the central point of his congregation. Their reverence cannot rise above his; and their reverence will if insensibly yet continually approach his. If this be the key-note of the service, questions of ritual will adjust themselves in harmony with it. And one reason why the point may be more safely pressed is, because reverence need not be the property or characteristic of any school in particular. It distinguished the Margaret Chapel of forty years ago, when the pastors of that church were termed Evangelical. It subsisted in that same chapel thirty years ago, when Mr. Oakley (now alas! ours no more), and Mr. Upton Richards gave to its very simple services, such as would now scarcely satisfy an average congregation, and where the fabric was little less than hideous, that true solemnity which is in perfect concord with simplicity. The Papal Church now enjoys the advantages of the labours of Mr. Oakley; who united to a fine musical taste, a much finer and much rarer gift, in discerning and expressing the harmony between the inward purposes of Christian worship and its outward investiture, and who then had gathered round him a congregation the most devout and hearty that I (for one) have ever seen in any communion of the Christian world.

And now, for my last word, I will appeal to high authority.

In the fourteenth chapter of Saint Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians may be found, what I would call the code of the New Testament upon ritual. The rules laid down by the Apostle to determine the comparative value of the gifts then so common in the Church will be found to contain the principles applicable to the regulation of Divine service; and it is touching to observe that they are immediately subjoined to that wonderful effusion describing "Charity," with which no ethical eloquence of Greece or Rome can suitably compare. The highest end, in the Apostle's mind, seems to be (v. 5) "that the church may receive edifying." At present there is a disposition to treat a handful of men as scapegoats; and my fear is not only that they may suffer injustice, but lest far wider evils, than any within their power to cause or cure, should creep onwards unobserved. As rank bigotry, and what is far worse, base egotistic selfishness may find their account, at moments like this, in swelling the cry of Protestantism, so much of no less rank worldliness may lurk in the fashionable tendency not only to excessive but even to moderate ritual. The best touchstone for dividing what is wrong and defining what is right in the exterior apparel of Divine service will be found in the holy desire and authoritative demand of the Apostle, "that the Church may receive edifying," rather than in abstract imagery of perfection on the one hand, or any form of narrow traditional prejudice on the other.

NOTE.—I subjoin to the article, now reprinted, Six Resolutions, in which, when the Public Worship Bill was before the House of Commons (July 1874), I endeavoured to set forth what appeared to me to offer a more safe and wise basis of legislation.

- That, in proceeding to consider the provisions of the bill for the Regulation of Public Worship, this House cannot do otherwise than take into view the lapse of more than two centuries since the enactment of the present Rubrics of the Common Prayer Book of the Church of England; the multitude of particulars embraced in the conduct of divine service under their provisions; the doubts occasionally attaching to

their interpretation, and the number of points they are thought to leave undecided; the diversities of local custom which under these circumstances have long prevailed; and the unreasonableness of proscribing all varieties of opinion and usage among the many thousands of congregations of the Church distributed throughout the land.

- That this House is therefore reluctant to place in the hands of every single Bishop, on the motion of one or of three persons howsoever defined, greatly increased facilities towards procuring an absolute ruling of many points hitherto left open and reasonably allowing of diversity; and thereby towards the establishment of an inflexible rule of uniformity throughout the land, to the prejudice, in matters indifferent, of the liberty now practically existing.
- That the House willingly acknowledges the great and exemplary devotion of the clergy in general to their sacred calling, but is not on that account the less disposed to guard against the indiscretion, or thirst for power, or other fault of individuals.
- That the House is therefore willing to lend its best assistance to any measure recommended by adequate authority, with a view to provide more effectual securities against any neglect of or departure from strict law which may give evidence of a design to alter, without the consent of the nation, the spirit or substance of the established religion.
- That, in the opinion of the House, it is also to be desired that the members of the Church, having a legitimate interest in her services, should receive ample protection against precipitate and arbitrary changes of established custom by the sole will of the clergyman, and against the wishes locally prevalent among them; and that such protection does not appear to be afforded by the provisions of the bill now before the House.
- That the House attaches a high value to the concurrence of Her Majesty's Government with the ecclesiastical authorities in the initiative of legislation affecting the Established Church.]

Is the Church of England Worth Preserving?

From *The Contemporary Review* for July, 1875.

"Trevor's Disputed Rubrics" (Parker), pp. 13 and *seqq.*

"De. vitâ et sanguine certant."

ÆN. xii. 763.

A PAPER contributed to the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW for October, 1874, elicited, together with many expressions of interest and approval, many also of disappointment. There seemed to have been an expectation that the Essay might untie, or cut, the knot of the questions which had been so warmly, if not fiercely, agitated during the preceding Session of Parliament. But it had no such ambitious aim. Its object was, within the limited sphere of my means, simply to dispose men towards reflection, to substitute for the temper of the battle-field, good as in its place that may be, the temper of the chamber, where we commune with our own hearts, and are still. And this was done for two reasons; the first, because all true meditation is dispassionate, and a dispassionate mood is the first indispensable condition for the resolution of controversies; the second, because there seemed to me to be real dangers connected, in the present day, with the merely fashionable accumulation of ritual, more subtle and very much more widely spread than the pronounced manifestations which had recently been so much debated.

The season is now tranquil; the furnace, no longer fed by the fuel of Parliamentary contentions among the highest authorities, has grown cool, and may be approached with safety, or, at least, with diminished risk. Those who opposed the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, in 1851, in some cases had for their reward (as I have reason to know) paragraphs in "religious" newspapers, stating circumstantially that they had joined the Church of Rome. Those who questioned the Public Worship Act, in 1874, were more mildly, but as summarily, punished in being set down as Ritualists. In the heat of the period, it would have been mere folly to dispute the justice of the "ticketing," or classification. Perhaps it may now be allowed me to say, that I do not approach this question as a partisan. Were the question one between historical Christianity and systems opposed to or divergent from it, I could not honestly profess that I did not take a side. But as regards ritual, by which I understand the exterior forms of Divine Worship, I have never, at any time of my life, been employed in promoting its extension; never engaged in any either of its general or its local controversies. In the question of attendance at this church or that, I have never been governed by the abundance or the scantiness of its ritual, which I regard purely as an instrument, aiming at an end; as one of many instruments, and not as the first among them. To uphold the integrity of the Christian dogma, to trace its working, and to exhibit its adaptation to human thought and human welfare, in all the varying experience of the ages, is, in my view, perhaps the noblest of all tasks which it is given to the human mind to pursue. This is the guardianship of the great fountain of human hope, happiness,

and virtue. But with respect to the clothing, which the Gospel may take to itself, my mind has a large margin of indulgence, if not of laxity, both ways. Much is to be allowed, I can hardly say how much, to national, sectional, and personal divergences, and to me it is indeed grievous to think that any range of liberty in these respects, which was respected during the storms of the sixteenth century should be denounced and threatened in the comparative calm of the nineteenth. Reverence, indeed, is a thing indispensable and invaluable; but reverence is one thing, and ritual another; and while reverence is preserved, I would never, according to my own inclination individually, quarrel with my brother about ritual. Nothing, therefore, would be easier than for me, after the manner of those who affect impartiality, to censure sharply the faults which, from our elevated point of view, we detect on both sides. Nothing easier, but few things more mischievous; for what is impartiality between the two, is often gross partiality and one-sidedness in the judgment of each, by reason of its ruthlessly shutting out of view those kernels of truth which are probably on both sides to be found under the respective husks of warring prejudice.

Without, however, any assumption of the tone of the critic or the pedagogue, there is one recommendation which may be addressed to both parties in the controversy of ritualism. They should surely be exhorted to cease altogether, or at least to reduce to its minimum, the practice of importing into questions concerning the externals of religion the element of doctrinal significance. The phrase is borrowed from a pamphlet by Dr. Trevor,

"Trevor's Disputed Rubrics" (Parker), pp. 13 and *seqq.*

which bears the stamp, not only of ability, but of an independent mind. The topic is, in my belief, of deep moment. It cannot, perhaps, be more effectively illustrated than by a reference to the particular article of ritual which has been, more than any other, the subject of recent contest—namely, the question whether, during the prayer of consecration in the Office of Communion, the priest shall stand with his face towards the East, or towards the South.

By some mental process, which it seems difficult for an unbiassed understanding to comprehend, a controversy, which may almost be called furious, has been raised on this matter. It of course transcends—indeed, it almost scorns—the bounds of the narrower question, whether the one or the other posture is agreeable, or, as may perhaps better be said, is more agreeable, to the legal prescriptions of the rubrics. For it is held, and held on both sides by persons not inconsiderable either in weight or number, that, if the priest looks eastwards at this point of the service, he thereby affirms the doctrines of the Real Presence and the Eucharistic Sacrifice, but that, if on the contrary he takes his place at the north end of the altar or table, he thereby puts a negative on those doctrines. If the truth of this contention be admitted, without doubt the most formidable consequences may then be apprehended from any possible issue of the debate. It is idle to hope that even judges can preserve the balance of their minds when the air comes to be so thickly charged with storm. We may say almost with certainty that there are many now reckoned as members of the Church of England, whom, on the one side, the affirmation of those principles would distract and might displace, while, on the other, their negation would precipitate a schism of an enduring character. But if this be even partially true, does it not elevate into an imperious duty, for all right-minded men, that which is in itself a rule of reason—namely, that we should steadily resolve not to annex to any particular acts of external usage a special dogmatic interpretation, so long as they will naturally and unconstrainedly bear some sense not entailing that consequence?

Now, it seems pretty evident that, in the present instance, the contentions of each of the two parties are perfectly capable of being explained and supported upon grounds having no reference to the doctrines, with which they have been somewhat wilfully placed in a connection as stringent, and perhaps as perilous, as that of the folds of the boa-constrictor. Take, for example, the case in favour of what we may be allowed to call orientation. The bishops of the Savoy Conference laid down the principle, as one founded in general propriety and reason, that when the minister addresses the people he should turn himself towards them, as, for example, in preaching or in reading the lessons from Holy Scripture; but that when, for and with them, he addresses himself to God, there is solecism and incongruity in his being placed as if he were addressing them. The natural course, then, they held to be, that congregation and minister, engaged in a common act, should, unless conformity between the inward and the outward is to be entirely expelled from the regulation of human demeanour, look together in a common direction. When this is done by a clergyman reading the Litany at a faldstool, he commonly turns his back on part of the congregation, and part of the congregation on him. When the same rule is followed in the prayer of consecration, the back of the clergyman is turned towards the entire congregation only from the circumstance that he officiates at the extreme East end of the church. The proper idea of the position is, not that he turns his back on the congregation, but that, placed at the head of the congregation, and acting for as well as with them in the capacity of the public organ of the assembled flock, he and they all turn in the same direction, and his back is towards the whole only as the back of the first line of worshippers behind him is towards all their fellow-worshippers. He simply does that, which every one does in

sitting or standing at the head of a column or body of men. And if he be a believer in the Real Presence and the Eucharistic Sacrifice, woe be to him in that capacity, unless he has some other and firmer defence for these doctrines than the assumed symbolism of an attitude that he shares with so many Protestant clergymen of Continental Europe, who are known to be bound but little to the first, and are generally adverse to the second of these doctrines. Thus, then, we have, in a particular view of the mere proprieties of the case, a perfectly adequate explanation of the desire to assume the eastward position, without any reference whatever to any given doctrinal significance, be it cherished or be it obnoxious. Let us now turn to the other side of the question, and see whether similar reasoning will not hold good.

It does not follow, upon the expulsion of this transcendental element from the discussion, that the objector to the plan of facing eastwards is left without a case, which again is one of simple policy and expediency, from his own point of view. He may, like many of his countrymen, be so wanting in the rudiments of the æsthetic sense, as to think that the most advantageous position for a Christian pastor towards the people is that in which he speaks all the prayers straight into their faces, and the best arrangement for the flock that of the double pews, in which they are set to look at one another through the service, in order to correct, by mutual contemplation, any excessive tendency to rapt and collected devotion. But it is not necessary to impute to him this irrational frame of mind. He may admit that in the act of prayer, as a rule, minister and people may advantageously look in the same direction. He may renounce the imputation upon his adversaries that, by facing eastwards, they express adhesion to certain doctrines. And he may still point out that there is more to be said. The prayer of consecration is a prayer not of petition only, but of action too. In the course of it, by no less than five parenthetical rubrics, the priest is directed to perform as many manual acts; and, quite apart from the legal argument that the reference in the principal rubric to breaking the bread before the people requires the action to be performed in their view, he may contend, if he thinks fit, that for the better comprehension of the service, it is well that they should have the power of seeing all that is required of the priest respecting the handling of the sacred elements, and that this cannot be seen, or cannot so well be seen, if he faces eastwards, as if, standing at the north end of the holy table, he faces towards the south. I do not enter into the question whether this argument be conclusive, either as to the legal interpretation of the rubric, with which at present we have nothing to do, or as to the advantage of actual view and the comparative facilities for allowing it. It is enough to show that arguments may be made in perfect good faith, and free from anything irrational, against as well as for the eastward position, without embracing the embittering element of doctrinal significance; that both from the one side and the other the question may be reasonably debated on general grounds of religious expediency. For if this be so, it becomes in a high degree impolitic, and very injurious to the interests of religion, to fasten upon these questions of position, whether in the sense of approval or of repudiation, significations which they do not require, and which they will only so far bear that, by prejudice or association, we can in any given case assign to words and things a colour they do not of themselves possess. There are surely enough real occasions for contention in the world to satisfy the most greedy appetite, without adding to them those which are conventional; that is to say, those where the contention is not upon the things themselves, but upon the constructions which prejudice or passion may attach to them. Surely if a Zuinglian could persuade himself that the English Communion Office was founded upon the basis of Zuinglian ideas, he would act weakly and inconsistently should he renounce the ministry of the Church because he was ordered to face eastwards during the prayer of consecration; and at least as surely would one, believing in the Catholic and primitive character of the office, be open to similar blame if he in like manner repudiated his function as a priest upon being required to take his place only on the North. Preferences for the one or the other position it is easy to conceive. To varying ideas of worship—and in these later times the idea of worship does materially vary—the one or the other may seem, or may even be, more thoroughly conformable; but strange indeed, in my view, must be the composition of the mind which can deliberately judge that the position at the North end is in itself irreverent, or that facing towards the East is in itself superstitious. Both cannot be right in a dispute, but both may be wrong; and one of the many ways in which this comes about is when the thing contended for is, by a common consent in error, needlessly lifted out of the region of things indifferent into that of things essential, and a distinction, founded originally on the phantasy of man, becomes the *articulus stantis aut cadentis concordie*.

It sometimes seems as though, even in the tumult of the Reformation, when the fountains of the great deep were broken up, the general mind must yet have been more solid and steadier, perhaps even more charitable, than now; though the edge of controversies at that epoch was physical as well as moral, and involved, at every sweep of the weapon, national defence and the personal safety or peril of life and limb. Members of the Church of England, even now somewhat irreverent as a body with reference to kneeling in ordinary worship, are nevertheless all content to kneel in the act of receiving the Holy Communion; a most becoming, most soothing, most fraternal usage. General censure would descend upon the man who should attempt to disturb it by alleging that this humble attitude of obeisance too much favoured the idea of paying worship to the consecrated elements. No less certainly, and even more sharply, would he be condemned who, himself believing in the Real

Presence, should endeavour to force it home on others as the only key to the meaning of the usage. But who can fail to see that for minds, I will not say jaundiced, but preoccupied with the disposition to attach extreme constructions to outward acts in the direction in which they seem to lean, nothing is more easy than to annex to the kneeling attitude of the receiver in the Holy Eucharist the colour and idea of adoration of the consecrated elements? So, also, nothing would be more difficult than, when once such a colour has been so annexed, again to detach it effectually, and thus to bring the practice to an equitable judgment. Yet the Church of England, which has unitedly settled down upon the question of kneeling at reception, has resolutely thrust aside the extreme construction, through which a baleful concurrence of opposing partisans might have rendered it intolerable. And this she did, carrying the practice itself without shock or hesitation through all the fluctuations of her Liturgy, during times when theological controversy was exasperated by every mundane passion which either the use of force, or its anticipation, can arouse. It will indeed be strange—should we not rather say it will indeed be shameful—if, after conducting the desperate struggles of the Reformation to their issue, and when we have realized its moral and social fruits for three centuries and a half, we prove to be so much less wise and less forbearing than our less civilized and refined forefathers, that we are to be led, by an aggravated misuse of this practice of gratuitous construction, to create a breach upon a question so much less difficult, so much less calling for or warranting extreme issues, than that which they proved themselves able to accommodate?

It may indeed be said, and not untruly, that in a certain sense both the friends and the adversaries of the practice I have been considering are agreed in attaching to it the meaning I presume to deprecate. Where both parties to a suit are agreed, it is idle, we may be told, to dispute what they concur in. Now the very point I desire to bring into clear view is that this is not a suit with two parties to it, but that many, perhaps most, of those who are entitled to be heard, are not before the court; many, aye multitudes, who think either this question should be let alone, or that if it is not let alone, it should be decided upon dry and cold considerations of law, history, and science, so far as they are found to inhere in it; not judged by patches of glaring colour, the symbols of party, which are fastened upon it from without. If this be a just view, the concurrence of the two parties named above in their construction of the eastward position is no better a reason for the acquiescence of the dispassionate community, than the agreement of two boys at school or in the street to fight, in order to ascertain who is the strongest, is a reason against the interference of bystanders to stop them if they can.

There is in political life a practice analogous, as it seems to me, to the practice of needlessly importing doctrinal significance into discussions upon ceremonial. It is indeed a very common fashion to urge that something, in itself good and allowable, has become bad and inadmissible on account of motives imputed to those who ask it. The Reforms proposed in 1831 and 1866 were not to be conceded, because they would be used as levers for ulterior extensions of the franchise. The Irish Church was not to be disestablished, because the change would serve as an argument for disestablishing the Church of England. Irish public-houses must not be closed on Sunday where the people desire it, for fear the measure should bring about a similar closing in England, where public opinion is not ripe for it. But then, in the secular world, this very practice is taken as the indication of an illiberal mind, and a short-sighted policy. The truly liberal maxim has ever been that by granting just claims you disarm undue demands: that things should be judged as they are in themselves, and not in the extraneous considerations, and remote eventualities, which sanguine friends and bitter foes oftentimes agree in annexing to them. It is, therefore, with unfeigned surprise, that I read in the work of no mean writer on this rubrical controversy, that in May last he "prayed" that the priest might be allowed to face eastwards, but that he would now refuse it, because "this eastward position is claimed for distinctively doctrinal purposes." I am reluctant to cite a respected name, but it is necessary to give the means of verifying my statement by a reference to Dr. Swainson's "Rubrical Question of 1874,"

But, at p. 70, Dr. Swainson, with great candour, states that, if the law be declared adversely to his view, he will at once renounce this imputation of doctrinal significance.

pp. 1, 5. I might, I believe, add other instances of the same unfortunate line of thought; but it is needless, and I gladly refrain.

What, then, is the upshot of this extraordinary preference of the worse over the better, the more arbitrary over the direct and inherent construction? It is this, that it heats the blood and quickens the zeal of sympathizing partisans. But then it has exactly the same effect upon the partisans of the two opposite opinions. So that it widens breaches, feeds the spirit of mutual defiance, and affords, like abundant alcohol, an intoxicating satisfaction, to be followed by the remorse of the morrow when the mischief has been done. It enhances the difficulties of the Judge's task, and makes hearty acquiescence in his decisions almost hopeless.

Wherever this importation of doctrinal significance, I care not from which side, has been effected, it powerfully tends to persuade the worsted party that the law has been strained against him on grounds extraneous to the argument, and to drive him either upon direct disobedience, or upon circuitous modes of counteracting the operation of any Judgment given. Those against whom the letter of the law seems to be turned invidiously, are apt to think they may freely and justly avail themselves of it wherever it is in their favour.

Supposing, for example, that, by a judgment appearing to rest on considerations of policy and not of law, the eastward position were to be condemned, who does not see that those who thought themselves wronged might discover ample means of compensation? Some have contended that the clergy, sustained by their flocks, might retrench the services of the parish church; and that, offering within its walls a minimum both of ritual and of the opportunities of worship, they might elsewhere institute and attend services which, under a recent Statute (18 & 19 Vict. c. 86), they believe they might carry on without being subject to the restraints of the Act of Uniformity. I am not aware that this contention can be confuted. If not, it opens to view a real and serious danger.

Or again, in the churches themselves, where the clergyman was forbidden to adopt a position construed as implying an excessive reverence, not he only, but, with certain immunity from consequences, his congregation might, and, probably would, resort to other external acts, at least as effectual for the same purpose, much more closely related to doctrinal significance, much more conspicuous in themselves, and, perhaps, much more offensive to fellow-worshippers, than the position which had been prohibited. What, upon either of these suppositions, would have been gained by the most signal victory in the courts, either for truth or for peace, or even for the feelings and objects of those who would be called the winners?

I have dwelt at length on this particular subject, not because I imagine the foregoing remarks to offer a solution of existing difficulties, but in order to point out and to avert, if possible, what would make a solution impossible. The very first condition of healthy thought and action is an effort at self-mastery, and the expulsion, from the controversies concerning certain rubrics, of considerations which aggravate those controversies into hopelessness, and which seem to dwell in them, as demons dwelt in the bodies of the possessed, till they were expelled by the beneficent Saviour, and left the sufferers at length restored to their right mind. If we cannot fulfil this first condition of sanity, it is, I fear, hopeless to expect that the day of doom for the Established Church of England can be long postponed. It is bad enough, in my opinion, that we should have to adjust these difficulties by the necessarily rude and coarse machinery of Courts of law. I do not disguise my belief, founded on very long and rather anxious observation, that the series of penal proceedings in the English Church during the last forty years, which, virtually though not technically, began with the action of the University of Oxford against Bishop Hampden, have as a whole been mischievous. I make no accusation, in speaking thus, against those who have promoted them. I will not say that they have been without provocation, that they could easily have been avoided, that they have been dishonourably instituted, or even vindictively pursued. I do not inquire whether, when they have been strictly judicial, they have or have not generally added to the fame of our British Judicature for power or for learning. Unhappily they came upon a country little conversant with theological, historical, or ecclesiastical science, and a country which had not been used for three hundred years, with the rarest exceptions, to raise these questions before the tribunals. The only one of them, in which I have taken a part, was the summary proceeding of the Council of King's College against Mr. Maurice. I made an ineffectual endeavour, with the support of Judge Patteson and Sir B. Brodie, and the approval of Bishop Blomfield, to check what seemed to me the unwise and ruthless vehemence of the majority which dismissed that gentleman from his office. It may be that, in this or that particular case, a balance of good over evil may have resulted. It could not but be that in particular instances some who would not have wished them to be instituted, could not wish them to fail. But I have very long been convinced that, as a whole, they have exasperated strife and not composed it; have tempted men to employ a substitute, at once violent and inefficient, for moral and mental force; have aggravated perils which they were honestly intended to avert; have impaired confidence, and shaken the fabric of the Church to its foundations.

The experience of half a century ago may, in part, serve to illustrate an opinion which may have startled many of my readers, but which long ago I for one entertained and made known in quarters of great influence. Nothing could be sharper than was at that time the animosity of Churchmen in general against what are termed Evangelical opinions. There was language used about them and their proposers in works of authority—such, for instance, as certain tracts of the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge—which was not only insolent, but almost libellous. But it seems that the Church took to heart the wise counsel which Athenè offered to Achilles, that he should abuse Agamemnon, but not touch him. "Fall foul of him with words, as much as you have a mind: but keep your sword within the scabbard."

II. i. 210.

The sword, at that period of our Church history, was never drawn; and the controversy settled itself in an advantageous way. Are we driven to admit that there was, among the rulers and the ruled of those days, more of patience, or of faith in moral force, or both; more of the temper of Gamaliel, and less of the temper of Said?

At a later date, it is true that Bishop Philpotts broke the tradition of this pacific policy in the case of Mr. Gorham. But all who knew that remarkable Prelate are aware that he was a man of sole action, rather than of counsel and concert; and it was an individual, not a body, that was responsible for striking the blow, of which the recoil so seriously strained the Church of England.

While frankly avowing the estimate I form of the results which have flowed from these penal proceedings

in matter belonging to law undoubtedly, but to conscience as well as law, I am far from believing that the public as yet fully shares these views. I must suppose, especially after the legislative proceedings of last year, that my countrymen are well satisfied with the general or average results, and have detected in them what my eyesight has not perceived—a tendency to compose the troubles, and consolidate the fabric, of the Church. My ambition does not, then, soar so high as to ask for a renunciation of the comforts and advantages of religious litigation. All that I am now contending for is that the suits which may be raised ought not to be embittered by the opening of sources of exasperation that do not properly belong to them; that contribute absolutely nothing to the legal argument on either side for the elucidation of the rubrics; and that, on the contrary, by inflaming passion, and suggesting prejudice, darken and weaken the intellects, while they excite the sensibilities, of all concerned.

If, as I hope, I may have carried with me some degree of concurrence in the main proposition I have thus far urged, let us now turn to survey a wider prospect. Let us look for a while at the condition of the English Church—its fears and dangers on the one hand, its powers and capacities on the other; and let us then ask ourselves whether duty binds and prudence recommends us to tear it in pieces, or to hold it together.

It is necessary first to free the inquiry from a source of verbal misunderstanding. In one and the same body, we see two aspects, two characters, perfectly distinct. That body declares herself, and is supposed by the law of the country to be, the ancient and Catholic Church of the country, while it is also the national Establishment of Religion. In the first capacity, it derives its lineage and commission from our Saviour and the Apostles; in the second, it is officered and controlled by the State. We may speak of holding the Church together, or of holding the Church and the State together. I am far from placing the two duties on the same ground, or assigning to them a common elevation. Yet the subjects are, in a certain form, closely connected; and the form is this. It may be that the continuing union of the Church within herself will not secure without limit the continuing union of the Church with the State. But it is certain, nevertheless, that the splitting of the Church will destroy its union with the State. Not only as a Church, but as an endowed Establishment, it is, without doubt, still very strong. Sir Robert Peel said, over a quarter of a century ago, in discussing the emancipation of the Jews, that the only dangers of the Church consisted in its internal divisions. Within that quarter of a century the dangers have increased, but with them has probably increased also the strength to bear them. Menace and peril from without, against the Church as an Establishment, have made ground, but are still within measure. They still represent a minor, not a major, social force; though they are seconded by a general movement of the time, very visible in other countries, and apparently pervading Christendom at large, yet with a current certainly slow, perhaps indefinitely slow. But though the Church may be possessed of a sufficient fund of strength, there is no redundancy that can be safely parted with. Any secession, if of sensible amount, constituting itself into a separate body, would operate on the National Church, with reference to its nationality, like a rent in a wall, which is mainly important, not by the weight of material it detaches, but by the discontinuity it leaves.

It is not, indeed, only the severance of the Church into two bodies which might precipitate disestablishment. Obstinacy and exasperation of internal strife might operate yet more effectively towards the same end. The renewal of scenes and occurrences like those of the session of 1874 would be felt, even more heavily than on that first occasion, to involve not only pain, but degradation. The disposition of some to deny to the members of the National Church the commonest privileges belonging to a religious communion, the determination of others to cancel her birthright for a mess of pottage, the natural shrinking of the better and more refined minds from indecent conflict, the occasional exhibition of cynicism, presumption, ignorance, and contumely, were, indeed, relieved by much genial good sense and good feeling, found, perhaps, not least conspicuously among those, who were by religious profession most widely severed from the National Church. But the mischief of one can inflict wounds on a religious body, which the abstinence and silent disapproval of a hundred cannot heal; and, unless an English spirit has departed wholly from the precincts of the English Church, she will, when the outrage to feeling grows unendurable, at least in the persons of the most high-minded among her children, absolutely decline the degrading relation to which not a few seem to think her born. I pass, then, to consider whether it be a duty or not to keep the Church united, with the negative assumption implied in these remarks, that without such union there cannot be a reasonable hope of saving the Establishment.

But it may be said, what is this internal union of the Church, which is professed to be of such value? We have within it men who build, or suppose themselves to build, their religion only upon their private judgment, unequally yoked with those who acknowledge the guiding value of Christian history and witness; men who believe in a visible Church, and men who do not; men who desire a further Reformation, and men who think the Reformation we have had already went too far; men who think a Church exists for the custody and teaching of the truth, and men who view it as a magazine for the collection and parade of all sorts of opinions, to meet the tastes of all sorts of customers. Nay, besides all this, are there not those who, with such concealment only as prudence may require, question the authority of Holy Scripture, and doubt, or dissolve into misty figure, even

the cardinal facts of our redemption enshrined in the Apostles' Creed? What union, compatible with the avowed or unavowed existence of these diversities, can deserve the name, or can be worth paying a price to maintain?

Now, before we examine the value or no value of this union, the first question is—does it exist, and how and where does it exist, as a fact? It does; and it is to be found in the common law, common action and history, common worship, and probably, above all, the common Manual of worship, in the Church. Though it is accompanied with many divergencies of dogmatic leaning, and though these differences are often prosecuted with a lamentable bitterness, yet in the law, the history, the worship, and the Manual, they have a common centre, to which, upon the whole, all, or nearly all, the members of the body are really and strongly, though it may be not uniformly nor altogether consistently, attached, and which is at once distinctive, and in its measure efficient. Nay, more, it has been stated in public, and I incline to believe with truth, that the rubrics of the Church are at this moment more accurately followed than at any period of her history since the Reformation. Twelve months ago I scandalized the tender consciences of some by pointing out that in a law which combined the three conspicuous features of being extremely minute, very ancient, and in its essence not prohibitive but directory, absolute and uniform obedience was hardly to be expected, perhaps, in the strict meaning of the terms, hardly even to be desired. I admit the scandals of division, and the greater scandals of dissension; but there are, as I believe, fifteen millions of people in this country who have not thrown off their allegiance to its Church, and these people, when they speak of it, to a great extent mean the same thing, and, when they resort to it, willingly concur in the same acts; willingly, on the whole, though the different portions of them each abate something from their individual preferences to meet on common ground, as Tories, Whigs, and Radicals do the like, to meet on the common ground of our living and working constitution. This union, then, I hold to be a fact, and I contend that it is a fact worth preserving. I do not beg that question: I only aver that it is the question really at issue; and I ask that it may be dispassionately considered, for many questions of conduct depend upon it.

The duty of promoting union in religion is elevated by special causes at the present day into a peculiar solemnity; while these causes also envelop it in an extraordinary intricacy. The religion of Christ as a whole, nay, even the pallid scheme of Theism, is assailed with a sweep and vehemence of hostility greater probably than at any former period. While the war thus rages without the wall, none can say that the reciprocal antagonism of Christian bodies is perceptibly mitigated within it, or that the demarcating spaces between them are narrower than they were. Most singular of all, the greatest of the Christian communions, to say nothing of the smaller, are agitated singly and severally by the presence or proximity of internal schism. The Papal Church has gone to war with portions of its adherents in Armenia, in Germany, in Italy, in Switzerland, and elsewhere; besides being in conflict with the greater number of Christian States, especially of those where the Roman religion is professed. The relations of the Church of England beyond St. George's Channel, however euphemistically treated in some quarters, are dark, and darkening still. Even the immovable East is shaken. The Slavonic, and the Hellenic, or non-Slavonic, elements are at present, though without doctrinal variance, yet in sharp ecclesiastical contention; and a formidable schism in Bulgaria, not discountenanced by Russian influences, disturbs at its own doors the ancient and venerable See of Constantinople, with its sister Patriarchates. This is a rude and slight, but I believe an accurate outline. I do not say it carries us beyond, but it certainly carries up to this point: that now, more than ever, our steps should be wary and our heads cool, and that, if we should not disguise the full significance of controversies, neither should we aggravate them by pouring Cayenne pepper into every open wound.

I do not say that, in circumstances like these, it becomes the duty of each man to sacrifice everything for the internal unity of his own communion. When that communion, by wanton innovation, betrays its duty, and aggravates the controversies of Christendom, the very best friend to its eventual unity may be he who at all hazards, and to all lengths, resists the revolutionary change. But it would seem that in all cases where the religious body to which we belong has not set up the *petra scandali*, the presumptive duty of the individual who remains in its communion, to study its peace, is enhanced. Nowhere, in my view, does this proposition apply with such force as to the case of the English Church. This Church and nation, by an use of their reforming powers, upon the whole wonderfully temperate, found for themselves, amidst the tempests of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a haven of comparative tranquillity, from which, for more than two centuries, they have not been dislodged. Within this haven it has, especially of late years, been amply proved that every good work of the Divine Kingdom may be prosecuted with effect, and every quality that enlarges and ennobles human character may be abundantly reared. I do not now speak of our British Nonconformists, for whom I entertain a very cordial respect: I confine myself to what is still the National Church; and I earnestly urge it upon all her members that the more they study her place and function in Christendom, the more they will find that her unity, qualified but real, is worth preserving.

I will dwell but very lightly on the arguments which sustain this conclusion. They refer first to the national office of this great institution. It can hardly be described better than in a few words which I extract from a

recent article in the *Edinburgh Review*:—

"The crown and flower of such a movement was the Elizabethan Church of England. There the watchword was never destruction or innovation; there a simple, Scriptural, Catholic, and objective teaching has preserved us from superstitious and dogmatic vagaries on the one hand, and from the subjective weakness of many of the Protestant sects on the other. To the formation of such a Church the nation gave its strength and its intelligence, viz., that of the idea of More (?), of Shakespeare, and of Bacon; and what is more, the whole nation contributed its good sense, its sobriety, its steadfastness, and its appreciation of a manly and regulated freedom."—*Edinburgh, Review, April, 1875, p. 574.*

There are those who think that bold changes in the law and constitution of the Church, in the direction of developed Protestantism, would bring within its borders a larger proportion of the people. My own opinion is the reverse of this. I look upon any changes whatever, especially of the Prayer-Book, if sensible in amount and contentious in character, as simply synonymous with the destruction of the National Establishment. But the matter is one of opinion only; and I fully admit the title of the nation to make any such changes, if they think fit, with such a purpose in view.

But, besides her national office and capabilities, the Church of England, in her higher character as a form of the Christian religion, has a position at once most perilous and most precious (I here borrow the well-known expression of De Maistre) with reference to Christendom at large. She alone, of all Churches, has points of contact, of access, of sympathy, touching upon all the important sections of the Christian commonwealth. Liable, more than any other religious body, to see her less stable or more fastidious members drop off from her now in this direction and now in that, she is, nevertheless, in a partial but not an unreal sense, a link of union between the several fractions of the Christian body. At every point of her frontier, she is in close competition with the great Latin communion, and with the varied, active, and in no way other than respectable, forms of Nonconformity. Nor does this represent the whole of the danger which, as to her sectional interests, she daily suffers in detail. She inhabits a sphere of greater social activity than is found in any other country of Europe; she is in closer neighbourhood, throughout her structure, than any other Church, with the spirit of inquiry (I do not say of research), and is proportionably more liable to defections in the direction of unbelief, or, if that word be invidious, of non-belief or negation. But this great amount of actual peril and besetting weakness is, in at least a corresponding degree, potential force and usefulness, for others as well as for herself; and no philosophic observer, whatever be his leanings, can exclude her from a prominent place in his survey of Christendom.

These things, it seems to me, are not enough considered among us. If they were enough considered, we should be less passionate in our internal controversies. We should recollect that we hold what all admit to be a middle place; that the strain, as in a wheel, is greatest at the centre, the tendency to dislocation there most difficult to subdue. So we should more contentedly accept the burdens of the position, for the sake of the high, disinterested, and beneficent mission with which they seem to be allied. Even if I am wrong in the persuasion that much ought to be borne rather than bring about a rupture, I can hardly be wrong in claiming the assent of all to the proposition that we had better not prosecute our controversies wildly and at haphazard, but that we should carefully examine, before each step is taken, what other steps it will bring after it, and what consequences the series may as a whole involve.

I am quite aware of the answer which will spring to the lips of some. "The object of the long series of prosecutions, and of the Act of 1874, is to cut out a gangrene from the Church of England; to defeat a conspiracy which aims at reversing the movement of the Reformation, and at remodelling her tenets, her worship, and her discipline, on the basis of the Papal Church: aye, even with all the aggravations of her earlier system, which that Church has in the latter times adopted." But the answer to this answer is again perfectly ready. If there be within the Church of England a section of clergy or of laity, which is engaged in such a conspiracy, it is one extremely, almost infinitesimally small. I do not now deal with the very different charge against doctrines and practices which are said to *tend* towards the Church of Rome. This charge was made against Laud by the Puritans, and is made against the Prayer-Book at large by our Nonconforming friends, or by very many of them.

These allegations did not commence with the revivals of our time. See for example the following extract from "The Catholic Question: addressed to the Freeholders of the County of York;" on the General Election of 1826: p. 24.

"All these things, however, are visible in the Church of England: go to a cathedral, hear and see all the magnificent things done there: behold the regiments of wax tapers, the white-robed priests, the mace-bearers; the chaunters, the picture over the altar, the wax-lights and the burnished gold plates and cups on the altar; then listen to the prayers repeated in chaunt, the anthems, the musical responses, the thundering of the organ and the echoes of the interminable roof; and then say, is not this idolatry? it is all the idolatry that the Catholics admit; it is the natural inclination that we have to those weak and beggarly elements, pomp and pride; and which both

Catholics and the High Church party think so important in religion. I boldly assert that there is more idolatry in the Church of England than amongst the English Catholics; and for this simple reason, because the Church of England can better afford it.. Two-thirds of the Church service is pomp and grandeur; it is as Charles II. used to say, 'the service of gentlemen.' It is for show, and for a striking impression; the cathedral service *is nothing more or less than a mass*, for it is all chaunted from beginning to end, and the people cannot understand a word of it."

My point is that those, who *aim* at Romanizing the Church, are at worst a handful. If, then, the purpose be to put them down, isolate them; attack them (since you think it worth while) in the points they distinctively profess and practise. But is this the course actually taken? Are these points the subjects of the recent prosecutions, of the present threats, of the crowd of pamphlets and volumes upon ritual controversy, which daily issue from the press? On the contrary, these prosecutions, these menaces, these voluminous productions, have always for their main, and often for their exclusive, subject the two points of Church law which relate to the position of the consecrator, and to the rubric on ecclesiastical vestments. But now we arrive at a formidable dilemma. Upon the construction of the law on these two points, the prosecuting parties are at variance, not with a handful, but with a very large number, with thousands and tens of thousands, both of the clergy and the laity of the Church of England, whose averments I understand to be these: first, that the law of 1662, fairly interpreted, enjoins the vestments of the First Prayer Book of Edward VI., and the eastward position of the consecrating priest; secondly, that it would be inequitable and unwise to enforce these laws, and that the prevailing liberty should continue; thirdly, that it would be inequitable and unwise to alter them. Are these propositions conclusive evidence of a conspiracy to assimilate the Reformed religion of England to the Papal Church? If they are not, why is the war to be conducted mainly, and thus hotly, in the region they define? If they are, then our position is one of great danger, because it is well known that a very large and very weighty portion of the clergy, with no inconsiderable number of the laity, proceeding upon various grounds—love of ritual, love of liberty, dread of rupture—are arrayed on the side of toleration against the prosecuting party. It is said to have been declared by persons in high authority, that a large portion of both clergy and laity do entertain the desire to Romanize the Church. I am convinced it is not so; but if it be so, our condition is indeed formidable, and we are preparing to "shoot Niagara." For I hold it to be beyond dispute that, whether minor operations of the knife be or be not safe for us, large excisions, large amputations, are what the constitution of the patient will not bear. Under them the Establishment will part into shreds; and even the Church may undergo sharp and searching consequences, which as yet it would be hardly possible to forecast, either in principle or detail.

For the avoidance of these dangers, my long cherished conviction still subsists that the best and most effectual remedy is to be found in more largely forbearing to raise contentious issues, and in ceasing to aim at ruling consciences by courts. I say this is the most effectual remedy. For the next best, which is that the parties shall, after full and decisive exposition of the law, submit to the sentence of the tribunals, is manifestly at the least incomplete. The prosecuting party, in the two matters of the Rubric on Vestments and the position of the consecrating minister, will doubtless submit to an adverse judgment; but will as certainly, and not without reason from its own point of view, transfer to the legislative arena the agitations of the judicial forum. The Dean of Bristol, who has argued these questions with his usual force and directness, wishes that no alterations should be made in the rubrics, if what is called the Purchas judgment be maintained; but, with his acute eye, he has perhaps shrewd suspicions on that subject; and accordingly he says, if that judgment be not maintained, he is "for such wide agitation, such strong and determined measures, as shall compel [*sic*] the Legislature to give back to the Church its old and happy character of purity."

Letter to Rev. Mr. Walker, pp. 23—26.

A pleasant prospect for our old age! But the Dean has this advantage over me. He does not object to the *voies de fait*, and, if only the judgment goes his way, will be quite happy. I am one of those who have the misfortune of being like Falkland in the war of King and Parliament: I shall deplore all disturbing Judgments on the points in question, wholly irrespective of my own sympathies or antipathies. If the prosecutors are defeated, who are strongly (to use a barbarous word) establishmentarian, we shall have agitation for a change in the law, too likely to end in rupture. If they succeed (which I own I find it very difficult to anticipate), we shall have exaggerated but unassailable manifestations of the feeling it has been sought to put down; and, while this is the employment of the *interim*, the party hit, who are by no means so closely tied to the alliance of the Church with the State, will, despairing of any other settlement, seek peace through its dissolution.

It may now perhaps in some degree appear why I have pressed so earnestly the severance of these rubrical suits from "doctrinal significance." Could we but expel that noxious element from the debate, could we but see that the two conflicting views of the position and the vestments are just as capable, to say the least, of a large and innocuous as of a specific and contentious interpretation, then we might hope to see therewith a frame of mind among the litigators, capable of acquiescence in any judgment which they believe to be upright, and to be

given after full consideration of the case. Soreness there might be, and murmuring; but good sense might prevail, and the mischief would be limited within narrow bounds. But unhappily men of no small account announce that they care not for the sign, they must deal with the thing signified. They desire the negation by authority of the doctrine of the Real Presence of our Lord and Saviour Christ, and of the Eucharistic Sacrifice; negations which, again, are synonymous with the disruption of the English Church.

When prudent men, or men made prudent by responsibility, are associated together for given purposes, whether in a cabinet, or a synod, or a committee, or a board, and they find their union menaced by differences of opinion, they are wont first to test very fully the minds of one another by argument and persuasion. Failing these instruments, both the instinct of self-preservation and the laws of duty combine in prompting them to put off the evil day, and thus to take the benefit of enlarged information, of fresh experience, of the softening influences of association, and of whatever other facilities of solution the unrevealed future may embrace. Why can we not carry a little of this forbearance, founded upon common sense, into religion, and at least fetch our controversies out of the torrid into the temperate zone?

The time may, and I hope will, arrive, when a spirit of more diffusive charity, a wider acquaintance with the language and history of Christian dogma, and a less jealous temper of self-assertion, will enable us to perceive how much of what divides us in the Eucharistic controversy is no better and no worse than logomachy, and how capable men, ridding them-selves of the subtleties of the schools and eschewing heated reactions, may solve what passion and faction have often declared insoluble.

But that time has not yet arrived; and, if the doctrine of the Eucharist must really be recast, there are no alternatives before us except on the one hand disruption, on the other postponement of the issue until we can approach it under happier auspices. The auspices are not happy now. There are even those in the English Church who urge with sincerity, and without being questioned by authority, the duty of preaching the "Real Absence,"

Rev. Mr. Wolfe on the "Eastward Position," p. 4.

and, though these be few, yet some who shrink from the word may be nearly with them in the thing. On the other side, wholly apart from the energy of partisanship, from a Romanizing disposition, and from a desire for the exaltation of an order, there are multitudes of men who can patiently endure differences which they believe to be provisional, and adjourn their settlement to a future day; but who believe that the lowering of the sacramental doctrine of the English Church, in any of its parts, will involve, together with a real mutilation of Scriptural and Catholic truth, a loss of her Christian dignity, and a forfeiture of all the hopes associated with her special position in Christendom. Of all sacramental doctrine, none is so tender in this respect as that which relates to the Eucharist. The gross abuses of practice, and the fanciful excesses of theological speculation in the Western Church before the Reformation, compelled the Anglican Reformers to retrench their statements to a minimum, which can bear no reduction, whether in the shape of altered formulas, or of binding constructions. If, in these times of heat, we abandon the wise self-restraint which in the main has up to a recent time prevailed, it is too probable that wanton tongues, prompted by ill-trained minds, may reciprocally launch their reproaches of superstition and idolatry, on the one hand, of heresy and unbelief on the other. Surely prudence would dictate that in these circumstances all existing latitude of law or well-established practice should as a rule be respected; that no conscience be pressed by new theological tests, either of word or action; and that we should prefer the hope of a peaceful understanding, in some even distant future, to the certainty of a ruinous discord as the fruit of precipitancy and violent courses. One of the strangest freaks of human inconsistency I have ever witnessed is certainly this. We are much (and justly) reminded, with reference to those beyond our pale, to think little of our differences and much of our agreements; but at the same time, and often from the same quarters, we are taught and tempted by example if not by precept, within our own immediate "household of faith," to think incessantly of our differences, and not at all of our much more substantial and weighty agreements.

The proposition, then, on which I desire to dwell as the capital and cardinal point of the case is, that heavy will be the blame to those, be they who they may, who may at this juncture endeavour, whether by legislation or by judicial action, and whether by alteration of phrases or by needlessly attaching doctrinal significance to the injunction or prohibition of ceremonial acts, to shift the balance of doctrinal expression in the Church of England. The several sections of Christendom are teeming with lessons of all kinds. Let us, at least in this cardinal matter of doctrinal expression, wait and learn. We have received from the Almighty, within the last half-century, such gifts as perhaps were hardly ever bestowed within the same time on a religious community. We see a transformed clergy, a laity less cold and neglectful, education vigorously pushed, human want and sorrow zealously cared for, sin less feebly rebuked, worship restored from frequent scandal and prevailing apathy to uniform decency and frequent reverence, preaching restored to an Evangelical tone and standard, the organization of the Church extended throughout the Empire, and this by the agency, in many cases that might be named, of men who have indeed succeeded the Apostles not less in character than in commission. If we are to fall to pieces in the face of such experiences, it will be hard to award the palm between our infatuation and

our ingratitude; and our just reward will be ridicule from without our borders, and remorse from within our hearts.

This highly-coloured description I desire to apply within the limits only of the definite statement with which it was introduced. But I am far from complaining of those who think the evils of litigation ought to be encountered, rather than permit even a handful of men to introduce into our services evidences of a design to Romanize the religion of the country. I have always, too, been of opinion that effective provision should be made to check sudden and arbitrary innovation as such, even when it does not present features of intrinsic mischief. To me this still appears a wiser and safer basis of proceeding than an attempt to establish a castiron rule of uniform obedience to a vast multitude of provisions sometimes obscure, sometimes obsolete, and very variously understood, interpreted, and applied. But this preference is not expressed in the interest of any particular party, least of all of what is termed the High Church party. For the rubrics, which the Public Worship Act is to enforce, may, with truth, be generally described as High Church rubrics; and the mere party man, who takes to himself that designation, has reason to be grateful to the opposing party for having so zealously promoted the passing of the Act. For my own part, I disclaim all satisfaction in such a compulsory enforcement of rubrics that I approve; and I would far rather trust to the growth of a willing obedience among those who are called Low Churchmen, where it is still deficient. I am far, however, from asserting that all enforcement of the law, beyond what I have above described, must of necessity produce acute and fatal mischiefs. Much folly both of "reges" and of "Achivi" has been borne, and may yet be borne, if only Judgments shall be such as to carry on their front the note of impartiality, and so long as we avoid the rock of doctrinal significance, and maintain the integrity of the Prayer-Book.

But I must endeavour, before closing these remarks, to bring into view some further reasons against free and large resort to penal proceedings in regard to the ceremonial of the Church. The remarks I have to offer are critical in their nature, for they aim at exhibiting the necessary imperfections even of the best tribunal; but they do not require the sinister aid either of bitterness or of disrespect.

The first of these remarks is, that the extinction of the separate profession of the civilian, now merged in the general study and practice of the bar, and the consolidation of the Courts of Probate and Admiralty with those of Equity and Common Law, have materially impaired the chances, which have hitherto existed, of not finding in our Judges of ecclesiastical causes the form of fitness growing out of special study. Any reader of the learned Judgments of the Dean of Arches may perceive the great advantages they derive from this source. It may be thought, with some reason, that episcopal assessors will, in doctrinal cases, help to supply the defect; but it would not be easy to arrange that the most learned Bishops should be chosen as assessors; and the general standard of learning on the bench cannot, under the hard conditions of modern times, be kept very high. The number of individuals must at all times be small, who can unite anything like deep or varied learning with the administrative and pastoral qualities, and the great powers of business and active work, which are now more than ever necessary, and are almost invariably found, in a Bishop. But in questions of ceremonial, the difficulties are greater still.

Let any one turn, for example, to the decision on appeal in the Purchas case, as it is the most recent, and seems to be the most contested, of the rubrical decisions. He will find, perhaps with surprise, that it does not rest mainly on considerations of law', but much more upon the results of historical and antiquarian study. Though rightly termed a legal Judgment, and though it of course has plenary authority as to the immediate question it decides, it is in truth, and could not but be, as to the determining and main portion of it, neither more nor less than a purely literary labour. Now, the authority of literary inquiries depends on care, comprehensiveness, and precision, in collecting facts, and on great caution in concluding from them. There is no democracy so levelling as the Republic of Letters. Liberty and equality here are absolute, though fraternity may be sometimes absent on a holiday. And a literary labour, be it critical, be it technical, be it archaeological, when it has done its immediate duty of disposing of a cause, cannot afterwards pass muster by being wrapped in the folds of the judicial ermine. It must come out into the light, and be turned round and round, just as freely (though under more stringent obligations of respect) as Professor Max Müller's doctrine of solar myths, or Professor Sylvester's fourth dimension in space, or Dr. Schliemann's promising theory that Hissarlik is Troy. It is, I believe, customary, and perhaps wise, that a prior judgment of the highest court of appeal should govern a later one. It is alleged, nor is it for me to rebut the allegation, that the Purchas Judgment contradicts the Judgment in the case of *Liddell v. Westerton*; but, if so, this is accidental, and does not touch the principle, which seems to be generally acknowledged. Now, however well this may stand with respect to interpretation of law, yet with respect to historical and antiquarian researches, and to Judgments which turn on them, it would evidently be untenable, and even ludicrous. And then comes the question, what right have we to expect from our Judges, amidst the hurry and pressure of their days, and often at a time of life when energy must begin to flag, either the mental habits, or the acquisitions, of the archaeologist, the critic, or above all of the historian? Why should we expect of the Bishop, because he may be assumed to have a fair store of theology, or of the

Judge, because he has spent his life in pleading or even in hearing causes, that they should be adepts in historical research, or that they should be imbued with that which is so rare in this country, the historic sense and spirit, abundant, in this our day, nowhere but in Germany?

It may be said that Judges can and will avail themselves of the labours of others; but they are unhappily not in the ordinary condition of courts of first instance, who can collect evidence of all kinds at will. They are confined to published labours, when they go beyond the *ex parte* statements with which counsel may supply them. Still, they are sure to do their best; and they may get on well enough, if the subject happens to be one of those which have been thoroughly examined, and where positive conclusions have been sufficiently established. But what if, on the contrary, it has been one neglected for many generations? if the authorities, so far as they go, are in serious if not hopeless conflict? if the study of the matter has but recently begun, and that only amidst the din and heat, and for the purposes, of the actual controversy? What is the condition of a Judge who has to interpret the law by means of *data*, which only the historian and the antiquarian can supply and digest respectively, when those valuable labourers have not digested or supplied them? For example, what if he have to investigate the question how a surplice is related to an alb, how far the use of either accompanies or excludes the cope or the chasuble (as a coat excludes a lady's gown), or in what degree the altar-wise position of the Holy Table had been established at the time when the Commissioners at the Savoy were engaged in the revision of the Liturgy? In this country a barrister cannot be his own attorney; yet a judge may not only have to digest his own legal apparatus, but may also be required to dive, at a moment's notice, into the *tohubohu* of inquiries, which have never yet emerged from the stage of chaos; and the decision of matters of great pith and moment for Christian worship and the peace of the Church comes to depend upon what is at best, by no fault of his, random and fragmentary knowledge.

Any reader of the Purchas Judgment on Appeal will perceive how truly I have said that it rests mainly, not on judicial interpretations, but on the results of literary research. In such interpretations, indeed, it is not wanting; but they are portions only of the fabric, and are joined together by what seems plainly to be literary and antiquarian inquiry. The Judicial Committee decide, for example, with regard to sacerdotal vestments, that the Advertisements of 1564 have the authority of law; and to this decision the mere layman must respectfully bow.

Brooke's Reports, pp. 171, 176.

But they also rule that the Advertisements in prescribing the use of the surplice for parish churches, proscribe the use of the cope or the chasuble, and that the canons of 1603-4 repeat the prohibition.

Ibid. p. 178. "If the minister is ordered to wear a surplice at all times of his ministration, he cannot wear an alb and tunicle when assisting at the Holy Communion; *if he is to celebrate the Holy Communion in a chasuble, he cannot celebrate in a surplice.*

Now, this is a proposition purely antiquarian. It depends upon a precise knowledge of the usages of what is sometimes termed "ecclesiastical millinery." Can Judges, or even Bishops, be expected to possess this very special kind of knowledge, or be held blameable for not possessing it? I think not. But when even Judges of great eminence, of the highest station, and of the loftiest character, holding themselves compelled to decide, aye or no, on the best evidence they can get, as to every question brought before them, proceed to determine that the use of the surplice excludes the use of the chasuble, this is after all a strictly literary conclusion, and is open to be confirmed, impaired, or overthrown, by new or widened evidence such as further literary labour may accumulate. And, indeed, it appears rather difficult to sustain the proposition that the surplice when used excludes all the more elaborate vestments, since we find it actually prescribed in one of the rubrics at the end of the Communion Office in the Prayer-Book of 1549, that the officiating minister is ordered to "*put upon him a plain alb or surplice with a cope.*"

Again, the Judicial Committee, in construing the rubrics as to the position of the minister, states that before the revision of 1662, "the custom of placing the table along the east wall was becoming general, and it may fairly be said that the revisers must have had this in view." This, of course, is a pure matter of history. Before and since the judgment was given, it has been examined by a variety of competent writers; and I gather from their productions, that had these been before the tribunal in 1871, it must have arrived, on this point, at an opposite opinion. The conclusion of Mr. Scudamore, indeed, is that the present position of the altars is the work of the eighteenth century.

The literary conclusion with respect to the surplice appears to be the foundation-stone of the Purchas judgment with reference to vestments. But it seems to be also collaterally sustained by three other propositions: one of which is, that the articles of visitation, and the proceedings of Commissions, in and after the reign of Elizabeth, prescribe the destruction of vestments, albs, tunicles, and other articles, as monuments of superstition and idolatry; the second, that the requisitions of Bishops in these parochial articles are limited to the surplice; the third, that there is no evidence of the use of vestments during the period. Now each and all of these are matters, not of law, but of historical criticism.

The critics of the Judgment are numerous; and few of them, perhaps, make due allowance for the difficulties under which it was framed. Their arguments are manifold, and far beyond my power fully to cite. Among other points, they admit the second of these three propositions, and consider that the attempts of the ruling authorities were limited, as regards enforcement, to the surplice; but hold that in those times what the law prescribed was one thing—what it enforced, or attempted to enforce, was another. Mr. MacColl "Lawlessness, Sacerdotalism, and Ritualism," p. 70.

cites a remarkable example; namely, that while the Rubric required the priest to read daily four chapters of Holy Scripture, the Advertisements aimed at enforcing only two. The orders of destruction raise a point of great importance, which demands full inquiry. As far as I have noticed, they seem uniformly to include "crosses" as "monuments of superstition and idolatry;" yet the Judicial Committee in *Westerton v. Liddell*, and in *Hebert v. Purchas*, both decide that crosses for decoration of the building are lawful. As regards the actual use of vestments, Mr. MacColl (while presuming that in a penal case it is evidence of disuse, not of use, that is demanded) supplies what he thinks ample proof;

Ibid., pp. 59—70.

and it is noticed that in the judgment itself there is evidence, viz., that of Dering (1593), and Johnson (1573), sufficient to impede an universal assertion. But into these matters I do not enter. There is much more to be said upon them. My purpose is not one of controversy. I confine myself to urging the necessity of further historical and archaeological inquiries, as absolutely necessary in order to warrant any judgments restrictive, in whatever sense, of the apparent liberality of our laws and practice; and I rejoice to see that for this end so many persons of ability, beside those I have named, are bringing in their respective contributions.

For example, Mr. Beresford Hope and Mr. Morton Shaw. Mr. Droop has produced some useful illustrations, unhappily not well arranged.

I suppose it to be beyond doubt that in our times the acts of the officers of the law may be taken as evidence of what the law is, or is reported to be. The burning of printed editions of English books by the Customs would prove that the importation of such works was prohibited. But history seems to show that this apparently obvious rule cannot be applied to times like those of the Reformation without much caution and reserve. For example. The *Purchas Judgment* states that the law required the use of copes in cathedral and collegiate churches, and generally treats authorized destruction as evidence of illegality; but it appears

Droop on Edwardian Vestments, p. 26.

that the Queen's Commissioners at Oxford, in 1573 (when the anti-papal tide was running very high), ordered in the College Chapel of All Souls that all copes should be defaced and rendered unfit for use.

There are three cautionary remarks, with which I shall conclude.

The first is that, unless I am mistaken, the word evidence is sometimes used, in judgments on ceremonial, in a mode which involves a dangerous fallacy. It seems to be used in a judicial sense, whereas it is really used in a literary sense. As respects the testimony given in a case, the Judge deals judicially, and with his full authority as a Judge; but the illustrative matter he collects in these suits from books or pamphlets, laborious as he may be, and useful as it may be, is not evidence except in the sense in which Dr. Schliemann thinks he has plenty of evidence as to the site of Troy; it is historical inquiry, or literary or learned speculation.

The second is that, if I am right in laying down as the grand requisite for arriving at truth in these cases the historian's attainments and frame of mind, the Judge, and the lawyer, labour in these cases under some peculiar difficulties. It is almost a necessity for the Judge, as it is absolutely for the advocate, that every cause be resolved categorically by an Aye or a No. But the historical inquirer is not conversant with Aye and No alone: he is familiar with a thousand shades of colour and of light between them. The very first requisite of the historic mind is suspense of judgment. Judicial business requires, as a rule, a decision between two—it is the judgment of Solomon; but the historian may have to mince the subject into many fragments, according to the probabilities of the case; he deals habitually with conjectures and likelihoods, as well as positive assertions. The Judge has to give all where he gives anything, and his mental habit forms itself accordingly; but the "I doubt" which was so much criticized in Lord Eldon, is among the most prominent characteristics of the philosophic and truth-loving historian.

Lastly; after the famous judgment Mr. Burke has passed upon the immense merits, and besetting dangers, of the legal mind, with direct relation to the character of Mr. Grenville, that great master proceeds to state that "Mr. Grenville thought better of the wisdom and power of human legislation than in truth it deserves."

Speech on American Taxation. Works, vol. ii. p. 389.

Most eminently does this seem to me to be true, in observing the manner after which our judges sometimes deal with ancient laws. Such as the character and efficacy of law is now, such they are apt to assume it always must have been. It has not been their business to consider the enormous changes in the structure of society, on its toilsome way through the rolling ages, from a low to a high organization. The present efficiency of law presumes the full previous inquiry and consultation of the deliberate power, and the perfect strength of the

executive. But that strength, depends on the magistracy, the police, the judiciary, the standing army; upon the intercommunication of men, of tidings, of ideas, by easy locomotion; upon a crowd of arrangements for the most part practically unknown to the loosely compacted structures of mediæval societies. The moral force, which abode in them, had little aid, for the purposes of the supreme power, except on the most pressing emergencies, from material force; partial approximations were then only possible, in cases where the modern provisions for instant and general obedience are nearly complete. The law of to-day is the expression of a supreme will, which has, before deciding on its utterance, had ample means to consult, to scrutinize the matter, to adapt itself to practical possibilities; and it is justly construed as an instrument which is meant to take, and takes, immediate and uniform effect. But the laws of earlier times were to a great extent merely in the nature of authoritative assertions of principle, and tentative efforts towards giving it effect; and were frequently, not to say habitually, according to the expediencies of the hour, trampled under foot, even by those who were supposed to carry them into execution. Take the great case of Magna Charta, in which the community had so vast an interest. It was incessantly broken, to be incessantly, not renewed, but simply re-affirmed. And law was thus broken by authority, as authority found it convenient: from the age when Henry III. "passed his life in a series of perjuries," as is said by Mr. Hallam,

Middle Ages, ii. 451-3.

to the date when Charles II. plundered the bankers, Magna Charta was re-asserted, we are told, thirty-two times, without having been once repealed. But we do not therefore, from discovering either occasional or even wholesale disobedience, find it necessary to read it otherwise than in its natural sense. The reign of Elizabeth bisects the period between Magna Charta and ourselves. But very little progress had been made in her times towards improving the material order of society; and, from religious convulsion, they were in truth semi-revolutionary times. Acceding to the throne, she had to struggle with an intense dualism of feeling, which it was her arduous task to mould into an unity. The clergy, except a handful, sympathized largely with the old order, and continued very much in the old groove throughout the rural and less advanced districts. To facilitate her operations on this side, she wisely brought in the Rubric of Ornaments. But there had also sprung up in the kingdom, after the sad experience of Mary's reign, a determined Puritanism, lodged principally at the main centres of population, and sustained by the credit of the returning exiles (several of them Bishops and by the natural sympathies of the Continental Reformation. Where this spirit was dominant, the work destruction did not wait for authority, and far outran it. In truth, the powers of the Queen and the law were narrowly hedged in, on this side as well as on the other. What could be more congenial to her mind and to her necessities, than that, for all this second section of her people, she should wink hard at neglect in a sore point like that of vestments, and that in proceeding to the Advertisements of 1564, though obliged to apply a stronger hand, she should confine herself to expressing what she thought absolute decency required, namely, the surplice, and leave the rubric and the older forms, to be held or modified according to the progressive action of opinion? Considering the violent divergencies with which she had to deal, would it not have been the ruin of her work if she had endeavoured to push to the extremes now sometimes supposed the idea of a present and immediate uniformity throughout the land? This I admit is speculation, on a subject not yet fully elucidated but it is speculation which is not in conflict with the facts thus far known, and which requires no strain to be put upon the language of the law.

"England expects every man to do his duty;" and this is an attempt at doing mine, not without a full measure of respect for those who are charged with a task now more than ever arduous in the declaration and enforcement of the Act of Uniformity. To lessen the chances of misapprehension, I sum up, in the following propositions, a paper which, though lengthened, must, I know, be dependent to a large extent upon liberal interpretation.

- The Church of this great nation is worth preserving; and for that end much may well be borne.
- In the existing state of minds, and of circumstances, preserved it cannot be, if we now shift its balance of doctrinal expression, be it by an alteration of the Prayer-Book (either way) in contested points, or be it by treating rubrical interpretations of the matters heretofore most sharply contested on the basis of "doctrinal significance."
- The more we trust to moral forces, and the less to penal proceedings (which are to a considerable extent exclusive one of the other), the better for the Establishment, and even for the Church.
- If litigation is to be continued, and to remain within the bounds of safety, it is highly requisite that it should be confined to the repression of such proceedings as really imply unfaithfulness to the national religion.
- In order that judicial decisions on ceremonial may habitually enjoy the large measure of authority finality, and respect, which attaches in general to the sentences of our courts, it is requisite that they should have uniform regard to the rules and results of full historical investigation, and should, if possible, allow to stand over for the future matters insufficiently cleared, rather than decide them upon partial and

fragmentary evidence.

[The *Quarterly Review* for July, 1875 (p. 288 n.) observes that I have "stated the difficulty of acquiring knowledge on these subjects," and also illustrated it." Three instances are given:—

1. In relating a proceeding of the year 1573, I have "elevated" a college chapel into a collegiate church. This the Reviewer shows to have been contrary to the law of 1573, by referring to the Canons of 1603, and to the Act of Uniformity of 1662, which draws the distinction clearly, No such distinction is drawn in the Act of Elizabeth, which says, "In any cathedral or parish church, or other place within this realm," etc. It has therefore to be considered whether, unless and until the law dealt with them separately, churches under the charge of a body of clergy were or were not collegiate churches. The Rubric of 1559, prescribing weekly communion in cathedral and collegiate churches, added the reason of the provision, "where be many priests and deacons": a description eminently applicable to colleges. This question, I presume, can hardly be decided by the Reviewer's very original method of referring to enactments made, one thirty and the other ninety years afterwards.

But it is a question of law, on which I can only guide myself by the opinions of others. And the Reviewer is wrong in saying that I stated the difficulty of "acquiring knowledge" on these subjects. My remarks refer entirely to historical and antiquarian knowledge, from which I have been careful to distinguish matters of law.

The Reviewer's second point is that I have quoted as accurate a statement of Mr. MacColl, that, as the Rubric required the Clergy to read four chapters of Holy Scripture daily, and the "Advertisements" two, we have here a case in which the statute prescribed a major amount of observance, but the subaltern or executive authority was content with a minor amount. The Reviewer holds that the provision of the Advertisements was cumulative; and that it was obligatory on the Clergy of England, under severe penalties, to read, in all, six chapters of the Bible daily. His proofs are (p. 253) that—

- The two chapters are to be read "with good advisement to the increase of my knowledge."
- That "the service appointed" was to be read clearly and audibly, "that all the people may hear and understand."

On this ground he dismisses the opinion contrary to his own as "a gross misrepresentation." I leave it to Mr. MacColl to develop and sustain his statements; but to me the contention of the Reviewer seems to border on the incredible; and the "gross misrepresentation" to be a reasonable construction, if we bear in mind, what the Reviewer forgets or omits, namely, that the rubrical obligation of the clergyman as such—not of the officiating "curate" merely, with whom he confounds the wider class—was to say daily the morning and evening prayers in public *or in private*.

His third allegation is: "It is admitted that surplice and cope are to be worn together in cathedrals." Admitted by whom? By him, perhaps, after he has been informed of a Rubric of 1549, which perhaps he had also omitted to observe. But I was remarking on the Purchas Judgment, and no such admission is contained in the Purchas Judgment. It says, "The Vestment or Cope, Alb, and Tunicale, were ordered by the First Prayer-Book of Edward VI. . . . The Canons . . . ordered the surplice *only* to be used in parish churches." (Brook's "Judgments," pp. 175-6.) The Canons say nothing (Canon 58) of the surplice *only*. But the Judges put in the word *only*. If the Reviewer is right, this was a reckless or fraudulent interpolation. But he is wrong, and why? Because they evidently believed the use of the sur- plice excluded the use of the other vestments. This, they have declared, in express terms (see note, p. 95) as to chasuble, alb, and tunicle: and from the words I have quoted, "the Vestment or Cope," it seems they were not aware of any distinction between cope and chasuble: as again they dwell upon "the determination to remove utterly . . . *all* the vestments now in question." This, I may add, they think was proved by the Lincoln MS. which Mr. Peacock has published. Evidently the Judges proceeded upon the report of some most ill-informed informant, and had not read—as how could they read?—the work itself. For Mr. Peacock's volume, which they cite to show the destruction of "all the vestments," refers to some hundred parishes only, and, in about a score of these, reports that the cope was still retained.

I am sorry to have detained the reader with this exposure of the errors of a Reviewer, who really has not the same excuse, as may be reasonably alleged on behalf of the Judges of Appeal, for the misapprehension and consequent misstatement of history; in a discussion very wearisome in itself, but on which unhappily great practical issues are made to depend by the error of one party or of both.]

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Religion as Affected by Modern Materialism:

An Address Delivered in Manchester New College, London,

AT THE OPENING OF ITS 89TH SESSION,

ON TUESDAY, OCT. 6TH, 1874.

BY James Martineau, LL.D.

Principal.

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Preface.

THE following Address, published by desire of my College, was much curtailed in oral delivery. As somewhat more patience may be hoped for in a reader than in a hearer, it now appears in full. The position assumed in it, of resistance to some speculative tendencies of modern physical research, is far from congenial to me: for it seems to place me in the wrong camp. But the exclusive pretension, long set up by Theology, to dominate the whole field of knowledge, seems now to have simply passed over to the material Sciences;—with the effect of inverting, rather than removing, a mischievous intellectual confusion, and shifting the darkness from outward Nature to Morals and Religion. I cannot admit that these are conquered provinces: and to re-affirm their independence, and protest against their absorption in a universal material empire, appears to me a pressing need alike for true philosophy and for the future of human character and society.

LONDON,

Oct. 12, 1874.

Religion as Affected by Modern Materialism.

THE College which places me here to-day professes to select and qualify suitable men for the Nonconformist Ministry; that is, the headship of societies voluntarily formed for the promotion of the Christian life. In carrying out its work, two rides have been invariably observed: (1) the Special Studies which deal with our sources of religious faith—whether in the scrutiny of nature or in the interpretation of sacred books—have been left open to the play of all new lights of thought and knowledge, and have promptly reflected every well-grounded intellectual change; and (2) the General Studies which give the balanced aptitudes of a cultivated mind have been made as extensive and thorough as the years at disposal would allow. In both these rules there is apparent a genuine thirst for a right apprehension of things,—a contempt for the dangers of possible discovery, a persuasion that in the mind most large and luminous the springs of religion have the freshest and the fullest flow; together with the idea that the Preacher, instead of being the organ of a given theology, should himself, by the natural influence of mental superiority, pass to the front and take the lead in a regulated growth of opinion.

There have never been wanting prophets of ill who distrusted this method as rash. So much open air does not suit the closet divine; such liability to change disappoints the fixed idea of the partisan; and the "practical man" does not want his preacher's head made heavy with too much learning, or his faith attenuated in the vacuum of metaphysics. At the present moment these partial distrusts are superseded by a deeper and more comprehensive misgiving, affecting not the method simply, but the aim and function of our Institution. Side by side with the literary pursuits of the scholar, the study of external nature has always had a place of honour in our traditions and our estimates of a manly education; and there is scarcely a special science which has not some brilliant names that range not far from the lines of our history; and from the favourite shelf of all our libraries, the Principia of Newton, the Essays of Franklin, the Papers of Priestley and Dalton, the "Principles" of Lyell, the Biological Treatises of South-wood Smith and Carpenter, and the records of Botanical research by Sir James Smith and the Hookers, look down upon us with something of a personal interest. The successive enlargements given by these skilled interpreters to our earlier picture of the world,—the widening Space, the deepening vistas of Time, the new groups of chemical elements and the precision of their combinations, the detected marvels of physiological structure, and the rapid filling-in of missing links in the chain of organic life,—have been eagerly welcomed as adding a glory to the realities around, and, by the erection of fresh shrines and cloisters, turning the simple temple in which we once stood into a clustered magnificence. Thus it was, so long as discoveries came upon us one by one; nor did any Biblical chronology or Apocalypse interfere with their proper evidence for an hour. But *now*—must we not confess it?—certain shadows of anxiety seem to steal forth and mingle with the advancing light of natural knowledge, and temper it to a less genial warmth. It comes on, no longer in the simple form of pulse after pulse of positive and limited discovery, but with the ambitious sweep of a universal theory, in which facts given by observation, laws gathered by induction, and

conceptions furnished by the mind itself, are all wrought up together as if of homogeneous validity. A report is thus framed of the Genesis of things, made up indeed of many true chapters of science, but systematized by the terms and assumptions of a questionable, if not an untenable philosophy. To the inexpert reader this report seems to be all of one piece; and he is disturbed to find an account apparently complete of the "Whence and the Whither" of all things without recourse to aught that is Divine; to see the refinements of organism and exactitudes of adaptation disenchanting of their wonder; to watch the beauty of the flower fade into a necessity; to learn that Man was never *intended* for his place upon this scene, and has no commission to fulfil, but is simply flung hither by the competitive passions of the most gifted brutes; and to be assured that the élite beings that tenant the earth tread each upon an infinite series of failures, and survive as trophies of immeasurable misery and death. Thus an apprehension has become widely spread, that Natural History and Science are destined to give the *coup de grâce* to all theology, and discharge the religious phenomena from human life; that churches and their symbols must disappear like the witches' chamber and the astrologists' tower; and that, as everything above our nature is dark and void, those who affect to lift it lead it nowhither, and must take themselves away as "blind leaders of the blind." Whether this apprehension is well founded or not is a very grave question for society in many relations; and is emphatically urgent for those who educate men as spiritual guides to others, and who can invest them with no directing power except the native force of a mind at one with the truth of things and a heart of quickened sympathies. Hitherto, they have been trained under the assumptions that the Universe which includes us and folds us round is the Life-dwelling of an Eternal Mind; that the World of our abode is the scene of a Moral Government incipient but not yet complete; and that the tipper zones of Human Affection, above the clouds of self and passion, take us into the sphere of a Divine Communion. Into this over-arching scene it is that growing thought and enthusiasm have expanded to catch their light and fire. And if "the new faith" is to carry in it the contra-dictories of these positions,—if it leaves us to make what we can of a simply molecular universe, and a pessimist world, and an unappeasable battle of life,—it will require another sort of Apostolate, and would make such a difference in the studies which it is reasonable to pursue, that it might be wisest for us to disband, and let the new Future preach its own gospel, and devise, if it can, the means of making the tidings "*glad*." Better at once to own our occupation gone than to linger on sentimental sufferance, and accept the indulgent assurance that, though there is no longer any *truth* in religion, there is some nice feeling in it; and that while, for all we have to teach, we might shut up to-morrow, we may harmlessly keep open still, as a nursery of "*Emotion*."

See Professor Tyndall's Address before the British Association; with Additions, p. 61.

I trust that, when "emotion" proves empty, we shall stamp it out, and get rid of it.

Though, however, no partnership between the physicist and the theologian can be formed on these terms of assigning the intellect to the one and the feelings to the other, may it not be that, in the flurry of exultation and of panic, they misconstrue their real position? and that their relations, when calmly surveyed, may not be in such a state of tension as each is ready to believe? Looking on their respective contentions from the external position of logical observation, and without presuming to call in question the received inductions of the naturalist, I believe that both parties mistake the bearing of those inductions upon religion; and that, although this bearing is in some aspects serious, it is neither of the quality nor of the magnitude frequently ascribed to it. I venture to affirm that the essence of religion, summed up in the three assumptions already enumerated, is independent of any possible results of the natural sciences, and stands fast through the various readings of the genesis of things.

The unpractised mind of simple times goes out, it is true, upon everything *en masse*, and indeterminately feels and thinks about itself and the field of its existence, the inner and the outer, the transient and the permanent, the visible and the invisible: its knowledge and its worship, the pictures of its fancy and the intuitions of its faith, are as yet a single tissue, of which every broken thread rends and deforms the whole. Hence the oldest sacred traditions run into stories of world-building; and the earliest attempts at a systematic interpretation of nature, in which physical ideas were clothed in mythical garb, are regarded by Aristotle as "*theological*." It must be admitted that our own age has not yet emerged from this confusion. And in so far as Church belief is still committed to a given kosmogony and natural history of Man, it lies open to scientific refutation, and has already received from it many a wound under which it visibly pines away. It is needless to say that the *new* "book of Genesis," which resorts to Lucretius for its "first beginnings," to protoplasm for its fifth day, to "natural selection" for its Adam and Eve, and to evolution for all the rest, contradicts the *old* book at every point; and inasmuch as it dissipates the dream of Paradise, and removes the tragedy of the Fall, cancels at once the need and the scheme of Redemption, and so leaves the historical churches of Europe crumbling away from their very foundations. If any one would know how utterly unproducable in modern daylight is the theology of the symbolical books, how absolutely alien from the real springs of our life, let him follow for a few hours the newest movement of ecclesiastical reform, and listen to the reported conferences at Bonn on the remedies for a divided Christendom. Scarcely could the personal re-appearance of Athanasius or Cyril on the

floor of the council-hall be more startling, or the cries of anathema from the voices of the ancient dead have a more wondrous sound, than the reproduction as hopes of the future, by men of Munich, of Chester, of Pittsburg, and of the Eastern Church, of formulas without meaning for the present, the eager discussion of subtle varieties of falsehood, and the anxious masking of their differences by opaque phrases under which everybody manages to look. Such signs of strange intellectual anachronism excuse the aversion with which many a thoughtful man, with a heart still full of reverence, turns away from all religious association, and lives without a church. It has been the infatuation of ecclesiastics to miss the inner divine spirit that breathes through the sources of their faith, and to seize, as the materials of their system, the perishable conceptions and unverified predictions of more fervent but darker times; so that, in the structure they have raised, all that is most questionable in the legacy of the past,—obsolete Physics, mythical History, Messianic Mythology, Apocalyptic prognostications,—have been built into the very walls, if not made the corner-stone, and now by their inevitable decay threaten the whole with ruin. Why indeed should I charge this infatuation on councils and divines alone? It is not professional but human; it is a delusion which affects us all. We are for ever shaping our representations of invisible things, in comparison with other men's notions, into forms of definite opinion, and throwing them to the front, as if they were the photographic equivalent of our real faith. Yet somehow the essence of our religion never finds its way into these frames of theory: as we put them together it slips away, and, if we turn to pursue it, still retreats behind; ever ready to work with the will, to unbind and sweeten the affections, and bathe the life with reverence; but refusing to be seen, or to pass from a divine hue of thinking into a human pattern of thought. The effects of this infatuation in the founders of our civilization are disastrous on both sides,—not only to the Churches whose system is undermined, but to the spirit of the Science which undermines it. It turns out that, with the sun and moon and stars, and in and on the earth both before and after the appearance of our race, quite other things have happened than those which the consecrated kosmogony recites: especially Man, instead of falling from a higher state, has risen from a lower, and inherits, instead of a uniform corruption, a law of perpetual improvement; so that the real process has the effect, not only of an enormous magnifier, but of an inverting mirror, on the theological picture. Yet, notwithstanding the deplorable appearance to which that picture is thus reduced, it is exhibited afresh every week to millions still taught to regard it as Divine. This is the mischief on the Theologic side. On the other hand, Science, in executing this merited punishment, has borrowed from its opponents one of their worst errors, in identifying the anomalous or lawless with the divine, and assuming that whatever falls within the province of nature drops thereby out of relation to God. As the old story of Creation called in the Supreme Power only by way of supernatural paroxysm, to gain some fresh start beyond the resources of the natural order, so the new inquirers, on getting rid of these crises, fancy that the Agent who had been invoked for them is gone, and proclaim at once that Matter without Thought is competent to all. In thus confounding the idea of the Divine Mind with that of *miracle-worker*, they do but go over to the theological camp, and snatch thence its oldest and bluntest weapon, which in modern conflict can only burden the hand that wields it. How runs the history of their alleged negative discovery? The Naturalist was told in his youth that at certain intervals—at the joints, for instance, between successive species of organisms—acts of sudden creation summoned fresh groups of creatures out of nothing. These epochs he attacks with riper knowledge; he finds a series of intermediary forms, and fragmentary lines of suggestion for others; and when the affinities are fairly complete, and the chasm in the order of production is filled up, he turns upon us and says, 'See, there is no break in the chain of origination, however far back you trace it; we no more want a Divine Agent *there* and *then* than *here* and *now*.' Be it so; but it is precisely here and now that He is needed, to be the fountain of orderly power, and to render the tissue of Laws intelligible by his presence: his witness is found not only in the gaps, but in the continuity of being,—not in the suspense, but in the everlasting flow of change; for, the universe as known, being throughout a system of *Thought-relations*, can subsist only in an eternal Mind that thinks it.

The whole history of the Genesis of things Religion must unconditionally surrender to the Sciences. Not indeed that it is without share in the great question of *Causality*; but its concern with it is totally different from theirs; for it asks only about the '*Whence*' of all phenomena, while they concentrate their scrutiny upon the '*How*:' by which I mean that their end is accomplished as soon as it has been found in what groups phenomena regularly cluster, and on what threads of succession they are strung, and into what classification their resemblances throw them. These are matters of fact, directly or circuitously ascertainable by perception, and remaining the same, *be their originating power what it may*. On *that* ulterior question the Sciences have nothing to say. And, on the other hand, when Religion here takes up her word and insists that the phenomena thus reduced to system are the product of *Mind*, she in no way prejudices the *modus operandi*, but is ready to accept whatever affinities of aspect, whatever adjustments of order, the skill of observers may reveal. On *these* investigations she has nothing to say. If indeed you could ever show that the method of the universe is one along which *no Mind could move*—that it is absolutely incoherent and unideal—you would destroy the possibility of Religion as a doctrine of *Causality*: only, however, by simultaneously discovering the

impossibility of Science,—which wholly consists in organizing the phenomena of the world into an intellectual scheme reflecting the structure of its archetype. That those who labour to render the universe *intelligible* should call in question its *relation to intelligence*, is one of those curious inconsistencies to which the ablest specialists are often the most liable when meditating in foreign fields. If it takes *mind* to construe the world, how can the negation of mind suffice to constitute it?

It is not in the history of Superstition alone that the human mind may be found struggling in the grasp of some mere Nightmare of its own creation: a philosophical hypothesis may sit upon the breast with a weight not less oppressive and not more real; till a friendly touch or a dawning light breaks the spell, and reveals the quiet morning and the bed of rest. Is there, for instance, no logical illusion in the Materialist doctrine which in our time is proclaimed with so much pomp and resisted with so much passion? 'Matter is all I want,' says the Physicist: 'give me its atoms alone, and I will explain the universe.' 'Good; take as many of them as you please: see, they have all that is requisite to Body, being homogeneous extended solids.' 'That is not enough,' he replies; 'it might do for Democritus and the mathematicians, but I must have somewhat more: the atoms must be not only in motion and of various shapes, but also of as many kinds as there may be chemical elements; for how could I ever get water, if I had only hydrogen molecules to work with?' 'So be it,' we shall say; 'only this is a considerable enlargement of your specified datum,—in fact, a conversion of it into several; yet, even at the cost of its monism, your scheme seems hardly to gain its end; for by what manipulation of your resources will you, for example, educe *consciousness*? No organism can ever show you more than matter moved; and, as Dubois-Reymond observes, there is an impassable chasm "between definite movements of definite cerebral atoms and the primary facts which I can neither define nor deny,—*I feel pain or pleasure, I taste a sweetness, smell a roscient, hear an organ tone, see red*, together with the no less immediate assurance they give, *therefore I exist*:" "it remains," he adds, "entirely and for ever inconceivable that it should signify a jot to a number of carbon and hydrogen and nitrogen and oxygen and other atoms how they lie and move;" "in no way can one see how from their concurrence consciousness can arise."

"Ueber die Grenzen des Naturerkennens," p. 29. Compare p. 20. "I will now prove, as I believe in a very cogent way, not only that, in the present state of our knowledge, Consciousness cannot be explained by its material conditions,—which perhaps every one allows,—but that from the very nature of things it never will admit of explanation by these conditions."

What say you to this problem? 'It does not daunt me at all,' he declares: 'of course you understand that my atoms have all along been affected by gravitation and polarity; and now I have only to insist, with Fechner, Einige Ideen zur Schöpfungs- und Entwicklungsgeschichte der Organismen, §§ i. ii.

on a difference among molecules; there are the *inorganic*, which can change only their *place*, like the particles in an undulation; and there are the *organic*, which can change their *order*, as in a globule that turns itself inside out. With an adequate number of these, our problem will be manageable.' 'Likely enough,' we may say, 'seeing how careful you are to provide for all emergencies; and if any hitch should occur at the next step, where you will have to pass from mere sentiency to Thought and Will, you can again look in upon your atoms, and fling among them a handful of Leibnitz's monads, to serve as souls in little, and be ready, in a latent form, with that *Vorstellungsfähigkeit* which our picturesque interpreters of nature so much prize. But surely you must observe how this "Matter" of yours alters its style with every change of service: starting as a beggar, with scarce a rag of "property" to cover its bones, it turns up as a Prince, when large undertakings are wanted, loaded with investments, and within an inch of a plenipotentiary. In short, you give it precisely what you require to take from it; and when your definition has made it "pregnant with all the future," there is no wonder if from it all the future might be born.'

"We must radically change our notions of Matter," says Professor Tyndall; and then, he ventures to believe, it will answer all demands, carrying "the promise and potency of all terrestrial life."

Address before the British Association; with Additions, pp. 54, 55. Compare the statement, by Dubois-Reymond, of the opposite opinion, quoted supra, p. 13, note.

If the measure of the required "change in our notions" had been specified, the proposition would have had a real meaning, and been susceptible of a test. Without this precision, it only tells us, "Charge the word potentially with your quæsitæ, and I will promise to elicit them explicitly." It is easy travelling through the stages of such an hypothesis; you deposit at your bank a round sum ere you start; and drawing on it piecemeal at every pause, complete your grand tour without a debt. Words, however, ere they can hold such richness of prerogative, will be found to have emerged from their physical meaning, and to be truly Greek quote,—terms that bear God in them, and thus dissolve the very theory which they represent. Such extremely clever Matter,—matter that is up to everything, even to writing Hamlet, and finding out its own evolution, and substituting a molecular plebiscite for a divine monarchy of the world, may fairly be regarded as a little too modest in its disclaimer of the attributes of Mind.

Nor is the fallacy escaped by splitting our datum into two, and instead of crowding all requisites into

Matter, leaving it on its old slender footing, and assuming along with it *Force* as a distinct entity. The two postulates will perform their promise, just like the one, on condition that you secrete within them in the germ all that you are to develop from them as their fruit; and in this case the word "*Force*" is the magical seed-vessel which is to surprise us with the affluence of its contents. The surprise is due to one or two nimble-witted substitutions, of which a conjuror might be proud, whereby unequals are shown to be equals, and out of an acorn you hatch a chicken. First, the noun *Force* is sent into the plural (which of course is only itself in another form), and so we get provided with several of them. Next, as there is now a class, the members must be distinguishable; and, as they are all of them activities, they will be known one from another by the sort of work they do: one will be a mechanician,—another a chemist,—a third will be a swift runner along the tracks of life,—a fourth will find out all the rest,—will do our reasoning about them, and get up all our examinations for us. The last of these, every one must own—at least every one who has graduated—is much more dignified than the others; and all through we rise, at every step, from ruder to more refined accomplishment. With things thus settled, we seem to have found Plato's ideal State, in which every order minds its own business, and no element presumes to cross the line and become something else. Not so, however; for, after thus differencing the forces and keeping them under separate covers, the next step is to unify them, and show them all as the homogeneous contents of a single receptacle. The forces, we are assured, are interchangeable, and relieve each other; when one has carried its message, it hands the torch to another, and the light is never quenched or the race arrested, but runs an eternal round. But why then, you will say, divide them first, only to unite them afterwards? Follow our logical wonder-worker one move further, and you will see. He has now, we may say, his four vessels standing on the table; the contents of the whole are to be whisked into one; having them all, he has more ways than one of working out their equivalence; and it remains at his option, *which* he shall lift to let the mouse run out. For some reason, best known to himself, he never thinks of choosing the last; indeed it is pretty much to avoid this, and obtain other receptacles *empty of thought*, that he broke down the original unity. If he be a circumspect physiologist, he will probably prefer the third, and exhibit the universal principle as in some sense *living*; if he be a daring physicist, he will lay hold of the first, and pronounce *mechanical* dynamics good enough for the kosmos.

Am I asked to indicate the precise seat of fallacy in the hypothesis which I have ventured to criticise? The alleged division of forces, considered as something over and above the phenomena ascribed to them, is absolutely without ground; each of them, as apart from any other, has a purely ideal existence, without the slightest claim to objective reality. Science, dividing its labours, has to break down phenomena into sets according to their resemblances and the affinities of their conditions; it disposes them thus into natural provinces, the laws of which, when ascertained, give us the rules by which the phenomena assort themselves or successively arise,—but nothing more. But whatever field we survey, we carry into it the belief, inherent in the constitution of the intellect itself, of a Causal Power as the source of every change: we believe it for each, we believe it for all: it repeats itself identically with every instance; and when a multitude of instances are tied up together in virtue of their similarity and made into a class, this constantly recurring reference, this identity of relation to a power behind, is marked by giving that power a singular name; as the phenomena of weight are labelled with the title *Gravitation*, expressing unity in their causal relation. Were we closeted with this group of facts alone, this unity would live in our minds without a rival, and we should have no numerical distinction in our account of force. But, meanwhile, other observers have been going through a like experience in some separate field; have gleaned and bound into a sheaf its scattered mass of homogeneous growths, and denoted them by another name—say, *Electricity*—carrying in it the same haunting reference to a source for them all. Now why is this a *new* name? Is it that we have found a new *power*? Have we carried our observation *behind the phenomena*, so as, in either instance, to find any power at all? Are the two cases differenced by anything else than the dissimilarity of their phenomena? Run over these distinctions, and, when you have exhausted them, is there anything left by which you can compare and set apart from each other the respective producing forces? All these questions must be answered in the negative; the differentiations lie only in the effects; the causal power is not *observed*, but *thought*; and that thought is the same, not only from instance to instance, but from field to field; and by this sameness it cancels plurality from *Force*, and reduces the story of their transmigration into a scientific mythology. The distinctive names therefore mark only differences in the *sets of phenomena*; they are simply instruments of classification for noticeable changes in nature, and carry no partitions into the mysterious depths behind the scenes. The dynamic catalogue being thus left empty and cut down to a single term, do we talk nonsense when we attach qualifying epithets to the word *Force*, and speak of '*electric force*,' of '*nerve force*,' of '*polar force*,' &c.? Not so; provided we mean by those phrases, simply, *Force*, *quantum sufficit*, now for *one set of phenomena*, now for *another*, without implication of other difference than that of the seat and conditions and aspect of the manifestations. But the moment we step across this restriction, we are in the land of myths.

Power then is one and undivided. As external causality, it is not an *object of knowledge* but an *element*

given in the relations of knowledge, a condition of our thinking of phenomena at all. Were this all, our necessary belief in it would be unattended by any *representation* of it; it would remain an intellectual notion (Begriff), and we could no more bring it before the mind under any definite type than we can the meaning of such words as "substance" and "possibility." In one field, however, and no more, it falls into coincidence with our experience; for we ourselves put forth power in the exercise of Will and are personally conscious of Causality; and this sample of *immediate* knowledge because self-knowledge supplies us with the means of *representing* to ourselves what else we should have to *think* without a type. Here accordingly we reach, I venture to affirm, what we really mean, and what alone saves us from the mere empty form of meaning, whenever we assent to the axiom of causality. It is very true that the exercise of Will, having more or less of complication, itself admits of analysis; *intention* may play a larger or smaller part, may leave less or more for the share of automatic or impulsive activity; and by letting the former withdraw into the background of our conception, we may come to think of *causation apart from purpose*,—which, I suppose, is the *idea of Force*. But this is a bare fiction of abstraction, shamming an integral reality;—an old soldier pensioned off from actual duty, but allowed to wear his uniform and look like what he was. Since we have to assume causality for all things, and the only causality we know is that of living mind, that type has no legitimate competitor. Even if it had, its sole adequacy would leave it in possession of the field. For among the products to be accounted for is the whole class and hierarchy of *minds*; and unless there is to be more in the effect than in the cause, nothing less than Mind is competent to realize a scheme of being whose ranks ascend so high. As for the plea,—which has unhappily passed into a commonplace,—that, even if it be so, that transcendent object is beyond all cognizance,—I will only say that this doctrine of Nescience stands in exactly the same relation to causal power, whether you construe it as Material Force or as Divine Agency. Neither can be *observed*; one or the other must be *assumed*. If you admit to the category of knowledge only what we learn by observation, particular or generalized, then is Force unknown; if you extend the word to what is imported by the intellect itself into our cognitive acts, to make them such, then is God known.

This comment on current hypotheses refers to them only so far as they overstep the limits of Science, and aspire to the seat of judgment on ulterior questions of Philosophy. So long as they simply descend upon this or that realm of nature, and try their strength there in simplifying its laws or rendering them deducible,—or, passing from province to province, labour to formulate equations available for several or for all,—they must be respectfully left to pursue their work; and whenever their authors present their demonstrated "system of the world," all reasonable men will learn it from them, whatever it may be, as scholars from a master. In the investigation of the genetic order of things, Theology is an intruder, and must stand aside. Religion first reaches its true ground, when, leaving the problem of what *has happened*, it takes its stand on what *for ever is*

This statement has been pronounced by a friendly critic (*Spectator*, Oct 17, p. 1293) "not only questionable, but gravely misleading;" as implying "that if history and science showed us constant degradation instead of evolution of higher forms, and filled us with anticipations from which reasonable hope,—hope, that is, measured by experience,—was utterly excluded, the religion of the Soul would just as certainly assert the supremacy of righteousness and the love of God, as she does with the united voices of revelation and experience to help her out."

If I had said that Religion has *no interest* in the history of nature and the world, this criticism would have been just. But I cannot see how it applies to the positions which the text aims to make good: viz. that Religion has no *locus standi* in investigations about the order of phenomena in the past, but must make what it can of that order as determined by scientific evidence: and that Religion has a *locus standi*, where Science has not, in the quest and cognition of the Cause that is behind all phenomena. To reach that Cause, there is no need to go into the past, as though, being missed here, He could be found there. But when once He has been discerned through the proper organs of divine apprehension, the whole life of humanity is recognised as the scene of His agency, and the past, no less than the present, has to be embraced in the religious interpretation of the world, and becomes an object of sacred interest. Though Religion, in taking its stand on what for ever is, *first reaches* its true ground, it does not follow that it must always remain there.

I do not say that it is indifferent to us how antecedent ages have been filled, and have brought up the march with which we fall into step to-day; for we are beings of large perspective, concentrating in us many lines of distance and images that lie between the eye and the horizon; and what we see at hand borrows a portion of its aspect from relation to remoter zones behind. But, still if the light were all turned off from the Past, and on facing it we looked only into the Night, the reality for us is not *there*, but *here*, where it is Day. However the present may have come about, I find myself in it: in whatever way my faculties may have been determined, faculties they are, and they give me insight into my duty and outlook on my position: however the world, of Nature and of Society, may have grown to what it is, its scene contains me, its relations twine around me, its physiognomy appeals to me with a meaning from behind itself. If these data do not suffice to show me my kinship with what is above, below, around me, and find my moral and spiritual place, I shall not be greatly

helped by discovering how many ages my constitution has been upon the stocks, and its antecedents been upon the way. The beings that touch me with their look and draw me out of myself, the duties that press upon my heart and hand, are on the spot, speaking to me while the clock ticks; and to love them aright, to serve them faithfully, and construct with them a true harmony of life, is the same task, whether I bear within me the inheritance of a million years, or, with all my surroundings, issued this morning from the dark.

Remaining then at home, and consulting the nature which we have and which we see, we find that, far from being self-inclosed, or related only to its visible dependences, it turns a face, on more than one side, right towards the Infinite, and, often to the disregard of nearer things, moves hither or thither as if shrinking from a shadow advancing thence, or drawn by a light that wins it forward. We are constantly,—even the most practical of us,—seeing what is invisible and hearing what is inaudible, and permitting them to send us on our way. Not left, like the mere animal, to be the passive resultant of forces without and instincts within, but invested with an alternative power, we are conscious partners in the architecture of our own character, and know ourselves to be the bearers of a *trust*; and this fiduciary life takes us at once across the boundary which separates nature from what transcends it. Seducing appetites and turbulent passions and ignoble ease never gain our undivided ear; while we bend to them, there are pleading voices which distract us, and which, if they do not save us, follow us with an expostulating shame. Nor, if ever we wake up and kindle at the appeal of misery and the cry of wrong, or with the spontaneous fire of disinterested affection or devotion to the true and good, can we construe them into anything less than a Divine claim upon us: we know their right over us at a glance; we feel on us their look of Authority in reply; if, to our careless fancy, we were ever our own, we can be so no more. Once stirred by the higher springs of character, and possessed by the yearning for the perfect mind, we are aware that to live out of these is our supreme obligation, and that for us nothing short of this is holy. To have *seen* the vision of the best and possible and *not* to pursue it, is to mar the true idea of our nature, and to fall from its heaven as a rebel and an outcast. This inner life of Conscience and ideal aspiration supplies the elements and sphere of Religion; and the discovery of Duty is as distinctly relative to an Objective Righteousness as the perception of Form to an external Space: it is a bondage, with superficial reluctance but with deeper consent, to an invisible Highest; and both moral Fear and moral Love stand before the face of an Authority which is the eternal Reality of the holy, just, and true. On the first view, you might expect that the stronger the enthusiasm for goodness, and the surer the recoil from ill, so much the fitter would the mind be to stand alone in its self-adequacy; yet it is precisely at such elevation that it most trusts in a Supreme Perfection to which it only faintly responds, and leans for support on that everlasting stay. The life of aspiration, attempting to nurse itself, soon pines and dies; it must breathe a diviner air and take its thirst to unwasting springs; and wherever it settles into a quiet tension of the will and an upturned look of the affections, it is sustained by habitual access to the Fountain of sanctity, and by the consciousness of an Infinite sympathy. Are not both the need and the existence of this objective sustaining power acknowledged by Mr. Matthew Arnold himself, when he insists on that strange entity, "That, not ourselves, *which makes for right-eousness*"? By an abstraction, however, such a function cannot be discharged; nothing ever "makes for righteousness" but One who *is* righteous. To support and raise the less, there must be a greater; and that which does not think and will and love, whatever the drift of its blind power, may indeed be larger, but is not greater, than the sinning soul that longs for purity.

Now so long as the devotee of Goodness is possessed by a faith, not only in his own aspirations, but in an Infinite Mind which fosters and secures them as counterparts of the highest reality, it is of little moment ethically what theory he adopts of their mode of origin within him. Whether he takes them as intuitive data of his Understanding, or, with Hartley, as a transfiguration of sensible interests into a disinterested glory, or, with Darwin and Spencer, as the latest refinement of animal instinct and discipline after percolating through uncounted generations,—that which he has reached,—be it first or last,—is at all events *the truth of things*, the primordial and everlasting certainty, in comparison with which all prior stages of training, if such there were, give but dim gropings and transient illusions. In Hartley himself, accordingly, a doctrine essentially materialistic and carrying in it the whole principle of Evolution, so far as it could be epitomized in the individual's life, easily blended with moral fervour and even a mystic piety; and, in Priestley, with a noble heroism of veracity and an unswerving confidence in the perfect government of the universe. But what if the process of atomic development be taken as the *Substitute for God*, not as His *method*? if you withdraw from the beginning all *Idea* of what is to come out at the end,—all Model or Archetype to control and direct the procedure, and restrain the *possible* from running off indefinitely into the false and wrong? Do you suppose that the ethical results can be still the same? The inevitable difference, I think, few considerate persons will deny; and without attempt to measure its amount, its chief feature may be readily defined.

It was often said by both James and John Stuart Mill, that you do not alter, much less destroy, a feeling or sentiment by giving its history: from whatever unexpected sources its constituents may be gathered, when once their confluence is complete the current they form runs on the same, whether you know them or not. How true this may be is exemplified by the younger Mill himself; who, while resolving the moral sentiments into simple

pleasure and pain, and moral obligation into a balance of happiness, yet nobly protested that he would rather plunge into eternal anguish than falsely bend before an unrighteous power. If so it be, then one in whom benevolence, honour, purity, had reached their greatest refinement and most decisive clearness would suffer no change of moral consciousness, on becoming convinced that it is a "poetic thrill" of his "ganglia"

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induced by the long breaking-in through which his progenitors have passed, in conformity with the system of organic modification that has deprived him of his fur and his tail. In spite of the apparent incongruity, let us grant that his higher affections will speak to him exactly as before, and make their claims felt by the same tones of sacred authority, so that they continue to subdue him in reverence or lift him as with inspiration. The surrender to them of heart and will under these conditions, the vow to abide by them and live in them, may still deserve acknowledgment as *Religion*; but, inasmuch as they have shrunk into mere unaccredited subjective susceptibilities, they have lost all support from Omniscient approval, and all presumable accordance with the reality of things. For what *are* these moral intensities of his nature, seen under his new lights? Whence is their message? With what right do they deliver it to him in that imperative voice? and, if it be slighted, prostrate him with unspeakable compunction? Are they an influx of Righteousness and Love from the life of the universe? Do they report the insight of beings more august and pure? No; they are capitalized "experiences of utility" and social coercion, the record of ancestral fears and satisfactions stored in his brain, and re-appearing with divine pretensions, only because their animal origin is forgotten; or, under another aspect, they are the newest advantage won by gregarious creatures in "the struggle for existence." From such an origin it is impossible to extract credentials for any elevated claim: so that although low beginnings may lead, in the natural order, to what is better than themselves,—as a Julia may be the mother of an Agrippina,—yet in such case the superiority lies in new endowment, which is *not* contained in the inheritance. For such new endowment as we gain in the ascent from interest to conscience the theory of transmission cannot provide; if the coarse and turbid springs of barbarous life, filtered through innumerable organisms, flow limpid and sparkling at last, the element is still the same, though the sediment is left behind; and as it would need a diviner power to turn the water into wine, so Prudence run however fine, social Conformity however swift and spontaneous, can never convert themselves into Obligation. Hence arises, I think, an inevitable contradiction between the scientific hypothesis and the personal characteristics of a high-souled disciple of the modern negative doctrine. For his superno affections no adequate Object and no corresponding Source is offered in the universe: if they look back for their cradle, they see through the forest the cabin of the savage or the lair of the brute; if they look forth for their justifying Reality and end, they fling vain arms aloft and embrace a vacancy. They cannot defend, yet cannot relinquish, their own enthusiasm: they bear him forward upon heroic lines that sweep wide of his own theory; and, transcending their own reputed origin and environment, they float upon vapours and are empty, self-poised by their own heat. One or two instances will illustrate the way in which what is best in our humanity is left, in the current doctrine, unsupported by the real constitution of the world.

Compassion—the instinctive response to the spectacle of misery—has a twofold expressiveness: it is in us a protesting vote against the sufferings we see; and a sign of faith that they are not ultimate but remediable. Its singularity is, to be not one of these alone, but both. Were it a simple repugnance, it would drive us from its object; but it is an *aversion which attracts*: it snatches us with a bound to the very tiling we hate, and not with hostile rush, but with softened tread and gentle words and uplifting hand. And what is the secret of this transfiguration of horror into love? It could never be but for the implicit assurance that for these wounds there is healing possible, if the nursing care does not delay. Should we not say then, if we trusted its own word about itself, that this principle, so deep and intense in our unfolded nature, is an evident provision for a world of *hopeful sorrow*? It is distinctly relative to pain, and would be out of place in a scene laid out for happiness alone; yet treats that pain as transient, and on passing into the cloud already sees the opening through. It enters the infirmary of human ills with the tender and cheerful trust of the young sister of mercy, who binds herself to the perpetual presence of human maladies, that she may be for ever giving them their discharge. Compassion institutes a strange order of servitude: it sets the strong to obey the weak, the man and woman to wait upon the child, and youth and beauty to kneel and bend before decrepitude and deformity. How then do the drift and faith of this instinct agree with the method of the outer world as now interpreted? Do they copy it exactly, and find encouragement from the great example? On the contrary, Nature, it is customary to say, is *pitiless*, and, while ever moving on, makes no step but by crushing a thousand-fold more sentient life than she ultimately sets up, and sets up none that does not devour what is already there. The battle of existence rages through all time and in every field; and its rule is to give no quarter,—to despatch the maimed, to overtake the halt, to trip up the blind, and drive the fugitive host over the precipice into the sea. Nature is fond of the mighty, and kicks the feeble; and, while for ever multiplying wretchedness, has no patience with it when it looks up and moans. And so all-pervading is this rule, that evil, we are told, cannot really be put down, but only masked and diverted; if you suppress it here, it will break out there; the fire of anguish still rolls below and has alternate vents; when

you stop up Ætna, it will blot out Sodom and Gomorrha, and bury the cities of the plain. Who can deny that such teachings as these set the outer universe and our inner nature at its best at hopeless variance with one another? Do they not depress the moral power to which we owe the most humanizing features of our civilization? We have not to go far for a practical answer. Within a few weeks the question has been raised whether the recent flow of commiseration towards the famine-stricken districts of India does not offend against the Law of Nature for reducing a superfluous population; and whether there were not advantages in the old method of taking no notice of these things, and letting Death pass freely over his threshing-floor and bury the human chaff quietly out of the way. Moral enthusiasm makes many a mischievous mistake in its haste and blindness, and greatly needs the guidance of wiser thought; but this tone of moral scepticism, which disparages the very springs of generous labour, and treats them as follies laughed at by the cynicism of Nature, is a thousand-fold more desolating. For it carries poison to the very roots of good. It is as the bursting out of salt-springs in the valley of fruits; it soaks through the prolific soil of all the virtues, and turns the promise of Eden into a Dead Sea shore.

Beyond the range of the merely compassionate impulse, *Self-forgetfulness* in love for others has a foremost place in our ideal of character, and our deep homage as representing the true end of our humanity. We exact it from ourselves, and the poor answer we make to the demand costs us many a sigh; and till we can break the bonds that hold us to our own centre, and lose our self-care in constant sacrifice, a shadow of silent reproach lies upon our heart. Who is so faultless, or so obtuse, as to be ignorant what shame there is, not only in snatched advantages and ease retained to others' loss, but in ungentle words, in wronging judgment within our private thoughts alone; nay, in simple blindness to what is passing in another's mind? Who does not upbraid himself for his slowness in those sympathies which are as a multiplying mirror to the joys of life, reflecting them in endless play? And the grace so imperfect in ourselves wins our instant veneration when realized in others. The historical admirations of men are often, indeed, drawn to a very different type of character: for Genius and Will have their magnificence as well as Goodness its beauty: but before the eye of a purified reverence, neither the giants of force nor the recluses of saintly austerity stand on so high a pedestal as the devoted benefactors of mankind. The heroes of honour are great; but the heroes of service are greater; nor does any appeal speak more home to us than a true story of life risked, of ambitions dropped, of repose surrendered, of temper moulded, of all things serenely endured,—perhaps unnoticed and in exile,—at some call of sweet or high affection. Is then this religion of Self-sacrifice the counterpart of the behaviour of the objective world? Is the same principle to be found dominating on that great scale? Far from it. *There*, we are informed, the only rule is *self-assertion*: the all-determining Law is relentless competition for superior advantage; the condition of obeying which is, that you are to forego nothing, and never to miss an opportunity of pushing a rival over, and seizing the prey before he is on his feet again. We look without, and see the irresistible fact of selfish scramble: we look within, and find the irresistible faith of unselfish abnegation. So here, again, Morals are unnatural, and Nature is unmoral; and if, beyond Nature, there is nothing supreme in both relations to determine the subordination and resolve the contradiction, he who would be loyal to the higher call must be so without ground of trust; if he will not betray his secret ideal, he must follow it unverified, as a mystic enchantment of his own mind.

Once more; the *Sense of Duty* enforces the suggestions of these and other affections by an authority which we recognise as at once within us and over us, and making them more than *impulses*, more than *ideals*, and establishing them in *binding* relations with our Will. The rudest self-knowledge must own that the consciousness of *Moral Obligation* is an experience *sui generis*, separated by deep distinctions from *outward necessity* on the one hand and *inward desire* upon the other; and the only psychology which can bridge over these distinctions is that which escapes with its analysis into prehistoric ages, and finds it easy to grow vision out of touch, and read back all differentiation into sameness. No one would carry off the problem into that darkness who could deal with it in the present daylight: so, we may take it as confessed, that *to us* the suasion of Eight speaks with a voice which no charming of pleasure and no chorus of opinion can ever learn to mimic. To disregard *them* is a simple matter of courage; we defy them, and are free: but if from *it* we turn away, we hear pursuing feet behind: and should we stop our ears, we feel upon us the grasp of an awful hand. Moral good would, in our apprehension, cease to be what it is, were it constituted by any natural good, or related to it otherwise than as its superior. It is not a *personal* end—one among the many satisfactions assigned to the separate activities of our constitution: else, it would be at our disposal, and we might forego it. Others are our partners in it: for it sets up *Rights* as counterparts to *Duties*, and widens by its reciprocity into a common element of Humanity. Is *that* then its native home? Have men created it, as an expression of their general wish,—a concentrated code of civic police? We cannot rest in this: for no aggregate of wills, no public meeting of mankind, though it got together all generations and all contemporary tribes, could by vote make perfidy a virtue and turn pity into a crime. Moral Eight is thus no *local* essence; but by its centrifugal force, relatively to our abode, slips off the earth and assumes an absolute universality as the law of all free agency. That it should present itself to us in this transcendent aspect is intelligible enough, if it be identified with the Universal Mind,

and thence imparted to dependent natures permitted to be like Him: for, in that case, the related feelings and convictions are *true*; in the order of reality, Righteousness *is* prior to the pains and pleasures of our particular faculties and the natural exigencies of our collective life; and our allegiance is due to an eternal Perfection which penetrates the moral structure of all worlds. How then does this intuitive faith of our responsible will, this worship of an eternally Holy, stand with the kosmical conceptions now tyrannizing over the imaginations of men? It encounters the shock of contemptuous contradiction. Ethically, we are assured, the known world culminates in us. Before us, there was nothing morally good: over us, there is nothing morally better: Man himself is here the supreme being in the universe. In the just, the beneficent, the true, there is no pre-existence: they are not the roots of reality, but the last blossoms of the human phenomena. And even there, the fair show which gives them their repute of an ethereal beauty is but the play of an ideal light upon coarse materials;—rude pleasures and ruder constraints are all that remain when the increments of fancy have fallen away. The real world provides *interests* alone; which, when adequately masked, call themselves virtues and pass for something new: and, duped by this illusion, we dream of a realm of authoritative Duty, in which the earth is but a province of a supramundane moral empire. And so, we must conclude, the Conscience which lives on this sublime but empty vision has transcended the tuition of Nature, and, in growing wiser than its teacher, has lost its foothold on Reality, only to lean on a phantom of Divine support.

On the hypothesis of a Mindless universe, such is the fatal breach between the highest inward life of man and his picture of the outer world. All that is subjectively noblest turns out to be the objectively hollowest; and the ideal, whether in life and character, or in the beauty of the earth and heaven, which he had taken to be the secret meaning of the Real, is repudiated by it, and floats through space as a homeless outcast. Even in this its desolation a devoted disciple will say, 'I will follow thee whithersoever thou goest;' but how heavy the cross which he will have to bear! Religion, under such conditions, is a defiance of inexorable material laws in favour of a better which they have created but cannot sustain,—a reaction of man against Nature, which he has transcended,—a withdrawal of the Self which a resistless force pushes to the front,—a preservation of the weak whom Necessity crushes, a sympathy with sufferings which life relentlessly sets up,—a recognition of authoritative Duty which cannot be. Or will you perhaps insist that, in this contrariety between thought and fact, Religion must take the other side, discharge the Greek quote as illusory, and in her homage hold fast to the solid world? This might perhaps in some sense be, if you only gave us a world which it was possible to respect. But, by a curious though intelligible affinity, the modern doctrine allies itself with an unflinching pessimism; it plays the cynic to the universe,—penetrates behind its grand and gracious airs, and detects its manifold blunders and impostures: what skill it has it cannot help; and the only faults and horrors that are *not* in it are those which are too bad to live. Human life, which is the summit that has been won, is pronounced but a poor affair at best; and the scene which spreads below and around is but as a battle-field at night-fall, with a few victors taking their faint shout away, and leaving the plain crowded with wounds and vocal with agony. Existence itself, insists Hartmann, is an evil, in proportion as its range is larger and you know it more, and that of cultivated men is worst of all;

Philosophie des Unbewussten, c. xii. p. 598.

and the constitution of the world (so stupidly does it work) would be an unpardonable crime, did it issue from a power that knew what it was about.

Ap. Strauss: der alte und der neue Glaube, p. 223.

How can these malcontents find any *Religion* in obeying such a power? Can they approach it with contumely at one moment, and with devotion at the next? If they think so ill of Nature, there can be no *reverence* in their service of her laws: on the contrary, they abandon what they revere to bend before what they revile. To this humiliation the more magnanimous spirits will never stoop; they will find some excuse for still clinging to the ideal forms they cannot verify; will go apart with them with a high-toned love which stops short of faith but is full of faithfulness; will linger near the springs of poetry and art, and there forget awhile the disenchanting Actual; and will wonder perhaps whether this half-consecrated ground may not suffice, when the temples are gone, to give an asylum to the worshippers. Such loyalty of heart towards the harmonies that *ought* to prevail, with disaffection towards the discords that *do* prevail, may indeed lift the character of a man to an elevation half-divine; and in his presence, Nature, were she not blind, might start to see that she had produced a god. But, for all that, she is not going to succumb to him; she can call up her lower brood to suppress him, or monsters to chain him to her rock. He contends with the lower forces, believing them to be the stronger, and fights his losing battle against hordes of inferiors ever swarming to overwhelm what is too good for the world. Such religion as remains to him is a religion of despair,—a pathetic defiance of an eternal baser power. And if there be anything tragic in earth or heaven, it is the proud desolation of a mind which has to regard itself as Highest, to know itself the seat of some love and justice and devotion to the good, and to look upon the system of the Universe as cruel, ugly, stupid and mean. The most touching episodes of history are perhaps those which disclose the life of genius and virtue under some capricious and ignoble tyranny,—asserting itself in the

ostracism of an Aristides, the hemlock-cup of Socrates, the blood-bath of Thræsea; and no other than this is the life of every man who, walking only by his purest inner lights, finds that they illumine no nature but his own, and are baffled and quenched by the outer darkness.

It cannot be denied that there does exist this contrariety between the modern materialistic philosophy and religious faith. It cannot be believed that this contrariety is chargeable on any mutual contradiction among the human faculties themselves. Were we really placed between two informants that said 'Yes' at the right ear and 'No' at the left, we should simply be without cognitive endowment at all, and all the pulsations of thought would cancel each other and die. Can we end the strife by separating the provinces of the two opposites, and saying that the function of the one is *to know*, of the other *to create*?

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Certainly, "creative" power is something grand, and Theology should perhaps feel honoured to be invested with it. But, alas! a *known* materialism and a *created* Cod presents a combination which thought repudiates and reverence abhors; and the suggestion of which must be met with the counter affirmations, that the atomic hypothesis is a thing *not known but created*, while God is *not created but known*. The only possible basis for a treaty of alliance between the tendencies now in conflict is not in lodging the one in the Reason and the other in the Imagination, in order to keep them from quarrelling, but in recognizing a Duality in the functions of Reason itself, according as it deals with phenomena or their ground, with law or with causality, with material consecution or with moral alternatives, with the definite relations of space and time and motion, or with the indefinite intensities of beauty and values of affection which bear us to the infinitely Good. When once this adjustment of functions has been considerably made, the disturbed equilibrium of minds will be reinstated, the panic and the arrogance of our time will disappear, and the progress of the intellect will no longer shake the soul from her everlasting rest.

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Preface.

IN reproducing the following Essay, I should gladly have divested it of all controversial character. But though in substance it is independent of its immediate occasion, its form has been so far shaped by the necessities of self-defence, as to render the features of its history indelible. Whatever personal element it contains will be found, I trust, strictly relevant to the general argument, and even indispensable to the right conception of the problem discussed. My sole object has been to reduce that problem to its essential factors, and remove the disguises thrown around it by ill-understood words. To the demand for exactitude of method in dealing with the border-land between Natural Knowledge and Theology I willingly submit. It was indeed in the interest of such a method that both this Essay and its predecessor were written: and it is to the want of it that the prevalent misunderstandings are due between the representatives of Science and the interpreters of Religion.

LONDON,

April 5, 1876.

Modern Materialism: its Attitude Towards Theology.

AT the beginning of October, 1874, it was my duty, as Principal of a Theological College, to open a new session with an Address, which was afterwards published under the title, "Religion as affected by Modern Materialism." It raises the question whether the free and scientific methods of study insisted on in the College involved results at variance with its theological design. It states accordingly three assumptions hitherto implied in that design: "That the universe which includes us and folds us round is the life-dwelling of an Eternal Mind; that the world of our abode is the scene of a Moral Government incipient but not yet complete; and that the upper zones of human affection, above the clouds of self and passion, take us into the sphere of a Divine Communion." With regard to these assumptions the thesis is maintained that they are beyond the contradiction, because not within the logical range, of the natural sciences. In support of this thesis the mischiefs are shown, both to science and to theology, of confusing their boundaries, and treating the discovery of Law as the negation of God; and the separating line is drawn, that in their intellectual dealings with phenomena, science investigates the "how" and theology the "whence." Tempted on by two of its indispensable conceptions, *matter* and *force*, science, overstepping this boundary, has of late affected to know not only the order but the origin of things; in the one case starting them from *atoms* as their source, in the other from mechanical *energy*. I try to show that neither datum will work out its result except by the aid of logical illusions. You will get out of your atoms by "evolution," exactly so much and no more as you have put into them by hypothesis. And with regard to force, it is contended that observation and induction do not carry us to it at all, but stop with *movements*; that the so-called kinds of force are only classes of phenomena, with the constant belief of causality behind; that of causality we have no cognition but as Will, from which the idea of "physical force" is simply cut down by artificial abstraction to the needs of phenomenal investigation and grouping; and that, in conceiving of the single power hid in every group, we must revert to the intuitive type, because the only authorized, and to the highest, because alone covering the highest phenomena. The attempt, under shelter of the unity of energy behind all its masks, to make the lowest phase, besides playing its own part, stand for the whole, is described as a logical sleight of hand by which a heedless reasoner may impose upon himself and others.

After this defensive argument to show that the religious positions are not displaced by natural science, they are traced to their real seat in human nature, and treated as postulates involved in the very existence and life of the reason and conscience. In support of their natural claim to our entire trust, it is contended that, for their ethical power, they are absolutely dependent on their objective truth; and further, that our nature, in respect of its higher affections, compassion, self-forgetfulness, moral obligation, is constructed in harmony with a world Divinely ruled, and in utter conflict with the Pessimist's picture of nature.

The Address thus epitomized has brought upon me the honour and the danger of a critique by Professor Tyndall,

Fragments of Science: "Materialism" and its Opponents; and, previously, *Fortnightly Review*, November 1, 1875.

marked by all his literary skill, and rendered persuasive by happy sarcasm and brilliant description. One fault at least he brings home to me with irresistible conviction. He blames my mode of writing as deficient in precision and lucidity. And I cannot deny the justice of the censure when I observe that my main line of argument has left no trace upon his memory, that its estimate of scientific doctrines is misconstrued, that my feeling towards the order of nature is exhibited in reverse, that I am cross-questioned about an hypothesis of which I never dreamt, and am answered by a charming "alternative" exposition of ascending natural processes, which I follow with assent till it changes its voice from physics to metaphysics, and from its premisses of positive phenomena proclaims a negative ontological conclusion. That at every turn I should have put so acute a reader upon a totally false scent, rebukes me more severely than any of his direct and pertinent criticisms; for, smartly as these may hit me, they fall chiefly on incidental and parenthetical remarks which might have been absent, or on mere literary form which might have been different, without affecting the purport of my Address. Whether the force of these minor thrusts is really disabling, or is only a by-play telling mainly on the fancy of the observer, a brief scrutiny will determine.

(1.) In saying that the College which I represent leaves open to all new lights of knowledge "the special studies which deal with our sources of religious faith," I expanded this phrase by the words, "whether in the scrutiny of nature or in the interpretation of sacred books." This innocent parenthesis, which simply summarizes the growing-grounds of all actual theology, produces in my critic an effect out of all proportion to its significance. Twice he challenges me to show how any "religious faith" can be drawn from "nature," which I regard, he says, as "base and cruel." It suffices to say that "scrutiny of nature" does not exclude "*human nature*," wherein the springs of religion are afterwards traced to their intuitive seats; and that, in what are called my "tirades against nature" as "base and cruel," I am describing, not my own view of the order of the world, but one which I repudiate as utterly sickly and perverse. Then, again, I am asked how, after giving up the Old Testament cosmogony, I can any longer speak of "sacred books," without informing my readers where to find them. I have occasionally met with scientific men whose ideas about the Bible, if going further than the

Creation, came to an end at the Flood, and who thought it only loyal to Laplace and Lyell thenceforth to shelve "Moses and the prophets:" but a judgment so *borné* I should not expect from Professor Tyndall. Can a literature then have nothing "sacred," unless it be infallible? Has the religion of the present no roots in the soil of the past, so that nothing is gained for our spiritual culture by exploring its history and reproducing its poetry, and ascending to the tributary waters of its life? The real modern discovery, far from saying there is no sacred literature, because none oracular, assures us there are several; and, notwithstanding a deepened because purified attachment to our own "Origines" in the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, persuades us to look with an open reverence into all writings that have embodied and sustained the greater pieties of the world. But to my censor it appears a thing incredible that I should find a sanctity in anything human; or deem it possible to approach religion in its truth by intercepting its errors as it percolates through history, and letting it flow clearer and clearer, till it brings a purifying baptism to the conscience of our time.

(2.) In order to give distinctness to that "religion" in relation to which I proposed to treat of "Modern Materialism," I specified "three assumptions" involved in it, of which the first and chief is the existence of the "Living God." I am reproached with making no attempt to verify them, but permitting them to "remain assumptions" "to the end." Be it so, though the statement is not quite exact: still, in every reasoned discourse assumptions have their proper place, as well as proofs; and the right selection of propositions to stand in the one position or the other depends on the speaker's thesis and the hearer's needs. My *thesis* was, that natural science did not displace these assumptions, because they lie beyond its range; and the *proof* is complete if it is shown that the logical limit of inductive knowledge stops short of their realm, and is illegitimately overstepped by every physical maxim which contradicts them. To turn aside from this line of argument in order to "verify" the primary matter of the whole discussion, would have been to set out for Exeter and arrive at York. My *hearers* consisted of the teachers, supporters and alumni of a *Theological* College; and to treat them as a body of atheists, and offer proofs of the being of a God, would have been as impertinent as for Professor Tyndall to open the session of a *Geological* Society with a demonstration of the existence of the earth.

(3.) A few reluctant words must suffice in answer to the charge of "scorning the emotions." I say "*reluctant* words:" for to this side of our nature it is given to speak without being much spoken of; to live and be, rather than be seen and known; and when dragged from its retreat, it is so hurt as to change its face and become something else. Here, however, little more is needed than to repeat the words which are pronounced to be so "rash" and even "petulant"—"I trust that when '*emotion proves empty*, we shall stamp it out and get rid of it." Do I then "scorn" the "emotion" of any mind stirred by natural vicissitudes or moving realities—the cry of Andromache, Greek quote at the first sight of her hero's dishonoured corpse; the covered face and silent sobs of Phædon, when Socrates had drained the cup; the tears of Peter at the cock-crowing; or any of the fervent forms of mental life—the mysticism of Eckhart, the intellectual enthusiasm of Bruno, the patriotic passion of Vane? Not so; for none of these are "empty," but carry a meaning adequate to their intensity. It is for "emotion" with a vacuum within, and floating *in vacuo* without, charged with no thought and directed to no object, that I avow distrust; and if there be an "overshadowing awe" from the mere sense of a blank consciousness and an enveloping darkness, I can see in it no more than the negative condition of a religion yet to come. In human psychology, feeling, when it transcends sensation, is not without idea, but is a type of idea; and to suppose "an inward hue and temperature," apart from any "object of thought," is to feign the impossible. Colour must lie upon form; and heat must spring from a focus, and declare itself upon a surface. If by referring religion to the region of emotion" is meant withdrawing it from the region of truth, and letting it pass into an undulation in no medium and with no direction, I must decline the surrender.

In thus refusing support from "empty emotion," I am said to "kick away the only *philosophic foundation* on which it is possible to build religion." Professor Tyndall is certainly not exacting from his builders about the solidity of his "foundation;" and it can be only a very light and airy architecture, not to say an imaginary one, that can spring from such base; and perhaps it does not matter that it should be unable to face the winds. Nor is the inconsistency involved in this statement less surprising than its levity. Religion, it appears, has a "philosophical foundation." But "philosophy" investigates the ultimate ground of cognition and the organic unity of what the several sciences assume. And a "philosophical foundation" is a legitimated first principle for some one of these; it is a cognitive beginning—a *datum* of ulterior *quæsitæ*—and nothing but a science can have it. Religion then must be an organism of thought. Yet it is precisely in denial of this that my censor invents his new "foundation." Here, he tells us, we know nothing, we can think nothing; the intellectual life is dumb and blank; we do but blindly feel. How can a structure without truth repose on philosophy in its foundation?

But do I not myself carry religious questions, in the last appeal, to the inward consciousness of man, whether intellectual for the interpretation of causality, or moral for the interpretation of duty? Undoubtedly; and Professor Tyndall thinks it "highly instructive" that I "should have lived so long, thought so much, and failed to recognize the entirely subjective character of this creed." If I may omit the word "entirely" (which implies a gratuitous exclusion of "objective truth"), I not only recognize it, but everywhere insist upon it. The

fundamental religious conceptions have no deeper validity than belongs to the very frame of our faculties and the postulates of our thinking. But as this equally holds of the fundamental scientific conceptions, as matter and force have also to retire to consciousness for their witnesses—nay, as objectivity itself is but an interpretation by the subject of its own experience, is it not "highly instructive" that a critic so compassionate of my "subjective" position should be unaware of the ideality of his own? Or has he, perhaps, found some "objective knowledge" which has not to fall back upon a "subjective" guarantee?

If, as I suspect, Professor Tyndall uses the word "subjective," not in its strict sense, for what belongs to the *human subject at large*, but to denote what is special to the feeling of *this or that individual*, the question will then be whether I mistake an exceptional personal experience for a universal form of thought. This question is not settled by saying that many able men find in themselves no such inner experience. The eye for correct psychological reading is not secured by great intellect or noble character, but, like the organ of any other art, must be trained to quickness and delicacy of insight; and, while false or over-culture exposes it to the danger of seeing what is not there, a failure of culture may prevent its seeing what there is. Eight interrogation and careful comparison alone can sift out the essential from the accidental. Doubtless many a principle once advanced as self-evident and universal survives only in the grotesque museum of philosophers' fancies. But, on the other hand, whatever laws of thought are now admitted as universal were at first propounded, and often long resisted, as the expressions of individual reflection.

(4.) On one point more a personal *éclaircissement* is needed as a condition of any profitable argument. I am said to be "imperfectly informed regarding the position I assail." If I am sensitive to this remark, it is not that I cannot bear to be reminded of my ignorance, the sense of which is a shadow that never quits my life, but that, as no man has a right to attack doctrines which he has not taken the pains to understand, the statement carries in it a moral imputation, and calls on me either to clear it away or to confess a wrong. What then is the "position" which, under the name of "materialism," I intended to assail, and ought, perhaps, to have fixed by exact definition? Professor Tyndall supposes it to be *his* position, regarding which undoubtedly I am very imperfectly informed; for the indications of it, though clear enough for assent or criticism when taken one by one, appear to me so shifting and indeterminate in their combination, as to afford no means of testing it. Except in the two or three passages where it is quoted, the Belfast Address was no more in my view than the writings to which it referred and others belonging to the literature of the subject; and did not supply the form of doctrine to which my argument was addressed. The only question therefore is whether that form of doctrine really exists. If it can be shown that I have misconceived the materialists' position, and fastened upon them any thesis which is without eminent representative in their school, I must accept my rebuke. But if no part of my sketch is unsupported by adequate authority, it will remain true, though it should conflict with sentences in the "Fragments of Science."

Probably the chief instance of "imperfect information" is this—that I suppose the materialist doctrine to be offered as an *explanation* of the order of things; for my censor contrasts with this "travesty" of the scheme his own statement, that the materialist's "molecular groupings and movements in reality explain nothing," and that "the utmost he can affirm is the association of two classes of phenomena, of whose real bond of union he is in absolute ignorance." But surely, if this is all that he can affirm, he gives his materialism nothing to do, and is as well off without it as with it: in order simply to see that two series of phenomena run parallel, and correspond term for term, he needs no more than methodized observation, possible and identical on every theory or no theory about the substratum of the phenomena. If the human mind could be content with this spectacle of unexplained concomitance, the very impulse would be wanting from which materialism has sprung. Its fundamental proposition, common, as Lange remarks, to all its forms, ancient and modern—"that the universe consists of atoms and empty space"

Geschichte des Materialismus, 2tes Buch, p. 181.

—is an *hypothesis* devised for the express purpose of establishing a "bond of union" between lines of succession previously detached—*i. e.* of giving the mind a bridge of passage other than that of "association" from the one to the other—*i. e.* of *explaining* the second by the first. An hypothesis commends itself to us when (*inter alia*) it offers a higher conception from which, as an assumption, we can deduce *both* sets of previously separate facts; and so far as it fails to do this, it is self-condemned. There may be other defects in hypotheses; but if their *data* do not logically lead to the *quaesita*, they break their primary promise; and to see whether they are watertight throughout, or are leaky at the joints, is an efficient test of their pretensions. A materialist who knows what he is about would not disown the words which I put into his mouth—"Matter is all I want; give me its atoms alone, and I will explain the universe"—but would assuredly be offended were he told, and that by a "candid friend," that his doctrine "explains nothing."

As it is impossible to come to close quarters with a seesaw doctrine, which now touches solid ground and now escapes it, I naturally addressed myself to thorough-going materialists, without presuming to commit Professor Tyndall to their consistency. That there have been and are such persons—persons who have

undertaken, by defining the essence of matter and fixing it in atoms, "to explain the enigmatical by the clear, the intricate by the simple, the unknown by the known"

Lange, *Geschichte des Materialismus*, Ites Buch, pp. 8, 9.

—he cannot deny, after having himself introduced us to the thesis of Democritus,

In connection with this name there is an historical error in the Belfast Address which I should hardly notice were it not likely to be perpetuated by the just reputation of the author, and did it not apparently fall back for support upon Lange. This writer, noticing that Democritus makes no attempt to explain the appearances of adaptation out of the blind power of natural necessity, adds, "Whether this gap lay in his system itself, or only in the tradition of it, we do not know; but we do know that the source of even this last principle of all materialism—rudely shaped, it is true, yet with perfect precision of idea—is to be found in the philosophic thought of the Hellenic race. What Darwin, with the support of vast stores of positive knowledge, has effected for the present time, Empedocles offered to the thinkers of antiquity—the simple and penetrating thought that if adaptations preponderate in the world, it is because it lies in their very nature to maintain themselves; while that which fails of adaptation has perished long ago." (I. pp. 22, 23.) Misled by the order of this passage, which gives the missing thought *after* naming the "gap" which it might have filled, Dr. Tyndall has described Empedocles as intentionally making good a defect in Democritus—"Noticing this gap in the doctrine of Democritus, he (Empedocles) struck in with the penetrative thought," &c. This is an inversion of the chronology. Empedocles preceded Democritus by at least a generation, being born about B.C. 490, and dying B.C. 430; whilst Democritus, whom we find at Thurii shortly after the foundation of the colony in B.C. 443, died at a very advanced age, B.C. 357.—*Diog. Laert.* viii. 52, 56, ix. 41. *Comp. Arist. Met. A. 4*, p. 965, b. 4. the reasonings of Lucretius, and the method of Gassendi

Starting from the fundamental assumption, "Principio ergo Universum ex corpore et inani constat, neque enim tertia natura concipi mente præterea potest."—*Phil. Epicur. Syntagma*, Op. T. iii. 11.

The "atomists," says Lange, "attributed to matter only the simplest of the various properties of things—those, namely, which are indispensable for the presentation of a something in space and time; and their aim was to evolve from these alone the whole assemblage of phenomena." "They it was," he adds, "who gave the first perfectly clear notion of what we are to understand by matter as the basis of all phenomena. With the positing of this notion materialism stood complete, as the first perfectly clear and consequent theory of all phenomena."

Geschichte des Materialismus, i. pp. 8, 9.

If there is any difference between this statement of the problem and my "travesty" of it, I cannot discern it.

The indistinctness of which I ventured to complain in Dr. Tyndall's account of his "primordial" datum, I do not find removed by my pleasant journey with him to the Caribbean Sea and the Alpine snows, or his graceful pictures of Cingalese ferns, and of nascent infant life. The whole exposition appears to be dominated by the tacit maxim, "No matter without force, no force without matter"

Büchner: *Kraft und Stoff*, p. 2 (Aufl. 4).

—a maxim which may be true in fact, but does not dispense with the necessity of investigating the relation between two fundamental ideas which are not identical or interchangeable. In the natural sciences no harm is done by running them both together, or resorting in varying proportions to the one and to the other. Experimental research and mathematical deduction may go on undisturbed, by mere use of them as provisional conceptions, and without even suspecting that they carry in them any ulterior problem. But it is not by thus picking them up *in mediis rebus*, and taking them as they happen to come, that we can reach any philosophical view of the world, or estimate the theories which strive to interpret its unity and meaning. In spite of the cheap wit expended in derision of metaphysics, and the brave preference avowed for *terra firma*, you can escape them only by not knowing where you are. In their embrace you live and move and have your being; and, however fast your foot may cling to the earth, none the less do you swim with it through the infinite space which, even in its emptiness, is yet the condition of all solidity.

At a first glance, nothing looks more hopeful to the enthusiast for simplification than the reduction of "matter" to "force." Two or three easy equations will carry him through the problem. Matter is known to us only by its "properties," and, relatively to us, is tantamount to them. Its properties, again, are only its ways of affecting ourselves, either directly or through operations on other portions of matter. That is, it is represented to us wholly by the *effects* which it has *power* to produce, and resolves itself into an aggregate of *forces*. Make its essence what you will,—extension with Descartes; or palpableness with Fechner,—it is still as acting on the eye or the touch or the muscles that this essence reaches our apprehension; it is the cause of sensations to us, and anything that should cause such sensations would be identical with it. Is it not plain therefore that matter is simply power locally lodged? and that when pursued to its smallest conceivable elements, it merges into dynamic points, unextended centres of attraction and repulsion? Such a course of thought has again and again led to theories of dynamic idealism, like Bosco-vich's, Ampère's, and Cauchy's, in which the dimensions of the atoms whence molecular action proceeds not simply are small relatively to the distances which separate them,

but absolutely vanish. Such theories, by isolating the elements needed for calculation, offer advantages for mathematical physics. But there will always be found an irresolvable residue which declines to melt away into force. When you have construed the atom's solidity into repulsion, and reduced its extension to nothing, there remains its *position*, and this "whereabouts" of a power is other than the power itself; and secures to it a *Da-seyn* or objective existence in space. Nor is the conception of motion adequately provided for in these schemes of abstraction. As geometrical points themselves cannot be moved, the phenomenon becomes a translation of a cluster of attractions and repulsions to new centres. But attraction with nothing to be attracted, repulsion with nothing to be repelled, motion with nothing to be moved, are presentable in language only, not in thought. The running of one eddy round another or into another is intelligible so long as there is a *medium* be it of ether, however rare; but *in vacuo*, not so. A material *nidus* is indispensable as the seat of every motory change. The reason of this lies in the very structure of the human understanding, which supplies us with the category of Attribute or Property only in combination with that of Substance or Thing as its abiding base. The relation between the attribute which speaks to you phenomenally, and the substance which is given intellectually, is indissoluble: and analyze the phenomena as you may, so as to turn them from one type of predicate to another, you cannot cut them off from their persistent and unyielding seat, so as to have left on your hands a set of predicates without any subject. Thus the idea of "matter" vindicates itself against every attempt to get rid of it by transformation.

The simplification has also been attempted by the inverse method of dispensing with "force," and making "matter" do all the work. In physics, it is said, we know what we perceive or generalize from perception: "we observe what our senses, armed with the aids furnished by science, enable us to observe—nothing more."

"Materialism and its Opponents," *Fortnightly Review*, p. 595.

Movements, however, are all that we perceive, and if at first this fact escapes us when we hear and see, it is because our organs are not fine enough to read the undulations which deliver to them tones and tints. Submit their sensibility to adequate magnifying power, and all that is observable would resolve itself into local changes,—molecular or molar. It is the same in the celestial mechanics as in the scene of daily experience. We say that the moon goes through its lunations, and upheaves the tidal wave on the earth spinning beneath it, by the constant force of gravitation. But the real facts noticed are simply the presence, now here, now there, of two visible and solid globes, and of some piled-up water upon one of them, and a certain rule according to which these changes recur. Were these the only phenomena within our ken, this rule would be all that we mean by the "force" of which we speak. But as there are countless others which we have found to follow the same rule, we cannot speak of it without tacit reference to these, so that the word covers indefinitely more than the facts immediately in view. Still, it takes in nothing in any part of its field but movements and their law. And nothing moves but matter. The natural sciences would thus resolve themselves into a register of co-existent and sequent positions of bodies, expressed in formulas as comprehensive as the state of analysis allowed; and in this form, as Comte and Mill justly insist, they would fulfil all the conditions of phenomenal knowledge, and secure that power of *prevision* which is the crown and reward of scientific labour.

This reduction of everything to matter, motion, and law, would be unimpeachable, were our intelligence somewhat differently constructed. Matter,—as these expositors set out by observing,—speaks to our perceptive senses alone; and we should still know it, had we no more than these, and the ability to retain their vestiges and set them in order. Let us only see how things like and unlike lie and move in place and time, and the history of matter is all before us. For this purpose we need not go, among the forms or data of the understanding, beyond the relations of objectivity, succession, and resemblance. But over and above these, we are subject to another determinate condition of thought,—the principle of causality,—in virtue of which there can be no cognition of *phenomenon*, except as relative to *power* that issues it, any more than there can be a cognition of a *here* without a *there*, or a *before* without an *after*. This intellectual law leaves us unsatisfied with merely reading the *order* of occurrence among the changes we perceive; it obliges us to refer movement to a motor, to look beyond the matter stirred to a force that stirs it, be the force *without*, as in the expansive energy which propels a loaded shell, or *within*, as in that which ultimately bursts it. In any case, you have here a clear dynamic addition to that scheme of regimented and marshalled phenomena which results from the lonely conception of matter. Will you rid yourself of the dualism by insisting, while you concede the power, that it is only a *property* of the matter?—

"See," says Lange, "whether here you are not in danger of a logical circle. A 'thing' is known to us through its properties, a subject is determined by its predicates. But the 'thing' is in fact only the resting-point demanded by our thought. We know nothing but the properties and their concurrence in an unknown object, the assumption of which is a figment of our mind (*Gemüth*), a necessary one it seems, rendered imperative by our organization."

Geschichte des Materialismus, ii. p. 214.

Another answer may be given thus:—'You may make anything a predicate of matter which you can *observe* in it, *i. e.* all its *movements*; but not what you *cannot observe*, therefore not the *power* which issues the

movements; for this is not seen in the phenomenon; it is supplied by a necessity of thought, not as an element in it, but as a condition of it.'

Inasmuch then as both "matter" and "force" are intellectual data (*noümena*), involved respectively in the principle of Objectivity and in that of Causality, neither can be substituted for the other. For ages each has been trying to end the divided sway; but the rival, though often driven from the front, has always found at last an impregnable retreat, whence its rights return to recognition when the usurping rage is past. The present tendency in natural science is so strongly in favour of force as the better known term, that, according to Lange, "the untrue element in materialism, viz., the erecting of matter into the principle of all that exists, is completely, and it would seem definitively, set aside."

Ibid. p. 215.

From these two roots have arisen two forms of naturalism, capable no doubt of a balanced co-existence in the same mind, but often unharmonized, and expressing themselves in doctrines doubtfully related to each other. The *material* theory works out the conception of *Atoms*. The *dynamic* relies on that of the *Conservation of energy*. As a means of intellectually organizing ascertained facts, and holding them together in a tissue of conceivable relations, these conceptions possess a high value, and are indispensable to the reaching of any generalizations yet higher. In the one, the multiple proportions of chemistry and the laws of elastic diffusion find an adequate vehicle of expression and computation. In the other, a common measure is set up for variations of heat and mechanical work and chemical decomposition and electrical intensity, bringing several special provinces into a federal affinity. Dr. Tyndall misconstrues me when he imputes to me any disparagement of these conceptions, in their *scientific* use, for formulating, linking, and anticipating phenomena. It is not till they break these bounds, and, mistaking their own logical character, set up *philosophical* pretensions as adequate data for the deductive construction of a universe without mind, that I venture to resist their absolutism, and set them back within their constitutional rights. It is no wonder, perhaps, that many an enthusiast in the study of nature, excited by the race of rapid discovery, should lose count of his direction as he sweeps along, and, mounted upon these hobbies, should fancy that he can ride off into the region of ontology, and finding nothing, because never really there, should mistake his own failure for its blank. But the calmer critics of human thought know how to distinguish between the physical and the metaphysical use of these conceptions.

"There is scarcely a more naïve expression of the materialism of the day," says Lange, "than escapes from Büchner, when he calls the atoms of modern times 'discoveries of natural science,' while those of the ancients are said to have been 'arbitrary speculative representations.' In point of fact, the atomic doctrine to-day is still what it was in the time of Democritus. It has still not lost its metaphysical character; and already in ancient times it served also as a scientific hypothesis for the explanation of natural processes."

Geschichte des Materialismus, ii. 181.

And respecting the law of Conservation of energy, Lange observes that, taken in its "strictest and most consequent meaning, it is anything but proved: it is only an '*Ideal of the Reason*,' perhaps however indispensable as a goal for all empirical research."

Ibid. p. 213.

It is from no want of deference for science proper that I pass again under review the competency of these two doctrines to work out, *ab initio*, a blind cosmogony.

I.—THE ATOMIC MATERIALISM.

The *material* hypothesis, as I read it, and as alone I propose to comment on it, maintains that, with ultimate inorganic atoms to begin with, the present universe could be constructed. Before it can be tested, its *datum* (inorganic atoms) must be pressed into more determinate form by an explanation of the word "atoms." "Things which cannot be cut" might be all alike; or they might be variously different *inter se*: and before we start, we must know on which of these two assumptions we are to proceed. The former is the only admissible one, so long as you credit the materialist with any logical exactness. When he asks for *no more than matter* for his purpose, he must surely be understood to require nothing but the *essentials of matter*, the characters which enter into its definition; and to pledge himself to deduce out of these all the accessory characters which appear here and not there, and which discriminate the several provinces of nature. The idea of *atoms* is indeed simply the idea of "matter" *in minimis*, arising only from an arrest, by a supposed physical limit, of a geometrical divisibility possible without end; and the attributes which suffice to earn the one name give the meaning of the other. When in mathematical optics the investigator undertakes, from the conditions afforded by an undulatory elastic medium, to deduce the phenomena of refraction and polarization, he is not permitted to enlarge the data as he proceeds, and surreptitiously import into his ether chemical or other characters unnamed at first. Just as little can one who proposes to show the way from simple atoms to the finished world be allowed to swell the definition of those atoms at his convenience, and take on fresh attributes which change them from matter,

Greek quote, and make them now *this* sort of matter, now *that*. Whatever he thus adds to his assumption is filched from his *quæsitæ*, to the relief of his problem and the vitiation of its proof: and if the whole fulness of the *quæsitæ* is so withdrawn, and turned back to be condensed into *datum*, all deduction is given up, and the thesis is simply taken for granted.

In precisely this plight,—unless there is some reasoning between the lines which I am too dull to see,—Professor Tyndall leaves his case. He ridicules me for defining the assumed atoms as "homogeneous extended solids," on the ground that a phrase thus restricted to the "requisites of body" gives only "a metaphysical body."

It becomes still more metaphysical in the hands of an eminent teacher of physical science. "L'impénétrabilité," says Pouillet, "c'est la matifère. On n'a pas raison de dire que la matière a deux propriétés essentielles, *Pétendue* et *Pimpénétrabilité*; ce ne sont pas des propriétés, c'est une définition." And again, "L'impénétrabilité inséparable est ce qu'on appelle un *atome*."—*Eléments de Physique expérimentale*, Tom. i. p. 4.

Everything which you define is, in the same sense, a "metaphysical" (more properly, a "logical") subject. The object of the definition is to specify the attributes which alone are to be considered in giving the name, and in reasoning from it. The atomist who is not content with my account of his premisses should oblige me with a better, instead of stopping short with the discovery that a definition of a class is not a full description of its individuals. When, however, I look about for my critic's correcter version of "matter" or its atoms, it is long before I learn more than that "we must radically change our notions" of it,—an injunction upon which, without further help, it is difficult to act. At length, however, on the concluding page of the critique, the missing definition turns up. "Matter I define as *that mysterious thing by which all this has been accomplished*," *i.e.* the whole series of phenomena, from the evaporation of water to self-conscious life of man. Need I say that such a proposition is no definition, and dispenses with all proof; being simply *an oracle*, tautologically declaring the very position in dispute, that matter carries in it "the promise and potency of all terrestrial life"? The whole of the picturesque group of descriptive illustrations which lead up to this innocent dictum are only an expansion of the same *petitio principii*: they simply say, over and over again, the force immanent in matter *is* matter;—they are identical; or if not so as hitherto understood, we will have a new definition to make them so. This is not a process of reasoning, but an act of will,—a decretal enveloped in a scientific nimbus. Nothing can be less relevant than to show (and nothing else is attempted) that the forces of heat, of attraction, of life, of consciousness, are attached to material media and organisms, which they move and weave and animate: this is questioned by no one. In the sense of being *immanent* in matter, and manifesting themselves by its movements, they are *material* forces; but *not* in the sense of being derivable from the essential properties of matter, *quæ* matter. And this is the only sense on which philosophies divide, and reasoning is possible.

If the essence of the materialist hypothesis be to start with matter on its lowest terms, and thence work up into its highest, I did it no wrong in taking "homogeneous extended solids" as its *specified, datum*, and its *only* one; so that it constituted a system of "monism." Dr. Tyndall asks me "where and by whom" any such datum is "specified." In the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, June, 1872, Mr. Herbert Spencer contends that "the properties of the different elements" (*i.e.* chemical elements, hydrogen, carbon, &c.) "result from differences of arrangement, arising by the compounding and recompounding of *ultimate homogeneous units*." Here, *totidem verbis*, is the monism which I am charged with "putting into the scheme." As my critic is evidently anxious to disclaim the monistic datum, I conclude that he owns the necessity of *heterogeneous elements* to begin with, and feels with me the insecurity of Mr. Spencer's deduction of chemical phenomena from mechanical. Though I have the misfortune, in the use of this same argument,—that you cannot pass from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous,—to incur the disapproval of two great authorities, it somewhat relieves the blow to find Mr. Spencer at one with the premiss, and Dr. Tyndall ratifying the conclusion.

Before I quit this point I ought perhaps to explain, in deference to Mr. Spencer, why I venture to repeat an argument which he has answered with care and skill. In common with all logical atomists, he appeals to the case of *isomeric* bodies, and especially to the *allotropic* varieties of carbon and phosphorus, to prove that, without any change of elements in kind or proportion, and even without any composition at all, substances present themselves with marked differences of physical and chemical property. There are several distinct compounds formed out of the same relative weights of carbon and hydrogen. And the simple carbon itself appears as charcoal, as black-lead and as diamond; and phosphorus, again, in the yellow, semi-transparent, inflammable form, and as an opaque, dark-red substance, combustible only at a much higher temperature. In the absence of any variation in the material, these differences in the product are attributed to a different grouping of the atoms; and whatever their form, it is easy, within certain limits, to vary in imagination the adjustments of their homologous sides, so as to build molecules of several types, and ultimately aggregates of contrasted qualities.

I admit that, on the assumption of homogeneity, we may provide a series of unlike arrangements to count

off against a corresponding number of qualitative peculiarities, though it is doubtful whether the conceivable permutations can be pushed up through the throng of cases presented by organic chemistry. But the morphological differences, if adequately obtained, contribute no explanation of the observed variations of attribute. "What is there in the arrangement $a b c$ to occasion "activity" in phosphorus, while the arrangement $b a c$ produces "inertness"? Where the products differ only in geometrical properties, and consequently in optical, the explanation may be admissible, the form and the laying of the bricks determining the outline and the density of the structure. But the deduction cannot be extended from the physical to the chemical properties, so as to displace the rule that to these heterogeneity is essential. To treat the cases of allotropy as destructive of a rule so broadly based, and fly off to a conjectural substitute, is surely a rash logic. In these cases certainly we know of no difference of composition. But neither do we know of any difference of arrangement. The first, if we could suppose it latent there, would be a *vera causa* of the unexplained phenomena; the second, though its presence were ascertained, would still rank only as a *possible* cause of them. If, therefore, an inquirer chose to say, "From this difference of property I suspect a difference of composition," what answer could we give him from Mr. Spencer's point of view? Could we say, "We finally know carbon to be simple"? On the contrary, we are warned that "there are no recognized elementary substances, if the expression means substances known to be elementary. What chemists for convenience call elementary substances are merely substances which they have thus far failed to decompose." If we are to stand ready to see sixty-two out of the sixty-three "elements" fall analytically to pieces before our eyes, how can we feel so confident of the simplicity of phosphorus or carbon, as to make it answerable for a hypothetical reconstruction of chemical laws?

Even in the last resort, if we succeed in getting all our atoms alike, we do not rid ourselves of an unexplained heterogeneity; it is simply transferred from their nature as units to their rules of combination. Whether the qualitative difference between hydrogen and each of the other elements is conditional upon a distinction of kind in the atoms, or on definite varieties in their mode of numerical or geometrical union, these conditions are not provided for by the mere existence of homogeneous atoms; and nothing that you can do with these atoms, within the limits of their definition, will get the required heterogeneity out of them. Make them up into molecules by what grouping or architecture you will; still the difference between hydrogen and iron is not that between one and three, or any other number; or between shaped solids built off in one direction and similar ones built off in another, which may turn out like a right and a left glove. If hydrogen were the sole "primordial," and were transmutable, by select shuffling of its atoms, into every one of its present sixty-two associates, both the tendency to these special combinations, and the effects of them, would be as little deducible from the homogeneous datum as, on the received view, are the chemical phenomena from mechanical conditions. I still think, therefore, that if you assume atoms at all, you may as well take the whole sixty-three sorts in a lot. And this startling multiplication of the original monistic assumption I understand Professor Tyndall to admit as indispensable.

Next, in the striking words of Du Bois-Reymond, I had pleaded the impossibility of bridging the chasm between Chemistry and Consciousness. The sensations of warmth, of sound, of colour, are facts *sui generis*, quite other than the undulations of any medium, the molecular movements of any structure; known on different evidence, compared by different marks, needing a different language, affections of a different subject; and defying prediction and interpretation, on the part of a stranger to them, out of any formulas of physical equilibrium and motion, or of chemical affinity and composition. They, with all the higher mental conditions, belong to a world beyond the bounds of the natural sciences,—a world into which they can *never* find their way, its phenomena being intrinsically inappreciable by their instruments of research. Here, then, in this establishment of two spheres of cognition, separated by an impassable gulf, we surely have a breach in the continuity of our knowledge: on the one side, all the phenomena of matter and motion; on the other, those of living consciousness and thought. Step by step, the "Naturforscher" may press his advance, through even the contiguous organic provinces; but at this line his movement is arrested; he stands in presence of that which his methods cannot touch;—an intellectual necessity stops him, and that for ever, at the boundary which he has reached. With this doctrine I invited my readers to compare the statement of Professor Tyndall, that, relying on "the continuity of nature," he "cannot stop abruptly where microscopes cease to be of use," but "by an intellectual necessity crosses the boundary," and "discerns in matter the promise and potency of *all* terrestrial life," including, therefore, *conscious* life. *This* statement appeared to me inconsistent with Du Bois-Reymond's "limit to natural science," and still appears so. What is my critic's reply? He cites *another* statement of his own, which is quite consistent with the doctrine of the eminent Berlin Professor and anticipates it; a procedure by which he answers himself, not me;—and, instead of removing the contradiction, takes it home. If, as the earlier passage says, "the chasm between the two classes of phenomena" (physical processes and facts of consciousness) "remains intellectually impassable," the "intellectual necessity of crossing the boundary" is not easy to understand. In order to "discern in matter the *promise*" of conscious life, you must be able, by scrutiny of its mere physical movements, to forecast, in a world as yet insentient, the future phenomena of feeling and

thought. Yet this is precisely the transition which is pronounced "unthinkable;" "we do not possess the intellectual organ, nor apparently any rudiment of the organ, which would enable us to pass, by a process of reasoning, from the one to the other." If between these statements "nothing but harmony reigns," then indeed I am justly charged with being "inaccurate."

How then does the case stand with the atomic hypothesis, as a starting-point of scientific deduction? In Dr. Tyndall's latest exposition we have it admitted—(1) that the monistic doctrine of homogeneous units will not work, and that the assumption must be enlarged to include heterogeneous chemical atoms; (2) that nothing which we can do with this magnified datum will prevent our being finally stopped at the boundary of consciousness. As these two positions are precisely those which I had taken up against the speculative materialist, it is an infinite relief to discover, when the mask of controversy is removed, the features of a powerful ally. The whole argument sums itself up in Sir William Thomson's remark, "The assumption of atoms can explain no property of body which has not previously been attributed to the atoms themselves."

That the totality of sensible and deducible phenomena is produced by a constant amount of forces in a given quantity of matter, is a legitimate principle of modern science, and an adequate key for the interpretation of every proved or probable evolution. And in order to see what is comprised in changes that are intricately woven or fall broadly on the eye, it is often needful to take them to pieces and microscopically scrutinize them. We thus discover more exactly what they are, and how at the moment they are made up; and by doing likewise with the prior and posterior conditions of the same group, we learn to read truly the metamorphoses of the materials before us. But this is all. To suppose that by pulverizing the world into its least particles, and contemplating its components where they are next to nothing, we shall hit upon something ultimate beyond which there is no problem, is the strangest of illusions. There is no magic in the superlatively little to draw from the universe its last secret. Size is but relative, magnified or dwindled by a glass, variable with the organ of perception: to one being, the speck which only the microscope can show us may be a universe; to another, the solar system but a molecule; and in passing from the latter to the former you reach no end of search or beginning of things. If in imagination you simply recede from the molar to the molecular form of body, you carry with you, by hypothesis, all the properties of the whole into the parts where your regress ceases, and merely substitute a miniature of nature for its life-size, without at all showing whence the features come. If, on the other hand, you drop attributes from the mass in your retreat to the elements, on your return you can never pick them up again: starve your atom down to a hard, geometrically perfect minimum, and you have parted with the possibility of feeding it up to the qualitative plenitude of our actual material forms; for in mere resistance,—which is all that is left,—you have no source of new properties, only the power of excluding other competitors for its place.

Accordingly, the "atom" of the modern mathematical physics has given up its pretension to stand as an absolute beginning, and serves only as a necessary rest for exhausted analysis, before setting forth on the return journey of deduction. "A simple elementary atom," says Professor Balfour Stewart, "is probably in a state of ceaseless activity and change of form, but it is, nevertheless, always the same."

The Conservation of Energy, p. 7.

"The molecule" (here identical with "atom," since the author is speaking of a simple substance, as hydrogen) "though indestructible, is not a hard rigid body," says Professor Clerk Maxwell, "but is capable of internal movements, and when these are excited it emits rays, the wave-length of which is a measure of the time of vibration of the molecule."

A Discourse on Molecules, p. 12.

"Change of form" and "internal movements" are impossible without shifting parts and altered relations; and where, then, is the final simplicity of the atom? It is no longer a pure unit, but a numerical whole. And as part can separate from part, not only in thought but in the phenomenon, how is it an "atom" at all? What is there, beyond an arbitrary dictum, to prevent a part which changes its relation to its fellows from changing its relation to the whole,—removing to the outside? Such a body, though serving as an element in chemistry, is mechanically compound, and has a constitution of its own, which raises as many questions as it answers, and wholly unfits it for offering to the human mind a point of ultimate rest. It has accordingly been strictly kept to a penultimate position in the conception of philosophical physicists like Gassendi, Herschel, and Clerk Maxwell, and of masters in the logic of science, like Lotze and Stanley Jevons.

It is a serious question whether, in our time, atomism can any longer fulfil the condition which all the ancient materialism was invented to satisfy. The Ionian cosmogonies sprang from a genuine intellectual impulse; the desire to conquer the bewildering multiplicity of nature, and find some pervading identity which should make a woven texture of the whole; and whether it was moisture, or air, or the ether-fire, which was taken as the universal substratum, it was regarded as a *single datum*, on the simplicity of which the mind might disburden itself of an oppressive infinitude. The intention of these schemes was to *unify* all bodies in their material, and in some cases all minds as well, so as not even to allow two originals at the fountain-head, but to

evolve the All out of the One. This aim was but an overstraining of the permanent effort of all scientific interpretation of the world. It strives to make things conceivable by simplification, to put what was separate into relation, what was confused into order; to read back the many and the different into the one and the same, and so lessen, as far as possible, the list of unattached and underived *principia*. The charm of science to the imagination and its gain to life may be almost measured by the number of scattered facts which its analysis can bring into a common formula. The very sand-grains and rain-drops seem to lose in multitude, when the morphological agencies are understood which crystallize and mould them. The greatness of Newton's law lies in the countless host of movements which it swept from all visible space into one sentence and one thought. No sooner does Darwin supply a verified conception which construes the endless differences of organic kinds into a continuous process, than the very relief which he gives to the mind serves, with others if not with himself, as an equivalent to so much evidence. The acoustic reduction of sounds, in their immense variety, to the length, the breadth, and the form of a wave, is welcomed as a happy discovery from a similar love of relational unity. To simplify is the essence of all scientific explanation. If it does not gain this end, it fails to explain. Its speculative ideal is still, as of old, to reach some monistic principle whence all may flow; and in this interest it is, especially to get rid of dualism by dissolving any partnership with mind, that materialism continues to recommend its claims. Does it really bring in our day the simplification at which it aims?

Under the eye of modern science, Matter, pursued into its last haunts, no longer presents itself as one undivided *stuff*, which can be treated as a continuous substratum absorbent of all number and distinction; but as an infinitude of discrete atoms, each of which might be though all the rest were gone. The conception of them, when pushed to its hypothetical extreme, brings them no nearer to unity than *homogeneity*,—an attribute which itself implies that they are separate and comparable members of a *genus*. And what is the result of comparing them? They "are conformed," we are assured, "to a constant type with a precision which is not to be found in the sensible properties of the bodies which they constitute. In the first place, the mass of each individual," "and all its other properties, are absolutely unalterable. In the second place, the properties of all" "of the same kind are absolutely identical."

Discourse on Molecules, by J. Clerk Maxwell, M.A., F.R.S., p. 11.

Here, therefore, we have an infinite assemblage of phenomena of Resemblance. But further, these atoms, besides the internal vibration of each, are agitated by movements carrying them in all directions, now along free paths and now into collisions,

Theory of Heat, by J. Clerk Maxwell, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S.S. London and Edin., pp. 310, 311.

Here, therefore, we have phenomena of Difference in endless variety. And so it comes to this, that our unitary datum breaks up into a genus of innumerable contents, and its individuals are affected both with ideally perfect correspondences and with numerous contrasts of movement. What intellect can pause and compose itself to rest in this vast and restless crowd of assumptions? Who can restrain the ulterior question,—whence then these myriad types of the same letter, imprinted on the earth, the sun, the stars, as if the very mould used here had been lent to Sirius and passed on through the constellations? Everywhere else the likenesses of individual things, especially within the same "species,"—of daisy to daisy, of bee to bee,—have awakened wonder and stimulated thought to plant them in some uniting relation to a cause beyond themselves; and not till the common parentage refers them to the same matrix of nature does the questioning about them subside. They quietly settle as derivative where they could never be accepted as original. Some chemists think, as Mr. Herbert Spencer reminds us,

Contemporary Review, June, 1872, p. 142.

that in the hydrogen atom we have the ultimate simple unit. By means of the spectroscope, samples of it, and of its internal vibrations, may be brought from Sirius and Aldebaran—distances so great that light itself needs twenty-two years to cross the lesser of them—into exact comparison with our terrestrial specimens; and were their places changed, there would be nothing to betray the secret. So long as no *à priori* necessity is shown for their quantity of matter being just what it is, and always the same at incommunicating distances, or for their elasticity and time of pulsation having the same measure through myriads of instances, they remain unlinked and separate starting-points; and if they explain a finite number of resemblances and differences, it is only by assuming an infinite.

But even the approach to simplicity which homogeneity would afford fails us. Notwithstanding the possibility, in the case of certain carbonates, of substituting isomorphous constituents for one another, it cannot be pretended that any evidence as yet breaks down the list of chemical elements: and, should some of them give way before farther attempts at analysis, they are more likely—if we may judge of the future from the past—to grow to a hundred than to dwindle to one: to say nothing of the probability, already suggested by the star-spectroscope, that in other regions of space there exist elements unknown to us. At present, in place of a single type of atom, we have to set out with more than sixty, all independent, and each repeating the phenomenon of exact resemblance among its members wherever found. Perhaps you see nothing inconceivable

in the self-existence of ever so many perfect facsimiles ready everywhere for the making of the worlds, and may treat it as a thing to be expected that, being there at all, they should be all alike. So much the more certain, then, must be your surprise on finding them *not* all alike, but ranging themselves under sixty heads of difference. If the similars are entitled to the position of Greek quote, the dissimilars are not: and if neither can prefer the claim, the atomic doctrine, when pushed into an ultimate theory of origination, extravagantly violates the first condition of a philosophical hypothesis.

Nor is its series of assumed data even yet complete. For these sixty kinds of atoms are not at liberty to be neutral to one another, or to run an indeterminate round of experiments in association, within the limits of possible permutation. Each is already provided with its select list of admissible companions; and the terms of its partnership with every one of these are strictly prescribed; so that not one can modify, by the most trivial fraction, the capital it has to bring. Vainly, for instance, does the hydrogen atom, with its low figure and light weight, make overtures to the more considerable oxygen element: the only reply will be, Either none of you or two of you. And so on throughout the list. Among the vast group of facts represented by this sample, I am not aware of more than one set—the union of the same combining elements in *multiple* doses for the production of a scale of compounds—of which the atomist hypothesis can be said to render an account. Everything else,—the existence of "affinity" at all, its limitation to particular cases so far short of the whole, the original cast of its definite ratios, its preference for unlike elements,—stands unexplained by it, or must be carried into it as a new burden of primordial assumptions. This chasm between the facts of chemistry and its speculations is clearly seen by its best teachers. Kekulé treats the symbolic notation of chemical formulas as a means of simply expressing the *fact* of numerical proportion in the combining weights.

"If to the symbols in these formulas" (he adds) "a different meaning is assigned, if they are regarded as denoting the atoms of the elements with their weights, as is now most common, the question arises, 'What is the relative size or weight of the atoms?' Since the atoms can be neither measured nor weighed, it is plain that to the hypothetical assumption of determinate atomic weights we have nothing to guide us but speculative reflection."

Lehrbuch der organischen Chemie, ap. Lange, Geschichte des Materialising, ii. p. 191.

The more closely we follow the atomist doctrine to its starting-point, and spread before us the necessary outfit for its journey of deduction, the larger do its demands appear; and when, included in them, we find an unlimited supply of absolutely like objects, all repeating the same internal movements,—an arbitrary number of unlike types, in each of which this demand is reproduced, and a definite selection of rules for restricting the play of combination among these elements,—we can no longer, in the face of this stock of self-existent originals, allow the pretence of simplicity to be anything but an illusion.

Large as the atomist's assumptions are, they do not go one jot beyond the requirements of his case. He has to deduce an orderly and determinate universe, such as we find around us, and to exclude chaotic systems where no equilibrium is established. In order to do this he must pick out the special conditions for producing this particular kosmos and no other, and must provide against the turning up of any out of a host of equally possible worlds. In other words, he must, in spite of his contempt for final causes, himself proceed upon a preconceived world-plan, and guide his own intellect as, step by step, he fits it to the universe, by the very process which he declares to be absent from the universe itself. If all atoms were round and smooth, he thinks no such stable order of things as we observe could ever arise; so he rejects these forms in favour of others. By a series of such rejections he gathers around him at last the select assortment of conditions which will work out right. The selection is made, however, not on grounds of *à priori* necessity, but with an eye to the required result. Intrinsically the possibilities are all equal (for instance), of round and smooth atoms, and of other forms; and a problem therefore yet remains behind, short of which human reason will never be content to rest, viz.: How come they to be so limited as to fence off competing possibilities, and secure the actual result? Is it an *eternal* limitation, having its "*ratio sufficiens*" in the uncaused essence of things; or *superinduced* by some power which can import conditions into the unconditioned, and mark out a determinate channel for the "stream of tendency" through the open wilds over which else it spreads and hesitates? It was doubtless in view of this problem, and in the absence of any theoretic means of excluding other atoms than those which we have, that Herschel declared them to have the characteristics of "manufactured articles." This verdict *amuses* Dr. Tyndall; nothing more. He twice

Belfast Address, p. 26. *Fortnightly Review*, Nov. 1875, p. 598.

dismisses it with a supercilious laugh; for which perhaps, as for the atoms it concerns, there may be some suppressed "*ratio sufficiens*." But the problem thus pleasantly touched is not one of those which *solventur risu*; and, till some better-grounded answer can be given to it, that on which the large and balanced thought of Herschel and the masterly penetration of Clerk Maxwell have alike settled with content, may claim at least a provisional respect.

Having confined myself in this section to the Atomic Materialism, I reserve for the next the consideration

of the Dynamic Materialism, and the bearings of both on the primary religious beliefs. To those—doubtless the majority in our time—who have made up their minds that behind the jurisdiction of the natural sciences no rational questions can arise, and from their court no appeal be made, who will never listen to metaphysics except in disproof of their own possibility, I cannot hope to say any useful word: for the very matters on which I speak lie either on the borders of their sphere, or in quite another. I am profoundly conscious how strong is the set of the *Zeit-geist* against me, and should utterly fail before it, did it not sweep by me as a mere pulsation of the *Ewigkeits-geist* that never sweeps by. Nor is it always, even now, that physics shut up the mind of their most ardent and successful votary within their own province, rich and vast as that province is. "It has been asserted," says Professor Clerk Maxwell, "that metaphysical speculation is a thing of the past, and that physical science has extirpated it. The discussion of the categories of existence, however, does not appear to be in danger of coming to an end in our time; and the exercise of speculation continues as fascinating to every fresh mind as it was in the days of Thales."

Experimental Physics, Introductory Lecture, *ad finem*.

II.—THE DYNAMIC MATERIALISM.

It is curious to observe how little able is even exact science to preserve its habitual precision, when pressed backward past its processes to their point of commencement, and brought to bay in the statement of their "first truth." The proposition which supplies the initiative is sure to contain some term of indistinct margin or contents; and usually it will be the term least suspected, because most familiar. The student of nature takes as his principle that all phenomena arise from a fixed total of force in a given quantity of matter; and assumes that, in his explanations, he must never resort to any supposed addition or subtraction of either element. In adopting this rule he must know, you would say, what he means by "matter," and what by "force," and that he means two things by the two words. Ask him whence this principle has its authority. If he pronounces it a metaphysical axiom, you may let him go till he can tell you how there can be not simply an *à priori notion* of matter and *notion* of force, but also an *à priori measure* of each, which can guarantee you against increase or diminution of either. As standards of quantity are found only in experience, he will come back with a new answer, fetched from the text-hooks of science: that his principle is inductively gathered; in one half of its scope—viz., that neither matter nor force is ever destroyed—proved by positive evidence of persistence;—in the other half—viz., that neither is ever created—proved by negative evidence, of non-appearance. If now you beg him to exhibit his proof that matter is indestructible, he will in some shape reproduce the old experiment of weighing the ashes and the smoke, and re-finding in them the fuel's mass: his appeal will be to the balance, his witnesses the equal weights. Weight, however, is force: and thus, to establish the perseverance of *matter*, he resorts to equality of *force*. Again, when invited to make good the corresponding position, of the conservation of force, he will show you how, *e.g.*, the chemical union of carbon and oxygen in the furnace is followed by the undulations of heat, succeeded in their turn by the molecular separation of water into steam, the expansion of which lifts a piston, and institutes mechanical performances: *i. e.* he traces a series of movements, each replacing its predecessor, and leaving no link in the chain detached. *Movements*, however, are material phenomena: so that to establish the persistence of *force*, he steps over to take counsel of *matter*. He makes assertions about each term, as if it were an independent subject: but if his assertion respecting either is challenged, he invokes aid from the other: and he holds, logically, the precarious position of a man riding two horses with a foot on each, hiding his danger by a cloth over both, and saved from a fall by dexterous shifting and exchange.

Nothing can be more unsatisfactory than a scientific proposition, the terms of which stand in this variable relation to each other. The first of them has been sufficiently fixed in discussing the *Atomic* conception. It remains to give distinctness to the second. In order to do so, it will be simplest to follow into their last retreats of meaning the parallel doctrines of the "Indestructibility of Matter" and of the "Conservation of Energy." If our perceptions were so heightened and refined that nothing escaped them by its minuteness or its velocity, what should we see, answering to those doctrines, during a course of perpetual observation?

1. We should see the ultimate atoms; and if we singled out any one of them, and kept it ever in view, we should find it, in spite of "change of form," "always the same." "A simple elementary atom," says Professor Balfour Stewart, "is a truly immortal being, and enjoys the privilege of remaining unaltered and essentially unaffected by the most powerful blows that can be dealt against it."

The Conservation of Energy, p. 7.

Here, then, we have alighted upon the "Matter" which is "indestructible."

2. These atoms might have been stationary; and we should still have seen them in their "immortality." But they are never at rest. They fly along innumerable paths: they collide and modify their speed and their direction: they unite: they separate. However long we look, there is no pause in this eternal dance: if one figure ceases, another claims its place. As in the atoms, so in the molecules which are their first clusters, there is a "state of

continual agitation," "vibration, rotation, or any other kind of relative motion;"

Theory of Heat, by J. Clerk Maxwell, p. 306.

"an uninterrupted warfare going on—a constant clashing together of these minute bodies."

Conservation of Energy, by Dr. Balfour Stewart, p. 7.

In this unceasing *movement* among the "immortal" atoms we alight upon the phenomenon, or series of phenomena, described by the phrase "Conservation of Energy." So far as the law thus designated claims to be an observed law, gathered by induction from experience, this is its last and whole meaning. We have only to scrutinize its evidence with a little care, in order to see that it simply traces a few transmutations of the perpetual motions attributed to atoms and molecules.

If we chose to shape it thus: "For every cancelled movement or element of movement there arises another, which is equivalent;" everything would be expressed to which the evidence applies. Had we to look out for a proof of such a proposition, we should first consider what it is that makes two movements equivalent: and, in the simplest case,—of homogeneous elements,—we should find it in equal numbers with the same velocity; so that the direct demonstration would require that we should count the atoms and estimate their speed. As we cannot count them, one by one, we *weigh* them in their masses;—an operation which has the advantage of reckoning at one stroke, along with their relative numbers, also the most important of their velocities. The atoms being all equal, the greater mass expresses the larger number. And weight is only the arrested velocity with which, in free space, they move to one another: it is prevented motion, in the shape of pressure. In order to measure it, *i.e.* to express it in terms of space and time, we might withdraw the prevention, and address ourselves to the path that would then be described. But it is more convenient to test it by taking it in reverse, and trying what other prevented motion will avail to stop it and hold it ready to turn back. Thus even statical estimates of equilibrium are but a translation of motion into more compendious terms.

If this is a true account of common weights, it still more evidently applies to the process which gives us the *footpound*, or "unit of work;" for this is found by the actual *lifting* of one pound through one vertical foot, *i.e.* by *moving* it through a space in a time. And as in this, which is the standard, so in all the changes which it is employed to measure, the fundamental quantity is simply *movement*, performed, prevented, or reversed.

This fact is easily traced through the proofs usually offered of the Conservation of Energy. The essence of them all is the same:—for each extinguished "unit of work," they find a substituted equivalent movement, molar or molecular. Dr. Joule, for instance, establishes for us a common measure of heat and mechanical work. How does he accomplish this? By applying the descent of a weight to create in moving water friction enough to raise the temperature 1° Fahrenheit; and finding that this result corresponds with a fall of the water through 772 feet. Here, on one side of the equation, we have the movement of the mass through its vertical path; on the other, the molecular movement that constitutes heat, measured by a third movement of an expanding liquid in the thermometer. Where the first is arrested, the second takes its place: and to double one would be to double both.

If heat is made to do chemical work, its undulations are similarly expended in setting up a fresh order of movements; of atomic combination, when burning coal unites with oxygen; of separation, when the fire of a lime-kiln drives its carbonic acid from the chalk. The friction which parts the electricities, the spark which attends their reunion; the crystallization of liquids by loss of temperature, and their vaporization by its increase; the waste of animal tissue by action, and its replacement by food; all reduce themselves to the same ultimate rule,—the exchange of one set of movements or resistances (*i.e.* stopped movements) for another, which, wherever calculable, is found to be an equivalent.

To a perfect observer, then, able to follow the changes of external bodies, in themselves and among one another, to their last haunts, nothing would present itself but consecutions and assortments of phenomena, and arrests of phenomena. And if he had noticed, and could name, what on the subsidence of each group would emerge to replace it, he would be master of the law of Conservation. The sciences would distinguish themselves for him by taking cognizance each of its special set of phenomena; as acoustics tell the story of one kind of undulations, optics of another, thermotics of a third. And the law in question would only carry his glance, as it chased the flight of change, across the lines of this divided work, and show him, on the desertion of *this* field, a new stir in *that*.

Though the whole objective world has thus been laid bare before him, and he has read and registered its order through and through, he has not yet, it will be observed, alighted on a single *dynamic* idea: all that he has seen (and nothing has been hid from him) may be stated without resort to any term that goes beyond the relations of co-existence and sequence. The whole vocabulary of causality may absent itself from the language of such an observer. "Were it even given to him, it would carry no new meaning, but only tell over again in fresh words the old story of regular time succession. He might, as Comte and Mill and Bain truly contend, command the whole body of science, including its latest law, without ever asking for the-origin (other than the phenomenal predecessor) of any change.

By no such ideal interpreter of nature, however, have our actual books of science been written. Never more than now have they abounded in the language which, we have seen, would be superfluous for him. The formula of the new law contains it: for it is the conservation of "Energy," or the correlation of "Forces," which it announces. Are these then some new-comers that we have got to know? or, have we encountered them before under other names, and only found out some new thing about them? "Energy," says Professor Balfour Stewart, "is the power of overcoming obstacles or of doing work."

Conservation of Energy, p. 13.

I see a flash of lightning pierce a roof and kill a man, and plunge into the earth: the obstacles overcome, the work done, are visible enough; but where is the "power"? what does it add to the phenomenon, over and above these elements? Besides the flash of lightning first, and then the changes in the roof and the man, is there something else to be searched for, and entered, as an object of knowledge, under a separate name? If there be such a thing, by what sense am I to apprehend it? through what aids of art can I penetrate to it? It is obvious that it has no perceptible presence at all; and that its name stands in the definition and in every inductive equation, as an x , an unknown quantity, which itself has to be found before it can add any new relation to the known. "Force," says Professor Clerk Maxwell, "is whatever changes or tends to change the motion of a body, by altering either its direction or its magnitude."

Theory of Heat, p. 83.

The shot fired from a gun at a moderate elevation is scarcely out of the muzzle before it quits the straight line for the parabola, and slackens its initial velocity, and soon alights upon the ground. We say the deflection is due to "gravitation." But, if so, this is an invisible part of the fact: no more is observable than the first direction and subsequent curvature of the ball's path, the changing speed, and the final fall, in presence of the earth. The "force" which we superadd in thought is not given in the phenomenon as perceived: and if we know the movements accomplished, prevented, modified, we know everything that is there.

One interpretation, indeed, may be given to these mysterious words, which makes them not superfluous, in a methodized account of the order of nature. "Gravitation" perhaps may mean only the *rule of happening* which, along with the deflection of the shot, describes also several other cases of movement; and if it enables us to advert to these while in presence of the immediate fact, it performs a truly scientific function. It is plain, however, that this is not what our Dynamic writers mean. A rule does not "change the motion of a body," does not "overcome obstacles and do work;" nor would any one dream of attaching such predicates to mere similarities of occurrence.

Our instructors then suppose themselves acquainted with more than phenomena, more than the laws of them; and believe that inductive analysis has carried them behind these to "the hiding-place of *power*." They tell us, with much ease and unanimity, what they have found there: so that the story is familiar to every advanced schoolboy, and reproduced in hundreds of examination papers every year. They have found, as sources of the phenomena, a considerable number of "Energies" of nature, which they distinguish from one another in various ways, as "strong" or "weak," as stretching far or keeping near, as demanding the unlike or content with anything, as single or splitting into opposites, as inorganic or organic. In every text-book of science a complete list of these is presented; and the student, as he learns how to discriminate them, cannot doubt that he is dealing, in each instance, with a separate unit of objective knowledge, which is the inner fountain of a definite set of outward changes. He thus is brought to conceive of nature as having many springs. Its multitudinousness is commanded by a senate of powers.

Further, it is impossible, on looking at the faces of these assembled forces, to assign the same rank to all, or miss the traits of graduated dignity which make them rather a hierarchy than a committee. The delicate precision with which chemical affinity picks its selecting way among the atoms, is an advance upon the indiscriminate grasp of gravitation at them all. The architecture of a crystal cannot vie with that of a tree. The sentiency of the mollusk is at an immeasurable distance from the thought which produces the *Mécanique Céleste*. Hence, in the company of powers that conduct the business of nature, a certain order of lower and higher establishes itself, which, without settling every point of precedency, at least marks a few steps of ascent, from the mechanical at the bottom to the mental at the top. All equally real, all equally old, they are differenced by the quality of the work they have to do.

On the imagination thus prepared, a new discovery is now flung. Keenly watch the face of any one of these forces; its features will change into those of another. You cannot fix its identity in permanence; it migrates from species to species. Now it is mechanical energy; in a minute it will be heat; if a tourmaline is near, it will turn up as electricity; and so on; for no part of the cycle is closed against it. You look, in short, upon a row of masks, behind which the "unknown power," slipping from one to another with magic agility, seems to multiply itself, but is found, on closer scrutiny, never to quit its unity. The senate of nature does but administer a monarchy.

And so, the plurality of forces disappears from the ultimate background, and comes to the front as a mere semblance. This brings up a new problem. What stands in the dynamic place thus vacated? How is it related to

the disguises it assumes? Do they in any way represent it? or do they only hide it? To this question there are three answers given. (1.) The One Power is indifferently related to all its masks, but is like none of them; they are opaque and let no lineament shine through. (2.) The "phases" are not on an equal footing, but consecutive in their genesis, the *lowest* being the oldest. With *that* the One Power was at first identical, and *that* is what truly represents its essence. (3.) The "phases" are consecutive in their genesis, the *highest* being the oldest. With *that* the One Power is for ever identical; all else is its action, but not its image. The second of these is the materialist's answer. His preference for it is mainly determined by two reasons. In the first place, since the several forces, A, B, C, D, &c., are all interchangeable, it suffices to allow A (the mechanical), and all the rest are provided for. In the second place, the traces of actual evolution follow this order, conducting us back past the dawn of life, and even the combinations of chemistry, to a period of purely mechanical energy. In estimating these reasons I will step for a moment on to their own ground, and postpone all objection to the theory of "energies" on which they rest.

It is true that, among a number of interchangeables, if the first be given, the others are potentially there. But it is no less true that if the last be given, or any intermediate, there is provision for the rest. The possibility of reciprocal transmutation all round, determines no preference of any member as having priority over the rest, and cannot be pleaded as an excuse for selecting the rudest mask of nature as the most faithful likeness of its inner essence. The law of Conservation is impartial, and tells in both directions, exhibiting the elements of the world, here living up into the self-conscious, there dying down into the inorganic, and suggesting, rather than any initial point, circling currents of crossing change.

But further, there is not the slightest ground, in the present transmutations, for treating the lowest phase of force as adequate to the production of the highest. Though mechanical energy, now that it stands in presence of the several chemical elements, may pass into chemical form, it does not follow that it could do so in their absence; for this would be to predicate of homogeneous atoms what we know only of heterogeneous. And the same consideration applies to the phases higher in the scale. *Given*, the existing materials and conditions of life and mind, and the circulation and equivalence of forces may take place as alleged; but that the order could be inverted, and the equivalence avail to provide the conditions, cannot be inferred. Take, on the other hand, any higher "phase" as first, and it carries all below it. Chemical force presupposes mechanical (as cohesion), and acts at its expense; and vital presupposes and modifies the inorganic chemical. In this order of derivation, therefore, the original *datum* would yield what is required by divesting itself of certain conditions admitted to be there, while in the opposite order it would have to take on fresh conditions assumed to be absent at its start. If, in choosing from the phases of force the fittest representative form, we are to be guided by the possibility of deduction, the supreme term must surely be taken as First.

The second plea of the "materialist," viz. that the vista of evolution recedes into the simply mechanical, and is intersected at dimly seen stages by entering lights, first of chemical affinity, then of life, and finally of consciousness, it is the less necessary to qualify as a statement of fact, because it is destitute of logical cogency. Granted that at successive eras these new forces appeared upon the scene, this supplies the "when," but not the "whence" of each. Something more is needful, if you would show that it is the product of its predecessor. Instead of advancing from behind, it may have entered from the side. You cannot prove a pedigree by offering a date. Since these several forces are but secondary phases of a Unitary Power, what obliges us to derive them one from another, instead of letting them all stand in equal and direct relation to their common essence? On this point the first answer to the inquiry after the One Power has a conclusive advantage over the second.

Such, it seems to me, would be the logical position of the materialist's case, on the assumption that separate kinds and transmutations of energy are known to us, over and above the resulting phenomena, as discoveries of natural science. That assumption, hitherto conceded, I must now withdraw. No "energy" has ever come under human notice, and disclosed its marks, so as to discriminate itself from others, similarly apprehended. This is not simply true thus far as a matter of fact: it is true permanently as a matter of necessity. We might watch for ever the relations of bodies and their parts *inter se*, and though we had eyes that ranged from the microscopic minimum to the analysis of the milky way, we should fetch no force into the field of view: and the whole story of what was laid open to us would be a record of interminable series and eddies of change. What are called the "transmutations of energy" are nothing but transitions from one chapter of that record to another. A certain catena of phenomena runs to an end; the first link of a new one is ready to take its place: a body's fall is stopped; its temperature rises: the thermometer in the kettle ascends to 212° Fahrenheit and stays there; the water turns to steam: this is observed, and no more than this. And the list of metamorphosed energies deceives us, if we take it for anything beyond an enumeration of these junctures between class and class of consecutive movements. Did we bring to the contemplation of nature no faculties but those which constitute our scientific outfit, I see no reason to believe that it would come before us under any other aspect; or that we should ever be tempted to paint its picture or tell its history in dynamic terms.

Are such terms then illusory? Are they susceptible of no meaning? or of only a false meaning? Far from it.

The thought that is in them we cannot indeed fetch out of nature; but we are obliged to carry it into nature. To witness phenomena, and let them lie and dispose themselves in the mere order of time, space, and resemblance, is to us impossible. By the very make of our understanding we refer them to a *Power* which issues them: and no sooner is perception startled by their appearance than the intellect completes the act by wonder at their source. This "power," however, being a postulate intuitively applied to phenomena, and not an observed function found in them, does not vary as they vary, but mentally repeats itself as the needed prefix to every order of them: and though it may thus migrate, now into this group, now into that, it is the dwelling alone which changes, and that which is immanent is ever the same. You can vary nothing in the total fact, except the collocations of material conditions; out of which, as each new adjustment emerges, the persistent Power elicits a different result. Instead of first detecting many forces in nature and afterwards running them up into identity, the mind imports one into many collocations; never allowing it to take different names, except for a moment, in order to study its action, now here, now there. If this be true, if causality be not seen, but thought, if the thought it carries belongs to a rule of the understanding itself, that every phenomenon is the expression of power, two consequences follow: the plurality of forces disappears: and, to find the true interpretation of the One which remains, we must look not without but within; not on the phenomena presented, but on the rational relations into which they are received. Power *is* that which *we mean by it*; nor have we any other way of determining its nature than by resort to our self-knowledge. The problem passes from the jurisdiction of natural science to that of intellectual philosophy. Thither let us follow it.

I have already hinted that if we were mere passive, though thinking, observers of the world around us, we should witness phenomena without asking for a power: the principle of causality would remain latent in the intellect: the occasion would be wanting which permits it to awake. That occasion is furnished by the active side of our nature, by our own spontaneous movement from its inner centre out upon objects near its circumference. Being conscious as originators of the exercise of power, we admit as recipients its exercise upon us: nor is causality conceivable except upon these meeting lines of action and reaction; any more than, in the case of position, a *here* is conceivable without a *there*. Both pairs, the dynamic and the geometrical, are functions of the same fundamental antithesis, of subject and object, which is involved in every cognitive act. Till we disengage ourselves from nature, we do not think, though we may feel: and when we disengage ourselves from nature, we are self-conscious subjects and objects of causal operation. The idea of power coming in this dual form, as out from us and on to us, its two sides are reciprocally related; and that which the inner side is to the *object*, the same is the outer side to the *subject*. With the inner side, however, we are intimately familiar: it is the one thing which we immediately know; unless, indeed, it sits so near our centre as rather to regulate our knowing than stand off enough to become itself the known: but in any case we have to mark it by a name, as the inmost nucleus of dynamic thought: we call it living *Will*. This is our causality; it is what we mean by causality: in the absence of this, no other source for the idea—in the presence of this, no other meaning for it, can be found. It is true, that of the reciprocal propositions, "We push against the wind," "The wind pushes against us," we know the force named in the first with a closeness not belonging to our knowledge of the other. We cannot identify ourselves with the wind as our own *nisus* is identified with us. We go out on an energy: we return home on a thought. But that thought is only the reflex of the energy; it has, and can have, no other type. Our whole idea of *Power* is identical with that of *Will*, or reduced from it. That which, in virtue of the principle of causality, we recognize as immanent in nature, is homogeneous with the agency of which we are conscious in ourselves. Dynamic conceptions have either this meaning, or no meaning: cancel this, and you cut them at the root, and they wither into words; and your knowledge, cast out into dry places, has to take refuge again with co-existences and successions. Whatever authority attaches to the law of causality at all, attaches to it, presumably at least, in its intuitive form,—phenomena are the expression of living energy; and cannot be reduced within narrower limits, unless by express disproof of coincidence between its natural range and its real range. Till that disproof is furnished, the One Power stands as the Universal Will.

I am aware what courtesy it would require in a modern *savant*, whether of the Nescient or of the Omniscient school, to behave civilly to such folly as this must seem to him: nor can I pretend to find his laughter a pleasant sound: for I honour his pursuits, and sorrowfully dispense with his sympathy. It makes amends, however, that even among the most rigorous scientific thinkers, some curious testimony or other from time to time turns up to the correctness of the interpretation just given of the idea of power. Even Gassendi, the modern Epicurus, the eager disciple of Copernicus and Galileo, cannot refrain from resorting to living and conscious action in explanation of physical. To render the earth's attraction intelligible, he has two favourite devices. He lays it down that every whole nature has a sort of clinging affection for all its parts, and resists their being torn or kept away from it; so that the earth sends out invisible arms or tentacula to fetch hack objects detached from it: and hence the fall of the rain, the hail, the stone from the sling.

De motu impresso a Motore translate, xii. Opera, Lugd. 1658, tom. iii. p. 491.

And he institutes a double comparison;—first assimilating the earth to a magnet; and then the magnet's

force to the fascinating or repulsive influence of objects upon the senses,—the sweetness of the rose, which draws us to it, the noisomeness of a drain, that drives us away.

Syntagma Philos. Phys. sect. iii. mem. I. lib. iii. p. ii. Op. 132; and De motu impresso, xiii. torn. iii. p. 492. In this appeal to "sympathy" and "antipathy" we see again, as already in the Greek quote of Democritus, how inevitably the imagination, even when most intent on keeping within physical limits, is betrayed into mental analogies. Not a few, indeed, of the most clear-sighted men of science have been well aware of the real source of our dynamic conceptions; in some cases accepting it as authoritative, in others being ashamed of it as a mere occasion of superstition. Redtenbacher, in his "Principles of Mechanical Physics," refers our knowledge of "the existence of forces to the various effects which they produce, and especially to the feeling and consciousness of our own forces."

Das Dynamidensystem, Grundzüge einer mechanischen Physik, p. 12, ap. Lange; Gesch. d. Materialismus, ii. p. 205.

And in conversation with Fechner, Professor E. H. Weber laid stress on the fact, that in the will to move the body occurs the only case of immediate consciousness of power operative on matter; and he accordingly identified the essence of power with that of will, and from this principle worked out his religious ideas. .

Fechner, Ueber die physikalische und philosophische Atomenlehre; 2te Aufl., p. 132 (note).

That it is not, however, in the mere interest of a religious theory that this doctrine finds its strength, is evident from its hold on Schopenhauer, who, in virtue of it, would call the inward principle of nature nothing but *will*, though striking out from that name whatever makes its meaning divine. Herschel's judgment, often criticised but never shaken, was deliberately pronounced:—

"That it is our own immediate consciousness of effort when we exert force to put matter in motion, or to oppose and neutralize force, which gives us this internal conviction of power and causation so far as it refers to the material world, and compels us to believe that whenever we see material objects put in motion from a state of rest, or deflected from their rectilinear paths and changed in their velocities if already in motion, it is in consequence of such an effort somehow exerted, though not accompanied with our consciousness."

Treatise on Astronomy, 1833; Ch. vii. § 370.

With the tone of this memorable statement it is interesting to compare the feeling of one who, owning the same psychological fact, treats it as an infirmity, instead of accepting it as a guide.

"Power, regarded as the cause of motion, is nothing," says Du Bois-Reymond, "but a more recondite product of the irresistible tendency to personify which is impressed upon us;—a rhetorical artifice, as it were, of our brain, snatching at a figurative turn of thought, because destitute of any conception clear enough for literal expression. In the notions of Power and Matter we find recurring the same dualism which presents itself in the ideas of God and the world, of soul and body; the same want which once impelled men to people bush and fountain, rock, air, and sea, with creatures of their imagination. What do we gain by saying it is reciprocal Attraction whereby two particles of matter approach each other? Not the shadow of any insight into the nature of the process. But, strangely enough, our inherent quest of causes is in a manner laid to rest by the involuntary image tracing itself before our inner eye, of a hand which gently draws the inert matter to it, or of invisible tentacles, with which the particles clasp together, try to seize each other, and at last twine together into a knot."

Untersuchungen über thierische Electricität; I. Bd. Berlin, 1848. Vorrede, S. xi. ap. Lange's Gesch. d. Materialismus, ii. 204.

This outburst of exasperation against all dynamic conceptions,—for to that length it really goes,—is justified if the human mind has nothing to do but to become an accomplished Naturforscher. It is quite true that "insight into the nature of a process" is gained only by a closer reading of its steps in their series and in their analogies, and is in no way aided by passing behind the movements they comprise. What then? Shall we be angry at our propensity to look behind them, and tear it from our nature under vows to reach a stainless intellect? We shall but emasculate the mind we wish to purify: for what is the nerve of its vigour but the very Wonder which is for ever seeking an unattainable rest? If we incessantly press into nature, it is in hope of finding what is beyond nature: and all that we have learned of the finite world indirectly comes from our affinity with the embracing Infinite. It would be strange if the Causal appetency, which no disappointment wears out, should be at once our greatest strength and our most fatal illusion. It is admitted to be "irresistible:" it is admitted to carry the belief of personality: but these features, which induced Herschel to yield to it and trust in it, are reasons with Du Bois-Reymond for resisting and despising it. I need hardly say that, when he calls its language "figurative" and its conception a "personification," he oracularly assumes the very point at issue. To "personify" is to invest with personality that which has it not: and to tell any one with Herschel's belief that he does this, is only to contradict him. So again, if you know that there are two things of different type, living power and dead power, and then transfer to the second the marks of the first, your language is "figurative:" but if to you the types are identical, the second coinciding with the first, you speak with literal exactitude; and to charge you with rhetoric is only to beg the question in dispute. Probably the writer was the less conscious of

any dogmatism here, from his thoughts already running upon the stock example of belief in the Pagan gods of "rock and air and sea,"—fairly enough adducible as a departed superstition. But the dying-out of Polytheism is misconceived if it be regarded as an expulsion of every Conscious Presence from venerated haunts, and the substitution of a dead for a living world. It was a fusion, not an extinction, of Will: as the little cantons of nature, once under independent guardians, melted into ever wider provinces, and clans of men clustered into confederated nations, the detected harmony of the kosmos and the felt unity of humanity carried with them the enthronement of a single Divine Mind in place of the vanished local gods. It is not that other and other powers have been discovered, but that fewer and fewer have been needed, till the plurality is lost in One Supreme. And as, with the widening scope of the natural order, the many wills lapsed into one, so, among mono-theists, did the many motives of that One, once so freely attributed, more and more merge themselves in the recognition of an all-comprehending scheme, whose thoughts were not acts but laws, and whose purpose flowed into the inlets of individual life from an ocean of universal relations. By this surrender of providences *in exiguis* we drop the quest of design in events taken one by one, and learn to speak of the power which produces them, and to divide it into lots, not according to their supposed aims, but according to their visible kinds: and thus it is that by suspending the idea of an end in view, the full-bodied notion of Will is attenuated to that of Force. How imperfectly, even then, the life is driven out of it, may be seen from Du Bois-Reymond's expostulation with it. And the suspended idea only flits away to settle upon a higher point. Instead of having discovered that *purpose is not there*, we have simply learned that purpose takes in more; and the little pulses of separate volition are lost in the mighty movements of Eternal Thought.

In the remarkable passage which I have quoted, and in the argument of which it forms a part, Du Bois-Reymond puts Matter and Force on the same footing, and discharges the former as well as the latter from the realm of reality, by reducing it also to an empty abstraction. He is led to this position by that just logical appreciation which gives to his writings, as to those of Helmholtz, a high philosophical rank, in addition to their value as models of scientific exposition and research. The equipoise, true enough, is perfect, in respect to validity, between the ideas of Matter and of Power; and the only question is, whether both are to be dismissed as illusions, or both retained as intuitive data of thought, the conditions of all construed experience. To reject them both is practically impossible, though logically necessary if you part with either. To retain them both is simply to accept the fundamental relation of object and subject under its two constitutive functions, instead of treating our only modes of knowing as snares of ignorance. The existence of a Universal Will and the existence of Matter stand upon exactly the same basis—of certainty if you trust, of uncertainty if you distrust, the *principia* of your own reason. For my part, I cannot hesitate. Shall I be deterred by the reproach of "anthropomorphism"? If I am to see a ruling Power in the world, is it folly to prefer a man-like to a brute-like power, a seeing to a blind? The similitude to man means no more and goes no further than the supremacy of intellectual insight and moral ends over every inferior alternative: and how it can be contemptible and childish to derive everything from the highest known order of power rather than the lowest, and to converse with Nature as embodied Thought, instead of taking it as a dynamic engine, it is difficult to understand. Is it absurd to suppose mind transcending the human? or, if we do so, to make our own Reason the analogical base for intellect of wider sweep? How is it possible to look along any line of light traced by past research, and, estimating the contents which it reveals, and leaves still unrevealed, to remember that along all radii to which we may turn, a similar infinitude presents itself to any faculty that seeks it, and yet to conceive that this mass of truth to be known has only our weak intelligence to know it? And if two natures know the same thing, how can they be other than like? Nay, Du Bois-Reymond himself takes up the magnificent fancy of Laplace, of a "mind cognizant of all forces operating in nature at a given moment, and all mutual relations among the beings composing it. Such a mind, if in other respects capacious enough to subject these data to analysis, would comprise in the same formula the movements of the greatest masses in the universe, and of the lightest atom. Nothing would be uncertain to him; and to his glance future and past would alike be present. The human understanding presents, in the perfection to which it has brought astronomy, a feeble image of such a mind."

Ueber die Grenzen des Naturerkennens, p. 6.

Here is reproduced the very thought which, in his ignorance of differential equations, Plato expressed by saying that God was the supreme Geometer; simply taking to the summit-level the analogy which Laplace leaves floating at some indefinite height above the human. Is the conception, then, vitiated because it is "anthropomorphic"? Let Du Bois-Reymond answer: "Wir gleichen diesem Geist, denn wir begreifen ihn."

Ibid. p. 10.

If to have the idea of a diviner nature is to resemble him, and if resemblance must be reciprocal, what can be more futile than the reproach that men attribute to God what is highest in humanity?

It may be doubted, indeed, whether the analogy might not be pressed further, without overstraining its truth. If the collective energies of the universe are identified with Divine Will, and the system is thus animate with an eternal consciousness as its moulding life, the conception we frame of its history will conform itself to

our experience of intellectual volition. Its course is ever from the indeterminate to the determinate; and as the passage is made by rational preference among possibilities, *thought* has its intensity at the outset, and *action* in the sequel. It is in origination, in disposing of new conditions, in setting up order by differentiation, that the mind exercises its highest function. When the product has been obtained, and a definite method of procedure established, the strain upon us is relaxed, habit relieves the constant demand for creation, and at length the rules of a practised art almost execute themselves. As the intensely voluntary thus works itself off into the automatic, thought, liberated from this reclaimed and settled province, breaks into new regions, and ascends to ever higher problems: its supreme life being beyond the conquered and legislated realm, while a lower consciousness, if any at all, suffices for the maintenance of its ordered mechanism. Yet all the while it is one and the same mind that, under different modes of activity, thinks the fresh thoughts and carries on the old usages. Does anything forbid us to conceive similarly of the kosmical development; that it started from the freedom of indefinite possibilities and the ubiquity of universal consciousness; that, as intellectual exclusions narrowed the field, and traced the definite lines of admitted movement, the tension of purpose, less needed on these, left them as the habits of the universe, and operated rather for higher and ever higher ends not yet provided for; that the more mechanical, therefore, a natural law may be, the further is it from its source; and that the inorganic and unconscious portion of the world, instead of being the potentiality of the organic and conscious, is rather its residual precipitate, formed as the Indwelling Mind of all concentrates an intenser aim on the upper margin of the ordered whole, and especially on the inner life of natures that can resemble him? I am aware that this speculation inverts the order of the received kosmogonies. But, in advancing it, I only follow in the track of a veteran physiologist and philosopher, whose command of all the materials for judgment is beyond question,—the author of "Psychophysik." Fechner insists that protoplasm and zoophyte structure, instead of being the inchoate matter of organization, is the cast-off residuum of all previous differentiation, stopping short of the separation of animal from plant and of sex from sex, and no more capable of further development than is inorganic matter, without powers beyond its own, of producing organization

Einige Ideen zur Schöpfungs- und Entwicklungsgeschichte der Organismen, p. 73.

And, far from admitting that the primordial periods had few organisms, which time increased in number, he contends that the earth was formerly more rich in organisms than now, and that the inorganic realm has grown at the expense of the organic.

Ibid. pp. 77, 78.

The resolution of all power into Will is met by the thorough-going objection, that Mind is not energy at all, and can never stir a particle of matter. "Were it possible," says Lange, "for a single cerebral atom to be moved by 'thought' so much as the millionth of a millimetre out of the path due to it by the laws of mechanics, the whole 'formula of the universe' (*i.e.* as imagined by Laplace) would become inapplicable and senseless."

Geschichte des Materialismus, ii. p. 155.

"Suppose," he adds, "two worlds, both occupied by men and their doings, with the same course of history, with the same modes of expression by gesture, the same sounds of voice, for him who could *hear* them—*i. e.* not simply have their vibrations conveyed through the auditory nerve to the brain, but he self-conscious of them. The two worlds are therefore to be absolutely alike, with only this difference: that in the one the whole mechanism runs down like that of an automaton, without anything being felt or thought, whilst the other is just *our* world; then would the formula for these two worlds be completely the same. To the eye of exact research they would be indistinguishable."

Ibid. ii. p. 156.

So much the worse, are we not tempted to say, for "exact research"? If, with all its keenness and precision, it misses half the universe, and identifies diametrical opposites, it will be a calamity rather for it than for us, that its "formula" should prove less applicable than had been supposed. The extension to man, in an exaggerated form, of Descartes' doctrine of animal automatism marks, perhaps, the lowest point which the falling barometer of philosophy has reached. By him it was propounded for the express purpose of finishing off the mechanical modes of action, even when strained to their maximum, short of the human characteristics; and of opening in these a second and sharply contrasted world, containing another hemisphere of phenomena, with their own lines of causality and relations of affinity. Though by his absolute separation of matter and mind he cut the problem of the world in two, he at least embraced the whole of it, and attempted to solve it by a double formula. But his modern interpreters do not see why one half of his theory should not be stretched to do the work of the whole: they have only to ignore his unmechanical part of the world and leave it out in the cold, and in place of his contrast they will get an identity. For his maxims,—Movement is the cause of movement, Thought of thought, but neither of the other,—they substitute the rule, that Movement is the cause of both, but Thought of neither: so that there is no longer any counterpart to the mechanism of nature, or any work done beyond it; and whatever puffs of thought and screeches of feeling there may be, it is only that the engine is blowing off its steam: nothing comes of it, and it may be treated as waste. This theory is founded on the analysis of reflex

action in the nervous apparatus, in which the sensory conductor having delivered its stimulus in the ganglion, the motory takes up the sequence and contracts the muscles requisite for action in response. If the brain be kept from interfering, the circuit is completed in unconsciousness; and its series, though determining the subject to all sorts of clever and congruous movements, is composed of molecular changes unattended by feeling or design. When the scene is transferred to the brain or connected with it, the story, we are assured, is still the same, only with the added phenomenon of consciousness. In the one case, the subject acts: in the other, he acts and knows it. But this new fact is inoperative, and leads to nothing: were it absent, he would figure away as a molecular automaton all the same, and not a scene or a word would be altered in the five-act comedy of life. Comparing in this view the reflex and the cerebral activities, we might say that the former resembles a clock with *one beat*—viz., movement only; the latter, a clock with *two beats*—viz., movement *plus* consciousness.

By the extent of this increment, the second does more work than the first. What, then, becomes of the difference? Where are we to look for it at its next stage? We are expressly told it has no next stage, and things will go on exactly as if it had not been there. Then a portion of work has perished, and the Conservation of energy is contradicted.

The only escape from this conclusion would be by denying that consciousness produced is "work done." This, however, is to admit that it is not an effect of molecular forces; to exempt it altogether from the range of physical law; and to throw it into an independent world of its own, beyond the jurisdiction of the natural philosopher. Such a position would be an unconditional relapse into the two-armed embrace of Descartes, from which the whole doctrine is a struggle to escape.

It is said that if thought can move a single molecule, the law of causality is at an end. Why is it not equally at an end if, conversely, molecular movement can wake a single thought? Either way, causality alike steps out of the material series, and crosses over to the other, now last, now first. And only on the assumption that, being a monopoly of Physics, it cannot do this, has the objection any sense.

This doctrine, that the most important elements of life,—all that constitute experience, and embody themselves in language, art, religion,—are so much *surplusage*,—that the mental phenomena are collectively a *cul-de-sac*, leading no-whither,—comes with a singular irony from men who by force of intellect, knowledge, and character, are in many ways changing the conceptions of their time, and whose most signal triumph it will be to convince us that, if they never felt or thought at all, or stirred emotion and idea in us, it would make no difference to our history, and the senseless pantomime of our life would fit into the same niche in the world's "formula." Such paradoxical triumphs are occasionally won by planting the old nightmare of necessity closely on our breast. But not for long: and the first of us that, feeling cold, spreads his hands before the fire, or, struck with grief, wrings them over the lifeless features of a friend, will here break the spell, and restore the faith that to be conscious, to think, to love, is to have power.

But then, it is said, this mental power, even if we concede it, is found only in connection with definite material conditions; in the absence of which, as in the structure of plants, we have no grounds for admitting any conscious life.

"What can you say then to the student of nature if, before he allows a Psychical principle to the universe, he asks to be shown, somewhere within it, embedded in neurine and fed with warm arterial blood under proper pressure, a convolution of ganglionic globules and nerve-tubes proportioned in size to the faculties of such a Mind?"

Du Bois-Reymond, Ueber die Grenzen des Naturerkennens, p. 37.

"What can we say?" I say, first of all, that this demand for a Divine brain and nerves and arteries comes strangely from those who reproach the Theist with "anthropomorphism." In order to believe in God, they must be assured that the plates in "Quain's Anatomy" truly represent him. If it be a disgrace to religion to take the human as measure of the Divine, what place in the scale of honour can we assign to this stipulation? Next, I ask my questioner, whether he suspends belief in his friends' mental powers till he has made sure of the contents of their crania? and whether, in the case of ages beyond reach, there are no other adequate vestiges of intellectual and moral life in which he places a ready trust? *Immediate* knowledge of mind other than his own he can never have: its existence in other cases is gathered from the signs of its activity, whether in personal lineaments or in products stamped with thought: and to stop this process of inference with the discovery of *human* beings, is altogether arbitrary, till it is shown that the grounds for extending it are inadequate. Further, I would submit that, in dealing with the problem of the Universal Mind, this demand for organic centralization is strangely inappropriate. It is when mental power has to be localized, bounded, lent out to individual natures and assigned to a scene of definite relations, that a focus must be found for it and a molecular structure with determinate periphery be built for its lodgment. And were Du Bois-Reymond himself ever to alight on the portentous cerebrum which he imagines, I greatly doubt whether he would fulfil his promise and turn Theist at the sight: that he had found the Cause of causes would be the last inference it would occur to him to draw: rather would he look round for some monstrous *creature*, some kosmic megatherium, born to float and pasture on the fields

of space. The great "energies" which we recognize as modes of the Universal Power are not central but ubiquitous: gravitation reports itself wherever there is a particle of matter; heat and light spread with the ether whose undulations they are; and electricity, at one moment gathered into poles, at another sweeps in the aurora over half the heavens. But if still my questioner cannot dispense with some visible structure as the organ of the Ever-living Mind, I will ask him, in his conception of the brain, to take into account these words of Cauchy's:—

"Ampere has shown . . . that the molecules of different bodies may be regarded as composed each of several atoms, the dimensions of which are infinitely small relatively to their separating distances. If then we could see the constituent molecules of the different bodies brought under our notice, they would present to our view sorts of constellations; and in passing from the infinitely great to the infinitely small, we should find, in the ultimate particles of matter, as in the immensity of the heavens, central points of action distributed in presence of each other."

Cited from Moigno's Cosmos, torn. ii. p. 374, by Fechner: Atom-enlehre, xxvi. p. 232.

If then the invisible molecular structure and movement do but repeat in little those of the heavens, what hinders us from inverting the analogy, and saying that the ordered heavens repeat the rhythm of the cerebral particles? You need an embodied mind? Lift up your eyes, and look upon the arch of night as the brow of the Eternal, its constellations as the molecules of the universal consciousness, its space as their possibility of change, and the ethereal waves as the afferents and efferents of Omniscient Thought. Even in the human nerves, the solid lines are but conductors, and the granules but media of movement; and science is ever on the search for some subtler essence that is thus sheathed and transmitted. In the kosmos, then, think of that essence as unsheathed and omnipresent, with light for its messenger and space for its scope of perception, and your material requisition is not wholly a dream.

Quite in the sense of Du Bois-Reynond's objection was the saying of Laplace, that in scanning the whole heaven with the telescope he found no God; which again has its parallel in Lawrence's remark that the scalpel, in opening the brain, came upon no soul.

Both these dicta I quote from memory, without at the moment being able to verify the citations. An equivalent passage to the latter occurs in the "Lectures on Physiology, Zoology, and the Natural History of Man," p. 8, 1819.

Both are unquestionably true, and it is precisely the truth of the second which vitiates the intended inference from the first. Had the scalpel alighted on some perceptible Greek quote, we might have required of the telescope to do the same; and, on its bringing in a dumb report, have concluded that there was only mechanism there. But, in spite of the knife's failure, we positively know that conscious thought and will were present, yet no more visible, yesterday: and so, that the telescope misses all but the bodies of the universe and their light, avails nothing to prove the absence of a Living Mind through all. If you take the wrong instruments, such quæsitæ may well evade you. The test-tube will not detect an insincerity, or the microscope analyze a grief. The organism of nature, like that of the brain, lies open, in its external features, to the scrutiny of science: but, on the inner side, the life of both is reserved for other modes of apprehension, of which the base is self-consciousness and the crown is religion.

The contempt or sorrow with which the claim of *design* is struck out from the interpretation of the world, results in like manner from a false start in construing the dynamic idea. We are supposed to have made acquaintance, in the laboratory, the botanic garden, the aquarium, and among the stars, with a set of blind forces, to which a happy hit and a stupid blunder are indifferent and possible, alike; and then, by way of supplement to these, to introduce into the thus prepared scene the action of intellectual purpose. The former is treated as the sphere of determinate causality; the latter, of teleological government. It is plain that, under these conditions, nothing is left to the second agency except the residue unexplained by the first; nor does anything suit its character except the fitnesses which (*inter alia*) are not impossible to the other also. Unless, therefore, it invades and interrupts the series otherwise inevitable, it is liable to be deposed and "mediatized" by advancing knowledge; its troop of anomalies filing off by degrees into the drilled army of necessity; and the adaptations it had claimed being traced to the forces which cannot think. With these logical preconceptions, it is no wonder that the naturalist directs a professional enmity against the doctrine of design, and meets it as the opponent he is for ever beating back: and as he is certainly not only in his right, but at his duty, in pushing to the utmost his researches into the physical history of the forms and phenomena he studies, it is a venial impatience with which he resents attempts to stop him by "supernatural phantoms" across his path. If he can display the mechanism by which the heliotrope turns to the sun, or the chemistry by which in a few hours the turbot assumes the colour of the ground over which it swims, or tell the whole story which, beginning with a jelly-point tingling in the sunshine, ends with the completed human eye, let his work have all sympathy and honour. But if he imagines that he is displacing Thought from nature by discovering causality, he is the subject of the very same illusion which would cry him down and arrest his course. The cases do but present the two sides of one superstition.

The dispute between acting Force and intending Mind is as unmeaning as the quarrel of a man with his own image. The two are identical,—expressions, now in all dimensions, now in some, of the same nature. Causal power other than Will being an unknown quantity, nay, absolutely out of the sphere of thought, teleology and causality are incorporated in one; and mechanical necessity, instead of being the negation of purpose, is its persistence,—the declining, no doubt, of this or that possible diversion to minor ends, but in subservience to the stability of a more comprehensive order. The inexorability of nature is but the faithfulness of God, the maintenance of those unswerving habits in the universe, without which it could train no mind and school no character: and that it is hard and unbending to us does not prevent its being fluid to Him. To affirm *purpose*, therefore, in the adjustments of the world, is not to set up a rival principle outside their producing force, hut to plant, or rather to leave, an integrating thought within it. And, conversely, to trace those adjustments to their "physical causes," is not to withdraw them from their ideal origin, but only to detect the method of carrying the inner meaning to its realization. "Who will venture to say, what nevertheless is constantly imagined, that to find how a change comes about is to prove that it was never contemplated? If it *were* contemplated, it would have to be executed *somehow*; if, the moment you read the machinery provided for this purpose, the purpose itself is quenched from your view, is this the discovery or the loss of a reality?"

This treatment of determinate causation as incompatible with conscious aims is the more curious, as proceeding from a school which, as necessarian, is constantly labouring to show the co-existence of the two in human nature. If man is only a sample of the universal determinism, yet forms purposes, contrives for their accomplishment, and executes them, definite causality and prospective thought can work together, and the field which is occupied by the one is not pre-occupied against the other.

The frequent plea, "See, there is no mind here, for all is necessary causation," tacitly concedes that, in order to have mind, there must be exemption from necessity; and can be consistently urged only by one who attributes this exemption to the human will. Is the argument conclusive from his point of view? It would be so, were it possible to prove his premiss, viz., the universality in the kosmos of necessary causation. But this is plainly out of the question, because his amplest science carries the induction, such as it is, only skin-deep into the universe; because he would have to show that the present fixity was not determined by a past exercise of will; because Mind, in proportion as it is orderly and exact in its methods, may assume the semblance of necessity, and be the less suspected that its freedom works by rule. He knows how he himself, though conscious of self-disposal as well as of subjection to nature, presents to the determinist the aspect of a machine; and how can he be secure against a similar illusion in his interpretation of the world? What is to prevent the same combination of free and necessary causality which he finds in himself from existing also beyond? Nay, if there were only mind-excluding force in nature, how could there arise a force-resisting mind in him? He could not carry in himself new causal beginnings, if in the kosmos whence he comes the lines of possibility were definitely closed.

I revert, then, after weighing these objections, to my "unwiderstehlicher Hang zur Personification," and persist in regarding that which the natural philosopher calls *force*, and Professor Tyndall raises to an immanent *life*, as Causal Will, manifesting itself, not in interference with an established order, but in producing it. As it builds and weaves and quickens all matter, and could not otherwise work before us at all, the structures and growths of the material world are its seat, and their phenomena its witnesses: so that the very story,—of saline crystals, and ice-stars, and Fern-fronds, and human birth,—which Professor Tyndall tells in order to exclude it, is to me a continuous report of its agency and laws. He asks, what else is there here than matter? I answer, the *movements* of matter, with their disposing and "formative *power*," the attracting and repelling energies, which, *dealing with* molecules and cells, *are not* molecules and cells. "Mens agitat molem." Whoever finds this incredible, will soon have to make friends with some abstraction which is but a ghastly mimicry of it; for *some* conception over and above that of "pure matter," is indispensable to the accurate representation of the simplest facts. If in the typical "oak-tree" the vitality suddenly ceased, the "matter" of it would at the next moment still be there, as certainly as that of a clock which had run down: it would weigh the same as before, and so stand the admitted test of the indestructibility of matter. Yet *something* is gone which was previously there, and that something has to be described otherwise than in terms of "matter." The droll "hypothesis" which my critic amuses himself with conjecturally attributing to me, "of a vegetative soul," wedded to the tree at a definite date, and quitting it when its term was up, certainly does not help us; and is set up on my behalf, I presume, simply from the facility of knocking it down. But are we any better served by the "alternative" conception of a "formative power," long latent and "potential," *i.e.* *not* forming anything, but only *going to do so*? I see that the conception contradicts Büchner's dictum, "A power not expressing itself has no existence;" yet am at a loss to know how, during its latency, its presence is ascertained, and to exercise with regard to it "that Vorstellungs-fähigkeit with which, in my efforts to think clearly, I can never dispense." Whilst it lies in wait behind the scenes,—before the time for the deposit of the crystal or the germination of the acorn,— *where* is it? behind what molecules does it hide? through what space is it invisibly present? What shape has it, enabling it to

lay its building particles and to agglutinate cells? How does it know the right moment of temperature for stepping on to the stage, and declaring itself without further reserve? In short, all the questions addressed to me respecting the "formative soul" invented for me, I refer back to be answered on behalf of my critic's "potential power." "Potentiality" is an intelligible fact in a being consciously able to act or to refrain. But when the idea is carried into a system of necessitated phenomena, it means nothing in *them*, but something in *us*, as their observers—viz., that we conditionally anticipate a future change, foreseeing a distant term of a series which would be certain, provided the nearer ones were not obscure. To plant this subjective suspense out into the field of nature to do objective work there, now alighting visibly upon the earth, and then hidden again in "an ambrosial cloud," is a sort of intellectual illusion which modern logic might have been expected to cast out.

In truth, the nearer I approach the Power which Professor Tyndall pursues through nature with so subtle and brilliant a chase, and the more I try, by combining the predicates which he gives and withholds, to think it out into the clear, the less distinct does this "ideal somewhat" become, not simply to the imagination, but to intellectual apprehension. A power which is not Mind, yet may be "potential" and exist when and where it makes no sign; which is "immanent" in matter, yet *is* matter; which "is manifested in the universe," yet is not "a Cause," therefore has no effects; presents to me, I must confess, not an overshadowing mystery, but an assemblage of contradictions. I have always supposed that "Power" was a relative word, and that the correlative was found in the "work done:" take away the latter by denying the causation, and the term drops into five letters which might as well be arranged in any other order.

Yet elsewhere this negative language is balanced by such large affirmative suggestions that I almost cease to feel the interval between my critic's thought and my own. Of the inorganic, the vegetable, and the animal realms, he says—

"From this point of view all three worlds would constitute a unity, in which I picture life as immanent everywhere. Nor am I anxious to shut out the idea that the life here spoken of may be but a subordinate part and function of a higher life, as the living, moving blood is subordinate to the living man. I resist no such idea, as long as it is not dogmatically imposed. Left for the human mind freely to operate upon, the idea has ethical vitality; but stiffened into a dogma, the inner force disappears, and the outward yoke of a usurping hierarchy takes its place."

Fortnightly Review, November, 1875, p. 596.

Bidding God-speed to this sudden flank-attack upon usurping hierarchies and dogmas, I pursue only the main line of inarch in the free "idea." Whither does it lead me? It shows me the three provinces which make up our kosmos blended into one organism by an all-pervading life, which conducts all their processes, from the flow of the river to the dynamics of the human brain. This alone brings me to a pause of solemn wonder,—a single power through the whole, and that a living one! But there is more behind. This power, co-extensive though it is with nature, is not all: beyond her level we are to think of a "higher life," to which her laws and history do but give functional expression. May we then really think out this "idea" of a life "higher" than what is supreme in the world,—higher, therefore, than the human? But scale of height above that point we do not possess, except in gradation of intellectual and moral sublimity; and either that Ideal Life must cease to live, or must come before our thought as transcendent Mind and Will, on a scale comprehending as well as permeating the universe. With any guide who brings me hither I sit down with joy and rest. It is the mountain-top, which shows all things in larger relations and through a more lustrous air; and every feature,—the great build of the world close at hand; the thinning of the everlasting snows, as they stoop and melt towards human life; the opening of sweet valleys below the earlier and wilder pines; and the final plains, teeming in their silence with industry and thought,—is better understood than from level points of view, where the scope is narrowed or the calm is lost. But my guide seems less content than I to rest here, and deserts me, not, so far as I can trace him, to reach a brighter point, but rather to descend into the mists. To the "higher life," transcending our highest, he dares not give the predicate "Mind," or apply the pronoun of Personality.

Fortnightly Review, November, 1875, p. 596.

On *what* scale, then, is it "higher"? If not on the intellectual and moral, then there is that in man which rises above it; for the power of attaining truth and goodness is ideally supreme. If Professor Tyndall can reveal to us something which is higher than Mind and Free Causality, by all means let us accept it at his hands and assign it to God. But in order to profess this, and therefore to deprecate as an "anthropomorphism," the ascription of mind to Him, one would have, I think, to be one's self something *more than man*. Only such a one could cast a look above the level of Reason, to see whether it was overtopped: and so, this fashionable reproach against religion is virtually an arrogating of a superhuman position. As we cannot overfly our own zone, no beat of our wings availing to lift us out of the atmosphere they press, surely, if that "higher life" speaks to us in idea at all, it can only be as Perfect Reason and Righteous Will. Those who find this type of conception not good enough for them,—do they succeed in struggling upwards to a better? Rather, I should fear, does a persistent gravitation gain upon them, till they droop and sink into the alternative faith of blind force which leaves their own rank

supreme.

Professor Tyndall sets the belief in "unbroken causal connection" and the "theologic conception" over against each other as "rivals;" and says that an hour's reasoning will give the first the victory

Fortnightly Review, November, 1875, p. 596.

The victory is impossible, because the rivalry is unreal. Why should not a Mind of illimitable resources,—such as "the theologic conception" enthrone in the universe,—conduct and maintain "unbroken causal connection"? Is not such connection congenial with the relations of thought and the harmony of intellectual life? Do not you, the student of nature, yourself admire it? Is it not the theme of your constant praise? Do you not speak with contemptuous aversion of alleged deviations from the steadfast tracks of order? and would you not yourself maintain those tracks, if you were at the head of things? To this attitude you are impelled by a just jealousy for the coherent beauty and worth of science as a whole. If, then, these unswerving lines so dignify the investigating intellect which regressively traces them up, how can it be out of character with the Mind of minds to think them progressively forth?

In the discussion which here reaches its close, my object has been simply defensive,—to repel the pretension of speculative materialism to supersede "the theological conception," by tracing that pretension to an imperfect appreciation of the ultimate logic of science. But the idea of Divine Causality which is thus saved, though an essential condition, is not the chief strength of religion; giving perhaps its measure in breadth, but not in depth. Were the physical aspects of the world alone open to us, we should doubtless gain, by reading a divineness between the lines, for beauty a new meaning, for poetry a fuller music, for art a greater elevation; but hardly a better balance of the affections or more fidelity of will. It is not till we cross the chasm which stops the scientific continuity, not till we make a new beginning on the farther side, that the "idea of a higher life," emerging now in a far different field, can claim its "ethical value." The *self-conscious* hemisphere of inner experience,—which natural philosophy leaves in the dark,—*this* it is which turns to its Divine Source; and finds, not in any vacant "mystery," but in the living sympathy of a supreme Perfection, "the lifting power of an ideal element in human life." Only by converse with our own minds can we—to use the words of Smith of Cambridge—"steal from them their secrets," and "climb up to the contemplation of the Deity."

Discourse iii. p. 66, ap. Tulloch's *Rational Theology*, vol. ii. p. 158.

It is but too natural that this inner side of knowledge, this *melior pars nostri*, should be unheeded by those who look on it as the mere accessory fringe of an automatic life, gracefully hanging from the texture, but without a thread of connection beyond; and that with them the word "subjective" should be tantamount to "groundless." They confess the "mystery" of this interior experience only to fly from it and refuse its light. Yet here it is that at last light and vision lapse into One, and supply the Greek quote

Plato de Rep. 508, A.

for the apprehension of the first truths of physical and the last of hyper-physical knowledge. Till we accept the "*faiths*" which our faculties postulate, we can never *know* even the sensible world; and when we accept them, we shall know much more. Short of this firm trust in the bases whereon our nature is appointed to stand,—a trust which, if destroyed by a half-philosophy, must be restored by a whole one,—the grandest "ideas" flung out to play with and turn about in the kaleidoscope of possibilities, or work up as material of poetry and rhetoric, can no more "lift" a human will than the gossamer pluck up the oak on which it swings. Unless your "ideal" reveals the real, it has no power, and its "ethic value" is that of a dissolving image or a passing sigh. You must "*believe*," ere you can "remove mountains;" if you only fancy, they sit as a nightmare on your breast. And if man does nothing well, till he ceases to have his vision, and his vision rather has him and wields him for action or repose; and if then he astonishes you with his triumphs over "nature" and her apparent real, is he the *only* being who thus rides out upon a thought, and makes the elements embody it? Have not these elements already learned their obedience, and grown familiar with the intellectual mandate to which they yield? A man truly possessed, ethically moulded by the pressures of reverence and love, you can never persuade that the beauty, the truth, the goodness which kindles him is but his private altar-lamp: it is an eternal, illimitable light, pervading and consecrating the universe. Unless it be so, it fires him no more: and, instead of utterly surrendering his will to it in trust and sacrifice, he begins to admire it as a little mimic star of his own,—a phosphorescence of matter set up by the chemistry of nature, not to see things by, but to glisten on the darkness of himself. It is vain to expatiate on the need of religion for our nature, and on the elevation of character which it can produce, and in the same breath bid it begone from the home of truth and seek

shelter in the tent of romance. If its power is noble, its essence is true. And what that essence comprises has been worked fairly out in the long experiment of Christianity on human nature; which has shown that, in its purest and strongest phase, religion is a variety and last sublimity of *personal affection* and living communion with an Infinitely Wise and Good and Holy. The expectation that anything will remain if this be dropped, and that by flinging the same sacred vestments of speech round the form of some empty abstraction you can save the continuity of piety, is an illusion which could never occur except to the outside observer. Look at the sacred

poetry and recorded devotion of Christendom: how many lines of it would have any meaning left, if the conditions of conscious relationship and immediate converse between the human and the Divine Mind were withdrawn? And wherever the sense of these conditions has been enfeebled, through superficial "rationalism" or ethical self-confidence, "religious sterility" has followed. To its inner essence, thus tested by positive and negative experience, Religion will remain constant, taking little notice of either scientific forbearance or critical management; and, though left, perhaps, by temporary desertions to nourish its life in comparative silence and retirement, certain to be heard, when it emerges, still speaking in the same simple tones, and breathing the old affections of personal love, and trust, and aspiration.