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The New Zealand Medical Service in the Great War 1914-1918

The Final Assault on Chunuk Bair. August 9th, 1915

The Final Assault on Chunuk Bair. August 9th, 1915.

4.30 a.m. The final assault on Sari Bair was delivered after a heavy bombardment by all available guns and ships; the 6th Gurkhas achieved the heights from which they overlooked the Narrows. Baldwin's column arriving late, delayed by traffic, in the dere—8 hours marching 2000 yards—deployed in daylight only to find the crest lined by the enemy in strength, the Gurkhas hurled off the heights, and the battle lost. The New Zealanders whose orders were to stand fast until Baldwin touched their left were the pivot of manoeuvre. The pivot remained, the manoeuvre had failed. The New Zealanders held what they had gained, but the doom of Anzac was sealed. Col. Neville Manders, A.M.S., A.D.M.S. to the New Zealand and Australian Division, crept out of his bivouac early on this fateful morning only to meet his end. A wandering bullet pierced his head, he fell forward, and when Major Holmes ran to pick him up he was dead! His many years of faithful service ended. Staunch to the last, he had never faltered—even under the galling yoke of Anzac.

7.30 a.m. Major Helsham reports from the Turkish bivouac "More bearers and stretchers are required on the line between here and the beach. 100 bearers with stretchers are necessary. It is no use clearing this station at present as my line is choked with wounded who cannot be shifted owing to lack of bearers." To this the D.A.D.M.S. replies that stretchers are in plenty at the embarkation pier—that he has no bearers at present but will supply them as soon as possible. Lieut.-Col. Beeston reports that he has moved his "C" Section further forward into a position better suited to evacuation from the 4th Australian Brigade.

8.30 a.m. D.A.D.M.S. requests O.C. New Zealand Field Ambulance to send some bearers to reinforce the 1st Australian Light Horse Ambulance, and despatches an officer with an important message to the D.D.M.S., Lieut.-Col. Keeble, stating that no casualty clearing station had arrived as yet and that he is without means of attending to the wounded at No. 3 and No. 2 outposts, as all his ambulances are fully engaged and that he requires to be cleared.

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9 a.m. The total casualties dealt with at Monash's Gully, A.D.S., since 8 p.m. the previous night, was only 11. Lieut.-Col. Begg, N.Z.M.C, now senior medical officer with the division, is transferred to Headquarters as acting A.D.M.S. Major O'Neil, D.S.O. is to take command of the New Zealand Field Ambulance. The 13 C.C.S. is now coming into action between No. 3 and No. 2 outposts in a depression of a line of low hills 400 yards long and about 30 or 40 feet high, overlooking the beach and the embarkation pier, some two or three hundred yards away. Here the C.C.S. took over from the 40th Field Ambulance a sandbagged shed used as a dressing station and operating room, one large dug out shelter with 5 beds and space for from 15 to 20 stretches. Water in limited quantity was available from a well at the foot of the Chailak Dere. The 40th Field Ambulance had cleared 750 cases in all since it opened at No. 3 outpost. A portion of the unit remained to assist the C.C.S. The remainder went to reinforce other units, the 41st in Chailak Dere, the 4th Australian in the Aghyl Dere. Their casualties for the three days:—2 killed, 4 wounded. The whole detachment numbered 6 officers, and 125 O.R. with light equipment only, and four trained ambulance dogs, evidently the bearer subdivisions, and during the 8th no less than 2 officers, 1 N.C.O. and 73 bearers had been sent forward to the A.D.S.'s, leaving 4 officers and 52 bearers to man No. 3 outpost, where there were estimated to be 600 wounded to carry to the beach. These facts deserve sympathetic consideration because of the complaints made by Anzac Units, at the time, of lack of attention to wounded at No. 3 outpost. Lieut.-Col. Begg in a reply to a query in this matter from the A.A. and Q.M.G. of the New Zealand Division dated 8th August, 1915, remarks that the complaint was mainly well founded, that Colonel Manders had considered the condition unsatisfactory but that the whole trouble was due to the non-arrival of the 13th C.C.S. We have seen how this unit was handled and that it was not in any way to blame for its late arrival, and I have tried to show that the 40th Field Ambulance, a small party of bearers, were of course wholly overwhelmed by the numbers of wounded coming in. They worked for 76 hours on end; they did their best—carried to the pier and to Anzac when the big sap was clear of traffic—drew water—built some sort of a sandbagged shelter—and helped to clear 750 cases under the worst possible conditions. As to the movements of the ambulance dogs, alas, there is nothing told in the diaries.

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3 p.m. A message comes from the New Zealand Brigade Headquarters for more stretcher bearers. The A.D.M.S. orders up "A" section and the new O.C. of the New Zealand Field Ambulance with all equipment that can be carried on stretchers; no transport is available; the bearers of "B" section are to remain at Walker's Ridge; "C" section in Sazli Beit Dere and Brigade Headquarters is notified of the despatch of one section of New Zealand Field Ambulance to assist in evacuations from the Apex. Major Newton, at Chalk Hill, is unable to send reinforcements as his strength is now reduced to 24 men only. 8.30 p.m. Major O'Neil proceeds with "A" section to a position near the Brigade Headquarters in the Chailak Dere and opens a dressing station there. Some details under the Quartermaster Lieut. Sandham, and the dental section—Captain Don, N.Z.M.C.—remain at the M.D.S. at Walker's Ridge, "C" section still in the Sazli Beit Dere.

We will again follow Captain Baigent's diary. "August 9th Major O'Neil came up early this night to assist and the New Zealand Field Ambulance formed an A.D.S. below 'Rose's Hill.' They cleared my R.A.P. The carry down to the C.C.S. was about 1200 yards. At 12 p.m. some of the 5th reinforcements were told off as stretcher parties, they also carried to the beach." The "fighting fifth," who arrived in the heat of the battle, had many casualties and now some of these stout fellows are tasting the full bitterness of war in carrying their mangled comrades back to the beach. Lieut.-Col. Begg at 11 p.m. asked for 100 of these men to carry 50 stretchers to the Apex; the party was immediately despatched. Captain Baigent continues:—"About 1 a.m. [on the 10th] I was dressing a wounded man, one of us was using an electric torch and every time we showed a light it drew fire; eventually I was hit. I was carried down to the C.C.S. where I found a lot of wounded lying about. There were no tents and no blankets, some of the wounded had no clothing on except their shirts, shorts and putties. Later on through the night I was evacuated to Anzac beach."

That night the New Zealanders were relieved on Chunuk Bair, coming back to the main position on Rhododendron Spur, now somewhat more organised as a defensive line. At 1 a.m. on the 10th a further 80 men of the 5th reinforcements were detailed as stretcher bearers and at 3 a.m. Captain A. V. Short with "B" section bearers of the New Zealand Field Ambulance moved out under orders to join O'Neil's party; all wounded in the Chailak Dere were away before daylight.

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At 5.30 a.m. the Turkish counter attack opened, in strength estimated as a division led by Kemal Bey in person. By 9 a.m. they were massing on the forward slopes having driven in the thin line of the New Army Battalions holding the New Zealand Trench on Chunuk Bair. A very determined flank attack was beaten off by Monash's Brigade but the most terrible hand to hand fighting took place about the Farm on the left of the Apex. Here Baldwin was killed. The 5th Wilts were practically annihilated, the Worcesters and Warwicks left without an officer. All our reserves were in—it was touch and go—but the line held at the Apex and from Cheshire Ridge to Warwick Castle at the head of the Aghyl Dere. By midday all counter attacks had been driven off with very heavy losses on both sides. O'Neil's A.D.S. at the head of the Dere had been withdrawn to a position a little lower down, conforming to the movements of troops now reorganising the position, the Apex now being the most forward point attained in the advance, 500 yards short of Chunuk Bair. Major O'Neil was now made responsible for all evacuations from this area; all wounded coming down were to be supplied with a haversack and water-bottle in order that they might have water and rations issued before they left the beach. Major Murray at the Monash Gully A.D.S. reported all clear by 10 a.m. Things were quiet there, the Lone Pine position was now safe; it had netted some five V.C.'s to the Australians; the Turkish counter attacks which lasted three days had died down.

The 13th C.C.S. was as yet not fully manned, some equipment had been brought up by hand and by transport on the beach road during the previous night. There were now 7 medical officers with about 20 O.R. of this unit at work; 50 fatigue men were added as stretcher bearers. Work on the beach and the pier was dangerous on account of bursts of rifle and M.G. fire from the Turkish lines above—it does not appear that any of this was aimed fire—dropping bullets were falling even in the C.C.S. where men were wounded occasionally. Captain Finn, had much trouble in getting the wounded away from the pier as the boats were small and few. Only an occasional horse barge was available, but from 6 p.m. on the 9th to 6 p.m. on the 10th, 168 lying down and 350 walking wounded got away to sea from this pier. Other walking wounded had been despatched down the big sap towards Anzac where they were handled at Walker's Pier by the 16th C.C.S.; but some 431 stretcher cases remained at No. 13 C.C.S. that night. Three hospital ships sailed on the 9th: Sicilia, Dongola page 98and Devanha, tranferring 2,500 cases to the Aquitania at Mudros. Only one hospital ship, the Neuralia was off Anzac on the 10th.

The three days fighting had cost the New Zealand and Australian Division and the 13th Division 375 officers, and 10,358 O.R. killed, missing, or wounded. The N.Z.M.C. casualties were not heavy: one R.M.O. wounded, one evacuated sick on the 10th. The New Zealand Field Ambulance had four wounded, but the New Zealand Mounted Field Ambulance lost 25 per cent. of their effectives from sickness or wounds.

During the night the removal of the wounded from the slopes of Sari Bair continued. By 4 a.m. on the 11th Major O'Neil reported that there were large numbers of stretcher cases to be evacuated and he asked for strong parties of bearers to be sent up. The A.D.M.S. applied to the A.A. and Q.M.G., Major Bentick, for the necessary men. Tarpaulin shelters and an operating tent had been erected at the C.C.S. but there was still insufficient cover for all wounded, who were coming in very quickly during the forenoon, in spite of evacuation by sea; quite 400 still remained at noon. A message from Colonel Keeble at Anzac states that the navy have sent every available boat, and that he has applied for a motor lighter. There was some improvement in the number of tows arriving after this, but later in the afternoon evacuation from the pier was discontinued after several men had been killed by observed machine gun fire from Battleship Ridge—range, say 1250 yards. It became necessary to evacuate by hand along the sap to the 16th C.C.S. whose pier at Walker's Ridge was safe. For this purpose the 13th Division furnished large parties of infantrymen who carried through the whole night. After dark it was possible to resume work at No. 3 pier. Up to 6 a.m. 209 lying and 492 sitting had been evacuated by sea, many hundreds also by the sap.

On the 12th the collecting station for wounded in the vicinity of the pier had 37 stretcher cases, these were brought up to the C.C.S; the red cross flag which had flown for 5 days on the pier head was struck, as the place was now considered too dangerous for further use. There were about 1000 casualties this day, 380 remaining in the C.C.S. which was not clear until two "Beetles" each capable of taking a very large number of stretchers reported at Walker's pier on the 13th. By this time the battle was over and the military situation had reverted to trench warfare.

In reviewing the medical arrangements and operations of medical troops during this very dramatic period in the history of Anzac page 99the machine-made, clockwork precision, and colossal efficiency of evacations of wounded in France must not be compared with these primitive amphibious, efforts at the Dardanelles, where lack of sea and land transport were insuperable difficulties. The medical arrangements made for the August Campaign were the outcome of much deliberation, hard thinking and downright gruelling work by the War Office, by the G.O.C., Sir Ian Hamilton himself, by his Administrative Staff, by the P.D.M.S., by the Surgeon General Birrell, and by the Naval Authorities who appointed Surgeon General Sir James Porter, R.N., Principal Hospital Transport Officer, making him responsible for all sea transport arrangements. An estimate of 20,000 casualties was assumed as a basis. Six hospital ships were provided, with thirty hospital transports staffed with medical officers, nurses and orderlies, and equipped with bedding, dressings, drugs and comforts. On the 4th August a conference was held at Army Corps Headquarters at which Surgeon General Birrell, Colonel Manders and Colonel Howse, V.C., were present for the purpose of discussing the medical arrangements. As the forthcoming landing at Suvla and the nature of the operations at Anzac had to be kept secret the subordinate medical officers could not be informed as to the coming moves, but this did not much affect the situation.

Several factors contributed to a partial failure in the evacuations. First, lack of small craft to embark the wounded. Early on the morning of the 7th the Australian and New Zealand Corps Headquarters were requested to communicate with Sir James Porter on board the yacht Liberty stating their requirements of tows for the two new piers. We have seen that at No. 3 pier there was a shortage of tows and that the craft was unsuitable. There was of course the tidal difficulty, the slender, inadequate pier, and above all the danger and the loss of life caused by shelling and rifle or machine gun fire. Had "Beetles" been made available at this pier on the 7th or 8th many lives might have been saved as that type of craft was shrapnel proof and could take aboard a very large number of stretchers expeditiously. Men could embark or disembark in fours from these new self-propelling machines, devised especially for amphibious warfare. There must have been a shortage of tows at Anzac at 11 a.m. on the 8th as they wired that they were full up. It is admitted by all competent authorities that tows were insufficient to clear expeditiously on the 8th. The second factor leading to a break down was lack of land transport. So evident was this that the D.M.S. who, with Surgeon-General Babtie, V.C., had considered the page 100problem in July, asked on the 11th to have 500 Egyptian bearers sent to Anzac; this request could not be complied with. We have seen that the carriage by hand of such a large number of wounded across our front and through congested traffic in a narrow sap, for a distance of over two and a half miles, approximately, would necessitate the employment of a very large number of bearers which at first were not available from medical personnel, and could not be reasonably asked for from fighting troops, of which a minimum only could be utilised in the main operation owing to poor water supply and insufficient communications, and more especially as the capture of Chunuk Bair—the vital issue—was in suspense for three days. The late arrival of the C.C.S. was of little moment as compared with these factors. A C.C.S. requires space, time, and liberal equipment to develop its usefulness. It could not do at No. 3 post what apparently was expected of it—short of equipment—short of shelters, tents and its other cumbersome paraphernalia—and, above all, short of personnel. Our memories of a C.C.S. in France with its adequate appliances, its fine surgical teams, its highly organised administration, good buildings, hutments or tents with a luxurious ambulance train drawn up in the hospital siding—all the product of weeks of preparation and months of training—must not obtrude in a survey of the work of the 13th C.C.S. at No. 3 post on the bullet swept corner of a crowded, dusty beach, the seaward part of which was under clear enemy observation and impracticable by daylight. That the wounded were subjected to hardship of a serious nature when congested at No. 3 outpost on the 7th, 8th, and 9th there is no doubt: that there were many complaints both at the time and afterwards is true. The best commentary on the matter is contained in the following extract from a letter written by Lieut.-Col. Begg, who was an eye witness. He says, some months later:—"It is quite possible that some wounded remained for three days at No. 3 outpost as the whole of the sea front was subject to shell fire and machine gun fire and it was impossible after three days to get wounded away by sea from this point. All carriage was by hand through narrow saps and trenches and in this manner many thousands were conveyed to barges. Of those who stayed on the beach for some days, many were slight cases who had to give way to the more serious; others were so seriously wounded that they had to be left undisturbed if possible. Many of these would have died during the handling necessary to get them to the beach. The personnel of the British Casualty Clearing Station worked for days without rest and I can give assurance page 101that everything in human power was done by those on the spot not only to remove all wounded men with rapidity but to relieve suffering to the utmost possible extent."

The final report of the Dardanelles Commission sums up the matter thus:—"The evacuation was carried out in accordance with Sir James Porter's dispositions, and on the whole the cases were better sorted than in the original landings, but there was still considerable confusion. The scheme for the evacuations in August was based upon an approximately correct estimate of casualties, and the supply of hospital ships was much larger than that at the first landing. On the whole the scheme worked well, though again there were cases in which the transports were not satisfactory and the organisation for transferring the wounded to the ships was imperfect."

That the operations were on a much larger scale than at the landing is shown by a comparison of casualties. The British losses for the landings from the 25th April to the 20th May, 1915, are given in Sir Ian Hamilton's first despatch:—

Total killed, wounded and missing14,089
Wounded evacuated8,219
whereas the total evacuations in 26 days from the Peninsula between the 10th August and the 5th September, 1915, are estimated roughly by Surgeon-General Babtie, V.C., in his report as 50,000: 30,000 wounded, 20,000 sick, and he comments upon the evacuation by noting "that great as were the difficulties ashore the provision of adequate sea transport was just as difficult." 25 transports were ultimately used, of these only one was not provided with staff, equipment, and nurses." As evidence of the severe nature of the fighting, the following statement of casualties in the New Zealand Brigade alone is eloquent.
Casualties Reported by the New Zealand Infantry Brigade from the 6th to the 14th August, 1915.
Officers O.R.
Killed 11 278
Wounded 43 988
Missing 6 388

Total casualties, 1714, about 50 per cent. of the effective strength of the Brigade.

The remainder of the month of August was taken up in consolidating and improving the defensive position which was not completely rectified until a "minor" operation, in which New Zealand troops co-operated, had added some 460 acres of territory page 102to what we had gained and welded our line firmly to that held by the Suvla Force.