Operations at Bellevue Spur, 11th to 18th October,1917.

At 6.30 a.m. on the 11th, Lieut.-Col. Murray, D.S.O., and Major McCormick, N.Z.M.C., with 60 bearers went up to the A.D.S. at Wieltje to take over, and at 9 a.m. they set out to make a personal reconnaisance. By the trench grid track, they reached Dump House, a bearer relay post, on the Gravenstafel ridge, about 500 yards north of the village site, and half a mile further on, they found Calgary range—whose name dated from Canadian times in 1915—where Captain Benham, R.M.O. to the 2nd N.Z.R.B., had his R.A.P. and a few stretchers awaiting removal. Pushing on to Kron Prinz Farm, a few wounded were located in shell holes on the way up and at this most forward and exposed post, Captain Reid, N.Z.M.C., of the 4th N.Z.R.B., had several cases awaiting evacuation. 12 N.Z.M.C. bearers were left behind and Colonel Murray's party ultimately reached Waterloo Farm about midday. Here they saw a long grey structure, consisting of two armoured concrete compartments surrounded by a litter of broken war material of every description. Captain Venables, N.Z.M.C., attached 2nd Otago was here and reported 50 stretcher cases, mostly of the 49th Division, awaiting bearers, while many more were lying out in pill boxes or shell holes in the vicinity. The situation was very difficult, as Waterloo Farm was in full view, more especially from Bellevue Farm, held by the Germans and about 1000 yards distant on a spur which projected into the valley from Passchendaele ridge. A gentle slope fell down from Gravenstafel to the valley of the Ravebeke or Strombeke, about 1200 yards from Abraham's heights. Both Kron Prinz and Waterloo were well down this slope not far from the muddy stream; both were subject to machine gun fire from the Bellevue fortress. The difficulties of clearing these forward slopes, so open to enemy observation, had been thoroughly appreciated by the Canadians in 1915, as when they held practically the same ground, they were compelled to site their R.A.P.'s in rear of the Gravenstafel Ridge on account of the fact that their front line was strongly dominated by Bellevue Spur; this necessitated long carries for the regimental stretcher bearers. Five hundred yards west of Gravenstafel crest, under cover of its slope a fresh bearer relay post was established by us in a concrete dugout called page 344Wimbledon. When Colonel Murray returned to Wieltje, he found the A.D.M.S. there and made his report on the medical situation. It was agreed then that the New Zealand Division would clear the 49th Division's wounded and to that end, Colonel McGavin arranged to get 400 infantrymen of the 4th Brigade to clear Waterloo Farm by night as it could not be approached by formed bodies in daylight.

The assembly of our two assaulting Brigades, the 2nd and the 3rd, proceeded under untoward circumstances, the ground on the forward slope was exceptionally heavy, the mud, in places knee-deep, retarding progress. Ultimately the Brigades, the Rifles on the left, the 2nd Brigade on the right, lay astride the road to Bellevue. The N.Z.R.B., in front of Kron Prinz Farm across the muddy Ravebeke with a cemetery on the hill in front of them, the 2nd Brigade still on our side of the creek and in part facing the Bellevue Spur and a sunken road to the south of it. Half a mile away to the right of their advance were "water fields," "marsh bottom," "dad trench"—unknown regions yet—but full of fateful possibilities. In the little time at our disposal—the Second Army was anxious to push on—the medical posts were manned and fresh dispositions made. In the right sector Waterloo Farm R.A.P. was served by a relay at Wimbledon, and on the left, Kron Prinz Farm, had a relay at "Dump House" near Calgery Grange, with a larger post at Kansas House in front of Kansas Cross where Captain McGhie, N.Z.M.C., in charge of this sector, was stationed with 56 bearers. Further back along the road, at Somme Redoubt, Major McCormick, in charge of forward evacuations, had a reserve of 56 bearers to be used in common by both sectors. An advanced walking wounded collecting post was under construction at Spree Farm in a large pill box half hidden in the debris of the farm in which it originally had been constructed. Here, Lieut.-Col. Hardie Neil and parties of No. 3 Field Ambulance were busy clearing the ground for the erection of tents which were to be used as a dressing station and a refreshment booth to be worked by our Y.M.C.A. The light railway had now reached this point but the road from Wieltje was negotiable by Ford cars only, with difficulty.

During the evening of the 11th the weather broke; it rained heavily. Patrols of the Otagos had reported much uncut wire along the front of our assaulting positions. This was bad news. It was cold that night, it rained incessantly and an inky darkness fitfully streaked by German star shells, hid the ugliness of the battle landscape. The enemy were uneasy, their artillery fired page 345spluttering showers of gas and high explosive shells into our back areas; Spree Farm was hit twice, the gas causing casualties amongst the bearers. Our own artillery was as yet not all in position: a portion of it was bogged in the mud and could not be dragged in action.

Zero hour on the 12th of October, 5.25 a.m. on a cold raw morning; rain was falling. Our barrage opened, weak and patchy—in places it could not be seen at all—many shells failed to explode in the muddy ground. The 3rd Brigade, on the left, whose assembly was complete, advanced with the barrage and fought their way to the cemetery at Wallenmolen, high ground of importance to us and the British Division on our left, but in a short while found the fire of machine guns, protected by chains of uncut wire, so imperious, that they could make no further headway. The unfortunate 2nd Brigade had little protection from the barrage, such as it was: the men groped their way through a swamp against the murderous fire of the Bellevue fortress, till they were forced to lie down in front of a deep zone of standing wire which some heroic souls had partially penetrated. "The horror of the shell hole area of Verdun was surpassed," writes General Ludendorff in his memoirs describing this terminal phase of the Flanders Campaign, "and through a world of mud the attackers dragged themselves slowly and steadily and in dense masses. Caught in the advanced zone by our hail of fire they often collapsed.…Then the mass came on again; rifle and machine gun jammed with mud. Man fought against man." So the 2nd Brigade came on, losing heavily, but made little progress in the slough of the Ravebeke morasses.

By 6 a.m. the walking wounded were slowly coming down; taking the duckwalk tracks they missed the post at Spree Farm, so that it became necessary to collect them at St. Jean as on the 4th. By 8 a.m. stretcher cases were coming in; the going was very heavy, the road impassable beyond Midland Farm. The small Ford cars had difficulty in getting up even to this post. The railway was available as far as Spree Farm, but part of it was under almost continuous shell fire—nevertheless it had to be used. By noon, it was clear that the attack had failed, and that the New Zealand Division, for the first time in its history, had not accomplished its appointed task. The 3rd Brigade had gained some 400 yards, the 2nd Brigade was hung up with heavy losses by a continuous belt of uncut wire not much ahead of its point of departure. The Bellevue fortress grimly overlooked their precarious lines and belched fire from a score of machine guns; page 346further advance was impossible. Of the walking wounded that reached Spree Farm, many were so exhausted that they had to be carried to the entraining point as stretcher cases. Passing waggons and empty ammunition trains helped to carry away the more seriously wounded. At Wieltje only 49 lying cases, so far, had come in. The bearers reported dreadful conditions; the length of the carry from the most forward positions was now three and a half miles, and it was taking six hours at least to bring down one stretcher. The bearer relay post at "Dump House," had been destroyed and several of the bearers killed there. The Wimbledon Post had 25 of its personnel (4th Ambulance) gassed; reports coming in to the A.D.S. showed that our losses were very heavy, especially in the 2nd Brigade sector; it was stated that over 200 stretcher cases were lying in and about Waterloo Farm, and many more in the open in Marsh Bottom, 500 yards from Bellevue Spur. The corps decided that nothing more could be done without sustained artillery preparation; a further attack was cancelled. It was no longer a battle of fighters; it was now a battle of bearers!

The A.D.M.S. came up to Spree Farm in the afternoon. Trains were infrequent and irregular, but lorries with engineer stores were lumbering up as far as this point. Extra stretchers and blankets were sent up by the A.D.M.S., packed on mules, each mule carrying six stretchers. 400 infantrymen were brought up from the 4th Brigade to act as stretcher bearers. By 4 p.m. the full extent of our losses was becoming clear; from 12 noon to 4 p.m. 78 lying, 214 sitting and 440 walking cases had passed through the A.D.S.; it was estimated that there were still 230 stretcher cases to bring in and that 1200 men would be required to clear the field. The N.Z.M.C. bearers had suffered many casualties—a considerable number gassed—others showed unmistakable signs of exhaustion, and had to be ordered to rest by their officers. It may be remembered that before our own attack commenced, the bearers had been employed during the afternoon and night of the 11th in assisting to clear about 120 stretcher cases of the 49th Division. This undoubtedly hampered their own work on the 12th and dissipated their energy before the assault began. It required six bearers working for six to seven hours to bring one stretcher case the 3,700 yards from the R.A.P.'s to Spree Farm, and when the. squad arrived it was so fatigued as to require several hours rest. The mud, in places, was knee deep, the bearers were frequently bogged and required the assistance of their mates to extricate themselves. At Waterloo page 347Farm the situation was desperate. This long, ugly, grey mass of concrete, pierced with openings so close to the ground that a man must crouch to crawl in, was packed with wounded, and yet more came in all day that had to be placed about the walls outside and in rear of the structure, where they lay exposed to rain, bursting shells, and occasional storms of machine gun bullets. During the morning, the post could be approached only by creeping from shell hole to shell hole. Captain Serpell, N.Z.M.C., 1st Canterbury, who had replaced Major Johns, M.C., Captain Lumsden, N.Z.M.C. 1st Otagos, and Lieut. Rhind, N.Z.M.C. of 2nd Canterbury, had a combined R.A.P. here in the same narrow quarters, where four battalion headquarters of the 2nd Brigade were huddled in the compartment that faced the enemy lines. The R.M.O.'s worked manfully and incessantly; exposed to severe fire they dressed and tended their wounded lying in the vicinity of the fortress. They organised parties of stretcher bearers, brought into shelter those wounded that could be crowded inside the concrete structures, placed the remainder behind the walls or in adjacent shell holes, and did all that could be done regardless of their own safety. Captain Serpell was wounded on the 12th but did not leave his post until wounded a second time and ordered to the rear by his battalion commander. So in some way these medical officers, never relaxing their efforts for 60 sleepless hours, strove to succour the human wreckage that agonised in the swampy valley of the Ravebeke.

Up to this death trap dragging through a hell of mud came the bearers of the field ambulances. One squad leader, Pte. Ivan Paine of the 4th Field Ambulance, in searching shell holes, forward of Waterloo, had his whole squad killed or wounded, but with an improvised party of infantrymen, continued the work of rescue. Another squad leader of the 4th Field Ambulance, Pte. Alexander Stewart, lost three of his bearers but carried on with the remaining two. No less devoted were the squad leaders of the other ambulances, working that day about Waterloo Farm. At Kron Prins Farm, further north in the valley, and equally exposed, an almost identical situation existed. Two small concrete rooms sheltered 50 men, of whom, the majority seriously wounded. Here Captain Benham, N.Z.M.C., and Lieut. Baxter, N.Z.M.C., both attached to the Rifle Brigade, were working under hazardous conditions. The concrete structure was hit repeatedly by shells which filled the compartments with dust and acrid vapours and drove down heavy fragments from the ceiling on to the huddled wounded below. Close by one of the low windows page 348in the foremost compartment a Lieut.-Colonel of the Rifle Brigade, sitting on the floor, hemmed in by wounded, for a time directed the movements of his battalion. An ambulance bearer in body armour, crouching in the doorway during a shell storm was pierced in the throat by a fragment flying in through the window and, as he sank to his death, a torrent of blood gushing from his wound deluged the unhappy battalion commander at whose feet the lifeless body fell. Outside there was a hail of machine gun bullets, when any movement could be discerned by the enemy. In rear of the pill box and about it stretcher cases gathered all during the afternoon as the fire slackened. The nearest relay post at Calgary Grange was 1000 yards away through a wilderness of mud, an hour's painful journey, and from there to the crest, near Dump House, the second relay, was over half a mile. At this point the trench grid track began, to the great relief of the bearers. Captain McGhie who was in charge of evacuations in this sector, working from Wimbledon, led his bearer parties on several occasions up to Kron Prinz and in spite of mud—up to the thighs in places—barrage and machine gun fire, got some of the lying cases away; at the same time he directed the walking wounded, who were able to face the journey, to the route of the boarded tracks. In this way many seriously wounded men, assisted by a bearer or in some instances by a German prisoner, staggered back to Wimbledon weak to the point of collapse.

The enemy showed no inclination to counter attack or to leave his concrete fortress; he, too, was counting his losses and clearing his wounded. Our dispositions for the night were: that each brigade had two battalions only in the front line. As night fell, it was known that we had over a 100 prisoners but that our estimated casualties exceeded 2000. The number of wounded passed through the A.D.S. at Wieltje was only 235 lying, 53 sitting and 460 walking. Walking wounded to the number of 38 officers, 1748 O.R., with many wounded Germans, had been tended by No. 4 Field Ambulance at Vlamertinghe Mill.

It rained heavily during the night; it was intensely cold, but there was "quiet" on the battlefield except for a few gas shells in the forward area. With great expenditure of energy, and in spite of all difficulties, the men in the front line were supplied by carrying parties with water and rations. Extra blankets and water were brought up by the ambulance bearers to the R.A.P.'s. All through the night stretcher parties furnished by the 4th New Zealand and the 147th Brigade of the 49th Division led, in many instances by N.Z.M.C. bearers, struggled page 349without much success to clear the forward posts, The trains had ceased to run from Spree Farm, but the trolleys were used and were pushed by bearers down to the A.D.S.

By 10 a.m. on the 13th there were at least 500 bearers working, there was still some shelling in the forward area but stretcher bearers were—by mutual consent—allowed to work in peace close up to the Ravebeke. No other parties were permitted to move on the forward slopes, machine guns and snipers saw to that, but a stretcher was a passport; the mud had made a truce, the enemy were no less busy getting in their own wounded. Reports showed that there were still very many wounded to bring in. The 2nd Brigade had 200 at least at Waterloo Farm, the Rifle Brigade 40 to 50 at Kron Prinz Farm Infantry parties of the reserve Battalions were organised as stretcher bearers to supplement the infantry from the 49th Division. By 4 p.m. only 98 stretcher cases had been brought down to Wieltje in eight hours work but at 5 p.m. a train load of 40 arrived and was followed by others. Up to this time at least 250 infantry had been working along the track to Dump House on the crest and from there through the mud via Calgary to Kron Prinz Farm bringing in with great labour a number of lying cases inadequate to clear the R.A.P. By nightfall some 523 wounded had passed through the A.D.S. during the day; of these over 200 lying. Captain McGhie at Wimbledon, finding it impossible to get more wounded away in the dark, collected all that he could reach and housed them for the night in the dugouts in his neighbourhood. Reports showed that the forward areas were clearing but that there were at least 70 lying wounded at Waterloo Farm of which only 30 could be under cover. Blankets had been carried to the R.A.P.'s by the N.Z.M.C. bearers, the R.M.O.'s did what they could with these coverings.

Early in the morning of the 14th there was heavy shelling on the tracks, both H.E. and gas were used. No doubt the duckboard tracks had been seen by aeroplanes the previous day. The northern track now reached to within half a mile of Kron Prinz Farm and the southern to Abraham's Heights, still very short of Waterloo Farm. These narrow wooden tracks were the only means of approach to our positions and were kept under fire although not subject to direct observation. To clear the battlefield very large numbers of men were required, the A.D.M.S succeeded in getting together about 1000 in all: D.A.C., the N.Z.A.S.C., the N.Z.F.A., N.Z. Engineers, Pioneers and Infantry. By 8 a.m. one party of 100 from the divisional train with 20 page 350N.Z.M.C. bearers had made a start from the A.D.S. Captain McGhie had been up to Kron Prinz Farm where Captain Benham reported about 30 stretcher cases, of these only a few not under shelter, but there were still some considerable number to come in from the front line—casualties occurring during the previous day and night. Already 30 bearers had been up, but the journey as far as the tracks was almost as much as they could manage; parties of New Zealand Infantry, Artillery and Engineers, in strength about 500 were on their way up from Wieltje and pushing on to "Waterloo Farm. Soon after midday reports showed that the front was almost clear and that all the wounded of the 11th had been collected. By 1 o'clock a train with 88 stretcher cases was unloading at Wieltje A.D.S. Early in the afternoon both Kron Prinz and Waterloo were finally cleared; there were at least 700 bearers working. Casualties were still occurring in large numbers and by midnight the total number of wounded tended at the A.D.S., from midnight on the 11th to 8 p.m. on the 14th amounted to no less than 586 stretcher cases, 112 sitting and 773 walking. During the night the 4th Brigade relieved the 2nd and 3rd Brigade in the front line.

The following day, the 15th, the weather improved but the shelling about Spree Farm, the road west of it, and the A.D.S. at Wieltje increased. Frequently the wounded waiting to be lowered by ropes into the mine shaft were wounded again or sometimes killed as they lay on their stretchers in the roadway. About Spree Farm the condition of the road was fantastic; broken transport, bogged guns, dead mules and a welter of jettisoned ammunition flanked the causeway, our only road for wheeled traffic. The German guns were searching for a large howitzer of ours in the neighbourhood. Spree Farm was repeatedly hit. Beyond on the track the infantry were still assisting in clearing the wounded. The ambulance bearers were by now badly done up after nearly 60 hours continuous work; their feet blistered and swollen, a few already showing signs of trench foot; others so severely chafed about the neck and shoulders from the web slings used in carrying stretchers as to be quite unfit for work. Spree Farm was a place to be avoided that afternoon, constant searching by the enemy's heavy guns ultimately led to the explosion of an ammunition dump, causing a large number of casualties in the vicinity. The total number of wounded for that day was much less, only 167 were evacuated, whereas the sick numbered 342.

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On the 16th the weather was ever so much better, the road was drying rapidly, but the shelling was as heavy as ever. So severe was it about Spree Farm that the post had to be abandoned by the N.Z.M.C. personnel, who were brought back to the Somme post half a mile nearer the A.D.S. The front, fortunately, was fairly quiet. The 3rd Brigade which had not had adequate rest before Passchendaele, as they had been employed in cable laying, now moved out to the Second Army Reserve area near Lumbres and with them went one section of the 3rd Field Ambulance. The estimated casualties for this brigade were 48 officers, 1164 O.R. killed, missing or wounded.

During the week that followed the relief of the New Zealand Division was gradually completed by the Canadian 3rd Division. The enemy artillery fire on the roads, boarded tracks, and back areas was considerably increased; night bombing was intensified. On the 2lst the bearer relay posts were relieved by personnel of No. 10 Canadian Field Ambulance. The 2nd Brigade accompanied by the 1st Field Ambulance entrained for the rest area and the Corps Walking Wounded Station was handed over by the 4th Field Ambulance to the 11th Canadian Field Ambulance. The following day the 2nd New Zealand Field Ambulance was relieved at Wieltje by the 10th Canadian Field Ambulance. The weather was fine but it rained in the afternoon and in the evening the 4th Brigade and the 4th Field Ambulance entrained at Ypres. The Dental Hospital which had been at Poperinghe during the operations loaded its equipment on two lorries and departed. Command passed to the Canadians, and by the 25th all New Zealand units were in rest, the headquarters at Nielles in the Lumbres area west of St. Omer.

In reviewing these costly operations at Passchendaele, Colonel Begg makes some comments, which, in order to avoid repetition, I have somewhat condensed. "The IInd Anzac Corps during the month made three assaults; on the 4th, the 9th and the 12th. For the attack of the 4th, weather conditions were favourable and little difficulty was experienced in dealing with all casualties. The heavy cars of the divisions in line were put at the disposal of the Officer Commanding the Motor Ambulance Convoy and were employed in evacuating the A.D.S.'s. The system worked quite effectively and the wounded were evacuated in a minimum time. For the second attack on the 9th the conditions were very bad. The roads were congested with traffic and the battlefield converted into a sea of mud. The greatest difficulty was experienced in clearing the wounded; with six men to the stretcher it took five page 352hours to bring in one case from the R.A.P. to the A.D.S. The light railways were unable to run special trains but some cases were brought back to Wieltje by returning empty trucks. The ambulance convoys were frequently held up on the roads for an hour or more by the great congestion of traffic. In spite of difficulties, however, the majority of the wounded were got out, though many remained until the field was cleared by infantry when the Division was relieved. The conditions of cold, wet and mud were much worse on the 12th. The carry by stretcher bearers had extended to 6000 yards (in some instances). Many infantry had to be placed at the disposal of the A.D.M.S.'s to help to clear the field, as it required seven hours for six bearers to bring down a case to the A.D.S. Arrangements were made to gather the wounded into such shelter as was available and they were supplied with blankets and fed until it was possible to remove them. "When the conditions are bad and hand carriage is long, at least 600 fresh bearers are required on each divisional front every 12 hours, this in addition to field ambulance bearers. When Infantry are detailed as additional stretcher bearers it is imperative that their own N.C.O.'s and, if possible, officers should accompany them, otherwise they soon become dispersed and are of little use. A.D.'sM.S. should be warned that supplies of blankets and stretchers are not unlimited, and they should ensure that these articles are strictly husbanded and evenly distributed. A maximum of 300 stretchers and 1000 blankets in addition to establishments should be ample and more should not be supplied. From 6 a.m. on the 4th of October to noon on the 13th of October, 2651 stretcher cases were evacuated from the corps front. During this time 2601 stretchers and 10,396 blankets were available for use in the forward areas and all stretchers and blankets coming down by M.A.C. from the forward areas were immediately replaced by the returning motor ambulances, each of which carried 4 stretchers and 12 blankets. It seems clear—as during the ten days each stretcher averaged only one journey—that a proper distribution and use of blankets and stretchers was not made."

Colonel Begg invited the A.D.'sM.S. to furnish an appreciation of a scheme whereby an addition of 200 stretchers and 500 blankets to their existing divisional supplies, could be made to suffice for operations extending over 21 days. Colonel Begg goes on to say that there was difficulty in dealing with slightly gassed men as it was impossible to determine the severity of the case. Gas had thrown open a wide door for malingering, and the undoubted severity of late complications following a condition, page 353at first sight not obviously serious, inspired medical officers with an excusable caution in delaying the evacuation of such cases. The final comment of importance made by Colonel Begg is this:—"The present stretcher is unsuitable for long carries over rough ground. A stretcher—like a hammock—slung on one pole could be carried on the bearer's shoulders much more easily and would be a lighter load for returning bearers. Horse drawn ambulances should not be used on narrow roads at the same time as motor vehicles, they only impede traffic." Colonel Begg gives in an appendix the following figures as to casualties:—

Casualties passed through corps dressing stations from 6 a.m. 4th October, to 6 a.m, 18th October 1917:—Stretcher cases: 231 officers, 4,412 O.R.; walking wounded: 131 officers, 6,831 O.R: totals: 362 officers, 11,243 O.R. The total number of gassed was 12 officers, 424 O.R.

Colonel McGavin in his report on the operations emphasised, the fact that when the Division took over from the 49th Division on the 11th there was no time to carry out protective work at medical posts. The time at his disposal was sufficient only to reconnoitre the sector, man the posts and equip them with the necessary medical supplies. He points out that the night of the 11th was occupied in bringing in over 120 stretcher cases of the outgoing division, and that this preliminary work exhausted the N.Z.M.C. bearers before the actual assault took place. "For a time," he says, "the railway service was not in operation, which compelled the hand carriage of certain wounded over a distance of 6100 yards from Kron Prinz Farm to Wieltje, the greater part of the route under shell fire and with mud in places four feet deep. The advanced walking wounded collecting post at Spree Farm, owing to increasing shell fire hardly fulfilled its purpose." On the very important question of stretcher and blanket supplies to the front line Colonel McGavin says:—"The number of relay posts necessitated by the abnormally long and difficult carry increased the number of stretchers required, as large reserves had to be maintained at these posts. The rain and mud necessitated a frequent change of blankets at the relay posts and the A.D.S.; so that instead of three blankets, each patient required six or nine. The supply of stretchers required depends largely on the number of relay posts established. In these operations, owing to the abnormal conditions, the bearers rapidly became exhausted, and at night easily lost their way." The conditions existing, therefore, necessitated many relay posts, at each of which a number of stretchers had to be maintained to page 354supply relieving bearers. In addition to this supply it was also necessary to keep a liberal reserve at the R.A.P.'s and relay posts in order to meet exceptional demands. A further large reserve had to be maintained at the A.D.S. for the use of infantry men employed as bearers. Some allowance must be made for losses by shell fire as in the destruction of bearer relay posts many stretchers were destroyed or lost. On the subject of assistance required by ambulance personnel in clearing a battlefield the report of Colonel McGavin is explicit. He says:—"The difficulties of evacuation in this offensive were due largely to an absence of roads and railways in the forward areas, necessitating long carries over very difficult terrain up to a point where wheeled transport became available. Under conditions such as these the strength of the bearer personnel of the medical corps is clearly inadequate, and before operations commence a number of infantry, based on the length of carry and the estimated casualties should be earmarked for the purpose of stretcher bearing. The infantry men should be accompanied by their own officers and work under the direction of the medical officers in charge of evacuations in the forward area. The supply of stretchers required depends largely upon the number of relay posts established. Any limitation in this supply would entail a limitation in the numbers of men employable for evacuation, which means delay in the clearing of the battlefield."

The condition of the wounded brought in during the operations of the 4th were favourable, but very unsatisfactory during the succeeding battles. There was a high proportion of wounds caused by machine gun fire. Penetrating wounds of the abdomen and thorax appeared to be less numerous than usual, but fractures of the lower limbs were much more frequently observed. Trench foot was noted in many cases that had been long lying out in isolated shell holes, and gas gangrene was prevalent, especially in the wounded of the 49th Division, some of whom had been exposed for several days. Of the corps dressing stations, the opinion of the A.D.M.S. as to their functions and utility must be duly weighed. He says in his report:—"There was congestion at the corps walking wounded collecting station on the 4th owing to slowness in dressing. It appeared that cases were dressed unnecessarily, especially as they had only just been dressed at the divisional walking wounded collecting post. The C.M.D.S. was well managed but I am still unable to understand what advantage is gained by interposing a corps walking wounded post and a corps M.D.S. between the A.D.S. and the C.C.S.'s. The corps page 355walking wounded station can do no more than the corresponding divisional unit, and the corps M.D.S.'s are not adequately equipped nor have they the time to deal with wounded by complete surgical procedures. The administration of anti-tetanic serum and the inscribing of records could equally well be done at C.C.S. by a staff detailed from the divisions. If the wounded were conveyed direct to C.C.S. from the divisional stations the following advantages would result:—

(1)	The staffs employed at the interposed corps stations would be set free for effective surgical work at C.C.S.
(2)	The patient would not be subjected to the repeated superfluous dressings; material would be saved and further exposure to infection and shock avoided.
(3)	Ambulances and other transport would not be delayed by unloading patients at the corps stations.
(4)	Above all, the incidence of gas gangrene is directly proportionate to the time intervening between the infliction of the injury and its efficient surgical treatment. Why, therefore, prolong the delay in the passage of the wounded from the place where they received first aid and the place where they are to receive comprehensive treatment when the delay may mean the onset of serious infection or its progress to such an extent as to entail serious consequences?

To enlarge the C.C.S.'s by reinforcing them with the medical officers and other ranks withdrawn from the corps stations, which could be eliminated and to provide a clerical staff from the divisions for the purpose of making records in a bureau adjacent to the C.C.S., would effect a considerable economy in transport, material, personnel, and would, I believe, gave many a life or limb." This opinion of the A.D.M.S., written at the time, based on his experiences at Messines and Passchendaele, demands careful consideration.

In attempting to estimate the casualties sustained during the two operations near Passchendaele, we must first consider the actual number of New Zealand wounded handled by the corps medical units during the period. First, the battle at Gravenstafel: The D.D.M.S. reports that during the period, 3rd to 7th October, the total New Zealand wounded admitted was: 40 officers; 1140 O.R.—figures which approximated to those given in the returns furnished by the A.A. and Q.M.G., namely: 1077 wounded; 80 missing.

During the period 13th to 18th October, which covers the days of the Passchendaele operation, the following report of page 356casualties was made to the A.A. and Q.M.G.:—Officers: 38 killed, 74 wounded, 5 missing, total 117; O.R.: 532 killed, 2032 wounded, 615 missing, total, 3179; totals: 570 killed, 2106 wounded, 620 missing, total 3296. The proportion of killed and missing to wounded is very high and most of the missing were killed. The casualties of the two Infantry Brigades engaged were estimated to be 504 killed, 1904 wounded, 327 missing—for the 12th and 13th alone. The total number of wounded of the New Zealand Division evacuated during the same period was only 62 officers, 1828 O.R.; but the figures given by the A.A. and Q.M.G. would include many lightly wounded remaining on duty. The gross total of wounded passing through the New Zealand Divisional A.D.S., including British troops and P.O.W. was: 3087, of which 833 stretcher cases. The official return made by the N.Z.E.F. of the casualties for the month of October as quoted by the G.O.C. in Charge Administration in his reports is probably the most accurate; the figures are: killed and died of wounds, 1536; missing 233; wounded 4309; total 6078.

For the first operation at Gravenstafel the proportion of lying to walking wounded was as 37.5 per cent. to 62.5 per cent., whereas during the Passchendaele battle the proportions were: lying, 27 per cent., walking, 66 per cent. At Messines, out of a total of 3126 wounded passed through the A.D.S. at Kandahar Farm, 40 per cent. were walking cases, 36 per cent. lying. It will be easier to compare these figures by a glance at the following table:—

Transport facilities were exceptionally good at Messines, hence the smaller proportion of walking cases. At Gravenstafel, transport was adequate, the figures representing the norms in all probability; whereas at Passchendaele transport facilities were very bad, hence the smaller number of lying cases. By comparing the figures we arrive at the conclusion that in these battles, characterised by good, fair, and inadequate means of evacuation, about one-third of the wounded required transport on stretchers, while much more than a half could walk a considerable distance to evacuating points and less than 20 per cent. required sitting accommodation.

The casualties in the N.Z.M.C. for the two engagements were not so heavy as at the Somme, but the period of work in the battlefield was of shorter duration. The killed page 357numbered 16 O.R.; the wounded 52, including 2 officers. A number of bearers died a few days after the action from gas poisoning. The losses of the 4th Field Ambulance were disproportionately high; 8 were killed in action; 2 died of wounds; 9 of gas poisoning; 25 were wounded or gassed; in all, this ambulance sustained 44 casualties in the bearer personnel, which numbered a little over a 100 men; a most eloquent memorial to the devotion of the bearers and the N.C.O.'s who led them.

During October our losses from sickness were over one-third of the losses in wounded: the average sickness wastage of the Division during the month was 12.4 per 1000 per week, reaching the sinister proportion of 19 per 1000 per week during the last 7 days of the month, when the Division was in rest. This rapid increase in sickness wastage was due partly to the inclement weather, partly to exhaustion caused by the very arduous nature of the operations. The Second Army rate of wastage by sickness during October averaged 10 per 1000 per week: generally, sickness wastages in Army and Division were higher than at the Somme. For the period extending from the 30th of September to the 27th of October, no less than 1392 New Zealand sick were evacuated from the C.C.S.'s to general hospitals; the sickness was serious, therefore; and if we add the sickness wastage to the computed battle casualties we find that the Division lost near 7,500 men during the month. By these losses the Division had reached such a degree of exhaustion as to render it temporarily unfit for further active operations; added to the weakness caused by fatigue, sickness and depleted numbers was a generally felt depression consequent upon our lack of success at Passchendaele and a certain dimming of ardour from which the Division was slow to recover.